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Public Opinion Survey Residents of Ukraine March 14 – 26, 2014

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Public Opinion Survey Residents of Ukraine March 14 – 26, 2014 Public Opinion Survey Residents of Ukraine March 14 – 26, 2014 International Republican Institute Detailed Methodology • The survey was conducted by the public opinion and market research company Baltic Surveys/The Gallup Organization on behalf of the International Republican Institute. The field work was carried out by Rating Group Ukraine. • Data was collected throughout Ukraine (including Crimea) March 14–26, 2014, through face-to-face interviews at respondents’ home. • The sample consisted of 1,200 permanent residents of Ukraine older than the age of 18 and eligible to vote. It is representative of the general population by age, gender, education, region and size of the settlement. • Multistage probability sampling method was used with the random route and next birthday respondent’s selection procedures. • Stage one: 27 official administrative regions of Ukraine were defined (25 regions of Ukraine, Kyiv and Sevastopol). All regions of Ukraine were surveyed. • Stage two: selection of the settlements - towns and villages. Towns were grouped into subtypes according to the size: • City more than one million residents • City 500,000-999,000 residents • City 100,000-499,000 residents • City 50,000-99,000 residents • City to 50,000 residents • Village • Settlements were selected at random. The number of selected settlements in each region was proportional to the share of population living in a particular type of the settlement in each region. • Stage three: primary sampling units were described. • The margin of error does not exceed plus or minus 2.8 percent. • Response rate was 63 percent. • Charts and graphs may not add up to 100 percent due to rounding. • The survey was funded by the U.S. Agency for International Development. 2 Russian-Speaking Citizens Not Under Pressure or Threat International Republican Institute Do you feel that Russian-speaking citizens of Ukraine are under pressure or threat because of their language? 3% 5% 7% Definitely yes 14% Rather yes Rather no Definitely no Don't know/Refused to answer 71% 4 Do you feel that Russian-speaking citizens of Ukraine are under pressure or threat because of their language? By ethnicity Definitely yes Rather yes Rather no Definitely no Don't know/Refused to answer Ethnic 5% 13% 76% 3% Ukrainian 3% Ethnic 12% 17% 17% 49% 5% Russian 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100% 5 Do you feel that Russian-speaking citizens of Ukraine are under pressure or threat because of their language? Definitely yes Rather yes Rather no Definitely no Don't know/Refused to answer West 3% 7% 88% 1% 1% Center 3%2% 11% 83% 1% South 13% 11% 23% 51% 2% East 5% 12% 16% 58% 8% 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100% 6 Do you support the decision of the Russian Federation to send its army to protect Russian-speaking citizens of Ukraine? 6% 7% 6% 9% Definitely yes Rather yes Rather no Definitely no 72% Don't know/Refused to answer 7 Do you support the decision of the Russian Federation to send its army to protect Russian-speaking citizens of Ukraine? Definitely yes Rather yes Rather no Definitely no Don't know/Refused to answer 5% West 1% 93% 1% Center 1% 5% 91% 1% 1% South 16% 11% 16% 51% 6% East 12% 12% 12% 49% 15% 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100% 8 Do you support the decision of the Russian Federation to send its army to protect Russian-speaking citizens of Ukraine? By ethnicity Definitely yes Rather yes Rather no Definitely no Don't know/Refused to answer Ethnic 4% 9% 80% 4% Ukrainian 3% Ethnic 23% 20% 11% 32% 14% Russian 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100% 9 Majority Want Closer Ties to Europe International Republican Institute If Ukraine was able to enter only one international economic union, should it be with…? European Union Customs Union with Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan Other Don't know/Refused to answer March 2014 52% 27% 6% 14% February 2014 41% 36% 9% 14% September 42% 37% 5% 16% 2013 May 2013 40% 37% 5% 18% August 2012 32% 42% 6% 20% May 2012 37% 41% 5% 17% March 2012 36% 43% 4% 17% November 42% 40% 3% 15% 2011 0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100% 11 If Ukraine was able to enter only one international economic union, should it be with…? European Union Customs Union with Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan Other Don't know/Refused to answer 2% West 90% 3% 5% Center 70% 9% 11% 10% South 29% 37% 10% 24% East 20% 59% 3% 18% 0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100% 12 If a referendum were held today on Ukraine joining the European Union, how would you vote? 11% 8% Would vote for Ukraine to join the EU Would vote against Ukraine joining the EU 53% Would not vote 28% Don't know/Refused to answer 13 If a referendum were held today on Ukraine joining the European Union, how would you vote? Would vote for Ukraine to join the EU Would vote against Ukraine joining the EU Would not vote Don't know/Refused to answer West 90% 4% 2% 4% Center 71% 16% 2% 11% South 29% 37% 23% 11% East 22% 55% 7% 16% 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100% 14 If a referendum were held today on Ukraine joining the Customs Union with Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan, how would you vote? 6% 15% 28% Would vote for Ukraine to join the Customs Union Would vote against Ukraine joining the Customs Union Would not vote Don't know/Refused to answer 51% 15 If a referendum were held today on Ukraine joining the Customs Union with Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan, how would you vote? Would vote for Ukraine to join the Customs Union Would vote against Ukraine joining the Customs Union Would not vote Don't know/Refused to answer West 6% 77% 9% 8% Center 10% 74% 5% 11% South 31% 32% 35% 2% East 62% 19% 17% 2% 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100% 16 Do you think that the authorities of Ukraine should sign the Association Agreement with the European Union as soon as possible? Definitely yes Rather yes Rather no Definitely no Don't know/Refused to answer March 2014 35% 18% 12% 21% 14% February 2014 25% 20% 16% 25% 14% 0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100% 17 Do you think that the authorities of Ukraine should sign the Association Agreement with the European Union as soon as possible? Definitely yes Rather yes Rather no Definitely no Don't know/Refused to answer West 72% 18% 3%2% 5% Center 42% 30% 9% 6% 13% South 12% 15% 15% 35% 23% East 13% 9% 19% 42% 17% 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100% 18 If a referendum were held today on Ukraine joining NATO, how would you vote? 13% 9% 34% Would vote for Ukraine to join NATO Would vote against Ukraine joining NATO Would not vote Don't know/Refused to 44% answer 19 If a referendum were held today on Ukraine joining NATO, how would you vote? Would vote for Ukraine to join NATO Would vote against Ukraine joining NATO Would not vote Don't know/Refused to answer West 64% 17% 5% 14% Center 47% 33% 4% 16% South 11% 52% 26% 11% East 14% 67% 8% 11% 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100% 20 Majority Consider Russia’s Actions an Invasion International Republican Institute In your opinion, a referendum in Crimea on joining Russia is…? 1% A legitimate right of the residents of Crimea to express their opinion about 8% 23% the future of Crimea An attempt to break Ukraine into several parts and threat to its independence Other Don't know/Refused to answer 68% 22 In your opinion, a referendum in Crimea on joining Russia is…? A legitimate right of the residents of Crimea to express their opinion about the future of Crimea An attempt to break Ukraine into several parts and threat to its independence Other Don't know/Refused to answer 2% West 2% 94% 2% Center 7% 87% 5% 1% South 41% 48% 10% East 45% 40% 2% 13% 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100% 23 In your opinion, what should the status of Crimea should be? Autonomous republic within 1% 1% 9% Ukraine Crimean-Tatar autonomous republic within Ukraine 5% Should become part of Russia 8% Become an oblast of Ukraine Should become an 50% independent state 13% Should become part of Turkey Other 13% Don't know/Refused to answer 24 In your opinion, what the status of Crimea should be? Autonomous republic within Ukraine Crimean-Tatar autonomous republic within Ukraine Should become part of Russia Become an oblast of Ukraine Should become an independent state Should become part of Turkey Other Don't know/Refused to answer 1% West 61% 14% 16% 2% 6% 1% Center 66% 11% 3% 8% 3% 6% 1% 1% South 42% 11% 31% 4% 4%1% 6% East 31% 16% 20% 5% 11% 1% 15% 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100% 25 How do you evaluate Russia’s actions in Crimea? In your opinion, are they aimed at...? Invasion and occupation of independent Ukraine 54% Threat to new Ukrainian political leaders 17% Protection of Russian-speaking citizens of Ukraine 13% Response to the new Crimea leaders asking for help 5% Protection of Russian military base in Sevastopol 4% Other 1% Don't know/Refused to answer 6% 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 26 How do you evaluate Russia’s actions in Crimea? In your opinion, are they aimed at...? Western Ukraine Invasion and occupation of independent 74% Ukraine Threat to new Ukrainian political leaders 20% Protection of Russian-speaking citizens of 1% Ukraine Response to the new Crimea leaders 1% asking for help Protection of Russian military base in 1% Sevastopol Other 1% Don't know/Refused to answer 2% 0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 27 How do you evaluate Russia’s actions in Crimea? In your opinion, are they aimed at...? Central Ukraine Invasion and occupation of independent 75% Ukraine Threat to new Ukrainian political leaders 16% Response to the new Crimea leaders 3% asking for help Protection of Russian-speaking citizens of 2% Ukraine Protection of Russian military base in 1% Sevastopol
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