Operation Nickel Grass: Airlift in Support of National Policy Capt Chris J
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Secretary of the Air Force Janies F. McGovern Air Force Chief of Staff Gen Larry D. Welch Commander, Air University Lt Gen Ralph Lv Havens Commander, Center for Aerospace Doctrine, Research, and Education Col Sidney J. Wise Editor Col Keith W. Geiger Associate Editor Maj Michael A. Kirtland Professional Staff Hugh Richardson. Contributing Editor Marvin W. Bassett. Contributing Editor John A. Westcott, Art Director and Production Mu linger Steven C. Garst. Art Editor and Illustrator The Airpower Journal, published quarterly, is the professional journal of the United States Air Force. It is designed to serve as an open forum for presenting and stimulating innovative thinking on military doctrine, strategy, tactics, force structure, readiness, and other national defense matters. The views and opinions ex- pressed or implied in the Journal are those of the authors and should not be construed as car- rying the official sanction of the Department of Defense, the Air Force, Air University, or other agencies or departments of the US government. Articles in this edition may be reproduced in whole or in part without permission. If repro- duced, the Airpower Journal requests a cour- tesy line. JOURNAL SPRING 1989. Vol. Ill, No. I AFRP 50 2 Editorial 2 Air Interdiction Col Clifford R. Kxieger, USAF 4 Operation Nickel Grass: Airlift in Support of National Policy Capt Chris J. Krisinger, USAF 16 Paradox of the Headless Horseman Lt Col Joe Boyles, USAF Capt Greg K. Mittelman, USAF 29 A Rare Feeling of Satisfaction Maj Michael A. Kirtland, USAF 34 Weaseling in the BUFF Col A. Lee Harrell, USAF 36 Thinking About Air Power Maj Andrew J. Ogan, USAF 43 Modified to Meet the Need: British Aircraft in the Falklands Capt Joseph F. Udemi, USAF 51 Ricochets Letters 3 Net Assessment Reviews uf Current Literature 73 Notams Notices of Interest 90 Contributors 91 EDITORIAL A Magnificent Staff It is a trap, by the way, that is not reserved for headquarters and other staffs. It is an equal opportunity pitfall that awaits any There was a magni/icenl legal staff, a who have a tendency to lose sight of overall mechanism such as is possessed by every goals. (And who among us does not fall prey state before its political, economic, and to this foible?) We all have seen manifesta moral collapse. tions of the highly intricate organizational —Jaroslav Hasek structure within which the emphasis on The Good Soldier: Schweik part-tasks has replaced an appreciation of what the organization is all about: the ab HE quote refers, in a narrow sense, to the sence of the “regular crew chief” to answer Tred-tape-encumbered administration of a question, the overgeneration of operation a 1914 Austro-Hungarian army detention ally ineffective sorties, the airlift deploy barracks. It is not necessarily an indictment ment loads closed in no particularly usable of the legal profession, nor of experts and sequence, the abundance of software-illit expertise. It is not the railings of an old war- erate “clerks” of all ranks manning personal horse against the “rear-echelon SOBs” who computers, and the flexible military leave do not have to endure the discomfort, fear, form that can be flexibly used only in a few and chaos at the point of combat. It is a constrained circumstances. commentary. Are we therefore destined to live out our Although good staffs are as essential to ef professional lives, slogging away in a mo fectiveness as are any other activities, the rass of activities, accepting the literary flog quote is a telling exposition of the trap into gings served out by journal editors and which "magnificent staffs” can lead. It is an other sage observers? No, we are not. The observation on the meaningless activity and preventative is easy to prescribe, often dif goal-less processing to which staffs can be ficult to swallow. Since any system is dri come oriented in both peace and war. It is a ven primarily by the individuals who lamentation of the all-too-familiar phenom people it, the remedy simply requires that enon of a rigidly structured, regulation-rid each of us assess our actions and activities den. tunnel-visioned emphasis on process in light of the intended result. This does re and "proper" procedure to the detriment of quire us to stretch beyond what to why, and an overall end product. It speaks to a lack of it requires that a mentor take the time to in vision of and an obliviousness to the ulti struct us on the why. But this puts all of us mate objective to which the varied and in in a position to ask, “Did I contribute today, dividual mechanisms of an organization not to the number of legal cases processed, should contribute. It describes what usually nor to the production of sorties, nor to the happens when the parts of the whole be number of patients seen, but did I contrib come so specialized and narrowly oriented ute to the mission that those indicators sup that perfect form in functional activity as port?" If so, then bask in a feeling of sumes the attributes of an end product. satisfaction; if not, then ask, “Why am I here When that occurs, real goals become all but and what am I really supposed to be invisible to most of us. doing?” KWG 2 ricochets Letters to the editor are encouraged. All corre- as faculty at the service academies and war col spondence should be addressed to the Editor. leges, although it's been my observation that Airpower Journal. Walker Hall, Maxwell AFB there is a dearth of strategic writings from this AL 36112-5532. We reserve the right to edit the source. Still others likely include officers whose material for overall length. duties involve intelligence or similar research study—much like Colonel Donovan's duties. STRATEGIC LITERACY The number of officers in these or related posi tions at any point in time is. however, tremen No doubt about it—Lt Col G. Murphy Donovan dously small. This fact, in my view, diminishes knows how to express himself exceedingly well. somewhat the significance of Colonel Donovan’s His "Strategic Literacy" in your Winter 1988 is observation that only “.003 percent of all active sue touched on a subject near and dear to the duty Air Force officers" are likely to write for hearts of those of us determined to add to the publication. body of military writings. Although Colonel After 23 years of service, I well appreciate the Donovan's linguistic gymnastics sometimes bor frustrations produced by the seemingly endless dered on being a little too "cute.” enhanced with bureaucratic morass and documentation review more than just a hint of apparent bitterness, processes that exist in today’s Air Force. But 1 am these detracted little from the significance of his not so cynical as to believe that some sort of in article. stitutional conspiracy or even an organizational Since much of Colonel Donovan’s theme is lethargy exists to stop the flow of professionally impinged upon significantly by the “jointness" relevant writings on military strategy. On the of our armed services. 1 asked the commander of contrary, if Colonel Donovan’s relatively low fig my joint command (a Navy flag officer) and our ure of 10 percent clearance denial for journal ar chief of staff (an Army 0-6) to share their ticles is to be generalized, then I’d consider that thoughts about the article. They agree that Colo at least a preliminary indication that the system nel Donovan’s concerns regarding the level of is working somewhat reasonably. Of course, this professional military writings on strategic does not address the level of dilution the other thought are applicable to each of the military ser 90 percent might have suffered in order to be vices. They also share my view that Colonel cleared. Donovan has perhaps attributed too much sig As for the supervisory and command "censor nificance to the security and command review ship" addressed by the author, my experience aspects of the issue. and that of others with whom I’m familiar re It seems to me that, with few exceptions, rising garding this aspect of publication review have stars in the military community often find little generally been of a positive nature rather than a time during an active duty career to engage in negatively inhibitive one. In the vast majority of rigorous, thought-provoking literary discourse the times, my superiors have reviewed my on strategy. It’s just a fact of professional life that manuscripts and offered suggestions based on we perceive ourselves as being too busy keeping their more extensive real-world experiences and our warfighting machinery "leaning forward in considered ideas; the resultant document the trenches” in anticipation of the unantici proved not only vastly more publishable, but pated. As a result, strategic thought tends to wait also significantly more scholarly in terms of until retirement before being put to paper. I level of contribution to our profession of arms. place no particular value judgment on this but Having said all this, however, it remains es merely note it. sential to the integrity of our profession that, as The exceptions to this generality include Colonel Donovan admonishes, we recognize the those of us who enjoy one-year sabbaticals as re dynamic but inseparable nature of both the real- search fellows, war college students, and the like. Another exception may be those assigned Cont/nued on page 65 3 AIR INTERDICTION Col Clifford R. Kr ieger , USAF air interdiction—air operations conducted to destroy, neutralize, or delay the enemy's military potential before it can be brought to bear effectively against friendly forces, at such distance from friendly forces that detailed integration of each air mission with the fire and movement of friendly forces is not required.