Presidential Election and Orange Revolution Implications for Ukraine’S Transition

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Presidential Election and Orange Revolution Implications for Ukraine’S Transition Helmut Kurth/Iris Kempe (Eds.) Presidential Election and Orange Revolution Implications for Ukraine’s Transition FRIEDRICH-EBERT-STIFTUNG Presidential Election and Orange Revolution Implications for Ukraine’s Transition Publisher: Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung Regional offi ce Ukraine, Belarus, Moldova 01004 Kyiv Pushkinska, 34 Ukraine Tel.: 00380 44 235 11 49 e-mail: [email protected] Copyright: Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung Editors: Helmut Kurth/Iris Kempe Cover paintings: Alexej A. Malykh, Kyiv Member of the art circle “Orange square” Cover design: Anatoliy Bielov, Kyiv Printing: Zapovit, Kyiv Printed in Ukraine, 2005 ISBN 966-7272-65-6 Contents Preface..................................................................... 5 Olaf Hillenbrand Good Governance and the Need for Consensus Building – A Framework for Democratic Transition ................................................................ 7 Oleksandr Dergachov Democratic Consensus Development ................... 32 Timm Beichelt, Rostyslav Pavlenko The Presidential Election and Constitutional Reform .................................................................. 50 Oleksandr Sushko, Oles Lisnychuk The Election Campaign and Ukraine’s Political Evolution ................................................ 86 Iris Kempe, Iryna Solonenko International Orientation and Foreign Support............................................ 109 Helmut Kurth Comment: After the “Orange Revolution”: New Challenges for Government and Civil Society ...................... 149 Preface Long before Independence Square in Kyiv became a sea of orange, it became clear to observers of Ukraine’s political processes that the fourth presidential election since the collapse of the Soviet Union would occasion a historic decision between authoritarianism and democracy. Discussions regarding the successor to President Leonid Kuchma were well underway as far back as 2001, when constitutional changes were proposed that would have given more power to the Parliament, but could also have extended Kuchma’s term of offi ce. While these changes did not pass, the proposal still showed that Kuchma and the “party of power” would not voluntarily leave the political stage. Unlike in the presidential election of 1999, in 2004 the opponent of Prime Minister Viktor Yanukovych, Kuchma’s hand-picked heir, was not a member of the Communist Party, but popular opposition leader Viktor Yushchenko. Not only does Yushchenko aspire to establishing closer EU-Ukraine relations, but he has also proclaimed the goal of fi ghting the country’s widespread corruption and the overbearing infl uence of the nation’s economic clans. Although the fi rst round of the presidential election, held on Oct. 31, 2004, received an OSCE evaluation considerably worse than that of the previous presidential election, its results were still more or less accepted. The second round, however, turned out to be quite different. During the run-off between Yushchenko and Yanukovych on Nov. 21, 2004, Ukraine experienced a black day for propriety, fairness and transparency, as basic human rights were trampled upon. All independent election observation groups originally reported evidence of serious fraud and massive violations intended to aid Yanukovych. These ranged from voter intimidation to widespread abuse of mobile polling stations. The long list of systematic violations also included destruction of ballots, multiple voting, blackmail, bribery and administrative pressure. In the opinion of the opposition, these fraudulent tactics, along with blanket media manipulation and other unfair and undemocratic practices during the campaign, gave Yanukovych his reported winning margin of three percent. This obvious deception exceeded the limits of the population’s tolerance. In the wake of the Nov. 21, 2004, debacle, hundreds of thousands of people took to the streets, stood up for their democratic right to free and fair elections, and started what was to become known to the world as the “Orange Revolution.” In bitterly cold winter weather, Ukraine’s fl edgling civil society helped coordinate the masses and score an unlikely and remarkable landslide victory for democracy. Even the opposition was surprised at the number of ordinary citizens who found the courage to take to the streets in Kyiv and other cities of Ukraine, in what was an outpouring of support for democracy. For most citizens, protesting against the falsifi cation of the election results and the hijacking of Ukraine’s presidency was a fi rst step in the right direction. Such a step required a lot of strength and moral courage, as it fl ew directly in the face of a deeply ingrained historical heritage dominated by fears and hesitation. This non-violent rebellion against the perceived unfairness of the authorities seemed to inspire new feelings of self-worth and self-confi dence in Ukrainians, and to motivate at least some political actors to take the real wishes of the population into greater account. The pressure of the brave and powerful civil movement, the mediation efforts of the international community, as well as the unanimous decision of the Supreme Court of Ukraine 5 to invalidate the results of the Nov. 21 presidential run-off vote cleared the way for a fresh election on Dec. 26, 2004. In the re-run of the second round, Viktor Yushchenko was the clear winner, with a lead of almost eight percent. When the “tent city” in the central Kyiv was fi nally removed and the inauguration completed, we could refl ect on how “people power” triumphed over the arbitrary acts of the old regime, and the people of Ukraine chose their new president in a free and fair election. The victory of President Yushchenko is not only a victory for democracy, but also refl ects an important turning point for further transition. This publication provides an analysis of the entire election process in Ukraine from different points of view. It also offers an outlook on how this hard-won victory can infl uence the future development of the country. Helmut Kurth Regional offi ce of the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung Ukraine, Belarus and Moldova Iris Kempe Center for Applied Policy Research, University of Munich 6 Good Governance and the Need for Consensus Building – A Framework for Democratic Transition Olaf Hillenbrand* 1. Introduction: Ukraine beyond the crossroads The year 2004 was a decisive, historical year for Ukraine. After 10 years of transition, Ukraine stood at crossroads between democracy and authoritarianism. The presidential election was seen as the key for the development of democracy. In the beginning, the key actors were not only the two presidential candidates, with quite different views about Ukraine’s future, but also the former president, including his administration, whose efforts to infl uence the election have inherently damaged and endangered democratic development. After the manipulated ballot on Nov. 21, 2004, with the population demonstrating in the streets, a further participant entered the political arena whose courage and persistence fi nally forced a repeat of the second round of the elections and a democratic change of power. In Ukraine, this victory for democracy created high expectations. President Viktor Yushchenko represents a departure to the West, a liberal democracy and the renewal of free market structures. After he suffered a poisoning attempt in September 2004, he transformed into a charismatic martyr for democracy. As a reformer he already enjoyed a good reputation because of his record as prime minister. However, in trying to modernize the country, he had also experienced intense resistance from eastern and southern regions. Furthermore, the “Orange Revolution” received strong attention beyond Ukraine’s borders. Actually, in order to receive attention, support and sympathy in the European neighborhood, its timing and its staging could hardly have been better. The whole of Europe stared with amazement at the situation in Ukraine. During this time, it became particularly clear to the European Union that, after the victory of the democrats, the country needs a European perspective to be able to continue on its way towards democracy and a market economy. The decisive role of elections For every democracy, elections are an indispensable constituent element. In Ukraine, authoritarian tendencies were established during recent years. Democratic procedures and institutions were set up. However, words must be matched with deeds in the coming years in * Olaf Hillenbrand — Center for Applied Policy Research, University of Munich. 7 order to establish an appropriate political culture and accompanying democratic consolidation. On the one hand it was possible that a defective, illiberal democracy similar to Russia’s could be consolidated in Ukraine. On the other hand, Ukraine still had the opportunity to advance step-by-step toward a Western-style liberal democracy. In this respect, the presidential elections played a decisive role at these crossroads of Ukrainian development: - As a litmus test, the election process is a very strong indicator that can provide information about the status of any given democracy. Democracy in Ukraine had to assess whether and to what extent the ruling party and related interest groups accepted common rules for the division of political power. Other questions included: How free and fair were the elections? Were there equal opportunities for each candidate? Was there a free fl ow of public information? Were there attempts at manipulation? Was there already a sustainable political
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