'Knives, Tanks, and Missiles': Israel's Security Revolution Eliot A. Cohen Michael J. Eisenstadt Andrew J. Bacevich The Washington Institute for Near East Policy A Washington Institute Monograph All rights reserved. Printed in the United States of America. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopy, recording, or any information storage and retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publisher. © 1998 by the Washington Institute for Near East Policy Published in 1998 in the United States of America by the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 1828 L Street N.W. Suite 1050, Washington, DC 20036 Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Cohen, Eliot A. 'Knives, tanks, and missiles' : Israel's security revolution / Eliot A. Cohen, Michael J. Eisenstadt, Andrew J. Bacevich. p. cm. ISBN 0-944029-72-8 (pbk.) 1. Israel —Defenses. 2. National Security —Israel. 3. Israel —Tseva haganah le- Yisra'el. I. Eisenstadt, Michael. II. Bacevich, A. J. III. Title UA853.I8C623 1998 98-10302 355'.03305694— dc21 CIP Cover design by Debra Naylor, Naylor Design Inc. Photo © Photodisc 1998. A Note About the Title The title of this study—'Knives, Tanks, and Missiles': Israel's Security Revolution—derives from an oft-repeated metaphor used by former Foreign Minister Shimon Peres to describe the threat Israel faces following the end of the Cold War. According to Peres, Israel had traditionally prepared to deal with the threat posed by "the tank"—that is, the conventional military forces possessed by its neighbors. This had caused Israel to "think in an old-fashioned way" that prevented it from facing "the new danger" that came from terrorism ("the knife") and weapons of mass destruction ("the missile").1 This paper examines Israel's efforts to come to terms with the new threat environment captured by the Peres metaphor, as well as its efforts to grapple with broader changes in the political, military-technical, and socioeconomic spheres. 1 Shimon Peres interview quoted in Mideast Mirror, April 6, 1993, p. 2; and Shimon Peres interview aired on the Charlie Rose Show, May 18,1994. The Authors Eliot A. Cohen is professor of strategic studies at the Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS) of the Johns Hopkins University. He received his B.A. and Ph.D. degrees from Harvard University, where he was an assistant professor of government from 1982 to 1985. Between 1985 and 1990 he taught in the strategy department at the Naval War College. Following a brief period of service on the policy planning staff of the Office of the Secretary of Defense, he was appointed to the chair in strategic studies at SAIS. From 1991 to 1993, he directed and edited the Gulf War Air Power Survey, the U.S. Air Force's six-volume official study of the 1991 war with Iraq. He is the author (with John Gooch) of Military Misfortunes: The Anatomy of Failure in War (Free Press, 1991) and of two other books and numerous articles. Michael J. Eisenstadt is a senior fellow at The Washington Institute for Near East Policy. He has an M.A. in Arab Studies from Georgetown University, and his publications include Iranian Military Power: Capabilities and Intentions', Supporting Peace: America's Role in an Israel-Syria Peace Agreement (with Carl Ford and Andrew Bacevich); and Like a Phoenix from the Ashes? The Future of Iraqi Military Power. In 1992 he took a leave of absence from The Institute to work on the U.S. Air Force's Gulf War Air Power Survey. In that capacity, he contributed a chapter on Iraqi strategy and plans prior to the Gulf War. Before coming to The Institute, he worked as a military analyst with the U.S. Army. He is also a reserve officer in the U.S. Army and served in Turkey and Iraq as part of Operation Provide Comfort. Andrew J. Bacevich is executive director of the Johns Hopkins Foreign Policy Institute at SAIS. A graduate of the U.S. Military Academy, he received his Ph.D. from Princeton University. Prior to beginning his academic career, Dr. Bacevich served for twenty-three years as an officer in the U.S. Army, to include tours in Vietnam, Germany, and the Persian Gulf. He is the author of two books: The Pentomic Era: The U.S. Army Between Korea and Vietnam and Diplomat in Khaki: Major General Frank Ross McCoy and American Foreign Policy, 1898-1949. Dr. Bacevich is also the coauthor of American Military Policy in Small Wars: The Case of El Salvador and Supporting Peace: America's Role in an Israel-Syria Peace Agreement. The opinions expressed in this Policy Paper are those of the authors and should not be construed as representing those of The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, its Board of Trustees, or Board of Advisors. Contents Acknowledgments ix Preface xi Executive Summary xiii I Introduction 1 II Israel's National Security Doctrine: Continuity and Change 17 HI Israel's Military Culture: Conservative Innovation 49 IV The Israeli Revolution in Security Affairs 81 V Implications 131 Appendices Appendix A: Five Scenarios for War 143 Appendix B: The IDF from War to War: A Statistical Portrait 147 vu Acknowledgments Many Israeli and American officials, journalists, and experts shared their views with us—often under condition of anonymity, which we have preserved—and we are grateful to them. Efraim Inbar of the BESA Center for Strategic Studies at Bar Ilan University gave us valuable substantive and administrative support during our research visit to Israel in the spring of 1996, which considerably eased our task there. He and his colleague, Stuart Cohen, shared their scholarly insights with us. Shimon Naveh and his associates, and in particular Zvi Lanir and Dov Tamari, arranged for us a series of meetings in Israel that provided indispensable insights into the IDF. Ze'ev Schiff, dean of Israeli defense correspondents, gave us the benefit of his encyclopedic knowledge of Israeli security matters. Robert Satloff of The Washington Institute for Near East Policy has supported this effort since its inception, lending particularly valuable logistical support during its early phases. Tehilla Kalisky and Lawrence Kaplan helped us assemble and organize a variety of sources, providing invaluable research assistance. Adam Garfinkle of the National Interest suggested the title. Stuart Frisch, Karen Dunn, Eytan Fisch, Elyse Aronson, Jonathan Lincoln, John Wilner, and Monica Neal of The Washington Institute for Near East Policy provided invaluable assistance in editing and preparing the monograph for publication. We received comments on earlier drafts from a number of individuals, including James Carney, Stuart Cohen, Efraim Inbar, Marvin Feuer, Thomas Keaney, Azriel Lorber, Andrew Marshall, Kenneth Pollack, Uri Reychav, Stephen Rosen, Thomas Welch, Ehud Ya'ari, Yedidiah Ya'ari and others, including serving officers in the IDF whose identities we have kept anonymous. Their views contributed greatly to this book. We stress, however, that we take exclusive responsibility for what follows. Eliot A. Cohen Michael J. Eisenstadt Andrew J. Bacevich IX Preface While the day's headlines focus on the stalemate in the Arab-Israeli peace process, the necessity of deterring and—potentially—fighting war remains the supreme challenge for Israel's leaders. Indeed, history provides few examples of a country taking risks for peace with some of its neighbors while remaining under threat of attack from others. Security and peace may go hand in hand, but ensuring one while attaining the other is no easy feat. Complicating this effort is the remarkable pace of technological change that has created what experts term a "revolution in military affairs." As the new century approaches, the very concept of war and conflict is undergoing fundamental change. Weapons are "smarter" and more lethal than ever before, terrorism can now pose a strategic threat and missiles can now bring an enemy thousands of miles away to a nation's borders. Readying soldiers, sailors, and airmen, mostly reserves, to fight an "old fashioned" conventional war—while preparing for these new challenges—is a herculean task. To understand the answers Israeli military planners and strategic thinkers have given to these critical questions—so as to glean appropriate lessons for the U.S. armed forces—the Pentagon's Office of Net Assessment commissioned a team of respected scholars to undertake this special study. Working under the joint banner of The Washington Institute and the Foreign Policy Institute at Johns Hopkins University's Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies, the trio of Eliot Cohen, Michael Eisenstadt, and Andrew Bacevich undertook extensive research and traveled together to Israel for intensive discussions with active and retired Israeli officers and officials. Their findings, presented here, constitute a comprehensive assessment of the changing face of Israel's security challenges and the varied responses the Israeli government has devised to meet them. We concur with the Pentagon in believing there is much for Americans to learn from the Israeli experience, but we also publish this study out of a conviction that increased knowledge of Israeli security dilemmas can assist the United States in advancing the cause of peace. Mike Stein Barbi Weinberg President Chairman XI Executive Summary Born a small, beleaguered state, outnumbered and surrounded by enemies committed to its destruction, Israel early in its history formulated a distinctive set of principles for its basic defense policy. To outside observers, Israel's approach became emblematic of, indeed, in some respects indistinguishable from its national character. Throughout the quarter-century immediately following independence, the national security concept derived from those principles served Israel well. Beginning with the shock of the 1973 war and continuing through the next two decades, however, events tested that concept severely and raised doubts about its durability.