Introduction Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik German Institute for International and Security Affairs Kiev’s EU ambitions Eberhard Schneider / Christoph Saurenbach SWP Comments The adoption of the EU–Ukraine Action Plan and the changed rhetoric of the new leadership in Kiev suggest a paradigm shift in Ukrainian foreign policy. The new government—unlike its predecessor, which failed to back up its EU-friendly rhetoric with specific actions in the same vein—has announced radical internal reforms and the adaptation of Ukrainian legislation to EU standards. The country’s new President, Victor Yushchenko, has made it absolutely clear that he sees a place for his country in the European Union. In 2006 Ukraine intends to submit an official application for EU membership and hopes that negotiations on its accession will begin in 2007. Yushchenko’s New European Policy rather than use it for transporting Russian President Victor Yushchenko is drawing a oil in the opposite direction, as Kuchma line beneath Ukraine’s previous vacillation had promised Moscow. between Moscow and Brussels and wants to The EU–Ukraine Action Plan signed on break with his predecessor’s practice of in- 21 February as part of the EU’s Neighbour- dicating a turn-off to Brussels, but actually hood Policy calls upon Kiev, amongst other following the signs leading to Moscow. things, to ensure that the general election Yushchenko’s short-term goals include in 2006 is conducted in line with OSCE seeing his country awarded market econ- standards; to guarantee freedom of opin- omy status by the EU, leading Ukraine into ion, a free press, the stability and efficiency the WTO and launching negotiations with of democratic institutions and of the rule of the EU on a free-trade agreement before the law; and to improve the climate for invest- end of 2005. This would be followed up by ment. Moreover, Kiev is supposed to fight talks about simplifying visa regulations for corruption, spend its public resources more students, journalists and diplomats, by efficiently and introduce social and health progress made in the energy dialogue and reforms. Where EU deliverables are con- by the modernisation of Ukraine’s borders cerned, the Action Plan holds out the pros- with the EU’s support. Furthermore, he pect of closer cooperation in the context of would like to deliver on a previous promise the Common Foreign and Security Policy made to the EU and use the 674-kilometer- (CFSP), of more intensive police and judicial long Odessa–Brody pipeline to transport oil cooperation and of negotiations on a free- from the Caspian Sea to Western Europe, trade area. SWP Comments 14 April 2005 1 The internal political prerequisites for take up the baton in the latter half of 2005. the implementation of the EU–Ukraine Moreover, an application for membership Action Plan are in place, for polls suggest of the Union would hold more water if the that a clear majority of the Ukrainian popu- new government could show that it had lation backs the pro-European approach already scored some tangible successes on taken by the new government. In parlia- the domestic policy reform front. ment too, which elected Yulia Tymoshenko Initial signs of change are already being prime minister on 4 February with a re- provided by the configuration of certain sounding majority of 373 votes (83%) as government posts. For instance, responsi- opposed to the required 226, hardly anyone bility for European integration has been apart from the Communist Party group is hived off from the Ministry of Economic objecting to the pro-EU course steered by Affairs, and the person in charge of the the government. department has been elevated to the status However, an analysis of the presidential of deputy head of government. The man election reveals that in eastern and south- picked by Yushchenko for this post is Oleg ern Ukraine most of the electorate voted for Rybachuk, who knows the West from his the candidate leaning towards Moscow, own experience there and speaks fluent Viktor Yanukovych. The political ideas of English (having participated in an 8-month- the people living in those parts of the coun- long programme in the USA and Great Brit- try are shaped by regional oligarchs and are ain in the mid-1990s). He’s responsible for constantly reinforced in their regional coordinating the government’s European media. Most members of these oligarchies policy. To this end, vice ministers for Euro- are active in sectors that are directly depen- pean affairs have been appointed in every dent on Russia or on cooperation with ministry, and the incumbents of these posts Ukraine’s giant neighbour. They conduct a report directly to Rybachuk. In addition, dialectical policy towards Russia that Rybachuk has announced the establish- entails cooperating, but also keeping the ment of “Departments of European integra- necessary distance. For their business deal- tion” in all ministries, whose job it will be ings it is always better to maintain close to guarantee the implementation of the relations with Ukraine’s own government. EU–Ukraine Action Plan in their respective What is more, they know full well that they areas of responsibility. The reappointment need the huge EU market. For all these of Borys Tarasyuk—a man with known pro- reasons it seems unlikely that there will be EU leanings—to the post of foreign minister any opposition to Ukraine’s rapprochement underlines the new government’s ambi- with the European Union. tions regarding the European Union. Taras- yuk previously chaired the Ukrainian par- liament’s European Affairs Committee. Chances of Qualifying In her policy statement on 4 February, for EU membership Prime Minister Tymoshenko said she in- Whereas back in January Yushchenko an- tended to develop a new strategy underly- nounced that the government would be ing EU-Ukrainian relations together with applying for EU membership within a few the EU authorities in Brussels. She also weeks, the official word now is that an of- made it clear that the prospect of Ukrainian ficial application will be submitted within EU membership belonged within such a the next six months. But maybe Kiev will strategy. even wait until early 2006, for the Austrian Before it can be deemed ready for the EU Presidency due to commence in January European Union, Ukraine must fulfil the of that year appears more favourably dis- criteria laid down in Copenhagen in 1993. posed towards Ukraine’s ambitions than The constitutional reform adopted on the British EU Presidency which is due to 8 December, which strengthens parliament SWP Comments 14 April 2005 2 at the president’s expense, should prevent was a clear endorsement of the European any reversion to authoritarian rule. This values of freedom and democracy. However, reform could also help both to establish a Ukraine’s road to Europe will be long and party system that is democratic and based hard. Yushchenko’s dream is to see his on social interests and to shore up parlia- country’s integration completed by the end ment’s role in the current system of checks of his second term in office, in 10 years’ and balances. However, in this connection, time. That is not impossible, as borne out Yushchenko’s attempts to go into the 2006 by the examples of Romania and Bulgaria, general election with a “party of power” which will join in 2007 after what turned organised by members of the executive in- out initially to be a highly problematic stead of a party coalition are counter-pro- transformation. ductive. The new leadership must demon- strate that unlike its precursors it is with- standing the temptation to misuse admin- The EU’s Position istrative resources for electoral purposes Ukraine’s “Orange Revolution” and the new and bring pressure to bear on opposition strategic thrust of its foreign policy media. The elections scheduled for March brought the country back to the attention 2006 will be the first major test of Ukraine’s of countries in Europe and of the European democratisation in accordance with the Commission. The peaceful outcome to the Copenhagen criteria. revolution is not least down to the work The top priorities for the EU are Ukrai- done by the EU’s High Representative for nian reforms geared towards the rule of law the Common Foreign and Security Policy, and the reconfiguration of the country’s Javier Solana, Polish President Alexander public administration. Experience with the Kwasniewski and Lithuanian President transition states in Central and Eastern Valdas Adamkus, who twice mediated Europe in the 1990s has shown that effi- between Yanukovych, Kuchma and Yush- cient institutions are a prerequisite for suc- chenko in late November and early Decem- cessful economic and social reforms. More- ber. For Poland’s diplomats in particular, over, the new government has to stem ubiq- who have actively been lobbying for uitous corruption by carrying out far-reach- Ukraine’s admission to the EU since their ing reforms designed to shore up the rule own country’s accession to the Union, of law and make the country more attrac- Yushchenko’s election victory represents a tive to foreign investors. The main problem major success. Kwasniewski has shown that here is one of mentality. Most judges below Poland is an important actor in Eastern the level of the highest courts in Kiev have Europe and can bring its strong influence never learnt how to dispense justice in- to bear within the CFSP to the EU’s benefit. dependently, and few of them are capable Besides Poland, the Baltic states and Scan- of doing so. The Soviet era was character- dinavian countries are pressing for Ukraine ised by so-called “telephone justice”: A call to be given a clear “European perspective” made to the regional party secretary or along the lines of EU membership.