UNMANNED AERIAL VEHICLES IN THE SERVICE OF THE ISRAEL AIR FORCE: “THEY WILL SOAR ON WINGS LIKE EAGLES” By David Rodman*

The Israel Air Force (IAF) has a rich history of employing unmanned aerial vehicles in battle with excellent results, and is set to expand significantly its drone operations in the coming decades, as the increasing sophistication of these vehicles makes them suitable for a rapidly expanding set of roles. In the future, the IAF's drone force could alter Israel’s strategic landscape, reinforcing both its nuclear and conventional deterrence, as well as making it less dependent on American military assistance .

Unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), often designers, and so on—familiarity with the referred to colloquially as drones, can claim a Jewish state’s UAV operations, past and lineage that dates back to the dawn of air present, is not widespread. A brief review of warfare. Though quite rare in comparison to Israel’s experience with drones, as well as a the enormous numbers of manned aircraft few thoughts about the future of its UAV involved in the first and second world wars, force, then, seems entirely in order. The UAVs participated in both conflicts, especially employment of these vehicles is set to expand the latter, mainly as attack vehicles armed dramatically in the years ahead, if the fighting with high-explosive warheads. Not until the in places as diverse as Afghanistan, Pakistan, Vietnam War, however, did drones really find Iraq, Lebanon, and Gaza is any indication of a defined niche on the battlefield, when the what is just over the horizon. United States Air Force conducted thousands of reconnaissance sorties over hostile territory UAVS AND THE ARAB–ISRAELI with UAVs. CONFLICT With the possible exception of the United States, Israel is the country most closely The Israel Air Force (IAF) first employed identified with UAV operations in the post- UAVs on a large scale in the 1973 Yom World War II period. The Jewish state has Kippur War. 1 During the opening days of the actually employed drones in a variety of roles conflict, the air force suffered heavy losses at since the early 1970s, but it initially gained the hands of the Egyptian and Syrian IADS. worldwide attention for its operations during Instead of focusing its efforts on the the 1982 Lebanon War, in which its UAVs destruction of these systems at the outset of played a substantial part in the destruction of hostilities, as envisaged in its prewar battle the Syrian integrated air defense system plans, the IAF was called upon to stem the (IADS) erected in Lebanon. Recent advance of Egyptian and Syrian land forces in asymmetric conflicts—the 2006 Second the Sinai and on the Golan, respectively, Lebanon War against Hizballah and the 2008– because the Israel Defense Forces (IDF), taken 2009 Operation Cast Lead against Hamas— by surprise by the Arab assault, had not sparked renewed global interest in Israeli deployed to the fronts its reserve units, which drone operations. constituted the bulk of its fighting power. The Nevertheless, outside of the international IAF, therefore, flew hundreds of sorties defense community—professional soldiers, against the Egyptian and Syrian armies, military analysts and journalists, arms regardless of the cost exacted by their IADS.

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Once the IDF’s reserve units had reached network. Subsequent air strikes on following the battlefields, blunted the Egyptian and days wiped out additional batteries. The IAF Syrian offensives, and stabilized the fronts, the also destroyed considerable numbers of AAA IAF sought to cut its losses to anti-aircraft fire. batteries. In its quest to do so, it began to employ its The IAF’s drones filled several roles during American-supplied Firebee and Chukar drones the battle. First, decoy UAVs, especially the (Israel had yet to deploy any UAVs of locally developed Samson, lured the Syrians indigenous design and manufacture) as decoys into activating their radar systems. The radar to draw this fire away from its aircraft, systems then fell prey to air-delivered especially on the Sinai front. The fact that the precision-guided weapons (PGMs), such as IAF’s losses to anti-aircraft fire dropped the American Standard anti-radiation missile dramatically after the first few days of (ARM), and ground-launched PGMs, such as hostilities suggests that the drones had a the Israeli Keres ARM. Other air-delivered positive impact on the air war. Whether the PGMs, like the Israeli Tadmit television- IAF also employed its UAVs to gather guided missile and the American GBU-15 photographic intelligence and to attack television-guided glide bomb, added to this surface-to-air missile (SAM) and anti-aircraft maelstrom. With the radar systems out of artillery (AAA) batteries is not known. In any commission, aircraft and artillery smashed the case, its Yom Kippur War experience appears SAM launch positions at will with a mixture to have convinced the IAF that drones could of general-purpose bombs and shells, as well be effective tools on the battlefield. as cluster munitions. Second, one SAM During the late 1970s, Israel fielded its first battery may actually have been taken out by a generation of homegrown UAVs, the Scout UAV fitted with a warhead, perhaps a and Mastiff. Though small and precursor to—or prototype of—the later Israeli unsophisticated by the standards of later Harpy attack drone. 3 Third, the IAF generations of drones—these compact, twin- undoubtedly employed UAVs for real-time tailed, propeller-driven vehicles carried very surveillance and target acquisition during the limited payloads of rather simple electronic battle, as well as for post-battle damage systems, mainly video cameras and, perhaps, assessment. infrared detection equipment—they During the Lebanon War, UAVs also nevertheless proved quite effective in service. engaged in other missions on behalf of the Prior to the Lebanon War, these vehicles, in Israeli war effort. They provided constant, tandem with IAF reconnaissance aircraft, real-time surveillance of Syrian air force routinely monitored the Syrian IADS in bases, alerting IAF air battle controllers to the Lebanon. 2 While expendable decoy drones take-offs of Syrian aircraft. This information drew anti-aircraft fire—a few of them were helped the controllers to vector IAF aircraft to even shot down—other drones and optimal intercept coordinates, contributing to reconnaissance aircraft gathered valuable the lopsided score in a series of air battles, in information on the locations and electronic which Israeli pilots shot down 80–100 Syrian signatures of SAM batteries, which the IAF aircraft without incurring a single loss. One then integrated into its battle plan for UAV even scored a “no weapons kill” of its destroying the Syrian IADS in a potential own through wild maneuvering, when a Syrian future confrontation. aircraft attempting to shoot it down collided With the commencement of hostilities in with the ground after the pilot lost control. 4 summer 1982, UAVs played a prominent part Finally, UAVs also assisted the IDF’s in the IAF’s spectacular elimination of the ground campaign. Drones furnished real-time Syrian IADS in the Beqa’a, which saw about intelligence on the location and movement of 20 SAM batteries knocked out on the first day Syrian and Palestine Liberation Organization of Operation Mole Cricket 19, the code name (PLO) units. Such data clearly assisted IDF given to the plan to demolish that air defense commanders in planning and executing

78 Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 14, No. 3 (September 2010) Unmanned Aerial Vehicles in the Service of the Israeli Air Force impressive tactical engagements, such as the Furthermore, IAF drone operators routinely large-scale defeat inflicted on Syrian armor by share their experiences with their foreign Israeli tanks and infantry around Lake Karoun. counterparts. 7 American drone operations in The employment of drones as part of the Iraq and Afghanistan in particular have IDF’s ground campaign, in short, opened up a benefited heavily from Israeli input. whole new avenue in air-land battlefield In the 1980s and 1990s, the main cooperation. operational theater of the IAF’s UAV force Buoyed by the accomplishments of its remained south Lebanon. 8 The air force’s UAV force in the Lebanon War, Israel drones played an especially active part in the continued to develop more sophisticated and Jewish state’s two large-scale anti-Hizballah specialized drones over the following decades. incursions, Operation Accountability in 1993 During the 1990s, the IAF deployed both the and Operation Grapes of Wrath in 1996. Even Searcher 1 and 2, essentially significantly before the incursions, the IAF employed bigger and more capable versions of the earlier UAVs to locate Hizballah training camps, Scout and Mastiff, fitted with broader and arms depots, command posts, and rocket more advanced arrays of electronic systems, as launchers. During the fighting, drones well as the Harpy attack drone intended provided real-time data on various targets, primarily to destroy air defense radar systems. including moving vehicles in the process of In the same decade, the Jewish state tinkered transporting insurgents from one location to with the idea of developing a long-range, another and rocket launch sites. Air and missile-launching drone to shoot down artillery units then engaged these objectives ballistic missiles in their “boost phase,” but with precision fire. It is unclear whether apparently abandoned the effort on cost UAVs also “lit up” targets with laser grounds. 5 designators for air-delivered PGMs to home in Since the early twenty-first century, the on. It is certain, on the other hand, that the IAF has fielded the Hermes 450, Hermes 900, round-the-clock, real-time intelligence Heron, Heron TP, and, possibly, other furnished by drones proved effective in many (classified) UAV models. The Heron TP is an instances in knocking out Hizballah targets, especially large vehicle—it has the wingspan even if the incursions themselves ended of a Boeing 737 aircraft—that can carry a inconclusively. state-of-the-art suite of sensors, including The participation of the IAF’s UAV force electronic warfare systems. Some of these in IDF operations has grown ever larger in the drones can apparently be armed with small latest rounds of Arab-Israeli hostilities, missiles (such as the American Hellfire or the namely the so-called al-Aqsa Intifada, the Israeli Spike) for attack missions. 6 The Heron Second Lebanon War, and Operation Cast TP is supposedly able to carry a one-ton Lead. 9 During the intifada, drones, most bomb. Israel’s aerospace industry has also prominently, relayed real-time intelligence on developed several models of hand-launched terrorist positions and movements to air and “micro-UAVs,” a number of which have been ground units in Judea, Samaria, and Gaza field-tested by IDF infantrymen for short- around the clock. Though no information has range intelligence-gathering missions. been made public on specific UAV missions, Naturally, the accumulated knowledge it is likely that drones played an integral part gained by Israel in UAV design and in many “targeted attacks” by helicopter deployment has not gone unnoticed by other gunships on terrorist operatives and Qassam countries. Israeli drone technology has been rocket launch sites. These attacks, collectively exported around the globe. Countries like the speaking, killed considerable numbers of high- United States, India, Turkey, Great Britain, ranking terrorists and disabled many Qassam and Germany either have bought UAVs batteries. Armed drones may even have directly from the Jewish state or they have executed some of these targeted attacks. manufactured them at home under license.

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Perhaps the most extensive deployment of that they certainly have the range to engage in drones, however, occurred during the Second such missions. Lebanon War and Operation Cast Lead. During the first night of the Second Lebanon UAVS AND THE IAF’S FUTURE FORCE War, IAF aircraft essentially destroyed STRUCTURE Hizballah’s long-range rocket force in 30 minutes of intensive air strikes. 10 UAVs, quite In terms of the technological sophistication likely, not only helped to pinpoint the launch of its UAV force, Israel is unquestionably well vehicles prior to this air assault, but also took ahead of the pack. Only the United States is in part in target acquisition during the strikes and the same league. Likewise, in terms of the in battle-damage assessments after them. Real- scope and effectiveness of the tactical uses to time surveillance of medium- and short-range which it has put its UAV force, the Jewish rocket launch sites by drones throughout the state is far ahead of other countries. Again, fighting also drastically shortened the “sensor- only the United States is a peer in this regard. to-shooter” loop by the end of the war; IAF Nevertheless, even though the IAF considers aircraft and helicopter gunships were able to drones to be an extremely valuable and cheap destroy launchers within a mere two minutes “force multiplier,” it has not divulged any of launch detections by UAVs. Armed drones concrete information about whether it intends may have carried out some attacks on to develop its UAV force into an instrument Hizballah targets, while other UAVs may have that will equal, or even surpass in certain “painted” these objectives with laser respects, its manned aircraft fleet in the designators for air-delivered PGMs. coming decades. 11 Drone deployment in Operation Cast Lead The IAF, according to foreign reports, more or less followed the pattern established presently fields three drone squadrons in its in the Second Lebanon War. The IAF’s UAV order of battle. 12 These same sources credit it force primarily provided real-time intelligence with possession of 15 fighter-bomber to air and ground units for them to act upon in squadrons, four helicopter gunship squadrons, engaging Hamas targets, whether command as well as a whole range of transport, training, posts, transport vehicles, rocket launchers, intelligence-gathering, and electronic warfare arms storage depots, or even individual squadrons. Moreover, the air force intends to terrorist operatives. Armed drones may once add to its arsenal in the next decade from one more have executed some strikes with Hellfire to three fighter-bomber squadrons of the new or Spike missiles, while other UAVs may have F-35 Lightening II fifth-generation stealth actively assisted aircraft or helicopter gunships aircraft (which would likely replace its oldest by lighting up targets for PGMs. jets). Thus, at least for the near future, the air Interestingly, around the time of Operation force order of battle appears as if it will be Cast Lead, unconfirmed news reports surfaced weighted heavily in favor of manned aircraft. to the effect that IAF drones had engaged in Such an emphasis would seem to make sorties very far from Israel’s borders. One sense for now. Drones, after all, will not story reported that they were conducting possess the capabilities to fulfill many of the electronic warfare missions over Iran in order roles of manned aircraft for years to come and to interfere with ballistic missile tests by may never be able to fill some of them. UAVs jamming telemetry systems. Another story (with the potential exception of the very claimed that they were flying surveillance and largest among them) cannot presently carry battle-damage assessment missions over the types of—not to mention the quantities Sudan in support of an air strike there that of—bombs and missiles necessary to destroy destroyed a Hamas-bound Iranian arms large, heavily fortified targets, such as Iran’s convoy. The Heron and Heron TP drones are nuclear installations. Nor can they defend capable of staying in the air for at least 24–36 airspace against hostile aircraft and drones. hours (most likely much longer), which means Nor can they move soldiers and supplies

80 Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 14, No. 3 (September 2010) Unmanned Aerial Vehicles in the Service of the Israeli Air Force around the battlefield or deep into an however, one can turn to Israel’s premier opponent’s hinterland. Nor can they provide as aerospace think tank, the Fisher Institute for thorough intelligence-gathering and electronic Air and Space Strategic Studies, the research warfare coverage as dedicated manned aircraft arm of the Israel Air Force Center (IAFC), a in some situations. The list of missions that nongovernmental organization with close ties drones either cannot yet execute at all or can to the air force. The institute has a study center only carry out less effectively than manned devoted to thinking about how drones can be aircraft, of course, could be extended well employed on current and future battlefields. 14 beyond this handful of examples. Much of the Fisher Institute’s research on Still, the list of missions for which UAVs UAVs is also secret, but it has published some are fit has grown substantially over the past literature on drone warfare and has hosted at few decades, a reality to which the IAF is least one conference partially open to the sensitive. 13 Furthermore, not only are drones public on the topic. At this gathering, active much cheaper to build, equip, and fly than and retired senior IAF officers indicated that, manned aircraft, but they also do not risk the while the air force does not yet have quite lives and limbs of the men and women who enough confidence to entrust drones with its operate them. And, unlike manned aircraft, most vital missions, it is definitely committed they can remain over a target area for long to the process of making them an ever larger periods of time in order to gather intelligence, part of future operations, including attack to disrupt communications, or even to launch sorties. 15 attacks. For these reasons alone, it would seem to make a great deal of sense for the Jewish UAVS AND ISRAEL’S STRATEGIC state not only to expand considerably its drone LANDSCAPE force in size and capabilities, but also to formulate a general battle doctrine for their A large and robust UAV force has the employment alongside its manned aircraft decided potential to alter Israel’s strategic fleet. Whether in a full-scale conventional landscape in the future, with implications for war, an asymmetric conflict, or a low-intensity both nuclear and conventional deterrence. In counterinsurgency campaign, a massed UAV respect to the former, drones could buttress force able to swarm the battlefield with whole deterrence in two distinct ways. First, a sizable squadrons of drones dedicated to specific fleet of long-range, highly advanced roles—such as attack, reconnaissance, and reconnaissance drones could supplement the electronic warfare—would clearly be of Jewish state’s growing surveillance satellite tremendous assistance to the IAF in achieving capabilities. The ability of UAVs to hover Israel’s military objectives. over a target area for long periods means that The IAF, naturally enough for an air force they could effectively serve as “gap fillers” for of a state perpetually in conflict with its space-based platforms that almost certainly neighbors, is a very security-minded could not remain “on station” for the same organization. Its long-range work plan with duration of time. 16 This capacity would be respect to building up the numbers and particularly valuable during a crisis situation. capabilities of its drone squadrons is thus a Drones, for example, could continually carefully guarded secret. Similarly, though it monitor Iranian ballistic missile launch sites. is likely that the air force has given sustained, If linked to active (e.g., the Arrow anti- in-depth thought to the formulation of a ballistic missile interceptor) and passive (e.g., general battle doctrine for their employment, warning sirens) defenses, UAVs could its thinking on this issue as well is a closely enhance Israel’s ability to counter a nuclear held secret. (or biological or chemical) weapons strike For clues—albeit circumspect and with ballistic missiles. Aware of this sporadic—as to the direction in which the IAF capability, a potential attacker, such as Iran or may be headed in the realm of UAV warfare, Syria, would have to add this consideration to

Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 14, No. 3 (September 2010) 81 David Rodman its decision-making calculus before deciding with the state’s limited economic capacity, upon a strike. means that Israel will remain dependent on Second, drones could enhance the Jewish American security assistance indefinitely; state’s nuclear deterrence by reinforcing its however, the build-up of a large and powerful “second strike” capability. 17 Though Israel, drone force could lessen the magnitude of that according to media reports, already possesses dependence. Israel, after all, is most dependent a potent retaliatory capability—one based on the United States in regard to the supply of upon a triad of submarine-based, nuclear- advanced fighter-bombers. To the extent that armed cruise missiles; land-based, nuclear- these aircraft are replaced in the future by tipped ballistic missiles; and air-delivered indigenous UAVs, there will be a concomitant nuclear bombs—UAVs could nevertheless reduction in Israel’s reliance on American bolster this asset. Drones configured either to assistance. Less dependence on security deliver nuclear weapons (e.g., via air-launched assistance from the United States, in turn, cruise missiles) or to serve as the actual attack could lead to greater freedom of action for the vehicles (e.g., as super-smart, super- Jewish state in a crisis situation where its destructive descendants of the German V-1) national interests and those of its benefactor could strengthen the aerial component of the do not necessarily coincide. triad. UAVs require much less ground Former IAF commander David Ivri has infrastructure than manned aircraft and can commented that: therefore operate from comparatively small and remote sites that would be hard to locate, Changes in force structure must let alone hit. They would thus be highly likely come about by evolution, by to survive a first strike. Once again, a potential selecting the proper pace for attacker would have to take this consideration activating these changes. The into account before deciding upon a strike. selection of the pace of change in In respect to conventional deterrence, itself demands serious thought and drones could augment Israel’s overall an orderly decision process, and qualitative edge over its opponents on the such a process will result in the battlefield in the decades ahead. Many experts optimal decisions. If this is not maintain that fifth-generation aircraft, such as done, we may find ourselves in the F-35, essentially represent the end of the combat situations in which we will line for manned fighter-bomber development. be required to perform immediate Though UAVs may never entirely displace upheavals—that is, drastic changes manned aircraft over the battlefield, they are in doctrine and courses of action in many ways the wave of the future with that will generally be less effective respect to aerial warfare. This trend augurs and more expensive. Therefore, it rather well for the Jewish state, as it is will be preferable to make changes presently far ahead of its opponents in the in force structure at preliminary realm of drone warfare. Moreover, this stages, so that they can be done at technological and doctrinal gap, in all the correct evolutionary pace. 18 likelihood, will only grow wider in the coming years, as Israel is in a position to expand its The limited amount of information about the capabilities in this area at a much faster pace IAF’s drone force in the public domain than its opponents. suggests that the air force has taken Major Finally, over time, UAVs could modify General Ivri’s advice to heart. somewhat the dynamics of the American- Israeli patron-client relationship. The national *David Rodman is the author of Arms security threats faced by the Jewish state are Transfers to Israel: The Strategic Logic quite long-standing, multifaceted, and serious. Behind American Military Assistance (Sussex This dangerous political environment, coupled Academic Press, 2007) and Defense and

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Diplomacy in Israel’s National Security Experience: Tactics, Partnerships, and 200 “First UAV” Squadron pointedly Motives (Sussex Academic Press, 2005) . refrained from answering the question at a briefing at Palmachim Air Force Base, Israel, NOTES June 23, 2008. 7 Ibid. Foreign officers, according to 1 A concise description of Israeli drone Lieutenant Colonel N, visit Palmachim on a operations during the Yom Kippur War is regular basis to learn from the IAF. found in John F. Kreis, “Unmanned Aircraft in 8 For the role of Israeli UAVs in south Israeli Air Operations,” Air Power History , Lebanon during this period see Shmuel Vol. 37, No. 4 (Winter 1990), p. 46. The Israel Gordon, The Vulture and the Snake: Counter- Air Force has lately changed its name to the guerrilla Air Warfare, the War in Southern Israel Air and Space Force (IASF), but this Lebanon (Ramat Gan: Begin–Sadat Center for article will refer to the former throughout. Strategic Studies, 1998), p. 57. 2 For concise descriptions of Israeli drone 9 To get a sense of drone participation in these operations before and during the Lebanon conflicts see, for example, Arie Egozi, “Israel War, see Kreis, “Unmanned Aircraft,” pp. 47– Praises UAV Abilities During Operation 49; Benjamin S. Lambeth, Moscow’s Lessons Change of Direction Anti-Hezbollah from the 1982 Lebanon Air War (Santa Campaign,” Flight International , August 29, Monica: The Rand Corporation, 1984), pp. 4– 2006, http://www.flightglobal.com (accessed 8; and Ralph Sanders, “Israeli Military June 8, 2010). Innovation: UAVs,” Joint Forces Quarterly , 10 Concise descriptions of the Jewish state’s No. 33 (Winter 2002–03), p. 115. Until the counter-rocket air campaign are found in early 2000s, the IDF’s military intelligence Anthony H. Cordesman, Preliminary arm, A’MAN, also carried out drone sorties. “Lessons” of the Israeli–Hezbollah War The relationship of this UAV force to the (Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic and IAF’s own, as well as its specific role(s), has International Studies, 2006); David Makovsky not been disclosed publicly. and Jeffrey White, Lessons and Implications 3 For this claim see Richard A. Gabriel, of the Israel–Hizballah War: A Preliminary Operation Peace for Galilee: The Israeli–PLO Assessment (Washington, D.C.: The War in Lebanon (New York: Hill and Wang, Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 1984), p. 99. Israel has since produced a 2006); and Noam Ophir, “Look Not to the highly sophisticated, longer-range, “hunter– Skies: The IAF vs. Surface-to-Surface Rocket killer” follow-up to the Harpy called Harop. Launchers,” Strategic Assessment , Vol. 9, No. The IAF also has in its arsenal an air-launched 3 (November 2006). Strategic Assessment is a “loitering” weapon system—that is, a weapon publication of the Institute for National system that can linger over a target area for a Security Studies at Tel Aviv University. period of time—known as Delilah. 11 On drones as a cheap force multiplier in IAF 4 Briefing by UAV operator Captain G of 200 eyes see Arie Egozi, “Israel Broadens UAV “First UAV” Squadron, Palmachim Air Force Use with Advanced Designs,” Flight Base, Israel, June 22, 2009. International , February 11, 2008, 5 See Sanders, “Israeli Military Innovation,” p. http://www.flightglobal.com (accessed July 117. Boost phase refers to the moments just 22, 2010). after lift off, as the missile is accelerating 12 See, for example, the IAF order of battle at away from the launch vehicle. http://www.scramble.nl . The air force does not 6 Israel has refused either to confirm or deny release official figures about the number of persistent media reports that the IAF uses squadrons (manned or unmanned) or about the armed drones for attack missions. When asked number of craft per squadron in its order of whether the IAF possessed such drones, UAV battle; therefore, the following figures are squadron commander Lieutenant Colonel N of estimates.

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13 See Arie Egozi, “Israel Broadens UAV Use.” 14 To get a sense of the Fisher Institute’s research mandate see its website at http://www.fisherinstitute.co.il/eng . Perhaps the institute’s most high-profile UAV-related project to date is the conceptualization of a medical evacuation drone that would transport wounded soldiers from “hot” battlefields where manned helicopters could not safely land. 15 See Barbara Opall-Rome, “Israel AF Hones Manned-UAV Mix,” Defense News , July 7, 2008, http://www.defensenews.com (accessed August 9, 2010). For an insightful discussion of the technical and operational complexities of drone employment in IAF operations see Asaf Agmon and Tal Inbar, “UAVs Heading Where?: Future Trends in the Development of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles and Their Operational Use,” Strategic Analysis (February 2006). Strategic Analysis is a publication of the Fisher Institute. 16 Indeed, the IAF already considers drones to be “substitutes” for satellites under certain circumstances. See Egozi, “Israel Broadens UAV Use.” 17 A country with a second strike capability is one whose arsenal of nuclear (or biological or chemical) weapons can survive an opponent’s first strike with nuclear (or biological or chemical) weapons, permitting it to then respond with a devastating counterstrike of its own. 18 David Ivri, Thoughts on Unmanned Airborne Vehicles (Herzliya: The Fisher Institute of Air and Space Strategic Studies, 2002), p. 4.

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