Introduction

Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik German Institute for International and Security Affairs

Kiev’s EU ambitions Eberhard Schneider / Christoph Saurenbach SWP Comments The adoption of the EU–Ukraine Action Plan and the changed rhetoric of the new leadership in Kiev suggest a paradigm shift in Ukrainian foreign policy. The new government—unlike its predecessor, which failed to back up its EU-friendly rhetoric with specific actions in the same vein—has announced radical internal reforms and the adaptation of Ukrainian legislation to EU standards. The country’s new President, Victor Yushchenko, has made it absolutely clear that he sees a place for his country in the . In 2006 Ukraine intends to submit an official application for EU membership and hopes that negotiations on its accession will begin in 2007.

Yushchenko’s New European Policy rather than use it for transporting Russian President Victor Yushchenko is drawing a oil in the opposite direction, as Kuchma line beneath Ukraine’s previous vacillation had promised Moscow. between Moscow and Brussels and wants to The EU–Ukraine Action Plan signed on break with his predecessor’s practice of in- 21 February as part of the EU’s Neighbour- dicating a turn-off to Brussels, but actually hood Policy calls upon Kiev, amongst other following the signs leading to Moscow. things, to ensure that the general election Yushchenko’s short-term goals include in 2006 is conducted in line with OSCE seeing his country awarded market econ- standards; to guarantee freedom of opin- omy status by the EU, leading Ukraine into ion, a free press, the stability and efficiency the WTO and launching negotiations with of democratic institutions and of the rule of the EU on a free-trade agreement before the law; and to improve the climate for invest- end of 2005. This would be followed up by ment. Moreover, Kiev is supposed to fight talks about simplifying visa regulations for corruption, spend its public resources more students, journalists and diplomats, by efficiently and introduce social and health progress made in the energy dialogue and reforms. Where EU deliverables are con- by the modernisation of Ukraine’s borders cerned, the Action Plan holds out the pros- with the EU’s support. Furthermore, he pect of closer cooperation in the context of would like to deliver on a previous promise the Common Foreign and Security Policy made to the EU and use the 674-kilometer- (CFSP), of more intensive police and judicial long Odessa–Brody pipeline to transport oil cooperation and of negotiations on a free- from the Caspian Sea to Western Europe, trade area.

SWP Comments 14 April 2005

1 The internal political prerequisites for take up the baton in the latter half of 2005. the implementation of the EU–Ukraine Moreover, an application for membership Action Plan are in place, for polls suggest of the Union would hold more water if the that a clear majority of the Ukrainian popu- new government could show that it had lation backs the pro-European approach already scored some tangible successes on taken by the new government. In parlia- the domestic policy reform front. ment too, which elected Initial signs of change are already being prime minister on 4 February with a re- provided by the configuration of certain sounding majority of 373 votes (83%) as government posts. For instance, responsi- opposed to the required 226, hardly anyone bility for European integration has been apart from the Communist Party group is hived off from the Ministry of Economic objecting to the pro-EU course steered by Affairs, and the person in charge of the the government. department has been elevated to the status However, an analysis of the presidential of deputy head of government. The man election reveals that in eastern and south- picked by Yushchenko for this post is Oleg ern Ukraine most of the electorate voted for Rybachuk, who knows the West from his the candidate leaning towards Moscow, own experience there and speaks fluent . The political ideas of English (having participated in an 8-month- the people living in those parts of the coun- long programme in the USA and Great Brit- try are shaped by regional oligarchs and are ain in the mid-1990s). He’s responsible for constantly reinforced in their regional coordinating the government’s European media. Most members of these oligarchies policy. To this end, vice ministers for Euro- are active in sectors that are directly depen- pean affairs have been appointed in every dent on Russia or on cooperation with ministry, and the incumbents of these posts Ukraine’s giant neighbour. They conduct a report directly to Rybachuk. In addition, dialectical policy towards Russia that Rybachuk has announced the establish- entails cooperating, but also keeping the ment of “Departments of European integra- necessary distance. For their business deal- tion” in all ministries, whose job it will be ings it is always better to maintain close to guarantee the implementation of the relations with Ukraine’s own government. EU–Ukraine Action Plan in their respective What is more, they know full well that they areas of responsibility. The reappointment need the huge EU market. For all these of Borys Tarasyuk—a man with known pro- reasons it seems unlikely that there will be EU leanings—to the post of foreign minister any opposition to Ukraine’s rapprochement underlines the new government’s ambi- with the European Union. tions regarding the European Union. Taras- yuk previously chaired the Ukrainian par- liament’s European Affairs Committee. Chances of Qualifying In her policy statement on 4 February, for EU membership Prime Minister Tymoshenko said she in- Whereas back in January Yushchenko an- tended to develop a new strategy underly- nounced that the government would be ing EU-Ukrainian relations together with applying for EU membership within a few the EU authorities in Brussels. She also weeks, the official word now is that an of- made it clear that the prospect of Ukrainian ficial application will be submitted within EU membership belonged within such a the next six months. But maybe Kiev will strategy. even wait until early 2006, for the Austrian Before it can be deemed ready for the EU Presidency due to commence in January European Union, Ukraine must fulfil the of that year appears more favourably dis- criteria laid down in Copenhagen in 1993. posed towards Ukraine’s ambitions than The constitutional reform adopted on the British EU Presidency which is due to 8 December, which strengthens parliament

SWP Comments 14 April 2005

2 at the president’s expense, should prevent was a clear endorsement of the European any reversion to authoritarian rule. This values of freedom and democracy. However, reform could also help both to establish a Ukraine’s road to Europe will be long and party system that is democratic and based hard. Yushchenko’s dream is to see his on social interests and to shore up parlia- country’s integration completed by the end ment’s role in the current system of checks of his second term in office, in 10 years’ and balances. However, in this connection, time. That is not impossible, as borne out Yushchenko’s attempts to go into the 2006 by the examples of Romania and Bulgaria, general election with a “party of power” which will join in 2007 after what turned organised by members of the executive in- out initially to be a highly problematic stead of a party coalition are counter-pro- transformation. ductive. The new leadership must demon- strate that unlike its precursors it is with- standing the temptation to misuse admin- The EU’s Position istrative resources for electoral purposes Ukraine’s “” and the new and bring pressure to bear on opposition strategic thrust of its foreign policy media. The elections scheduled for March brought the country back to the attention 2006 will be the first major test of Ukraine’s of countries in Europe and of the European democratisation in accordance with the Commission. The peaceful outcome to the Copenhagen criteria. revolution is not least down to the work The top priorities for the EU are Ukrai- done by the EU’s High Representative for nian reforms geared towards the rule of law the Common Foreign and Security Policy, and the reconfiguration of the country’s Javier Solana, Polish President Alexander public administration. Experience with the Kwasniewski and Lithuanian President transition states in Central and Eastern Valdas Adamkus, who twice mediated Europe in the 1990s has shown that effi- between Yanukovych, Kuchma and Yush- cient institutions are a prerequisite for suc- chenko in late November and early Decem- cessful economic and social reforms. More- ber. For Poland’s diplomats in particular, over, the new government has to stem ubiq- who have actively been lobbying for uitous corruption by carrying out far-reach- Ukraine’s admission to the EU since their ing reforms designed to shore up the rule own country’s accession to the Union, of law and make the country more attrac- Yushchenko’s election victory represents a tive to foreign investors. The main problem major success. Kwasniewski has shown that here is one of mentality. Most judges below Poland is an important actor in Eastern the level of the highest courts in Kiev have Europe and can bring its strong influence never learnt how to dispense justice in- to bear within the CFSP to the EU’s benefit. dependently, and few of them are capable Besides Poland, the Baltic states and Scan- of doing so. The Soviet era was character- dinavian countries are pressing for Ukraine ised by so-called “telephone justice”: A call to be given a clear “European perspective” made to the regional party secretary or along the lines of EU membership. Another respective KGB chief would tell the judge group, led by France and the United King- which direction the verdict had to take. dom, which are currently grappling with Since Ukraine’s independence, in many domestic policy wrangles over the Euro- cases either leading local politicians or pean Constitution and Turkey’s accession, prominent business figures have been voic- believes it is premature to discuss Ukraine’s ing their expectations in a similar fashion, membership ambitions for the time being. or the judges anticipate their wishes. Meanwhile, the countries in southern The weeks of protest by 100,000 demon- Europe are not at all interested in seeing strators from many different parts of the Ukraine join the Union, for Spain and country in Independence Square in Kiev Portugal are already feeling the negative

SWP Comments 14 April 2005

3 consequences of eastward enlargement. for reforms and already set specific targets Germany is taking up a central position: for their implementation over the coming Berlin would like to help Ukraine to be- months. In particular, the EU should press come eligible to join the EU, but isn’t mak- for the reform of Ukraine’s public adminis- ing any promises as regards membership. tration and offer its expertise. When Yushchenko visited Germany on If Ukraine resolutely implements the 8-9 March, Chancellor Gerhard Schröder Action Plan, the EU should hold out the promised the President that the German prospect of the PCA being converted into an federal government would help with association agreement including a member- Ukraine’s approximation to Euro-Atlantic ship perspective. Offering the “perspective structures. And the German opposition of such a perspective” would be the appro- parties are offering Kiev, like Turkey, a priate middle way between a premature “privileged partnership” with the EU. discussion at this stage about the country’s At the very latest, the EU’s policy on membership and a (barely reasoned) rejec- Ukraine really started shifting when the tion, which would undermine the process European Parliament passed a pro-Ukrai- of reform in Ukraine and play into the nian resolution on 13 January. At the end of hands of those advocating integration with that same month External Affairs Commis- Russia. sioner Benita Ferrero-Waldner and Javier Once Ukraine has met the EU’s main Solana unveiled a 10-point plan to speed up demand that it hold fair and free elections Ukraine's integration with the EU. That and clearly subscribe to the Union’s values, plan was adopted at the meeting of the the EU should follow up its words with EU-Ukraine Cooperation Council held in deeds and boost the aid awarded to support Brussels on 21 February, and contains the the country’s transformation. Furthermore, following new elements: the following steps could be taken in a  The offer of a new “upgraded agreement” European policy on Ukraine that goes be- when the current Partnership and Coop- yond the EU-Ukraine Action Plan and the eration Agreement (PCA) expires in 2008; aforementioned 10-point plan:  the creation of a high-level energy dia-  Step up cooperation in the second and logue forum; third pillars. For instance, such coopera-  negotiations on a simplified visa system; tion could be institutionalised by creat-  the facilitation of Ukraine’s access to ing a Ukraine-ESDP Council in which European Investment Bank funding; both sides would intensify their coopera-  the adaptation of the EU–Ukraine Action tion in a bid to resolve the Transnistria Plan by as soon as the beginning of 2006, conflict. The settlement of that smoul- provided that substantial headway can dering dispute, which could escalate at be shown to have been made in its im- any moment, is in the interests of both plementation. the EU and Ukraine. In the context of police and judicial cooperation the EU should increase the aid it offers to deal Recommendations with so-called “soft” security risks (e.g. The EU–Ukraine Action Plan is a sensible arms or drug smuggling and human traf- document that points in the right direc- ficking) and coordinate such aid closely tion, but its wording is both too general with other donors such as NATO. and not tight enough. Consequently, at the  Increase the staff and budget of the Dele- meeting between Commission President gation of the European Commission in Barroso and Yushchenko in Brussels, the Kiev and appoint a Permanent Represen- idea of a “road map” for implementing the tative of the Council for Ukraine to im- Action Plan was discussed. Such a road map prove the coherence of EU policy towards would pinpoint the immediate priorities that country.

SWP Comments 14 April 2005

4  Extend the programme of scholarships for students and young scientists in the context of the TEMPUS programme and set up so-called “Jean-Monnet Professor- ships” at Ukraine’s universities.

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SWP Comments 14 April 2005

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