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The Airlift That Saved Israel.” Nickel Grass

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The Airlift That Saved Israel.” Nickel Grass It was justifiably called “the airlift that saved Israel.” Nickel Grass By Walter J. Boyne 54 AIR FORCE Magazine / December 1998 USAF’s Operation Nickel Grass airlifted war materiel to Israel during the 1973 Mideast war. As part of the commemoration of the airlift’s 25th anniversary, aviation artist Gil Cohen recently completed this painting, depicting a typical scene at the Lod/ Ben-Gurion air complex near Tel Aviv, Israel. The painting hangs at the Air Mobility Command Museum at Dover AFB, Del. AIR FORCE Magazine / December 1998 55 withhold critical aid shipments if Washington perceived Israel to be the aggressor. On the southern front, the on- slaught began with a 2,000-cannon barrage across the Suez Canal, the 1967 cease-fire line. Egyptian assault forces swept across the waterway and plunged deep into Israeli–held terri- tory. At the same time, crack Syrian units launched a potent offensive in the Golan Heights. The Arab forces fought with efficiency and cohesion, rolling over or past shocked Israeli defenders. Arab air forces attacked Israeli airfields, radar installations, and missile sites. Day 4 of the war found Israel’s once-confident military suffering from the effects of the bloodiest New to USAF’s fleet, the C-5 proved itself in Nickel Grass, hauling in oversize items mauling of its short, remarkably suc- like tractors, helicopters, and M-60 tanks (above). The first C-5 airlifter to land at cessful existence. Egypt had taken Lod delivered 97 tons of 105 mm howitzer shells. the famous Bar Lev line, a series of about 30 sand, steel, and concrete ne of the most critical but least land and, by 1973, the stalemate bunkers strung across the Sinai to O celebrated airlifts in history had become intolerable. Egypt’s slow an attack until Israeli armor unfolded over a desperate 32 days Anwar Sadat and Syria’s Hafez could be brought into play. Egyptian in the fall of 1973. An armada of al-Assad meticulously planned commandos ranged behind Israeli Military Airlift Command aircraft their 1973 offensive, one they lines, causing havoc. In the north, carried thousands of tons of materiel hoped would reverse Israeli gains things looked equally bad. The Syr- over vast distances into the midst of of the earlier war and put an end ian attack had not been halted until the most ferocious fighting the Mid dle to Arab humiliation. The war was Oct. 10. East had ever witnessed—the 1973 set to begin on the holiest of Jew- Grievously heavy on both sides Arab–Israeli War. MAC air lifters—T- ish religious days, Yom Kippur. were the losses in armored vehicles tailed C-141s and C-5As—went in and combat aircraft. Israeli air- harm’s way, vulnerable to attack from Trapped by Complacency power was hard hit by a combina- fighters, as they carved a demanding The Arab states had trained well tion of mobile SA-6 and the man- track across the Mediterranean, and and Moscow had supplied equip- portable SA-7 air-defense missiles to missiles and sabotage, as they were ment on a colossal scale, including expertly wielded by the Arabs. The off-loading in Israel. 600 advanced surface-to-air mis- attacking forces were also plenti- Though not as famous as the siles, 300 MiG-21 fighters, 1,200 fully supplied with radar-controlled 1948–49 Berlin Airlift or as massive tanks, and hundreds of thousands ZSU-23-4 anti-aircraft guns. Israeli as the 1990–91 Desert Storm airlift, of tons of consumable war materiel. estimates of consumption of am- this 1973 operation was a watershed On paper, the Arabs held a huge ad- munition and fuel were seen to be event. Code-named “Nickel Grass,” vantage in troops, tanks, artillery, totally inadequate. However, it was it restored a balance of power and and aircraft. This was offset, in the high casualty rate that stunned helped Israel survive a coordinated, Israeli minds, by the Jewish state’s Israel, shocking not only Meir but life-threatening Soviet–backed as- superior technology, advanced mo- also the legendary Gen. Moshe sault from Egypt and Syria. It proved bilization capability, and interior Dayan, minister of defense. the Air Force concept of global mo- lines of communication. Despite The shock was accompanied bility based on jet-powered transport unmistakable signs of increasing by sheer disbelief at America’s aircraft. The airlift also transformed Arab military capability, Israeli failure to comprehend that the the image of the C-5 from that of leaders remained unworried, even situation was critical. Voracious expensive lemon to symbol of US complacent, confident in Is rael’s consumption of ammunition and might. ability to repel any attack. huge losses in tanks and aircraft A quarter of a century ago, in The Israeli government became brought Israel to the brink of de- summer and fall 1973, the Mideast unequivocally convinced of impend- feat, forcing the Israelis to think seethed with tensions. Six years ing war just hours before the Arab the formerly unthinkable as they earlier, in June 1967, Israeli forces nations attacked at 2:05 p.m. local pondered their options. conquered vast swaths of land time, Oct. 6. Prime Minister Golda Half a world away, the United States controlled by Egypt, Syria, and Meir, despite her immense popularity, was in a funk, unable or unwilling Jordan. Cairo and Damascus failed refused to use those precious hours to act decisively. Washington was in over the years to persuade or force to carry out a pre-emptive attack; the throes of not only post–Vietnam Israel to relinquish its grip on the she was concerned that the US might moralizing on Capitol Hill but also 56 AIR FORCE Magazine / December 1998 the agony of Water gate, both of which concerned as they were about the war-reserve stocks, began pouring impaired the leadership of President adverse effects Arab reaction would into these sites. Richard M. Nixon. Four days into the have upon their businesses. MAC’s Less than nine hours after Nixon’s war, Washington was blindsided again inquiries with commercial carriers decision, MAC had C-141s and C-5s by another political disaster—the received the same negative response. ready to depart. There would be forced resignation of Vice President Then, it was suggested that MAC as- some initial delays, and they would Spiro T. Ag new. sist the Israeli flag carrier by flying encounter some difficulties en route, Not surprisingly, the initial US the material to Lajes, the base on but they would be the first of a flood reaction to the invasion was one of the Portuguese Azores islands in the of aircraft into Israel. confusion and contradiction. Lead- Atlantic, where it could be picked up The complex nature of Nickel ers tried to strike a balance of the by Israeli transports. Grass required a flexible chain of traditional US support of Israel with The US dithered in this fashion for command. Within MAC, 21st Air the need to maintain a still-tenuous four days. Then, on Oct. 12, Nixon Force, commanded by Maj. Gen. superpower détente with the Soviet personally decided that MAC would Lester T. Kearney Jr., was designated Union and a desire to avoid a threat- handle the entire airlift. Tel Aviv’s as the controlling Air Force. The ened Arab embargo of oil shipments Lod/Ben-Gurion air complex would vice commander of 21st, Brig. Gen. to the West. be the off-load point. Kelton M. Farris, was named MAC “Send everything that can fly,” he mission commander. The prime airlift Shifting Scenarios ordered. director was Col. Edward J. Nash. The many shifts in US military USAF had been preparing right planning to aid Israel are well-doc- along to take on the challenge. Gen. We’ll Hold Your Coat umented, notably in Flight to Israel, George S. Brown, USAF Chief of The threat of an oil embargo fright- Kenneth L. Patchin’s official MAC Staff, telephoned Gen. Paul K. Carl- ened US allies. With a single excep- history of Operation Nickel Grass. ton, MAC commander, to begin load- tion, they all denied landing and Nixon, in response to a personal ing MAC aircraft with materiel but overflight rights to the emergency plea from Meir, had made the crucial to hold them within the US pending MAC flights. The exception was Por- decision Oct. 9 to re-supply Israel. release of a formal order sending tugal, which, after hard bargaining, However, four days would pass before them onward. Carlton put his com- essentially agreed to look the other the executive office could make a manders on alert and contacted the way as traffic mushroomed at Lajes final decision on how the re-supply heads of other involved commands, Field. Daily departure flights grew would be executed. including Gen. Jack J. Catton of Air from one to 40 over a few days. This Initially, planners proposed that Force Logistics Command. AFLC was a crucial agreement for MAC, Israel be given the responsibility accorded the same high priority to which could not have conducted the for carrying out the entire airlift. Nickel Grass, and the results showed airlift the way it did without staging (Israel did use eight of its El Al com- immediately. More than 20 sites in through Lajes. mercial airliners to carry 5,500 tons the United States were designated When Nixon flashed the deci- of materiel from the US to Israel.) to be cargo pick-up points where sion Oct. 12, top American officials Israel attempted to elicit interest the US military would assemble instantly applied pressure for im- from US commercial carriers, but materiel for shipment to Israel.
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