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Home , Armed Forces of Ukraine, Ihor Smeshko, Imagery intelligence, Ivo Daalder, Law of Ukraine, Oleksandr Turchynov

Preserving ’s Independence, Resisting Russian Aggression: What the and NATO Must Do

Ivo Daalder, Michele Flournoy, John Herbst, Jan Lodal, Steven Pifer, James Stavridis, Strobe Talbott and Charles Wald © 2015 The Atlantic Council of the United States. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means without permission in writing from the Atlantic Council, except in the case of brief quotations in news articles, critical articles, or reviews. Please direct inquiries to:

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ISBN: 978-1-61977-471-1 Publication design: Krystal Ferguson; Cover photo credit: /David Mdzinarishvili

This report is written and published in accordance with the Atlantic Council Policy on Intellectual Independence. The authors are solely responsible for its analysis and recommendations. The Atlantic Council, the , and the Chicago Council on Global Affairs, and their funders do not determine, nor do they necessarily endorse or advocate for, any of this report’s conclusions.

February 2015

This report is the result of collaboration among the provinces of and . scholars and former practitioners from the A stronger Ukrainian , with enhanced Atlantic Council, the Brookings Institution, the defensive capabilities, will increase the pros- Center for a New American Security, and the pects for negotiation of a peaceful settlement. Chicago Council on Global Affairs. It is informed When combined with continued robust Western by and reflects mid-January discussions with economic sanctions, significant military assis- senior NATO and U.S. officials in Brussels and tance to bolster Ukraine’s defensive capabilities senior Ukrainian civilian and military officials in will make clear that the West will not accept and at the Ukrainian “anti-terror operation” the use of force to change borders in Europe. headquarters in . President Putin may hope to achieve glory through restoring, through intimidation and The report outlines the background to the force, Russian dominion over its neighbors. But crisis over Ukraine, describes why the United a peaceful world requires opposing this through States and NATO need to engage more actively decisive action. and urgently, summarizes what the authors heard in discussions at NATO and in Ukraine, We fully endorse the analysis and recommen- and offers specific recommendations for steps dations contained in the report and urge the that Washington and NATO should take to Obama Administration and NATO governments, strengthen Ukraine’s defenses and thereby with support from the U.S. Congress and Allied enhance its ability to deter further Russian parliaments, to move rapidly to implement the aggression. recommendations.

Such action would contribute to helping Ukraine restore control over its border and territory in

Ivo Daalder, President, the Chicago Council on Global Affairs, and former U.S. Permanent Representative to NATO

Michele Flournoy, Chair, Center for a New American Security, and former Under Secretary of Defense

John Herbst, Director, Dinu Patriciu Eurasia Center, the Atlantic Council, and former U.S. Ambassador to Ukraine

Jan Lodal, Distinguished Fellow and former President, the Atlantic Council, and former Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense

Steven Pifer, Senior Fellow, the Brookings Institution, and former U.S. Ambassador to Ukraine

James Stavridis, Member of the Board, the Atlantic Council, Dean, Fletcher School of and Diplomacy, Tufts University, and former Supreme Allied Commander Europe

Strobe Talbott, President, the Brookings Institution, and former Deputy Secretary of State

Charles Wald, Member of the Board, the Atlantic Council, and former Deputy Commander, U.S. European Command TABLE OF CONTENTS

Executive Summary...... 1

Background: A Putin-Manufactured Conflict...... 2

The Case for Increased U.S. Military Assistance Now...... 2

Providing Military Support to Deter Further Aggression...... 3

Recommendations for Specific Military Assistance...... 4

Supporting Recommendations...... 5

Conclusion...... 6

Appendix 1: 5 Ceasefire Protocol...... 7

Appendix 2: Russian/Separatist Military Advantages...... 8

Appendix 3: Key Elements of the Ukraine Freedom Support Act of 2014...... 9

Appendix 4: Discussions in Brussels, January 12, 2015...... 10

Appendix 5: Discussions in Ukraine, January 13-16, 2015...... 11 Preserving Ukraine’s Independence, Resisting Russian Aggression: What the United States and NATO Must Do

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

We face a critical juncture in Ukraine. There is no real possible in 2015, followed by additional tranches of $1 billion in FY 2016 and FY 2017.

mid-January,ceasefire; indeed, with thereRussian/separatist was a significant forces increase launching in Additional non-lethal assistance should include: counter- attacksfighting on along the theDonetsk line of airport contact and in easternother areas. Ukraine Instead in battery , unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), of a political settlement, Moscow currently seeks to electronic counter-measures for use against opposing UAVs, secure communications capabilities, armored to pressure and destabilize the Ukrainian government. Humvees and medical support equipment. Russianscreate a frozen continue conflict to be in present eastern in Ukraine the Donetsk as a meansand Lethal defensive military assistance should include light Luhansk oblasts in substantial numbers and have anti-armor , given the large numbers of armored vehicles that the Russians have deployed in Donetsk and could be preparation for another major Russian/ Luhansk and the abysmal condition of the Ukrainian separatistintroduced offensive. significant amounts of heavy weapons. This military’s light anti-armor weapons. Russian success would fatally undermine Ukraine’s Other NATO members should provide military assistance stability and embolden the Kremlin to further challenge as well. Of particular use to the Ukrainian military would the security order in Europe. It might tempt President be equipment and weapons from NATO members who Putin to use his doctrine of protecting ethnic Russians operate former Soviet equipment compatible with the and Russian speakers in seeking territorial changes arms currently in the Ukrainian inventory. elsewhere in the neighborhood, including in the Baltic States, provoking a direct challenge to NATO. Assisting Ukraine to deter attack and defend itself Maintaining Western sanctions are critical but not is not inconsistent with the search for a peaceful, political solution—it is essential to achieving it. Only if deterrence in Ukraine by raising the risks and costs to the Kremlin knows that the risks and costs of further Russiaby themselves of any renewed sufficient. major The offensive.West needs to bolster political solution. ’s actions in and against Ukraine That requires providing direct military assistance—in posemilitary the actiongravest are threat high towill European it seek to security find an inacceptable more far larger amounts than provided to date and including than 30 years. The West has the capacity to stop Russia. lethal defensive arms—so that Ukraine is better able The question is whether it has the will. to defend itself. The U.S. government should provide Ukraine $1 billion in military assistance as soon as

ATLANTIC COUNCIL 1 Preserving Ukraine’s Independence, Resisting Russian Aggression: What the United States and NATO Must Do

economy—particularly as oil prices have dropped Background: substantially, sharply reducing export earnings. But A Putin-Manufactured Conflict they have not yet achieved their principal political goal: effecting a change in Russian policy toward Ukrainian President Yanukovych’s November 2013 Ukraine. Western leaders have stated that sanctions will decision, apparently under great pressure from Putin, remain in place until the Kremlin’s policy changes in a not to sign an association agreement with the triggered massive demonstrations and an intense political crisis within Ukraine. The Ukrainian significantAlthough there way. have been numerous diplomatic

February 2014, when Yanukovych abandoned his little real progress has been made toward a broader positioncrisis became and Russian a major military Ukraine-Russia forces seized conflict . in late Just settlement.exchanges since The Russiansthe September have done 5 ceasefire little to agreement, implement weeks after Russia’s annexation of Crimea, armed separatists—with support, funding and leadership forces and equipment; indeed, NATO and Ukrainian from Moscow—seized government buildings in the the ceasefire terms. They have not withdrawn their eastern Ukrainian oblasts of Donetsk and Luhansk. By equipment in December and January. By all appearances, May, the Russian-supported separatists had occupied a assources of mid-January, report a significant the Russian influx government of Russian does heavy not seek a genuine settlement in but intends

significantOnce a Ukrainian portion counteroffensive of the Donbas. started to make destabilize the Ukrainian government. progress in June, Russia began supplying the separatists to create a frozen conflict as a means to pressure and with heavy weapons, such as tanks, armored personnel Russian and separatist forces currently operating in carriers, artillery and advanced anti-aircraft systems, apparently including the BUK (NATO designator Ukrainian armed forces in air superiority, intelligence, SA-11/17) surface-to-air system that shot electroniceastern Ukraine warfare, enjoy command significant and advantages control, artillery over the and rockets, supply and logistics, and sanctuary in Russia large numbers of “volunteers.” When Ukrainian forces (see Appendix 2 for more detail). These advantages continueddown Malaysia to make Air flightprogress 17 inin July., Russia regular also sentRussian in army units entered the Donbas, and attacked and capabilitieshave significantly most likelycontributed render toUkrainian losses suffered forces unableby Ukrainian volunteer battalions. The Ukrainian military toUkrainian prevent, forces and unlikely since the to Septemberhalt on favorable 5 ceasefire. terms, These a reportedlyinflicted heavy lost casualtieswell over half on the of its Ukrainian deployed military armor. and major offensive by Russian and separatist forces to take additional territory in the Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts or to create a land bridge through to Crimea. A ceasefire was reached in Minsk on September 5, which significantly reduced the number of deaths hold.from theIn some fighting areas, (see including Appendix around 1 for thethe twelveDonetsk points The Case for Increased U.S. Military of the ceasefire). But the ceasefire never fully took Assistance Now airport, fighting continued almost unabated. There The situation in eastern Ukraine is urgent and thewas line a significant of contact improvement between Ukrainian in compliance and separatist/ with the Russianceasefire forces beginning in the on Donbas December increased 8, but markedly shellings acrossaround weapons has grown markedly, and Moscow is no longer January 11, and the situation again deteriorated. Since takingdeteriorating. steps to In hide recent this weeks, support the from flow overhead of heavy imagery. Fighting along the line of contact increased an additional 500 square kilometers of territory. the ceasefire, the Russian-backed separatists have seized Zakharchenko, leader of the self-proclaimed “Donetsk The United States, European Union and other countries People’ssignificantly Republic,” during indicated the week on of January 2319. that Aleksandr the imposed increasingly severe economic sanctions separatists would seek to take all of the . on Russia over the course of 2014. They began with Large numbers of Russian forces remain deployed along sanctions targeted at individuals but in July and the border, ready to enter Ukraine on very short notice. September applied much broader and more robust sanctions targeting a range of Russian entities in Russian and separatist forces clearly have the capacity for further offensive military action—whether to gain control of the entire Donbas region or, worse, to the financial, energy and defense sectors. Sanctions appear to be having a significant impact on the Russian

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establish a land bridge between Russia and the Crimea East and the strategic challenge posed by the rise of through effective control of southeastern Ukraine. Any , Washington and other capitals have not devoted such offensive move would set back the prospect for a peaceful settlement and further destabilize Ukraine. implications for Western security. This must change. The costs to the West of maintaining an independent sufficient attention to the threat posed by Russia and its Ukraine would then only grow, and Moscow might be If the United States and NATO do not adequately support emboldened to take further actions. While these actions Ukraine, Moscow may well conclude that the kinds of may not seem likely, they certainly are not unthinkable. tactics it has employed over the past year can be applied Few analysts at the end of 2013 would have considered elsewhere. Of particular concern would be Russian a Russian military seizure of Crimea or invasion of the actions to destabilize or Latvia, each of which Donbas “thinkable.” which are NATO members to whom the United States The post-World II effort to create a safer Europe is andhas aallies significant have an ethnic Article Russian 5 commitment. minority andThe bothKremlin of under serious threat. The 1975 Conference on Security has already demonstrated aggressive intent in the Baltics and Cooperation in Europe Final Act, in which Russia agreed to respect the “inviolability of borders” in Europe, NATO Wales summit ended. has been blatantly violated. The United States, moreover, by kidnapping an Estonian security official the day the is a signatory to the 1994 Budapest Memorandum on To be sure, there are issues on which the interests of the Security Assurances for Ukraine. In that document, the United States and the West, on the one hand, and Russia, United States, Britain and Russia committed to respect on the other, coincide. These include preventing Iran Ukraine’s sovereignty, independence and territorial from acquiring nuclear arms, avoiding a return of the integrity, and not to use or threaten to use force against Taliban or chaos in , the broader counter- Ukraine. Russia has grossly violated those commitments, terrorism struggle, and controlling nuclear weapons and which were key to Kyiv’s decision to eliminate its materials. But these interests should not outweigh the nuclear weapons. The United States and Britain should, West’s interest in blocking Russian aggression that poses in response, do more to robustly support Ukraine and a threat not just to Ukraine, but also to the security of penalize Russia. broader Europe and the transatlantic community.

This is not just a question of honoring U.S. commitments The world has faced this kind of challenge before. under international agreements. It is important for History makes clear that the only way to stop such preserving the credibility of security assurances for aggression from precipitating a regional or even world- the future, when they might play a role in resolving other nuclear proliferation cases, such as Iran and early as possible and not to be fooled by protestations of North Korea. innocentwide conflagration motives or is lack to deter of further and defend ambitions. against it as

Above and beyond Ukraine—and more important in strategic terms for the United States and NATO—is the need to respond to the challenge to European and Providing Military Support to Deter Eurasian security posed by the Kremlin’s aggressive Further Aggression policies. Russia has broken the cardinal rule of post- war European security, i.e., states must not use The Ukrainian military appears capable of limited military force to change international borders. Putin military operations, such as the January 19 counter- and the Kremlin have proclaimed a unique and legally attack on the Donetsk airport (the airport reportedly dubious right to “protect” ethnic Russians and Russian has since been lost). Given the experience of August, speakers, wherever they are located and whatever however, Kyiv is most unlikely to launch a major military effort to try to regain control of Donetsk belatedly offered for Russia’s illegal annexation of and Luhansk; President Poroshenko has said there Crimea,their citizenship. despite the This fact was that the there justification was no credible that Putin threat can be no military solution and has sought a negotiated to ethnic Russians in Crimea. settlement.

If not constrained, such Russian policies represent a There remains, however, the question of Kyiv’s ability clear danger to European security, the North Atlantic to defend itself against further Russian attacks. Even community, as well as to Russia’s neighbors in Eurasia. with enormous support from the West, the Ukrainian Given the many other world challenges confronting the army will not be able to defeat a determined attack by United States, especially problems in the broader Middle the Russian military. This point is well understood in

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Kyiv. The more appropriate goal of Western military to ensure that Congressional authorizations are written assistance should be to give the Ukrainian military in a way that allows the government to make quick and additional defense capabilities that would allow it

should the Russians launch new offensive operations, efficientSome of ususe traveled of the assistance. January 12-16 to Brussels for to inflict significant costs on the Russian military, discussions with senior NATO leaders, to Kyiv for further aggression. discussions with senior Ukrainian civilian and sufficient enough that Moscow will be deterred from military leaders, and to Kramatorsk to meet with the The United States and NATO should seek to create a commanding general of the “anti-terror operation” situation in which the Kremlin considers the option of and his staff.1 According to both NATO and Ukrainian further military action in or against Ukraine too costly to pursue. The combination of closing off that option plus the cumulative impact of Western economic Russianofficials, heavyRussian equipment military personnel in December are and in the January. Donbas, sanctions could produce conditions in which Moscow Theand thereUkrainians has been reported a significant that the influx Russians of additional make heavy decides to negotiate a genuine settlement that allows use of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) for Ukraine to reestablish full sovereignty over Donetsk and reconnaissance and combine those with long-range and Luhansk. (The West cannot lose sight of the status artillery and rocket strikes with devastating effect. (See of Crimea, though Kyiv has said that that is an issue for Appendices 4 and 5 for details on discussions in Brussels the longer term; it correctly attaches priority to the and Ukraine.) Donbas situation.) The following recommendations, based on what we Putin’s aggression in Ukraine and self-proclaimed heard in Brussels, Kyiv and Kramatorsk, constitute a right to protect ethnic Russians and Russian speakers minimum immediate response. Washington should wherever they are pose the gravest security threat urgently consult with Kyiv on provision of the following to the transatlantic community and Eurasia since the types of military assistance, with a view to rapid end of the . The United States and NATO must procurement—or provision from existing U.S. defense recognize this danger and adjust policies and allocate stocks—and delivery:

bolster Kyiv’s ability to deter further Russian attacks. • Counter-battery radars that can detect and locate Moreover,resources accordingly.if confronted A by firm a strong Western Western response response can in the origin of multiple launch rocket system (MLRS) support of Ukraine, the Kremlin will be far less tempted to challenge the security or territorial integrity of other kilometers. These will enable the Ukrainian military to states, including NATO members Estonia and Latvia. launches and artillery firings out to a range of 30-40 the Russian/separatist weapons that have thus far causedidentify the ceasefire greatest violations number andof Ukrainian potentially casualties. to target (Approximately 70 percent of Ukrainian casualties are Recommendations for Specific Military Assistance • fromMedium rocket altitude/medium and artillery fire.) range UAVs. These will Bolstering Ukraine’s defense capabilities will require a assist the Ukrainian military to increase its tactical commitment of serious resources. The U.S. government situational awareness, identify opposing troop in 2014 pledged $120 million in non-lethal military deployments, and locate opposing MLRS and artillery. assistance, of which about half has been delivered. The • Electronic counter-measures for use against opposing Ukraine Freedom Support Act of 2014 authorized—but UAVs. This will give the Ukrainian military capabilities did not appropriate—$350 million in military to disrupt opposition UAVs conducting missions assistance (non-lethal and lethal) over three years (see against Ukrainian forces. Appendix 3 for key provisions of the Act). • Secure communications capabilities. Much Ukrainian This is a beginning. But a much more substantial effort tactical communication currently is conducted over is required. The administration should request, and non-secure or cell phones and thus is extremely Congress should immediately authorize and appropriate, vulnerable to interception by Russian intelligence- $1 billion in assistance to bolster Kyiv’s defense and gathering systems. deterrence capabilities as rapidly as possible in 2015, with additional tranches of $1 billion to be provided in FY 2016 and FY 2017. Congressional staff should coordinate with the Departments of Defense and State 1 Daalder, Herbst, Lodal, Pifer and Wald traveled to Brussels and Ukraine.

4 ATLANTIC COUNCIL Preserving Ukraine’s Independence, Resisting Russian Aggression: What the United States and NATO Must Do

• Armored Humvees. With Russian UAVs patrolling the to provide equipment and weapons from their stocks to skies and the persistent threat of Russian precision Ukraine. For the longer term, U.S. military experts should consult with the Ukrainian military on steps to build a all-weather mobility, speed, reliability and a measure stronger national air defense. As part of this discussion, ofrocket protection and artillery as they fire, move Ukrainian between forces positions require on the United States should not rule out the possibility of helping provide advanced air defense systems.

• theMedical battlefield. support equipment. Ukrainian casualties are The U.S. government should approach , the Baltic greater because of their relatively underdeveloped States, and Britain regarding their readiness and severely under resourced military medical system. to provide lethal military assistance. Such assistance should be coordinated to avoid duplication of efforts. their soldiers’ survival rate. Poland, in particular, as a former Warsaw Pact member, The provision of field hospitals would greatly improve should be able to help with consumables and spare • In addition to the above non-lethal items, the U.S. parts, as well as compatible equipment, since the bulk of government should immediately change its policy Ukraine’s equipment is Soviet in origin. from prohibiting lethal assistance to allowing provision of defensive military assistance, which may Some in the West are concerned that provision of include lethal assistance, most importantly, light anti- military assistance, particularly of lethal arms, would armor missiles. Ukrainian light anti-armor capabilities cause Russia to escalate the crisis. We vehemently are severely lacking at a time when the Russians have disagree. Russia has already continuously escalated: moved large numbers of tanks and armored personnel seizing and annexing Crimea, encouraging and aiding carriers into the Donbas (70 percent of their existing separatists in eastern Ukraine, providing the separatists stocks of light anti-armor weapons reportedly do not with heavy arms, and ultimately invading the Donbas work). Any major Russian/separatist advance beyond with regular Russian army units. Although NATO and the line of contact would presumably make heavy use Ukraine differ over whether Russian regular units have of tanks and armored personnel carriers. Anti-armor missiles would give the Ukrainian army the capability to impose heavier costs and support the disruption of Russianbeen withdrawn, military equipment there is no remaindispute in that the a Donbas. significant such attacks. Raising the risks and costs will help deter Enhancednumber of military Russian assistanceofficers and would a large increase amount Kyiv’s of further Russian offensive operations. capability to deter further Russian escalation.

Given the urgency of the situation—some fear that a new offensive could be launched once the spring arrives in April/May—consideration should be given to drawing Supporting Recommendations equipment from U.S. stocks and using assistance funds to replenish U.S. inventories. There exists a clear gap between NATO and Ukrainian intelligence estimates with regard to the number and Bolstering Ukraine’s defenses should not be a U.S.-only organization of Russian military personnel in eastern responsibility. NATO members should also increase Ukraine. NATO and Ukrainian intelligence analysts their military assistance to Ukraine, with a view to should consult with a view to developing a common picture of the Russian presence. It appears that there who have former Soviet/Warsaw Pact equipment and weaponsmeeting the systems priority similar needs to identified or compatible above. with NATO those allies Russian activities in and near eastern Ukraine. Given now operated by the Ukrainian military should consider theare gravesignificant nature gaps of thein U.S. danger and posedNATO byintelligence the Kremlin’s on contributing those to Kyiv’s defense capabilities. aggression in Ukraine, the United States and NATO should increase intelligence coverage of the relatively small Ukrainian area of operations. Closing this While Russian resort to large-scale air strikes would intelligence gap requires an immediate shift of more Ukraine has a significant need for improved air defenses. remove any veneer from Moscow’s claim that its military intelligence assets to the Ukraine/Russia theater. is not engaged in operations in/against Ukraine, such action cannot be excluded. Procuring advanced U.S. air U.S. military equipment should be provided to the defense weapons would be expensive, and integrating Ukrainian army only, not to the Ukrainian volunteer them into the existing Ukrainian air defense system would take time. A quicker solution would be for NATO be tasked to monitor the equipment’s employment in members who operate similar former Soviet air defenses orderbattalions. to ensure The U.S. its effectiveDefense andAttaché appropriate Office in use.Kyiv should

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As a condition of this assistance, the U.S. government and, if necessary, defending against further aggression should require the Ukrainian government to develop and will strengthen Ukraine’s sovereignty, but that may implement a plan to integrate the volunteer battalions matter little unless the Ukrainian government moves into—and place them under command of—regular army forward with serious reforms. units and the National Guard as rapidly as possible. That would enhance the effectiveness of Ukrainian military The robust political and economic sanctions currently operations. imposed on Russia with the full support of our European allies, and with the strong leadership of In providing military equipment, the United States and German Chancellor Merkel, are having an impact on its NATO partners should steer clear of equipment that the Russian economy and appear to have taken the is of such technological sophistication that it would Russian leadership by surprise. If Kyiv can deter further require U.S. or NATO personnel to operate or maintain. Russian military aggression while the sanctions have Ukraine’s defense and deterrence posture can be further impact on the Russian economy, there is a bolstered without a direct U.S. or NATO presence on chance that Moscow will alter its course and seek a the ground, and we would not support such a presence peaceful settlement in eastern Ukraine. In the meantime, under current circumstances. the Kremlin’s aggression presents the transatlantic communityhowever, Ukraine with its finds most itself serious in a periloussecurity state,threat and in more than 30 years. Conclusion The United States and NATO must respond, both to The West should work with Ukraine to create a support Ukraine and to push back against Russia’s successful and prosperous democratic state that is unacceptable challenge to the post-war European capable of choosing its own foreign policy course. The security order. This will require more military Ukrainian government has stated that it will institute assistance, some of it lethal but none of it offensive. economic and political reforms, as well as institute Should we delay action, the West should expect that the anti-corruption measures. Ukraine will need more price will only grow. Should we not act more robustly, we can expect to face further Russian incursions, possibly institutions, such as the International Monetary Fund, including attempts to redraw borders elsewhere, and andfinancial the West. support Others from have international made recommendations financial for efforts to intimidate former Soviet states into accepting such additional support, provided that Ukraine does Russian dominance. indeed move forward on reform. Success in deterring

6 ATLANTIC COUNCIL Preserving Ukraine’s Independence, Resisting Russian Aggression: What the United States and NATO Must Do

APPENDIX 1: September 5 Minsk Ceasefire Protocol

Following is an informal translation of the Russian 10. Remove illegal military formations, military language text of the ceasefire protocol signed on equipment, and militants and mercenaries from the September 5, 2014: territory of Ukraine.

Protocol on the results of the consultations of the 11. Approve a program for economic development of the trilateral contact group regarding joint steps towards Donbas and renew the vital functions of the region. implementation of the peace plan of President of 12. Give guarantees of personal security for participants Ukraine and the initiatives of in the consultations. President of Russia Members of the trilateral contact group: As a result of consideration and discussion of the proposals by members of the consultations in Minsk Ambassador Heidi Tagliavini (Signed) on September 1, 2014, the trilateral contact group Second L. D. Kuchma (Signed) composed of representatives from Ukraine, the Russian Federation and the Organization for Security and Ambassador of Russian Federation to Ukraine M. Yu. Cooperation in Europe, an understanding was reached Zurabov (Signed) regarding the need to take the following steps: A. V. Zakharchenko (Signed) 1. I. V. Plotnitskiy (Signed) 2. Provide for an immediate and bilateral ceasefire. Provide OSCE monitoring and verification of the 3. Conduct decentralization of power, including through ceasefire. approval of the “On the temporary order of local self-government in certain districts of the Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts” (the law on special status). 4. Provide permanent monitoring at the Ukrainian-

creation of a safety zone in the areas adjacent to the borderRussian in state Ukraine border, and and the verification Russian Federation. by OSCE, with 5. Immediately free all hostages and persons being held illegally. 6. Approve a law to prevent the persecution and punishment of persons in regard to events that took place in certain districts of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions of Ukraine. 7. Continue an inclusive national dialogue. 8. Take measures to improve the humanitarian situation in Donbas. 9. Conduct early local elections in accordance with the law of Ukraine “On the temporary order of local self-government in certain districts of the Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts” (law on special status).

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APPENDIX 2: Russian/Separatist Military Advantages

Russian and separatist forces enjoy significant • Electronic warfare: Russian/separatist forces employ military advantages over the Ukrainian armed advanced systems to jam communications and GPS forces, including the following: signals, disrupting Ukrainian C2, maneuver of forces, air operations and targeting. • Air superiority: Russian/separatist forces have denied Ukrainian forces the ability to attack, collect • Artillery and rockets: Russian/separatist forces intelligence, maneuver and resupply their forces employ long-range artillery and multiple launch rocket in Ukraine’s sovereign airspace. Ukrainian forces systems such as the GRAD, with capacity to put large amounts of munitions into a target area at ranges up due to effective Russian/separatist employment of to 30-40 kilometers. have halted all flight operations in eastern Ukraine (MANPADS), which have downed numerous Ukrainian • Supply and logistics: Russian/separatist forces shoulder-fired man-portable air defense systems receive supplies from Russia into the Donetsk and guided surface-to-air missiles, such as the BUK (NATO Luhansk oblasts through the unsecured Ukraine- designatorfixed and rotary-wing SA-11/17) aircraft,which is and widely advanced believed - to have Russia border. downed Malaysia Air 17 in July 2014. • Sanctuary: Russia provides advisors, training, • Intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance: weapons, equipment and safe haven for separatists Russian/separatist forces employ unmanned aerial and their Russian partners bound for operations vehicles, including the Aesop 100 and 4-post, to inside Ukraine. Ukrainian forces are prohibited from attacking targets in Russia. artillery and rocket attacks, likely collecting video/ imageryoverfly Ukrainian intelligence forces, to aid often targeting coinciding and to with assess attack effectiveness as well as collecting to monitor the mostly unencrypted Ukrainian communications.

• Command and control (C2): Russian/separatist forces use secure/encrypted communications systems and their own cell phone network, while Ukrainian forces lack signals intelligence collection or jamming systems to collect or disrupt these capabilities.

8 ATLANTIC COUNCIL Preserving Ukraine’s Independence, Resisting Russian Aggression: What the United States and NATO Must Do

APPENDIX 3: Key Elements of the Ukraine Freedom Support Act of 2014

Statement of Policy (Section 3):

“It is the policy of the United States to further assist the in restoring its sovereignty and territorial integrity to deter the Government of the Russian Federation from further destabilizing and invading Ukraine and other independent countries.”

Increased Military Assistance for the Government of Ukraine (Section 6):

“The President is authorized to provide defense articles, defense services, and training to the Government of Ukraine for the purpose of countering offensive weapons and reestablishing the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Ukraine, including anti-tank and anti-armor weapons, crew weapons and ammunition, counter- artillery radars to identify and target artillery batteries,

control equipment, tactical troop-operated surveillance drones,fire control, and rangesecure finder, command and opticaland communications and guidance and equipment.”

Presidential Report to Congress Required February 18, 2015:

“Not later than 60 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the President shall submit a report detailing the anticipated defense articles, defense services, and training to be provided pursuant to this section and a timeline for the provision of such defense articles, defense services, and training.”

$350 million authorized (but not appropriated) for fiscal years 2015-2017:

“There are authorized to be appropriated to the

Secretary of State $100,000,000 for fiscal year 2015, $125,000,000 for fiscal year 2016, and $125,000,000 for fiscal year 2017.”

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APPENDIX 4: Discussions in Brussels, January 12, 2015

List of Individuals Met in Brussels and Mons and others from Russia. They also operate the more sophisticated equipment that Russia has deployed into • Robert Bell, Defense Advisor, U.S. Mission to NATO the Donbas. In recent weeks, NATO has observed a • General Sir Adrian Bradshaw, Deputy Supreme Allied Commander Europe, NATO including tanks, armored personnel carriers, artillery, large influx of Russian equipment into eastern Ukraine, • General Philip Breedlove, Supreme Allied Commander and air defense systems, with less effort than before to Europe, NATO conceal those movements. • Catherine Dale, Senior Advisor to Supreme Allied NATO’s position is that organized Russian army units Commander Europe, NATO were not present as of about January 12 and that the • Kurt Donnelly, Political Advisor, U.S. Mission to NATO Russian military personnel there were not operating in viable military units. They noted that the Russian army • Ambassador Martin Erdmann, Permanent had eight to nine battalion tactical groups and 50,000 Representative of the Federal Republic of Germany to troops deployed close to the Ukraine-Russia border NATO • between the NATO and Ukrainian assessments on the Allied Commander Europe questionson the Russian of numbers side. (A of significant Russian troops difference and presenceexisted of Rear Admiral Collin Green, Executive Officer, Supreme • Alice Guitton, Deputy Permanent Representative of organized Russian army units in Donetsk and Luhansk.) to NATO

• Major General Randy “” Kee, Director of training on the use of the equipment that Russia Strategy and Policy, U.S. European Command hasNATO moved believes into that the RussianDonbas andofficers that are Moscow providing has • Lee Litzenberger, Deputy Chief of Mission, U.S. Mission strengthened command and control (C2) over to NATO • Ambassador , U.S. Permanent equipment, Russian leadership, greater training and Representative to NATO improvedthe separatist C2 means units. Thisthat thecombination Russians/separatists of influx of have a capability for offensive operations, though NATO • Håkan Malmqvist, Deputy Chief of Mission of Sweden believes these units as of about January 12 did not have to NATO • Ambassador Jacek Najder, Permanent Representative current line of contact with Ukrainian forces in Donetsk of the Republic of Poland to NATO andsufficient Luhansk. logistics for significant operations beyond the • Ambassador Pia Rantala-Engberg, Head of Mission of Finland to NATO From the January 12 discussions, it was clear that some NATO members did not fully appreciate the threat • , Secretary General, NATO posed by Russia’s more aggressive policies of the past • Ambassador , Deputy Secretary year. Conversely, interest remains strong among some General, NATO in attaining a settlement that would allow for an end to • Lieutenant General Michel Yakovleff, Vice Chief of sanctions. Staff, Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe Some NATO member states—the Baltic States, Poland, Canada, and perhaps Britain—might be prepared to NATO believes that a large number of Russian military provide lethal military assistance to Ukraine if the United States were to do so. These states are reluctant to ranged from 250 to 1000—are in eastern Ukraine as of intelligence (GRU) and military officers—estimates when U.S. policy remains one of providing nonlethal trainers to the separatists, as well as to the “volunteers” assistancego first and only. run the risk of political exposure, however, about January 12. These officers serve as advisors and

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APPENDIX 5: Discussions in Ukraine, January 13-16, 2015

List of Individuals Met in Kyiv and Kramatorsk • Anatoliy Pinchuk, Chairman, Civic Assembly of Ukraine

• Michael Bociurkiw, Spokesperson, OSCE Special • , Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of Monitoring Mission to Ukraine Ukraine • Boris Boyko, Chairman of the Supervisory Board, • Ambassador Geoffrey Pyatt, U.S. Ambassador to Charitable Fund for War Veterans and Participants of Ukraine the Antiterrorist Operation • Oleksiy Ryabchyn, Member of Parliament • Valeriy Chaliy, Deputy Head, Administration of the (Batkivshchyna) President of Ukraine • Ostap Semeriak, Member of Parliament (People’s • Bohdan Chomiak, Board Director, Charitable Fund Front) for War Veterans and Participants of the Antiterrorist • Major General Oleksandr Sirskiy, Commander, “Anti- Operation Terror Operation,” • Colonel Joseph Hickox, Defense Attaché, U.S. Embassy, • Colonel General , Head, Joint Intelligence Kyiv Committee and Advisor to the President of Ukraine • General Leonid Holopatiuk, Deputy Chief of Staff, • Serhiy Sobolev, Member of Parliament (Batkivshchyna) Armed Forces of Ukraine • Wolfgang Sporrer, Political Analyst, OSCE Special • Oleksiy Honcharenko, Member of Parliament (Bloc of Monitoring Mission to Ukraine Petro Poroshenko) • , Member of Parliament • , Head, National Institute of (Batkivshchyna) and former Foreign Minister of Strategic Studies and Advisor to the President of Ukraine Ukraine • , Secretary, National Security and • , Minister of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine Defense Council of Ukraine • Ivanna Klympush-Tsintsadze, Member of Parliament • Ivan Vinnyk, Member of Parliament and Secretary, (Bloc of Petro Poroshenko) Parliamentary Committee on National Security and • Igor Lepsha, Board Director, Charitable Fund for Defense War Veterans and Participants of the Antiterrorist Operation Ukrainian interlocutors were understandably concerned • Petro Mekhed, Deputy Minister of Defense of Ukraine regarding Russian actions in eastern Ukraine and possible future intentions. They noted that the Russians/ • Sergey Mikhaylenko, Chairman, Charitable Fund for separatists have steadily expanded the territory under War Veterans and Participants of the Antiterrorist Operation currently occupy about 500 square kilometers more • , Head, Security Service of territorytheir control than since four themonths September ago. There 5 ceasefire is some and concern Ukraine that Moscow might aim to take all of the Donetsk and • Colonel Nozdrachov, Head, Civil-Military Cooperation Luhansk oblasts. There seemed to be less concern about (CIMIC), Armed Forces of Ukraine a Russian drive to take Mariupol and continue on to • Major Jason Parker, Air Attaché, U.S. Embassy, Kyiv seize a land bridge to Crimea. Some interlocutors noted preparations for partisan warfare in the event that • Serhiy Pashynskyi, Member of Parliament and Head, Russia occupied further Ukrainian territory. One cited Parliamentary Committee on National Security and Defense the 1980s. the experience learned from Afghan fighters in

ATLANTIC COUNCIL 11 Preserving Ukraine’s Independence, Resisting Russian Aggression: What the United States and NATO Must Do

Ukrainian sources said that the total number of Russian largely fell into the non-lethal category: secure 36,000, as opposed to 34,000 Ukrainian troops along the communications,Other gaps reported counter-jamming by Ukrainian military equipment, officers linetroops of contact.and separatist They believed fighters thatin the Russian Donbas forces came made to electronic counter-measures for use against UAVs, up 8500 to 10,000 of the 36,000 and included eight to UAVs for the Ukrainian military with ranges of 50-80 ten airborne and mechanized battalion tactical groups, kilometers, armored Humvees and medical support with each battalion tactical group comprising 600 to equipment. They had two primary requests for lethal military assistance: sniper weapons and precision anti- put the number of Russian troops at 5000 to 6000. (The800 officers number and of Russiansoldiers. troops One unofficial and the presence/interlocutor The current stocks of Ukrainian anti-tank/anti-armor absence of organized Russian army units in the Donbas weaponsarmor weapons, are at least specifically 20 years the old Javelin and reportedly anti-tank missile.have a was the biggest difference between the NATO and 70 percent out of commission rate.

One knowledgeable Ukrainian interlocutor noted UkrainianWhen one briefings.)subtracts the number of Russian soldiers Ukraine’s “strategic” need for modern air defense systems, given the overwhelming Russian advantage the majority of the rest are Ukrainian citizens. The in airpower, which he believed would be employed from the 36,000 figure, Ukrainian sources believe that in any major force-on-force operation by the Russian Russia. One interlocutor said that approximately 2000 military, e.g., an effort to seize a land bridge to ofothers the 36,000 include are Chechen operating and in Cossack “rogue” fighters units that from are not Crimea. He contrasted this with the “tactical” need under Russian, “Donetsk People’s Republic” or “Luhansk for anti-armor weapons. People’s Republic” command.

learn to operate new equipment and cited their experienceUkrainian officials in getting maintained U.S.-provided that theycounter-mortar could quickly T-72Like NATO,tanks asthe well as armored reported personnel a significant carriers), recent radars into action. artillery,influx from multiple Russia launch into Ukraine rocket ofsystems armor (MLRS)(T-64 and such as the Grad, and sophisticated air defense systems. One While there is some coordination between the regular Ukrainian estimate put the armor numbers at 250 army and volunteer battalions, it varies with the tanks and 800 armored personnel carriers; other battalion, ranging from barely satisfactory to poor. estimates were higher. with those battalions that are working with the Ministry ofMilitary the Interior. officials suggested that coordination is better unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) for surveillance andUkrainians targeting reported purposes. significant The Russians Russian combined use of this The OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine (which capability with MLRS and artillery with devastating is separate from the OSCE mission that monitors two crossing points on the Ukraine/Russia border) reported Ukrainian casualties were from MLRS and artillery effect; one Ukrainian officer stated that 70 percent of that some 5.2 million people have been affected (the capabilities to jam or down Russian UAVs. majority,a difficult but situation not all, in on the the Donbas. separatist The side mission of the believed line strikes. Ukrainian military officers said that they have no of contact) and that, in addition, more than one million people had been displaced, with slightly more than half radars provided by the United States and now in use of those relocated in Ukraine while most of the rest alongUkrainian the line military of contact, officials but praised they observed the counter-mortar that those had gone to Russia. The mission noted that 70 percent radars have a range of only six to seven kilometers. of the Russian/separatist-controlled area in Luhansk They expressed very strong interest in acquiring longer oblast was not under control of the “Luhansk People’s range counter-battery systems that could detect MLRS Republic” but was controlled by rogue groups.

kilometers and enable the Ukrainian military to target thoselaunches systems and artillery with its firingown MLRS out to and a range artillery. of 30-40 (The Grad MLRS, which the Russians/separatists have used to great effect, has a range of 20 kilometers.)

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