Euromaidan Newsletter No. 51
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Ukraine Election: Comedian Zelensky Wins Presidency by Landslide - BBC News
Ukraine election: Comedian Zelensky wins presidency by landslide - BBC News Menu Home Video World US & Canada UK Business Tech Science Stories World Africa Asia Australia Europe Latin America Middle East Ukraine election: Comedian Zelensky wins presidency by landslide 22 April 2019 Share Ukrainian presidential election 2019 Volodymyr Zelensky and his supporters celebrate winning Ukraine's presidential election Ukrainian comedian Volodymyr Zelensky has scored a landslide victory in the country's presidential election. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-48007487[12/15/2019 9:28:06 AM] Ukraine election: Comedian Zelensky wins presidency by landslide - BBC News With nearly all ballots counted in the run-off vote, Mr Zelensky had taken more than 73% with incumbent Petro Poroshenko trailing far behind on 24%. "I will never let you down," Mr Zelensky told celebrating supporters. Russia says it wants him to show "sound judgement", "honesty" and "pragmatism" so that relations can improve. Russia backs separatists in eastern Ukraine. The comments came from Russian Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev, in a Facebook post on Monday (in Russian). He said he expected Mr Zelensky to "repeat familiar ideological formulas" that he used in the election campaign, adding: "I have no illusions on that score. "At the same time, there is a chance to improve relations with our country." Mr Poroshenko, who admitted defeat after the first exit polls were published, has said he will not be leaving politics. He told voters that Mr Zelensky, 41, was too inexperienced to stand up to Russia effectively. Mr Zelensky, a political novice, is best known for starring in a satirical television series Servant of the People, in which his character accidentally becomes Ukrainian president. -
Preserving Ukraine's Independence, Resisting Russian Aggression
Preserving Ukraine’s Independence, Resisting Russian Aggression: What the United States and NATO Must Do Ivo Daalder, Michele Flournoy, John Herbst, Jan Lodal, Steven Pifer, James Stavridis, Strobe Talbott and Charles Wald © 2015 The Atlantic Council of the United States. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means without permission in writing from the Atlantic Council, except in the case of brief quotations in news articles, critical articles, or reviews. Please direct inquiries to: Atlantic Council 1030 15th Street, NW, 12th Floor Washington, DC 20005 ISBN: 978-1-61977-471-1 Publication design: Krystal Ferguson; Cover photo credit: Reuters/David Mdzinarishvili This report is written and published in accordance with the Atlantic Council Policy on Intellectual Independence. The authors are solely responsible for its analysis and recommendations. The Atlantic Council, the Brookings Institution, and the Chicago Council on Global Affairs, and their funders do not determine, nor do they necessarily endorse or advocate for, any of this report’s conclusions. February 2015 PREFACE This report is the result of collaboration among the Donbas provinces of Donetsk and Luhansk. scholars and former practitioners from the A stronger Ukrainian military, with enhanced Atlantic Council, the Brookings Institution, the defensive capabilities, will increase the pros- Center for a New American Security, and the pects for negotiation of a peaceful settlement. Chicago Council on Global Affairs. It is informed When combined with continued robust Western by and reflects mid-January discussions with economic sanctions, significant military assis- senior NATO and U.S. -
Ukraine's Security and Judicial Reforms Under Zelensky
POLICY BRIEF GUARDING THE GUARDIANS: UKRAINE’S SECURITY AND JUDICIAL REFORMS UNDER ZELENSKY Gustav Gressel August 2019 SUMMARY Despite Ukrainians’ deep unhappiness with the corruption and inefficiency of the judiciary and security bodies, the Poroshenko administration failed to reform these services. Political interference and personal enrichment have long been part of the practice of these services, overshadowing the strong work they are often capable of and holding back reformist elements. The office of the prosecutor general and the Ukrainian Security Service need particular attention, but merely passing new laws will not be enough: replacing incumbent high-level officials should be an early step. The EU, US, and NATO have worked effectively together on encouraging reform in Ukraine, but they must now ensure that these services remain high in the minds of the Zelensky administration and of Rada members. Introduction Since 2014, much of Europe’s public debate on Ukraine has revolved around the geopolitical contest between the West and Russia, the war in Donbas, and their security implications for Europe. But, at its core, Ukraine’s Revolution of Dignity was an anti-corruption uprising that only became geopolitical later. Ukrainians longed for a government that was less corrupt, more responsive to citizens’ demands, and bound by the rule of law. They ousted a government that had denied them their rights, fought the foreign invasion that would have reinstated a repressive kleptocracy, and elected new political leaders. However, these new leaders did not meet expectations – in either Ukraine or the West. Disappointment with the slow progress of reforms, particularly a series of setbacks in the fight against corruption, was key to the subsequent collapse in popularity of former president Petro Poroshenko and of established political parties. -
The Future of Ukrainian Oligarchsdownload
Ukrainian Institute for the Future is an independent analytical center that: • forecasts changes and models possible scenarios for events in Ukraine; • makes a competent assessment of the Ukrainian events; • makes specific recommendations for actions; • offers effective solutions; • offers a platform for discussions on current topics. It is a project of representatives of Ukrainian business, politics and the public sector. Founded in summer 2016. AUTHORS Victor Andrusiv Executive Director of the Ukrainian Institute for the Future, PhD in Political Science, analyst and opinion journalist, author of the book “Change the future” Oleg Ustenko Executive Director of the Bleyzer Foundation, President of Harvard Club of Ukraine alumni association Yurii Romanenko Co-founder of the Ukrainian Institute for the Future, head of the International and Domestic Policy programme, editor-in-chief of the portal Hvylya Ihar Tyshkevich Expert of International and Domestic Politics programme of the Ukrainian Institute for the Future (UIF) © Art-direction D!VANDESIGN © Idea and design INCOGNITA INTRODUCTION. THE BRITISH DISEASE IN UKRAINE Content 05 THEORY AND STRUCTURE OF THE UKRAINIAN OLIGARCHY 06 INFLUENCE OVER ENERGY INDUSTRY 14 INFLUENCE OVER METALLURGY 26 INFLUENCE OVER TRANSPORT INFRASTRUCTURE 38 INFLUENCE OVER MEDIA 50 INFLUENCE OVER POLITICS 62 THREE SCENARIOS FOR THE FUTURE OF THE OLIGARCHS 72 Victor Andrusiv Executive Director of the Ukrainian Institute for the Future, PhD in Political Science, analyst and opinion journalist, author of the book “Change the future” Introduction: the British disease in Ukraine After the fall of the Soviet Union, the starting conditions for economic development in Ukraine were advanta- geous. However, after 27 years of independence, we continue to be the most backward country of the post-Sovi- et bloc. -
Keystone of the System. Old and New Oligarchs in Ukraine
59 KEYSTONE OF THE SYSTEM OLD AND NEW OLIGARCHS IN UKRAINE Wojciech Konończuk NUMBER 59 WARSAW auGusT 2016 KEYSTONE OF THE SYSTEM OLD AND NEW OLIGARCHS IN UKRAINE Wojciech Konończuk © Copyright by Ośrodek Studiów Wschodnich im. Marka Karpia / Centre for Eastern Studies Content editor Adam Eberhardt Editor Halina Kowalczyk Co-operation Katarzyna Kazimierska, Anna Łabuszewska Translation Jim Todd Charts Wojciech Mańkowski Graphic design PARA-BUCH DTP GroupMedia Illustration on cover Shutterstock Publisher Ośrodek Studiów Wschodnich im. Marka Karpia Centre for Eastern Studies ul. Koszykowa 6a, Warsaw, Poland Phone + 48 /22/ 525 80 00 Fax: + 48 /22/ 525 80 40 osw.waw.pl ISBN 978-83-62936-82-3 Contents SUMMARY /5 INTRODUCTION /8 I. OliGarchs in The sysTem of posT-Maidan Ukraine /11 1. The ‘old’ oligarchs (temporarily) on the defensive /11 2. Co-operation with the new government /15 II. New oliGarchs in The GOVernmenT /21 1. The business-political circle of President Poroshenko /22 2. The business-political circle of Arseniy Yatsenyuk and the People’s Front /28 III. The de-oliGarchisaTion THAT neVer happened /35 SUMMARY • For the last two decades, oligarchs, or big entrepreneurs who have been able to turn their business prowess into power- ful political influence, have been among the most important actors in Ukraine’s politics. More than two years after the Maidan revolution, it is fully justified to say that the oligar- chic system remains a key mechanism in Ukraine’s political and economic life. While it is true that the influence of the for- merly most powerful oligarchic groups has eroded during this period, no such group except for the Family, i.e. -
Public Opinion Survey of Residents of Ukraine
Public Opinion Survey of Residents of Ukraine December 13-27, 2018 Methodology • The survey was conducted by Rating Group Ukraine on behalf of the International Republican Institute’s Center for Insights in Survey Research. • The survey was conducted throughout Ukraine (except for the occupied territories of Crimea and Donbas) from December 13- 27, 2018, through face-to-face interviews at respondents’ homes. • The sample consisted of 2,400 permanent residents of Ukraine aged 18 and older and eligible to vote. It is representative of the general population by gender, age, region, and settlement size. The distribution of population by regions and settlements is based on statistical data of the Central Election Commission from the 2014 parliamentary elections, and the distribution of population by age and gender is based on data from the State Statistics Committee of Ukraine from January 1, 2018. • A multi-stage probability sampling method was used with the random route and “last birthday” methods for respondent selection. • Stage One: The territory of Ukraine was split into 25 administrative regions (24 regions of Ukraine and Kyiv). The survey was conducted throughout all regions of Ukraine, with the exception of the occupied territories of Crimea and Donbas. • Stage Two: The selection of settlements was based on towns and villages. Towns were grouped into subtypes according to their size: • Cities with populations of more than 1 million • Cities with populations of between 500,000-999,000 • Cities with populations of between 100,000-499,000 • Cities with populations of between 50,000-99,000 • Cities with populations of up to 50,000 • Villages Cities and villages were selected by the PPS method (probability proportional to size). -
Statement by His Excellency Mr. Petro Poroshenko, the President Of
Statement by His Excellency Mr. Petro Poroshenko, the President of Ukraine, during the General Debate of the 71st session of the United Nations General Assembly (21 September 2016, New York) Distinguished Mr. President, Excellencies, Ladies and gentlemen, On behalf of Ukraine, I sincerely congratulate honourable Mr. Peter Thomson on his election as President of the 71st session of the United Nations General Assembly. I pledge Ukraine’s full support for all your endeavours. In one of the worst years of the 20th century, Ernest Hemingway wrote an inspiring humanistic novel. In the epigraph to the novel, he quoted English poet John Donne [Донн]: "No man is an island, Entire of itself, Every man is a piece of the continent, A part of the main.1 Any man's death diminishes me, Because I am involved in mankind…" These words embodied the essence of moral and historical transformation the humanity underwent in the wake of the two world wars of the 20th century. We entered the third millennium with a strong sense of being united – as a new humankind for which there is no such thing as ‘someone else’s pain’. What has happened to this feeling? Where has it gone? Where has the drive to isolate oneself on an "island" come from? Why is it that new politicians come to power on various continents calling to ignore someone else’s pain? Why is that cynicism, not seen since the times of Hemingway’s novel, has settled down in our lives under the guise of pragmatism? What does make Evil so strong and Good so weak nowadays? 1 В епіграфі далі йде фраза:“if a Clod bee washed away by the Sea, Europe is the lesse, as well as if a Promontorie were, as well as if a Mannor of thy friends or of thine owne were;” 2 "No man is an island" – this is also about those in power. -
Russians in Ukraine: Before and After Euromaidan Written by Mikhail Pogrebinskiy
Russians in Ukraine: Before and after Euromaidan Written by Mikhail Pogrebinskiy This PDF is auto-generated for reference only. As such, it may contain some conversion errors and/or missing information. For all formal use please refer to the official version on the website, as linked below. Russians in Ukraine: Before and after Euromaidan https://www.e-ir.info/2015/03/26/russians-in-ukraine-before-and-after-euromaidan/ MIKHAIL POGREBINSKIY, MAR 26 2015 This is an excerpt from Ukraine and Russia: People, Politics, Propaganda and Perspectives – an E-IR Edited Collection. Available now on Amazon (UK, USA, Fra, Ger, Ca), in all good book stores, and via a free PDF download. Find out more about E-IR’s range of open access books here. In the title of the article, I have reproduced the topic proposed by the editors of the collection, however, I consider the stylistic formula ‘Russians in Ukraine’ to be rather confusing and unable to grasp the essence of the problem. The idea of Russians in Ukraine being a national minority similar to, for instance, Hungarians in Romania or Slovakia, Swedes in Finland, or even Russians in Estonia, is in fact profoundly fallacious. And not because of the scope of inclusion – I will talk about that later. But it is this idea that underlies western policies towards Ukraine and the current crisis. According to that idea, the Ukrainians, with the moral support of the West, are trying to free themselves from the centuries-old Russian colonial oppression, while Moscow resists it in every way, and as soon as it ‘lets Ukraine go’, European values will triumph in Ukraine. -
The Ukrainian Left During and After the Maidan Protests
THE UKRAINIAN LEFT DURING AND AFTER THE MAIDAN PROTESTS Study requested by the DIE LINKE. delegation in the GUE/NGL Volodymyr Ishchenko [email protected] ABSTRACT The paper seeks to present a balanced, well documented and nuanced discussion covering the full range of positions of the Ukrainian left and activities in relation to the Maidan and Anti-Maidan movements and the war. It covers all the major groups and parties who at least identify with the socialist and/or anarchist tradition: from ‘old left’ parties originating from the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) to ‘new left’ organisations, unions and informal initiatives that did not have any relation whatsoever to the CPSU. The paper gives a brief overview of the most important (and often still unresolved) questions about major political events in Ukraine starting from 2013. Then it describes and explains the positions and political activities of the various Ukrainian organisations on the left towards the Maidan uprising, the Anti-Maidan movement and the war in eastern Ukraine. The paper attempts to answer the following questions. How did different left wing organisations try to intervene in the Maidan and Anti-Maidan movements and how successful were their interventions? To what extent were they able to defend the left agenda against liberals and (both Ukrainian and Russian) nationalists? To what extent did they rather follow the agenda of their political opponents? What were the differences not only between the different left wing organisations but also between -
Poll Was Uploaded to Iri.Org on July 10, 2019 to Address Minor Inaccuracies Contained in the Version Published on July 9, 2019
Public Opinion Survey of Residents of Ukraine June 13-23, 2019 *A corrected version of this poll was uploaded to iri.org on July 10, 2019 to address minor inaccuracies contained in the version published on July 9, 2019. Methodology • The survey was conducted by Rating Group Ukraine on behalf of the International Republican Institute’s Center for Insights in Survey Research. • The survey was conducted throughout Ukraine (except for the occupied Crimea and certain areas of Donbas) on June 13-23, 2019 through face-to-face interviews at respondents’ homes • •The sample consisted of 2,400 permanent residents of Ukraine aged 18 and older and eligible to vote. It is representative of the general population by gender, age, region, and settlement size. The distribution of population by regions and settlements is based on statistical data of the Central Election Commission from the 2019 presidential elections, and the distribution of population by age and gender is based on data from the State Statistics Committee of Ukraine from January 1, 2018. • A multi-stage probability sampling method was used with the random route and “last birthday” methods for respondent selection. • Stage One: the territory of Ukraine was split into 25 administrative regions (24 regions and Kyiv). The survey was conducted throughout all regions of Ukraine, except for the occupied Crimea and certain areas of the Donbas. • Stage Two: the territory of each region was split into village and city units. Settlements were split into types by the number of residents: • Cities with population over 1 million • Cities with population 500,000-999,000 • Cities with population 100,000-499,000 • Cities with population 50,000-99,000 • Cities with population up to 50,000 • Urban villages • Villages • Cities and villages were selected using the PPS method (probability proportional to size). -
How Social Media Transformed Pro-Russian Nostalgia Into Violence in Ukraine
This is a repository copy of How social media transformed pro-Russian nostalgia into violence in Ukraine. White Rose Research Online URL for this paper: http://eprints.whiterose.ac.uk/114776/ Article: Kozachenko, I. (2014) How social media transformed pro-Russian nostalgia into violence in Ukraine. Working Papers of the Communities & Culture Network+, 4. ISSN 2052-7268 Reuse Unless indicated otherwise, fulltext items are protected by copyright with all rights reserved. The copyright exception in section 29 of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988 allows the making of a single copy solely for the purpose of non-commercial research or private study within the limits of fair dealing. The publisher or other rights-holder may allow further reproduction and re-use of this version - refer to the White Rose Research Online record for this item. Where records identify the publisher as the copyright holder, users can verify any specific terms of use on the publisher’s website. Takedown If you consider content in White Rose Research Online to be in breach of UK law, please notify us by emailing [email protected] including the URL of the record and the reason for the withdrawal request. [email protected] https://eprints.whiterose.ac.uk/ 4/7/2017 How social media transformed proRussian nostalgia into violence in Ukraine | Communities and Culture Network + How social media transformed pro-Russian nostalgia into violence in Ukraine Ivan Kozachenko, University of Aberdeen When Ukraine’s proRussian president, Victor Yanukovych, was ousted in late February, thousands of outraged and fearful people in southern and eastern cities took to the streets to demonstrate against the new proEuropean government that had swept to power. -
Mariupol: an On-Site Report
Mariupol: An On-Site Report by Dr. Jiri Valenta and Leni Friedman Valenta BESA Center Perspectives Paper No. 1,136, April 9, 2019 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY: Although Vladimir Putin has not articulated the final objective of his proxy war in eastern Ukraine, his actions seem to indicate that he is determined to create a land bridge from Mariupol to Odessa – two major seaports vitally important to Ukraine's economy. Putin's overall strategy in Ukraine seems to be to strangle it economically by disrupting shipping between the Odessa and Azov Sea ports, with the aim of eventually subjugating Ukraine to Russia. On April 3, 2018, Russian President Vladimir Putin – having essentially won the war in Syria on behalf of his beleaguered client, Syrian President Bashar Assad – had some more good news. US President Donald Trump had given instructions to the American military to begin planning for the withdrawal of US troops from Syria. Although the official decision was not announced until December 21, the Kremlin evidently gambled that Trump was serious about the withdrawal. On November 25, 2018, the West awakened to a new and unsettling threat to world peace, this time in the Sea of Azov. Putin, who had largely frozen his war there in 2015, was now defrosting it, without any serious response from the West. The Russian Navy attacked three Ukrainian ships in the Sea of Azov that were heading towards the Ukrainian city of Mariupol. A Russian Coast Guard vessel rammed a Ukrainian navy tugboat, several sailors were injured, and 24 were taken prisoner. Those sailors are still awaiting trial.