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List of Persons and Entities Under EU Restrictive Measures Over the Territorial Integrity of Ukraine

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List of Persons and Entities Under EU Restrictive Measures Over the Territorial Integrity of Ukraine dhdsh PRESS Council of the European Union EN List of persons and entities under EU restrictive measures over the territorial integrity of Ukraine List of Persons Name Identifying Reasons Date of listing information 1. Sergey Valeryevich DOB: 26.11.1972. Aksyonov was elected 'Prime Minister of Crimea' in the Crimean 17.3.2014 AKSYONOV, Verkhovna Rada on 27 February 2014 in the presence of pro-Russian POB: Beltsy (Bălţi), gunmen. His 'election' was decreed unconstitutional by the acting Sergei Valerievich now Republic of Ukrainian President Oleksandr Turchynov on 1 March 2014. He actively AKSENOV (Сергей Moldova lobbied for the 'referendum' of 16 March 2014 and was one of the co- Валерьевич signatories of the ’treaty on Crimea´s accession to the Russian AKCëHOB), Federation’ of 18 March 2014. On 9 April 2014 he was appointed acting Serhiy Valeriyovych ‘Head’ of the so-called ‘Republic of Crimea’ by President Putin. On 9 AKSYONOV (Сергiй October 2014, he was formally ‘elected’ 'Head' of the so-called 'Republic Валерiйович Аксьонов) of Crimea'. Aksyonov subsequently decreed that the offices of ‘Head’ and ‘Prime Minister’ be combined. Member of the Russia State Council. 1/83 dhdsh PRESS Council of the European Union EN Name Identifying Reasons Date of listing information 2. Rustam Ilmirovich DOB: 15.8.1976 As former Deputy Minister of Crimea, Temirgaliev played a relevant role 17.3.2014 TEMIRGALIEV in the decisions taken by the ‘Supreme Council’ concerning the POB: Ulan-Ude, ‘referendum’ of 16 March 2014 against the territorial integrity of Ukraine. (Рустам Ильмирович Buryat ASSR He lobbied actively for the integration of Crimea into the Russian Темиргалиев) (Russian SFSR) Federation. On 11 June 2014 he resigned from his function as ‘First Deputy Prime Minister’ of the so-called ‘Republic of Crimea’. 3. Rustam Ilmirovich DOB: 15.8.1976 As former Deputy Minister of Crimea, Temirgaliev played a relevant role 17.3.2014 TEMIRGALIEV in the decisions taken by the Verkhovna Rada concerning the POB: Ulan-Ude, 'referendum' against territorial integrity of Ukraine. He lobbied actively for (Рустам Ильмирович Buryat ASSR the integration of Crimea into the Russian Federation. Темиргалиев) (Russian SFSR) On 11 June 2014 he resigned from his function as ‘First Deputy Prime Minister’ of the so-called ‘Republic of Crimea’. 4. Denis Valentinovich DOB: 15.7.1974 Berezovskiy was appointed commander of the Ukrainian Navy 17.3.2014 BEREZOVSKIY on 1 March 2014 but thereafter swore an oath to the Crimean armed POB: Kharkiv, forces, thereby breaking his oath to the Ukrainian Navy. (Денис Валентинович Ukrainian SSR Березовский) He was then appointed Deputy Commander of the Black Sea Fleet of the Russian Federation. 2/83 dhdsh PRESS Council of the European Union EN Name Identifying Reasons Date of listing information 5. Aleksei Mikhailovich DOB: 13.6.1961 Chaliy became ‘People´s Mayor of Sevastopol’ by popular acclamation 17.3.2014 CHALIY on 23 February 2014 and accepted this ‘vote’. He actively campaigned POB: Moscow or for Sevastopol to become a separate entity of the Russian Federation (Алексей Михайлович Sevastopol following a referendum on 16 March 2014. He was one of the co- Чалый) signatories of the ’treaty on Crimea´s accession to the Russian Federation’ of 18 March 2014. He was acting 'governor' of Sevastopol from 1 to 14 April 2014 and is a former 'elected' Chairman of the Legislative Assembly of the City of Sevastopol. 6. Pyotr Anatoliyovych ZIMA DOB: 29.3.1965 Zima was appointed as the new head of the Crimean Security Service 17.3.2014 (SBU) on 3 March 2014 by ‘Prime Minister’ Aksyonov and accepted this (Пётр Анатольевич Зима) appointment. He has given relevant information including a database to the Russian Intelligence Service (FSB). This included information on Euro-Maidan activists and human rights defenders of Crimea. He played a relevant role in preventing Ukraine’s authorities from controlling the territory of Crimea. On 11 March 2014 the formation of an independent Security Service of Crimea was proclaimed by former SBU officers of Crimea. 3/83 dhdsh PRESS Council of the European Union EN Name Identifying Reasons Date of listing information 1 8. Sergey Pavlovych TSEKOV DOB: 29.9.1953 or As Vice Speaker of the Verkhovna Rada of Crimea; Tsekov initiated, 17.3.2014 23.9.1953 or together with Sergey Aksyonov, the unlawful dismissal of the government (Сергей Павлович Цеков) 28.9.1953 of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea (ARC). He drew Vladimir Konstantinov into this endeavour, threatening him with dismissal. He POB: Simferopol publicly recognized that the MPs from Crimea were the initiators of inviting Russian soldiers to take over the Verkhovna Rada of Crimea. He was one of the first Crimean Leaders to ask in public for the annexation of Crimea to Russia. Member of the Federation Council of the Russian Federation from the so- called ‘Republic of Crimea’. 9. Viktor Alekseevich DOB: 5.1.1958 Chairman of the Security and Defence Committee of the Federation 17.3.2014 OZEROV Council of the Russian Federation. POB: Abakan, (Виктор Алексеевич Khakassia On 1 March 2014 Ozerov, on behalf of the Security and Defence Озеров) Committee of the Federation Council, publicly supported, in the Federation Council, the deployment of Russian forces in Ukraine. 1 The entry was deleted on 10 March 2016 following a delisting decision. 4/83 dhdsh PRESS Council of the European Union EN Name Identifying Reasons Date of listing information 10. Vladimir Michailovich DOB: 29.9.1952 First Deputy-Chairman of the International Affairs Committee of the 17.3.2014 DZHABAROV Federation Council of the Russian Federation. (Владимир Михайлович On 1 March 2014 Dzhabarov, on behalf of the International Affairs Джабаров) Committee of the Federation Council, publicly supported, in the Federation Council, the deployment of Russian forces in Ukraine. 11. Andrei Aleksandrovich DOB: 9.11.1972 Chairman of the Committee on Constitutional Law of the Federation 17.3.2014 KLISHAS Council of the Russian Federation. POB: Sverdlovsk (Андрей Александрович On 1 March 2014 Klishas publicly supported, in the Federation Council, Клишас) the deployment of Russian forces in Ukraine. In public statements Klishas sought to justify a Russian military intervention in Ukraine by claiming that ‘the Ukrainian President supports the appeal of the Crimean authorities to the President of the Russian Federation on landing an all-encompassing assistance in defence of the citizens of Crimea’. 12. Nikolai Ivanovich RYZHKOV DOB: 28.9.1929 Member of the Committee for federal issues, regional politics and the 17.3.2014 POB: Dyleevka, North of the Federation Council of the Russian Federation. (Николай Иванович Donetsk region, Рыжков) On 1 March 2014 Ryzhkov publicly supported, in the Federation Council, Ukrainian SSR the deployment of Russian forces in Ukraine. 13. Evgeni Viktorovich DOB: 4.10.1958 Deputy Speaker of the Federation Council of the Russian Federation. 17.3.2014 BUSHMIN POB: Lopatino, On 1 March 2014 Bushmin publicly supported, in the Federation Council, (Евгений Викторович Sergachiisky region, the deployment of Russian forces in Ukraine. Бушмин) RSFSR 5/83 dhdsh PRESS Council of the European Union EN Name Identifying Reasons Date of listing information 14. Aleksandr Borisovich DOB: 3.4.1957 Member of the Committee of International Affairs of the Federation 17.3.2014 TOTOONOV Council of the Russian Federation. POB: Ordzhonikidze, (Александр Борисович North Ossetia On 1 March 2014 Totoonov publicly supported, in the Federation Council, Тотоонов) the deployment of Russian forces in Ukraine. 15. Oleg Evgenevich DOB: 21.7.1952 Former First Deputy Chairman of the Committee on Parliamentary Issues 17.3.2014 PANTELEEV of the Federation Council. POB: Zhitnikovskoe, (Олег Евгеньевич Kurgan region On 1 March 2014 Panteleev publicly supported, in the Federation Пантелеев) Council, the deployment of Russian forces in Ukraine. Currently First Deputy Governor of the Kurgan Oblast and Head of the delegation of the Government of Kurgan Oblast to the Government of the Russian Federation. 16. Sergei Mikhailovich DOB: 14.2.1953 Member of the Council of the State Duma; Leader of Fair Russia faction 17.3.2014 MIRONOV in the Duma of the Russian Federation. POB: Pushkin, (Сергей Михайлович Leningrad region Initiator of the bill allowing Russian Federation to admit in its composition, Миронов) under the pretext of protection of Russian citizens, territories of a foreign country without the consent of that country or an international treaty. 17. Sergei Vladimirovich DOB: 30.7.1970 Deputy Speaker of the State Duma of the Russian Federation. 17.3.2014 ZHELEZNYAK POB: St. Petersburg Actively supporting use of Russian Armed Forces in Ukraine and (Сергей Владимирович (former Leningrad) annexation of Crimea. He led personally the demonstration in support of Железняк) the use of Russian Armed Forces in Ukraine. 6/83 dhdsh PRESS Council of the European Union EN Name Identifying Reasons Date of listing information 18. Leonid Eduardovich DOB: 4.1.1968 Chairman of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) Committee 17.3.2014 SLUTSKI of the State Duma of the Russian Federation (member of the LDPR). POB: Moscow (Леонид Эдуардович Actively supporting use of Russian Armed Forces in Ukraine and the Слуцкий) annexation of Crimea. 19. Aleksandr Viktorovich DOB: 13.9.1961 Commander of the Black Sea Fleet, Admiral. 17.3.2014 VITKO POB: Vitebsk Responsible for commanding Russian forces that have occupied (Александр Викторович (Belarusian SSR) Ukrainian sovereign territory. Витко) 20. Anatoliy Alekseevich DOB: 2.7.1958 Former Commander, Russia’s Western Military District, units of which are 17.3.2014 SIDOROV deployed in Crimea. He was responsible for part of the Russian military POB: Siva, Perm presence in Crimea which is undermining the sovereignty of the Ukraine (Анатолий Алексеевич region, USSR and assisted the Crimean authorities in preventing public demonstrations Сидоров) against moves towards a referendum and incorporation into Russia.
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