Ukraine at the Crossroad in Post-Communist Europe: Policymaking and the Role of Foreign Actors Ryan Barrett [email protected]
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University of Missouri, St. Louis IRL @ UMSL Dissertations UMSL Graduate Works 1-20-2018 Ukraine at the Crossroad in Post-Communist Europe: Policymaking and the Role of Foreign Actors Ryan Barrett [email protected] Follow this and additional works at: https://irl.umsl.edu/dissertation Part of the Comparative Politics Commons, and the International Relations Commons Recommended Citation Barrett, Ryan, "Ukraine at the Crossroad in Post-Communist Europe: Policymaking and the Role of Foreign Actors" (2018). Dissertations. 725. https://irl.umsl.edu/dissertation/725 This Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by the UMSL Graduate Works at IRL @ UMSL. It has been accepted for inclusion in Dissertations by an authorized administrator of IRL @ UMSL. For more information, please contact [email protected]. Ukraine at the Crossroad in Post-Communist Europe: Policymaking and the Role of Foreign Actors Ryan Barrett M.A. Political Science, The University of Missouri - Saint Louis, 2015 M.A. International Relations, Webster University, 2010 B.A. International Studies, 2006 A Dissertation Submitted to the Graduate School at the The University of Missouri - Saint Louis in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree Doctor Philosophy in Political Science May 2018 Advisory Committee: Joyce Mushaben, Ph.D. Jeanne Wilson, PhD. Kenny Thomas, Ph.D. David Kimball, Ph.D. Contents Introduction 1 Chapter I. Policy Formulation 30 Chapter II. Reform Initiatives 84 Chapter III. Economic Policy 122 Chapter IV. Energy Policy 169 Chapter V. Security and Defense Policy 199 Conclusion 237 Appendix 246 Bibliography 248 To the Pat Tillman Foundation for graciously sponsoring this important research Introduction: Ukraine at a Crossroads Ukraine, like many European countries, has experienced a complex history and occupies a unique geographic position that places it in a peculiar situation be- tween its liberal future and communist past; it also finds itself tugged in two opposing directions by the gravitational forces of Russia and the West. The ongoing political struggles in Kyiv over reform, democratization, energy and foreign policy represent a battle taking place on a path between two distinct periods and two different places. Two and a half decades after independence, Ukrainians have reached a fork in the road, where they must confront difficult choices about their future. Dissident Ukrainians began disrupting the Yanukovych regime with an osten- sibly innocuous event. What started as a celebratory gathering on Maidan Nezhalezh- nosti (Maidan Independence Square), supporting closer ties with the European Union (EU), climaxed in a violent struggle for political power over the country. A few thou- sand students first gathered on Maidan Square in downtown Kyiv on November 28th 2013, just before the Vilnius Summit, to show their support for the EU Association Agreement (AA).1 Days before the meeting, however, Viktor Yanukovych had abrupt- ly announced that he would not sign the accord, effectively suspending the negotia- tions. A small crowd soon protested Yanukovych’s decision while evermore Ukraini- ans gathered in central Kyiv to demonstrate their displeasure. The government steadi- ly increased pressure, to force the protesters to disperse, eventually resorting to vio- lence. The Berkut, a group of nondescript, mercenary police hired directly by Yanukovych, used force in an attempt to breakup the gathering. Civilians 1 Nadia Diuk, “Euromaidan: Ukraine’s Self-Organizing Revolution,” World Affairs (March/April 2014), http://www.worldaffairsjournal.org/article/euromaidan-ukraine’s-self-organizing-revolution. 1! responded by appearing on the square in ever greater numbers, swelling to hundreds of thousands by December 1st.2 Russian officials used not only sticks but also carrots in persuading Yanukovych not to sign the AA. On December 17, 2013, the Russian government agreed to buy $15 billion worth of Ukrainian bonds and reduced the price of natural gas shipped to Ukraine.3 This infusion of cash came at a critical time when roughly $10 billion in bonds would mature in the coming months with little certainty that creditors would get paid.4 Moscow’s lifeline acted as another instrument in deterring Yanukovych from signing the AA. Meanwhile, the violence in downtown Kyiv cli- maxed on February 20th when snipers on rooftops opened fired on protesters, killing fifty people.5 Two years later, pedestrians walking along Institustka Street still stop by small, makeshift memorials to those who died. By February 22, 2014, Viktor Yanukovych had buckled under public pressure and fled the country.6 As the situation in Kyiv deteriorated, Russian soldiers and ac- tivists slowly and stealthily took over the Crimean Peninsula starting on February 28th.7 Nondescript Russian troops, many transported from the mainland to their base 2 Diuk, “Euromaidan: Ukraine’s Self-Organizing Revolution.” 3 Diuk, “Euromaidan: Ukraine’s Self-Organizing Revolution.” 4 Vladimir Isachenkov and Maria Danilova, "Putin: Russia to buy $15 billion in Ukraine bonds,” US- AToday (December 17, 2013), https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/world/2013/12/17/russia-ukraine- bonds-putin/4058059/. 5 Damien Sharkov, “Ukraine has Found the Weapon Used in the ‘Maidan Massacre.’” Newsweek (July 14, 2016), http://www.newsweek.com/ukraine-claims-find-sniper-maidan-massacre-480406. 6 Alexander Baunov, Balazs Jarabik and Alexander Golubov, “A Year After Maidan: Why did Viktor Yanukovych Flee After Signing the Agreement with the Opposition?” Carnegie Moscow Center (Feb- ruary 25, 2015), http://carnegie.ru/commentary/?fa=59172. 7 John Simpson, “Russia’s Crimea Plan Detailed, Secret and Successful,” BBC News (March 19, 2014), http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-26644082. 2! at Sevastopol, began seizing control of key transportation points. By March the Russ- ian government had wrestled control of the peninsula away from Ukraine. Meanwhile, anti-government protests erupted in eastern Ukraine, condemning the EuroMaidan movement. Supported by Russian operatives and resources, eastern Ukrainians in the Donbas region formed a separatist movement, causing a civil war that is still frozen.8 Since independence in 1991, many Ukrainians have adopted a set of untenable goals: they want to seek prosperity through growing economic cooperation with western Eu- rope, as well as to maintain stable relations with Russia, along with protecting the country’s sovereignty against excessive foreign influence. By 2014 the Ukrainian government could no longer reconcile these conflicting goals. The disillusionment with the lack of economic prosperity, and the massive inequality between oligarchs and all other citizens, and the cultural divisions between Russian and Ukrainian iden- tities, led to the political upheaval on the Maidan.9 Ukraine currently features as the main target of Russia’s foreign policy calcu- lus. Kyiv stands at the crossroad in post-communist Europe, at a critical point in space and time: its fate as a member of the West or Eurasia hangs in the balance. The Maid- an Revolution, or EuroMaidan, highlights many concurrent processes in post-Soviet Europe, which include post-communist development, democratization and the reemergence of mercantilist energy politics. The conflict caused by EuroMaidan also signals a wider tension between Russia and the West, and Ukraine’s role of a proxy battle space. 8 Damien Sharkov, “Putin Claims Russia ‘Forced to Defend’ Ukraine Separatists,” Newsweek (October 12, 2016), http://www.newsweek.com/putin-claims-russia-forced-defend-ukraine-separatists-509281. 9 Leonid Grigoriev, Eugenia Buryak, and Alexander Golyashev, “The Transition of Ukraine’s Econo- my: A Second Start?” Problems of Economic Transition, 58, 3 (2016): 256. 3! An examination of Ukraine’s relationship with Western countries and Russia is significant for four core reasons. First, understanding the clash between these two countries can help to mitigate a much wider conflict on the European continent. No country has undertaken military intervention into a European country since the Soviet Union last invaded Czechoslovakia in 1968. Europeans have not witnessed a major conflict on their soil since the break-up of Yugoslavia in the 1990s. Russia’s invasion and occupation of Crimea, along with its support for separatists in eastern Ukraine, signals a new era of instability in Europe. Second, because most European states are also members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), any potential conflict between Russia and the EU would involve the US and further exacerbate the conflict. Despite attempting to “re- set” US-Russian relations in 2009 to reconcile their respective conflicting security interests, any partnership seems more unlikely than since 1991.10 From disagreements over how to handle the civil war in Syria, to American accusations of Russian inter- ference in the 2016 presidential election, US-Russian relations have moved to their lowest point since the end of the Cold War. Third, analyzing Ukraine’s democratization progress and the role that Russia has played thus far may hold answers for other post-Soviet states and countries transi- tioning from authoritarian regimes to democracies. Fifteen states emerged from the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, while seven other member states outside the USSR withdrew from the Warsaw Pact; their paths to democracy and economic pros- 10 For an explanation of the “reset” in relations, see an interview with one of its architects Michael McFaul, in Jason