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Citizens and the State in the Government-Controlled Territories of the Donetsk and Luhansk Regions Problems, Challenges and Visions of the Future

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Citizens and the State in the Government-Controlled Territories of the Donetsk and Luhansk Regions Problems, Challenges and Visions of the Future Citizens and the state in the government-controlled territories of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions Problems, challenges and visions of the future Funded by: This document has been produced with the financial assistance of the European Union through International Alert. The contents of this document are the sole responsibility of International Alert and UCIPR and can in no way be taken to reflect the views of the European Union. Layout: Nick Wilmot Creative Front cover image: A mother and daughter living in temporary accommodation for those displaced by the violence in Donetsk, 2014. © Andrew McConnell/Panos © International Alert/Ukrainian Center for Independent Political Research 2017 Citizens and the state in the government-controlled territories of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions Problems, challenges and visions of the future October 2017 2 CONTENTS 1. Introduction 3 2. Methodology 6 3. Findings 7 4. Statements from interviewees 22 5. Conclusions and recommendations 30 Citizens and the state in the government-controlled territories of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions 3 1. INTRODUCTION The demarcation line (the line of contact)1 and the ‘grey zone’ between the government-controlled2 and uncontrolled territories3 of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions separates the parties to the conflict in the east of Ukraine. The areas controlled by the Ukrainian authorities and bordering the ‘grey zone’ are very politically sensitive, highly militarised, and fall under a special governance regime that is different from the rest of the country. In the absence of a comprehensive political settlement and amid uncertain prospects, it is unclear how long this situation will remain. It is highly likely that over the next few years, Ukrainians in areas adjacent to the contact line will live under very particular and unusual governance structures, and in varying degrees of danger. These vulnerable areas are therefore the focus of this study. The so-called ‘grey zone’ or ‘security zone’ appeared as the result of efforts aimed at resolving the armed conflict triggered by instability in Ukraine, and Russian policy in the territory of Ukraine’s Luhansk and Donetsk regions. Following the Maidan demonstrations, the collapse of the government in Kyiv, and after the Russian Federation’s illegal annexation of Crimea, the epicentre of violence shifted to the Donbass in the spring of 2014. As of July 2017, military operations of variable intensity in the east of Ukraine continue. International experts record not only military assistance to the local armed forces from Russia, but also massive shelling from its territory.4 There is also return shelling from the Ukrainian side into non-government controlled areas. In January 2017, according to Stepan Poltorak, the Minister of Defence of Ukraine, there were about 40,000 members of illegal armed formations in the Donbass, of whom 5,000 are career officers in the regular Russian Armed Forces. According to the United Nations, by 15 May 2017, at least 10,090 people had been killed, 23,966 injured, and more than 1,600,000 forced to move out of the conflict zone. According to the Ministry of Defence of Ukraine, the Ukrainian militaries have borne 2,696 casualties and 9,903 wounded as of 16 June 2017. Ukraine’s Donetsk and Luhansk regions are densely populated. The population of the Donetsk region is estimated to be 4,234,300 as of 1 May 2017, while that of the Luhansk region is 2,192,100 as of 1 April 2017. Conflict in these densely populated areas has resulted in a decrease in the average population density by 20.2%. Regional infrastructure has been destroyed as a result of the war. According to expert estimates, most of the damage is to residential buildings and the energy, water, and heating systems. The total losses in the Donetsk region alone exceed 1.25 billion Ukrainian hryvnia (UAH).5 At the same time, a significant part of the social infrastructure and major industrial enterprises have remained in territory uncontrolled by Ukraine. Military fighting, population flight as a result of these hostilities, the influence of information from the Russian Federation and from occupied areas of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions (ORDLO), and the loss of economic potential, have had a particularly negative effect on the Donbass in general, and particularly on communities living in the government-controlled territories near the line of contact. 1 The line of contact is a conditional delineation between the uncontrolled and government-controlled territories 2 The government-controlled territory is understood as being the territory where the Anti-Terrorist Operation is being carried out, and where the state authorities fully exercise their powers established by Ukraine’s legislation (the temporary procedure for monitoring the movement of people across the contact line within the Donetsk and Luhansk regions is approved by the Anti-Terrorist Centre under the Security Service of Ukraine) 3 The temporarily uncontrolled territory is the territory where the Ukrainian authorities temporarily do not exercise their powers. 4 Putin’s undeclared war: summer 2014 – Russian artillery strikes against Ukraine, Bellingcat, 2016 https://www.bellingcat.com/news/uk-and- europe/2016/12/21/russian-artillery-strikes-against-ukraine 5 National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine, Review of the Donbass: Assessment of socio-economic losses and priority areas of government policy, 2015, http://nbuviap.gov.ua/images/nauk-mon/Vidrodgennya_Donbasu.pdf 4 The Ukrainian government has taken steps to address the humanitarian, social, and economic problems in the territories under its control. The programme on ‘Measures to restore the Donbass’ was adopted by Cabinet Resolution No. 1002 on 16 October 2014.6 These measures mainly focused on restoring damaged infrastructure. On 20 April 2016, the Ministry of Temporarily Occupied Territories and Internally Displaced Persons (MTOT) was established on the basis of the State Agency for the Restoration of the Donbass and the State Service for the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the City of Sevastopol. On 31 August 2016, the government of Ukraine approved the concept of the state targeted programme ‘Restoration and development of peace in the eastern regions of Ukraine.’ The document detailed the policy along the demarcation line in the territories controlled by the Ukrainian authorities, and stated that the policy of reconstruction was (at that time) unsystematic, while the main areas of financing were not defined. Three main areas of activity were prioritised: • To restore critical infrastructure and the social services sector, including energy, transportation, water supply and drainage facilities. There were also plans to reinstate education, healthcare, and social security institutions. • To support small and medium-sized businesses. • To develop civil society in the region, and rebuild confidence and peace.7 On 11 January 2017, the Cabinet of Ministers approved the Action Plan for the implementation of principles of state domestic policy in certain districts of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions where the state authorities do not currently exercise their powers. The Action Plan has provided for measures to combat corruption, to address infrastructure issues, and to increase trust in communities (activities in the field of education and medical care). Nevertheless, it is difficult today to identify the problem-free implementation of all these measures, because the effectiveness of Ukraine’s politics is hampered by the uncoordinated actions of the state apparatus, a lack of proper financing, and military action in the region. In 2016, a large amount of funds transferred to the special fund of the budgets of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions in July (UAH 3.8 billion) was practically not used, despite the acute need for restoring infrastructure and housing. The reason for this, in the opinion of experts, was the unjustified centralisation of project management.8 There is a need for the full reintegration of the government-controlled territories into Ukraine, the solution of social and humanitarian problems, and the strengthening of confidence-building measures inside and outside the Donbass. A policy is also required for communication with citizens residing in the non-government controlled territories, though full reintegration will only be possible after security problems are solved, separatist forces disbanded, Russian troops removed, and the region demilitarised. Among the main problems of concern to citizens residing in the government-controlled territories near the contact line were the following four components: • Security problems; • Receiving social and administrative services, and problems around the reintegration of internally displaced persons (IDPs); • Lack of drinking water and electricity, and problems of medical care; • Socio-economic problems typical for the whole of Ukraine, but aggravated in the conflict zone (unemployment, the high costs of utilities, and corruption). 6 Resolution of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine, On the action plan to organise restoration of damaged (ruined) social and transportation infrastructure objects, residential buildings and utilities provision systems in the Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts, No. 1002, 2014, http:// zakon2.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/1002-2014-%D1%80 7 The peace initiative: How the government is going to restore Donbass, RBC-Ukraine, 31 August 2016, https://daily.rbc.ua/rus/show/mirnaya- initsiativa-pravitelstvo-sobiraetsya-1472640150.html, accessed 4 September 2017
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