Preserving Ukraine’s Independence, Resisting Russian Aggression: What the United States and NATO Must Do Ivo Daalder, Michele Flournoy, John Herbst, Jan Lodal, Steven Pifer, James Stavridis, Strobe Talbott and Charles Wald © 2015 The Atlantic Council of the United States. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means without permission in writing from the Atlantic Council, except in the case of brief quotations in news articles, critical articles, or reviews. Please direct inquiries to: Atlantic Council 1030 15th Street, NW, 12th Floor Washington, DC 20005 ISBN: 978-1-61977-471-1 Publication design: Krystal Ferguson; Cover photo credit: Reuters/David Mdzinarishvili This report is written and published in accordance with the Atlantic Council Policy on Intellectual Independence. The authors are solely responsible for its analysis and recommendations. The Atlantic Council, the Brookings Institution, and the Chicago Council on Global Affairs, and their funders do not determine, nor do they necessarily endorse or advocate for, any of this report’s conclusions. February 2015 PREFACE This report is the result of collaboration among the Donbas provinces of Donetsk and Luhansk. scholars and former practitioners from the A stronger Ukrainian military, with enhanced Atlantic Council, the Brookings Institution, the defensive capabilities, will increase the pros- Center for a New American Security, and the pects for negotiation of a peaceful settlement. Chicago Council on Global Affairs. It is informed When combined with continued robust Western by and reflects mid-January discussions with economic sanctions, significant military assis- senior NATO and U.S. officials in Brussels and tance to bolster Ukraine’s defensive capabilities senior Ukrainian civilian and military officials in will make clear that the West will not accept Kyiv and at the Ukrainian “anti-terror operation” the use of force to change borders in Europe. headquarters in Kramatorsk. President Putin may hope to achieve glory through restoring, through intimidation and The report outlines the background to the force, Russian dominion over its neighbors. But crisis over Ukraine, describes why the United a peaceful world requires opposing this through States and NATO need to engage more actively decisive action. and urgently, summarizes what the authors heard in discussions at NATO and in Ukraine, We fully endorse the analysis and recommen- and offers specific recommendations for steps dations contained in the report and urge the that Washington and NATO should take to Obama Administration and NATO governments, strengthen Ukraine’s defenses and thereby with support from the U.S. Congress and Allied enhance its ability to deter further Russian parliaments, to move rapidly to implement the aggression. recommendations. Such action would contribute to helping Ukraine restore control over its border and territory in Ivo Daalder, President, the Chicago Council on Global Affairs, and former U.S. Permanent Representative to NATO Michele Flournoy, Chair, Center for a New American Security, and former Under Secretary of Defense John Herbst, Director, Dinu Patriciu Eurasia Center, the Atlantic Council, and former U.S. Ambassador to Ukraine Jan Lodal, Distinguished Fellow and former President, the Atlantic Council, and former Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense Steven Pifer, Senior Fellow, the Brookings Institution, and former U.S. Ambassador to Ukraine James Stavridis, Member of the Board, the Atlantic Council, Dean, Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University, and former Supreme Allied Commander Europe Strobe Talbott, President, the Brookings Institution, and former Deputy Secretary of State Charles Wald, Member of the Board, the Atlantic Council, and former Deputy Commander, U.S. European Command TABLE OF CONTENTS Executive Summary .................................................................................................................................................................. 1 Background: A Putin-Manufactured Conflict ................................................................................................................ 2 The Case for Increased U.S. Military Assistance Now ............................................................................................... 2 Providing Military Support to Deter Further Aggression ......................................................................................... 3 Recommendations for Specific Military Assistance ................................................................................................... 4 Supporting Recommendations ........................................................................................................................................... 5 Conclusion ................................................................................................................................................................................... 6 Appendix 1: September 5 Minsk Ceasefire Protocol ................................................................................................... 7 Appendix 2: Russian/Separatist Military Advantages ............................................................................................... 8 Appendix 3: Key Elements of the Ukraine Freedom Support Act of 2014 ........................................................ 9 Appendix 4: Discussions in Brussels, January 12, 2015 ........................................................................................... 10 Appendix 5: Discussions in Ukraine, January 13-16, 2015 .........................................................................................11 Preserving Ukraine’s Independence, Resisting Russian Aggression: What the United States and NATO Must Do EXECUTIVE SUMMARY We face a critical juncture in Ukraine. There is no real possible in 2015, followed by additional tranches of $1 billion in FY 2016 and FY 2017. mid-January,ceasefire; indeed, with thereRussian/separatist was a significant forces increase launching in Additional non-lethal assistance should include: counter- attacksfighting on along the theDonetsk line of airport contact and in easternother areas. Ukraine Instead in battery radars, unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), of a political settlement, Moscow currently seeks to electronic counter-measures for use against opposing UAVs, secure communications capabilities, armored to pressure and destabilize the Ukrainian government. Humvees and medical support equipment. Russianscreate a frozen continue conflict to be in present eastern in Ukraine the Donetsk as a meansand Lethal defensive military assistance should include light Luhansk oblasts in substantial numbers and have anti-armor missiles, given the large numbers of armored vehicles that the Russians have deployed in Donetsk and could be preparation for another major Russian/ Luhansk and the abysmal condition of the Ukrainian separatistintroduced offensive. significant amounts of heavy weapons. This military’s light anti-armor weapons. Russian success would fatally undermine Ukraine’s Other NATO members should provide military assistance stability and embolden the Kremlin to further challenge as well. Of particular use to the Ukrainian military would the security order in Europe. It might tempt President be equipment and weapons from NATO members who Putin to use his doctrine of protecting ethnic Russians operate former Soviet equipment compatible with the and Russian speakers in seeking territorial changes arms currently in the Ukrainian inventory. elsewhere in the neighborhood, including in the Baltic States, provoking a direct challenge to NATO. Assisting Ukraine to deter attack and defend itself Maintaining Western sanctions are critical but not is not inconsistent with the search for a peaceful, political solution—it is essential to achieving it. Only if deterrence in Ukraine by raising the risks and costs to the Kremlin knows that the risks and costs of further Russiaby themselves of any renewed sufficient. major The offensive.West needs to bolster political solution. Russia’s actions in and against Ukraine That requires providing direct military assistance—in posemilitary the actiongravest are threat high towill European it seek to security find an inacceptable more far larger amounts than provided to date and including than 30 years. The West has the capacity to stop Russia. lethal defensive arms—so that Ukraine is better able The question is whether it has the will. to defend itself. The U.S. government should provide Ukraine $1 billion in military assistance as soon as ATLANTIC COUNCIL 1 Preserving Ukraine’s Independence, Resisting Russian Aggression: What the United States and NATO Must Do economy—particularly as oil prices have dropped Background: substantially, sharply reducing export earnings. But A Putin-Manufactured Conflict they have not yet achieved their principal political goal: effecting a change in Russian policy toward Ukrainian President Yanukovych’s November 2013 Ukraine. Western leaders have stated that sanctions will decision, apparently under great pressure from Putin, remain in place until the Kremlin’s policy changes in a not to sign an association agreement with the European Union triggered massive demonstrations and an intense political crisis within Ukraine. The Ukrainian significantAlthough there way. have been numerous diplomatic February 2014, when Yanukovych abandoned his little real progress has