Secretary of the Air Force Janies F. McGovern

Air Force Chief of Staff Gen Larry D. Welch

Commander, Air University Lt Gen Ralph Lv Havens

Commander, Center for Aerospace Doctrine, Research, and Education Col Sidney J. Wise

Editor Col Keith W. Geiger

Associate Editor Maj Michael A. Kirtland

Professional Staff Hugh Richardson. Contributing Editor Marvin W. Bassett. Contributing Editor John A. Westcott, Art Director and Production Mu linger Steven C. Garst. Art Editor and Illustrator

The Airpower Journal, published quarterly, is the professional journal of the United States Air Force. It is designed to serve as an open forum for presenting and stimulating innovative thinking on military doctrine, strategy, tactics, force structure, readiness, and other national defense matters. The views and opinions ex- pressed or implied in the Journal are those of the authors and should not be construed as car- rying the official sanction of the Department of Defense, the Air Force, Air University, or other agencies or departments of the US government.

Articles in this edition may be reproduced in whole or in part without permission. If repro- duced, the Airpower Journal requests a cour- tesy line. JOURNAL SPRING 1989. Vol. Ill, No. I AFRP 50 2

Editorial 2 Air Interdiction Col Clifford R. Kxieger, USAF 4 Operation Nickel Grass: Airlift in Support of National Policy Capt Chris J. Krisinger, USAF 16 Paradox of the Headless Horseman Lt Col Joe Boyles, USAF Capt Greg K. Mittelman, USAF 29 A Rare Feeling of Satisfaction Maj Michael A. Kirtland, USAF 34 Weaseling in the BUFF Col A. Lee Harrell, USAF 36 Thinking About Air Power Maj Andrew J. Ogan, USAF 43 Modified to Meet the Need: British Aircraft in the Falklands Capt Joseph F. Udemi, USAF 51 Ricochets Letters 3 Net Assessment Reviews uf Current Literature 73 Notams Notices of Interest 90 Contributors 91 EDITORIAL

A Magnificent Staff It is a trap, by the way, that is not reserved for headquarters and other staffs. It is an equal opportunity pitfall that awaits any There was a magni/icenl legal staff, a who have a tendency to lose sight of overall mechanism such as is possessed by every goals. (And who among us does not fall prey state before its political, economic, and to this foible?) We all have seen manifesta­ moral collapse. tions of the highly intricate organizational —Jaroslav Hasek structure within which the emphasis on The Good Soldier: Schweik part-tasks has replaced an appreciation of what the organization is all about: the ab­ HE quote refers, in a narrow sense, to the sence of the “regular crew chief” to answer Tred-tape-encumbered administration of a question, the overgeneration of operation­ a 1914 Austro-Hungarian army detention ally ineffective sorties, the airlift deploy­ barracks. It is not necessarily an indictment ment loads closed in no particularly usable of the legal profession, nor of experts and sequence, the abundance of software-illit­ expertise. It is not the railings of an old war- erate “clerks” of all ranks manning personal horse against the “rear-echelon SOBs” who computers, and the flexible military leave do not have to endure the discomfort, fear, form that can be flexibly used only in a few and chaos at the point of combat. It is a constrained circumstances. commentary. Are we therefore destined to live out our Although good staffs are as essential to ef­ professional lives, slogging away in a mo­ fectiveness as are any other activities, the rass of activities, accepting the literary flog­ quote is a telling exposition of the trap into gings served out by journal editors and which "magnificent staffs” can lead. It is an other sage observers? No, we are not. The observation on the meaningless activity and preventative is easy to prescribe, often dif­ goal-less processing to which staffs can be­ ficult to swallow. Since any system is dri­ come oriented in both peace and war. It is a ven primarily by the individuals who lamentation of the all-too-familiar phenom­ people it, the remedy simply requires that enon of a rigidly structured, regulation-rid­ each of us assess our actions and activities den. tunnel-visioned emphasis on process in light of the intended result. This does re­ and "proper" procedure to the detriment of quire us to stretch beyond what to why, and an overall end product. It speaks to a lack of it requires that a mentor take the time to in­ vision of and an obliviousness to the ulti­ struct us on the why. But this puts all of us mate objective to which the varied and in­ in a position to ask, “Did I contribute today, dividual mechanisms of an organization not to the number of legal cases processed, should contribute. It describes what usually nor to the production of sorties, nor to the happens when the parts of the whole be­ number of patients seen, but did I contrib­ come so specialized and narrowly oriented ute to the mission that those indicators sup­ that perfect form in functional activity as­ port?" If so, then bask in a feeling of sumes the attributes of an end product. satisfaction; if not, then ask, “Why am I here When that occurs, real goals become all but and what am I really supposed to be invisible to most of us. doing?” KWG

2 ricochets

Letters to the editor are encouraged. All corre- as faculty at the service academies and war col­ spondence should be addressed to the Editor. leges, although it's been my observation that Airpower Journal. Walker Hall, Maxwell AFB there is a dearth of strategic writings from this AL 36112-5532. We reserve the right to edit the source. Still others likely include officers whose material for overall length. duties involve intelligence or similar research study—much like Colonel Donovan's duties. STRATEGIC LITERACY The number of officers in these or related posi­ tions at any point in time is. however, tremen­ No doubt about it—Lt Col G. Murphy Donovan dously small. This fact, in my view, diminishes knows how to express himself exceedingly well. somewhat the significance of Colonel Donovan’s His "Strategic Literacy" in your Winter 1988 is­ observation that only “.003 percent of all active sue touched on a subject near and dear to the duty Air Force officers" are likely to write for hearts of those of us determined to add to the publication. body of military writings. Although Colonel After 23 years of service, I well appreciate the Donovan's linguistic gymnastics sometimes bor­ frustrations produced by the seemingly endless dered on being a little too "cute.” enhanced with bureaucratic morass and documentation review more than just a hint of apparent bitterness, processes that exist in today’s Air Force. But 1 am these detracted little from the significance of his not so cynical as to believe that some sort of in­ article. stitutional conspiracy or even an organizational Since much of Colonel Donovan’s theme is lethargy exists to stop the flow of professionally impinged upon significantly by the “jointness" relevant writings on military strategy. On the of our armed services. 1 asked the commander of contrary, if Colonel Donovan’s relatively low fig­ my joint command (a Navy flag officer) and our ure of 10 percent clearance denial for journal ar­ chief of staff (an Army 0-6) to share their ticles is to be generalized, then I’d consider that thoughts about the article. They agree that Colo­ at least a preliminary indication that the system nel Donovan’s concerns regarding the level of is working somewhat reasonably. Of course, this professional military writings on strategic does not address the level of dilution the other thought are applicable to each of the military ser­ 90 percent might have suffered in order to be vices. They also share my view that Colonel cleared. Donovan has perhaps attributed too much sig­ As for the supervisory and command "censor­ nificance to the security and command review ship" addressed by the author, my experience aspects of the issue. and that of others with whom I’m familiar re­ It seems to me that, with few exceptions, rising garding this aspect of publication review have stars in the military community often find little generally been of a positive nature rather than a time during an active duty career to engage in negatively inhibitive one. In the vast majority of rigorous, thought-provoking literary discourse the times, my superiors have reviewed my on strategy. It’s just a fact of professional life that manuscripts and offered suggestions based on we perceive ourselves as being too busy keeping their more extensive real-world experiences and our warfighting machinery "leaning forward in considered ideas; the resultant document the trenches” in anticipation of the unantici­ proved not only vastly more publishable, but pated. As a result, strategic thought tends to wait also significantly more scholarly in terms of until retirement before being put to paper. I level of contribution to our profession of arms. place no particular value judgment on this but Having said all this, however, it remains es­ merely note it. sential to the integrity of our profession that, as The exceptions to this generality include Colonel Donovan admonishes, we recognize the those of us who enjoy one-year sabbaticals as re­ dynamic but inseparable nature of both the real- search fellows, war college students, and the like. Another exception may be those assigned Cont/nued on page 65

3 AIR INTERDICTION

Col Clifford R. Kr ieger , USAF air interdiction—air operations conducted to destroy, neutralize, or delay the enemy's military potential before it can be brought to bear effectively against friendly forces, at such distance from friendly forces that detailed integration of each air mission with the fire and movement of friendly forces is not required. — Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms

IKE counterair operations, air inter­ studied and thus little understood. Few diction (AI) is a classic air mission. It people know what it is and what it can and appeared during World War I and cannot do. This lack of understanding has came into its own during World War led to errors at the highest levels, adversely LII. Over the last 70 years, air interdictionaffecting the conduct of air interdiction. campaigns have had varying degrees of ef­ The danger for the future is not that re­ fectiveness. Air interdiction was an impor­ sources will be wasted on AI but that, be­ tant factor in preparing for the Allied cause of mismanagement, its potential will invasion at Normandy in 1944; however, its be ignored or perhaps even lost. Against a usefulness to the Allied effort in Italy was strong and offensively oriented opponent, limited because it was conducted in isola­ such as the Warsaw Pact, AI must be em­ tion from the land campaign. In recent ployed as effectively as possible. years, the Israeli air force has had mixed re­ Commanders have a natural desire to sults with AI. Despite the fact that air in­ command and control those external forces terdiction is a classic air mission, it is little (e.g., air forces) that they depend on for sup-

4 port. This inclination is in accordance with fungible forces—will not be discussed in the basic principle of unity of command. this article. However, two considerations mitigate The air interdiction campaign is not an against that approach. First, commanders independent air operation but comple­ cannot continue to add units to their pur­ ments the efforts of friendly surface forces view without eventually diluting their abil­ in achieving the objectives of the theater ity to provide command and control for commander in chief (CINC). Like the cam­ each one. Second, at some point command­ paigns of the surface component command­ ers will find that they do not possess the ex­ ers, the AI campaign is structured to fulfill pertise needed to give close attention to the the theater CINC’s overall objectives. In detailed technical structure of each organi­ view of the common perception that an air zation. Although overextending the span of interdiction campaign is designed to en­ control is a less serious concern with ho­ hance the effectiveness of the land compo­ mogeneous units, technical diversity can nent commander, it seems strange to talk quickly become a problem. A third issue— about conducting the campaign according the ability of a senior commander to quickly to the theater CINC's objectives. These ob­ provide new objectives for certain highly jectives are important because of the CINC’s apportionment decision, which determines the total expected air effort and assigns forces that should be devoted to various op­ erations for a given period of time.1 The US Air Force has long maintained that it is the prerogative of the unified or joint com­ mander to apportion air effort to counterair, air interdiction, and close air supports Thus, from day to day the theater CINC can increase or decrease the amount of effort ap­ plied to the air interdiction campaign. The air component commander (ACC) recom- 6 AIRPOWER IOURNAL SPRING 1989 mends the air apportionment to the theater ion to supported surface commanders who CINC and thereby strongly influences the fi­ feel that they will benefit if they are running nal decision. In fact, the views of all the the show. The conduct of the campaign re­ component commanders must be consid­ quires the expertise and constant attention ered.' At the very least, the theater CINC of both the commander and staff of the air prescribes the size of the air interdiction component. Whether the decision to con­ campaign and indirectly determines how it duct an AI campaign comes directly from is executed. The CINC or a higher authority the theater CINC, the ACC, or as a request may also provide more definitive direction from one of the surface component com­ about what the air interdiction campaign manders, the ACC should have responsibil­ should accomplish and what may or may ity for the mission. Air interdiction is a not be done.4 classic case for the use of mission-oriented Because the construction of an AI cam­ command and control, sometimes called paign appears to be straightforward, many mission order tactics.5 This concept of com­ people are tempted to meddle in the plan­ mand and control (see table), which stems ning. A number of individuals want to have from German military tradition as far back their hands on the air power throttle—from as Helmuth von Moltke, is designed to give senior government leaders concerned about the greatest freedom to the person who the impact of target selection on world opin­ knows the situation and emphasizes initia-

Tenets of Mission-Oriented Command and Control

The superior • determines the objectives to be achieved and to this end assigns a clearly defined mission. • ensures that the forces, resources, and the authority required to accomplish the mis­ sion are available to the subordinate. • lays down details only to the extent necessary for coordination within a broad scope. These details usually apply to the interaction with such forces and resources not subordinate to the person executing the mission or not immediately available to him.

The subordinate • has extensive latitude in the way he executes the mission. He can use his own ini­ tiative to develop his operation plan and determine the necessary details. He has full discretion and freedom of action. • remains—whatever he may do—committed to the substance of his mission and the concept of operations of the higher level of command. In carrying out his operation he never forgets the goals his superior is trying to attain. The Germans would say: “The mission is sacred to him.” • combines obedience wdth thinking in broader terms and a willingness to assume responsibility.

Source: German Military Thinking: Se/ecled Papers on German Theory and Doctrine. Art of War Colloquium (Qtrlisle Uar- racks. Pa.: US Army War College. May 1983). 95-96. AIR INTERDICTION 7

tive at the lowest level. It thereby takes ad­ objectives in terms of desired outcomes vantage of what the US military prides itself rather than targets to be attacked or sorties on—the initiative of the individual soldier, to be flown. Although it may be easier to list sailor, or airman. targets or detail sorties, presenting the ob­ jectives in such terms cripples the planning process and results in a less effective overall air effort." Not only must ACCs know the­ ater objectives but also they must know the objectives of the surface commanders so that they can provide them the best possible support and help them exploit the results of the AI campaign. Once the objectives are known, the air planners outline the various ways they can be achieved. An attack on bridges and road defiles may be possible, but—as our experience in Vietnam taught us—it may be far more effective to lay mines in harbors and attack docks. The issue is not one of hitting bridges or docks but of finding the best way to achieve the objectives, in Mission-oriented command and control view of the existing situation. Attacking is missing in current discussions of air in­ supplies in dumps may be the answer, but terdiction. Consequently, everyone who attacking command and control nets may be might receive some benefit from air inter­ equally effective. Selection of target sys­ diction w ishes to have a say in how it tems should be coordinated with the sur­ should be done. The large number of cooks face component commanders to ensure that threatens to spoil the broth. Air interdiction must be conducted as a single campaign un­ der the direction of one commander—the ACC— who should be held responsible for its execution. To do otherwise, given the limited air assets available, will fragment the effort and diminish effectiveness. The air interdiction campaign delays, dis­ rupts, diverts, or destroys enemy forces.6 It achieves one or more of these effects by con­ ducting operations against a number of pos­ sible targets or target systems, including enemy combat units; transportation net­ works; command, control, and communi­ cations networks; combat supplies; or a combination of them. The specific form of an air interdiction campaign must be de­ destruction of these targets fulfills land and rived from the theater CINC’s objectives, naval objectives. When reviewing potential taking into consideration enemy threats and targets, however, the air component com­ the opportunities for friendly action.7 mander must also consider the threat each The theater CINC’s objectives for an in­ one represents. terdiction campaign should be broad Enemy targets cannot be viewed solely in enough to permit the ACC latitude in meet­ terms of the number of weapon systems in­ ing them. The CINC should identify these volved. In addition to the types and prolif- 8 AIRPOWER IOURNAL SPRING 1989 eration of defensive radars, aircraft, tunities to apply air interdiction in espe­ missiles, and guns, the terrain and weather cially effective ways. Often an AI campaign may also be factors. For example, terrain will resemble previous campaigns, but can be used to mask our attacking aircraft ACCs must examine all opportunities and from ground-based radars, and atmospheric exploit them when it is to their advantage. conditions can aid or hinder either the de­ Such opportunities may be offered by the fender or the attacker. Further, ACCs have a land component commander’s scheme of number of options available to them to maneuver, the campaign of the naval com­ counter the existing threat and aid in mis­ ponent commander, the enemy’s situation, sion planning. These include intelligence environmental factors, or the ACC's own ex­ isting condition. For example, enemy lines of communication may be very fragile, the weather may have shielded an area from at­ tack or bogged down the enemy, or Al sup­ port of a Marine landing may divert enemy forces away from an impending Army offen­ sive. On the friendly side, the range of avail­ able aircraft may allow large bomb loads to be carried to deep area targets (e.g., by F-l lls) or may require the campaign to op­ erate against pinpoint targets close to friendly bases (e.g.. with F-4E PAVE TACK). Likewise, the pace of operations may be de­ termined by limitations in either friendly supply or maintenance capabilities. Avail­ able intelligence may convince the ACC to assets and electronic warfare assets (e.g., de­ attack critical logistics command, control, fense suppression forces—those of the ACC and communications nodes, thus disrupt­ and of the land and naval component com­ ing movement of enemy reinforcements and manders). Notwithstanding the effective­ supplies. If working with allies whose air­ ness of electronic warfare assets, certain craft and munitions are second-rate, the targets or target systems may be so costly to ACC might use allied aircraft to attack soft attack that alternate ways of achieving the targets on roads and rail lines and concen­ objective need to be considered. More than trate US air assets on defense suppression. likely, high-value targets that are well de­ The task of the ACC and staff in the tacti­ fended by the enemy will require a tailored cal air control center (TACC) is to tie all package of attack forces including defense these and other factors together and pro­ suppression, electronic warfare, and air- duce a campaign plan to meet the theater superiority aircraft. The nature of the threat CINC’s objectives. This responsibility re­ may influence not only the selection of tar­ quires more than opening a copy of the Joint get systems but also the phasing and timing Munitions Effectiveness Manual. It requires of attacks. For example, heavily defended a knowledge of the techniques and proce­ bridges may call for sowing influence mines dures involving fighter, bomber, and recon­ along rail lines in remote areas. Subsequent naissance aircraft; the capabilities, shifting of enemy defenses may then open limitations, and practices of supply and up certain bridge targets for attack. The maintenance; and the tactical proficiency of threat may also dictate friendly basing at ex­ various units. This expertise is gained tended ranges, which in turn requires inte­ through study and experience as airmen. gration of aerial refueling assets. Similarly, commanders and staff officers The ACCs must be alert to unique oppor­ must be fully prepared for the conduct of air AIR INTERDICTION 9

operations. Given the current limits on at- surface component levels. If collocation is tendance at intermediate and senior service impractical, senior representatives must be schools. Air Force personnel should take exchanged. Placing junior liaison officers in the time to pursue alternative educational each other's headquarters is not sufficient. opportunities.9 Staff officers must under- Because these officers must represent their stand potential enemies—their doctrine, commanders at the other headquarters, they past military operations, strengths and must understand how their commanders weaknesses, as well as transportation net- think. This capability requires skill and sen- works and command, control, communica- sitivity that go beyond mere liaison. To a tions, and intelligence systems. Further, certain extent, the lack of such collocation staff officers need to know the lessons is presently compensated for by collocating learned from past air interdiction cam- tactical air control parties (TACPs) and air paigns as well as the capabilities and support operations centers (ASOCs) with limitations of manned and unmanned aero- land unit headquarters, and ground liaison space systems, the effects of weapons, and officers with Air Force combat wings. One the doctrine of allied forces. This education, idea under consideration within the US Air coupled with operational expertise and ex- perience. will fully prepare commanders and staff for the conduct of theater air operations. It is not enough that ACCs and their staffs be both smart and proficient. They must understand what surface forces can and cannot do. Further, they must know and understand the surface component com- manders and their staffs. Electronic com- munications will not replace the value of speaking to each other. One of the best ways to encourage such communication is to col- locate the headquarters of the component commanders. At the end of World War II, the US Ninth Air Force published an anal- ysis of its operations in Europe. One com- Forces in Europe (USAFE) is to provide ment in the Condensed Analysis is brigadier general corps air liaison officers particularly germane: (ALOs) in wartime.11 This idea is a step in One of the most significant lessons learned the proper direction and. if Congress will al- from tactical air warfare in the desert was that low the spaces, should be extended into it was mandatory that air and ground cooper- peacetime as well. Such arrangements need ating headquarters function together in closest to be continued and expanded to include operational and physical unity. The practical equivalent representation at naval head- step indicated by this thinking was that Ninth quarters. when appropriate. Air Force would have to form a mobile, com- pact operational headquarters which could The surface component commanders as- keep pace with swiftest movement of the army sist the ACC by providing their require- group and could operate independently of the ments for air interdiction in terms of main administrative headquarters in the rear."’ objectives and plans for achieving those ob- jectives. When appropriate, they should When forces are operating in a major the- also include recommended targets and tar- ater. collocation of headquarters should get systems for air attack. The ACC then in- continue down the chain of command to at tegrates the needs of the surface component least numbered air forces and equivalent commanders into the overall effort and con- 10 AIRPOWER JOURNAL SPRING 1989 siders their target recommendations in for­ from nighttime to daytime was delayed. mulating a plan. Whatever the decision, Sometimes the changes are more subtle, as the ACC should coordinate the plan with when the North Vietnamese ran cables these commanders and inform them of any across streams, placing wood planks on changes. them when bridging was needed and taking Having developed an effective air inter­ the planks up again afterward. diction campaign, the ACC cannot sit back and let it execute itself. As Gen Helmuth von Moltke pointed out, "No plan survives contact with the enemy.”12 The enemy is not an inanimate object but will react to our efforts and even initiate action that upsets our plans. Further, the ACC’s ability to as­ sign assets to the A1 campaign varies daily according to attrition and variations in the war. No AI campaign can be static. The ACC must constantly review the campaign so that it responds to a number of factors, in­ cluding the enemy threat, the surface situa­ tion of allied forces, and the status of friendly air power. In tracking enemy coun­ termeasures, the ACC must have timely, ac­ curate intelligence. Experience has shown Intelligence should play three roles dur­ that enemy forces usually adapt rather ing the execution phase of the air interdic­ quickly to air operations directed against tion campaign. First, it can provide up-to- them. Sometimes the enemy response is date information to assist current opera­ quick, unexpected, and effective, as in 1943 tions. This data is critical for planning at­ tacks on mobile targets. Although the ACCs should not make the campaign dependent upon the capabilities of real-time sensor systems, they should fully exploit the ca­ pabilities of these devices. Second, intelli­ gence can indicate how the enemy is adapting to the campaign so that ACCs can respond appropriately. Third, intelligence can help analyze the effectiveness of the various parts of the air interdiction cam­ paign, especially concepts newly intro­ duced. Because they are at the center of both intelligence and air-status reporting, ACCs are best able to revise the campaign as nec­ essary and thereby achieve the theater CINC’s objectives. Further, based on the in­ when the Germans changed from night telligence available, the expertise of the evacuation across the Strait of Messina to ACCs, the competence of their staffs, and day evacuation. The Allied effort to cut off the progress of the air interdiction cam­ or destroy the German forces retreating from paign, the ACCs are able to recommend Sicily was thwarted by a failure to realize changes in immediate and near-term plans that the enemy had taken this risky step. to the surface component commanders. Consequently, shifting Allied AI operations After examining theater objectives (in­ AiR INTERDICTION 11

eluding the objectives of the surface could take the form of counterair opera­ component commanders), threat character- tions. air interdiction, close air support, air stics, and capabilities limitations of reconnaissance, or tactical airlift. When a friendly forces, the ACC determines the tar­ particular scheme of maneuver requires air gets and. if necessary, tailors the attack interdiction, both air and land forces must packages. In accordance with mission-ori­ be closely coordinated. Diversion of air ented command and control, however, par­ power or the delay of Army defense ticipating units along with individual flight suppression or unit movements will disrupt leaders and aircrews select appropriate tac­ tics, techniques, and procedures. This pro­ cess results in the best use of initiative and the most efficient use of expertise at the proper level. Further, because subordinate air commanders understand the objectives of air interdiction, they can continue the campaign despite interruptions in commu­ nications with higher headquarters. That is. they do not have to receive a daily Air Task Order to continue combat operations. More­ over. aircrews can rely on their training and expertise to conduct armed reconnaissance operations when so tasked and to attack tar­ gets of opportunity when so authorized. Air interdiction not only assists a surface the overall effort and put the success of the component commander by reducing the en­ undertaking at risk. Any changes in air in­ emy’s ability to reinforce and maneuver, but terdiction must be closely worked out with also it helps the commander and subordi­ the land commander. Similarly, any nates maneuver to defeat enemy forces. For changes in the land commander’s scheme of example, a land-force commander, perform­ maneuver must be coordinated with the air commander. The other side of mission-oriented com­ mand and control is that the superior—the theater CINC—ensures that forces, re­ sources. and the authority required for ac­ complishment of the mission are available to the responsible subordinate. Although the assets are in theater due to previous ser­ vice programming and the wartime execu­ tion decisions based on apportionment of forces in the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP), the theater CINC determines where the forces will be used and for what purpose. The CINC is responsible for the theater strategy and sets the objectives. This determination of priorities can make or ing at w'hat the Army calls the operational break an air campaign. If the CINC directs level of war, fights battles of maneuver (fire the ACC to give priority to counterair and and movement). In planning and fighting close-air-support operations, this decision the campaign, the commander needs the co­ will limit the assets available for air inter­ operation of air power. That cooperation diction. If the CINC directs the ACC to con- 12 AIRPOIVER JOURNAL SPRING 1989 duct major air efforts in several areas within dissipated. The same situation obtains to­ the theater, this action may dilute the effec­ day. To try to operate an air interdiction tiveness of air power and prevent a unified campaign by parceling out air assets to var­ effort. ious surface commanders means that suffi­ cient forces and resources necessary to do the job will not be available. In effect, the principles of mass and economy of force 'i /’ will be violated. The various services, commands, and agencies have roles to play in all military operations we conduct today. Certain assets can play a vital role in the AI campaign even though they do not belong to the ACC. Five types come to mind: (1) National Intelligence Assets. Intelli­ gence resources may meet the needs of more than one theater. They should be controlled at the national level, but tasking might be delegated if communications allow.

To ensure proper use of resources, the theater CINC provides forces to the people who can best use them to achieve theater objectives. Consequently, the air compo­ nent commander is responsible for all air as­ sets, including the limited number of specialized aircraft. Within mission-ori­ ented command and control, the concept of centralized planning and decentralized ex­ ecution is applicable to the air interdiction campaign. There are two reasons for cen­ tralized planning and decentralized execu­ tion: limited assets and the efficient application of those assets. The ACC must usually operate with less than the desired numbers and types of forces. Further, the speed, range, and flexibility of air assets re­ (2) Strategic Air Command (SAC). SAC quire centralized planning. can quickly place a large amount of ord­ For example, in early World War II when nance on a target and can increase the effec­ the Allies fought with limited resources, tiveness of other forces. It can provide a centralized control with decentralized exe­ mixed force of bomber, tanker, and recon­ cution was essential for successful opera­ naissance aircraft. Because of the impor­ tions. Although these assets were capable of tance of these assets in deterring nuclear doing a variety of missions, priorities had to war, operational command has remained be set. Granted, the speed and range of air with CINCSAC.13 We now recognize, how­ power gave the commander flexibility in de­ ever, that responsibility for control of these ciding where and when to use it. But if air aircraft should pass to the theater com­ assets were committed in penny packets to mander so that targeting, allocation, task­ meet the needs of many parties, they accom­ ing, and execution of these assets will be in plished little, and air strength was quickly the hands of the person who knows what is AIR INTERDICTION 13

going on.M We have yet to acknowledge that interdiction campaign (e.g., assisting with the responsibility should belong to the air defensive operations at sea). When the na­ component commander rather than the val component commander has organic air theater CINC. Under a new concept pre­ capability and associated command and sented at the 1988 US Air Force Aerospace control capabilities—as in an amphibious Power Symposium, SAC proposed that a operation—the ACC provides the air effort, including targeting, allocation, tasking, and execution. ACCs support naval component commanders who have no organic tactical air (e.g., commander, Naval Forces South­ ern Europe—COMNAVSOUTH) in much the same way they provide close air support to land component commanders. (4) Special Operations Forces (SOF). When SOF forces are operating in an area where the ACC is conducting AI and are conducting operations applicable to the AI campaign (e.g., gathering intelligence), they should be part of the ACC’s effort. (5) Army Weapons. As the Army employs weapons with ranges upward of 200 kilo­ meters (km), it becomes clear that those sys­ strategic area of responsibility (SAR) be des­ tems need to be closely integrated into the ignated within a theater and that SAC forces air interdiction campaign to take advantage operate in that SAR under what amounts to of their extreme range. The ratification of mission-type orders.15 The SAR would be the Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces an area accessible only by heavy bomber or (INF) Treaty will soon remove ground- principally by this aircraft. (3) Naval Air. Depending on the theater CINC’s objectives and the state of battle, the naval component commander may have carrier sorties available. Similarly, Marine air-ground, task-force aircraft sorties may be available. If the overall theater situation so dictates, these excess sorties should be placed at the disposal of the ACC’s control system for targeting, allocation, tasking, and execution. This recommendation does not imply that the ACC should control all air aperations of the naval component com­ mander. Far from it. When naval compo­ nent commanders are using organic naval air to conduct the naval campaign, they are in the best position to understand its capa- launched missile systems with ranges ex­ bilities/limitations and to integrate it with ceeding 500 km, but other long-range sys­ surface and subsurface operations. In fact, tems remain in the Army inventory or can the ACC cooperates with the naval compo­ b e p r o c u r e d . 16 T h e q u e s t i o n o f c o m m a n d nent commander in fulfilling theater objec­ and control of surface-to-surface missiles tives. This cooperation is in addition to that becomes more important as technology provided by the ongoing counterair and air makes them effective participants in non- 14 A1RPOWER JOURNAL SPRING 1989 nuclear counterair and air interdiction cam­ particularly bad. a Lance missile could con­ paigns. Logically, control of targeting. ceivably arrive at the very moment that Al aircraft are delivering their ordnance. At the very least, these weapons should be closely integrated with the ACC's tasking because no one would conduct close air support without closely integrating it with the land force's scheme of fire and maneuver. In sum, air interdiction must be con­ ducted as an integrated campaign by a sin­ gle commander who has the tools and authority to accomplish the mission. The ideal candidate for conducting AI is the air component commander because this officer commands or controls most of the applica­ ble assets and has the information to make timely decisions. The ACC should be the co­ ordinating authority for the overall interdic­ allocation, tasking, and execution for such tion effort in the theater and must always weapons belongs to the commander respon­ keep in mind the objectives assigned by the sible for the overall direction of a particular theater CINC. Mission-oriented command campaign. If these systems are not inte­ and control is fully applicable to air inter­ grated into the AI campaign, it is possible diction, and not until it is rigorously ap­ that they might inadvertently destroy plied will we be able to gain the maximum friendly aircraft. For example, if timing is benefit from our efforts.

Notes 1. ICS Publication t, Department of Defense Dictionary of poinl in the war, COMLANDSOUTH may turn to the COM­ Military and Associated Terms. 1 lune 1987. 32. NAVSOUTH REP and ask why ships with a resupply of artil­ 2. Exchange of letters between Gen |. P. McConnell, chief of lery shells have not yet left Gibraltar. The COMNAVSOUTH staff, US Air Force, subject: Concept for Improved Joint Air- REP would turn to the COMSTRIKEFORCESOUTH REP and Ground Coordination. 19 March 1965,and Gen Harold K. John­ ask when carrier battle groups will be available to clear the son. chief of staff, US Army, subject: Concept for Improved path. The response might be that commander in chief. South­ Joint Air-Ground Coordination. 28 April 1965. The discussion ern Europe (CINCSOUTH) has directed the carriers to support of apportionment is found on page 5 of the concept. This po­ the battle in Greek-Turkish Thrace. At that point the COM­ sition on apportionment was confirmed by a jointly signed NAVSOUTH REP might turn to COMFIVEATAF and ask about memorandum of 23 May 1981. subject: US Army and US Air tactical air support of maritime operations {TASMO). only to Force Agreement on Apportionment and Allocation of Offen­ be told that land-based air has been totally committed to pro­ sive Air Support (OAS)—Information Memorandum—signed viding support to COMLANDSOUTH. At this point the COM­ by Lt Gen Glenn K. Otis.GS, deputy chief of staff for operations NAVSOUTH REP turns to COMLANDSOUTH and says. "If and plans, and Lt Gen Jerome F\ O’Malley. US Air Force deputy you want your resupply, you need to decrease your immediate chief of staff, plans and operations. demands for air support for two days, so Five ATAF can pro­ 3. As an example of evaluating the needs of all components, vide TASMO for my supply convoy." Although this case is hy­ consider a hypothetical discussion in the NATO war head­ pothetical. it points up the need for mutual understanding quarters in northern Italy, where the component commanders among component commanders. or representatives are commander, Land Forces Southern Eu­ 4. An example of restricting an air interdiction campaign is rope (COMLANDSOUTH); commander, Five Allied Tactical the initial limitation on operations against transportation tar­ Air Force (COMFIVEATAF): commander. Naval Forces South­ gets during the preparation for the Normandy invasion. Prime ern Europe Representative (COMNAVSOUTH REP); and com­ Minister Churchill directed that the only targets to be attacked mander, Striking and Supporting Forces Southern Europe were those where French casualties were unlikely to exceed Representative (COMSTR1KEFORCESOUTH REP). At some 150. This limitation was quickly dropped, however, after at- AIR INTERDICTION 15

lacks produced relatively few casualties. Hilary St. George and Staff College to a half-year course will further exacerbate Saunders. The Fight Is Won. vol. 3 of Royal Air Force 1939- the problem. Further, officers assigned to a TACC or loan over­ 1945 ILondon: Her Majesty's Stationery Office. 1954). 87. seas equivalent have not attended PME in residence. Although 5. German Military Thinking: Selected Papers on German both the Air Ground Operations School (AGOS) and the Com­ Theory and Doctrine. Art of War Colloquium (Carlisle Bar­ bined Air Warfare Course (CAWC) provide pieces of the puz­ racks. Pa.: US Army War College, May 1983). 94. zle. we need in-depth instruction in air war. That includes not 6. The meaning of air interdiction cited earlier differs some­ only organization charts and command, control, communica­ what from the current Department of Defense definition of in­ tions, and intelligence (0*1) flow, but also targeting, weapons terdiction: "An action to divert, disrupt, delay or destroy the effects, sortie generation, the enemy approach to war. and the enemy's surface military potential before it can be used effec­ history of air power from an applications point of view. This tively against friendly forces.” (CS Publication 1.191. This def­ last topic may be the most difficult to teach. inition closely parallels the view in Air Force basic doctrine 10. Condensed Analysis of the Ninth Air Force in the Euro­ that successful air interdiction “can delay the arrival or pean Theater of Operations (1946: new imprint. Washington, buildup of forces and supplies, disrupt the enemy’s scheme of D.C.: Office of Air Force History, 1984). 57. operation and control of forces, divert valuable enemy re­ 11. The USAFE plan is to provide general officer liaison dur­ sources to other uses, and destroy forces and supplies." AFM ing war by committing Tactical Air Command air division 1-1. Basic Aerospace Doctrine of the United States Air Force, commanders as corps air liaison officers. This action will, for 16 March 1984. 3-3 and 3-1. the first time, provide a level of liaison that shows the serious 7. AFM 1-1. 2-10 and 2-11. nature of the Air Force's commitment to the corps commander. 8. If the theater CINC goes beyond apportionment of air effort Although the general officer ALO may lack direct experience or if a component commander wishes to detail how support when he deploys, the permanent colonel ALO will make up for should be provided, either officer immediately becomes in­ any shortcomings. The general officer ALO will ensure access volved in the detailed planning of the air effort. Commanders to the highest councils of war within both the Air Force and cannot simply translate air effort into sorties. For example, in Army camps. NATO's Central Region of Allied Command Europe (ACE), an 12. Robert Debs Heinl. Jr.. Dictionary of Military and Naval Alpha jet sortie represents a limited bomb load at short range Operations (Annapolis. Md.: United States Naval Institute, with little electronic self-protection. On the other hand, an 1966).239. F -lll represents a large bomb load delivered at considerable 13. Gen William W'. Momyer, Air Power in Three Wars range with significant electronic self-protection. Once com­ (Washington. D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1978), 99-107. manders decide to take on the allocation and tasking function, 14. "Integrating Strategic and Tactical Air Power in Conven­ they must assume the entire function: otherwise, some, if not tional Warfare." US Air Force Aerospace Power Symposium. all. missions will not be performed at optimum levels. Maxwell AFB. Ala., 2—4 March 1988. 9. We will have to develop the instruction that we need. Joint 15.Ibid. professional military education (PME) does not have time to 16. Systems that operate beyond 500 km are allowed under teach the issues of AI planning in the TACC or in an equivalent the INF’ Treaty, but because they operate at such extreme allied headquarters. Even Air Force PME does not now have ranges, they are considered part of a different concept for the time to teach this material, and the reduction of Air Command application of air power. C apt C hr is ). K risinger, U S A F

N 6 October 1973, while the state of Israel observed the Jewish holy day of Yom Kippur. war burst upon the Middle East. OEgyptian and Syrian forces struck simulta neously against the frontiers of Israel in what would be the fourth Middle East war in 25 years. In his book The Arab-lsraeli Wars, Chaim Herzog commented that the at­ tack was the equivalent of the NATO forces

16 in Europe being flung against Israel.1 At­ rael’s urgent requirements. Airlift was the tacking in midafternoon, Egyptian forces only viable alternative, and plans were crossed the Suez Canal at three points and quickly drawn to accomplish the necessary moved into the Sinai Peninsula while, to resupply. On 13 October President Nixon the northeast, Syrian troops overran Israeli- made the decision to begin the airlift, and occupied positions in the Golan Heights. on the following day the first US military After initial Arab successes, the Israeli De­ transport, a C-5, landed at Lod International fense Forces (IDF) held and by 10 October Airport, Tel Aviv. The American airlift, counterattacked, first in the Golan Heights dubbed Operation Nickel Grass, was under area, where they drove to within 30 miles of way.4 Damascus, and a week later in the Sinai, By midnight on 14 November, one month where they eventually pushed the Egyp­ later, the United States completed an airlift tians back across the Suez Canal. of immense proportions—an effort that The ferocity of the combat severely de­ played a decisive role in preventing the de­ pleted the equipment and military stock­ feat of Israel.5 Although less publicized than piles of both sides, and the need for the belligerents’ combat operations, the ae­ resupply became urgent. The Soviets re­ rial resupply efforts of Operation Nickel sponded to requests from Egypt and Syria Grass were significant. For the United and. while US observers looked on with States, Nickel Grass had far-reaching polit­ growing apprehension, began airlifting mil­ ical and military effects. From a broad per­ itary supplies into those countries aboard spective, the airlift may even have been as An-12 and An-22 transport aircraft.- The important as the Western allies’ airlift that United States delayed the resupply of Israel broke the Berlin blockade in 1948-49. to conduct diplomatic negotiations with Militarily, the Israeli airlift was signifi­ Moscow to restore peace in the area; how­ cant because it offset the Soviet airlift to ever, it became apparent that those talks Egypt and Syria, it overcame Israel’s critical would succeed only by reestablishing the shortage in certain military items, and it military balance through a massive resup­ strengthened Israel’s overall military posi­ ply of war materiel to Israel. tion. For the US Air Force, Nickel Grass was US officials considered various delivery an important milestone in developing its methods that did not require military airlift ability to project and resupply forces with forces to enter the war zone.3 They rejected an all-jet transport fleet over intercontinen­ sealift because the prohibitively long time tal distances. In particular, the operation necessary for delivery would fail to meet Is­ put the C-5 Galaxy to its first real test as the

17 18 AJRPOWER JOURNAL SPRING 1989

C-5 aircraft unloading at Lajes Field in the Azores. Lajes was a critical location because most European nations refused to permit overflight or en route land- ing of aircraft supporting Operation Nickel Grass. Lajes handled 30 to -JO flights per day.

world’s largest intercontinental airlifter. The events of Nickel Grass also provided the impetus for several significant enhance­ ments to the airlift capability we know to­ day: air refueling for airlift aircraft, upgrades in command and control, and re­ alignment of airlift assets under Military Airlift Command (MAC). Despite its military importance, the airlift probably had an even greater political im­ pact because of the effects that extended be­ yond the immediate scope of the Arab- israeli conflict. The political ramifications involved not only the relationship of the United States with Israel but also with the Soviet Union, the Arab countries (particu­ larly Egypt), and NATO members. The suc­ cess of the aerial resupply also supported the contention that airlift may be among the most flexible options available to the na­ tional command authorities (NCA) for the execution of national policy during peace or war.

Policy before Planes The Israelis called for American aid al­ most immediately after the Egyptian army crossed the Suez Canal. Their request was denied on 7 October because of a consensus halted—particularly to countries even more within the Nixon administration that “they dependent on Arab oil than the United didn’t really need the equipment’’ and that States.7 Also at stake was our status as a bro­ they didn’t suffer from shortages of mate­ ker in the peace negotiations going on with riel.'' Officials in the administration, most the Soviets and with various Middle East­ prominent among them Secretary of State ern countries. Henry Kissinger, also believed in an inevi­ Regardless of these concerns, the US gov­ table Israeli victory with or without resup­ ernment found that maintaining the balance ply. Additionally, some people did not of power in the region was closely tied to want to antagonize the Arabs because we the survival of Israel. Surprisingly, the depended upon them for some of our oil. United States was under no treaty obliga­ Large oil companies warned against aid to tions or formal protocols to supply Israel. Israel, fearing that the flow of oil would be Our commitments derived from a series of White House policy pronouncements is­ quickly as it had hoped. In dealing directly sued by five successive presidents dating with the Israelis, the United States stipu­ back to Harry S Truman. These pronounce­ lated that it would provide military assis­ ments indirectly linked the territorial integ­ tance only under certain conditions.10 First, rity of Israel to the national security Israel was not to have provoked the Arabs interests of the United States within the into starting the conflict. In a related re­ greater framework of peace and stability in quirement, the United States wanted assur­ the Middle East.8 Moreover, under the ance that Israel had not ordered a Nixon Doctrine, the United States favored preemptive military strike against the Ar­ support to friendly countries by providing abs, thereby initiating hostilities. Two the military equipment and supplies events emphasize US intransigence on this needed for self-defense.9 issue: on the morning of 6 October, the US For Israel, resupply did not come as ambassador to Israel cautioned Prime Min-

19 20 AIRPOWER IOURNAL SPRING 1989 ister Golda Meir against a preemptive at­ The US Departments of State and Defense tack, stating that the United States could not had similar concerns for Soviet opinion and resupply Israel under that circumstance; at established their own conditions for aid to the same time, Secretary of State Kissinger Israel.11 First, Secretary Kissinger did not warned Israel’s foreign minister not to ini­ want military aid to Israel to disrupt US re­ tiate the fighting if Israel desired US sup­ lations with either the Arabs or the Soviet port. Actually, Mrs Meir had already ruled Union. Further, he wished to avoid damage out a first strike even though military intel­ to the ongoing negotiations over the Middle ligence indicated that an Arab attack was East situation or to the spirit of detente that imminent. Yet another criterion for aid was existed with the USSR. Within the Depart­ that it would be offered only for self-de­ ment of Defense (DODj, Secretary of De­ fense. It is possible the United States estab­ fense James Schlesinger initially did not lished this condition so that the Soviets want MAC to deliver goods directly to Is­ would perceive US military aid to Israel rael. Instead, he favored a covert operation only as a counterbalance to Soviet aid to in which MAC would fly supplies to the Egypt and Syria. Azores for pickup by Israeli aircraft. Because of these numerous conditions, the United States deliberated for nearly a week on whether to authorize military aid MAC pilots were careful to stay in international air- space during the flight from Lajes to Tel Aviv. The to Israel. After costly battles, particularly in original route north of Crete had to be changed to com - the Sinai, Israel on 8 October again re­ ply with a request from the Greek government. quested assistance from the United States.

USSR Aviano

SPAIN

Incirlik

MOROCCO ALGERIA

LIBYA EGYPT MAC Flight Route ------Route Prior to 22 Oct 73 • Airfields ■ i US Naval Support Vessels This time it asked for aircraft, tank and ar- illery ammunition, and electronic counter­ measures (ECM) equipment.'2 Despite a deteriorating battlefield situation, the United States was still reluctant to commit o a resupply, preferring to analyze the ex- :ent of Soviet efforts and determine its effect on detente. At this point, the United States gave Israel tacit approval for El Al, the Israe­ li airline, to begin moving supplies to Israel. Consequently, planeloads of bombs and air- to-air missiles arrived in Israel on 10 October.13

The Airlift Takes Shape Gen Paul K. Carlton, MAC commander, Upon arrival at Lod Airport, Tel Aviv (below/, the sup­ plies were immediately loaded aboard waiting trucks kept a close watch on the unfolding events. for delivery to the front (abovej. Critical supplies During the early part of the war, MAC was reached the northern front in about three hours. 22 AIRPOWER fOURNAL SPRING 1989 directed to provide a number of options for airlifting war materiel to Israel. Accord­ ingly, MAC prepared its plans and waited for a political decision. In the following days, these plans changed repeatedly as the White House, National Security Council, and the Departments of State and Defense wrestled with the complexities of the war and its political and economic factors to de­ termine the extent of US involvement.14 One of the options examined at various levels called for MAC to airlift cargo to the East Coast of the United States for transship­ ment by Israeli aircraft to the final destina­ tion. Another option was to shift the transshipment point to the Atlantic—Lajes Air Base in the Azores. Planners also con­ sidered using American commercial aircraft for the operation.1S The Israelis did, in fact, use eight of their commercial B-707 and

Even such oversize items as this 175-mm cannon B-747 aircraft to move 5,500 tons from the (above) and M-48 tanks (below) were delivered by air. United States to Israel but abandoned this C-5 aircraft airlifted almost half the total tonnage of effort because their fleet could not expedi­ supplies yet flew only 25 percent of the total sorties. tiously move the necessary quantities of cargo.16 On 12 October 1973, before a final deci­ sion was made on the method of conducting the airlift, Mrs Meir personally sent Presi­ dent Nixon an urgent message requesting immediate assistance. At this point Israeli supplies were running critically low, and Israel’s fate was in serious doubt. That day the president ordered DOD to immediately begin an airlift to Israel with cargoes des­ tined for offload at Lajes Air Base. The next day, however, the secretary of defense di­ rected that the US airlift would operate all the way into Israel using MAC aircraft and that Lod International Airport near Tel Aviv would be the offload point.17 Once the method of resupply was ap­ proved, the United States tunneled large quantities of equipment and materiel through an aerial pipeline that stretched across the Atlantic and through the Medi­ terranean. To begin the supply transfer, crews onloaded equipment and supplies at 29 locations in the United States, princi­ pally military air bases.16 Equipment and

* materiel were also drawn from the stock- OPERATION NICKEL GRASS 23 piles of US forces in Europe and airlifted to 30 to 40 (lights per day during the airlift.21 Israel.19 Base crews handled little cargo and were Once loaded, the transports began the ap­ more involved in maintaining the aircraft proximately six-hour flight to Lajes Air and keeping the airlift moving. The C-5s Base. Lajes was the only available choice for and C-14 Is did not unload cargo here unless landing and refueling because most Euro­ they could not continue due to mechanical pean countries had denied overflight and problems. Rather, maintenance personnel landing rights to the United States, fearing refueled the aircraft, and fresh crews that the Arabs would retaliate by withhold­ boarded the C-141s. Before leaving the ing vital oil supplies.20 Serving as a staging United States, the C-5s were augmented base for the entire operation, Lajes handled with extra crewmembers who often re­ mained with their aircraft to Lod and back to the United States, sometimes flying more Many of the airlifted supplies, such as these ECM pods than 28 hours without relief.22 At the peak for Israeli F-4s. helped turn the tide in the conflict. The United States learned a number of lessons, both in pre­ of the airlift, 1,300 additional personnel paredness and airlift requirements, from Operation crowded Lajes. They were billeted in World Nickel Grass. War II barracks, psychiatric wards, show- 24 AIRPOWER JOURNAL SPR/NG 1989 ers, and even aboard the aircraft. At one airplanes either by hand or with materials point, someone recommended that SAC handling equipment (MHE) flown in on tanker crews supporting operations and early chalks.* Interestingly, the first C-5 to transiting Lajes bring their own sleeping arrive at Lod on 14 October had its 113,000 provisions.23 pounds of cargo unloaded by hand (in three Once the transports departed Lajes for Is­ and one-half hours) because the C-5 with rael. they flew to a point over the Strait of the first MHE had aborted at Lajes.27 In ad­ Gibraltar, then east over the Mediterranean dition, the IDF was responsible for loading to the vicinity of Crete, then southeast to Tel the supplies and ammunition on waiting Aviv. On 22 October 1973 MAC changed the trucks and overseeing their distribution route to fly south of Crete, to comply with a either directly to the combat units or to the request from the Greek government. MAC IDF’s main depots, depending on the type of exercised extraordinary care to comply materiel. Sources report that crews aver­ with flight restrictions; even flights originat­ aged 30 minutes to unload the aircraft and ing in West Germany were routed to Lajes, that IDF trucks left Lod Airport approxi­ then through the Mediterranean to Israel. mately 90 minutes after the aircraft landed, Aircraft were also careful to avoid overfly­ reaching their farthest destination about ing Arab territory or entering airspace con­ two hours later. Thus, the minimum total trolled by Arab countries.^ time from arrival of the supplies at Lod to Once in the Mediterranean, the US Na­ their delivery was around 3.5 hours.28 vy’s Sixth Fleet helped arrange codes, safe- Conditions at Lod were more difficult passage procedures, and diversion plans in than at Lajes, not because of overcrowding, case of hostile interceptions. In fact, the but due to a lack of US personnel. Col Don­ Navy tracked the airlift aircraft from Gibral­ ald R. Strobaugh, commander of the MAC tar throughout the length of the Mediterra­ ALCE throughout the operation, had only nean. A ship was stationed every 300 miles 12 cargo handlers and 20 communications and an aircraft carrier about every 600 miles workers when the airlift began. The number to provide support, if necessary.25 As in­ of ALCE personnel at Lod never exceeded coming aircraft approached to within 150 55 during the 32 days of the airlift. Colonel miles of the Israeli coast, Israeli Air Force Strobaugh described working conditions at (IAF) Mirages and F-4s escorted them the re­ Lod in an article in the McGuire AFB, New mainder of the way. Most of the transports Jersey, newspaper Airtides: “Our men did a landed at Lod Airport in Tel Aviv, while fantastic job. They worked 12 hours a day— some flew to an airfield at El Arish in the 84 hours a week. Some worked more than Sinai. Overall, the flight time from Lajes to that. If they started working on a plane at the Israel was approximately seven hours.26 end of their shift, they stayed on past the We had no support facilities at Lod Air­ time they should have to finish the port, and'only a small number of US sup­ aircraft.”29 port personnel were present in Israel to The Israelis eagerly displayed their ap­ assist with the airlift. To coordinate a min­ preciation for the hard work of the ALCE imum maintenance capability for the trans­ and the aircrews that made the trip from the ports once they landed, the US Air Force United States: established an airlift control element (ALCE) at Lod, while El Al maintenance El Al Airlines did a great job taking care of the American aircrews at Lod. Tables with catered crews performed routine servicing for the meals were set up in a special lounge for crew aircraft. To unload the planes, the Israeli Defense Forces employed a mixture of re­ serve personnel and civilian teenagers en­ ‘ Chalks refers to the early troop carrier practice of chalking listed as laborers from the surrounding area. corresponding numbers on complete, individual aircraft loads and on the intended aircraft. The term has entered general use Israeli teams of five to 10 men emptied the as a means of identifying loads or missions. OPERATION NICKEL GRASS 25

members. . . . El Al’s chief stewardess went chologically, the Egyptians were shaken by around Tel Aviv asking merchants for gift do­ this reversal of their military successes. nations saying they were making it possible for Another example of the impact of the air­ their businesses to continue.10 lift on the war was the effectiveness of the TOW and Maverick missiles. According to Colonel Strobaugh also received 75 to 100 the Defense Intelligence Agency, these letters each day from Israeli schoolchildren. weapons were responsible for the majority One typical letter read, “Thanks for helping of Israeli tank kills (Arab losses were esti­ us in our war. When you have a war, we will mated at 1,900 tanks during the war). Since help you.”31 the TOW and Maverick were not present in the Israeli inventory in any significant num­ Measuring bers before the war began, it is apparent that Airlift’s Performance the missiles delivered by airlift made the difference.35 The airlift to Israel lasted 32 days. Though Most accounts measure the airlift’s per­ not as large as the Berlin airlift, which car­ formance in terms of tonnage moved, but it ried more than 2 million tons of supplies to is more important to note what items were that city, the US airlift of 22,305 tons to moved and their actual impact on the war. Israel was impressive, nevertheless. The For example, only 39 percent of the Nickel C-141s flew 421 missions to Israel, deliver­ Grass materiel was delivered before the ing 11,632 tons of equipment and supplies, cease-fire agreement on 22 October.36 Fur­ while the C-5s flew 145 missions and deliv­ ther, the C-5 was able to demonstrate its ca­ ered 10,673 tons of cargo. Some 48 percent pability to transport outsized cargo— items of the total tonnage was moved on Galaxy too large for other transport aircraft.37 flights, yet they flew only 25 percent of the The movement of outsized cargo had dif­ missions.32 The Soviet airlift to Arab allies ferent effects on the Israeli war effort but pales in comparison: generally complemented the continual re­ Best estimates of the Soviet effort were that supply of combat consumables. During the their 935 missions, over a distance of 1,700 entire airlift, the C-5s delivered 29 battle miles, moved in about 15.000 tons during a 40- tanks to Israel.38 Only four of those tanks day period. In short, MAC airlifted one-fourth along with 10 other pieces of outsized more cargo with a little more than one-half the equipment arrived before the cease-fire on missions over a route that was three times 22 October.3" The other 25 tanks were deliv­ greater.13 ered after the fighting had stopped. Al­ Overall, it appears that the American air­ though 432 Israeli tanks were lost between lift had both substantive and psychological 6 and 8 October during the armor battles of effects. The Israelis, who had begun to the Sinai, the Israelis did not overlook the worry about how many shells they had left, psychological value of the airlifted tanks.4" were able to resume an extremely high rate The General Accounting Office (GAO) re­ of fire with the delivery of plentiful stocks port on the airlift assessed the impact of the of 105-, 155-, and 175-millimeter ammuni­ outsized cargo accordingly: tion. With the influx of many of the consum- ables of war to replenish depleted stockpiles, they also were emboldened to The aerial delivery of combat tanks and other outsize cargo by C-5s was an impressive use of throw all available reserves into the battle airlift capability and it is impossible to assess and succeeded in breaking through the the psychological impact of demonstrating Egyptian lines to the west side of the Suez this capability. In our opinion, the relatively Canal, threatening the bridgehead estab­ small quantities of outsize equipment deliv­ lished by the Egyptians on the east side, and ered in this manner had no effect on the war’s encircling the Egyptian Third Army.34 Psy­ outcome." 26 AIRPOWER JOURNAL SPRING 1989

Facts and figures aside, American airlift “re­ in Europe prevented the United States from versed the imbalance of military power cre­ strategically positioning tankers to provide ated by the vast shipments of Russian war refueling for the return trip from Lod.46 material to the Arab nations and led to a Thus, the Israeli airlift was possible only cease-fire which in turn brought about a re­ because our aircraft were able to use Lajes turn to the status quo. In short, the airlift Air Base. Although Portugal made Lajes made possible the achievement of a na­ available for this operation (after consider­ tional objective—peace in the Middle able negotiation), it is uncertain whether we East.”-12 will always have access to this facility. Therefore, an important lesson learned from the airlift is that implementation of our policy of remote presence requires an effec­ Nickel Grass tive in-tlight refueling capability. MAC and and Its Mark on the Air Force have recently made great strides in this area. In fact, the current re­ US Airlift Capability fueling capability of the C-141 and C-5, the The Military Airlift Command received procurement of the KC-10, and the commit­ near-unanimous high marks for its perfor­ ment to training in air refueling all have mance under demanding conditions, but their genesis in Nickel Grass. the operation was not entirely free of prob­ lems. Fortunately, MAC resolved these dif­ Need for Improved ficulties before they jeopardized the Command and Control operation. Still, there were lessons to be learned. After the cease-fire, MAC officials General Carlton described the problems of examined these areas and gained insights command and control during Nickel Grass that would benefit future airlift capability. in a 1984 interview: Three areas requiring improvement were The concept of operating within an estab­ particularly prominent: (1) air refueling lished command and control structure was vi­ (AR), (2) command and control, and (3) olated—the Air Force didn’t set up a command management of airlift resources. post to handle our activity; yet, we were work­ ing for the Air Force. We found ourselves tak­ Need for Air Refueling ing instruction primarily from JCS/)-4, Although the C-5 could have carried a re­ Logistics. Command and control, or rather a duced load of 33 tons nonstop from the lack of it, caused indecision.4’ United States to Israel, the C-141 could not General Carlton went on to explain that, de­ have flown this mission nonstop at all.'13 spite operating in European Command’s Without the C-141, it would have taken (EUCOM’s) theater of operations, the com­ more than 670 C-5 flights to deliver the mand “wasn’t even in the equation for this same 22,305 tons to Israel. At the directed operation.”48 Instead of tying into EUCOM’s daily aircraft flow rate of six to eight arrivals command and control system. MAC aircraft per day, the operation would have taken transiting the Mediterranean worked indi­ 100 days.44 The C-5 has always been capable rectly with the Navy’s Sixth Fleet through of in-flight refueling (the C-141 lacked this the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), as mentioned capability at the time of the operation); previously. however, MAC did not use AR because of The GAO report on Nickel Grass further concerns about its effect on the aircraft’s identified specific shortcomings in com­ then questionable wing.45 Technicians later mand and control procedures: (1) insuffi­ determined that AR would have put less cient numbers of experienced people to stress on the wing than the extra takeoffs manage emergency airlift operations, (2) in­ and landings. Further, the political climate adequate communications facilities. (3) in­ OPERATION NICKEL GRASS 27 accurate and delayed reports to higher C-130s per day were dedicated to MAC for levels, (4) deficient dissemination of critical use, even though initial planning for Nickel weather data, and (5) the lack of reliable, Grass began on 6 October.52 As it turned out, high-quality voice, air-to-ground, and se­ these instances of doubtful airlift manage­ cure communications.4'3 After the operation, ment were powerful arguments for airlift each item was redressed through modern­ consolidation—which took place on 1 De­ ization of equipment or additional training cember 1974—and for designating MAC as a and manpower. specified command on 1 February 1977. Need for Improved Management of Airlift Resources The GAO report also made the point that “to Final Assessment manage an airlift efficiently, MAC should Along with the Berlin airlift of 1948 and control the flow of aircraft.’’50 That is, MAC 1949 and numerous other military and hu­ should specify the types of cargo and num­ manitarian emergencies, Nickel Grass takes ber of passengers to be moved and the time its rightful place in proving that airlift is a frames for movements. Then MAC should key factor in America’s military and diplo­ determine the type of aircraft, airlift flow, matic activities around the globe. MAC dra­ and methods of delivery best suited to meet matically demonstrated its ability to the requirements. During the Israeli airlift, organize quickly and transport vast quite the opposite was true. DOD directed amounts of cargo over global distances to MAC’S operations and frequently changed support our government’s policies. Further­ the aircraft flow rate. To comply with the more, the fact that our effort exceeded the variable flow rate, MAC had to position ex­ Soviets’ did not go unnoticed in capitals tra aircraft and crews at Lajes and use them throughout the world. Nickel Grass con­ as directed. This procedure proved to be vinced many people that airlift is a vital counterproductive to efficient management component of our national strategy of deter­ of aircraft, crews, and facilities. According rence: “The demonstration of capability to DOD. the secretary of defense controlled and determination doubtless will not be lost the airlift because political considerations on friend or foe and should prove of great were more important than efficient airlift value in underscoring the deterrence that is management. However, DOD did agree that, the cornerstone of American strategy.”53 to achieve economic use of aircraft, MAC Perhaps the most meaningful assessment of should have a say in determining total airlift our role came from Israeli Prime Minister needs.51 Golda Meir. During a private meeting in Furthermore, MAC initially did not have Washington with American Jewish leaders access to the C-130 fleet to move small but three weeks after the cease-fire, she emo­ critical loads to certain locations because tionally commented that “for generations to these aircraft were either theater assets un­ come, all will be told of the miracle of the der the control of theater commanders in immense planes from the United States chief (CINCs) or CONUS-based assets under bringing in the materiel that meant life to Tactical Air Command. Because of this sit­ our people.”54 □ uation, it wasn’t until 15 October that 12

Notes 1. Chaim Herzog. The Arab-tsraeli Wars (New York: Random 3. General Accounting Oflice (GAO). Airlift Operations of House. 1982). 230 the Military Airlift Command during the 1973 Middle East War 2. William B. Quandt. Soviet Policy in the October 1973 War. (Washington. D.C.; Government Printing Office. 16 April Rand Report R-1864-ISA (Santa Monica, Calif.; Rand Corpora­ 1975). 7. tion. May 1976). 18-27. 4. Charles W. Dickens, "The Israeli Airlift,” Airlift Opera- 28 AIRPOWER JOURNAL SPRING 1989

lions Review, October 1979. 28. 26. Maxwell, 55. 5. Military Airlift Command (MAC) Directorate of Informa­ 27. Lt Col Charles E. Miller. Airlift Doctrine (Maxwell AFB tion. The Military Airlift Command's Hole in the Israeli A irlift Ala.: Air University Press. 1988). 341. of 1973 (Scott AFB. Ill : March 1974). 3. 28.Ibid. 6. Henry Kissinger. Years of Upheaval (Boston: Little. Brown 29. "438th in Mideast: ALC.E at Lajes and Lod." Airtides. 30 & Co., 1982). 408. November 1973. 1. 7. Kenneth L. Patchin. Flight to Israel: Historical Documen­ 30. Dolle. 20. tor)' of the Strategic Airlift to Israel (U| (Scott AFB. III.: MAC. 31. "438th in Mideast." 1. Office of Air Force History, 30 April 1974). 23. (Secret) Only 32. MAC Directorate of Information. 4-6. unclassified information used from this source. 33. Patchin. 253. 8.Ibid. 34. "The C-5A and the Middle East Airlift." Congressional 9. GAO. 6. Record, 94th Cong.. 1st sess.. 1975. pt. 9: 11211. 10. GeorgeS. Maxwell III. "Israeli Defense Force |IDF| Logis­ 35. Dickens, 28. tics in the Yom Kippur War" (Thesis. Air Force Institute of 36. GAO. i. Technology. 1986). 51. 37. MAC Directorate of Information. 6. 11. Ibid.. 52. 38. GAO, 11. 12. Kissinger. 491-96. 39.Ibid. 13. Maxwell. 53. 40. Maxwrell, 53. 14. Patchin. 5. 41. GAO. 34. 15. GAO, 8. 42. Patchin. 249. 16.Ibid. 43. GAO. 30. 17. Ibid.. 7-8. 44. Ibid. 18. Ibid.. 9. 45. Miller. 342. For a provocative discussion of the C-5's 19. Maxwell, 57. wing problems, see Berkeley Rice’s TheC-5A Scandal (Boston: 20. Ibid.. 54. Houghton Mifflin, 1971), 151-61. 21. Ibid. 46. Dolle. 24. 22. Dennis B. Dolle, "Operation Nickel Grass," Research Re­ 47. Trimpl. 16. port 87-0700 (Maxwell AFB. Ala.: Air Command and Staff Col­ 48. Ibid., 17. lege. April 1987). 19. 49. GAO. 32-33. 23. Ibid. 50. Ibid.. 31. 24. GAO. 9. 51.Ibid. 25. Lt Col Robert Trimpl. "Interview with General Paul K. 52. Trimpl, 17. Carlton," Airlift. Winter 1984, 17. 53. Patchin. 259. 54. Ibid., 262. Paradox of the Headless Horseman

On mounting a rising ground, which brought the figure of his fellow traveler in relief against the sky, gigantic in height, and muffled in a cloak, Ichabod was horror-struck, on perceiving that Ithe riderl was headless!—bul his horror was still more increased, on observing that the head, which should have rested on (the rider's) shoulders, was carried before him on the pommel of the saddle. —Washington Irving, "The Legend of Sleepy Hollow"

S children, we were terrified by the specter of Irving’s mighty horseman riding through the night without a head. But years of experience have diminished our fear, and the Aformer nightmare has been reduced to a quaint fairy tale. Perhaps one of the reasons we no longer dread the haunts of Sleepy Hollow is that the very idea of a head­ less horseman is a paradox— why should we fear any­ thing with no head? Because the head contains the brain—the center for all the senses, thought, and coor­ dinated action—a headless horseman could not func­ tion and would pose no threat. Although the headless

Lt C ol Joe Boyles, USAF C ar t G reg K. M ittelman, USAF 30 AIRPOWER JOURNAL SPRING 1989 horseman may have existed only in the lesser backseat role when the Navy as­ mind of nineteenth-century author Wash­ sumed joint Department of Defense (DOD) ington Irving, countless examples today responsibilities for technical training and suggest that the paradox he represented still equipment development. Many of the re­ persists. Specifically, it exists in organiza­ sponsibilities expected from an officer tions that either have no mission or lack the corps were swept away in the interests of ef­ leadership necessary to accomplish the ficiency and economy. In essence, the Air mission. Force has received from EOD what it paid Nowhere is the paradox more prominent for: since little has been invested, not much than in air base operability (ABO), the new­ has been gained. Interestingly, the life pre­ est in-vogue phrase to describe the ability of server for EOD’s mission—as well as for the US Air Force to defend and regenerate several other poorly organized yet vital ca­ its air bases following attack. The Air Force reer fields—is firmly attached to air base has long possessed the fundamental capa­ operability. bilities of ABO—explosive ordnance dis­ The ability of an air base to survive an en­ posal, damage response, disaster emy attack and quickly reconstruct mini­ preparedness, fire fighting, and runway re­ mum essential operating areas so it can pair—but has failed to join these parts into resume offensive air operations has long a whole.' Consequently, our training has been a concern to people who think seri­ been fragmented, acquisition of new equip­ ously about war. Because the problem is ment inadequate, and development of doc­ difficult to solve, our solution was to have trine incomplete. The net result is a faith in the joint air defense network and as­ questionable ABO capability. sume that forward air bases were invulner­ An example of a modern headless horse­ able.- In the 1980s we no longer suffer from man is the Air Force explosive ordnance that illusion; our bases will fall under attack disposal (EOD) career field. Previously, from enemy special forces, quick-strike EOD accepted only officers and enlisted ground units, and tactical air forces. There­ specialists experienced in other munitions fore. we must prepare to defend, survive, re­ career fields. Because storing and loading pair, and reconstitute to fulfill the objective munitions is an adjunct to aircraft mainte­ of sustaining the war effort beyond the ini­ nance, EOD units—although they lacked tial surge.3 Air base operability encompas­ any maintenance function—were organiza­ ses the emerging mission area of sustaining tionally tied to the deputy commander for air operations before and after attack. maintenance (DCM). Since the DCM's pri­ It isn't surprising that ABO has been long mary mission was sortie production—to ignored—the Air Force has a history of em­ which EOD rarely contributed—the fate of phasizing its glamorous, state-of-the-art EOD officers took one of two roads: benign weapon systems. New strategic bombers, neglect and career oblivion or conversion to advanced tactical fighters, strategic airlift a sortie-producing specialty. EOD leader­ vehicles, and tactical missiles—so-called ship was left in the capable hands of senior sexy weapon systems—attract much more noncommissioned officers, adept at execut­ support and attention than a technically ing an operations order but ill equipped to unsophisticated, armored bulldozer develop the vision, doctrine, and bureau­ needed to remove unexploded ordnance cratic apparatus necessary to carve out a from runways. Yet all of these advanced mission statement. Without dedicated, strategic and tactical systems will be long-term officer leadership, EOD has been wasted unless we also organize, train, and left to wander an uncertain course despite equip for ABO.4 Make no mistake. ABO is a being one of the Air Force’s most critically fundamental warfighting capability be­ needed wartime specialties. cause it will permit aerospace forces to sus­ The Air Force resigned EOD to an even tain combat operations. As Under Secretary PARADOX OF THE HEADLESS HORSEMAN 31

of the Air Force Tidal McCoy puts it. ABO Some commands place responsibility for is Task One in the ability to project an air ABO in the staff of the deputy for opera­ force.” ABO is the fundamental base of the tions while others task the logistics deputy air operations pyramid that allows Task or civil engineering. Still other commands, Two (aircraft) and Task Three (munitions) notably some in the CONUS, have not fully to sustain combat.s lent their support to ABO and. as a result, Just as EOD needs help, so does ABO. A have fragmented the effort needed to get the strong advocate and mission statement are concept completely off the ground. Thus the ingredients to ensure that ABO will sur­ ABO, recognized as an urgent need by many vive the tough budget battles that lie ahead. people, faces an uncertain future without It is amazing that ABO still exists without the cohesive bureaucratic line and staff de­ the bureaucratic constituency so necessary velopment necessary to wage the fiscal and to survive in times of fiscal restraint and doctrinal battles now under way. limited resources. ABO survives because of Similarly, the ABO concept sorely lacks the crying need recognized at base level in internal leadership. Unfortunately, there is our overseas commands. This grass-roots no easy solution to this dilemma. It takes approach to building an organization is an time and patience to develop leaders who unusual, rather inefficient way of carving are thoroughly indoctrinated, practiced, out a mission element. The usual approach and schooled in their career specialties and is to begin with a statement of need fol­ the profession of arms. The core of future lowed by bureaucratic, top-down manage­ ABO leadership will come from the career ment of the supporting programs. But this fields of EOD, disaster preparedness, secu­ procedure has not been observed with rity police, and civil engineering. Two of ABO. where the mission has slowly and these fields, EOD and disaster prepared­ sporadically evolved without significant ness, have not fared well in the officer corps centralized or coordinated guidance.6 because they were either organizationally The basic responsibility of any service is misplaced or considered to have no consis­ to organize, train, and equip combat forces. tent peacetime or wartime role. These atti­ A deficiency in the first requirement—or­ tudes must change. Once again, we get what ganization—has resulted in our failure to we pay for. Until the corporate Air Force support the ABO mission. The Air Base Op­ structure recognizes the legitimacy of ABO. erability Division is under the Deputy Chief acknowledges its warfighting aspect, and of Staff for Plans and Operations. This as­ centralizes management, the concept will sociation is probably a mistake from the flounder. On the other hand, recognition of standpoint of establishing and maintaining ABO together with support from a strong a strong power base. Ultimately, ABO is a advocate would create a legitimate career logistics, engineering, and services respon­ path of line, staff, and command functions sibility—clearly the charter of the Deputy with commensurate academic and profes­ Chief of Staff for Logistics and Engineering. sional schooling. The Air Force could cul­ Selecting an appropriate bureaucratic tivate its ABO leadership from second power base is vital to any emerging mission lieutenants and junior NCOs and use cross element in order to help enhance and de­ trainees from other combat-support career velop capability. The importance of a fields as a stopgap during the interim. Ide­ strong advocate cannot be overstated, par­ ally, cross utilization between ABO and ticularly in times of shrinking budgets.7 other traditional combat-support career Even if there is a central office for ABO in fields, such as personnel and services, the Pentagon, the bureaucratic foundation could serve to strengthen each area and in­ breaks down at the next lower level, where troduce the warrior concept to a broader the major commands disagree on organiza­ base of future leaders in the officer and NCO tion and support for air base operability. ranks. 32 AfRPOWER JOURNAL SPRING 1989

The staffs at Headquarters US Air Force augmentation will be required to flesh out a and the major commands provide the wing capable of sustaining a base under at­ framework for ABO, but implementation of tack. The recent experiences of naval units combat capability is the responsibility of in combat in the Falkland Islands and Per­ the air base. Air base operability is a com­ sian Gulf should serve as a useful reminder bat-support function and rightly belongs to that just as warships are vulnerable so are the base commander. Below this level, the air bases. Navy crewmen—with secondary water is muddied across organizational skills in fire fighting, damage control, and lines. Properly organized, ABO can justify a unexploded ordnance handling—have squadron structure composed of EOD, dis­ saved more than one vessel. Air Force per­ aster preparedness, fire fighters, power pro­ sonnel can and should be organized to re­ duction. and airfield management. This spond to base defense in the same manner, structure would require breaking into mis­ adding the skills of defensive infantry tac­ sion territory reserved for civil engineering, tics and buddy-care first aid to the ABO rep­ but the advantage of joining the elements of ertoire." Furthermore, passive defense ABO is worth the pain of reorganization. measures including camouflage and con­ ABO is inextricably linked to civil engi­ cealment techniques developed in ABO cir­ neering; once this relationship is under­ cles need to be taught and practiced by stood and acknowledged, redefining augmentees to help protect their respective mission lines is not inconceivable. work areas. ABO is much larger than a small Civil engineering has been at the van­ division of specialists responsible for se­ guard in transforming Air Force peacetime lecting a minimum operating strip and re­ attitudes to a wartime perspective." Histor­ pairing adjacent facilities. It is a warrior ically. Air Force thinking has limited the spirit that needs to permeate the entire air warrior's mantle to aircrews and security base population and supporting police units charged with base defense. The organizations. vast majority of Air Force personnel have Just as ABO requires central leadership been characterized as direct or indirect and broad-base acceptance, so does it need combat-support technicians: people in a center where personnel can practice inte­ maintenance, transportation, services, mu­ grated tactics, test units operationally, test nitions. supply, to name a few. Many indi­ new equipment, and refine the doctrine that viduals still view the rear echelon base as an field units will need to employ. If the Air invulnerable garrison. This perspective has Force Engineering and Services Center allowed most Air Force specialties to com­ (AFESC) is the proper organizational home fortably slip into the role of technician or re­ for ABO, then it should be formally desig­ source manager, an approach that appears nated as such and supported with addi­ to work during times of peace but is ineffec­ tional monies and expertise that show tive during war.'* On the other hand, the commitment and resolve. But the concept civil engineering corps—mindful of the les­ needs to expand beyond base recovery after sons from Navy Seabees and Army combat attack (BRAAT), now practiced on field no. engineers—embarked on a warfighting 4 at Eglin AFB. The ABO center should also course with the formation of Red Horse and include the means to defeat or deceive at­ Prime Beef units in the 1960s.10 These or­ tackers and protect command, control, com­ ganizations are good examples of the war­ munications, and intelligence {C'l) systems rior spirit for future ABO operations and to coordinate all the elements that comprise squadrons to emulate. ABO.12 It is time to realize that initial train­ However, an effective ABO structure at ing in disaster preparedness, explosive ord­ base level goes far beyond those units nance disposal, runway repair, and security tasked specifically for full-time operability. gives technicians and officers only the basic Many secondary skills and considerable tools to protect and defend the air base. PARADOX OF THE HEAD LESS HORSEMAN 33

ABO. on the other hand, integrates special­ plan of action to correct the persistent, ties into a coordinated unit mission to sup­ though erroneous, assumption that our port the air base during wartime conditions. bases are invulnerable. The immediate threat to ABO is that it To summarize, ABO faces many chal­ may fall victim to the budget ax before being lenges. Among these are competition with given an opportunity to flourish and con­ glamorous new weapons in lean budget tribute to combat capability. Even though years, acquiring strong advocacy from the ABO equipment is far less expensive than Air Staff, obtaining common agreement on our newest weapon systems, the danger of organization among the major commands, neglect is ever present. It is important to re­ establishing a coordinated ABO career path mind programmers that the most capable to develop officer and NCO leadership, em­ aircraft or tactical missile is useless if bodying the warrior spirit in career fields locked in a Tab-Vee shelter at an air base, that have emphasized peacetime manage­ frozen after attack to the point of immobil­ ment in lieu of wartime leadership, and cre­ ity. Ultimately, the air base is the founda­ ating a center of excellence to coordinate tion of our logistics system. We would do integrated training, doctrine development, well to heed the reminder of popular nov­ and equipment acquisition. We do not help elist Tom Clancy’s antihero in Red Storm matters by failing to address these tough is­ Rising; “The tactics . . . no, amateurs dis­ sues. It is not enough to leave the challenges cuss tactics, Alekseyev thought wryly. of ABO in the hands of overseas base-level Professional soldiers study logistics.”'3 commanders; each obstacle must be ad­ Another danger lies in the mental trap of dressed by corporate Air Force leadership viewing a new capability only from the van­ bent on strengthening the logistics base to tage point of what it is designed to accom­ permit projection of air power. Like EOD, plish. The value of ABO lies not so much in ABO requires central focus to fully develop what it will allow the Air Force to accom­ its leadership in order to sustain combat op­ plish but what it will prevent the enemy erations. It is time to lift the head from the from accomplishing—namely, shutting saddle and place it on the shoulders of the down operations after the first attack. In horseman. ABO deserves no less than fact, ABO is not a new capability—just a strong leadership, central focus, and un­ wavering support. □

Notes Are We Ready? Have We Learned?" Air Force lournal of Logis­ 1. "Airman's Interview," Airman. June 1988. 9. tics. Spring 1987. 12. 2. Tidal W. McCoy, "Task One: Air Base Operability." 7. “Airman's Interview." 8. Armed Forces journal International. September 1987. 54. 8. Smith. 11. 3. Robert H. Keller IV, "Logistics Under Fire—A Call for 9. McDaniel. 14. Combat Arms." Air Force lournal of Logistics, Spring 1987. 3. 10. Smith. 9. 4. William T. McDaniel. )r., "Combat Support Doctrine: 11. "Airman's Interview." 8. Coming Down to Earth." Air Force journal of Logistics. Spring 12. Air Base Combat Support Training Workbook (Eglin 1987. 13. AFB. Fla.. April 1988). 2. 5. McCoy. 52. 13. Tom Clancy. Red Storm Rising (New York: G. P. Put­ 6. Edward M. Smith. "Civil Engineering Combat Support: nam's Sons. 1986). 392. A Rare Feeling of Satisfaction

M ai M ic h a e l A. K ir t l a n d , USAF

S the ground launched cruise missile INF Treaty. In the aftermath of that agree­ A (GLCM) and Pershing II troops return to ment, many people argued that removal of the United States from Europe, it seems ap­ these systems that had helped bolster West­ propriate to reflect on the meaning of the In­ ern security would leave Europe vulnerable termediate-range Nuclear Forces (INF) to Soviet aggression and perhaps damage Treaty. Many people have already specu­ the NATO alliance. They seem to have for­ lated on whether the treaty is a "good deal” gotten the original purpose of the deploy­ or a “bad deal” and whether we are more or ment: to convince the Soviets to remove less safe from Warsaw Pact threats. To un­ their SS-20s—the missiles that we felt derstand the situation, we must consider tipped the balance too far against NATO. why the missiles were deployed in the first For the first time, we achieved worldwide place. disposal of an entire class of nuclear weap­ NATO decided to deploy the missile sys­ ons. NATO had seen a threat, countered the tems to counter Soviet deployment of the threat, and created the conditions that al­ SS-20 mobile missile. NATO made it clear lowed the INF Treaty to remove the threat. at that time that if the Soviets did not deploy In the world of nuclear deterrence it is their missiles, new NATO systems would often difficult to tell just what impact a not be deployed. The Soviets attempted to country’s actions have on any given situa­ call our bluff by denying any such mutual tion. In the case of the INF Treaty, however, restraint. They felt they could ensure suffi­ we have rare, tangible evidence of the suc­ cient political unrest within the NATO al­ cess of our time on alert in Europe: the SS- liance and could convince antinuclear 20s are being removed and destroyed. We activists in Western Europe that NATO should remember that it is the job of deter­ would be unable to deploy its systems. In so rent forces to keep the peace. The GLCM doing, the Soviets saw an opportunity to and Pershing II forces have contributed to weaken or perhaps even split apart the keeping that peace and to making the world Western alliance. In simple terms, they ex­ a little bit safer. pected NATO resolve to crumble under So­ Other forces will remain to keep the de­ viet saber rattling. terrent alive. But as the INF troops go to Instead ’of crumbling, NATO stood firm, other tasks, it is important to remember that and its members worked together as they they are leaving, not because they have have for the last 40 years. The deployment reached their rotation date, but because of NATO missiles was well on its way to they have accomplished their mission. completion when the Soviets agreed to the They can come home with a rare feeling of satisfaction.

34 Winter 1988 IRA C. EAKER AWARD WINNERS

Col K. A. Myers, USAF Lt Col J. G. Tockston, USAF

for their article “Real Tenets of Military Space Doctrine”

Congratulations to Col Kenneth A. Myers and Lt If you would like to compete for the Ira C. Laker Col John G. Tockston on their selection as the Award, submit an article of feature length to the Ira C. taker Award winners for the best eligible Alrpower Journal, Walker Hall, Maxwell AFB, AL article from the Winter 1988 Issue of the Alr- 361 12-5532. The award is for the best eligible power Journal. Lt Col Tockston receives a $500 article in each issue and is open to all US mili­ cash award for his contribution to the Air tary personnel below the rank of colonel or Force's professional dialogue. The award hon­ equivalent and all US Government civilian em ­ ors Gen Ira C. Eaker and is made possible ployees below GS-15 or equivalent. through the support of the Arthur G. B. Metcalf Foundation of Winchester, Massachusetts.

The radar-guided threat to our aircraft continues to grow at an increasing rate. Unfortunately, the electronic warfare threat is not limited to central Europe but can be found in all theaters . . .

HE threat of radar-guided weapons to In Europe, our electronic combat capabil­ our aircraft continues to grow at an ity consists of one wing of F-4G/F-16C Wild increasing rate. The worst case is the Weasels, one squadron of EF-111 Ravens, Soviet integrated air defense system and a squadron of EC-130H Compass Call T(IADS), consisting of over 7,000 early warn­ aircraft. These assets could be augmented ing radars, 13,000 surface-to-air missile by a like number of TAC aircraft, assuming (SAM) launchers, and 12,000 air-defense there is no other contingency requiring guns.1 Unfortunately, the threat of elec­ TAC’s support. The in-place force in Europe tronic warfare is not limited to central Eu­ provides defense suppression for a very rope but can be found in all theaters. Our limited number of locations along the for­ current airborne capability to combat this ward edge of the battle area (FEBA), where threat is technically quite good but also very our attack aircraft could operate or pene­ limited in range and numbers. The good trate. Due to the Weasels’ limited range, news is that reasonably inexpensive solu­ there is no in-place capability in NATO’s tions exist. I propose that we employ con­ Allied Forces. Northern Europe (AF- ventionally tasked B-52s, assisted in the NORTH) and Allied Forces, Southern Eu­ highest threat areas by the Army’s multiple rope (AFSOUTH) without use of scarce air launch rocket system (MLRS), to augment refueling assets or resource-intensive for­ our current defense suppression assets. ward basing. Although the EF-111 and EC- 130H have greater range than the Weasels, the synergistic effect of the E F - lll’s jam­ ming of the IADS radar, Compass Call’s *1 gratefully acknowledge the assistance of Maj Cary C. Mor­ jamming of command, control, and com­ gan. USAF. in the preparation of this article Major Morgan, munications (C), and the Weasel’s lethal formerly of the 52d Tactical Fighter Wing at Spangdahlem AB. West Germany, is currently with the Tactical Air Warfare Cen­ antiradiation missiles (ARMs), makes joint ter at Eglm AFB. Florida employment of all three assets the most ef-

37 38 AIRPOWER JOURNAL SPRING 198t

fective combat option even though it limits the package to the Weasel’s area of coverage. However, using our conventionally tasked B-52s armed with the AGM-136 Tacit Rain­ bow antiradiation drone would increase both our range and coverage. The B-52 has virtually unlimited range and is capable of carrying 30 Tacit Rainbow drones, giving it the firepower of over a dozen Weasels (each Weasel nominally car­ ries two ARMs).2 In addition, the B-52 has an electronic countermeasures (ECM) ca­ pability that conceptually approximates the combined capabilities of the Compass Call (EC-130H) and EF-111 aircraft (i.e.. the abil­ ity to jam the same bandwidths). Assuming

Clockwise from below are the EF-111 A, EC-130H, F-4G and F-16C. In Europe, these ECM combat aircraft can work together to form a very effective electronic shield and strike capability, but they are limited in range and numbers. An EB-52 would have the com­ bined capability of these tactical aircraft as well as longer range and the ability to employ the Tacit Rain­ bow antiradiation missile.

EF-111 A <9 40 AIRPUWER JOURNAL SPRING 1989

the Tacit Rainbow has at least the same ef­ threat normally iound at the FEBA (e.g., mo­ fectiveness as the Weasel’s best weapon— bile SAMs, infrared (IR) SAMs, and guns) the AGM-88 high-speed antiradiation mis­ and on ships. In addition to keeping this sile (HARM)—the potential to destroy en­ limited resource out of harm’s way, no emy SAM radars is actually increased. Army corps airspace would have to be al Since the Tacit Rainbow was developed 10 located to the B-52 because it could operate years after the HARM, it is reasonable to as­ well back from the FEBA and above the nor sume that its capability is actually better mal ingress/egress routes. Currently, signif than the HARM’S. icant coordination is necessary to allow the The Tacit Rainbow also has two major ad­ Weasels to work near the FEBA; required vantages over the HARM: range and loiter fire-control measures often hamper the time. Jane’s Defence Weekly credits Tacit ground commander’s ability to make gooc Rainbow with a range of “several hundred the air defender’s promise that “if it flies, i kilometers,’’ which greatly exceeds that of dies.” the HARM. ' More important, because it is a Few experts doubt that we need more de­ winged drone rather than a ballistic missile. fense suppression assets. As a simplistic Tacit Rainbow is able to loiter in the target yardstick, if defense suppression can re­ area. Therefore, the enemy ground radar op­ duce the loss of NATO aircraft by only 2 erator cannot defeat the antiradiation mu­ percent, it will save the equivalent of a wing nition by shutting off the target radar since of fighters (72) for each week’s 3,600 combat the AGM-136 will simply loiter in the target sorties. Yet, in our current budget climate, area until the threat radar is turned on. If the the first question asked concerns cost. In radar operator chooses to remain “off the one sense, there is no additive cost in my air” while Tacit Rainbow is in the vicinity, proposal. The Air Force has already an­ the weapon will have accomplished its mis­ nounced its desire to dedicate a portion ol sion of protecting our attack aircraft. A the B-52G force to conventional operations coordinated HARM/Tacit Rainbow (and as the B-52H, B-l, and B-2 assume the stra­ Harpoon?) attack, especially in a maritime tegic nuclear mission. My proposal simply operations role, would give an enemy radar offers a specific conventional role for the operator cause for increased vodka B-52Gs. Tacit Rainbow is nearing opera­ consumption. tional status and is designed for employ The combined capabilities of the B-52 ment by the B-52. Since the B-52 is and Tacit Rainbow provide opportunities obviously a “sunk cost,” the primary addi­ not now available, range being the most tional expense would come from operation prominent. The current defense suppres­ and maintenance (O&M). The fact that rela sion assets are able to provide coverage of tively few B-52s (less than a squadron) are NATO’s Central region, but, as noted above, essentially as effective as an entire Weasel they cannot easily support the AFNORTH wing plus EF-llls and EC-130Hs suggests and AFSOUTH regions. The “BUFF Wea­ that my proposal would be both fiscally and sel” (EB-52?) can provide that capability operationally cost-effective. with a very small number of B-52s. In addi­ Basing options also favor BUFF Weasel. tion, arming the B-52 with Tacit Rainbows The B-52’s intercontinental range would al­ would enhance its current maritime opera­ low it to operate from CONUS locations if tions role in both European and maritime operational constraints (short-notice con­ theaters. The ability to suppress the signifi­ tingency) or funding constraints required cant naval SAM threat would give greater such basing. Since the lengthy flight time freedom to US and NATO aircraft (both car­ would significantly reduce the B-52’s avail­ rier and land-based) to attack hostile ships. ability and responsiveness, the use of a for­ The range of the Tacit Rainbow will allow ward operating location (FOL) to provide the B-52 to remain outside the scope of the in-theater responsiveness is attractive. This WEASEL1NG IN THE BUFF 41

The AGM-136A Tacit Rain- bow w ill be carried on board Navy A-6 aircraft. Using the EB-52 for mari- time operations would pro­ vide increased ECM coverage for antiship strikes by naval aircraft.

The AGM-88A HARM mis­ sile aboard an F-4G Wild Weasel. HARM is a highly effective system that has been in the inventory for some time. Tacit Rainbow w ill have the advantage over HARM of being able to loiter in the target area and automatically attack any hostile radar that is turned on. 42 AIRPOWER JOURNAL SPRING 1989

scheme would eliminate the costs associ­ and AFSOUTH), the sea lines of communi ated with maintaining a permanent base cation (SLOCs), and the CENTCOM AOR. overseas. The FOL would need the standard Andersen AFB in Guam could cover the Pa­ forward base support (billeting, messing, cific, and Loring AFB, Maine, could support water, minimal maintenance capability, the Atlantic. These two B-52 main operating fuel, munitions storage, and operations sup­ bases, combined with an FOL in Morocco, port). However, instead of the vast quan­ would provide reasonable coverage of the tities of munitions required for employment world's hot spots. of the B-52 in its conventional bombing mis­ Fighter aircraft operating at the FEBA are sion, the BUFF Weasel’s munition storage threatened by more defenses than even requirement would be relatively small and BUFFs and current Weasels can suppress. should even be less than that of a fighter However, there is a joint capability that FOL. A special requirement of the B-52G, could become operational in the near term though, is the production and/or storage of at minimal cost, which would provide our large quantities of demineralized water forces with increased defense suppression needed to augment engine thrust at takeoff. at the FEBA. A simple procedural change Morocco would be an appealing location could help reduce the threat (especially to for a BUFF Weasel FOL, with advantages ac­ Army helicopters) from the ZSU-23/4 and cruing to Morocco, the United States, and other short-range radar threats found close NATO. Lt Col David Dean suggests that the to the FEBA. An F-4G equipped with the political climate is right for such a move: ARN-101 (a precise navigation device) can “King Hassan II . . . has always been pro- locate enemy radar emitters with enough Western in his political inclination and in accuracy to allow the Army’s MLRS to tar­ recent years has made a strong move toward get them. The airborne F-4G need only call increasing his ties with the United States.”4 the coordinates (using the Army’s grid sys­ Following the ouster of the 401st Tactical tem) to the MLRS targeting center. (Since Fighter Wing (TFW) from Spain, Rabat of­ the F-4 has only UHF radios, the call might fered to base the 401st in Morocco. An FOL have to go to the air liaison officer with the in Morocco would help the Moroccan econ­ Army unit.) There would be little or no cost omy, improve US-Moroccan relations, and involved in making the simple procedural provide us with a geographically ideal lo­ change of providing the Weasels with the cation. B-52s launching from Morocco location/frequency/call sign of the receiving would not require overflight rights to reach units. any location in the area of responsibility My purpose has been to propose some (AOR) of the commander in chief, European low-cost solutions to the very difficult prob­ Command (CINCEUR). By basing the B-52s lem of providing our forces with adequate outside NATO, CINCEUR could employ the defense suppression. Like many other novel B-52s throughout his AOR (including much ideas, their success will require nontradi- of Africa and parts of the Middle East) with­ tional employment of air power, true joint out requiring NATO sanction. Should cooperation, and willpower not to “gold- NATO become involved in a conflict, the plate” procedures that are adequate to ac­ B-52s would obviously be close enough to complish the mission. In this period of support all NATO commands. fiscal constraint, we must do no less. If necessary, the B-52’s range would also Notes allow it to support US Central Command 1. John T. Correll. "With Waveforms and Wits," Air Force (USCENTCOM) operations. Since the BUFF Magazine, June 1987. 64. 2. Hugh Lucas. "AWACS: focal point for USAF upgrade.' Weasel’s primary role would be to augment, /one's Defence Weekly. 26 March 1988. 554. rather than replace, our current electronic 3. Ibid. 4. David |. Dean, The Air Force Role in Low-Intensity Con combat (EC) assets, its basing should be able /lict (Maxwell AFB, Ala.: Air University Press, October 1986' to support the NATO flanks (AFNORTH 29. THINKING ABOUT AIR POWER

V\aj A n drew J. O g a n , USAF

IR power is the military employ­ The Problem ment of aerospace resources to de­ Although such statements may be ac­ fend the nation and support cepted today, the concept is, nevertheless, national foreign policy. Further, it unclear. Just what is air power and, more Ais the application of aerospace tools to importantly, how does it fit within the pa­ achieve the objectives of the national lead­ rameters of modern warfare? The questions ership. Air power may act independently or are basic, but the answers are not readily ap­ in concert with land and sea forces.1 parent. The fact is that air power has been

43 44 AIRPUWER IOURNAL SPHJNU 1989 fragmented. We have no comprehensive Today, however, there exists no concise, doctrine that pulls together the separate en­ generally accepted definition of air power tities of air power and defines the medium Even the mix of tools that make up air of aerospace. Today’s US Air Force oversees power differs from service to service and only a small portion of total air power from country to country. The problem in resources. The Army, Navy, and Marine defining this term really turns upon the Corps all maintain “air forces" that are sep­ best way to delineate aerospace weapon sys­ arate and distinct from the US Air Force. tems from land and sea systems. Only two Doctrinally and operationally, each ser­ characteristics are needed to fulfill this re vice has developed facets of air power. Like quirement: environment and intelligence. the blind men and the elephant, each ser­ A description of both characteristics and vice “ touches” only a portion of the air the way they interact will illustrate their im­ power spectrum. This fragmentation of air pact on concepts of future air power power has historical roots. The political ob­ employment. jective of forming a separate air service (or retaining an air arm within land or sea Environment forces) has blurred the very lessons of his­ tory that demonstrate the potential of air The aerospace environment is the medium power/ Out of this turf battle has come a in which a military mission occurs/ An air­ very limited view of air power as it relates to craft must fly through the air to put bombs the activities and needs of each service. To­ on target; similarly, a satellite must use the day. air power is what each service says it aerospace medium to perform its missions is—nothing less and certainly nothing In this regard, an aircraft uses the mediun more. to accomplish military objectives. This en Missing from the current concept of air vironmental characteristic admits weapon power is a structure for doctrinal develop­ systems such as fixed-wing aircraft and ment and innovation. Rivalries and artifi­ helicopters while excluding such military- cial boundaries must be put aside in order instruments as tanks and ships. to define and develop its capabilities. This Admittedly, the characteristic is an ob­ article assumes a dispassionate view of air vious one. Air Force documents that dis­ power and suggests a possible conceptual cuss the performance characteristics ol framework that may aid the future devel­ speed and range assume that all actions take opment of this medium of warfare. Toward place within the aerospace environment.- that end, this discussion develops two ma­ However, this characteristic alone is not jor themes: a conceptual framework for air sufficient to distinguish aerospace instru­ power and the translation of that framework ments from sea and land forces. Bullets and into actual applications. Together, these shells, for example, travel through the two themds determine the employment of aerospace medium but are not considered air power. unique aerospace instruments in the same sense as aircraft. Another characteristic is needed to further delineate aerospace from the other mediums. Characteristics of the Aerospace Medium Intelligence Any discussion of air power or the aero­ Intelligence is a logical consequence of en space medium should begin with a defini­ vironment. Specifically, once the vehicle is tion because the medium affects the tools in the aerospace medium, the operator has available and the usefulness or applicabil­ the capability to make decisions or to exer­ ity of future technological developments. cise intelligence. This characteristic is a less THINKING ABOUT AIR POWER 45

obvious but essential element of air power. workhorse on the modern battlefield, assur­ The intelligence can be resident within the ing a degree of mobility that only air power aerospace vehicle, within a second vehicle, can deliver.6 The technologies of vertical or on the ground. Thus, fixed-wing aircraft, and/or short takeoff and landing (VSTOL) remotely piloted vehicles, and satellites will further blur the distinctions among the would all be aerospace vehicles. tools of air power. This characteristic is neither new nor startling. Air Force documents that discuss the flexibility of air power assume the abil­ Aerospace Military Capabilities ity to change targets or locations—to exer­ cise intelligence within the weapon The characteristics of environment and platform.s Further, many of the operational intelligence set air power apart from land capabilities attributed to aerospace opera­ and sea forces. Once this distinction is tions such as mobility, responsiveness, sur­ made, we can begin to define the role of air vivability, and presence have their basis in power. As a basis of discussion, we can fo­ this characteristic.6 Originally, intelligence cus on the military capabilities of air power. was resident in the airman operating the air­ Typically, air power enthusiasts have con­ craft. Today, although the weapon system centrated on the massive destructive poten­ remains intact, it can be supplemented by tial of air power—strategic bombardment.9 artificial intelligence and ground-con­ However, the capabilities of air power must trolled systems. be viewed against all of the ways it has been used in the past, in light of the way the term is defined. Historically, air power has been em­ Application of the Characteristics ployed to accomplish projection, denial, Taken together, these two characteristics and oversight. Rather than attempting to provide a basis for development of future provide an inclusive definition, we will re­ aircraft. A sampling of air power instru­ fer to these functions as military capabili­ ments that exhibit these characteristics in­ ties. They form a powerful triad from which clude helicopters, missiles, remotely roles and missions can be developed. Each piloted vehicles, satellites, and fixed-wing represents a valuable element of air power aircraft. Although this list is not exhaustive, that must be recognized in the employment it does provide a useful frame of reference. of aircraft. Each of the “air forces" in the US military uses some of these instruments. No service, however, includes all of them in the devel­ Projection opment of its doctrines or operational The great part of modern air power theory concepts. and doctrine has been directed toward the To date, distinctions made between air­ capability of projection, in this context, pro­ craft (e.g., fixed-wing aircraft versus heli­ jection is the ability to place military force copters) for the purpose of dividing them at a given location at a certain time. This def­ among the services have been artificial and inition is intentionally general. A variety of transitory.7 Because of the technological de­ methods are used to focus military power. velopments taking place in the aerospace The obvious Air Force method is through industry, clean lines of demarcation be­ bombardment. A less obvious but equally tween various aircraft are not always possi­ important method is the projection of land ble or practical. For instance, the airlift forces through airlift. The mobility that the resources of air power have been aug­ Army enjoys today is a result of the projec­ mented and enhanced by the helicopter. In tion of force by helicopters and fixed-wing a short time, this vehicle has matured into a aircraft.'0 Commonly accepted practices 4b A1RPOWER JOURNAL SPRING 1989 such as close air support, interdiction, and cause governments to behave differently— strategic bombardment are all variations of to change their military plans. this capability. The important aspect of pro­ jection is the placement of military force— Application of Military Capabilities in whatever fashion—in a given amount These capabilities work in concert to sup­ and at a specified time and place. port specific air power missions. Missions are simply statements of military objectives Denial that form the basis for force structures.'3 These objectives can be attained through ex­ The companion to projection must be de­ ercising military capabilities. In short, any nial. This capability entails denying an ad­ mission contains a mix of these capabilities. versary freedom of action. Whereas Hence, these capabilities establish a foun­ projection was strictly offensive, denial in­ dation for building mission statements and volves a mixture of offensive and defensive force structures. actions. On the one hand, this capability In each mission, one capability domi­ tends to be defensive insofar as it prevents nates while the others assume supporting enemy actions. Many people consider the roles. Only through utilization of all capa­ Battle of Britain a classic example of such bilities can the mission be completed. In air denial." On the other hand, offensive ac­ interdiction, for example, projection is the tions such as those involved in attaining air dominant capability. However, denial is superiority are also integral parts of denial. necessary to suppress enemy defenses—to Certain elements of interdiction and close allow freedom of movement—and oversight air support may also fall into this category. is needed to acquire target information and Through movement of forces and resources, evaluate the success of the mission. even airlift can deny territory or freedom of action to an adversary.

Oversight Application Environment Perhaps the most used but least considered These characteristics and capabilities are military capability of air power is oversight. important only if they help us apply air Simply stated, oversight involves watching power. In the final analysis, theory must be or guarding to assure proper direction and of some practical use. Air power leadership control. The use of reconnaissance aircraft functions within the application environ­ and satellites to observe foreign military de­ ment. a broad structure for the practical ap­ velopments and to protect the United States plication of air power theory. To the is a significant and critical contribution of military leader, this environment consists air power. Clearly, this capability uses the of two primary considerations: the spec­ impact of visibility to influence the actions trum of conflict and the national policy. It is of hostile governments. For example, the within this environment that air power satellite observation that goes on world­ must be effective and responsive. wide is a key ingredient in the military power of the United States and a critical component of foreign policy.12 Further­ Spectrum of Conflict more. the movement of E-3A aircraft into a The nature and intensity of conflict vary region sends an assortment of political and substantially from event to event. Although military signals. One of the crucial compo­ air power proponents have traditionally fo­ nents of any arms reduction agreement is cused on nuclear or conventional roles, the ability of the United States to exercise there are many other kinds of conflicts that this military capability. Oversight may require US forces. In point of fact, there is a THINKING ABOUT AIB POWBH 47

recognized spectrum of conflict (see figure) country or group to act in a certain man­ that categorizes these different forms of ner.15 Whereas the spectrum of conflict de­ warfare. Conflicts can range from low inten­ termines the appropriate military response, sity, such as show-of-force operations and the national policy dictates the level and surgical strikes, to high intensity, such as scope of military involvement in any given general conventional or nuclear war.1-* situation. The spectrum of conflict defines the op­ To the military leader, national objectives erational environment for the military plan­ describe the political framework within ner. Determining the nature of a conflict and which military power will be used. These the appropriate military options is the pur­ objectives define the terms of success or vic­ est form of military art. This military assess­ tory and must be consistent. Key military ment of the appropriate strategies, tactics, variables that are dependent upon the polit­ and tools is performed against the backdrop ical environment include the level of force, of the conflict. The tempo and intensity of duration of the conflict, degree of freedom operations as well as required force for the military forces, and, possibly, the strengths to carry out these operations are forces to be used.,fi key factors defined by the nature of the conflict. Air Power and the Environment The spectrum of conflict and the national National Policy policy both define the application environ­ ment for the air power planner. The char­ Air power is effective—and, for that mat­ acteristics and capabilities of air power ter, needed—only to the extent that it sup­ provide a framework to develop aerospace ports and furthers national policy. Implicit options within this environment. The char­ in that statement is the idea that the sea, air, acteristics are important in identifying the and land forces operate in concert rather wide range of tools available to accomplish than in opposition. Military forces, in this air power missions. The military capabili­ context, are used to “influence” another ties provide a means of assessment for struc-

LOW INTENSITY HIGH INTENSITY (Very Limited) (Unlimited)

Show of Force Nuclear War

Surgical Operations Conventional War

Limited Conventional War

Source: Adapted from David J. Dean. The Air Force Hole in Low-Intensity Conflict (Maxwell AFB, Ala.: Air Uni versitv Press. October 1986). 3. 4B A1RPOWER JOURNAL SPRING 1989 turally developing air power missions ther, care must be taken to consider the ca commensurate with the demands of the pabilities of the tool rather than its common conflict and the nation. use. The role of the bomber, for example, has evolved to include nuclear, conven­ tional, tactical, and strategic missions.’7 Employment of Air Power The air power planner can, from a list ot To this point, the discussion of air power possible systems, use a mix of systems tha has been theoretical. With the real-world best supports the military capabilitie: framework or application environment es­ sought and thereby meets the mission tablished, however, the actual employment needs. of air power against that framework can be developed. The remainder of this article Example of Mission Development elaborates upon a concept for mission de­ velopment, discusses this concept in To put all of these details into some per­ greater detail through the use of one exam­ spective, let’s consider a simplified case. ple, and summarizes the key elements of Assume that the type of conflict is nuclear this discussion. war. In the pure military sense, there are a variety of ways to protect the nation from Mission Development and possibly win a nuclear war. Preemptive Mission development begins with a con­ nuclear strikes, defensive missile systems, flict. The spectrum of conflict is useful in and a number of other options are possible determining the nature of a particular con­ solutions. However, the national policy flict and its possible resolution. The purely must also be taken into account. Assume military options can be ascertained through that the national leadership has a policy of this process. However, only after a national strategic nuclear deterrence. That is, the policy has been established can military leadership wants to prevent an attack on planners begin to assign forces or build a this nation solely through its ability to force structure to support that policy. Air counterattack and devastate any nation that theorists, working with their counterparts attacks it. How would this air power mis­ from the land and sea forces, must develop sion be developed? air power missions. Following the identifi­ To perform this mission of deterrence, the cation of the conflict and the development air power planner relies on a blend of pro­ of policy, the air power planner defines mis­ jection, denial, and oversight. The domi­ sions and builds forces to implement the nant capability is offensive, most probably policy. the military capability of projection. The The air power capabilities (projection, other two capabilities are directed in ways denial, and oversight) form a structure for that support and facilitate the dominant developing the air power mission. The na­ one. Projection is essential to carry out the ture of the air power mission (e.g., offensive response to an aggressor. This action is what versus defensive or active versus passive) the national leadership has demanded. determines which of the capabilities will be Denial is added to deflect enemy attacks the dominant one. Although one capability against the projection forces. Observation or may dominate, the others assume support­ oversight is necessary for early detection of ing roles and are essential to the develop­ enemy attacks and to assist in the targeting ment of the mission. of mobile enemy forces. The characteristics of air power identify The air power planner builds the needed the weapon systems that implement the air force structure by choosing from the air power mission. These characteristics are power instruments available. The charac­ helpful in determining the number and teristics of air power are useful here. Envi­ types of instruments available for use. Fur­ ronment and intelligence allow the air THINKING ABOUT AIR POWER 49

power planner ample tools to fulfill the na­ missiles, and helicopters. The explosion in tional policy objective. For instance, the ca­ technology that created these systems con­ pability of projection is achieved through tinues unabated. The air power forces of to­ the use of manned aircraft, satellite systems, morrow may have as much in common with and missiles. The forces to conduct denial air forces today as current aircraft have with make use of similar systems designed to ob­ the biplane. struct or deflect enemy forces. Finally, sat­ Because the role of air power will con­ ellites, remotely piloted vehicles, and tinue to evolve as it matures, its doctrinal manned aircraft would be appropriate to foundations must be broad enough to allow perform the oversight function. for the maturation process. The spectrum of conflict and national policy establish the context within which air power will be Key Elements used. The characteristics and the military Three key elements are central to this dis­ capabilities of air power provide a broad ba­ cussion. First, the element of national pol­ sis for future growth—and for the future of icy remains influential throughout the air power. process. For example, some air power in­ Thus, it falls to the practitioner of air struments may not be acceptable to the na­ power to escape the artificial constraints of tional leadership. Second, the m ilitary the past and develop the air medium capabilities provide a structure for examin­ broadly on the basis of the doctrinal frame­ ing any mission. Together, they cover the work delineated here. Reconsider those in­ abilities of air power. Third, the character­ itial questions: What is air power? How istics assure that planning will have at its does it fit into modern warfare? We now disposal the total inventory of air power in­ have a means to answer them. struments. Further, this discussion focuses entirely on the broad mission of air power and largely ignores tactical matters. The methods for getting through an opponent’s defenses or the appropriateness of certain air power instruments are not in question Notes here. Those decisions are left to the techni­ 1. Giulio Douhet. The Command of the A ir (Washington. D.C.: Office of Air Force History. 1983). 70. cal expertise of the airman. 2. Robin Higham. Air Power (New York: St. Martin's Press, 19721.2. 3. Douhet, 3-5. 4. AFM 1-1. United States A ir Force Basic Doctrine, 1984. 2- 2 . Conclusions 5. Ibid. 6. Ibid., 2-3. When the early proponents of air power 7. Arthur T. Hadley, The Straw Giant (New York: Random were developing their theories, few aircraft House, Inc., 1986), 136. 8. Richard E. Simpkin, Race to the Swift (New York: Bras- existed. The lessons of combat were not sey's Defence Publishers, 1985). 119-20. available. Therefore, their theories were 9. Hadley. 78-79. 10. Simpkin. 120. based on what they thought air power could 11. Higham. 237. accomplish. Many of these theories (which 12. Grover E. Myers, Aerospace Power (Maxwell AFB, Ala.: formed the basis of our doctrines) were Air University Press. September 1986), 40. 13. AFM 1-1. 3-2. based on very specific views of future 14. David ). Dean, The Air Force Role in Low-Intensity Con­ conflicts. flict (Maxwell AFB, Ala.: Air University Press, October 1986), Over the past 70 years, the entire science 1-4. 15. Edward N. Luttwak, Strategy (Cambridge: Belknap Press of warfare has undergone massive changes. of Harvard University Press, 1987), 190-91. Air power has evolved into a fighting force 16. Ibid., 232. in its own right. Those fragile biplanes have 17. Thomas A. Keaney, Strategic Bombers and Conventional Weapons (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University been replaced by a variety of jet aircraft, Press, 1984), 61-66. 50 AIRPOWER JOURNAL SPRING 1989

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S af ™ mw fobms ,ma rqn and romt request Modified to Meet the Need British Aircraft in the Falldands

C apt Joseph F. U demi, USAF 52 AlflPOlVER JOURNAL SPRING 1989

IKE Shakespeare's placid character, ships were also considered expendable.* Great Britain was shaken out of its Fortunately for Britain, these vessels were lethargy in 1982 when Argentina in­ still available when Argentina invaded. vaded the Falklands (Islas Malvinas), Britain also was proud of the vertical and/or anL island group in the South Atlantic short takeoff and landing (VSTOL) capabil­ claimed by both Argentina and Britain but ity of the British Aerospace (BAe) Harrier occupied by the British. Ground, sea, and and Sea Harrier aircraft, designed to defend air forces of the Bard’s homeland did indeed air and sea. However, opponents of the air­ imitate the action of the tiger in fighting for craft claimed that their weapons load was control of the islands. Meanwhile, back in too small, that they were too slow for mod­ Britain, military and industrial engineers ern air warfare, and that there were too few and technicians hurriedly modified mili­ of them to be effective against an enemy.3 ary aircraft to meet the requirements of the war effort. At the time of the invasion, Brit­ ain was at a disadvantage in the critical areas of available fighter aircraft, long-range Meeting the airlift aircraft, instruments for conducting Superior Numbers electronic warfare, and devices for aircraft surveillance. This discussion examines var­ Argentine aircraft greatly outnumbered ious aircraft modifications or improvisa­ the Sea Harriers of the Royal Navy’s air arm. tions Britain hastily undertook to meet the Together, the Argentine air force and naval needs created by shortfalls or by Argentine air arm had approximately 110 fighter and threats. Many of these changes were com­ fighter-bomber aircraft. Posing the greatest pleted in a matter of days or weeks. In threat to the British were 11 French-built peacetime, comparable modifications and Mirage Ills and five Super Etendard aircraft. improvisations performed in Britain or the Argentina also boasted 57 American-built United States might have taken years. Since A-4 Skyhawk fighter-bombers and 34 Is­ the conflict lasted only two and one-half raeli-built Mirage Vs (called Daggers by the months (2 April to 14 june 1982), some of Argentines).4 These aircraft operated out of these aircraft modifications were not com­ several air bases on the Argentine main­ pleted before the cessation of hostilities. land, the closest being 380 miles from the is­ Others were completed with various de­ lands and the farthest 517 miles. Although grees of success and made contributions in the long distances meant that some of the combat. The effectiveness of the program is aircraft would be operating close to the end evidence of the ingenuity, inventiveness, of their combat radius and their loiter time and resourcefulness of the British govern­ over the islands would be limited, they still ment, military, and industry. posed a substantial threat to the ships of the Although Britain responded to the “blast British task force and to Sea Harrier of war," prior to the crisis the country was aircraft.5 very much like Shakespeare’s man in peace­ To supplement its fighters, Argentina de­ time. During previous years, Britain had ployed 34 short-range attack aircraft of var­ elected to maintain its contributions to the ious types to the islands. Adding over 100 North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) reconnaissance, transport, helicopter, and rather than support a worldwide defense support aircraft brought the total combined commitment. Consequently, the Royal Argentine air strength to approximately 250 Navy was hit especially hard by budgetary aircraft.6 Initially, the British aircraft facing cuts.’ In fact, plans were made to eliminate this Argentine force included 20 Sea Har­ its two operational aircraft carriers by scrap­ riers on board the carriers Hermes and In- ping HMS Hermes and selling HMS Invin­ vincible together with 53 helicopters on the cible to Australia. Two amphibious assault carriers and other warships of the task BRITISH AIRCRAFT IN THU FALKLAND* 53

Because British forces were committed to supporting NATO rather than maintaining a global defense pos- , \ Argentine Military Bases Valparaiso j \ ture. the Argentine invasion of the Falkland Islands • ) Sant.ago caught them unprepared. Although Argentina’s war­ > N—•>. y~ planes operated out of bases far removed from the is­ ! Buenos Aires lands fright), they posed a formidable threat to Talcahuano [ / m Rio Santiago British forces. Concepcion! 4R Puma del \ Tenoil r'W Indio \ • Temuco • ^ Neuqoen 8ahia Bianca HMar del Plata

Espo>a / Puerto Beigrano Valdivia force.7 The Argentine threat was even Puerto M oili greater than that suggested by their superi­ ority in numbers because the Sea Harrier was unproven in combat and could not fly Comodoro as fast as the Mirage, Super Etendard, or Rivadavia Dagger fighters.8 The British aircraft, how­ ever, did have an advantage in weaponry since it was equipped to use the AIM-9 (A-4s Mirages. NJV, Sidewinder heat-seeking, air-to-air missile.9 Daggers) Obviously, the task force needed more 4?0nm I778tml >/ V aircraft as soon as possible. At the beginning Falkland Islands Puma / of the war, only 31 Sea Harriers were in ex­ MA-4*. .R io Grande Super Eiendards. istence, and three were lost in the first week. Daggers) Because some of them were kept in England The Royal A ir Force H arrier GR.3 I right I was designed as an air-to- ground aircraft but had to be con- verted for air-to-air operations as w e ll as fo r m aritim e d u ty (oppo- site pageI. RAF Vulcan bombers (below ) were ready fo r retirem ent when called into service for con­ ventional bombing. Technicians fitte d these aircraft w ith naviga- tion systems for long-range over- w ater flig hts and w ith electronic countermeasures systems for pro- tection from Argentine air- defense weapons.

5b A1HPOWEH JOUHNAL bPHING 1909 for evaluation and testing, a mere eight air­ Subsequently, the GR.3s would augment craft were available to reinforce the task the Sea Harriers in the air defense mission force. The only alternative was to use the and eventually conduct ground support Royal Air Force’s (RAF’s) Harrier GR.3 air­ attacks.11 craft.10 This decision entailed the formida­ Between 14 and 16 April the British Min­ ble task of converting the air-to-ground istry of Defence (MOD) and BAe compiled a GR.3 to an air-to-air craft capable of ship­ modification list for the GR.3s. Some of the board operations. On 8 April the Harrier changes facilitated shipboard operation GR.3s of No. 1 (F) Squadron were selected to while others accommodated the South At­ undergo a series of modifications that lantic environment.12 For example, to se­ would take four weeks to complete before cure the GR.3s to carrier decks, technicians deploying to the Hermes and Invincible. fitted tie-down shackles to the aircraft’s out­ rigger legs and modified the nosewheel for better steering control on deck.13 They also drilled drainage holes in the aircraft and The Argentine threat to the British task force was sig- sealed other areas to keep out corrosive salt nificant. A lack of airborne early warning ca p a b ility left the fleet vulne rable to a ir attack. B elow is an a rt- water.14 ist's depiction of an Argentine A-4 The GR.3s also needed I-band transpon­ engaging a British warship. ders, which would emit a precoded identi- BRITISH AIRCRAFT IN THE FALKLANDS 57 fication transmission when interrogated by data, the INAS must be properly leveled and an I-band radar signal, thereby clearing the aligned before takeoff."* Sea Harriers have a aircraft for recovery by the carriers. BAe de­ different navigation system that compen­ livered the first GR.3 transponder modifi­ sates for the ship’s movement, but there was cation kits only eight days after the MOD’S no time to install this system in the GR.3. request. Technicians then installed each Faced with the impending GR.3 deploy­ transponder and its antenna in an access ment to the carriers, MOD requested tech­ panel under the aircraft’s nose.15 The speed nical help from Ferranti.17 with which BAe produced these kits was Ferranti officials discussed the project on typical of the cooperation between industry 15 April and received the go-ahead from and government during the crisis. MOD the next day. Two days later a design Another example of industry’s commit­ for the Ferranti inertial rapid alignment ment was the development by Ferranti Ltd. of support equipment to align the GR.3’s in­ ertial navigation-attack system (INAS). The INAS’s accelerometers provide the pilot in­ The Argentines’ A-4 Skyhawks as well as the French- formation about altitude, navigation, and built Mirage III (below) and Super Etendard proved to be lethal weapon systems. British ground forces bombing by calculating velocity and also had to worry about the Argentine-built Pucard changes in position. To provide accurate (bottom). 58 AJRPOVVER JOURNAL SPRING 1989 equipment (FINRAE) was complete. FIN- Farnborough and Boscombe Down. Lastly, RAE—developed and delivered in only 18 the need for additional British aircraft in the days—is a lightweight, trolley-mounted, South Atlantic tended to overcome pre­ battery-powered platform that can interface vious funding difficulties. with the GR.3's INAS and feed it positional Six modified GR.3s and eight Sea Harriers data. The acquisition of FINRAE's trolley is flew to Ascension Island where they were typical of the speed with which the project loaded on board a containership, eventually was completed. The manufacturer origi­ joining the task force on 18 May. Before the nally quoted a delivery time of six months, hostilities ended, four additional modified but after being told why the trolley was GR.3s reached the task force after in-flight needed, delivered it the next morning.1" Be­ refueling by Victor tanker aircraft.22 Despite cause the FINRAE’s navigational data was the intense effort to modify the GR.3 to carry not as accurate as information available the AIM-9, these missiles were off-loaded from airfields, the GR.3s used FINRAE for after their first operational mission because attitude information only. This restriction the Argentine air threat to the Harriers had forced the crew to use visual navigation for not materialized as anticipated.23 The suc­ weapons delivery during low-level opera­ cess of Sea Harriers armed with AIM-9s in tions. After the conflict, FINRAE was fur­ aerial combat persuaded Argentina to re­ ther tested and eventually produced frain from risking any more aircraft.24 The accurate and timely alignments.19 GR.3s were therefore employed in low-level Lastly, the GR.3 had to be modified to ground attacks and reconnaissance mis­ carry the AIM-9 Sidewinder missile. On 16 sions, mostly in support of amphibious April MOD indicated that this modifica­ landings and battlefield air interdiction.25 tion—the most involved of all the changes to the GR.3—would have to be completed in two weeks. By 21 April BAe and RAF engi­ neering officers had developed a conversion Meeting the plan, and MOD approved it the following day. The first conversion was completed at Long Distances RAF Wittering on 28 April.20 Adapting the Just as Britain was the United States’ larg­ GR.3 to carry the AIM-9 required techni­ est “aircraft carrier" for striking at Germany cians to install an electronic relay box in the during World War II, so had Ascension Is­ rear equipment bay and a missile control land become Britain’s largest aircraft carrier panel in the cockpit. They made only a few in its war with Argentina. During the con­ changes to the existing armament wiring in flict, Wideawake Airfield on Ascension be­ the wings leading to the outer pylons but came one of the most active fields in the modified an adapter that allowed the mis­ world.26 Located almost halfway between sile launch rail to be attached to the pylons. Great Britain and the Falklands, Ascension After 18 AIM-9 modification kits were pro­ was logistically crucial for a task force that duced, technicians modified 11 aircraft was operating far from home and for an air initially.2' force that would help to keep it supplied.27 Several factors contributed to the speed To comprehend the resupply task facing and success of the AIM-9 program. The the RAF. one must review the overwater RAF, plans in hand, had asked for similar distances involved versus the RAF’s airlift modifications but funding was not forth­ range capability. The distance from Great coming. Further, the program benefited Britain to Ascension Island is over 4,000 from the exceptional cooperation and joint miles and from Ascension to the Falklands effort of the BAe design team from Kingston, another 3,500 miles.2H Fifty-four C-130 Her­ the RAF Engineering Wing at Wittering, and cules aircraft were the mainstay of the RAF officials from the test establishments at airlift strength.29 These aircraft had an ap­ BRITISH AIRCRAFT IN THE FALKLANDS 5y

proximate range (depending on configura- from retired Vulcan bombers were installed ion) of 3,000 miles and no in-flight on top of the fuselage above the C-130’s refueling capability.J0 cockpit and offset to the right. Fuel lines To reach Ascension from Great Britain, a were placed along the fuselage roof from the C-130 had to make en route stops at Gibral­ probe to the trailing edge of the starboard tar, Dakar (in Senegal), or Banjul (in Gam­ wing root and into the aircraft’s fuel tanks.31' bia). The airlift missions to Ascension Following flight tests at Boscombe Down, )egan on 2 April. The missions continued the first modified C-130 (designated C.lP) and helped supply the task force when it deployed to Ascension on 14 May. Between passed through Ascension in mid-April.31 16 May and 14 June, 18 air-refueled airdrop Unless their range could be extended, the missions were flown from Wideawake to C-130s were able to reach only 1,500 miles the task force over 3,000 miles away. After beyond Ascension to perform airdrop mis­ hostilities in the islands ended, the airdrop sions to resupply the task force. missions continued, and one C.lP set an air­ The most available means to extend the borne endurance record of 28 hours and 4 C-130’s range was through the use of cylin­ minutes. Six C-130s were converted to drical auxiliary fuel tanks installed in the C.lPs before 14 June, and 10 more were aircraft’s fuselage. Earlier cargo aircraft had completed after that.37 used long-range fuselage tanks; therefore, During this time, the demands on the Vic­ the concept was not new. The Engineering tor tanker aircraft increased, and the need Wing at RAF Lyneham revised this concept for additional in-flight refueling support be­ and reclaimed the old fuselage tanks from came apparent. On 30 April, MCE began storage.32 In a matter of days the first modi­ work on modifying the C-130 to function as fied C-130 was ready for flight test. Two or an in-flight refueling tanker. This modifi­ four tanks could be installed in a cargo bay cation was complex and risky because the of the C-130 to extend flying time; however, C-130 rear cargo door would require exten­ the trade-off was a decreased payload.33 sive work to hold a refueling unit and a re­ The long-range tanks allowed C-130s to fuel hose had never been trailed from the deploy to Ascension without en route stops. aircraft’s fuselage.38 The first converted aircraft reached Wide­ Despite the complexity of the modifica­ awake Airfield on 5 May. From 7 to 18 May, tion, a C-130 tanker (C.lK) made its first various airdrop missions were flown by sev­ flight on 8 June, only 38 days after the re­ eral aircraft from Ascension, with the long­ quirement was initiated. It encountered est flight lasting 18 hours.34 buffeting problems, a technical problem The extended-range C-130s were an in­ that delayed the operational delivery of the terim solution to the airlift problem. A C.lK until 5 July.39 more permanent solution involved giving The contribution of the C-130 Hercules to the C-130 an in-flight refueling capability. the British war effort can be summed up by As with other conflict-related modifica­ its 44 airdrop missions and over 13,000 tions. an initial design study had been con­ flying hours. Successful and timely fuselage ducted years before, but the effort never tank and in-flight refueling modifications materialized. Unlike the fuselage tank mod­ enabled the C-130s to perform nonstop de­ ification, this effort exceeded RAF Lyne- ployments to Ascension and essential air­ ham’s capability. With a real need now drops. A total of six C-130s underwent the present, Marshalls of Cambridge Engineer­ tanker conversion; however, none of them ing Ltd. (MCE) began work on 15 April. In­ saw operational service. These aircraft did itial estimates for this modification were play a role in future deployments to the three weeks; however, the first aircraft was British Falkland garrison.411 modified and ready for testing in 10 days.35 Another aircraft that would play an im­ In-flight refueling nozzles and probes portant role in the recovery of the islands 60 AIRPOWER IOURNAL SPRING 1989

was the RAF's Nimrod MR.MK2 maritime ries to maintain its empire. This war was reconnaissance aircraft. The Nimrod, fought for old principles but with the latest equipped with various computer-assisted military technology. In the Falklands, Brit­ radar and acoustic systems, was used to per­ ish aircraft would face a variety of modern form a variety of essential missions.41 The European and American electronic weap­ Nimrod roles included airborne patrols to onry. The British had to rely on hasty im­ protect Ascension Island and the task force, provisations to counter the electronic search-and-rescue missions during Harrier threat. deployments, and a communication link for The greatest air-to-air threat came from air-to-air refuelings and bomber missions.42 the Mirage III aircraft. The Mirage could The Nimrod had to cover all operational carry two Matra Magic R550 heat-seeking areas; however, it had a range of about 5,500 missiles or one Matra R530 semiactive ra­ miles and could not be refueled in flight.43 dar-homing missile.48 Any aircraft going The Nimrod, like the Hercules, under­ against a Mirage III would need to protect it­ went a rapid modification to allow in-flight self from these missiles. refueling. BAe was given the go-ahead on 14 To defend against air attacks, the Argen April to begin modifications, and work be­ tinians had placed several types of radar- gan four days later. On 27 April, a modified controlled antiaircraft weapon systems on Nimrod flight-tested the aerodynamics of the islands. Potentially, the most lethal the aircraft and its newly installed refueling of these systems was the European-built probe (which had been removed from a Vul­ Roland missile with its radar-guidance and can bomber). These tests revealed a yaw- fire-control system. Ironically, a further instability problem that was later solved by threat came from two British-built weap­ installing finlets near the aircraft’s tail.44 ons, the Tigercat and Blowpipe shoulder- The first Victor/Nimrod linkup occurred 30 fired surface-to-air missiles (SAMs).49 April, and the first completely modified air­ In addition to the missile systems, several craft was available on 2 May.45 radar-controlled antiaircraft artillery (AAA) The Nimrod modification consisted of a systems made low-flying sorties dangerous. refueling probe attached above the cockpit The most sophisticated AAA system was with a fuel hose extending down to the the Oerlikon 35-mm twin-barrel cannon, cabin floor. This canvas-on-rubber, flexible directed by the Contraves Skyguard all- bowser hose then ran along the cabin floor weather, fire-control radar. Finally, the Ar­ for two-thirds the length of the fuselage.4* gentinians possessed a number of optically Thirteen Nimrods were modified during directed Rheinmetall 20-mm and Hispano- the conflict, and three more were completed Suiza 30-mm cannons.50 afterwards. The first refueling mission for a Providing the Argentinians with vital Nimrod from Wideawake took place on 9 early warning of impending air strikes and May. The in-flight refueling modification al­ aiding defensive fighter coordination were lowed the Nimrod to perform valuable long- a Westinghouse AN/TPS-43F three-dimen­ range reconnaissance missions almost to sional, long-range surveillance radar and a the Argentine coast. On 15 May, a Nimrod supporting Cardion AN/TPS-44 tactical sur­ flew 8.453 miles, the longest distance flown veillance radar.51 These radars could track by an aircraft during the conflict.47 Harrier aircraft, determine the location of British ships, and advise attacking Argen­ tine aircraft.52 Britain would later dedicate Meeting several air strikes to the destruction of these the Electronic Threat important radar systems. At the time of the conflict, British aircraft The conflict was reminiscent of the many did not have electronic countermeasures wars Britain fought throughout the centu­ (ECM) equipment despite the probability BRITISH AIRCRAFT IN THE FALKLANDS 61

that potential adversaries would possess a cially manufactured. Rather than use the varying range of modern electronic warfare normal liquid-cooling system, engineers in­ (EW) capabilities. British attempts to fill stalled ram-air cooling. On 12 May, the this ECM shortfall would therefore involve prototype pod was complete and ready for protection for its aircraft and elimination of ground testing.57 radar threats. Flight testing began on 14 May and in­ Modifications to protect Harriers took the cluded evaluating the pod’s performance in form of a chaff flare dispenser and a self­ place next to the pod of an Aden gun that protection radar jammer. Chaff consists of was actually firing. Also under considera­ bundles of radar-reflecting aluminum strips tion was whether the electrically fired that confuse an enemy's radar when re­ 30-mm ammunition could be safely ex­ leased. Infrared decoy flares are used to de­ posed to any energy the pod might radiate. flect heat-seeking missiles from an aircraft’s No problems were discovered, and the pod exhaust. was declared ready for operational use. Initially, chaff bundles were crudely Marconi produced a total of nine Blue Eric wedged between the Harrier’s bombs and pods w ithin four days. Only 15 days pylons and between the speedbrake and the elapsed from initial requirement to fuselage. After US aid to Britain was ap­ delivery.58 proved, the Tracor Company, a US defense Other modifications involved preparing contractor, assisted in installing the ALE-40 the venerable Vulcan bomber for its sorties chaff flare system in a modified ventral ac­ to the islands. The Vulcans were used in cess panel under the Harrier’s rear fuselage, several conventional bombing attacks on aft of the speedbrake.53 the Port Stanley airfield and in m issile The production of an ECM pod was an­ attacks on the Argentine radar sites.59 other effort to protect the Harrier. The The Vulcans were fitted with the Carousel hurried project to build the ECM pod (com­ inertial navigation system (INS) for their monly called Blue Eric) was begun by the long-range overwater missions, and their Marconi Space and Missile Defense System supporting Victor tankers were supplied and RAF electronic warfare experts. In with the Carousel INS or the Omega radio peacetime a project of this magnitude and navigation system.60 complexity would have taken at least two To protect itself against Argentine radar, years. After only two weeks, nine pods were the Vulcan was given the Westinghouse ready for service.54 AN/ALQ-101 ECM pod. These pods were The project actually began on 6 May, mounted on locally devised underwing py­ when RAF and Marconi EW experts identi­ lons, and the wiring was routed through un­ fied the characteristics of the Argentine ra­ used refrigeration ducts. The ALQ-101 pods dar threat and decided how to counter it. were used to jam Argentine radar during the They determined that existing ECM pods Vulcan’s Black Buck missions against the were too big and heavy to be used on the Port Stanley airfield and radar sites.61 Harrier.55 On the following day, they elected In order to destroy the Argentine AN/ to use one of the two Aden underbelly gun TPS-43F and TPS-44 radars, the RAF de­ pods for the ECM equipment rather than cided to equip the Vulcan with US-supplied build a new pylon-mounted pod. BAe was AGM-45 Shrike antiradiation missiles. A to­ brought into the project to coordinate the in­ tal of four Shrikes could be mounted on the terfacing of the pod and the aircraft’s elec­ Vulcan.62 Shrike missile attacks on the radar trical system. Within five days, Marconi had sites destroyed one AAA Skyguard radar. completed the design work.56 Despite the tremendous effort made on the The system’s electronic components Black Buck missions, the two Argentine came either from the Marconi Skyshadow surveillance radars remained functional un­ pod, were off-the-shelf items, or were spe­ til hostilities ended.63 62 A/RPOWER JOURNAL SPRING 1989

The ALQ-101 pod and the chaff bundles battle; thus, this threat would have to be did provide some protection to the Vulcan dealt with. and the Harrier, although the exact contri­ There were no immediate solutions to the bution of these measures is difficult to as­ lack of AEW. It was too impractical to refur sess. Three GR.3s and one Sea Harrier were bish the Royal Navy’s several retired Gannet lost to AAA fire. Only one Sea Harrier was AEW aircraft.66 The 1950s-era Shackletori lost to a Roland SAM. No Harriers were lost AEW aircraft could not help, and an AEW in air-to-air combat, and no Vulcans were version of the Nimrod was several year lost.64 away.69 Once again, a modification effor Although a commendable effort went into would be undertaken to meet the need foi the Blue Eric jammer pod, it was never used an AEW capability. in combat. The four GR.3s equipped with The ideal solution would be to have an Blue Erics arrived late in the conflict and AEW aircraft that could operate from the flew only missions clear of radar defense. task force. Westland had previously done The Blue Eric effort, however, provided the design studies on an AEW version of its Sea RAF and industry a great lesson in rapidly King HAS.2 helicopter; therefore, on 23 producing ECM equipment and ECM tech­ May, MOD gave Westland approval to com­ nology for the Harriers. It helped justify the mence with the conversion.70 need to the British for an indigenous de­ Two Sea Kings were fitted with the Nim­ fense industry. The Blue Eric project had rod’s Thorn-EMI search-water maritime also cost considerably less than it would surveillance radar. The large, unsightly have if it had been a two-year peacetime looking radar dome was mounted on an ex­ contract.BS ternal swivel arm extending from the rear starboard of the helicopter’s fuselage.71 The two AEW Sea Kings were cleared for operation and deployed on HMS Illustrious Defending on 2 August, only 11 weeks after initial the Task Force planning began.72 Despite another com­ mendable conversion effort, these Sea King The British task force arrived in the South helicopters were too late to help prevent the Atlantic with a serious deficiency. It lacked loss of British ships to surprise air attacks. airborne early warning (AEW) capability, The task force did have the advantage of and therefore its ships were vulnerable to Nimrod aircraft providing valuable recon­ surprise attack by Argentine aircraft. This naissance and antisubmarine duties as they vulnerability was quickly realized when headed for the South Atlantic. After the HMS Sheffield was unexpectedly hit by an Nimrod’s range had been extended by in­ air-launched. French-built Exocet missile flight refueling, it was able to perform on 4 May.66 Unfortunately, the British long-range reconnaissance sweeps. The first learned the value of AEW in modern war­ of these missions occurred on 15 May, and fare the hard way. its track was within 60 miles of the Argen­ In addition to the Argentine air attacks, tine coast. These missions were important, there was also the surface threat. The Argen­ but they were also very risky for the un­ tine navy possessed one aircraft carrier, one armed Nimrods flying in unfriendly skies.73 cruiser, seven destroyers, three frigates, and The Nimrod proved to be a versatile air­ numerous patrol and attack craft. All ships craft with the capability of carrying both were armed with a variety of naval weap­ air-to-air and air-to-surface weapons. It had onry, approximately nine of them having originally been designed with two under­ the ship-to-ship Exocet missile.67 The Brit­ wing hard points and a weapons bay. After ish had no way of knowing whether or not suitable pylons and wiring had been de­ Argentina would commit its naval forces to signed ATM-9 Sidewinder missiles were BRITISH AIRCRAFT IN THE FALKLANDS 63

mounted on the Nimrod. The first AIM-9- envisioned. The {Hue Eric EW pod was a armed Nimrod deployed to Ascension on 5 technological breakthrough; however, it ar­ June.74 rived too late to be tested in combat. If the The Nimrod’s weapon bay was also mod­ war had continued or had taken a different ified to carry the American AGM-84A course, these modifications and improvisa­ Harpoon antiship missile. The first Har­ tions may have been used. poon-equipped Nimrod deployed on 2 July. The C-130 tanker and the AEW Sea King Neither the Sidewinder nor the Harpoon helicopter modifications were far too exten­ conversions were ever used in combat.75 sive and complex to be completed before Despite the effort to defend the task force, the hostilities ended. These major modifi­ the British suffered the loss of six ships, cations would have taken years of work un­ with an additional 11 ships damaged. der peacetime conditions. In light of the Losses would have been greater, but many British defense policy, these modifications of the Argentine bombs failed to explode.76 would probably have never been under­ The lack of AEW proved to be the task taken if not for the Falklands war. force’s Achilles' heel. The AEW Sea King There are several reasons why these mod­ helicopter came far too late. The Nimrod ifications were completed so quickly. The was a valuable surveillance asset even decisionmakers knew what needed to be though its armed versions were never vali­ done. The urgency of the situation called for dated. In the end, it was fortunate for the immediate action rather than the contin­ British that the Argentine naval capabilities gency planning game of peacetime. In ad­ had been negated by the British nuclear sub­ dition, there was little time to conduct marine threat.77 extensive planning studies or to go through the normal approval or funding process. Of course, eliminating these steps probably presented risks to safety, but war made these risks acceptable.8,1 Lastly, people have Conclusion traditionally put forth a greater effort when their sense of national pride or security is The modifications that had the greatest challenged. direct contribution to the war effort were The British aerospace industry was chal­ adapting the Harrier GR.3s for carrier oper­ lenged, and according to all accounts, it ations, providing the Hercules and Nimrods performed magnificently. Its contributions with in-flight refueling capability, and in­ further support the argument for a country stalling improved navigation equipment on to maintain a strong indigenous defense in­ the Vulcan and Victors. These aircraft could dustry that can respond when needed.81 not have performed their role in the South War has always been a catalyst for indus­ Atlantic without these modifications.78 trial and engineering development. How­ Several other timely modifications were ever, despite tremendous effort, many of the completed; however, for various reasons Falkland modifications were still not ready they did not see combat. AIM-9 missiles for operational use by 14 June. The lesson to mounted on GR.3s and Nimrods were de­ be learned here is one of preparedness. ployed but were too late to be needed or There may not be time for the military or used in an air-to-air role.79 The principle of industry to provide the technological re­ flexibility in war was put into practice when sponse to fill shortfalls. he GR.3s reverted to their air-to-ground It is clear that Britain went into the con­ ole after the threat changed. FINRAE had flict with several major shortfalls. Had operational difficulties, and the GR.3’s Argentina used better planning, employ­ changing role meant that use of its INAS ment, and execution, the course of events alignment was not as crucial as originally could have been different. The shortfalls 64 AIRPOWER JOURNAL SPRING 1989 and the time it took to recover could have British aircraft modifications, as well as resulted in more severe losses or worse for other wartime improvisations do validate the British. an old cliche: necessity is the mother of invention.

Notes 1. Lawrence Freedman. "British Defense Policy after the 41. David M. Russell. "Industry Promotes UK Defense Up­ Falklands," World Today, September 1982, 332-33. grade." Defense Electronics, September 1983. 54. 2. Max Hastings and Simon Jenkins, The Battle for the Falk- 42. Burden et al., 401-2. lands (London: Michael Joseph Ltd.. 1983), 11. 43. Taylor. 258. 3. Roy Bravbrook. British Aerospace Harrier and Sea Harrier 44. Burden et al., 402-3. (London: Osprey Publishing Ltd., 1984). 102—4. 45. Derek Wood and Mark Hewish. “The Falklands Con­ 4. Jeffrey Ethell and Alfred Price, Air War South Atlantic flict—Part 1: the air war." International Defense Review 15. no. (New York: Jove Books. 1983). 20. 26. 8 (1982): 980. 5. Bravbrook, 106-7. 46. Ethell and Price, 88. 6. Ethell and Price, 231. 47. Burden et al.. 403. 7. Ibid., 231-33. 48. Ethell and Price, 61. 8. Bravbrook. 104-5. 49. Braybrook. 145, 149, 151. 9. Ethell and Price. 22. 50. Ibid.. 146-48. 10. Braybrook. 112.126. 51. Burden et al., 140. 11 Rodney A. Burden et al., Falklands. the Air War (Lon­ 52. "Falklands War Pressured British EW Development," don: Arms and Armour Press. 1986). 371. Defense Electronics, January 1985, 57. 12. Ibid.. 372. 53. Braybrook, 129-30. 13. Braybrook. 128-29.195. 54. Ethell and Price, 154-55. 14. Burden et al.. 372. 55. "Falklands War Pressured." 57. 15. Braybrook. 129. 56. Ibid.. 57-59. 16. Ibid.. 130. 57. Ibid.. 59. 17. Ibid.. 132-33. 58. Ibid., 59-61. 18. Ibid.. 133-34. 59. RogerChesneau and Ray Rimell. Vulcan (Essex. England 19. Ibid.. 157. Limewrights Ltd., 19841, 5. 20. Burden et al.. 372. 60. Ethell and Price, 25. 21. Braybrook. 129. 61. Burden et al.. 363-65. 22. Burden et al.. 373. 62. Ibid.. 365. 23. Ibid.. 374-75. 63. Ibid., 365-67. 24. Ibid.. 189. 64. Ethell and Price, 248-51. 25. Ibid.. 371. 65. "Falklands War Pressured." 62. 26. Ibid.. 185. 66. Burden et al., 186. 27. Valerie Adams. "Logistic Support for the Falklands Cam­ 67. Ibid.. 176-78. paign,” Journal of the Royal United Services Institute for De- 68. Ibid., 243. fence Studies, September 1984. 44—46. 69. Taylor, 49. 28. Ibid.. 46. 70. Burden et al.. 243—44. 29. Burden et al.. 405. 71. Ibid., 244. 30. John W. R. Taylor, ed., fane's All the World's Aircraft, 72. Wood and Hewish. 977. 1982-1983 (London: Jane's Publishing Company Ltd.. 1983). 73. Burden et al.. 402-3. 408. 74. ibid., 403. 31. Burden et al.. 405. 75.Ibid. 32.Ibid. 76. Ibid.. 428-35. 33.Ibid. 77. Alberto R. Coll and Anthony C. Arend, eds.. The Falk- 34. Ibid.. 405-7. lands War: Lessons for Strategy, Diplomacy, and International 35. Ibid.. 407. Law (Winchester. Mass.: G. Allen & Unwin. Inc., 1985). 183. 36.Ibid. 78. Ethell and Price, 218. 37. Ibid. 79. Ibid.. 218-19. 38. Ibid., 408. 80. The Falklands Campaign: The Lessons (London: Her 39.Ibid. Majesty’s Stationery Office, 1982), 24-25. 40. Ibid., 408-9. 81. Taylor. 51. RICOCHETS 65

Ricochets In contrast is the supervisor who will not let continued from page 3 subordinates be any more intellectual than the boss. A case in point is the time I used a word my ities of military operations and the conceptual three-letter-word bosses had never seen. The as­ nature of strategic military theory. Perhaps the sistant director said, ”! had to look that word real obstacle to achieving this state in any satis­ up—and learned something today.” But the di­ factory way is represented less by the security rector said, “I don't know that word. Take it policy review "minefield” than it is by the need out.” I also learned something that day—about for military practitioners to increasingly channel my bosses! I have observed that these supervi­ a portion of our day-to-day energies into the in­ sors are also generally the ones who will not let tellectual pursuit of strategic literacy—no matter their folks consider problems in the “hard" cat­ how busy it gets in the trenches. egory. Bring in all the short-term pap you want, but show these people a really tough question Col Bennie J. Wilson III, USAF North Chicago. Illinois that needs a long-term solution, and you will be thrown right out (or at least slow’-rolled until you give up in disgust). To Colonel Donovan regarding his paper “Stra­ His proposal that we publicize the writings of tegic Literacy,” 1 can only say "amen!” But it our officers in their biographies and records must be a qualified “amen.” could have merit, but not right away. In my ex­ For writers in the field, there are some pitfalls perience, everything that senior people publish he fails to point out. Once one becomes known is in fact ghostwritten by the staff. We recognize as a good writer, suddenly virtually anything this fact in formally establishing the job of that requires better-than-average writing seems speech writer for some very visible senior peo­ to get dumped on one’s desk. This is particularly ple. To give credit for authorship to the senior true of award and decoration nominations, would result in failure to recognize the contri­ where the powers-that-be expect miracles from bution of the real author, which is the very goal the writer. First, all too often the writer is ex­ Colonel Donovan is after. If we do this, we also pected to produce something from nothing, in will have to forbid ghostwriting of published order that the “fair-haired boy” can get unde­ works, including speeches, since they are often served recognition. Requests for facts to support published later as papers. I'm not going to hold the nomination fall on deaf ears, and the writer my breath waiting for that! And recognizing the becomes an author of fiction. Second, the unit— similarity of bureaucracies everywhere, I must failing to recognize the effort that is needed to ask whether Marshal Ogarkov writes his own produce really good writing—will wait until the stuff or has the staff do it. Bets, anyone? last minute before delegating the task. I was once Clearance is indeed a problem. For those who required to produce two Outstanding Airman of have not seen the process in action, some ampli­ the Year nominations in the same afternoon! fication on Colonel Donovan's thoughts are in How many prospective writers, seeing the ef­ order. The review is managed by the staff public fects of this on their unfortunate colleague, hide affairs office, which farms the manuscript out to their ability in order to avoid the same fate? anyone it thinks might appropriately review the Another phenomenon often seen in the field work. In Systems Command at least, this review (not usually in the staff) is the "mandatory cre­ is both for security concerns and technical ac­ ativity” syndrome. This is usually the result of curacy. The author does not know who is per­ some observation that base ABC has not pub­ forming the review, and the public affairs people lished anything in command vanity publication will not release the names of the reviewers to the XYZ lately, and that looks bad—especially since author. This is supposedly for complete honesty base CDE has had an article each and every in the review, but can lead all too easily to month for the past year. The typical “solution” abuse—especially in the area of technical accu­ for base ABC is to establish a rotating suspense racy. What constitutes “technical accuracy” in among its squadrons to produce an article each discussing a controversial development pro­ month. Quality is irrelevant; the only measure is gram? The obvious answer is that the manu­ quantity. The budding author takes to the hills script will not be technically accurate until it when these suspenses come in the door. And reflects the party line. how many of these periodicals are even read, While I doubt that our formal review process much less taken seriously? will be revamped to the extent proposed, there 66 A1RPOWER IOURNAL SPRING 1989 are some things that can be done. Review of se­ must always be the future, since today’s strate­ rious professional writings by the chain of com­ gist is a captive of yesterday’s research, devel­ mand should be forbidden, for example. Normal opment, and deployment decisions. And staff writings can and should go up. But if we are according to Maj Gen Perry M. Smith, Retired, in serious about the disclaimers in front of our jour­ Taking Charge, it is the long-range, 10-to-25-year nals—that the thoughts within are the thoughts time frame that the strategist should be looking of the authors and not the Air Force—then why at. should the authors get their bosses’ okay to pub­ One example of the article’s orientation to the lish? Staff reviews for clearance—not technical present is its identification of satellites as “in­ accuracy—can still be required, with careful flexible” as compared to airplanes. While this is safeguards to prevent censorship in the name of perfectly true at present, future systems have security. Let the journals protect themselves clear potential for more flexibility. For instance, from technical quacks; most of them do techni­ developments in both more efficient conven­ cal reviews anyway before accepting a piece for tional propulsion (e.g., the XLR-132) and electric publication. propulsion will make the deployments of weap­ Yet this will not help the problem of the su­ ons to high orbits (e.g., 100,000 miles altitude) a pervisor who brands an author as a malcontent relatively affordable, practical option. Once in a or radical after reading a paper with which he or high orbit, a satellite would be far more flexible she personally (or institutionally) disagrees. To because for a relatively small amount of deboost, that I have no answer, for it will remain a prob­ it could descend into an elliptical orbit, with its lem until there is a fundamental change in the low point in low-orbit space. Such maneuvering way the Air Force views intellectualism and would use gravity to tap potential energy, thus criticism. allowing force to be flexibly concentrated at the Maj Julius F. Sanks, USAF critical point (for example, to attack satellites in Edwards AFB, California low-earth orbit that were interfering with US space launches). This employment of maneuver would effectively apply the doctrinal “gravity well” advantages foreseen by Dr Robert S. Rich­ A DIFFERENT PATH TO SPACE ardson in 1943 (see Confrontation in Space by G. Harry Stine). "Real Tenets of Military Space Doctrine” (Air- Another example of the article’s near-term fo­ power Journal, Winter 1988) rightly character­ cus is its assumption that US space systems can izes space as a distinctly different realm of employ "warning to operators to evade impend­ military operations from the air. The article (by ing attacks.” While warning may currently be Col Kenneth A. Myers and Lt Col )ohn G. Tock- useful to evade the first-generation Soviet anti­ ston) demonstrates that basic US military space satellite (ASAT), it would be overly optimistic to doctrine has not been brought up to date with assume this would be adequate in the 10-to-25- “the way space capabilities are actually em­ year time frame. It is well known that the Soviet ployed in space operations” today. However, the Energiya rocket will be used in the future to de­ article begins a process that should be carried ploy massive payloads. Are we to assume these one step further. Basic doctrine, unless it is to be deployments will not be weapons? The only no more than a sterile description of how things sure identification short of wartime usage would are currently done, must take into account de­ come if they were tested openly in low orbit. veloping threats. By contrast, the article seems to However, maskirovka is more than just a Soviet rest upon the current state of affairs in its assess­ slogan—its application means such weapons ment of space capabilities and in its doctrinal would be disguised and tested covertly (in high recommendations. orbits, behind the moon, or in deep space). As It is vital to address the future in doctrine, par­ more Soviet systems were deployed to low-orbit ticularly basic space doctrine, because “doctrine space, average proximity to US satellites would has, or should have, an extraordinary impact on decrease, while technological progress in­ the strategy process,” according to Col Dennis creased their speed and effectiveness, thus de­ M. Drew (cited by the article) and Dr Donald M. creasing warning. With the introduction of laser Snow in their book Making Strategy. According weapons or space mines, warning could ap­ to the same authors in Introduction to Strategy, proach zero. Given these potential circumstan­ the primary operating realm of the strategist ces, which are reasonable projections ol RICOCHETS 67

established trends, it would appear that warning permeated the US/NATO intelligence commu­ and subsequent evasion should not be relied nity. in spite of evidence to the contrary. upon to the exclusion of other factors (such as • Spetsnaz (troops of special designation) are by protection of space-based weapons in high-alti­ no means comparable to Western elite forma­ tude keep-out zones) to enable survivability and tions such as the special forces or the British subsequent restorative space-control measures. Special Air Services (SAS). The bulk of these A third example of the article's current-oper­ troops are two-year conscripts, "elite" in the ational approach is its identification of a robust sense that they meet the more stringent physical launch capability as the means to sustain access and mental selection criteria imposed for Soviet to space. Since it is the primary conclusion of desantniki—airborne and air assault troops. We America’s strategic defense initiative (SD1) re­ certainly ought to credit them with good combat search that launch vehicles are critically vulner­ skills, but beyond this we're straining credibil­ able in the boost phase, and since the Soviets ity. It is ludicrous to believe (as many Western­ have been working on SDI-type systems longer ers seem to) that these troops could move freely than we, it seems that boost-phase intercept in the NATO rear, disguised as tourists or ath­ would be the most likely means employed to letic teams, creating untraceable havoc. threaten US access to space. Even a minimally • While Spetsnaz units are subordinate “in a capable Soviet SD1 force could shut down US special sense” (to use the Russian term) to the launches (or by attrition render them unafford­ main intelligence directorate (GRU), there is able). An escalatory US conventional or nuclear nothing insidious in this connection. The GRU reaction to a blockade might be reasonably de­ is responsible for reconnaissance and intelli­ terred by the threat of a Soviet response-in-kind gence collection in support of military opera­ (an option that gains practicability as more quiet tions. Most Spetsnaz units are directly Soviet submarines are armed with cruise mis­ subordinate to fronts, armies, and fleets—which siles). Thus, a robust launch capability should are, for the most part, not in the covert opera­ be viewed as only one of the elements needed to tions business. ensure US space access. A survivable US force in space, for example, might be equally important • The primary mission of Spetsnaz troops is not in defending launch windows above US space- unconventional warfare; it is operational recon­ launch areas. naissance directed against high-value targets, In short, while "Real Tenets of Military Space which will be attacked by means of long-range Doctrine" builds a strong case for major change fire. Spetsnaz units undoubtedly have a second­ in basic US military space doctrine based on ary mission to carry out "diversionary” tasks in present realities, the need for change is even certain circumstances, but it is extremely un­ greater when one considers the “futures” that likely that these valuable reconnaissance assets can reasonably be anticipated. Perhaps the au­ would be squandered on risky direct-action mis­ thors saw no need to strengthen their case by sions such as those cited by Captain Campbell. speculation about the future, which, despite ob­ • Finally, the history of warfare testifies to the vious trends, is never fully predictable and fact that covert special-operations-type missions therefore disputable. However, if doctrine fails are extremely difficult to accomplish, dangerous to anticipate the future, the US will have no op­ to the participants, and rarely more than a minor tion other than to react after the fact. Such a sit­ irritant to the target country or armed forces. The uation abandons the initiative to potential most common result is the loss of highly trained adversaries— a condition we should surely wish personnel in exchange for trivial results. Intelli­ to avoid. gence analysts and military professionals un­ Maj Thomas C. Blow II, USAF aware of this fact do not know their business. Maxwell AFB. Alabama A word of advice for Captain Campbell: citing Suvorov as a source does not enhance war cred­ ibility. Anyone who has heard Suvorov speak THE SPETSNAZ THREAT and is familiar with his background cannot fail Regarding Capt Erin E. Campbell's article on to be struck by the lack of understanding he evi­ “The Soviet Spetsnaz Threat to NATO" (Sum­ dences with regard to the basic realities of war­ mer 1988): there seems to be a widespread mis­ fare. and the brevity of his professional resume conception of the role and capabilities of in comparison with the knowledge he claims. He Spetsnaz units. This misconception has even is a pure sensationalist, feeding an eager, gull- 68 AIRPOWER JOURNAL SPRING 1989 ible audience in the West. We cannot blame him; the evening of 26 December 1979, Soviet para­ he’s a salesman like any other. If naive Western­ troopers struck at the telecommunications cen­ ers want an insidious Spetsnaz threat, he'll give ter, key government buildings, and the us one. presidential residence in Kabul. The following Capt Ralph Hitchens, USAFR day. after having landed at Kabul airport, an ar­ Gaithersburg. Maryland mored column moved out of the airport toward the palace. It consisted of a few hundred Soviet Captain Campbell Responds commandos, plus a specially trained assault group of KGB officers. They were all in Afghan The subject of Soviet Spetsnaz forces remains uniforms, and their vehicles had Afghan mark­ rather controversial today, largely because much ings. When they reached the palace, the special of the information pertaining to this area is dif­ troops attacked with orders from Moscow that ficult to confirm and because there seems to be a Amin was to be exterminated, that no prisoners lack of consensus in the West as to the exact na­ were to be taken, and that no Afghans were to be ture and composition of these troops. Currently, left to tell the tale of what had transpired in the there appear to be two schools of thought regard­ palace. The Spetsnaz forces apparently were ing the role of Spetsnaz troops. One school con­ successful on all counts. tends that Spetsnaz forces would be used almost It is indeed highly unlikely that NATO would exclusively for reconnaissance purposes in war­ find “a Spetsnaz behind every tree” or that the time; the other maintains that, in addition to this Soviets have a large contingent of troops that role, Spetsnaz troops also would be used for could blend into Western Europe posing as na­ other missions such as sabotage and assassina­ tives of the region. Nevertheless, the events in tion. 1 adhere to the latter school, not only due to Czechoslovakia and, more recently, in Afghan­ current indicators, cited in my article—of ongo­ istan indicate that the Soviets would use their ing Spetsnaz preparations for a potential future Spetsnaz troops for unconventional war pur­ war in Western Europe—but also due to prece­ poses, and this possibility is a factor that NATO dents where the Soviets have used their Spets­ should take into account when assessing the naz forces. threat posed by the Soviets during wartime. Fi­ When the Soviets invaded Czechoslovakia in nally, while Captain Hitchens finds "nothing in­ 1968, they initiated their actions with a surprise sidious” in the Spetsnaz connection to the GRU, assault by their special forces, including both he seems to ignore the Spetsnaz forces under the KGB and military Spetsnaz elements. While key control of the KGB, which would likely be used objectives were being captured, local agents for purposes other than reconnaissance. were activated—teaming up with KGB elements Capt Erin E. Campbell, USAF in securing political control throughout the Alexandria. Virginia country. Among these agents assisting the in­ vading Soviet forces were members within the RUNWAY REQUIREMENTS Czechoslovak Communist Party, many of whom had been trained in intelligence and diversion­ Reference your article, “Operational Art and ary work (i.e., sabotage and assassination) in Aircraft Runway Requirements” (Fall 1988), I KGB schools in the USSR. These agents w'ere share Colonel Bingham's concern about the in­ used for securing political control throughout fluence of the air base on the air commander’s the country while other agents acted to limit the operational art. I value his historical perspective possibility of coordinated and meaningful Czech on the issue. I want to add technical perspective military counteractions. The Soviet invasion of to his argument. As a test pilot at Edwards AFB, Czechoslovakia demonstrated the potential ef­ California, I developed methods to measure the fectiveness of employing military active mea­ damaged runway operating capability of aircraft sures, performed by Spetsnaz and KGB troops in the US Air Force inventory. From Edwards 1 that successfully used the element of surprise to moved to the Naval Air Test Center where I enable the main army forces to perform their flight-tested the Harrier—the old AV-8A and the mission more readily. newer AV-8B. I also tested Air Force mobile ar­ Concerning events in Afghanistan, the in­ resting gear. At the Air Force Flight Dynamics sights of Vladimir Kuzichkin (a former KGB ma­ Laboratory, I was the program manager for the jor who served under cover in Iran for five years) F-15 short takeoff and landing (STOL)/maneu- have been reported publicly, indicating that on vering technology demonstrator. 1 was later ch'ef RICOCHETS 69

of the laboratory’s Flight Control Division. I tachments are self-contained with substantial shall comment on three general areas: “conven­ cross-training of personnel. They rely on decep­ tional ’’ airplanes, vertical and/or short takeoff tion, mobility, and dispersion to avoid attack. and landing (VSTOL) aircraft, and the role of the The aircraft are designed for dispersed opera­ airfield. tions. Electrical power for maintenance is sup­ First, current fighters, especially with arrest­ plied from the auxiliary power unit (APU). A ing gear, can operate from rapidly repaired run­ built-in hydraulic hand pump facilitates main­ ways. That capability should be improved. The tenance. Simple, nonredundant, accessible me­ STOL F-15 has landing gear that increases rough chanical and electronic systems are reliable and runway capability by 75 percent and can be eas­ maintainable. Design of the base affects design of ily retrofitted. Other minor upgrades could fur­ the aircraft and vice versa. ther improve the existing fleet’s operability from Where does VSTOL fit? Several dozen VSTOL combat bases. experiments in the United States, UK, France, Other conventional airplane problems Col­ West Germany, and the USSR have so far con­ onel Bingham cites are being addressed. The tributed only the Harrier and the Forger. The F-15 STOL demonstrator will stop better than technical compromises required for a successful previous fighters with thrust reversing. It uses design dictate a limited set of requirements. I am control technology to overcome problems with confident that the compromises of VSTOL will instability, so stopping distances can be compa­ be resolved as engine thrust to weight improves. rable to takeoff distances. Colonel Bingham Today, the ratio of engine thrust to weight is properly makes an issue of finding the touch­ between seven and 10. Within the technically down point. Even a Harrier needs someone on predictable future, it will rise to about 20. With the ground to help choose a place to land. The that single improvement, most of the current im­ F-15 STOL's system will guide the pilot to the pediments to VSTOL operation will be removed. designated spot. Incidentally, its landing speed Should the Air Force be buying AV-8Bs today? (about 120 knots) is limited by visibility over the Perhaps. The Harrier 11 has about the same pay- nose rather than the usual sloppy, slow-speed handling. Landing accurately is a task modern load/range as the F-16. It bombs extremely well and can give a good accounting of itself in self- control systems can handle well, without hard defense. It cannot match the F-16 in air-to-air, touchdowns. Better flight controls, landing gear, and reverse thrust can reduce runway length, but it can fly even if the runways have been at­ width, and smoothness requirements. tacked. It has different logistics support require­ Current airplanes use arresting gear to reduce ments than current US Air Force airplanes and landing distance. Colonel Bingham mentions requires a special training program. It does have the time required to reset the gear. Just as rele­ fuel reserve requirements, and tired pilots still vant, arresting gear operators work in a vulner­ have a critical landing task. The pilot cannot able wartime environment. Robotic arresting land in any parking lot or open field. With real gear should be developed. Improved runway re­ bullets loaded for air-to-air, I'd much rather be in pair techniques can also be developed. The syn­ an F-16 than an AV-8. If plenum chamber burn­ ergism of increased ability to operate from ing is perfected, the fuel consumption of the damaged runways and improved repair tech­ AV-8 would be excessive in the 400-to-700-knot niques has great potential. The base must be­ arena. But it could be the only forward-based US come part of a fighting system, not just a place to Air Force airplane flying on the day the war park. starts. A better understanding of the air base and its Should the Air Force be at least gaining expe­ relationship to the airplane is essential. We rience with Harrier operations? Absolutely. My should study the Navy's systems engineering ap­ assignment with the research, development, test proach to aircraft carriers and carrier-based air­ and evaluation (RDT&E) program and several ex­ craft. We can also study existing fortress bases in change pilots’ assignments have not given the Sweden and Switzerland. We seldom build new US Air Force enough collective experience to bases, but we can modify our current European think about the impact of tomorrow's or even to­ and Pacific bases to become part of a system with day’s VSTOL technology. the airplanes. How can we best approach our uncertain fu­ United Kingdom (UK) Harriers use dispersed ture? We must face up to wartime requirements basing. With mobile support equipment, they as well as ease and economy of peacetime oper­ disperse to previously scouted locations. De­ ations. Air base operability must be considered 70 AIRPOWER JOURNAL SPRING 1989 in the design of airplanes. Thrust reversers are I have watched, with great interest, the discus­ heavy and expensive but may be necessary. sion over the proper focus of the Airpower Jour- Bases must be improved. If we fully recognize nal (Editorial, Fall 1988). This issue would the costs of facing up to today’s necessities, appear to be the latest example of the much VSTOL becomes a more attractive option. On the larger discussion concerning the proper devel­ other hand, we must recognize our substantial opment of the military professional: are we investment in "rubber on the ramp” and find in­ professional specialists (pilots, civil engineers, novative ways to keep our current fleet combat accountants, and so on) who happen to work for capable as we develop tomorrow’s Air Force. the United States Air Force, or are we profes­ Col Richard A. Borowski, USAF sional soldiers with training in various Holloman AFB, New Mexico specialties? If we are indeed professional soldiers first, MAYDAY! RESPONSE then we must ensure that our brethren in arms are trained as soldiers as well as specialists. 1 do The Fall 1988 editorial entitled "Mayday! May- not believe "Mayday" advocates that the Journal day! Mayday!" has done a good job of putting the should be focused on senior officers; rather, “the cart before the proverbial horse. The beast is the appropriateness and methods of translating po­ same one we have drug to the water bucket many litical objectives into reality through military ac­ times. The typical US Air Force officer today tion” should be of concern to all officers, hi would have a hard time professionally and com­ recent testimony before the House Armed Ser­ pletely answering the question "Do you really vices Committee, Gen John T. Chain, Jr., com­ want to commit forces and fight?” Somehow we mander in chief, Strategic Air Command, said, “1 have taken quantum leaps and pushed the cart of believe it is important for an officer to under­ political-military thought out in front and now stand the politico-military context in which our have to drag the war-horse of operational art military forces train and operate." from behind. Where is the problem? Let’s look at So, the question as it relates to the Airpower the Pentagon, which has grown in direct propor­ Journal would seem to be as follows: is the Jour- tion to the size of the congressional staffs and nal to be focused on the professional soldier, or subcommittees. The puzzle palace contains only is it to be focused on the professional aviator? In a token force of operationally (vice tactically) Colonel Geiger’s position update, the assertion smart people. Why? Because that is where our was made that the "professional journal of the “best and brightest" gravitate in search of future United States Air Force” should “concentrate on command positions and increases in rank—not how best to apply (military power)." Professor out to the theater commands. Yet, the lack of un­ Samuel Huntington, in his The Soldier and the derstanding of the operational level of warfight­ State, in defining a professional soldier, rules ing. no matter how astute the political-military out most enlisted people because they apply, knowledge, relegates the horse to the rear posi­ rather than manage, violence. The application of tion. The Airpower Journal is designed to correct air power is important, but it is only the final this and make the level of knowledge of both po­ step in a long, involved process that professional litical-military thought and operational level of soldiers must understand if they are to be able to warfare a complete package. properly bring that air power to bear. You can only professionally answer the ques­ It is my firm belief that soldiers concerned tion "Do you really want to commit forces and only with "operational art" are, at best, satisfac­ fight?" by gleaning all the available information tory technicians. These soldiers, since they and knowledge from our system. This system know nothing of the interplay of their “art" and not only includes the dilemmas of the political- the politico-economic realities of society, cannot military situation but also must include the be expected to be responsible for any ramifica­ knowledge and education at the operational tions of their actions beyond the simple fact of level of warfighting one can gain by being as­ whether the target was hit or the hill was taken. signed to a unified or specified employment staff Are these professionals? I think not! or by reading about it. The Airpower Journal is In the final analysis, professional soldiers doing the latter to make our future warfighters serve because they believe in their country and smarter. place their country's good above their own. They Col M. R. Taffet, USAF are the protectors of their country. The citizenry Maxwell AFB. Alabama at large may take world affairs for granted, but it RICOCHETS 71

is imperative that professional soldiers be inti­ their position on the focus of the Airpower Jour- mately familiar with all aspects of their country nal. I quote from’the inside cover of that Fall and its place in the world. To expect any less is 1988 issue: “designed to serve as an open forum to invite disaster. for presenting and stimulating innovative think­ Capt William H. Eckert, fr.. USAF ing on military doctrine, strategy, tactics, force structure, readiness, and other national defense 1 appreciate your broadcast invitation to join in matters." The reader can expect an air power the debate on the proper focus of my favorite Air slant to all of these subjects. However, there is no Force publication. I find, on balance, that I favor mention of the perceived company/junior field- the approach advocated by Colonels Fabvanic grade officer’s concern with “effectively orches­ and Baucom for a reason that they don’t cite trating military action to achieve the objectives specifically. set by the strategists and higher-level campaign At the behavioral level, we each progress dur­ architects.” ing our sendee through various stages from op­ Further, I feel belittled by the suggestion that erator to (we hope!) senior leadership positions. only senior officers (0-6 and above) are con­ We ought to be developing a broader and broader cerned “with the appropriateness and methods perspective of our profession during that whole of translating political objectives into reality process so that, whatever our current positions, through military action,” as indicated in your re­ we have the ability to relate our current respon­ frain. While this may be part of the responsibil­ sibilities to what the overworked phrase calls ities of their particular positions, certainly the “big picture." The services have always en­ others amongst us are concerned with the appro­ joyed a well-deserved reputation for “growing” priate application of force in executing national their officers in ways that are the envy of my ci­ security policy. vilian counterparts in the field of human re­ Colonels Fabyanic and Baucom, Col Dennis sources development. 1 would hate to take too Drew, and Lt Col Price Bingham did not sud­ big a step back from that tradition just when oth­ denly achieve an understanding of national se­ ers. in the private sector, are awakening more curity policy upon reaching the ranks of the and more to its advantages. senior field grade. They studied long and hard to Professional military education (PME) is an understand the likes of Carl von Clausewitz and invaluable assist in the growth process, but it is Antoine Jomini and, 1 trust, began this study necessarily episodic in its application. Profes­ while still company grade officers. We must re­ sional growth requires continuous learning. member that the officers at the Air Corps Tactical Your excellent magazine is, indeed, our profes­ School in the 1930s included the likes of Capt sional journal and, therefore, our primary tool Claire Chennault, Capt George C. Kenney, Capt for this continuous learning process. 1 would not Hoyt S. Vandenberg, and Maj Carl Spaatz—men consider a “big picture” focus appropriate only who did not wait until they had achieved field for the senior leader; every officer should be grade to think great thoughts. evolving into that level of understanding on a Personally, I had hoped to have an article or continuous basis. I would advocate this position two published in time, first in the Air University even if we did not serve a democracy; the reality Review and later in the Airpower Journal. This is of our being citizen-soldiers makes it all the the "professional journal" of the Air Force—the more imperative that we have the resources of forum in which one would expect to find articles professional growth and understanding. on national security with an air power slant. I The reorientation of the Journal was by no read the likes of International Security and For- means negative; perhaps the previous version eign Policy to further my knowledge, yet the role had drifted into issues that were a bit too far from of the Air Force is, for the most part, not a the "sharp end." But with air power, as with any subject. jther subject, intelligent professionals can best While operational experience is very benefi­ understand how to use their tools if they under­ cial in this realm and depth of knowledge in stand why they're using them. one's Air Force specialty code (AFSC) furthers Maj William C. Bennett. USAF one’s professional performance. AFR 36-1, Offi- Randolph AFB, Texas cer Classification. does not include an AFSC for “strategic thinker.” From whence are they sup­ Concerning the guest editorial by Colonels Fa- posed to emerge? We must cultivate these inter­ byanic and Baucom. 1 find myself agreeing with ests from the beginning, or not only may we 72 AiRPOWEfi JOURNAL SPRING 1989 expect the scenario provided by Colonels Fa- However, within NATO’s Allied Command Eu­ byanic and Baucom. but also the individual pro­ rope there are a dozen ATOCs, regional opera­ viding the commander in chief with the answer tions centers (ROCs), tactical air forces (TAFs), to a question on the use of military force may and equivalent-level air organizations on the of­ never have served a day in uniform and thus lack fensive side, plus at least eight defensive-ori­ operational experience of any nature. And once ented sector operations centers (SOCs), not again we may leave the making of strategy in the counting United Kingdom (UK) Air and a couple hands of civilians as we have done with nuclear of specialized organizations. In the event of war, strategy (such as Bernard Brodie. Herbert York, it is highly likely that one or more of these orga­ Herman Kahn, and Thomas Schelling). nizations will be out for some period of time. Capt William B. Vlcek, USAF Then responsibility will fall to the wing or base Thompson. Connecticut commander, as that person is often known within NATO. Often, for US Air Force squad­ rons, that wing commander will not be an American. TO FLY AND FIGHT The more we understand the operational level I was glad to see Col Wayne Possehl's article “To of war, the better prepared we will be to integrate Fly and Fight at the Operational Level” in the our air power into the battle and to be effective. Winter 1988 issue of the Airpower Journal. An Colonel Possehl's article is a good first step, but understanding of the operational level of war we need to think and talk more about this most will be fundamental to our effectiveness in any critical area. One question to ask ourselves is, future combat. With apologies, 1 do believe Colo­ "Who is manning the ATOCs. ROCs, TAFs, and nel Possehl was too quick to dismiss those rarest SOCs, which will be providing our air task or­ and most unconventional of situations wherein ders?” A supplemental question is, “Do the as­ the wing commander would have to operate at signed staff officers understand how to get the the operational level of war. Granted, the level of most out of assigned US Air Force squadrons?” the allied tactical airforce (ATAF) and allied tac­ More articles are needed on this critical issue. tical operations center (ATOC) is where we nor­ Col C. R. Krieger, USAF mally find the operational level of war. Washington, D.C.

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Chennault: Giving Wings to the Tiger by Martha lowing the war, Chennault became a private Byrd. Tuscaloosa, Alabama 35487: University businessman and formed a commercial airline in of Alabama Press, 1987, 480 pages, $25.95 China. These were immensely difficult times, hardback. and Byrd is masterful at describing the obstacles thrown up by the Japanese, the Americans, and Martha Byrd has given us an excellent biog­ by the Chinese themselves. (Indeed, in a typical raphy of Claire Chennault. Best known for his contradiction, Chennault railed incessantly at role in leading the Flying Tigers against Japan the mistakes and shortcomings of his American during World War II. Chennault is depicted here superiors, but he showed infinite patience with as gruff, stubborn, and iconoclastic but also as the corruption and Byzantine intrigue of the gentle and cultured. It is an interesting portrait. Chinese.) As before, Chennault’s performance Byrd shows that Chennault's personality was featured a dogged determination that won the both his greatest strength and his greatest weak­ loyalty of his subordinates but also an abrasive­ ness. He displayed a determination and courage ness that alienated virtually everyone else. He that won many advocates, but his stubbornness had an especially difficult time with his Ameri­ and tendency to gloat in victory gained him even can superiors. more enemies. When he was a junior officer, Never on good terms with his Air Corps col­ these same traits kept him in frequent difficulty leagues, Chennault exacerbated this relationship with his superiors. Fortunately, his outstanding with his constant complaints and his tendency abilities as a pilot and leader saved him from to circumvent the chain of command by dealing oblivion. directly with Chiang and President Roosevelt. Chennault arrived at the Air Corps Tactical Although knowing how this infuriated his su­ School in 1930 with a reputation as a premier periors. Chennault persisted. As a consequence, pursuit pilot. His ideas concerning pursuit em­ George Marshall thought him disloyal and un­ ployment evolved from much thought and prac­ reliable. "Hap" Arnold considered him a "crack­ tical experience. But Air Corps doctrine was pot,” and Joe Stilwell called him a "jackass." making a decisive shift in favor of bombardment, Chennault wanted to fight the war his way, with­ and Chennault’s attempts to stem this tide were out interference. Even if his strategic theories futile. As Byrd points out, Chennault’s abrasive had been correct, his method of promoting them personality negated his well-conceived argu­ ensured their demise. ments, and his colleagues found it more satisfy­ In fact, his ideas were not sound. It is one of the ing simply to ignore him. Suffering from a book’s few flaws that it does not sufficiently ex­ variety of physical ailments and realizing his plore the implications of Chennault’s "air guer­ theories were out of tune with Air Corps policy, rilla" strategy. He believed that a small force of Captain Chennault retired in 1937. aircraft, mostly pursuit aircraft, could so disrupt His story might have ended there and his name Japanese logistics as to lead to its eventual de­ forgotten had not an unusual opportunity then feat. In 1942 Chennault proposed to President presented itself. The Chinese, engaged in an un­ Roosevelt that a force of 105 pursuit planes plus declared war with Japan since 1931 and needing 30 medium bombers and 12 heavy bombers an American adviser to build their air force, of­ could knock Japan out of the war. This boast was fered Chennault the position. Byrd states that patently absurd, but Byrd defends it by claiming Chennault saw this opportunity as an “escape a typographical error: Chennault really wanted from a sense of failure and inadequacy” and 150 pursuit planes! accepted. The image of Japan being destroyed by a dozen For the next 20 years. Chennault’s life inter- B-l 7s would be amusing had Chennault not been 'wined with China. He served as an adviser to serious. What the general advocated was an in­ Chiang Kai-shek and his wife. “Madame," and tensive interdiction campaign against Japanese after Pearl Harbor was recalled to active duty and supply lines. But interdiction campaigns do not soon advanced to the rank of major general. Fol­ win wars, and it is doubtful if anv amount of tac-

73 74 A1RPOWER JOURNAL SPRING 1989 tical air power could have prevented Japan from in and out of the Army see close air support as overrunning China, much less brought about its the critical test of whether they can depend on defeat. Though an outstanding tactician whose the Air Force. To help eliminate many of the determination in the face of overwhelming sup­ misconceptions and myths surrounding close ply and equipment difficulties kept the Four­ air support, we now have an excellent study pro­ teenth Air Force in the field, Chennault's duced as a cooperative effort between the US strategic ideas can only be classified as puerile. Army Center of Military History and the Office of With the war's end, Chennault remained an Air Force History. Motivation for the study came outsider to the Army Air Force hierarchy. Retir­ from the memorandum of understanding be­ ing once again, he maintained his ties with China tween the Army and Air Force chiefs of staff and set up its Civil Air Transport. Like Douglas concluded on 22 May 1984 and. in particular, in­ MacArthur, his many years away from home had itiative 24, which reaffirmed the Air Force's mis­ distorted his global vision: he saw only Asia. sion to provide close air support to the Army. Also like MacArthur. he was a “cold warrior,” As explained in the preface, this study focuses and he fought Mao's Communists, with help on the North African campaign because this was from the CIA, as vigorously as he had the Japa­ where the basic: system of close air support for nese. This time Chennault was defeated. Pushed American forces was worked out. Yet, there are off the mainland and suffering severe financial two other important reasons why this campaign losses. Chennault returned to America nearly deserves study. The campaign shows the prob­ two decades after he had left. Retiring to a cabin lems military forces face when they make the in Louisiana with his new Chinese wife and chil­ transition from peace to war. In addition, it is dren. he thundered at his many enemies both in one of the few cases where US forces have fought and out of government service. He died in 1958, for air superiority while simultaneously con­ defiant to the end. ducting major ground operations. Byrd admirably describes Chennault’s com­ Relying on both primary and secondary plex and contradictory personality. He could be sources, this well-documented study begins tough and gentle, concerned and callous, a good writh an examination of the organization, doc­ husband and father, and a notorious rake. Byrd is trine. and weapons developed for close air sup­ commendably balanced in her treatment and port during the interwar years. Before the war, shows her subject both as a hero and a sinner. ground officers dominated the Army, causing Her research is thorough, especially for the pe­ doctrine to reflect the view that air power was riod through World War II. Her treatment of primarily an auxiliary force to further the Chennault's postwar activities and his CIA con­ ground-force mission. While some concessions nections are not handled as well. For these were made to the ideas of airmen, especially as events Byrd relies primarily on Chennault’s pa­ their influence increased in the years just before pers. interviews, and secondary sources. CIA the war, the irresolvable nature of the issues re­ documents, most of which are now declassified sulted in doctrine that tended to equivocate and available for review, were not consulted. about close air support. Attempts to test doctrine Nevertheless, this is an excellent book, undoubt­ and promote teamwork were handicapped by edly the definitive biography of an important self-serving attitudes from both the air and and controversial American airman and his re­ ground branches, as well as by the limited avail­ lationship with the Chinese enigma. ability of aircraft for large-scale exercises. Equip­ Lt Col Phillip S. Meilinger, USAF ment was still another problem. The war in USAF Academy, Colorado Europe showed that the type of aircraft the Air Corps possessed was excessively vulnerable, causing Gen Henry H. Arnold to procure light bombers to perform close air support. A Pattern for Joint Operations: World War II Problems quickly became apparent once the Close Air Support, North Africa by Daniel R. North African campaign commenced. Unlike Mortensen. Washington, D.C. 20402: Office of their commander, Gen Dwight D. Eisenhower, Air Force History and US Army Center for Mil­ many subordinate ground commanders did not itary History. 1987, 94 pages, $5.50. think of air power in theater terms. Ignoring standard doctrine and even his planning guid­ Close air support has been and continues to be ance, they were adamant about parceling air an extremely controversial subject. Many people power out to provide air cover over their forces NET ASSESSMENT 75

to defend against German air attacks. Their in­ cludes with a nostalgic look at what it all meant efficient use of air power was made worse by a to participants through the eyes of veterans 40 slow request system, breakdowns in logistics, years later at a division reunion. and the fact that Allied aircraft were based a No aspect of this work is as thorough as the greater distance from the front than German air­ Army's official histories. But for a quick look at craft. While Eisenhower and his air adviser. Maj a little bit of everything, GI is ideal. Trivia lovers Gen Carl Spaatz. worked to correct these prob­ will adore the beguiling train of anecdote and lems, the debacle at Kasserine brought matters to detail. For example, instant coffee as a modern a head. national staple was developed for K rations by Taking over the Allied Air Support Command the Army Quartermaster Corps. The leading during the battle, British Air Vice Marshal Sir cause of nonbattle casualties in World War II Arthur Coningham convinced Eisenhower to let was traffic accidents, with 12,000 GIs killed and him use scarce aircraft assets for employment in 230.000 injured. By 1945, the largest American close air support. Drawing on a reputation retail operation was the Army’s Post Exchange earned by success in the Western Desert, Con­ (PX) system. The reader may be surprised to ingham instituted important changes that gave learn of Army Chief of Staff George C. Marshall's air leaders greater control. He abandoned defen­ personal concern over Frank Sinatra's draft ex­ sive air umbrellas in favor of offensive opera- emption for a hearing defect; that the Military ions designed to seize air superiority. He also Police Corps dates only from 1941; that to reduce removed light bombers from air support units, fire hazard, few camp or fort buildings were over assigning this duty to fighter-bomber units. two stories high; that the greatest training inno­ Besides supporting these actions, Eisenhower vation of the era was the training film, with over authorized a committee to produce a new doc­ 400 produced (several by future commander in trine—Field Manual 100-20—that stressed the chief, then Signal Corps captain, Ronald need for air superiority and established close air Reagan). support as the third priority after air interdic­ Despite large blocks of regulars, national tion. Generally satisfied with these changes. Ei­ guardsmen, and reservists, World War II was senhower remained concerned, despite his truly the war of the draftee. And Americans had victory, because many field commanders still never experienced conscription in peacetime. did not understand his thinking. Thus, the first peacetime draftees frequently re­ Dr Mortensen has written an important book. ceived community or local club sendoffs, com­ Both airmen and soldiers should read it to ap­ plete with cigarettes and a dollar bill (almost 5 preciate the problems commanders can cause percent of a private’s pay in 1940) or a bag of Bull when they are ignorant of doctrine and its ration­ Durham and a Bible. ale. My only criticism is that the study takes GI opens with the Army’s peacetime expan­ such a broad perspective that close air support sion. Attempts to apply lessons learned in and receives too little treatment from a tactical from World War I are intriguing, especially con­ perspective. cern for winnowing out individuals who might Lt Col Price T. Bingham. USAF be susceptible to "shell shock." This World War Maxwell AFB, Alabama I problem had affected nearly 100,000 Ameri­ cans by 1919, and their care had cost the Veterans Administration almost $1 billion. Ac­ GI: The American Soldier in World W ar II by cordingly, by 1945, the Army had rejected Lee Kennett. New York 10022: Charles Scrib­ 1.846.000 men for neuropsychosis. As is so often ner's Sons. 1987, 265 pages, $20.95. the case, more revealing than mere numbers are some of the accompanying vignettes. The psy­ For pure fascination. Cl: The American Sol- chiatrists’ brief interviews were by no means dier in World War II is hard to beat. Its 265 pages foolproof, and one harried analyst reported "in­ ire a splendid mix of fact, anecdote, observation, terviewing” 512 men in one day. ind analysis. Portraying the transition from ci­ Much of Kennett's recounting of the transition vilian to soldier. University of Georgia history from civilian to soldier is timelessly familiar. professor Lee Kennett surveys the "view from Nevertheless, it is unlikely any of today’s re­ the barracks." movement overseas, combat/ cruits would put on a uniform 22 years old and wounds/death/capture, and finally the GI as lib­ find a 1918 PX receipt in the pocket, as did some erator and conqueror. Professor Kennett con­ of the first draftees in 1940. That year was also 76 AIRPOWER JOURNAL SPRING 1989 not a time of great affluence in America. The from England: 12,000 from Australia), the troop­ depression was far from an ancient memory, and ship experience ("We'll win this damn war but I one US home in three did not have running can’t face the trip back”). Even the lowly C- water or central heating. The Army offered both. ration can receives its due. (Enemy recon planes For many soldiers, uniformed life was an eco­ could sometimes spot routes and bivouacs by nomic step up. Barracks life, however, with its following the trails of golden C-ration cans—un­ “endless scrutiny" and unending uniformity, til they were painted olive drab.) was another matter. Kennett describes the essential quality of the The expanding Army underwent enormous American GI overseas as “enthusiasm.” No trib­ growing pains. There were shortages of every­ ute to nor explanation for this characteristic is thing. By 1941, an Army-wide morale crisis set more revealing than a Czech villager’s remark in. For tens of thousands of citizen-soldiers, ad­ about the Americans' less than precise way of justment to Army life was aggravated by asking marching: "They walk like free men.” themselves "Why?” A special secret report lik­ GI: The American Soldier in World War II clo­ ened the draftees' concern to a “football team in ses with the author’s visit to the 1985 reunion of training but without a schedule of games." the 84th "Railsplitters" Infantry Division. It is a Overseas, the American GI was immediately moving, wistful look at what it all meant—the recognized almost everywhere. He was usually transition from civilian to soldier, soldier to vet­ accompanied by fleets of the quintessential eran, liberator, conqueror, and back to civilian American vehicles of the day—the jeep and the again—to the men who experienced it over 40 two-and-one-half-ton truck. The GI seemed years before. never out of or far from vast supplies of ciga­ This book is lively, entertaining, and inform­ rettes, gum, and candy. Scenes of American ative. It is by no means the only or the last word soldiers surrounded by children were seldom on the subject, but in 265 pages it is very likely contrived. The GI's very distinctive headgear— the best. the Ml helmet and liner now being phased out— Lt Col Wayne A. Silkett, USA was a resounding success and a trove of fasci­ SHAPE, Belgium nation. Early helmet liners were first made from impregnated fiber, later from redwood bark, and then from macerated canvas before the ultimate Foreign Intelligence Organizations by Jeffrey T. answer: laminated phenolic resin-impregnated Richelson. Cambridge, Massachusetts 02138: fabric. Ballinger Publishing Co., 1988, 311 pages, Once the GI was at war, he sought special sym­ $39.95. bols of belonging—a division shoulder patch, paratrooper boots, "tanker" jackets, and the Any attempt at writing about the secret worlds Combat Infantry Badge. And he took special of national intelligence and security organiza­ pride in his "by-soldiers, for-soldiers” alter tions is a noteworthy endeavor. American au­ egos—the Sad Sack and Bill Mauldin's Willie thor and consultant Jeffrey Richelson has done and Joe. just that and succeeded admirably. His Foreign Kennett devotes considerable attention to the Intelligence Organizations completes a trilogy— two major theaters of war. pointing out such dra­ started more than four years ago— examining matic differences as the Pacific GI's higher neu­ every major intelligence community in the ropsychiatric rate and lower venereal disease world. The previous two volumes—both well re­ and AWOL rates than his European theater ceived—were The U.S. Intelligence Community counterpart. These and other differences—in­ (1985) and Sword and Shield: The Soviet Intel- cluding the relatively high degree of hatred for ligence and Security Apparatus (1986). the Japanese but low degree of hatred for the Ger­ Promoted as the “only book of its kind." For­ mans—were the results of vast differences in Pa­ eign Intelligence Organizations provides cific and European theater climate, geography, detailed descriptions of the intelligence com­ culture, and—for venereal disease and AWOL— munities of eight nations—the United Kingdom. opportunity. Particularly unfamiliar to the Canada, Italy, West Germany, France. Israel. Ja­ Pacific GI was an environment with so few pan, and China. While not inclusive, this list towns, cities, and farms. still represents a significant grouping of national All in all, little is missing. Kennett covers mail intelligence assets—separate from the United censorship, rumors, GI “war brides" (80,000 States and the Soviet Union—involved in the se- NET ASSESSMENT 77

rious and complex business of intelligence col­ has extensive liaison arrangements, and partici­ lection and analysis. pates in joint conferences. As proof, he lists four On the positive side. Richelson is very con­ such exchanges and conferences the British sistent in presenting a framework to discuss in­ had—in 1974! Surely, more recent examples are telligence organizations. Each chapter deals available; unfortunately, they are not used here. with a separate country. The first section on An imbalance in presentation also creates origins traces how each one evolved to its mod­ some problems because of the amount of space— ern arrangement. The author then goes into vary­ or lack thereof—devoted to actual intelligence ing degrees of detail, examining intelligence and missions performed recently by each country. In security organizations, management structures, the chapter on the United Kingdom, discussion and liaison with other national organizations on intelligence operations in the Falklands War to include “work with—or against—our own goes on for 13 pages. Richelson devotes half of [American] intelligence-gathering strategies.” that—seven pages—to US-Israeli intelligence Examples of recent actual intelligence missions operations in the chapter on Israel. Examples for follow. Concluding every chapter are citations the other countries average only slightly more for documentation and reference. than two pages each on operational matters. Foreign Intelligence Organizations is a wel­ One way Richelson could have avoided this come addition to the small but growing field of problem would have been to write two books in­ unclassified literature dealing with classified in­ stead of one to complete his study of the world’s telligence agencies. For readers interested in the intelligence communities. This reviewer would world of intelligence, this book compiles a great have liked Richelson first to take some of the in­ deal of useful information. When combined with formation provided in his The Ties that Bind: In­ Richelson’s earlier efforts, it presents “a more telligence Cooperation with the UKUSA complete picture of world-wide intelligence Countries (United Kingdom, United States, Can­ gathering.” ada, Australia, and New Zealand)—coauthored Of value are the sections on the origins and ev­ in 1985 with Australian Desmond Ball—and ex­ olutions of several of the national intelligence pand it into a study on Commonwealth intelli­ organizations. Particularly interesting is the sec­ gence organizations. That way, he could add tion on how—beginning in 1946—the United parts on Australian and New Zealand intelli­ States helped Richard Gehlen, World War 11 Ger­ gence and security organizations to an elabo­ man military intelligence leader, establish an in­ rated coverage of British and Canadian efforts telligence program to penetrate Eastern Europe and their connection with the US intelligence and the Soviet Union. Gehlen’s effort produced community. Richelson could then write the sec­ the first postwar foreign intelligence organiza­ ond book on the other intelligence organizations tion in West Germany. of the world. These might include those of the Additionally. Richelson does a credible job Warsaw Pact countries. South Africa, Middle discussing how the eight countries direct their East, and so on. Enough secondary source mate­ intelligence resources in internal and external rials should exist to support such an approach. operations. Of special interest are sections de­ These problems aside. Foreign Intelligence picting how these countries collect, collate, and Organizations serves as a thorough and valuable use intelligence on terrorists, both inside and survey of several of the world’s principal intel­ outside their national boundaries. ligence organizations. For readers who want to On the negative side. Richelson uses extensive know something about such agencies and how secondary source materials. Granted, dealing they relate to the extensive intelligence arrange­ with classified subjects—on foreign organiza­ ments of the Americans and the Soviets, Jeffrey tions—in an unclassified publication is difficult Richelson’s three-volume set is very useful. to do. Yet, the author seems at times to take the Lt Col Frank P. Donnini, USAF easy way out by referencing secondary sources Maxwell AFB, Alabama instead of analyzing and breaking out informa­ tion contained in available primary sources. Ad­ ditionally. some information is too dated to make the points originally intended. For exam­ Fighting to a Finish: The Politics of War Termi­ ple. Richelson discusses in considerable detail nation in the United States and Japan, 1945 how Britain shares finished intelligence analysis by Leon V. Sigal. Ithaca. New York 14850: Cor­ products with the other Anglo-Saxon nations, nell University Press, 1988, 335 pages, $39.95. 78 AIRPOWER JOURNAL SPRING 1989

As the title of this work implies, the closing fate of the Japanese emperor despite agreement events of World War II in the Pacific serve as the by US officials that preservation of the throne vehicle for the author’s analysis of factors affect­ would be in the national interest can be ex­ ing political and military decisions necessary to plained as a result of internal politics. He main­ war termination. Lest the reader be misled, let tains that the doctrine of “unconditional me hasten to add that the book is not primarily surrender” had become such an article of faith about the United States' use of nuclear weapons with the American public that no politician against Japan although that decision is among could risk being pictured as condoning a retreat those reviewed in support of the author’s thesis. from that doctrine, regardless of rationality. The Clearly, the political decisionmakers in both influence of organizational process is depicted the United States and Japan had to consider the in the discussion of Secretary of War Henry L. international situation. The interests of allies, Stimson’s largely unsuccessful attempts to limit friends, enemies, and potential enemies ob- the conventional bombing of Japan, an effort that iously impinged on the process of war termi­ foundered on the Air Force’s determination to nation. The general approach to studies of war demonstrate the efficacy of strategic bombard­ termination has been to assess the national in­ ment and prove that air power alone could be de­ terests of the warring states in the international cisive. Dr Sigal’s analysis is not, of course, context and to seek an explanation of their de­ limited to these examples, which are cited here cisions in a cost-benefit analysis of the options only as illustrations of the tenor of his work. He available to them. In this rational-choice ap­ does not reject the rational-choice approach as proach. individual states are regarded as unitary valueless but does an excellent job of pointing actors, able to calculate to some degree the rela­ out its limitations and suggesting other tools that tive costs and benefits to be derived from various can help supply a more complete understanding options and to select the most cost-effective in of the war-termination process. terms of their national interest. But according to The final chapter in this book is devoted to ex­ Dr Sigal. this technique of analysis, although amining the implications that the author's con­ useful, fails to adequately explain decisions tentions may have for today’s nuclear-armed made with regard to war termination. nations. Dr Sigal attaches a caveat to this discus­ For example. Dr Sigal rejects the rational- sion by recognizing the limitations of his single choice explanation that the decision to use nu­ example and acknowledging that there are im­ clear weapons against Hiroshima and Nagasaki portant fundamental differences in today’s was based simply on the calculation that other situation. He is conservative in his claims con­ methods of forcing Japan to surrender would in­ cerning the predictive value of his methods of volve even greater casualties, both American analysis but argues convincingly that war ter­ and Japanese. Similarly, he refutes the revision­ mination in the nuclear age is fraught with dif­ ist view that the use of nuclear weapons against ficulty. He concludes that these difficulties Japan was driven primarily by an external, polit­ suggest strongly that the best time to stop a nu­ ical objective—the desire to demonstrate to the clear war is before it begins. Soviets the destructive power of the weapon and This addition to the distinguished series of the American will to use it. Both of these prop­ Cornell Studies in Security Affairs should prove ositions derive from rational-choice analysis but useful to scholars seeking to understand the dy­ differ in imputing a different assessment of the namics of the oft-neglected area of war termina­ lational interest to the political decisionmaker. tion. Its utility is enhanced by thorough According to Dr Sigal. both also suffer numerous documentation (a bibliography of approxi­ anomalies that the rational-choice method can­ mately 200 entries, many of them to primary not explain. sources), skillful footnoting, a useful index, and Dr Sigal, however, maintains that most of a lucid, readable style. This latter attribute these anomalies are explainable by the use of a should ensure that the book is also read and ap­ different method of analysis. His central conten­ preciated by decisionmakers who can profit tion is that “the approaches of internal politics from the author’s analysis of factors that affect and organizational process help clear up many the process of war termination. of the anomalies in rational-choice accounts of the end of the war between the United States and Japan.” For example, he argues that the Ameri­ I.t Col Harvey |. Crawford, USAF can refusal to provide assurances regarding the Maxwell AFB. Alabama NET ASSESSMENT 79

Fletcher s Gang: A B-17 Crew in Europe, 1944- Overall, the book presents Fletcher as a good 45 by Eugene Fletcher. Seattle 50096: Univer­ flyer and a responsible soldier. On more than sity of Washington Press, 1988, 267 pages. one occasion, the different accounts verify that $19.95. the 22-year-old first lieutenant’s skills as a pilot In 1944-45, the emotions of B-17 crewmem­ resulted in the safe return of a damaged or even bers stationed in Europe generally alternated crippled ship. And Fletcher’s integrity is appar­ between protracted boredom and intense fear. ent from his letters home. For instance, acknowl­ More than merely explaining this phenomenon, edging that letters from the front were subject to Fletcher’s Gang illustrates the variations in the wartime censors but that many soldiers at­ daily routine of the air combatant who fought in tempted to send home accounts of combat mis­ "the Good War.” "This narrative is not intended sions anyway, Fletcher makes it clear from the to be a saga of the Battle of the Air during World beginning that he feels duty-bound not to say War II,” writes Fletcher—a former pilot and any more than is appropriate: “I could refer to bomber commander—"Many authors have al­ my work more closely than I do and it would ready documented the thrilling air battles and probably get by. But 1 look at it this w'ay, why the heroism and danger inherent therein. It is a take a chance? The rules were made for my safety study of the mood of the times, and what went and the least I can do is try to live up to them.” on in the minds of the people who were caught On another occasion, u'hen the crew' goes off to up in this crucial struggle." Thus, there is some­ play, he feels committed to stay and study the re­ thing about the psychology of the warrior to be sponsibilities of his command. gleaned from reading this collection of 1st Lt Eu­ The crewmembers agree that he is a good offi­ gene Fletcher’s wartime letters to his wife, inter­ cer. Fletcher "was admired and trusted by each spersed among diary entries of crewmembers of us," recalls the navigator. "We knew he was and Fletcher’s own recollections and explica­ loyal and w'ould fight to protect our interests. tions made 40 years later. The longer I live and the more people I observe, What the author calls "a study" is really a col­ the more certain I become that Fletch was an ex­ lection of narrative accounts of the stateside ceptional leader; he is an extraordinary man!” training and the 35 combat missions flown by He is dutiful but not at the expense of enterprise Fletcher and his crew as part of the 95th Bom­ and humor. The retelling of occasions when he bardment Group (Heavy), 13th Combat Wing. 3d stretched the rules or played practical jokes Air Division, Eighth Air Force in Europe. Fletch­ breathes life into both the man and the book. er’s letters to his wife constitute the core of the Another element that lends the book authen­ book, but he presents each mission from as many ticity is the depiction of fear experienced by reliable view-points as he is able to muster. Each crewmembers during missions. Though some­ account generally begins with an entry from the times rightfully terrified at the risks a particular diaries of the copilot, navigator, or bombardier, mission might entail, the crew plods on—in followed by Fletcher’s letter to his u’ife concern­ every instance successfully returning w'ith a ing the mission, and concludes with the author’s fully intact crew', if not a fully intact plane. After recollections and commentary. the first combat mission, Fletcher’s ground crew Both Fletcher s book and crew have numerous counted 23 holes in his ship caused by flak—not virtues. The book has an air of authenticity. The the most that he would eventually bring home, crew emerges as skillful, united, and dutiful but but evidence of baptism under fire just the same. real human beings. They are sometimes fright­ There is enough authentic duty, honor, and ened, sometimes cocky, sometimes unseemly or “shoot ’em up” in Fletcher's Gang to make inter­ impolitic, but generally brave and successful. esting reading for any Air Force member (despite The first-person, firsthand account of each mis­ the author’s disclaimer that the book is not a war sion makes the book more credible than one saga). The book also documents another impor­ written solely from library research. Although tant side of war and its effects on the mind: the the author has biases, emerging both in his let­ long, boring hours—and sometimes days—that ters and his commentary, they appear to have pass between combat missions. However, there changed sufficiently over 40 years to offset each are elements of humanity in these accounts of other somewhat. This fact, together with the boredom that make them interesting. According technique of recounting each incident from dif­ to Fletcher, these were times when a shortage of ferent perspectives, gives the reader a fairly ob­ reading materials had every soldier reading jective picture. everything he could find, from pulp detective 80 AIRPOVVER JOURNAL SPRING 1989 fiction to poetry. A commercial radio was a rare (3) tactics used are outdated, and (4) personnel possession and a sheer delight, despite its fuzzy policies reflect individual service needs rather reception of German stations only—when it re­ than the strategic needs. ceived anything at all. "Organizational reformers” emphasize the The book is realistic and insightful. At times it need for change within the military establish­ is also humorous and exciting. Fletcher’s Gang ment. The basic critique of the organizational is readable, interesting, even sometimes compel­ reformers holds that serious problems in the or­ ling. But there are some minor problems: transi­ ganization of the military services have led to a tion between the accounts from different sources military establishment in which the parochial and daily entries is not always smooth, occa­ interests of each service have been forwarded to sionally leaving the reader feeling that he is the detriment of the national interests. "Admin­ being jerked around. And at least once, there is a istrative reforms” center on the vast administra­ distracting shift in the narrative personal tive bureaucracy that supports the military pronoun. establishment. Some of the proposals call for Despite these minor stylistic problems, how­ greater competition in the procurement of mili­ ever. the book is generally meritorious, artisti­ tary equipment, the elimination of duplication cally as well as historically. The juxtaposition of among the services, independent testing bureaus the varying accounts of each incident gives the within the Pentagon, and the elimination of the reader a deeper feeling for the stresses of World “revolving door” whereby military officers retire War II combat and, even more, for those long pe­ to lucrative positions with defense contractors riods of monotony between missions. The book they ostensibly supervise. is high-quality, personal history, refreshingly In the first part of his book. Hendrickson unencumbered by the jargon and prejudices of places these reform movements within a histor­ academic historians. All in all, Fletcher's Gang ical context that stresses traditional, theoretical, is a good book for personal history buffs, for and practical dilemmas raised by civil-military those interested in the nonhistorian’s account of relations. Specifically. Hendrickson examines the war— especially the role of the Army Air three problems. First is the division of respon­ Corps—and simply for readers curious about the sibility between the civilian and military lead­ authentic struggles of the human spirit during ership. Second is the lack of unified direction, wartime. resulting from the division of civilian authority Capt David M. Kirkham, USAF between the executive and legislative branches Washington. D.C. of the government and the division of expertise among the independent military services. The third area concerns three organizational dilem­ Reforming Defense: The State of American mas resulting from the sheer size of the branches Civil-Military Relations by David C. Hen­ of service: (1) the question of whether the mili­ drickson. Baltimore. Maryland 21211: Johns tary services should be structured along mission Hopkins University Press, 1988, 152 pages, or functional lines. (2) the appropriate degree of $24.50. centralization (or decentralization), and (3) the responsiveness to change. In reviewing the three “Of defense reform," writes David Hendrick­ problems, Hendrickson attempts to outline a son, “it might fairly be said that while there is a more proper “division of labor" among the civil­ consensus that we need it. there is no agreement ian and military institutions competing for au­ on what it is.” In an attempt to ease the confu­ thority and power to determine military policy. sion surrounding military reform. Hendrickson Hendrickson then goes on in part 2 of his defines and analyzes the three major reform books to show how the many reform proposals— movements that have arisen in the 1980s: mili­ particularly those of the military reformers—are tary, organizational, and administrative. misconceived and might serve to undermine the According to Hendrickson, the "military re­ effectiveness of the military. Hendrickson re­ formers" submit the following propositions: (1) views seven propositions that he considers cen­ American military services continue to support tral to the notion of military reform. His a doctrine emphasizing attrition and should re­ discussions range across such topics as the use align their strategy toward "maneuver warfare,” of the large-deck aircraft carrier as the center of (2) weapons procured by the services do not the naval battle group, the Air Force’s “self-im­ work in combat and are expensive to maintain, age as an ‘independent arm’ capable of achieving NET ASSESSMENT 81 an independent decision in battle.” the direction vides advocates of SDI much useful technical in­ NATO has taken in the past decade under Amer­ formation and marfy quotable turns of phrase. ican leadership, and the preference of the ser­ However, even detractors of SDI will be fasci­ vices for the most advanced "high-tech" nated by author Angelo Codevilla’s view of the weaponry that budget constraints make impos­ Washington power struggle he believes has sible to procure in the necessary quantities. dominated SDI. Hendrickson then goes on to the question of in­ Codevilla describes various assumptions stitutional reform. He draws particular attention made in researching BMD—both by critics and to three areas. First is a reform of the budgetary SDI program officials—that he believes are procedures that would stabilize the acquisition ‘‘presumptuous to the point of being self-decep­ of weapon systems. Second is a reorganization of tive.” He outlines in some detail why he believes the Department of Defense that would give that this "policy reasoning dressed in pseudo- greater authority to offices—based on their mis­ technical cloaks" has only tenuous connections sion—and less to offices that support the mis­ with reality. This analysis—combined with Cod­ sions. Finally, he discusses a revision to the evilla’s personal, behind-the-scenes experi­ 1948 Key West Accord, which would correct (ac­ ences—will raise questions in the reader’s mind. cording to the critics) deformities in force Reflecting upon these questions will help the posture. reader develop a much deeper understanding of In his conclusion. Hendrickson places the the role of SDI. military reform critique in a final and surprising Codevilla constructs a case for the proposition perspective. When the subject is considered in that the SDI program has functioned primarily as total. Hendrickson feels it is difficult to escape a “research-ever, deploy-never" political dy­ the conclusion that a civilian attempt to impose namic, rather than as a precursor to a fully a reform program on the services would result realized interdictory defense. Certainly, this in very serious consequences and would make conclusion is a cynical one. On the other hand, things worse, not better. The real case for reform. the objective reader must credit this notion with Hendrickson argues, lies in the transformation of some degree of truth, and the curious reader American strategic doctrine, in those institu­ must wonder what the degree might be. tional changes that would combat the lack of un­ Some of Codevilla’s assessments remain at the ified direction in civil-military relations, and in level of assertion because they outline the inten­ the strengthening of military professionalism tions of individuals, which can never be nailed within the American officer corps. down. For example, he describes the actions of Hendrickson does an excellent job of discuss­ the president as "resolute indecision” that failed ing all aspects of the various issues confronting to challenge bureaucratic inertia for the funding the defense establishment. I highly recommend of existing initiatives. He outlines how various adding this book to your professional library as a factions of the governmental bureaucracy have concise but comprehensive review of the major reacted and compares the logic of their reactions issues of the defense reform movement. to institutional incentives. Capl Robert L. Eskridge, USAF Codevilla believes that recently proposed leg­ Ma/mstrom AFB. Montano islation establishing a US defense force needs to be passed. According to him, this legislation is necessary to set firm goals and assign adequate authority to US space-weapon program initia­ tives. The safest, wisest course is for the United States to build the best defense it can with the While Others Build by Angelo Codevilla. New tools at hand, rather than continue to mark time York 10022: Free Press. 1988. 256 pages. while others build. He argues that the Soviet- $22.50. directed energy warfare program "is in the pro­ cess of turning out not just technology, but pri­ This analysis of the politics of the strategic de­ marily weapons. No American knows what fense initiative (SDI) by a Hoover Institute fellow these weapons will or won’t do. . . . The Soviet (former 10-year member of the Senate Intelli­ Union is really ten years ahead of the US in anti­ gence Committee staff) comprises a unique view missile weapons.” of the US space-weapons research program. Its After assessing Codevilla’s case, some readers overview of ballistic missile defense (BMD) pro­ may find that they still disagree with his conclu- 82 /\/RPOWEfi JOURNAL SPRING 1989

sions. However. I believe serious students of SD1 lected the Tuskegee Institute in Alabama for the should add this book to their list of required training site. If offered free land, existing facili­ reading. ties, a supportive environment, and an Army Re­ Maj Thomas C. Blow II, USAF serve Officer Training Corps headed by (then) 1st Maxwell AFB, Alabama Lt Ben O. Davis, Jr., whose father was America’s first flag-rank black officer. The initial graduates formed the 99th Pursuit The Tuskegee Airmen: The Men Who Changed Squadron, flying P-51s over North Africa, Italy, a Nalion by Charles E. Francis. Boston 02147: and German-occupied eastern Europe. This unit Branden Publishing Co., 1988, 300 pages, was later subordinated to the enlarged but all­ $16.95. black 332d Fighter Group, which was decorated with the Distinguished Unit Citation—the unit The Tuskegee Airmen is the comprehensive Medal of Honor equivalent. history of America's black military aviators dur­ Should World War II America have trained its ing World War II. In those days. Army Air Forces fledgling black airmen at a Northern site? Might units formed a mushrooming giant within the integration of the armed services have been has­ US Army, which was required by law to operate tened by that decision? By law, the Army and racially segregated units. Consequently, nearly Navy of 1941 to 1945 were totally segregated. 1,000 black pilots and six times that number of Because the Army Air Forces itself was a com­ black enlisted airmen were trained at Dr Booker ponent of a major service, one hardly could T. Washington's famed Tuskegee Institute to op­ imagine a solitary legion within a subordinate erate their own segregated legion within the force being able to integrate the far-flung mil­ Army Air Forces. lions who were activated for World War II. How good were these men as combat aviators? They won 150 Distinguished Flying Crosses; 160 The secret to the Tuskegee airmen was a qual­ of them, mostly officers, were killed in air oper­ ity that reflects the mighty spirit of the late Dr ations; and they shot down 136 enemy aircraft, Booker T. Washington. One black pilot who was mostly German, destroying 273 more on the shot down and captured by the Germans was ground. being taunted about his role as a second-class From their ranks came Lt Gen Benjamin O. citizen in his homeland. This Tuskegee airman Davis, |r., (35th of 276 in West Point's class of asked his captor why the Germans were so hard 1936), later US undersecretary of transportation; on the Jews and their weaker European neigh­ Gen Daniel "Chappie" James, the nation's first bors. Confined to a 16' x 16’ room with nine black four-star officer; and a generation of black other cellmates—seven from the segregated high achievers, both in and out of aviation. Their Southern states—he reported, “Although I was a immediate legacy was the 21 black jet combat pi­ Negro they treated me as one of them. Each man lots and hundreds of black airmen who fought performed a duty, and each day we combined with the fledgling and racially integrated US Air our rations, cooked it together, and shared Force in the Korean Conflict. Today, the 5.4 per­ equally.” cent of the Air Force officer corps who are black Too soon, America has forgotten these air he­ and the 15.3 percent of black enlisted airmen roes who were the transition to a US Air Force would scarcely recognize the strange mixture of where a man or woman advances on merit. At early air power euphoria and plain old Jim Crow the US Air Force Academy, a statue of the "Tus­ that was the World War II life of the Tuskegee kegee Airmen" has been dedicated during mov­ airman. ing ceremonies. Author Charles E. Francis, who The presence of any black airmen at all in the was one of them, tells their story with accuracy, US forces during World War II was due to patient candor, and a conspicuous absence of recrimi­ lobbying by the National Association for the nation. Any reader— military or civilian, air- Advancement of Colored People. Sen Harry H. minded or earthbound— will feel very good Schwartz of Wyoming and Congressman Louis about America at the end of The Tuskegee Ludlow of Indiana sponsored bills in the Senate Airmen. and House “to guarantee the training of Negro military aviators." Surprisingly, America had several hundred "licensed Negro civilian pilots" Dr Russell W. Ramsey in 1941. Secretary of War Harry W. Woodring se­ Maxwell AFB. Alabama NET ASSESSMENT 83

Wars of the Third Kind: Conflict in Underdevel­ scenario of the raid (16 bombers taking off from oped Countries by Edward E. Rice. Berkeley. an aircraft carrier to conduct the first air strike California 94720: University of California against Japan, dropping bombs over widely scat­ Press. 1988. 186 pages. $18.95. tered targets, and crashing in China) has been known to readers since Ted Lawson’s classic Wars of the Third Kind is must reading for Thirty Seconds over Tokyo. In a masterful piece every military officer. Rice, a foreign service of­ of writing, however, Carroll Glines answers the ficer with vast experience, has packed into this challenge with a gripping, riveting chronicle of small book a superior synthesis of the best avail­ the famous raid. In addition to blending numer­ able materials on revolutionary warfare, includ- ous recollections from participants and dozens ing the unique insights of his personal of previously unknown aspects of the mission, experiences as a virtual eyewitness to "wars of he fleshes out the epic with fascinating accounts the third kind" in several diplomatic posts. For of what happened to the crews after the raid. those Americans who equate revolutionary war­ After years of research, Glines amassed amaz­ fare only with the recent American past and ing details about the operation. For example, we present (i.e.. Vietnam and Nicaragua). Rice learn how the idea for the raid originated: Ad­ draws on previous American experiences (the miral King, the chief of naval operations, sug­ Philippines after the Spanish-American War gested transporting Army bombers and cargo and Nicaragua during the 1920s and 1930s) as planes on an aircraft carrier to North Africa to well as similar wars in Algeria, China, Cuba, the help counter possible French resistance in an Philippines after World War II. Mexico, and—of impending invasion. A submarine officer on his course—Vietnam and modern Nicaragua. His staff took that idea and developed the strategy analysis of revolutionary warfare offers marvel­ that put 16 B-25 bombers on the carrier Hornet ous insights bolstered by wide-ranging historical off the Japanese coast. evidence. Of particular interest is a fascinating Glines also gives a full account of the prepa­ chapter on the perils that await great powers rations for the raid. With incredible speed (just who find themselves enmeshed in "wars of the over three months elapsed from the birth of the third kind.” This chapter should be required idea to the dropping of the bombs), Doolittle as­ reading for every American policymaker (and sembled the planes and crews for secret training Soviet policymaker in the wake of Afghanistan). in Florida. The B-25s received unusual modifi­ If the book has a fault, it is that there needs to be cations: broomstick “guns" were put in the un­ more "prescription" to accompany the "descrip­ defended tail to deceive attacking fighters, the tion.” But then, no one seems to have yet for­ bottom gun turret was replaced with a gas tank, mulated the consistently effective counter to a and a new low-altitude bombsight was made well-led and popularly based insurgency. In from 20 cents' worth of aluminum and installed sum. Wars of the Third Kind is a superior book— in just weeks. Even so, a blimp still ferried parts one of the very best on a very important subject. to the planes after the Hornet left San Francisco. Col Dennis M. Drew. USAF Surprisingly, we find that the aircrews were Maxwell AFB. Alabama quite relaxed before the raid. Their detailed rec­ ollections show that they were mainly con­ cerned about the condition of the planes and their ability to get off the carrier deck—not about the flight over Japan or the landings in China. Glines presents a dramatic, plane-by-plane ac­ count of the fate of all 16 bombers. In addition to The Doolittle Raid: America’s Daring First the adventures of the more famous crews (Doo­ Strike against Japan by Carroll V. Clines. New little’s and Lawson’s), the daring experiences of York 10003: Crown Publishers. Inc., 1988. 272 the other crews come to life. Each crew picked its pages. $17.95. own target. We learn that their attacks on Tokyo were actually witnessed by several Americans One of the difficult challenges facing an author on the ground, including the American ambas­ writing about a famous wartime mission such as sador. Glines re-creates the exhilaration of at­ the Doolittle raid is creating an atmosphere of ex­ tacking enemy targets and the desperation of citement and drama that will pull the reader crews faced with low fuel, bad weather, and un­ through to the end of the book. After all, the basic familiar enemy territory. 84 AJRPOVVER JOURNAL SPRING 1989

After the attack, many of the crewmembers try, often around Hanoi/Haiphong. This area faced bizarre situations. One aircrew landed in contained formidable defensive weapons, in­ Russia and was confined in rapidly deteriorating cluding SA-2 surface-to-air missiles (SAMs), facilities. After working as aircraft mechanics, MiG-15, -17. -19, and -21 aircraft, and antiaircraft they finally escaped over the Soviet-Iranian bor­ artillery (AAA) up to 100 mm. Colonel Brough­ der 13 months after the raid. One crewmember ton, whose career as a fighter pilot included com­ from another plane bailed out over China and, bat in Korea, a tour as the Thunderbird lead, and after regaining consciousness, found he had experience as vice wing commander at Takhli landed on top of a cliff. Two crews were captured AB, Thailand, has not simply described the air by the Japanese. Although Glines wrote a sepa­ combat of the Vietnam War in his new book, rate book. Four Came Home, on the fate of these Going Downtown. Not only does he put the crews, he includes several poignant chapters reader in the cockpit and the war, but also he covering their experiences in captivity and their characterizes the frustrations of those men who rescue. Three crewmembers were executed after risked and lost their lives in a war that was being a mock trial. Their farewell letters are both cou­ micromanaged from Washington on down the rageous and heartbreaking. The account of the chain of command. The incident that caused his rescue of other captured crewmembers at the end career to come to a sour close also prompts an of the war proceeds at fever pitch. Despite sur­ important statement on loyalty as a two-way rendering. the Japanese had no intention of re­ street in our Air Force. leasing the fliers from prison in occupied China. Early chapters in Going Downtown describe Only the brilliant exploits of an Office of Stra­ the political history of Vietnam and Ho Chi tegic Services (OSS) agent who parachuted into Minh, the air war in Korea, and development of Peking saved their lives. Even after their release, the Century Series fighters, including the F-105. however, incredible experiences continued. One Colonel Broughton then takes the reader on an raider was hospitalized under terrible condi­ eye-opening tour of air combat in Vietnam with tions in several US military institutions and, in the F-105, including struggling to avoid radar- effect, was rescued again—this time by General guided antiaircraft fire, last-minute maneuvering Doolittle. to avoid SAMs, coping with some of the worst Several sections of the book create so much ex­ weather in the world, and losing friends in citement that the reader can't turn the pages fast combat. enough. The author includes much factual infor­ The theme of the book deals with the extent to mation yet weaves it into a story that is better which politically motivated restrictions caused than most wartime fiction. Glines, an honorary unnecessary loss of life, extended the war and Tokyo raider, begins and ends his book by de­ POW internment, and led to the eventual loss of scribing the raiders’ annual reunion. His book is the war. Broughton presents a strong case that a magnificent telling of the famous raid that will the supposed attacks on US destroyers Maddox inspire Americans long after the last raider is and Turner Joy in the Gulf of Tonkin in 1964 gone. were fabricated by the Johnson administration to Cap! Stephen J. Gardetto, USAF justify our retaliation to earlier unanswered at­ Andrews AFB, Maryland tacks by North Vietnam. This fabrication oc­ curred after election-year outcries by Sen Barry Goldwater. Colonel Broughton describes Presi­ dent Johnson as being a “step behind" through­ out the war but reserves most of his criticism for Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara. McNamara was convinced that there was no Going Downtown: The War against Hanoi and possibility of winning the war and feared Chi­ Washington by Jack Broughton. New York na’s entering the war on the side of North Viet­ 10003: Orion Books. 1988, 300 pages, $18.95. nam. McNamara’s self-fulfilling prophecy Nineteen years ago. Col Jack Broughton wrote colored his warfighting philosophy throughout his first book. Thud Ridge, a graphic depiction of his time as secretary of defense. Target lists were the air war in Vietnam as seen by Air Force pilots maintained for approval by the president, and fi­ of the F-105, also known as the “Thud.” Thud nal target approvals occurred at a weekly lun­ drivers flew predominantly against targets in cheon although no military representatives were "Pack Six"—the northernmost area of the coun­ present. Colonel Broughton describes the case of NET ASSESSMENT H5

in F-105 pilot who was recalled just as he taxied ered an uneven but needed addition to our un­ out. McNamara had telephoned him directly, derstanding of the gulf war between Iran and wanting him to change his target and ordnance— Iraq. a striking example of the bureaucratic micro- The Gulf War is a relatively straightforward ac­ management of the war. The Johnson/McNamara count of the causes of the conflict, followed by a team stated from the start that not even an out­ chronological history that focuses on military house would be attacked unless they gave their campaigns through 1987. The author effectively approval. Colonel Broughton cites numerous ex­ outlines the early twentieth-century history of amples of unnecessary restrictions at the fighting both nations, illustrating how perceptions and level that were instituted by President Johnson prior international agreements prepared each for on down the chain of command—restrictions the conflict that ensued. O’Ballance’s explana­ usually made by people who were separated tions are exceptionally clear, sometimes reading from the fighting and unfamiliar with the war. more like a cookbook than a history book. Given The irony was that no one listened to ideas from the Byzantine complexity of Southwest Asian the Thud pilots at the wing level—the very peo­ international affairs, this characteristic is more ple who were fighting the war. of a blessing than a curse. Only the portion of the Colonel Broughton concludes Going Down­ introduction concerning the effect of the rule of town with a chilling account of the "Turkestan the mullahs on Iranian military readiness de­ incident,” involving the unintentional strafing of prives the reader of needed information. The au­ a Soviet ship in harbor by two of his pilots. The thor generally describes a deterioration in ship was just inside a forbidden target area and readiness, but a bit more detail would have gone was apparently unloading ammunition to anti­ a long way toward explaining the initial suc­ aircraft guns that were firing on F-105s. Brough­ cesses of the Iraqi army. ton and the two pilots wrongly attempted to O’Ballance follows up the introduction with a jonceal the attack from higher authorities, but blow-by-blow review of each military campaign. Broughton explains his actions by putting the This section is valuable because it provides the reader in the frustrating position of those people military reader with a great deal of interesting in­ who were fighting the war. In the subsequent formation concerning strategy, operational plan­ court-martial. Colonel Broughton made a strong ning, and tactics. In a number of cases, however, statement about loyalty in the Air Force. He felt O’Ballance is sloppy in his technical details. Al­ ’hat he concealed the attack out of loyalty to his though the flaws are not fatal, they detract from oilots, but when he needed support from his su- the credibility of the book. For instance, the au­ jeriors during the court-martial and during the thor confuses the Phoenix air-to-air missiles of var, no one came to his aid. the Iranian F-14s with heat seekers and cannot Going Downtown is a frank and vivid account understand why they were not employed against )f the air war in Vietnam. It also cites some les­ Iraqi tanks. I had to read that section several sons learned from the war in an attempt to pre­ times. Similar errors were found in his account vent us from repeating our mistakes in the future. of the Israeli attack on an Iraqi reactor. It is a pity Capt Todd Travis, USAF that these mistakes mar a generally well-written Vance AFB, Oklahoma work. While not destined for leather binding or sta­ tus as a timeless classic, The Gulf War is an ad­ mirable overview of that subject. O’Ballance has succeeded in giving us most of the essentials of the long, bloody conflict and conveys them with The G ulf W ar by Edgar O'Ballance. London: crisp, concise journalistic prose. I would most Brassey's Defence Publishers, 1988, 231 pages. highly recommend this book as a companion to $28.00. other works that focus more clearly on the polit­ ical and social underpinnings of the war. The Edgar O’Ballance, a specialist in international Gulf War is not perfect, but it does take the reader terrorism, is a frequent contributor to military lit­ where few books have yet ventured. erature. His work is characteristically contem­ porary and concise. Both of these features are prominent in his latest book. The Gulf War. His Maj Bill Nikides, USAF efforts result in what ultimately must be consid­ Langley AFB, Virginia 86 AIHPOWER JOURNAL SPRING 1989

Pleiku: The Dawn of Helicopter Warfare in Viet­ division's combat units overcame the faulty in­ nam by ). D. Coleman. New York 10010: St. formation concerning enemy size and location. Martin’s Press, 1988, 315 pages, $19.95. Artillery was airlifted in daily to support the in­ tense fighting in and around landing zones and It is hard to imagine the US Army in Vietnam camps. Air-interdiction missions augmented without helicopters and air mobility for combat supporting artillery. Permanent sites for the 1st operations. But the war in Vietnam did not create Air Cavalry troops became inviting targets for the the need for helicopter warfare—it validated the North Vietnamese, leading to the idea that real need. J. D. Coleman traces more than a decade of estate was worthless. The enemy had to be developments that led to the central highlands chased, engaged, and defeated. Scout helicopters west of Pleiku, where for 35 days in 1965 a new searched for the North Vietnamese by drawing 1st Calvary Division (airmobile) corroborated the fire with “recon-by-decoy” tactics. Helicopter concept of air mobility. America's first division­ gunships suppressed enemy fire while troop- sized commitment to the Vietnam War tested laden Hueys delivered soldiers to the fight. And men, equipment, and doctrine in combat to de­ J. D. Coleman documents every battle with termine if infantrymen could be freed from the precision. "tyranny of terrain." In short, the American forces compensated for In a well-researched, factual manner, Coleman inadequate intelligence reports with mobility, recounts the struggle within the Army and De­ punished the North Vietnamese with artillery partment of Defense to achieve tactical mobility and air interdiction, and influenced battles by with large-scale helicopter movements. The de­ delivering additional troops by helicopter. These velopment of high-powered, lightweight turbine tactics all point to a reliance on technology and engines provided Army visionaries with the numbers, similar to the situation described in technology needed for a tremendous increase in Russell Weigley’s The American Way of War. tactical mobility. The Air Force was clearly hos­ But Coleman takes pains to accurately describe tile to the new concept of air mobility and in­ the bloody and valiant fights by the men of the sisted on a series of agreements that limited the 1st Air Cavalry Division. The opposition was de­ size and armament of Army aviation assets. The termined, the landing zones were often tiny, author covers the formation and testing of the help was late in coming, and the outcome was new airmobile division along with the prepara­ often in doubt. tions for deployment following President John­ The author had the opportunity to clearly con­ son’s increased commitment to Vietnam. trast the success of the helicopter airlift opera­ The book focuses on events of 1965 that were tions with the disastrous march of a single intimately familiar to the author. One should not cavalry battalion to landing zone (LZ) Albany. assume, however, that Pleiku is a reminiscence He chose instead to let his readers draw their of ). D. Coleman, retired lieutenant colonel. In own conclusions. The American commander addition to his own experience as an information had his battalion in an unusual single-column officer with the division, Coleman relies on per­ formation that prevented it from either attacking sonal interviews, official records, and captured or defending itself. The march ended when the documents to write a gripping history of uncer­ battalion was ambushed by a battalion-sized en­ tain and dartgerous events. He hits his stride as emy force. After suffering extremely heavy an author of combat history, re-creating the ac­ losses, the American forces remained while the tion coincidental with the 1st Cavalry Division’s North Vietnamese withdrew. The author seemed arrival in the central highlands of Vietnam. less than objective in his analysis of the opera­ By detailing the daily movements and contacts tion: "It had been a hip shoot and the NVA lost— of the combat units of the 1st Air Cavalry, Cole­ at least in the sense that they were gone and the man shows the complexity and rapid pace of bat­ Americans were still on Albany." But the battle tle management in Vietnam. The poor quality of at LZ Albany cost 151 American lives. Perhaps US military intelligence in this campaign be­ the author is unwilling to blame the fiasco on came a key factor as the division deployed comrades who served honorably but not throughout an area where division-strength perfectly. North Vietnamese regular forces were preparing Soldiers of the 1st Air Cavalry Division de­ to sever South Vietnam. Because helicopters feated a North Vietnamese division that subse­ moved companies and battalions with bewilder­ quently withdrew into Cambodia. This defeat ing speed, however, the tactical mobility of the forced the Hanoi leadership to reevaluate their NET ASSESSMENT 87

plans for South Vietnam. Although 304 troops of rational approach in a bureaucratically driven the 1st Air Cavalry were killed and an additional system, but it is not the rational approach in a 524 wounded in the 35-dav Pleiku campaign, the combat-oriented system. losses most certainly would have been greater Bassford believes that meaningful reform must without helicopter warfare and air mobility. This be based on unit (combat) performance. Short of book is an important addition to the history of actual war, this ability to execute would be de­ military aviation and adds to the understanding termined by an elaborate, large-scale "external of the Vietnam War. evaluation.” These evaluations, which could last up to three weeks, would replicate combat as Maj Rick Searle, USAF Falcon AFS, Colorado much as possible. They would provide reliable data on the combat effectiveness of units, indi­ viduals, equipment, the supply system, and so on. Unit performance in these evaluations would allow revision of the promotion, assignment, pay The Spit-Shine Syndrome: Organizational Irra­ grade, supply, and command and control sys­ tionality in the A m erican Field A rm y by tems. Bassford maintains that if the careers of Christopher Bassford. Westport. Connecticut everyone in the line Army depended on unit per­ 06881: Greenwood Press. 1988. 171 pages. formance in the “external evaluations,” combat $38.00. capabilities would improve dramatically. Bass­ The Spit-Shine Syndrome is military reformist ford is not particularly critical of people in the criticism with a difference: it is highly personal, Army; in fact, he states that they have adapted to passionate, and—the seriousness of the subject the existing system, its priorities, and incentives. matter notwithstanding—humorous. Christo­ They give the Army what it currently demands. pher Bassford. who served for six years as an ar- Behavior can be changed only by changing the illery officer in Korea and West Germany and is reward system. To get combat effectiveness, now a doctoral candidate in history at Purdue Bassford maintains that the Army should de­ University, joined the Army as a research proj­ mand professional military competence through ect. He must have kept detailed notes and clearly systemic changes. jbserved an extremely large number of cases of Reorientation of Army priorities would be re­ military incompetence. With this material, he flected in a wide range of personnel matters. Se­ accuses the Army—and the other services as nior noncommissioned officers who have well, given the similarities of their bureaucratic military experience and have demonstrated organization—of being incapable of accomplish­ leadership with fighting forces should be given ing wartime missions. the appropriate (liberal and military) education Bassford ardently believes that the Army’s first and, after commissioning, should comprise a sig­ priority should be its ability to fight. The Spit- nificant portion of the junior officer ranks. Field Shine Syndrome's thesis is that the Army’s ex­ commanders should control promotions, assign­ cessive focus on appearances rather than on the ments, and school selection. Rank and pay grade realities of military effectiveness is so ingrained should be divorced. Commanders and troops that it cannot be rectified short of radically re­ should be freed of bureaucratic interference so forming the entire system. they can concentrate on large-scale, combined- National spirit, codes of ethics, general staff, arms training. excessive fat, the draft, procurement, bureau­ The excellent bibliographical essay notwith­ cratic infighting, and interservice rivalry are not standing, too much of The Spit-Shine Syn­ central to the Army’s inability to fight effec­ drome's documentation—especially of Army tively. Rather, the problem is that the Army is incompetence—is from the author’s personal ob­ structured on a bureaucratic model that is in­ servation. However, because the armed forces compatible with the military mission. Bassford are less than candid in official documents, more focuses on personnel turbulence caused by in­ authoritative or more broadly based sources are dividual. rather than unit, assignment. This type extremely rare. His observations, criticism, and of assignment inevitably results in unit combat suggested solutions are essentially centered on ineffectiveness because most military skills are the field Army—on combat and combat sup­ .ollective skills. Unit training, cohesion, and port—at battalion level and below, which was -ontinuity are essential for combat effectiveness. the extent of Bassford*s experience. This assess­ Consequently, individual assignment may be a ment, unfortunately, slights operational art and 88 AIRPOWER JOURNAL SPRING 1989 implies that military effectiveness is based solely pastiche is due to the simple fact that he never on tactical effectiveness. strays from the basics: his is a military history in In general, a democracy requires a crisis to the framework of political history. force reform of an institution that has lost its In the early 1960s, Air Force doctrine was ability to accomplish the missions for which it rooted in the experience of World War II—dur­ exists. The armed forces have largely been un­ ing which time the conflicting imperatives of willing to accept responsibility for military fail­ strategic bombardment and support of ground ures in Korea, Southeast Asia, Iran, Lebanon, forces in combat were never resolved—and was Grenada, Libya, and the Persian Gulf. How criti­ conditioned by the overarching mission of the cal must military failures be before they are 1950s: the deterrence of nuclear war. This doc­ widely recognized as institutional failures and trine and the force structure evolved to imple­ before the nation demands reform? In identifying ment it were challenged by the Kennedy a problem of this magnitude—the Army's failure administration’s view of the emerging threat of to focus on its combat capabilities—The Spit- Soviet-inspired insurgencies. The imprecise and Shine Syndrome is not part of the problem; it is romanticized New Frontier concept of “counter- part of the solution, and probably for all the insurgency” stimulated a debate within the Air armed services—not just for the Army. Force concerning its competencies within this Lt Col Jeffrey C. Benton, USAF putatively new environment. Mrozek, through Maxwell AFB. Alabama the extensive and able use of lengthy, contex­ tually valid quotations, documents both the de­ bate and the ultimate failure of the Air Force and Air Power and the Ground War in Vietnam: decisionmakers alike to establish a correct or rel­ Ideas and Actions by Donald J. Mrozek. Air evant use of air power in counterinsurgent con­ University Press, Washington, D.C. 20402: US flicts. Furthermore, the author correctly and Government Printing Office, 1988, 212 pages, damningiy faults the civilian decisionmakers for $9.00. having failed to correctly and relevantly see the opportunities and limitations of armed force in The use of air power in support of or in lieu of support of the basic political goals of achieving ground combat operations constitutes a subject stability within South Vietnam. This failure col­ of great contention amongst theorists and histo­ ored the later, subordinate controversies con­ rians alike. It seems inevitable that the role of air cerning operational employments of the air power during the Vietnam conflict will be a sub­ instrument. ject of concern and controversy, if not always Chief among the subordinate controversies wisdom and erudition, for years to come. was the one involving the utility of air power in All too many considerations of the air war in support of ground forces. To what extent could Southeast Asia have been unsatisfying, whether air power serve as an economy-of-force measure, they were based upon dated documentation as and what sorts of operations would best develop was Guenter Lewy’s America in Vietnam, overly the force-multiplier potential? Again, significant freighted with political-science modeling as agreement between ground and air commanders with James Thompson’s Rolling Thunder: Un- or between the military and civilian decision­ derstanding -Policy and Program Failure, or en­ makers was impeded by the lack of a clear and thusiastically tainted with the demonology of consistent understanding of the nature and qual­ presumed American hubris as in James Gibson's ity of the rapidly growing war. Mrozek shows The Perfect War: Technowar in Vietnam. Now, clearly that this lack of understanding ensured a Professor Mrozek. with a book short in length but palpable lack of meaningful success despite detailed in documentation and rich in scholar­ enormous efforts and impressive innovations. ship and insight, provides the baseline for the He implies that innovation without insight leads history of air power in Vietnam. to empty successes. The author has undertaken the formidable task Wars must have goals that are realistic and de­ of considering the roots of US Air Force doctrine, finable. The definition of success must be rele­ matters of conflicting interbranch and interser­ vant to the goals. The theory of victory—the vice institutional imperatives, and unclear or means by which success is to be achieved—must changing political and diplomatic considera­ likewise be relevant to the goals. Further, it must tions. That he has produced a coherent explica­ not be captive either to the past—no matter how tion and interpretation rather than a mere successful—or to a present, muddled hope. Mro- NET ASSESSMENT 89

zek’s analysis underscores the saliency of these sons of the Vietnam War so that the United States fundamentals in a convincing fashion. might deal more successfully with nasty, ambig­ Dr Mrozek is a professor of history at Kansas uous little wars in which the role of force in sup­ State University and a former senior research fel­ port of policy is neither obvious nor certain—in low at the Airpower Research Institute. His book short, the type of war most likely to mark the is highly recommended to readers concerned near future. with understanding and reifying the proper les­ Dr Larry Cable Wilmington, North Carolina

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The following books have recently been pub­ lished by Air University Press. Department of Defense organizations may request copies from Air University Press. Walker Hall, Building no. 1400, Maxwell AFB, AL 36112-5532. Other in­ terested parties may purchase these books through the Superintendent of Documents, US Government Printing Office, Washington DC 20402. You may charge your purchase on Visa or Mastercard. Checks should be made payable to Superintendent of Documents.

Making Strategy: An Introduction to National A look at low-intensity conflict throughout the Security Processes and Problems by Col Dennis world by the Political-Military Affairs Division M. Drew. USAF. and Dr Donald M. Snow, Au­ of the Airpower Research Institute. Specialists gust 1988. 209 pages, $10.00. stock no. 008-070- examine each of the major areas of the world 00617-1. with regard to the environment for low-intensity conflict and the factors influencing each A consideration of the elements of political situation. and military strategy as part of the broad deci­ sionmaking process, influenced by economic, technological, cultural, and historical factors. Covers the strategy-making process, grand strat­ On Space Warfare: A Space Power Doctrine by egy. military’ strategy throughout the spectrum of Lt Col David E. Lupton, USAF (Retired), June conflict, and the factors that influence the pro­ 1988,149 pages. $7.00, stock no. 008-070-00608- cess of making strategy. i. Insights into the various doctrines that govern (or could govern) military affairs in space. The Low-Intensity Conflict in the Third World by Dr book examines the historical perspective from Lewis B. Ware et al., August 1988, 178 pages, which these doctrines are viewed and places $7.50, stock no. 008-070-00609-0. them in the context of current space issues. notams

Notices of upcoming conferences, seminars, and other professional notices of a noncommercial nature should be sent to: Editor, Airpower Jour­ nal, WaJker Hall, Maxwell AFB AL 36112-5532. We reserve the right to edit material for length and editorial content.

VMI/American M ilitary Institute Military Edu­ “Space—A New Era." For more information, cation Conference contact the United States Space Foundation, PO The Virginia Military Institute's Department of Box 1838. Colorado Springs CO 80901, or call History and Politics will host the annual meet­ (719)550-1000. ing of the American Military Institute on 14-15 April 1989 in Lexington, Virginia. The confer­ Specialized Pilot Training ence theme is “Military Education and The Air Force has announced that it will begin Thought.” For more information, contact the specialized undergraduate pilot training in AMI Conference Coordinator, Department of 1991. All pilot trainees will attend a primary History and Politics, VMI, Lexington VA 24450. phase of training followed by a specialized track for either bomber-fighter aircraft or tanker-trans­ Old Dominion Soviet Military Doctrine port aircraft. The specialized track for the stu­ Conference dents will be identified before they enter the Old Dominion University is sponsoring a con­ primary phase of training. Bomber-fighter stu­ ference on “Soviet Military Doctrine in an Era of dents will fly T-38 aircraft in their specialized Change" to be held at Old Dominion University track while tanker-transport students will fly a on 25-27 May 1989. For more information, con­ yet-to-be-identified twin-engine aircraft. tact Philip S. Gillette, Graduate Program in In­ ternational Studies. Old Dominion University, Army Aviation Meeting Norfolk VA 23529-0088, or call (804) 440-4643. The Army Aviation Association of America's an­ nual convention will be held 5-9 April 1989 in Space Symposium Atlanta, Georgia. This year’s theme is “Training The United States Space Foundation will hold the Army Aviation Force.” For more informa its Fifth National Space Symposium 4-7 April tion, contact Bill Harris, Army Aviation Associ 1989 at the Broadmoor Hotel, Colorado Springs, ation of America, 49 Richmondville Avenue. Colorado. The theme of the symposium is Westport CT 06880-2000. or call (203) 226-8184

90 contributors

berta. Canada. Captain (major (AF/IG) for the Air Force Inspection selecteel Krisinger is a graduate of and Safety Center. Norton AFB, Cali­ Squadron Officer School and Air fornia. His flying experience totals Command and Staff College. 1.700 hours, primarily as an F-4 weapon systems officer. He served as commander of the 3246th Munitions Maintenance Squadron (AFSC) at Egiin AFB, Florida. Colonel Boyles has published articles in Flying Safety and Airscoop. He is a graduate of Squadron Officer School and Air Command and Staff College.

Col Clifford R. Krieger (USAFA; MA, University of Southern California) is chief of the Strategy Division. Joint Chiefs of Staff. He has served as com­ mander of the 86th Tactical Fighter Wing; as assistant deputy chief of staff, plans, at Headquarters USAFE; and as chief of the Doctrine Division at Headquarters USAF. He is a gradu­ Capt Greg K. Mitteiman (BA. South­ ate of the Royal Air Force Staff Col­ west Texas State University: MS, Troy lege. Army War College, Air State University) is chief. Explosive Command and Staff College, and Air Ordnance Disposal. 3246th Muni­ War College. tions Maintenance Squadron at Egiin AFB. Florida. He has served as a mu­ nitions inspector for the Headquarters Pacific Air Forces Inspector General and as munitions branch chief. Osan AB. Republic of Korea, and Wheeler AFB. Hawaii. Captain Mitteiman is a graduate of Squadron Officer School.

Col A. Lee Harrell (BBA. University of Miami: MS. University of Southern California) is deputy commander for operations. 507th Tactical Air Control Wing, Shaw AFB, South Carolina. His Cap! Chris J. Krisinger IUSAFA) is previous assignments have included the editor of Airlift magazine, pub­ deputy commander for operations, lished at Military Airlift Command's 52d Tactical Fighter Wing, Spangdah- Airlift Operations School. Scott AFB, lem AB, West Germany, and air liai­ Illinois. A C-130 pilot with more than son officer, 82d Airborne Division at 3.000 flying hours, he has served a Fort Bragg, North Carolina. Colonel tour at Pope AFB. North Carolina, and Harrell is a graduate of Squadron Of­ has been an exchange officer with Ca­ Lt Col Joe Boyles (USAFA; MS. AFIT) ficer School, Air Command and Staff nadian Forces at CFB Edmonton. Al­ is an aircraft maintenance inspector College, and Air War College.

91 Maj Andrew J. Ogan (BS, University Capt Joseph F. Udemi (BS, Texas of Kansas; MS. AF1T) is chief of sup­ A&M University: MS, Embry-Riddle ply, 513th Supply Squadron, RAF Aeronautical University) is an A-10 Mildenhall (USAFE). He has served aircraft maintenance officer. 23d Tac­ in many supply-related positions, in­ tical Fighter Wing. England AFB. cluding chief of wholesale require­ Louisiana. From 1985 to 1988. he was ments policy at Headquarters USAF. assistant professor of aerospace stud­ Major Ogan has published articles in ies. AFROTC Detachment 880. Vir­ the Defense Management Journal. Lo­ ginia Military Institute. Captain gistics Spectrum, and the Air Force Udemi is a graduate of Squadron Of­ Journal of Logistics. ficer School. BOARD OF ADVISERS

Col Kenneth J. Alnwick, USA F, Retired, Kapos Associates Lt Col Donald R. Baucom , USAF, Office of Air Force History Col Janies L. Cole, Jr., USAF, Assistant for Joint Matters, ODJS Col Raym ond A. Hamilton, Jr., U SA F, AFROTC, University of Alabama Maj Gen I. B. Holley, Jr., USAFR, Retired, Duke University Dr Richard H. Kohn, Chief, Office of Air Force History

The Airpower Journal (ISSN 0897-0823), Air Force Recurring Publication 50-2, is published quarterly. Subscriptions are available from the Superin- tendant of Documents, US Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402. Annual rates are $9.50 domestic and $11.90 outside the United States. The GPO stock number is 708-007-00000-5. The Journal welcomes unsolicited manuscripts. Address them to Editor, Air- power Journal, Walker Hall, Maxwell AFB, Alabama 36112-5532. Submit double-spaced, typed manuscripts in duplicate. Journal telephone listings are AUTOVON 875-5322 and commercial (205) 293-5322. Summer Selections

Revisiting Air Defense Australian Air Doctrine “Downtown” Once More C i

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