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Home , Aerial refueling, Bar Lev Line, Israeli Air Force

It was justifiably called “the that saved .” Nickel Grass

By Walter J. Boyne

54 Magazine / December 1998 USAF’s Operation Nickel Grass airlifted war materiel to Israel during the 1973 Mideast war. As part of the commemoration of the airlift’s 25th anniversary, aviation artist Gil Cohen recently completed this painting, depicting a typical scene at the Lod/ Ben-Gurion air complex near , Israel. The painting hangs at the Museum at Dover AFB, Del.

AIR FORCE Magazine / December 1998 55 withhold critical aid shipments if Washington perceived Israel to be the aggressor. On the southern front, the on- slaught began with a 2,000-cannon barrage across the , the 1967 cease-fire line. Egyptian assault forces swept across the waterway and plunged deep into Israeli–held terri- tory. At the same time, crack Syrian units launched a potent offensive in the . The Arab forces fought with efficiency and cohesion, rolling over or past shocked Israeli defenders. Arab air forces attacked Israeli airfields, radar installations, and missile sites. Day 4 of the war found Israel’s once-confident military suffering from the effects of the bloodiest New to USAF’s fleet, the C-5 proved itself in Nickel Grass, hauling in oversize items mauling of its short, remarkably suc- like tractors, , and M-60 tanks (above). The first C-5 airlifter to land at cessful existence. had taken Lod delivered 97 tons of 105 mm howitzer shells. the famous , a series of about 30 sand, steel, and concrete ne of the most critical but least land and, by 1973, the stalemate bunkers strung across the Sinai to O celebrated in history had become intolerable. Egypt’s slow an attack until Israeli armor unfolded over a desperate 32 days Anwar and ’s Hafez could be brought into play. Egyptian in the fall of 1973. An armada of al-Assad meticulously planned commandos ranged behind Israeli their 1973 offensive, one they lines, causing havoc. In the north, carried thousands of tons of materiel hoped would reverse Israeli gains things looked equally bad. The Syr- over vast distances into the midst of of the earlier war and put an end ian attack had not been halted until the most ferocious fighting the Mid­dle to Arab humiliation. The war was Oct. 10. East had ever witnessed—the 1973 set to begin on the holiest of Jew- Grievously heavy on both sides Arab–Israeli War. MAC air­lifters—T- ish religious days, Yom Kippur. were the losses in armored vehicles tailed C-141s and C-5As—went in and combat aircraft. Israeli air- harm’s way, vulnerable to attack from Trapped by Complacency power was hard hit by a combina- fighters, as they carved a demanding The Arab states had trained well tion of mobile SA-6 and the man- track across the Mediterranean, and and Moscow had supplied equip- portable SA-7 air-defense missiles to missiles and sabotage, as they were ment on a colossal scale, including expertly wielded by the Arabs. The off-loading in Israel. 600 advanced surface-to-air mis- attacking forces were also plenti- Though not as famous as the siles, 300 MiG-21 fighters, 1,200 fully supplied with radar-controlled 1948–49 Berlin Airlift or as massive tanks, and hundreds of thousands ZSU-23-4 anti-aircraft guns. Israeli as the 1990–91 Desert Storm airlift, of tons of consumable war materiel. estimates of consumption of am- this 1973 operation was a watershed On paper, the Arabs held a huge ad- munition and fuel were seen to be event. Code-named “Nickel Grass,” vantage in troops, tanks, artillery, totally inadequate. However, it was it restored a balance of power and and aircraft. This was offset, in the high casualty rate that stunned helped Israel survive a coordinated, Israeli minds, by the Jewish state’s Israel, shocking not only Meir but life-threatening Soviet–backed as- superior technology, advanced mo- also the legendary Gen. Moshe sault from Egypt and Syria. It proved bilization capability, and interior Dayan, minister of defense. the Air Force concept of global mo- lines of communication. Despite The shock was accompanied bility based on jet-powered transport unmistakable signs of increasing by sheer disbelief at America’s aircraft. The airlift also transformed Arab military capability, Israeli failure to comprehend that the the image of the C-5 from that of leaders remained unworried, even situation was critical. Voracious expensive lemon to symbol of US complacent, confident in Is­rael’s consumption of ammunition and might. ability to repel any attack. huge losses in tanks and aircraft A quarter of a century ago, in The Israeli government became brought Israel to the brink of de- summer and fall 1973, the Mideast unequivocally convinced of impend- feat, forcing the Israelis to think seethed with tensions. Six years ing war just hours before the Arab the formerly unthinkable as they earlier, in June 1967, Israeli forces nations attacked at 2:05 p.m. local pondered their options. conquered vast swaths of land time, Oct. 6. Prime Minister Golda Half a world away, the controlled by Egypt, Syria, and Meir, despite her immense popularity, was in a funk, unable or unwilling Jordan. Cairo and Damascus failed refused to use those precious hours to act decisively. Washington was in over the years to persuade or force to carry out a pre-emptive attack; the throes of not only post– Israel to relinquish its grip on the she was concerned that the US might moralizing on Capitol Hill but also

56 AIR FORCE Magazine / December 1998 the agony of Water­gate, both of which concerned as they were about the war-reserve stocks, began pouring impaired the leadership of President adverse effects Arab reaction would into these sites. Richard M. Nixon. Four days into the have upon their businesses. MAC’s Less than nine hours after Nixon’s war, Washington was blindsided again inquiries with commercial carriers decision, MAC had C-141s and C-5s by another political disaster—the received the same negative response. ready to depart. There would be forced resignation of Vice President Then, it was suggested that MAC as- some initial delays, and they would Spiro T. Ag­new. sist the Israeli flag carrier by flying encounter some difficulties en route, Not surprisingly, the initial US the material to Lajes, the base on but they would be the first of a flood reaction to the invasion was one of the Portuguese islands in the of aircraft into Israel. confusion and contradiction. Lead- Atlantic, where it could be picked up The complex nature of Nickel ers tried to strike a balance of the by Israeli transports. Grass required a flexible chain of traditional US support of Israel with The US dithered in this fashion for command. Within MAC, 21st Air the need to maintain a still-tenuous four days. Then, on Oct. 12, Nixon Force, commanded by Maj. Gen. superpower détente with the Soviet personally decided that MAC would Lester T. Kearney Jr., was designated Union and a desire to avoid a threat- handle the entire airlift. Tel Aviv’s as the controlling Air Force. The ened Arab embargo of oil shipments Lod/Ben-Gurion air complex would vice commander of 21st, Brig. Gen. to the West. be the off-load point. Kelton M. Farris, was named MAC “Send everything that can fly,” he mission commander. The prime airlift Shifting Scenarios ordered. director was Col. Edward J. Nash. The many shifts in US military USAF had been preparing right planning to aid Israel are well-doc- along to take on the challenge. Gen. We’ll Hold Your Coat umented, notably in Flight to Israel, George S. Brown, USAF Chief of The threat of an oil embargo fright- Kenneth L. Patchin’s official MAC Staff, telephoned Gen. Paul K. Carl­ ened US allies. With a single excep- history of Operation Nickel Grass. ton, MAC commander, to begin load- tion, they all denied landing and Nixon, in response to a personal ing MAC aircraft with materiel but overflight rights to the emergency plea from Meir, had made the crucial to hold them within the US pending MAC flights. The exception was Por- decision Oct. 9 to re-supply Israel. release of a formal order sending tugal, which, after hard bargaining, However, four days would pass before them onward. Carlton put his com- essentially agreed to look the other the executive office could make a manders on alert and contacted the way as traffic mushroomed at Lajes final decision on how the re-supply heads of other involved commands, Field. Daily departure flights grew would be executed. including Gen. Jack J. Catton of Air from one to 40 over a few days. This Initially, planners proposed that Force Logistics Command. AFLC was a crucial agreement for MAC, Israel be given the responsibility accorded the same high priority to which could not have conducted the for carrying out the entire airlift. Nickel Grass, and the results showed airlift the way it did without staging (Israel did use eight of its com- immediately. More than 20 sites in through Lajes. mercial to carry 5,500 tons the United States were designated When Nixon flashed the deci- of materiel from the US to Israel.) to be cargo pick-up points where sion Oct. 12, top American officials Israel attempted to elicit interest the US military would assemble instantly applied pressure for im- from US commercial carriers, but materiel for shipment to Israel. mediate results. MAC’s complex they refused to enlist in the effort, Equipment, some directly from machinery sprang into action, but it took some hours to establish a steady, regulated flow of aircraft and crews. Initial flights were delayed because of high winds at Lajes, generating White House fury that supplies had not magically reached Israel. Adm. Thomas H. Moorer, Chair- man of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, called Carlton about this, saying, “We’ll have to get them moving, or we’ll lose our jobs.” Carlton knew the airlift business. He knew that he had an adequate number of aircraft, crews, and re- quired equipment. The fleet consisted of 268 C-141s and 77 C-5As, and Carlton knew that he could sustain a steady flow of three C-141s every two hours and four C-5s every four hours—indefinitely. He also knew that MAC could orchestrate the op- The Air Force initially set the daily flow of airlifters at 12 C-141s and four C-5s, then eration, establishing a rational flow raised it to 17 and six, respectively, until Oct. 30. The pace was rough on aircrews of aircraft matching the cargo to be and support personnel alike. carried with off-loading equipment

AIR FORCE Magazine / December 1998 57 at the destination. In his plan, MAC points (McGuire AFB, N.J.; Dover were delayed as a result of 50-knot would essentially become a conduit AFB, Del.; and Charleston AFB, crosswinds at Lajes. Scheduled to through which materiel would flow S.C.) to Lajes, but from Lajes on- be the first aircraft at Lod was a C-5 in a well-adjusted stream. ward it was precise. Aircraft flew carrying the ALCE team, headed by At first, however, he could not to Gibraltar at the southern tip of Col. Donald R. Strobaugh. How- convey either his concept or his and then followed a narrow ever, it encountered engine trouble confidence to the White House, State path over the Mediterranean to and had to return to Lajes, where Department, or Pentagon. Tel Aviv. Strobaugh and his team transferred Carlton had already begun to ex- The route was deliberately placed to a C-141. pedite things, taking extraordinary along the center of the Mediterranean The first C-5 (Tail No. 00461) to actions in the interest of saving time. Sea on the Flight Information Region land at Lod touched down at 22:01 These steps included waiving crew boundary line dividing the airspace of Zulu. It carried 97 tons of 105 mm rest requirements, weight limitations, the hostile African states to the south howitzer shells, and it arrived at a daily utilization restrictions, and rou- and that of the “friendly” European time when Israeli forces were down tine maintenance demands. He had to states to the north. to their last supplies of ammunition. fight a continuing change of orders Another 829 tons would be delivered streaming out of the White House Fighters All the Way in the next 24 hours. Even as Israeli and State and Defense departments. The threat of Arab interception was workers unloaded those first cargo There was continuing pressure to real, and the US Navy’s Sixth Fleet airplanes, huge formations of Israeli enlist the help of commercial airlines, acted as protector until the transports and Egyptian armor, maneuvering despite their universal reluctance. At came within about 200 miles of Israel. just 100 miles to the southwest, were one point, late in the game, officials There fighters took locked in a desperate tank battle that threatened to remove MAC entirely over. Although threats were made would prove to be the largest clash of from the operation. by radio, and several un­identified armor since the World War II Battle Even so, Carlton was confident fighters were seen, no overt hostile of Kursk. he could establish a flow that not action was taken. Carlton was only too aware of the only would let MAC handle the Neither Lajes nor Lod possessed C-5’s vulnerability to ground attack. initial requirement of 4,000 tons adequate aerial port facilities. Carl- Whenever possible, the Air Force of materiel but also continue to ton called for establishment of Air- would have only a single C-5 on the handle all of MAC’s other as- lift Control Elements at both places, ground at any one time. signments. He asked for patience, accurately estimating the number of The first C-141 (Tail No. 60177) to stating that “once this flow starts, personnel and the equipment that arrive at Lod landed at 23:16 Zulu. it [the materiel] is going to come each would require. (More than The aircraft carried more ammuni- like a bushel basket of oranges just 1,300 people would work at Lajes, tion but, more importantly, it deliv- being dumped.” seriously taxing all the facilities.) ered Strobaugh and his ALCE crew. The average distance from US Other ALCEs were established at The group ultimately numbered 55, departure points to Lajes was 3,297 points within the US where aerial all of whom worked 12 hours a day, miles. It was another 3,163 miles port facilities were not sufficient seven days a week. They were given from Lajes to Lod/Ben-Gurion. The to handle the rush. three 40K loaders as well as locally route varied from eastern departure The initial missions to Israel improvised unloading gear. The arriving MAC airplanes were greeted ecstatically by the Israelis. The crews received red-carpet treat- ment. Israel put in place a system to expedite cargo handling; materiel unloaded from the transports usually were at the front in Syria in about three hours and in the Sinai in less than 10 hours. The original 4,000-ton airlift re- quirement grew daily. After the first day, USAF set the daily flow require- ment at four C-5s and 12 C-141s. After Oct. 21, it raised the aircraft flow level to six C-5s and 17 C-141s and maintained it there until Oct. 30, when the demand began to drop. The continuous flow of aircraft on the long flights was tough on the aircrews, but MAC was judicious in its positioning of relief crews Supplies airlifted into Lod kept aircraft like this Israeli air force A-4 flying. From for the C-141 and using augmented Nickel Grass USAF learned the importance of an overseas staging base such as crews on the C-5. A special pool Lajes and the requirement for of airlifters. of navigators was created for the

58 AIR FORCE Magazine / December 1998 vital but tedious task of navigating the Mediterranean.

To the Offensive WideWorld Photo Because it eliminated the need to husband ammunition and other con- sumable items, the continuous flood of US war materiel enabled Israeli forces to go on the offensive in the latter stages of the war. In the north, Israel’s ground forces recovered all territory that had been lost and began to march on Da­mascus. In the Sinai, tank forces led by Maj. Gen. smashed back across the Suez, encircled the Egyptian Third Army on the western side of the canal, and threatened Ismailia, Suez City, and even Cairo itself. Egypt and Syria, which had previ- ously rejected the idea of a negotiated The largest tank battle since World War II took place during the 1973 Arab–Israeli settlement, now felt compelled on War. Airlifters not only resupplied the Israelis with M-60s but also brought in new anti-tank weapons and electronic countermeasures equipment. Oct. 22 to agree to the arrangement hammered out by Washington and Moscow with the goal of preventing missions by C-141 Star­lifter. The reliability. No accidents occurred. the total destruction of the trapped C-5s delivered about 48 percent The abort rate of all planned flights Egyptian army. Israel was reluctant of the tonnage but consumed 24 came in under 2 percent. to comply immediately, wishing to percent less fuel than the C-141s. The airlift taught the Air Force gain as much as possible before a Included in the gross cargo ton- many lessons, large and small. One cease-fire. nage was a total of 2,264.5 tons was that Lajes was a godsend—one The , faced with Is­ of “outsize” materiel, equipment that the US best not take for granted rael’s continuing offensive, raised that could be delivered only by in a future emergency. The Air Force the stakes. Moscow declared to the a C-5. Among these items were established an immediate require- United States that, if the US could M-60 tanks, 155 mm howitzers, ment for aerial refueling to become not bring Israel to heel, it would ground radar systems, mobile trac- standard practice in MAC so that take unilateral action to dictate a tor units, CH-53 helicopters, and its airlifters could operate without settlement. On Oct. 24, the United A-4E components. forward bases, if necessary. Another States, in order to intensify the The airlift had been a key to the lesson was that commercial airlines, image of risk in Soviet minds and victory. It had not only brought on their own, could not be expected to keep Soviet forces out of the cri- about the timely resupply of the volunteer their services and aircraft. sis, responded by taking its armed flagging Israeli force but also This meant that access to commercial forces to a worldwide DEFCON provided a series of deadly new lift in the future would have to be III alert, implying readiness for weapons put to good use in the lat- met by activating the Civil Reserve nuclear operations, if necessary. ter part of the war. These included Air Fleet, as in fact it was during the Fortunately, after several abortive Maverick and TOW anti-tank weap- . Nickel Grass also led to efforts, an effective cease-fire finally ons and extensive new electronic the consolidation of all airlift aircraft took hold Oct. 28. countermeasures equipment that under Military Airlift Command and Israel suffered 10,800 killed and warded off successful attacks on its designation as a specified com- wounded—a traumatic loss for a na- Israeli fighters. Reflecting on the mand Feb. 1, 1977. tion of some 3 million persons—plus operation’s vital contribution to Finally, the C-5 proved to be the fin- 100 aircraft and 800 tanks. The Arab the war effort, Reader’s Digest est military airlift aircraft in history, nations suffered 17,000 killed or would call it “The Airlift That not the expensive military mistake as wounded and 8,000 prisoners, and Saved Israel.” it had been portrayed in the media. lost 500 aircraft and 1,800 tanks. Both US transport types distin- Its ability to carry huge amounts of The airlift officially ended Nov. guished themselves by performing cargo economically, carry outsize 14. By then, the Air Force had de- reliably and economically. The C-5A pieces of equipment, and refuel in livered 22,395 tons of cargo—145 had an 81 percent reliability while flight fully justified the expense of missions by C-5 Galaxy and 422 the C-141 registered a 93 percent the program. “For generations to come,” said Walter J. Boyne, former director of the National Air and Space Museum in Wash- Golda Meir not long after the war’s ington, is a retired Air Force colonel and author. He has written more than 400 end, “all will be told of the miracle of articles about aviation topics and 29 books, the latest of which is Beyond the Ho- the immense planes from the United rizons: The Lockheed Story. His most recent article for Air Force Magazine, “MiG States bringing in the material that Sweep,” appeared in the November 1998 issue. meant life for our people.” ■

AIR FORCE Magazine / December 1998 59