Autumn Readings Air Base Defense Kenney in the Pacific Wartime Manpower

Secretary of the Air Force Dr Donald B. Rice

Air Force Chief of Staff Gen Larry D. Welch

Commander, Air University Lt Gen Ralph E. Havens

Commander, Center for Aerospace Doctrine, Research, and Education Gol Sidney J. Wise

Editor Col Keith W. Geiger

Associate Editor Maj Michael A. Kirtland

Professional Staff Hugh Richardson, Contributing Editor Marvin W. Bassett, Contributing Editor John A. Westcott, Art Director and Production Manager Steven C. Garst, Art Editor and Illustrator

The Airpower Journal, published quarterly, is the professional journal of the United States Air Force. It is designed to serve as an open forum for presenting and stimulating innovative think- ing on military doctrine, strategy, tactics, force structure, readiness, and other national defense matters. The views and opinions expressed or implied in the Journal are those of the authors and should not be construed as carrying the official sanction of the Department of Defense, the Air Force, Air University, or other agencies or departments of the US government.

Articles in this edition may be reproduced in whole or in part without permission. If repro- duced, the Airpower Journal requests a courtesy line. JOURNAL FALL 1989, Vol. Ill, No. 3 AFRP 50-2

To Protect an Air Base Brig Gen Raymond E. Beil, fr., USAR, Retired 4

One-A-Penny, Two-A-Penny Wing Comdr Brian L. Kavanagh, RAAF Wing Comdr David J. Schubert, RAAF 20 Aggressive Vision Maj Charles M. Westenhoff, USAF 34 US Space Doctrine: Time for a Change? Lt Col Alan J. Parrington. USAF 50 A US Air Force Role in Counterinsurgency Support Maj Richard D. Newton, USAF 62 Solving the Wartime Combat-Support Manpower Equation G. F. Matecko Maj Clifford R. Borofsky, USAF 74 Fire/Counterfire! Col Clifford R. Krieger, USAF Lt Col Price T. Bingham. USAF 8 6

Ricochets 2 Letters Net Assessment 91 Reviews of Current Literature Notams 94 Notices of Interest Contributors 95 ricochets

Letters to the editor are encouraged. A ll corre- effective for these types of missions. Their over­ spondence should be addressed to the Editor. all size and stability provide excellent platforms Airpower Journal, VV'alker Hall. Maxwell AFB for even the nost advanced cameras and equip­ AL 36112-5532. We re s e r v e the right to edit the ment. The medium-threat environment can cer­ material for overall length. tainly be met by such platforms as the RF-4 and other reconnaissance aircraft that are equipped with electronic countermeasures devices. It is RECONNAISSANCE within the high-threat environment that I feel (Editor's Note: The following letter is in re­ most changes could and should be made. sponse to two articles from earlier editions of As an example, let’s look at the mission of Airpower Journal—specifically. “Tactical Em- battle-damage assessment. Under heavy fire and ployment of Strategic Air Power in Korea” from in situations requiring up-to-the-minute intelli­ Winter 1988 and "Air Battle 200(1 in the NATO gence, we have relied upon the audacity and Alliance: Exploiting Conceptual and Techno- daring of reconnaissance pilots and their expen­ logical Advances” from the Winter 1987-88 sive hardware. issue.] Now, imagine a scenario in which an RPV carrying advanced sensing equipment were to accompany a strike force on a run. After the first We are living in the age of information. Telecom­ aircraft made an attack, the inexpensive drone munications and the electronic transfer of data could loiter in the vicinity of the target and and information occur at a rate that is staggering instantaneously relay information to the striking to the mind. The battlefield of tomorrow is no aircraft, showing whether a second aircraft different. The battle lines will demand faster needed to attempt a run. This would reduce the means of gathering and disseminating informa­ exposure of manned aircraft to enemy fire. The tion than ever before. I believe that the future of RPVs I have mentioned are certainly not a new aerial reconnaissance lies in remotely piloted idea, but an idea whose time has come. vehicles (RPVs) and in improved systems for Advances in the technology associated with aircraft that are currently in the inventory. Each such vehicles clearly point the way. Providing threat level—low, medium, and high—presents that drones remain inexpensive, I see no reason a different challenge to the designers of any why we could not expect to see them opera­ system or platform that will meet the needs of tional within four to five years. By “inex­ each situation. pensive." I mean that the optical and sensing Aerial reconnaissance is worth its weight in equipment would account for the major portion gold. Some of the missions in which it will most of the cost. likely be used include (1) advance warning of Shifting this mission to unmanned vehicles troop transfers (indicating escalation, potential would free up more equipment and funds for outbreaks of hostilities, and related informa­ primary attack and fighter aircraft. As men­ tion), (2) target acquisition (including identify­ tioned earlier, the ideal system would include ing. pinpointing location, and assessing strength the ability to directly transfer the imagery to the of materials needed to engage ground targets), aircraft accompanying an RPV on the mission. (3) battle-damage assessment (determining the This could also be expanded to include the results of strikes against targets), and (4) other transfer of information to the rear, where unit general-purpose intelligence gathering. commanders could assess the situation first­ This list is by no means complete. 1 believe hand. Other advantages would be that the drone that the current platforms are adequate for mis­ could then be expendable, since the information sions in low-threat environments and most of would not have to be retrieved and processed those in medium-threat environments. Aircraft like film before it could be used. “Expend- such as the C-130 Hercules and even the older abilitv" in this sense means that the drone could C-47s have proven themselves reliable and cost- be directed into hostile fire and remain close to HICOCHETS 3

joth the ground and the target. Even as it goes to iron majors better than that. He won’t survive its destruction, it could provide close-up images long in the big world of Washington yuppie ;hat would allow more accurate assessments of politics unless he mends his ways. the damage. To make this program a success. Major Hillson Increased availability to instantaneous infor­ will have to address safety consideration (how mation implies emphasis on the associated do we keep our own pilots from running into training that would be required of unit com­ them? I suggest we install global positioning manders. In fact, there would be a need for system [GPS] locating beacons on each balloon personnel at every level to become aware of the and exchange precision location information via principles of photo/imagery interpretation so as Joint Tactical Information Distribution System to prevent good information from becoming bad [JTIDS] Class IV terminals). He will also have to analysis. If commanders are to have access to address how to make them capable of with­ more information, they must also increase their standing hurricane-force winds (hurricanes are ability to mentally process and use the infor­ very common in the Central Region. 1 suggest we mation. Of course, this could not replace the tether them to a ground control module [GCM], experience and talents of professional photo­ suitably configured for nuclear, biological, interpreters. There will always be a demand chemical [NBC] operations, all-terrain traversal, within the military for this skill, and any efforts and with interactive-distributed, precision, made toward remotely piloted aerial reconnais­ semiactive, redundant control capabilities. The sance would merely enhance their work rather tether could be of fiber-optic-capable, multilay­ than replace it. Oddly enough, there is a fear ered, KEVLAN II, composite construction.) Ma­ among pilots that their positions are somehow jor Hillson will also have to address cost rhreatened by remotely piloted reconnaissance sharing, multislice funding, and balloon-off test­ drones. I do not see this as a valid concern. ing before we can even begin to consider going There will always be a need for trained, skilled, to the acquisition board for consideration. He and talented pilots. Yet, to fend off the inevitable has a lot of work to do. advances in the field of remote drones is to be A good first effort, though. rather shortsighted. Let us welcome the future technological breakthroughs with open arms; Col Wayne A. Possehl, USAF they will allow us to put lives on the line only Norfolk, Virginia when there is no viable alternative. Where we have the capability, I do not see how we could take any other course. After all, is not the AN EOD DEFICIENCY preservation of life and the quality of that life the reason for a military system in the first Lt Col Joe Boyles and Capt Greg K. Mittelman place? (“Paradox of the Headless Horseman,” Spring 1989) point out that the deficiency concerning Cadet Jeffrey J. Godfrey, AFROTC Brigham Young University. Utah explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) is one of ill-equipped but otherwise capable and adept noncommissioned officers (NCOs). Yet, their solution is not to properly equip these capable HOT AIR BALLOONS NCOs but to provide long-term (commissioned) Congratulations to Maj Franklin J. Hillson on his officer leadership. Their solution doesn't fit the Summer 1989 article "Barrage Balloons for Low- problem-another paradox. Level Air Defense.” It was well written and Because all solutions must fit problems, provocatively supported. surely they're not suggesting that “dedicated, Shame on him. though, for being so politically long-term officer leadership" must be the tools naive as to think that a simple, nondevelopmen- or the equipment EOD senior NCOs need to use tal, cheap, effective, and readily available sys­ to develop the “vision, doctrine, and bureau­ tem has a chance at all of being seriously cratic apparatus necessary to carve out a mission considered. He should know that even a concept statement." Neigh. That's too much like a horse that has stood the test of combat operations in of a different color. two world wars has no chance of implementa­ Their sentiment about EOD senior NCO lead­ tion unless it is expensive, technologically over­ ership reminds me of another one; only commis- sophisticated, unsupportable. and subject to career building. I thought we were training our Continned on page 91 TO PROTECT AN AIR BASE . . .

B rig Gen Raymo nd E. B el l , Jr ., USAR, R et ir ed

A rebel band took its Stingers to the Soviet air base at Qandahar [Afghanistan], set up shop not far from the end of the runway. . . . Wall Street Journal

T IS a rigorous challenge to protect an NATO challenge. This challenge, to be sure, air base against ground attack. It was for is not new—except, that is, for the United the Soviets in Afghanistan. It will be for States Army. the US Central Command (USCENT- In Vietnam, for example, air base ground ICOM) as well. This article therefore focuses defense was a major problem for both the on USCENTCOM's area of operations in US Air Force and Marine Corps. In fact, Southwest Asia where unilateral efforts at from the establishment of the first airdrome Army-Air Force ground defense integration until 1 November 1964, ground defense of are required, unlike in Europe where air airfields was pretty much an academic ex­ base ground defense is a multinational ercise for the US military. Then, on that TO PROTECT AN AIFi BASE 5

.November day—two days before the US lowed at once by parachute troops, dropped national elections—harsh reality stung the into the aerodrome. And so, when the defend­ United States. At the large air base at Bien ers came up for air. they found themselves Hoa, north of Saigon. South Vietnam, a looking into the muzzles of tommy-guns."1 sudden Communist ground attack killed The Germans used these techniques in four Americans, wounded another 76, and 1941 in the invasion of Crete, but the as­ destroyed 27 aircraft. sault was a very costly airborne seizure It was the turning point for the Air Force, operation. German paratroop and airlanded which heretofore had concentrated almost soldiers captured the British air base at exclusively on internal base security. The Maleme, which was the key to driving the attack left the Air Force little choice but to Commonwealth soldiers off the island. But start looking beyond the base perimeter. in spite of its success, the assault also It would take another twenty years, how­ ever. for the US Army to become doctrin- ally involved. Throughout the Vietnam conflict, the Army was but a casual partic­ ipant in protecting Air Force bases. In Au­ gust 1965, for example, Lt Gen |ohn L. Throckmorton said Army troops would not secure air bases. There were not enough soldiers for the mission. In December 1965 Gen William Westmoreland reiterated the Army stand. He felt that every US military member, regardless of service, must be pre­ pared to engage the enemy in combat. The result was that no Army troops were ever completely dedicated to the task. Westmoreland's words still ring true, but the context within which they are viewed is different. Today the Army and the other services squarely face the major challenge of air base ground defense. And the chal­ lenge has stirred some vigorous concern.

The Threats In World War II. the most critical ground threat to an airfield was its seizure. German tactics against Allied air bases had become fairly standardized by 1940. In his book The Second World War. 1939-1945, noted military writer J. F. C. Fuller states: The German technique in attacking aero­ dromes is interesting. First came bombers which from medium levels attacked the pe­ riphery in order to drive the enemy A.A. gunners to shelter. Next came dive-bombers and machine-gunning fighters to keep the defenders in their shelters. “These were fol­ 6 AIRPOWER JOURNAL FALL 1989 meant the end of large-scale German air­ but each have their drawbacks. Air assaults borne operations. The losses to the Luft­ take time, surprise, extensive planning waffe and its airborne troops were so and air superiority. The effectiveness of devastating that they deterred Hitler from rockets is decreased by aircraft dispersion, ever trying such a scheme again. Neverthe­ berms, bunkers, revetments, and emplace­ less, we could expect the Soviets to follow ments. Alert and pervasive defenses can a similar pattern today if they tried such also thwart rocket attacks as well as sapper operations. sorties. Against a well-defended air base, Later, in Vietnam, air bases were also the sappers’ chances of success rapidly prime enemy targets, but the major threats decrease. there ended up being rockets and sappers. Although the aforementioned threats are On 27 February 1967, for example, the still important, modern technology has pro­ Vietcong fired 56 Soviet-made 122-mm vided an even more sinister threat—the rockets into the Da Nang Air Base for the shoulder-launched guided missile. first time. The rockets were a favorite weapon of the Vietcong, and on this occa­ sion the rockets caused considerable casu­ The Most alties and much damage. Until countered, they continued to be effective. Demanding Threat On the other hand, on 1 July 1965, an enemy sapper (demolition) squad got “A rebel band . . . blasted a few Soviet through the perimeter wire onto the flight planes as they tried to take-off with fuel and line at Da Nang. It destroyed three C-130 ammunition, then melted in the hills.” So transports and three F-102 fighters while reported the Wail Street Journal on 16 Feb­ damaging three more F-102s. The raiders ruary 1988.1 For a potential horror story, came through the thickly populated area substitute the words United States for So­ for which the South Vietnamese armed viet. Enough said. forces were responsible. Such actions hap­ From Pearl Harbor to Da Nang, some people have pened many times. thought that keeping aircraft lined up close together Today airborne operations, rockets, and made sense, but it only provided lucrative targets for sappers continue to be important threats, the enemy. TO PROTECT AN A lii RASE 7

The wing commander's primary mission Enter then the aggressor with the is to generate a large number of aircraft shoulder-fired guided missile. The threat of sorties. That is, he wants to launch as many missiles flying up the tail pipes of US armed aircraft as possible to flv missions aircraft as they lift off is real and hard to against the enemy. He needs to be able to do counter. If the need for air base ground that any time the aircraft are required, and defense ever needed a clarion call for im­ he wants the skv as clear as possible over mediate attention, this threat surely is it. the air base, particularly when he launches. So intimated Bernard E. Trainor in the It can be argued that an aircraft is most 15 February 1989 issue of the New York vulnerable when it takes off. The pilot has Times when he wrote: to be concerned with maneuvering with a American officers are also studying the effect full load of fuel and munitions. He is very of hand-held anti-aircraft missiles, like the busy at and just after lift-off, and his ability to protect himself against hostile attack is very limited. An aircraft returning from a mission, on the other hand, is generally low on fuel and has expended its munitions. The pilot can usually go around for a second landing attempt if he needs to. He is actively look­ ing for impediments to his landing. If the air base is under attack, he probably has the option of diverting to another field for more fuel and armaments. The launching air­ craft, however, get no second chance at taking off or being diverted.

Maintenance areas Irightl are lucrative targets far enemy attacks. Shelters I below I aid in preventing damage, as does the vigilance of security forces and maintenance personnel. 8 AIRPOWER IOURNAL FALL 1989

Stinger, on the battlefield. They are pleased day, the Royal Air Force, with its integral with the Stinger's success, but worry about ground component, executes the air base the consequences of that success on their own ground defense mission. tactics.3 It also appears that the United States was moving in the same direction early in the Who Will war. On 12 February 1942 the Army Air Forces (AAF) began to form air base secu­ Counter the Threat? rity battalions, but they were never fully organized and were inactivated in 1943. Unfortunately, responsibility for counter­ Later, the Key West Agreement of 21 April ing the threat of hand-held antiaircraft mis­ 1948 left out any mention of a ground siles has long been a vague area for the combat mission on our bases for the new Americans. Such is not the case for the US Air Force. British. Soon after the fall of the airfield at In the Korean conflict, air base ground Maleme in Crete, the British moved to solve defense was a moot point. Although there their own situation. In February 1942 the were thousands of Korean guerrillas roam­ Royal Air Force Regiment was created. Full ing the rear areas, they never attacked an responsibility for local airdrome ground airfield. Nevertheless, the Air Force almost defense operations became the sole respon­ quadrupled its police strength to 39,000 sibility of the British Air Ministry. To this personnel in a year and a half. It also

Keeping one's head down during an attack can result in losing the battle, as the British found out in Crete during World War II. Enemy air attacks by the Germans were followed up by airborne assault and air landings. The same tactics can be expected from a Soviet assault on an air base. TO PHOTECT AN A lii HASP. y

as forcing the Air Force to having to go it alone. In Vietnam, nevertheless, the Air Force at first ignored air base ground defense. In­ stead. it concentrated on physical security aunched a crash program to procure ar- on the bases. The Vietnamese were left to nored cars, machine guns, recoilless rifles, provide protection outside the base. ind other infantry weapons. Not so. however, with the US Marine It was the Air Force’s Strategic Air Com­ Corps. In March 1965 the 9th Marine Expe­ mand (SAC) that first really picked up on ditionary Brigade was assigned to protect the air base at Da Nang. But it took a while the need for sound air base ground defense to work out an effective and coherent plan. doctrine. In the October 1952 edition of At first, battalions of the 9th Marine Infan­ SAC Manual 205-2, SAC recognized that try Regiment were employed in coordina­ the Army could not be expected to defend tion with the Vietnamese. A provisional Air Force installations that were not vital to base defense battalion was organized and the accomplishment of the Army’s own then disbanded in the summer of 1965. missions. SAC saw the responsibility rest­ In 1966 the 1st Military Police Battalion ing firmly on the Air Force’s shoulders. It (USMC) arrived and worked a three-tier hoped for the Army’s participation but saw protective operation. In addition to aggres­ distance and other, more pressing missions sively patrolling outside the base perime-

The British quickly realized the need for a dedicated defense force after the loss of Crete. The RAF Regiment now forms such a force. The US Air Force has determined that air base ground defense teams and Armv forces should do the job. Da Nang AJ3. Vietnam. !967. An example of the kind of destruction that a quick, elusive enemy attack can cause. ter. the Marines fortified and wired much of the installation. It took almost another 20 years for the Army and Air Force together to make a decision similar to that made by the Marines in Vietnam. In 1984 mutual agreement between the Air Force and the Army was reached as to who would provide ground protection to Air F’orce bases. In peacetime and in the continental United States (CONUS), at all times, the responsibility is that of the Air

10 TO PROTECT AN AIR BASE 11

orce. Outside CONUS during war the re­ under all circumstances. Sortie genera­ sponsibility for protection outside the air tion is everything. Essentially this means base belongs to the US Army Military Po- launching aircraft into the air and on their ice Corps. way into battle. Once they return, the planes must be refueled, rearmed, and pos­ sibly recrewed as quickly as possible and dispatched forthwith. Air Force The problem arises as to what those Air Security Forces Force personnel who are not charged spe­ cifically with guarding the base or have no Whereas there is agreement between the aircraft to service do when the base is Army and Air Force on who does what, under ground attack. Do they grab weapons there is still an internal dilemma within the and fight, or do they “go to ground”? Con­ Air Force. It is still not definitely deter­ sidering the World War II German airfield mined to what extent the Air Force itself attack technique, “going to ground" might will participate in its own defense. mean the demise of the air base. The successful defense of an air base is As a result of US War Department Gen­ medicated on keeping the base functioning eral Order 7 in 1927, marksmanship train-

lobile a ir base ground defense teams are designed to The Air Force would like to see dedicated Army units defend the perimeter of a base from attack. The Air assigned to defend air bases, but for the Army that is Force has shown its adaptability to ground warfare not a practical solution. Nonetheless, military police with such teams. Coordination with Army m ilitary are assigned this role outside of the United States in police operating outside the perimeter w ill signifi- wartime. cantly improve base security. 12 AIRPOWER JOURNAL FALL 1989

internal security and law and order func­ tions, the security police are organized into security police squadrons that are much like US Army military police (MP) ele­ ments on Army posts. They are very much in evidence on duty at the gate and in patrolling throughout the air base. They are less obvious performing security duties on ing was denied Army aircraft mechanics the aircraft ramps unless one tries to make and other technicians. Army Air Corps per­ an unauthorized entry into some off-limits sonnel were to receive no more infantry area. training than how to march and salute. For the defense of the air base, the secu­ On the other hand, on 29 June 1941, after rity police assume a different posture. They the fall of the base at Maleme, Prime Min­ are organized into air base ground defense ister Winston Churchill of Great Britain flights. The basic formation, consisting of ordered the Royal Air Force into a ground 44 personnel, is equivalent to a Marine combat role. He noted that “every airfield Corps infantry platoon and is also orga­ should be a stronghold of fighting air- nized somewhat like one. groundmen, and not the abode of uni­ The flight is commanded by a captain formed civilians in the prime of life and has a platoon sergeant known as a protected by detachments of soldiers.”4 police superintendent. Three radio/tele- There was not much doubt in the minds of phone operators complete the five-member the British airmen as to where their duty flight headquarters element. The flight is a lay. heavily armed fighting unit with extensive Today, however, the issue is not at all communications capability. Each flight has clear-cut. One of the biggest inhibitors three squads of 13 airmen each as its fight­ to training all airmen to defend them­ ing elements. The squads are further di­ selves and to function as infantry is cost- vided into three teams of four airmen each and have a noncommissioned officer as effectiveness. Is it worth the cost to train so squad leader. Each team leader is armed many Air Force personnel for such a prob­ with an M-16 rifle. A second team member lematical situation as defending an air­ is also armed with an M-16, as is a third field? An even more potentially dangerous who carries an M203 grenade launcher at­ situation would be the inability to coordi­ tached to his weapon. The fourth team nate properly all the firepower thus gener­ member is armed with an M-60 machine ated. Might it be better to have a few airmen gun. who are well armed and trained to fight The standard air base ground defense properly than have everyone shooting at unit does not have organic transportation. everyone else, thereby also jeopardizing the There are, however, mobile flights that are successful defense of the base? There has equipped with the new high-mobility mul­ been no firm Air Force-wide decision as of tipurpose wheeled vehicle (HMMWV). In yet. addition, all flights are well supplied with the materiel required to defend fighting positions. This includes copious amounts Security Police of sandbags, timber, and barbed wire to secure defensive sites. The Air Force has, nevertheless, taken The Air Force’s Korean and Vietnamese many positive steps to enhance its air base experience regarding heavier equipment ground defense forces. Primary responsibil­ has also not been forgotten. As a result, the ity within the Air Force for such missions Air Force has continued to procure a vari­ rests with the security police. For normal ety of heavy infantry weapons. The 81-mm TO PROTECT AN AIR RASE 13

mortar. .50-cal. heavy machine gun, 90-mm Finally, there are other Air Force units recoilless rifle, and 40-mm automatic gre­ designated to assist in base defense. But nade launcher are in the Air Force inven­ those units basically augment the standard tory. air base ground defense flight. Special teams that reinforce the basic In spite of all the necessary ingredients, organization fight against heavy weapons. however, there is one important element There is the two-man heavy machine gun presently missing. There is no unit struc­ section that may be attached as reinforce­ ture above the flight level, like an air base ment to a flight. The weapon is used in ground defense squadron, to effectively co­ either its ground or vehicular-mounted ordinate the defense against all the afore­ configuration. There is also a two-man re­ mentioned elements. It is not yet known in coilless rifle section for employment the field how all the flights and teams will against tanks and other armored vehicles. be organized to conduct operations under The 90-mm rifle is a good match for the the aegis of the base defense operations light tracked fighting vehicles of the threat center (BDOC). Thus some pertinent ques­ forces' airborne armor unit. tions go unanswered. For example, is a Then there is the four-man mortar sec­ standard air base ground defense squadron tion. Its function is to fire signal flares and consisting of several flights and weapons smoke shells as well as to hit pinpoint teams to be organized for defense of large targets. The range of the mortar allows it to air bases? If so, will the air base commander be used in support of both the air base be assigned several squadrons or will there ground defense flight and the military po­ be just one with several flights assigned to lice operating outside the perimeter. it per base? Such questions must be an­ swered soon because the Air Force security forces are not the only ones concerned with the answers. The Army’s military police In Vietnam. Army defensive units became quite adept at directing air support, such as this AC-47 gunship. also need to know the answers so they can in air base defense. That expertise needs to be re­ fight beside the Air Force in a coordinated gained to effectively defend a ir bases today. manner. 14 A1RPOWER JOURNAL FALL 1989

Army Air Base Calling in artillery fire and directing at­ Ground Defense Forces tacking aircraft are relatively new tasks for military police. But the exigencies of fight­ The US Army, charged with the task of ing in the rear areas make it mandatory that guarding air bases under the 1984 Memo­ they be able to do so. In Vietnam, for randum of Agreement, gave the job to its example, the AC-47, dubbed “Puff the military police. A look at the military po­ Magic Dragon,” was particularly effective lice combat support structure shows it is in destroying Communist airfield attackers. well suited to accomplish its share of the Since Vietnam was really one big “rear task. area” and “Puff” with its three 7.62-mm The basic organization that will fight miniguns capable of firing 18,000 rounds of alongside the Air Force security police is ammunition per minute was so lethal, the MP combat support company. It con­ “Puff’s” modern version will again be very sists of a company headquarters and four much in demand. Consequently, the em­ identically organized platoons. The 33- ployment of the up-to-date AC-130 Spectre member platoon has a headquarters staff of is part of the Air Force security police three people: a lieutenant platoon leader, a training. It needs to be part of the Army’s as platoon sergeant, and a driver who also well. operates the vehicular radio. There are three squads of three teams each led by a noncommissioned squad leader for a total of 10 MPs per squad. Each team is Air Force armed with M-16 rifles, pistols, a grenade Operational Techniques launcher, a machine gun, and light antitank weapons. In the near future, a squad auto­ The Air Force has moved rapidly to train matic weapon (SAW) and the automatic its security police in air base ground de­ grenade launcher will be introduced. fense techniques. Such training has been Thus a platoon, with its 10 mobile- and is being done at such places as Nellis mounted weapon systems, represents a po­ AFB in Nevada. The concept of how to tent fighting force when assembled as a operate in a joint mode, however, needs unit. At the same time, because of its mo­ much more practice. USCENTCOM, recog­ bility, the platoon can operate effectively as nizing the shortfall, has already conducted scouts over a large area. The unit has the a joint air base ground defense exercise. ability to communicate and move in both a If practice is lacking, doctrine is not. vehicular and on-foot mode. Basically, the Air Force security elements The platoon, however, is rarely em­ are responsible for defending the close de­ ployed as one element in the sense that a fense area (CDA). This area includes all tank or mechanized infantry platoon would facilities and territory on the air base out to be. The platoon’s principal worth is to be what is very roughly considered “the pe­ found in its ability to obtain information, to rimeter wire.” This real or imaginary line, report it accurately, to call in supporting strung out along commanding terrain fea­ fires, and, only if necessary, to fight. The tures if possible, is usually delineated by combat military policeman is really a field fortifications manned by Air Force “super scout.” At the same time, however, security police, who establish themselves he must also be an accomplished artillery as if they were infantry units in the defense. forward observer and even a forward air Where the air base and all its ancillary controller. US Army military policemen elements are collocated, the task of provid­ must, therefore, learn the techniques for ing internal base defense is relatively sim­ calling in aircraft flying close air support ple. The problem arises where the fuel missions. supply—or more likely, the ammunition TO PROTECT AN AIB BASE 15 dump—is some distance from the flight results are potent. A visit to the stone- line and runways. Communications facili­ strewn desert area quickly reveals just how ties located off the base also complicate good infantrymen Air Force security police matters. can be. If the dump, fuel point, communications Thus, the Army soldier who must fight site, or some other key installation is an alongside the Air Force “soldier” can be exclusive Air Force responsibility, then the comfortable when he talks about fields of Air Force will provide the security. But fire, aiming stakes, and fighting positions. if the facilities are shared with the Army, The airman knows how to dig in, set up his or host nation, then the responsibility is weapons, and take the enemy under fire. shared. Each facility would initially have to defend itself against the attackers. As the fighting escalates, military police and Army Operations mobile Air Force security police would respond. Finally, a major tactical combat Whereas the Air Force’s overall security organization would be employed to defend role is fairly well defined, the Army’s is less against a major attack by airborne or airmo­ so. It is not that the Army’s role is unusu­ bile forces. ally difficult, but rather it is a matter of To facilitate dealing with attackers, plan­ emphasis. Military police are most evident ners have established three levels of threat in a law-and-order mode. They also train to determine the degree of response neces­ to fight, but the operational requisites of sary. Level I threats are those that a US peacetime often relegate such training to a Army troop unit should be able to counter. backseat. Saboteurs and agents fall into this category. In wartime, however, the military police Level II threats are the military police’s maneuver outside the base perimeter to responsibility and consist of small groups execute air base ground defense tasks. They of marauders that combat support or ser­ operate on the base only when their fire­ vice support troop units cannot effectively power and mobility are needed to repel counter. Level III threats require the em­ aggressors who have penetrated the outer ployment of major Army combat forces, as limits of the CDA. Basically, the military in the case of an airborne assault in the rear police mission is to detect and break up an area. enemy attack before it threatens the air Air Force units use the Army’s basic base’s operations. This, for example, is the techniques to defend against threat Levels I best way to deal with the guerrilla with the and II “inside the wire.” These techniques hand-held missile. MPs act as light cavalry, are taught to Air Force security police by constantly moving about and reconnoiter- the Army at Fort Dix, New jersey, where all ing, keeping the potential attacker off- airmen with a security police Air Force balance. not allowing him the luxury of just specialty code (AFSC) are given basic and sitting at the end of the runway with a advanced individual training. This came missile poised to fire at an aircraft. about as the result of another Memorandum The military police will conduct inten­ of Agreement which, in effect, made the sive patrol and combat operations over an Army the contractor for teaching airmen area that extends from three to five kilome­ basic infantry fighting techniques. Infantry ters from the base perimeter. The actual tactics or basic unit training for air base distance depends on an analysis of the unit ground defense, however, is conducted on mission, enemy threat, terrain in the area, Air Force bases like Nellis AFB. If what can and troops and time available. Beyond this be seen at Nellis is any indication as to the area, which is called the main defense area effectiveness of the joint basic Army-Air (MDA) is the screening force area (SFA), Force training, one can be assured that the also a military police responsibility. 16 A1RPOWER JOURNAL FALL 1989

The goal is to keep the enemy as far away coordinated. This goes as well for identifi­ from the air base as possible and particu­ cation signals and fields of fire. The Air larly out of those areas directly under an Force must have confidence in the Army aircraft’s flight path. The accomplishment troops in front of them. Thus, they must of that goal allows the air base to function know when and when not to shoot in order effectively and helps prevent the enemy to avoid fratricide. from shooting down launching aircraft. The The enemy airborne assault, either by best possible outcome is for the air base parachute or helicopter, represents a seri­ commander to never experience an enemy ous challenge and makes Army-Air Force ground presence. If the military police are coordination especially important. The at­ doing their job. the air base commander tacking force assembly area is the most will not see the MPs either. vulnerable part of such an assault. MPs Any threat is handled basically the same therefore pay particular attention to the way, much as the 1st MP Battalion of the fringes of landing or drop zones where Marines did in Vietnam, but with a large assembling troops congregate. If possible, dose of intelligence and local indigenous MPs preregister Air Force mortar or AC-130 coordination. The military police control fires as well as Army artillery because in­ the movement around and access into the direct fire is especially effective against air base by using a combination of highly troops assembling just after landing. mobile patrols—foot, motorized, and air­ MPs must also keep from becoming deci­ borne-observation posts and traffic and sively engaged in any situation where the straggler control points, and searches and enemy arrives in force. They will employ ambushes. Again, they emphasize sanitiz­ delaying tactics as they reposition them­ ing the critical area under the aircraft's selves to accomplish their mission more takeoff flight path. Actions range from in­ effectively. If necessary, the MPs will with­ terim checking of credentials and suspi­ draw into the base defense system itself. cious people to acting as the “eyes and Once inside the perimeter, they will move ears" of a major combat force deploying to to previously designated positions from attack an enemy airhead. Because all these where they can support the air base ground actions are highly dependent on utilizing defense flights in stopping the attack. The an effective intelligence network, continu­ MPs’ mobility also allows them to be em­ ing cooperation with local police and au­ ployed effectively as a mobile reserve. thorities is very important. In the event a major US Army combat The MP companies performing the air formation is employed against a large en­ base ground defense mission will operate emy force, the MPs will operate as part of in sectors. They will deploy the platoons to the combat formation. They will perform cover likely avenues of enemy approach reconnaissance and fire-direction missions and missile and rocket-firing positions and in the same manner they would for the air then establish a patrol and outpost plan. base commander. Having operated over the The MPs will stay as mobile as possible and terrain over which the enemy is moving, will not be tied down to guarding fixed terrain that would probably be new to the positions. When MPs dig in, they will only major Army unit, the military police would prepare hasty fighting positions so as to be be in an excellent position to provide valu- able to move out quickly. The vulnerable seam in this arrangement is the detailed on-the-ground coordination between the MP units and the security police. For example, since the air base ground defense flights have heavy weap­ ons, rules of engagement must be closely TO PROTECT AN A/R BASE 17 able information and assistance to the ma­ get all the protection it needs. In fact, an air jor unit commander. base would get a very high priority for protection since it is considered a critical installation. MP units are assigned mis­ Command and Control, sions according to priorities established, so air bases would be close to the head of the A Major Issue list of critical installations defended by military police. However, the number of Basically, the control of all defense forces installations that can be afforded protection on or around the base becomes the task of will depend on how many MP units are the air base commander's chief of security available. police (CSP) who operates out of the BDOC. Unfortunately, the Army does not have The BDOC is, in turn, tied in with the sufficient military police resources to turn .Army’s command and control element for over to the Air Force for its exclusive use. fighting the rear area battle, the rear area But even if the resources were available, operations center (RAOC). The air base, the Army does not favor the concept of when part of the overall area defense sys­ putting such a valuable asset on the tight tem, is considered a "base" or “base clus­ leash that “dedication” implies. The mobil­ ter” in Army parlance. A base is a self- ity, communications, and firepower of mil­ contained defense system. A base cluster itary police units give them a capability of comprises two or more such systems. An operating effectively over a wide area. To airfield with 360-degree protection would tie them down in an exclusive air base be considered such a base. On the other ground defense role is to rob them of their hand, if elements of the air base cannot be full potential. The solution is to give con­ tied together physically, yet are still mutu­ trol to the air base commander under the ally supporting, the entire air base could be same conditions military police would be considered a base cluster. Since the base or placed under the control of any base or base base cluster is most likely located within a zone for which the Army is responsible cluster commander requiring MP support. overall, the Army must provide it the same protection it would for Army units in the same zone. Thus, Army formations that A Final Challenge fight the rear area battle for Army logistical and other support elements would do the A final important challenge concerns same for the Air Force units also located joint practice. Because military police and there. But as straightforward as this delin­ security police have seldom worked to­ eation of responsibility is, there is still a gether to any great extent, they are not problem with how much control over the attuned to each other’s normal modus MPs the Air Force gains and the Army operandi. This was also a major problem loses. for the Air Force and Marines in Vietnam The Air Force would like military police when working with the host nation. To specifically dedicated to the air base com­ meet this challenge requires a comprehen­ mander to protect the installation on a sive joint training program from which will continuing basis. The Army’s position, evolve a common understanding of every­ however, is that it is going to provide the thing from the nuances of the services’ required assistance regardless of the spe­ “lingo” to the application of the most so­ cific command and control arrangement. phisticated combat techniques. That is, since the Army is responsible for The program needs to begin at the protecting all the installations in the platoon/flight level. Because Southwest Army’s areas of operations, an air base will Asia is the one area where there are no 18 AM POWER JOURNAL FALL 1989

host-nation agreements, it is the most crit­ clearly accentuated the task of protecting ical one for the Army and Air Force to get air bases against all types of threats. In together. Nellis AFB. with its desert terrain addition, the lessons from Vietnam provide and its established courses, is an ideal an excellent basis for the successful de­ location to conduct such a program. fense of air bases. The US Army and Air Within the context of this program, for Force have both already sown the seeds for example, the service-peculiar language the necessary cooperation. Most important, challenge can be addressed. Thus the Army however, the obstacles to effective execu­ can learn to talk to Air Force aircraft. The tion of the mission have been identified Air Force can practice coordinating with and are within reach of being overcome. military police operating in front of their Indeed, from the Army’s perspective, air positions. Both can learn to coordinate base ground defense is really not a new time-sensitive operations like the passage challenge. The MPs require no new orien­ of friendly lines. Service-peculiar slang can tation or extensive reeducation to accom­ thereby become viable tools instead of con­ plish the mission. The fundamentals fusing nuisances. presently employed in a rear battle combat Already Air Force officers and noncom­ role require no modification for successful missioned officers visit Army schools. Now execution of air base ground defense, only junior US Army MP officers and noncom­ an intensification. They need only practice missioned officers need to be able to take more with the Air Force security police. advantage of the opportunities the Air What is new, nevertheless, is the empha­ Force has to offer. sis that must be placed on precision of execution in keeping the enemy far from the airfield. Once the missileers “set up To Protect an Air Base shop not far from the end of the runway,” it is too late to save that heavily laden aircraft The US Stinger missile’s success in help­ taking off. In reality, the attempt to protect ing to turn the tide in Afghanistan has also an air base just failed.

Notes 1. ) F C. Fuller. The Second World War, 193.9-1940: A 3. Bernard E. Trainor. "Afghans and the Soviet Psyche: Strategical and Tactical History (New York: Duel!. Sloan, and Military Myths Fade as the Troops Pull Out." New York Pearce. 1954). 67. Times. 15 February 1989. 6. 2. John Walcott and Tiin Carrington. "Role Reversal: CIA 4. Winston Churchill, The Second World War. vol. 3. The Opposed Plan to Give Stinger Missiles to Afghan Rebels." Grand Alliance (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1950). 776—77. Wall Street /oumul, 16 February 1988. 31. Basis of Issue

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19 “One-A-Penny, Two-A-Penny...” Air Power in the

Defence o f Australia— United or Divided?

Air power in penny packets is worse than useless. It fritters away and achieves nothing. The old fable of the bundle of faggots com­ pared with the individ­ ual stick is abundantly true of air power. Its strength lies in unity.

HE debate over the role that air power should play in the defence of a nation is one that has ebbed and flowed since the beginnings of air Tforces. Today, among nations of the West­ ern world, and certainly within Australia, the discussion is no less lively than Editor's Note W in g Comdr Brian L. K avanag h. RAAF This is the second article available to us from a project of the W in g Comdr David J. S chuber t , RAAF Royal Australian Air Force-the Chief of the Air Staff Project- to set down its doctrine in print. Those of you who read "The RAAF Writes Its Doctrine" {Airpower Journal. Summer 1989) will note that the present article addresses more specifically the environmental imperatives that underlie many air doc­ trines around the world. 21 22 A1RPOWER JOURNAL FALL 1989 it has been in the past. Although we en­ Australians might become aware of the full courage informed debate on the most effec­ potential of that enormous force called air tive use of the air arm of the Australian power in our possession and the part it Defence Force (ADF), all too often in these should play in the defence of this nation. days of increasing jointness and integration In any appreciation of air power in amongst defence forces, discussion centres Australia’s defence, we might first ask our­ on the part that air power should play in selves why air power should play a promi­ supporting the roles of the other services. nent role— indeed, any role— in the defence At the same time, there appears to be insuf­ of this country. Few antagonists will see ficient understanding of air warfare or ap­ no part at all for an aerial capability. preciation of its history to realise there are Rather, the question is what contribution equally valid and compelling strategies for air power should offer to the Australian the employment of air power other than military equation, as compared with that of helping to win a land or sea battle. While the more traditional land and sea powers. no one doubts the importance of essential More explicitly, how should this form of mutual support among the three services in combat power be employed and managed achieving the war aim, some balance in the when it is interacting with land and naval debate needs to be restored in order that we forces? The issue then becomes one of command and control of air power and distribution of its assets. It is one of the more pressing defence issues within Aus­ The Royal Australian A ir Force traces its heritage to the early clays of flight. This heritage is now threat- tralia today. ened by the shortsighted thinking of some people who All too often, many people now see air would dole out Australian air power to other sendees. power only as a force to be carved up ONE-A-PENNY, TWO-A-PENNY 23

among the other two services. Occasionally copter retain its multirole capability in they urge this action in the name of joint­ its new livery? Will command and control ness, but more often they do so in order that of the battlefield helicopter become so de­ the navy and army may better fulfill their centralised in Australia that this weapon respective tasks. This line of reasoning is system will be unable to exploit the funda­ oriented primarily to tasks or capabilities, mental principles of mass and concentra­ whereby one thinks in terms of the opti­ tion? mum weapons or force mix—either biser­ The very fact that distribution of air vice or triservice—necessary to fulfill a task power is such an important issue within or provide a capability within the joint the ADF is testimony to its relevance to force. Moreover, this reasoning takes little Australia, yet the intricacies of the proper account of the various tasks each service employment of air power are poorly under­ can achieve.1 With sensible application, stood within all arms of the services. This force mixing has a valid place within our article explains the best use of air power for strategic thinking; each component of com­ Australia and the fundamental need to bat power, after all, is complementary. But keep it unified. We make these points by force mixing must not be allowed to domi­ substantiating the importance of air power nate our thinking to the exclusion of those to our national defence, by explaining the hard-learned lessons of history that vindi­ concept of unity of air power, and by anal­ cate a continuing need to maintain three in­ ysing the consequences of divided air ser­ dependent fighting arms of a defence force. vices for this country. If we need an integrated force from inde­ pendent armed services to complete a task or mount a capability, we should carefully weigh the benefits of this action against Air Power’s Relevance possible disunity among the parent ser­ to Australia vices. Disregard for single-service unity is evi­ The most conspicuous reason that the dent in Australia today. There is a persis­ use of the air is essential for Australia is the tent and irrational trend within the ADF nature of our continent—its geographical to parcel out packets of air assets as each position, topographical profile, distribu­ new requirement for joint-service capabili­ tion of people and resources, and its lack of ties is identified. Either in supporting the adequate lines of communications. Suffice fleet at sea with a particular task such as it to say, the nature of the continent de­ maritime strike operations or in meeting a mands a force that can respond quickly, close-air-support requirement of the land over thousands of miles, with enough flex­ commander, permanent allocation of air ibility to change roles rapidly, against a power seems to be the inevitable cry—and variety of targets in locations often inacces­ damn the consequences. Oftentimes, peo­ sible by surface means. The type of force ple advocate this course of action with little needed is self-evident. Only by possessing thought for the integrity of the air force an effective air component of our military as a unified entity or for the best use of force can we ever hope to exert influence scarce air power resources. In fact, in the within our region at a time and place of our interests of meeting a perceived single­ choosing, during periods of both hostility service need—not to mention one of joint and peace. capability—we have gone to this extreme. Linked with geographical realities is a The transfer of the battlefield helicopter to national defence policy that gives priority the army is the prime example. In this to stopping an aggressor in the sea/air gap, instance, however, we must inquire about especially to the north. The underlying the consequences; can the battlefield heli­ military concept is that of defence in depth

Much of the hardware used in the RAAF. such as this reasons, Australia would try to avoid a F - l l l Heft), comes from the United States. But the major land battle, except as a last resort. demands of defence in Australia are not met by Consequently, if the will of Australia is to US defence doctrine. Therefore, the development of a doctrine appropriate for Australia is the purpose of protect offshore assets and prevent a hostile the chief of the air staff's project, just as the arma­ lodgement, it will need air power. In most ment load of the RAAF's aircraft is versatile (above), cases, air power will be the initial and, so too are the roles that air power can play. Violating most likely, the principal tool to use. the principle of unity in air power diminishes this versatility. Indeed, any strategy of defence in depth requires air power. It is a primary element in maintaining surveillance of and gather­ ing intelligence in the sea/air gap, in con­ Such a defence policy is as expedient as it trolling this gap in times of threat, and in is sensible because in most contingencies defeating hostile forces should they at­ this buffer zone must be crossed by any tempt to cross the seas or land on our aggressor, and here the enemy is most shores. In short, air power in Australia “is vulnerable— particularly to attack from the needed to win the air battle, it is needed to air. Further, we can ill afford a major lodge­ win the maritime battle, and it is needed to ment on our continent. It is politically win the land battle.”2 unacceptable, but—more pragmatically— These, then, are the reasons that air our relatively low population would be a power is important for Australia. If this disadvantage in manpower-intensive war­ nation is to defend itself effectively and fare. For these and other more obvious field the best possible deterrent forces, it

25 26 A1RPOWER JOURNAL FALL 1989 must maintain credible, operationally effi­ The Black Hawk helicopter (right, below) has cient, and state-of-the-art air forces that are already been transferred to the army in Australia, powerful by regional standards. Our geog­ and there is pressure to turn over the RAAF’s P-3 (right) to the navy. In both cases, the end result is raphy, manpower and economic resources, decreased versatility and a corresponding decrease and access to technology all attest to this in capability within the Australian military. requirement, as does an Australian defence policy of self-reliance achieved through defence in depth. Most strategists and de­ fence thinkers in Australia today will en­ lines to assure its most effective use. Thus, dorse these sentiments. What many of this third dimension provided a similar them forget, however, is that if the ADF is basis for the evolution of centrally com­ to have optimum military effectiveness, air manded air forces. power—like any other form of combat Theoretically, unity of each form of com­ power— has to retain some unity of action bat power is simply a set of historically and purpose within the total force. As we evolved principles. Practically, the applica­ shall see, unity of air power is the cardinal tion of these principles generates interne­ tenet of air power doctrine; yet, paradoxi­ cine argument because the application is cally, it is being avidly challenged in Aus­ really about command and control. Bluntly tralia today. put, the debate centres on who within the total force should own and employ the resources of individual forms of combat power while ensuring that the unified ac­ The Concept of tion of each form is retained. Each service Unity of Air Power argues that for best effect its own traditional combat power demands command and con­ There is nothing mysterious or particu­ trol that should be, first, at the most appro­ larly difficult to understand about unity of priate level and, second, within the most air power. It evolved from hard-learned appropriate service— two dictums that are historical lessons—namely, that the opera­ common to land, sea, and air power. tional and organizational processes of The historical experience of air power using the air for warfighting should be accords with these two dictums. Thus, air commanded and controlled at the highest forces argue in defence of unity of their practical level and by a single agency with own combat power that unity of air power the best expertise to do so. Nor is the means air assets must be retained under the concept of unity unique to air power. In­ highest practical level of centralised com­ deed, operational and organizational unity mand and control and that they must is necessary with each form of combat be commanded by a leader experienced in power— be it on land, at sea, or in air— the application of air power. Air forces, in if each is to contribute fully to military fact, are adamant about these requirements effectiveness. Historically, land power and because historical experience also shows sea power were coordinated, organized, that the impact of unity of air power has and commanded— each within its own even greater consequences for military ef­ dimension—for best effect. This traditional fectiveness than the impact of unit}' of the responsibility of each form of combat other combat powers. Similarly, experience power for its own dimension was indeed and logical analysis show that divided air the rationale for the evolution of armies power produces disproportionately large and navies. Because the air is a separate reductions in military effectiveness in com­ and independent dimension, air power also parison with the effects of disunity in land needed a unity of coordination, organiza­ or sea power. Aviators understand this ad­ tion, and command along environmental verse consequence, and they argue tena- 27 28 AIRPOWER JOURNAL FALL 1989 ciously for the indivisibility of air power, indicates a completely different perspec­ a phrase synonymous with unity of air tive of time and space within which air power. Both phrases mean that air power power is employed in contrast to the per­ assumes its greatest strength when it is spective for land and sea power. The differ­ applied holistically as a distinct entity, ences are substantial and deserve closer rather than in a collection of roles. The examination if we are to fully understand reasons for this conclusion warrant further the aviator’s concern over the misuse and analysis. division of air power and the diminution of The introduction to this article suggested its effect. If we look at the traditional evo­ that support for the other services was only lution of command and control, the relative one of the strategies available to air power. perspectives of time and space will be more Two other distinct but interactive aerial evident. strategies have direct application for air First, the extent of military command forces and can have unmediated and inde­ and control is commensurate with the com­ pendent influence on the outcome of the bat radius of action of the weapon system war. One is to attack an enemy’s warfight­ involved. For example, the combat radius ing capacity— that is, to inflict moral or of action of an infantry platoon, depending material damage directly on his homeland. on the time frame, is a day’s march or the The second is to oppose and defeat his air trajectory range of small arms munitions. forces. These strategies are termed strategic Therefore, it would make no sense to take strike and air superiority, respectively. The divisional artillery weapons, with ranges of three aerial strategies are not independent 50 kilometres or more, and parcel them out actions whereby one follows another in to command at battalion level or lower. As some battle campaign sequence. All three we know, this is not done; artillery assets are interactive and. in reality, would be are commanded at the highest possible pursued simultaneously. Their hierarchy of level, where the "big picture” is more evi­ importance at a particular time must be dent. determined in the light of strategic as well What sense, then, does it make to break as tactical considerations.3 This hierarchi­ up into penny packets a force with a com­ cal determination requires a decision by a bat radius of action of hundreds or thou­ supreme commander, with the advice of a sands of miles, which can be used against a commander having full knowledge of air variety of targets by reroling or reequipping power employment. and which can have a big picture of strate­ The second reason for unifying air power gic proportions, compared with the more is the ability to concentrate its force rapidly tactical view of surface-locked combat in time and space— its greatest innate ad­ units? Even navy fleet units at sea with vantage. Concentration enables a force to be speeds of advance of less than 40 knots and decisive. If need be, the w'hole weight of the combat radii of action limited either to air power force can be employed against a radar horizons or the ranges of surface- single, most important target or, alterna­ launched weapons are, within realistic tively. against an array of lesser targets. time frames, tactical units. Air Force com­ Used properly (i.e., in accordance with the bat units are capable of being used in the correct employment doctrine and concen­ macro (strategic) sense, whereas most other trated in time and space) air power can be combat units belong to the micro (tactical) singularly decisive in affecting the outcome environment. of the war, rather than merely influencing Linked directly with the “space" per­ the land and sea battle by piecemeal appli­ spective is the difference in appreciation of cation. time between air power forces and surface The ability to use concurrent aerial strat­ forces. Surface forces, by virtue of the lim­ egies and to concentrate air forces rapidly itations on their speed and mobility, think ONE-A-PENNY. TWO-A-PENNY 29 more in terms of days and weeks to react means the size of the entire body of an to a threat, manoeuvre, or redeploy their independent force needed to support its forces. Air power operates in much shorter fighting edge—that is. the total infrastruc­ time frames; its commanders think in terms ture that, with the operational component, of hours and even minutes to complete a makes for an effective warfighting entity. task. Again, what sense does it make to The critical mass concept is especially rel­ allocate sections of a highly responsive evant for air forces because they have an force to commanders who traditionally inherently high “tail-to-teeth” ratio; there­ wage war at a much different pace? The fore, their critical mass is high. For exam­ quantum difference in appreciations of ple, it takes the whole force of about 22,000 time and space between air forces and permanent serving members in the RAAF surface forces is the basal premise for unity today to maintain an organization whose of air power.4 sole aim in a war is to launch a few hun­ There is a third, different aspect militat­ dred individuals in a lesser number of ing against the division of air power within aircraft to meet a hostile threat. This con­ he total force. Today's modern air assets cept is difficult for many people to grasp, are capable of more than one role. An both within and outside the ADF. What antitank weapon within an army is an an­ many also fail to realise is that should these titank weapon. Within an air force, how­ few hundred operational assets be divided ever. it is also a battlefield air interdiction among different agencies, each of these weapon, perhaps an offensive counterair agencies then requires an inordinately dis­ weapon, and even an air defence weapon, proportionate support “tail" to maintain its dividing up these flexible assets to meet own limited air power capability, com­ larrow. specific requirements means that pared with the size of the tail required for a hey are not available for reroling. A perti­ single air force. nent example is the P-3 aircraft in the Royal The ADF. now that it is committed to Australian Air Force (RAAF) today. If P-3 self-reliance and if it is to achieve maxi­ iircraft are permanently assigned to the mum military effectiveness, must be fully lavy for fleet support functions, they will aware of both sides of the tail-to-teeth equa­ rot be readily available for first-echelon, tion before dividing its assets. This cogni­ ayered defence roles of out-of-area recon­ zance was not so crucial in the past when naissance and surveillance, as well as ad- Australia conveniently neglected the sup­ litional roles including electronic warfare, port aspect of critical mass, as it so often >earch and rescue, general transport, and did because of its historical reliance on and iirborne command and control. The result alliance with the United Kingdom and rom this example and others is a reduction United States. The ADF can no longer rely n multirole flexibility that decreases the on superpower support, nor should it con­ jfficiency and application of air assets and tinue to model its defence forces on those iiminishes national military effectiveness. of nations with vastly different resource The foregoing are three operational rea­ bases and national objectives. As with sons that unity of air power is vital to other small, independent forces, Australia national military effectiveness. In addition must develop an appropriate infrastructure o these operational aspects, there are two to support the fighting edge of combat )ther important factors that also attest to power or, conversely, reduce the size of the he necessity for unity of air power. They fighting force. Dividing air assets demands ire the concept of critical mass and the a larger base of support; if the support is not mportance of aerial expertise and contin- provided, effectiveness is reduced. Realis­ icd professional development to air pow­ tically, the ADF must compare its force er's proper application. structure and division of roles and assets Critical mass, used in this context. with other small, independent, but proven 30 AIRPOWER JOURNAL FALL 1989 forces such as Israel's, rather than continue cardinal tenet of basic air power doctrine the traditional approach of half copying the from which emanates all air force com­ forces of larger allies, particularly those of mand and control thinking. In principle, its the United States. evolution is no different from that of the Professional expertise, the second non- unity of other forms of combat power, but operational factor, is also woven into the unity of air power contributes more to argument for unity of combat power. This military effectiveness than does unity of expertise is the origin of the second dictum land or sea power. Air power is a bigger that command must be retained within the contributor because its application allows appropriate military discipline. The notion concurrent prosecution of the three inde­ is simple. Each service must exercise a pendently decisive air power strategies: professional ability within its own combat support for the other services, strategic environment whilst at the same time ac­ strike, and air superiority. Further, it en­ knowledging and respecting the other ser­ ables a force to concentrate firepower rap­ vices’ expertise to best operate and manage idly in time and space, and it offers a nation their own combat power assets. In Austra­ all the benefits of multirole flexibility. lia today, the army and navy frankly do not Three premises underlie the conclusion have the skill to properly employ the air that command of the air must be retained power that may be placed under their per­ by an airman at the highest practical level manent command. Nor, conversely, does and within an independent air service: the the air force have the know-how to opti­ practicalities of controlling weapon sys­ mise land or sea power for its own use, tems with radically different combat radii should such a situation arise. of action and reaction times, the critical Few people will disagree that the army mass needed to properly apply air power in is naturally oriented to the land as its pri­ a high-technology force, and the require­ mary operational environment, just as the ment to generate the highest possible level navy looks to the sea for its operations. of professional expertise within each indi­ The best army and navy officers will natu­ vidual service. rally be those most proficient in their par­ ticular service’s respective environment— and rightly so. Just as some officers need to The Consequences of be trained to operate on the land or at sea, so do others need specialist training within Dividing Air Power the third dimension, the air, as a primary in Australia medium of operations. The air calls for different strategic and operational thinking All services have potential for disunity, as well as specialised skills, and it will but none so great as air forces because continue to do so into the foreseeable fu­ aircraft—unlike tanks or ships—are promi­ ture. Therefore, if the nation is to be served nent in all forms of warfare and readily by the same quality of professionalism lend themselves to parcelling out. Air is within the air environment, it must not also the pervasive medium in any conflict. allow air power to become divided and Land and naval commanders are aware of thus subordinate to other combat forces. the importance of air to the success of their Otherwise, a curtailment of professional own missions and naturally are desirous of development within the air environment having within their own control these flex­ would ensue because army and navy offi­ ible, responsive forces that can concentrate cers would be preoccupied with their pri­ large quantities of firepower. If all demands mary environments, resulting in a gradual are met discretely, air power becomes di­ erosion of air power expertise. vided. In short, unity of air power constitutes a There are at times overwhelming tempta­ ONE-A-PENNY, TWO-A-PENNY 31

tions to divide air power assets. Succumb­ effectiveness for the defence of this nation? ing to such enticements does not guarantee For all the reasons given in this article, the a favourable short-term result in the battle, answer to these questions is a clear and and in the longer term it inhibits flexibility categoric no. It is patently inept to have and an ability to concentrate one's force. three air forces in this country—Australia Lord Arthur VV. Tedder, in a lecture to the can ill afford it economically or militarily. Royal United Sendees Institute in London What, then, are the most likely outcomes in January 1946. warned that of allowing the evolution of what effec­ if your organization is such that your air tively are three independent air forces for power is divided up into separate packets and Australia? The short term would see a there is no overall unity of command at the weakening of air force capability and an top, once again you will lose vour powers of increase in navy and army force structures concentration. Air power in penny packets is to meet newly perceived capabilities. The worse than useless. It fritters away and air force would have to reexamine its func­ achieves nothing. The old fable of the bundle tions and roles and concentrate its limited of faggots compared with the individual stick capability into specialised roles such as air is abundantly true of air power. Its strength defence. Eventually, each service would lay lies in unity.5 exclusive claim to both its own air assets The RAAF today is a modern, reasonably and specialised air power roles for reten­ well-balanced force with the capacity to tion within that service rather than lor the employ all three air power strategies. It is common good of Australia’s defence. Even also a force that has built up sufficient if they wanted to—and it is doubtful that levels of expertise and support to ensure they would—the three services could little that the ADF receives the best return for the hope to combine the three air service arms heavy investment it has made toward a into a coordinated entity to concentrate the complete and credible air power capability. force in times of conflict. The experiences Any weakening of the balanced force or of the United States, with four military air reduction of its levels of expertise by dis­ arms, uphold this supposition. In the long unity and decentralisation of command term, this handicap would inhibit the use will have implications far beyond normal of flexibility and versatility to employ the single-service, air force boundaries. Yet, total air power force in the best possible this is happening. Some well-intentioned manner for the defence of this country, but misguided individuals see Australia’s because each separate air service group defence enhanced by the division of the would be anchored to its vested interests. country’s combat air power. Second, the ADF would experience a As a middle-ranking power, Australia general degradation of expertise and effi­ has too few available resources and its ciency in the way each service operated its defence force is too small to maintain and air assets. This aecline would come about operate three separate air services. Should because the army and navy organizations this trend continue, important questions of do not have the necessary size and depth of efficiency and effectiveness will demand infrastructure for the maximum develop­ answers. Will the ADF realise any savings ment of personnel trained in air power and in terms of manpower and resources by the most efficient use of its equipment. Nor taking this route? Here, one needs to care­ do they have a natural orientation to oper­ fully examine the real, total costs of current ate in the air environment. Within the other army and navy organic air. Will the ADF two services, as lar as operational and tech­ overcome unnecessary duplication of effort nical expertise are concerned, air power and wastage of resources in the future? would eventually take a backseat. More important, will divided air assets In all. unless we direct our thinking in within the ADF offer the maximum military this country more toward retaining unity 32 AIR POWER JOURNAL FALL 1989 within the most pervasive form of combat us then heed the words of Field Marshal power available within our military inven­ Bernard L. Montgomery, one of the first tory, the standard of air service provided by senior military commanders to appreciate the ADF will drop significantly. This de­ the essence of the unity of air power: clivity will result in a weakening of our The Air Force . . . must be centralised and total air power capability and directly re­ kept under Air Force command. I hold that it duce the ADF’s ability to protect Australia. is quite wrong for the soldier to want to exercise command over the air striking forces. Perhaps in these days of competing pri­ The handling of an Air Force is a life-study, orities and limited resources, we need to and therefore the air part must be kept under occasionally go back to first principles. Let Air Force command.6

Notes 1. The "capabilities" versus "services" approach to total- approach" to doctrine in "The Evolution of Air Power Doc­ force structure is from a concept of Royal Air Force (RAF) trine within the RAF. 1957-1987" (Thesis. Queens College. Wing Comdr A. G. B. Vallance. who used a doctrinal devel­ Cambridge University. United Kingdom. August 1988). opment matrix with "the optimum mix of air/land/sea weap­ 4. The concept here is an extension of the idea of Air Vice ons systems” as the vertical perspective and the Marshal Tony Mason (RAF) of determining levels of command “balance . . . and interaction between the various air power and control by using comparative combat radii of action of roles" for the horizontal perspective. “Air Power Doctrine." weapon systems. After adding the perspective of time to Air Clues. May 1988. 163-68. respond, one can analyse command and control in the context 2. Air Marshal R. G. Funnell. "The Royal Australian Air of the two dimensions of time and space. Force: A Small Air Force and Its Air Power." the 1987 Sir Ross 5. Lord Arthur W. Tedder, "Air. Land, and Sea Warfare,' and Sir Keith Smith Memorial Lecture, published in Aero­ Journal of the Royal U nited Sendees Institute. January 1946 space 15. no. 10 (October 1988): 10-15. Air Marshal Funnell is 61. chief of the Air Staff. 6. John Terraine, A Time for Courage: The Royal Air Force 3. For a much more detailed coverage of the hierarchy of in the European War. 1939-1945 (New York: Macmillan aerial strategies—also termed air power em ployment doc­ Publishing Company. 1985), 380. trine—see RAF Wing Comdr A. G. B. Vallance's "strategies SUMMER 1989 IRA C. EAKER AWARD WINNER

Maj Franklin J. Hillson, USAF

for his article Barrage Balloons for Low-Level Air Defense

Congratulations to Maj Franklin J. Hillson on If you would like to compete for the Ira C. Eaker his selection as the Ira C. Eaker Award winner Award, submit an article of feature length to the for the best eligible article from the Summer Airpower Journal, Walker Hall, Maxwell AFB, 1989 issue of the Airpower Journal. Major AL 36112-5532. The award is for the best eligi­ Hillson receives a $500 cash award for his ble article in each issue and is open to all US contribution to the Air Force’s professional di­ military personnel below the rank of colonel or alogue. The award honors Gen Ira C. Eaker and equivalent and all US Government civilian em­ is made possible through the support of the ployees below GS-15 or equivalent. Arthur G. B. Metcalf Foundation of Winchester, Massachusetts.

33 AGGRESSIVE VISION

M ai Char l es M. W estenhoff, USAF More than most campaigns of World War II, New Guinea was won using current military concepts and organizations. From the start, operations were combined (multinational) and joint (multiservice).

HEATER air power progressively Kenney’s relationship to his joint-force freed joint fighting potential as it commander, we will see if he used any won a succession of campaigns. special keys to winning that might still T And, as in many current contingen­ work today. cies. theater forces fought at the end of an extended logistical chain with few replace­ ments. Ironically, the New Guinea* air campaigns are as poorly covered in popular historical accounts as they are rich in les­ Challenges sons learned. When General Kenney reported for duty The clearest way to review the New to General MacArthur on 29 July 1942, the Guinea campaigns for operational lessons strategic, operational, and logistical situa­ is from the perspective of the air compo­ tions were far worse than most Ameri­ nent commander. Gen George C. Kenney cans—then or later—understood. They commanded the Allied air forces, reporting would get worse. to Gen Douglas MacArthur, commander of Strategically, the SWPA forces had been the Southwest Pacific Area (SWPA). A good mauled for eight months in a string of look at General Kenney’s theater problems, battles and withdrawals. Japanese forces, his first steps to create a winning air with relatively short supply lines (fig. 1), component, and his first decisive victory— were moving to sever the long supply line the Battle of the Bismarck Sea—will dem­ between America and Australia. Allied onstrate Kenney’s style. By focusing on supplies to Australia were strained through a chain of island fortresses, each of which “New Guinea is the name of the island where Southwest siphoned resources for its own buildup. Pacific Area forces fought through 1944 Most operations described in this article took place in Papua, the country From their growing base at Guadalcanal, ompnsing the eastern half of New Guinea. Japanese forces immediately threatened

35 36 AIRPOWER JOURNAL FALL 1989 this logistics chain in the Solomon Islands Darwin is no more. . . . There is not a single and in New Guinea, where Allied forces building standing in the city or at the were fighting to preserve a toehold at Port airport. . . . It is a scene of utter desolation. Moresby. These things we do not hear of in the States.2 Japanese attacks on Australian cities had Most SWPA forces of all services were busy caused widespread alarm since the first preparing to fight in Australia, and many mass air raid on Darwin in February 1942. voices urged abandoning Port Moresby In June miniature submarines had attacked immediately to concentrate on defending inside Sydney’s harbor, while larger sub­ Australia’s populated areas. Most of Ken­ marines shelled the city’s suburbs and sank ney’s operational forces would remain merchant ships off the coast.1 Frequent air based in Australia, even after the Allies raids eventually devastated Darwin. A vis­ won the Battle of the Bismarck Sea.3 iting American airline pilot noted in his Operationally, conditions were similarly diary that grim. Because Kenney’s squadrons were

PACIFIC OCEAN AGGRESSIVE VISION 37 locally outnumbered, they could be over­ New Britain, Japan's chief air threat to whelmed any time Japanese forces concen­ Guadalcanal. About 17 bombers would trated against them. Only his fighters were launch from Mareeba, Australia, refuel at based in New Guinea, and they had no Port Moresby, and make the attack. (The warning system since Japanese forces occu­ mission would take 23 hours to fly.) Al­ pied all the potential radar sites in the though 17 airplanes seem a small force, it mountains above Port Moresby. (In con­ would be the biggest air operation in the trast, fighters based on Guadalcanal when SWPA to date. Not only MacArthur but also Allied operations began there got ample the aircrews thought Kenney’s plan was warning from Australian coast watchers in audacious ... so would Japanese naval the upper Solomons and could get airborne officers.6 in time to meet attackers.)4 Daily missions In the same meeting, Kenney put himself included air combat, resupply, reconnais­ on a new footing with his joint-forces com­ sance of a broad ocean area, and interdic­ mander. He explained the challenges facing tion of Japanese forces approaching Port the Allied air forces and how he would Moresby. Kenney’s assets wrere overtasked, solve them, effectively taking responsibility and there was no relief in sight. for the air force and its pursuit of joint Kenney faced an immense logistical chal­ objectives. Kenney proposed organizing lenge. In this theater, transportation of the two subordinate commands—the US Fifth vast amount of bulk items needed for mod­ Air Force to fight in New Guinea, and a ern war depended largely on maritime Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF) com- shipping, which was scarce and vulnerable to air and submarine attack. Naval forces were already overtasked; by the fall of 1942, only one US aircraft carrier and one US battleship were in the Pacific, and the carrier was under repair for battle damage. (Major carrier actions were not resumed until November 1943.) Further, land trans­ portation from Australia’s southern ports was incapable of expeditiously moving even the few supplies that arrived by sea. Unfortunately, each Australian territory had its own unique rail system, with track widths ranging from 2' 6" to 5' 3" causing bottlenecks at each transshipment point. Finally, the fact that Kenney’s air depot was in South Australia increased every repair and modification delay.5 If. on 29 July 1942, Kenney thought he had a full plate already, General Mac- Arthur’s first question didn’t ease things: what could Kenney’s SWPA air forces do to support the landing at Guadalcanal the following week (fig. 2J? Kenney took a whirlwind tour to assess his forces and reported back; his answer was not what MacArthur expected. Kenney had relieved his B-17s of other taskings so they could get eady for a big raid on the base at Rabaul, h ; i«« General Kenney used his limited resources to airlift 5.000 troops (abovej and heavy equipment (rightI to the battle for Buna, avoiding the unhealthy overland route. Standard cargo aircraft. B-17s. B-25s. and civilian airliners took part in the operation.

mand to defend Australia's northern coast. Forces from both nations would be as­ signed to each command. More important, Kenney requested approval to pursue one primary goal: command of the air over his theater. MacArthur agreed.

First Operations: Winning Northern Bases art. Fortunately for Kenney. Japanese forces were divided between two campaigns—one Kenney’s principal aim—air superior­ to take Fort Moresby, the other to control ity—was a long way off.7 As August 1942 Guadalcanal. began, Kenney had to start, using what he Kenney’s little “big raid" on Rabaul took had, to create the conditions for success. In place on 7 August; it started a seldom- other words, he had to apply operational noted chain of events that had unforeseen

38 This destroyed C-47 clearly shorn that forward basing was a hazardous operation consequences. Japanese naval officers Guadalcanal, they could reorganize and watched the raid, which hit an air base near swamp SWPA forces in New Guinea. For the harbor, and were impressed by its Allied ground forces, time and disease size— 13 of the B-17s got through. Conse- were more effective threats than enemy quently. the convoy to reinforce Guadalca- bullets. On Guadalcanal. Allied forces held nal was split to minimize vulnerability to a coastal position with a sea breeze to air attack. This allowed an Allied sub- suppress disease. At Buna, though, the Al- marine to pick off the cruiser Kuko and lies approached from the swamps and were reduced the force available for the Battle of soon riddled by malaria, dengue fever, Savo Island." scrub typhus, and dysentery'. One unit of In New Guinea, the Japanese forces ad- 1.100 men was reduced to 05 unhealthy vancing overland on Port Moresby- troops available for battle.1" “The ultimate interdicted by Kenney's whole tactical air nightmare country is how MacArthur's force, from P-39s to B- 17s— were stopped chief engineer described the almost im- 30 miles from the base by Australian infan- passable terrain that slowed each array try in mid-Sept ember 1942. The Austra- movement.n lians were soon pursuing the Japanese The initial plan was to transport troops army to its bases around Buna on New and supplies i lose to Buna by sea.1'’ hut Guinea s north coast, while Kenney's forces without forward bases, sustained fighter resupplied them and shut down the Japa- escort was impossible. In the absence of air nese air base at Buna Some strategists superiority, this plan fizzled. Instead. Gen- wanted Mai Arthur simply to contain the eral Kennev had a forward strip built and enemy at Buna But an intai t Japanese used airlift to bring troops and supplies garrison, capable of patrols and raids, close to the battle, and to evacuate casual- would have made this area unsuitable for ties. In his typical fashion. Kenney used MacArthur s plans: he needed forward air everything available for the prime mission: bases near Buna * B-17s. B-25s. and < ivil airliners performed The battle for Buna became a race for airlift to augment his C-47s. and all of these time. The moment the Japanese won or lost aircraft got fighter cover In perspective. 40 AIRPOWER JOURNAL FALL 1989

Kenney established temporary and local air March. They anticipated the reaction of superiority to create conditions for later air SWPA air forces and distributed key sup­ supremacy. When Allied ground forces fi­ plies equally among eight freighters. Each nally took the Buna area, MacArthur made was loaded so the most critical items would a jubilant statement to the press: be unloaded first when the ships reached The Horii Army has been annihilated. The port in New Guinea. The convoy would be outstanding military lesson of this campaign protected by eight destroyers and fighter was the continuous calculated application of escorts and would sail under cover of a big air power, inherent in the potentialities of the storm system.16 Air Force, employed in the most intimate tactical and logistical union with ground troops.13 Battle of the Bismarck Sea Bismarck Sea Buildup As evidence of an impending convoy Kenney lost no time building a network mounted, Kenney increased the readiness of forward operating bases near Buna. On of his forces. His reforms in maintenance 23 December Japan’s Imperial General Headquarters ordered two fresh divisions forward to the Solomons. On 4 January A Japanese destroyer (right) shows the effects of an 1943 Imperial General Headquarters de­ attack by General Kenney's B-25s. early in the Battle cided to abandon Guadalcanal, and Japan’s of the Bismarck Sea. A Japanese merchant vessel (below), one of the 22 ships sunk during the battle. fresh divisions were diverted to Rabaul to is seen under low-level attack. load up for New Guinea. The overall plan called for reinforcing New Guinea with 100.000 troops.14 Allied ground forces were in terrible shape to meet any attack early in 1943; casualties in the Buna campaign were al­ most twice those at Guadalcanal. In fact, Allied ground forces were not ready for major operations until August. Kenney’s air forces were the only operationally effective arm available. General Kenney anticipated the shift of Japanese Strength and increased training for maritime operations. Practicing against a ship hulk near Port Moresby, his pilots became adept at low-altitude skip bombing, using five-second fuzes for safe escape. (Although skip bombing was originally de­ vised for B-17s, B-25s and A-20s took over this role because of their better maneu­ verability.)1 ’ Kenney authorized installa­ tion of eight fixed, forward-firing .50- caliber machine guns in B-25 “commerce raiders,” as well. In Rabaul. Japanese staffs expertly planned a convoy operation for early

Attacks by different types of aircraft operating at As the convoy assembled. Kenney moved varying aititudes took their toll on lapanese naval all available forces forward. The complete forces, including an armed cargo vessel (left/ and a destroyer (above), which was sunk despite its force flew a detailed rehearsal of the coor­ evasive maneuvers. dinated attack plan (screened by fighters to preserve surprise) on 28 February, landed at its deployment bases, and then stood down. That night, at 2300. Lt Gen Hatazo bad doubled aircraft availability, which in Adachi and 7.000 troops sailed from Ra- urn allowed him to keep a third of his baul under the cover of the storm. force operating from forward bases in New Kenney’s B-24s were new to the theater Guinea and another third in northern Aus­ and plagued by maintenance problems. tralia as a ready reserve. The remainder of The few available B-24s weren’t enough to his forces recovered, transitioned to new put into the attack plan, so they took over aircraft, or trained.17 long-range reconnaissance duties and freed

43 44 AIRPOWER JOURNAL FALL 1989 more B-17s to attack en masse. It was a B-24 shoot in one direction when threatened that briefly glimpsed the convoy through from another quadrant outside one’s field the storm clouds on 1 March. Because Ken­ of view.)20 ney’s P-39s, P-40s, and RAAF Bostons The B-25 attack presented another di­ didn’t have the range to participate in the lemma, this time horizontal: should the attack, they strafed and bombed Japanese captains turn broadside to mass their de­ airfields in northern New Guinea to reduce fensive fire or turn fore and aft to minimize interference.10 the ships’ cross section? Most captains ap­ On 2 March another B-24 spotted the parently anticipated torpedo attacks and convoy, which was pressing on at seven turned bow or stern to the B-25s. Conse­ knots under low clouds. The convoy was quently, only a few guns on each ship could still so far away that only B-17s and P-38s try to disturb the aim of the “commerce could reach it. and most of the P-38s got raiders.” Each B-25 carried three or four separated in the clouds. Twenty-eight B- bombs and a battery of fixed guns loaded 17s attacked that morning; the convoy scat­ with a firing sequence of one tracer, tered to hide under the low clouds, but one two armor-piercing, and two incendiary freighter was left sinking. A second nine- rounds. The B-25s strafed the perfectly plane attack in the late afternoon was less aligned ships and then dropped their effective, perhaps giving the sailors and bombs. Finally, the A-20s came in to strafe soldiers in the convoy some false reassur­ and skip bomb the ships. ance. In about one hour, all seven freighters Imagine the sounds of Kenney’s RAAF and three destroyers were sinking or crip­ and US Army Air Forces (AAF) aircraft pled. The battle was so short and violent assembling on the morning of 3 March that it was impossible, either then or later, 1943: 13 Beaufighters, 12 B-25s, 16 P-38s, to determine which aircraft or units con­ and a dozen A-20s took off from the bases tributed most to the result. More to the near Buna. Thirty-four B-17s approached point, every single element of the Allied from Port Moresby. During the night the force was indispensable to the plan and its storm had shifted, and the scattered clouds success. couldn't protect the 15 ships remaining.19 The five remaining serviceable destroy­ As Kenney’s forces came within visual ers picked up as many survivors as possible range, the convoy scattered and began fir­ and headed north to escape. Although ing its air-defense guns. Far overhead, an worsening weather and increasing range escort of 26 Japanese fighters stayed high, prevented Kenney’s full forces from repeat­ expecting the “real” attack to come at high ing the morning’s performance, a late after­ altitude. P-38s engaged them while the rest noon reattack found and hit one destroyer. of the force maintained position to accom­ Characteristically, Kenney ordered reat­ plish the coordinated attack plan they had tacks for the next day; crippled ships were rehearsed. (One B-17 and three P-38s were bombed and strafed until they sank. The lost in the air-to-air battle, compared to final toll was eight of eight freighters and Allied claims of downing at least 22 Japa­ four of eight destroyers.21 nese fighters. This far from Rabaul, the Japanese fighters could fight only briefly; effective Japanese fighter escort throughout the daylight hours was impossible.) Results of the Battle The first attack presented the convoy with a vertical dilemma: the RAAF Beau- Samuel Eliot Morison called the Battle of fighters approached for low-altitude straf­ the Bismarck Sea “the most devastating air ing as B-17s at medium altitude prepared to attack on ships of the entire war, excepting drop bombs from overhead. (It’s hard to only that on Pearl Harbor.”22 We should V • ,

The last Japanese ship afloat, a destroyer, was sunk superiority.23 Deficient shipping weakened by nine B-25s in mida/ternoon. In all. Allied air the Japanese land forces and reduced their power sank some 90,000 tons of enemy shipping patrolling, just as their reconnaissance during the battle. flights were also dwindling for lack of fuel. Not having to worry so much about enemy reconnaissance, Kenney built a hidden for­ note that Kenney’s assault, unlike the Pearl ward base at Tsili Tsili. New Guinea, so he Harbor attack, was against a force expecting could mass forces for his first big counterair opposition, and he defeated the Japanese campaign in August 1943. strategy as well as the convoy. The Battle of Finally, the burden of resupplying the Bismarck Sea was decisive, a result that ground forces in New Guinea in the face of Kenney took pains to assure. the Allied air threat increasingly tasked After this battle, Japanese planners never Japanese submarine forces.24 Their with­ again attempted to reinforce their New drawal from Australian waters freed Allied Guinea forces with large ships. Instead, shipping to build and sustain strong air and they relied on destroyers dashing to the ground forces in New Guinea, which even­ coast, coastal barges, and submarines for tually allowed Kenney’s airlifters and their replenishment. Without bulk shipping, Jap­ fighter escorts to catch their breath. Control anese air forces in New Guinea lacked the of the air, and thus the sea, allowed Mac- means to sustain the long fight for air Arthur and his small amphibious force to 46 AIRPOWER JOURNAL FALL 1989 begin a series of 56 enveloping operations, air forces attacked Kenney’s three biggest spearheaded and guarded by air from a air bases in overwhelming strength during succession of forward bases—a concept of April; within four days they attacked each operations that Winston Churchill would base once. But when Kenney rebuilt his call “triphibious” warfare. force and mounted his counterair campaign in August, he attacked each Japanese base in numerous waves for several days—and Questions of Numbers the target bases did not recover. Both forces put overwhelming numbers over their tar­ The most important result of the Bis­ gets, but the Allied operation, quick­ marck Sea battle was qualitative, not quan­ turning from forward bases, was persistent titative. Japan could replace 12 or so ships, enough to produce decisive results.26 but the Japanese strategy couldn’t be re­ paired or salvaged. In simple numerical terms, Kenney Kenney’s should have been out of business in the air Keys to Winning war. Contemporary commanders were amazed at Kenney’s boldness in attacking Kenney put four important attributes to the convoy just when replacements had work when the chips were down: opera­ become critically few.'5 Before this battle, tional skill, creativity, brilliance at the air his monthly losses always exceeded his component commander’s job, and vision. replacements, while Japanese air strength Each of these traits merits some discussion. in New Guinea continued to grow until Since numbers didn’t decide the out­ September 1943. come of the New Guinea campaigns, some­ In trying to piece together the air orders thing else—some qualitative difference— of battle throughout the New Guinea cam­ must have been important. It wasn’t simply paigns. one inevitably concludes that the airplanes and crews. The air forces of Ja­ task is impossible. Aircraft moved hourly pan’s army and navy were skillful and and were used for tasks beyond their de­ experienced for the most part. Kenney and signers' wildest dreams—or nightmares. many of his pilots thought that most of the Units from dispersed operating locations Allied fighters (P-39s, P-40s, and Spitfires) massed for their attacks and scattered were inferior to those of their Japanese again, minutes or days later. opponents. The difference wasn’t tactics Numbers of available forces became key either, a fact that Kenney’s crews attest to." considerations when, in Napoleon’s tra­ The only qualitative edge Kenney could ditional campaigns, mass armies over­ employ to offset his strategic and tactical whelmed -smaller armies. But in modern disadvantages was his own operational campaigns, comparing numbers of assets skill. And, as one examines his actions, a available for battle can be simplistic. Avail­ pattern becomes evident: concentration on ability is a matter of degree for modern one objective, surprise, moving forces, lo­ forces, especially air forces. Operational gistics, throwing every useful asset into the decisions of force disposition, command right fight at the right time . . . Kenney’s and control, equipment, training, and task­ operational decisions flesh out the princi­ ing are key to making forces both effective ples of war with remarkable consistency. and available for a given mission. And It was not that Kenney consciously ap­ Kenney addressed all these factors to plied the principles of war (his memoirs achieve decisive results. give us only hints on that question). The Kenney’s operational approach is best point, for us, is that these principles help illustrated by counterair operations. In re­ us understand his brilliance. Perhaps more sponse to the Bismarck Sea battle, Japanese important, studying concrete examples AGGRESSIVE VISION 47

such as Kenney’s campaigns builds a Over the objections of almost everyone else broader understanding of the principles of on MacArthur’s staff, Kenney obtained war, making them more useful and cam­ MacArthur’s permission for early airlift op paign lessons more memorable. By apply­ erations. This and subsequent successes ing the principles of war, not as rote but as increased MacArthur’s open-mindedness a means to recognize good and bad military and his confidence in Kenney, a situation operations, anyone with sufficient exper­ that allowed Kenney increasing freedom to tise in air power might plan sound opera­ operate. tions with effective results. MacArthur’s air component commander But the most advanced computer in the didn’t hesitate to advise on Allied army world couldn’t duplicate Kenney’s second and naval plans, which were inextricably key to winning—creating what he needed linked with his air operations. Kenney’s to win. Much has been said about Kenney familiarity and competence with army and as an innovator. He played a critical role in naval questions were indispensable for developing parafrag bombs, the predeces­ planning and fighting coherent joint sor of current cluster bomb units (CBUs), campaigns—matters that had strategic sig­ and in fashioning attack aviation. Some nificance. other innovations credited to Kenney— What could be more joint than the Japa­ such as daisy-cutter bombs, decoy aircraft, nese convoy of 16 ships, carrying 7,000 and dummy airfields— had already been troops and capped by a fighter escort? But used by the Japanese.28 Although his the crucial fault of the Japanese forces was memoirs gloss over the provenance of their lack of interservice unity. The Japa­ his ideas, Kenney said, “Any time I can’t nese army and navy staffs had approached the war with different, divergent strategies. think of something screwy enough, I have a Japan’s Imperial General Headquarters was flock of people out here to help me.”29 In a temporary creation, with no peacetime truth, Kenney’s open-mindedness, encour­ predecessor. Japan’s army air force had agement of subordinates who had ideas, fought only on the Asian continent until and ability to recognize both good and bad the 6th Air Division was sent to augment ideas gained him far more than his own the naval air force and oppose Kenney in creations, alone, could have. New Guinea. Committed piecemeal, rather Third, in his relations with MacArthur, than under a single air commander, neither Kenney set a standard for performance as force was decisive. When Japan abandoned an air component commander that would her offensive naval strategy and elected to be hard to top. He started out by assuring defend air bases with land-based air power, the joint-forces commander of his complete Kenney’s Allied air forces defeated this dedication to the joint mission and imme­ new strategy at its outset. As one Japanese diately established his credibility with the commentator concludes, “It became im­ 17-ship raid on Rabaul. possible to transport construction and MacArthur had felt the sting of early other basic materials for air bases and their Allied defeats deeply and personally, and defense.’’31 The unity of Allied effort, appeared depressed or even defeatist at the spearheaded by Kenney, was indispensable time Kenney reported in. One of Mac- to winning. Arthur’s biographers reports that Finally, Kenney had an operational per­ MacArthur's restoration to full health and spective on his theater that paid tremen­ activity might well be dated from the day that dous dividends in joint operations as well Kenney walked into his headquarters in Bris­ as air campaigns. He saw the possibilities bane. . . . The importance of Kenney to Mac­ of airlift, forward bases, and antishipping Arthur in the following three years cannot be operations, and MacArthur approved his overestimated.30 proposals. Soon after the Bismarck Sea bat- 48 AIRPOWER JOURNAL FALL 1989 tie, MacArthur would state that the pur­ momentum for MacArthur’s command and pose of operations in his theater was to its course to victory. advance the line of air bases. Kenney’s vision provided MacArthur with a broader, more effective view of his theater and its strategic possibilities. Final Assessment When Kenney created Advanced Eche­ MacArthur described Kenney in his lon New Guinea and placed tactical opera­ memoirs: tions there under Brig Gen Ennis C. Whitehead, Kenney freed himself to con­ Of all the brilliant air commanders of the war, centrate on winning at the operational none surpassed him in those three great es­ level. Kenney didn’t stay aloof from crucial sentials of combat leadership: aggressive vi­ details like engineering support, weapons sion, mastery of air tactics and strategy, and developments, and the welfare of his peo­ the ability to extract the maximum in fighting qualities from both men and equipment.34 ple, but he entrusted Whitehead with run­ ning daily operations in the war zone. History should remember Kenney for re­ Kenney equipped, trained, moved, and viving the offensive spirit and will of a supplied forces to fight but only supervised joint-force commander who was soon in­ the fighting.33 Kenney’s vision of possi­ fected by Kenney’s aggressiveness, open- bilities— his drive to control the air over mindedness, and vision. The unity of New Guinea from the start—provided a purpose shared by these commanders, es­ coherent direction for tactical, operational, pecially as it contrasted with the frag­ and strategic choices. The unity of purpose mented efforts of their opponents, was the that Kenney created provided the aim and foundation for joint success.

Notes

1. Gavin Long. The Six Years War: A Concise History of Japanese Navy in World War II: In the Words of Former Australia in the 1939—45 War (Canberra. Australia: Australian Japanese Naval Officers, ed. and trans. Dr David C. Evans War Memorial and the Australian Government Publishing (Annapolis. Md.: Naval Institute Press. 1986). 226. 241. Service, 1973). 193. 9. Long. 247; D. Clayton lames. The Years of MacArthur. 2. Weldon E. “Dusty" Rhoades. Flying MacArthur to Victory vol. 2. 1941-1951 (Boston; Houghton Mifflin Company. 1975). (College Station. Tex.: Texas A&M Press. 1987). 67. 282: and Samuel Eliot Morison, Histoiy of United States 3. Wesley F. Craven and James L. Cate, eds., The Army Air Naval Operations in World War 11. vol. 6, Breaking the Forces in World War II. vol. 4. The Pacific: Guadalcanal to Hismurcks Barrier, 22 July 1942-1 May 1944 (Boston: Little, Saipan. August 1942 to July 1944 (Chicago: University of Brown and Company. 1950), x. 41—42 (hereafter cited as BBB). Chicago Press, 1950; Washington. D.C.: Office of Air Force 10. Gen Robert L. Eichelberger with Milton MacKaye, Our History. 1983). 118. Jungle Road to Tokyo (Washington. D.C.: Zenger Publishing 4. Vern Haugland. The AAF Against Japan (New York: Co.. 1982). 23, 41—44, 57; Kenney, 124. Harper & Brothers Publishers. 1948). 164. 11. Willoughby and Chamberlain. 96-97; Reports o f General 5. Maj Gen Charles A. Willoughby and )ohn Chamberlain. MacArthur. vol. 1, The Campaigns of MacArthur in the MacArthur. 1941-1951 (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Com­ Pacific (Washington. D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1966). pany. Inc.. 1954), 76. 42. 89 (hereafter cited as Reports). This volume of the reports 6. Capt William Crawford. Jr., as told to Ted Saucier. Gore narrates MacArthur's operations from his point of view and and Glory (Philadelphia: David McKay Company. 1944). 101. casts MacArthur in a good, almost flawless, light. This account explains the 23-hour mission. Kenney's first two 12. Headquarters Army Air Forces (AAF) SWPA Operations meetings are covered in George Churchill Kenney. General Instruction no. 26. 26 October 1942. in US Air Force Historical Kenney Reports: A Personal H istory of the Pacific War (New Research Center (USAFHRC) collection. Maxwell AFB, Ala­ York: Duell. Sloan and Pearce, 1949; Washington, D.C.: Office bama. of Air Force History. 1987). 13. Reports, vol. 1: 98. contains the complete text of General 7. Kenney called his later counterair operation of August Headquarters SWPA press release. 24 January 1943; the first 1943 merely “what looks to be a real step to control of New sentence included here is normally omitted in quotations. Guinea air." Lt Gen George C. Kenney, commander. SWPA Air 14. Reports, vol. 2. Japanese Operations in the Southwest Forces, to Maj Gen Ennis C. Whitehead, commander. Ad­ Pacific Area (Washington. D.C.: Government Printing Office, vanced Echelon (ADVON) New Guinea, letter. 17 August 1966). 200. This volume of the reports contains invaluable 1943. materials that present the war from the Japanese view (in this 8. Toshikazu Ohmae. "The Battle of Savo Island." in The book “the enemy" means the Allies). AGGHESSIVE VISION 49

15. Haugland. 160. 25. Eichelberger. 89. 16. Morison. BBB. 55-56: Craven and Cate. 142; Long points 26. Craven and Cate. 159-61. 178-80. out that Allied submarine strength required the lapanese to 27. Edward T. Maloney, ed.. Fighter Tactics of the Ace's sail in convoys. Thus, submarines forced concentration, as air S.W.P.A. (Corona Del Mar. Calit ; World War II Publications. power would force dispersion (251). 1978). passim: Lex McAulay. Into the Dragon’s Jaws (Mesa. 17. Papuan Campaign: The Buna-Sanananda Operation. 16 Ariz.: Champlin Fighter Museum Press. 1986). 11. November 1942-23 /anuary 1943 (Washington. D.C.: War 28. Compare McAulay. 10. to Kenney, 106-7. on daisy- Department. Military Intelligence Division. 1944). 199; Craven cutters. for example. See also Headquarters AAF SWPA Ob­ and Cate. 139—10: lames. 198-99. jective Folder No 65. 25 July 1943. "Japanese Camouflage and 18. RAAF Intelligence Resume, week ending 8 March 1943. Deception Methods.” in USAFHRC collection; Samuel Eliot Morison. The Two- 29. Herman S. Wolk, "The Great Innovator." in Makers of Ocean War. A Short History of the United States Navy in the United States Air Force, ed. John L. Frisbee (Washington. World War II (Boston; Little. Brown and Company. 1963). 272 D.C.; Government Printing Office. 1987). 141. Wolk's work has (hereafter cited as TTOW); Craven and Cate. 139. an excellent assessment of Kenney as well as a valuable 19. Air order of battle cited here is from Summory of bibliography. His chapter "MacArthur's Premier Airman," in Operations. AAF SWPA, 'Daily Summary." dated 3 March We Shall Return! ed. William M Leary (Lexington. Ky.: 1943. in USAFHRC collection. Summary figures were com­ University Press of Kentucky. 1988). is even better and has a piled and corrected at the end of the month, rather than better bibliography as well. simply compiled from a day's reports. 30. Clark Lee and Richard llenschel, Douglas MacArthur 20. Craven and Cate. 146-50; Steve Birdsall. Flying Bucca­ (New York: Henry Holt and Company. 1952), 167. neers; The Illustrated History of Kenney's Fifth Air Force 31. Ohmae in Evans. 220; Yokoi in Evans. 501-3; Ronald H. (Carden City. N.Y.: Doubleday & Company. Inc.. 1977). 55-63. Spector. Eagle against the Sun: The American War with Japan Both sources provide detailed reconstructions of the battle. Do (New York: Random House. 1985). 151. not be misled by the word illustrated in the subtitle. This is no 32. General Headquarters Warning Instructions 2. 6 May picture book; Birdsall’s text is well researched and a good 1943. quoted in John Miller. |r., Cartwheel. The Reduction of read. Rabuul (Washington. D C.; Government Printing Office. 1959). 21. On the basis of battle reports. Kenney believed that a 29. higher number of ships were sunk: his belief was reinforced 33. Not that MacArthur. Kenney, and Whitehead restricted during postwar interview's with Japanese officers. But two themselves to their own responsibilities when important detailed analyses, in 1943 and 1945. established the numbers issues were at stake. Kenney prized Whitehead for his frank­ given in the text. Craven and Cate. 146-50: Willoughby and ness as well as his skill and forwarded Whitehead's recom­ Chamberlain. H I Morison. in BBB. includes an acid para­ mendations on army and theater strategy to MacArthur. For graph declaiming Kenney's choice of figures on p. 205 of example, a letter of 13 July 1943. from Maj Gen Ennis C. Kenney (64). lames has the most recent and detailed coverage Whitehead to Lt Gen George C. Kenney, recommends that of the controversy, which is essentially unsolvable (297-303). MacArthur completely revise the strategic estimate of the Lae 22. Morison. TTOW. 272. operation (in USAFHRC collection) 23. Toshiyuki Yokoi. "Thoughts on Japan's Naval Defeat." in 34. General of the Army Douglas MacArthur. Reminiscences The lapanese Navy in W orld W ar II: In the W ords of Former (New York: McGraw-Hill. 1964). 157: quoted in Gavin Long, Japanese Naval Officers, ed. and trans. Dr David C. Evans MacArthur as Military Commander (Princeton. N.J.: D. Van (Annapolis. Md.: Naval Institute Press. 1986|. 514. Nostrand Company. Inc.. 1969). 107. Long also quotes Lee and 24. Long. 292. Henschel’s estimate of Kenney's influence on MacArthur.

US SPACE DOCTRINE Time for a Change?

I T Cm Aiaw I PauoiMr.TriM ll^AF

u B OST in Space," exclaimed the Express," the Air Force was backing away 1 cover story of the 17 August from manned space flight altogether. I 1987 issue of Newsweek. "A The NASA conclusions and contradic­ year and a half after the space tory signals from Washington indicate a shuttle Challenger blew up on its way to deficiency in space doctrine. The United orbit, the U.S. space program is a shambles: States has not decided what it wants to do commercial satellites are backed up for in space, how it can achieve its aims, or launching: the Pentagon has only one spy what equipment it needs for future space satellite left in orbit, and sophisticated sci­ exploration. If the US government is to ence probes are sitting in costly storage.”1 eliminate confusion and give direction to Several other leading national magazines the space program, it must first develop a ran similarly distressing stories in 1987 and cohesive military space doctrine. Other­ 1988, and even such industry stalwarts wise, we will continue to pursue different as Aviation Week 8r Space Technology initiatives that have competing, if not con­ chimed in with summer editorials about flicting. results. the demise of American leadership on the The lack of a sound doctrine was most newest frontier." apparent in the programmatic decisions Most critics argued that the problem was that followed the Challenger explosion. Af­ caused by a lack of vision, commitment, or ter the accident, the Air Force—as execu­ money. A blue-ribbon National Aeronau­ tive agent for DOD space launch—officially tics and Space Administration (NASA) ad­ reversed its decade-old plan for primary visory panel decided that "the U.S. space reliance on the shuttle for military pay- program now suffers from dissension be­ loads and returned to the former policy of tween the Department of Defense (DOD) depending upon expendable launch vehi­ and NASA, confusion over goals, lack of cles (ELVs) such as the Atlas and Titan consensus on content and major thrusts of rockets.4 However, the ELVs soon proved space activity and, consequently, no gen­ no more reliable than the shuttle, experi­ eral agreements on the need for or commit­ encing catastrophic failures and temporary ment to a long-term program.'" Even DOD groundings.5 could not reach consensus on where it was Actually, the Challenger disaster in Jan­ headed: while President Reagan promised a uary 1986 was just the second in a string of space station and a hypersonic "Orient mishaps that included the loss of two Air

51 52 A1RPOWER JOURNAL FALL 1989

Force Titan 34Ds, an Atlas Centaur vehicle, even be used to make nuclear war obsolete. and a NASA Delta rocket.6 No common The basis for each of these proposals was fault was responsible for the five accidents; the popular belief that we had solved basic in fact, each of these launch systems statis­ earth-to-orbit launch problems. Nothing tically met or exceeded the success rates of was further from the truth. similar earth-to-orbit vehicles. Through Even before the Challenger accident 1981, for instance, the United States lost grounded the orbiter fleet, unlaunched sat­ one of every eight launch systems, and ellites had been stacking up at an alarming “while one might expect that the success rate, and the Air Force had begun work on rate has greatly improved over the last a complementary expendable launch vehi­ several years, the success rate was only 93 cle (CELV) program for some of its own percent between 1977 and 1981.”7 The priority payloads. But the $2.1 billion state-of-the-art Ariane 4 of the European CELV program financed only 10 vehicles Space Agency failed in four of its first 18 that used old technologies and were no launches,6 and the workhorse of the Soviet more reliable than the shuttle.11 The going fleet—the “reliable and capable” Proton rate of $3,000 per pound to carry payloads booster—was advertised by the Politburo as to low earth orbit also made it unclear having only a 91.47 percent chance of whether the United States could afford a reaching orbit.'1 Despite the tragic conse­ greatly expanded space program.12 In short, quences of the Challenger explosion, the futurists’ predictions about adventure on shuttle’s success rate after 25 launches still the high frontier were technologically and compared favorably with all other existing financially grounded by an inadequate systems. space-launch program.13 The simple fact was that all contempo­ Numerous proposals for improved rary launch systems of the 1980s used a launch systems surfaced after the Chal- ballistic missile approach to achieve orbital lenger mishap and after the Air Force up­ parameters and, as a result, depended on graded the CELV program into a more stable thrust for control during the critical ambitious agenda. But while nations like stages of flight. Adding to the complexity Japan. West Germany, France, and Great was the formidable technological feat of Britain moved to develop reusable manned lifting multimillion-pound platforms by systems, the United States was alone in means of highly explosive propellants. returning to its policy of reliance on ex­ These factors combined to produce an in­ pendable ballistic vehicles and appeared to herently unstable method of reaching be pursuing a new space strategy by use of orbit.10 Why then the consternation and old doctrines and equipment.14 In 1945 headlines over US failures? Gen Henry H. "Hap” Arnold warned future Between the late 1960s and early 1980s, Air Force leaders about making this mis­ Americans had come to consider their na­ take: tion the world leader in space develop­ National safety would be endangered by an ment. The unmatched successes of Apollo, Air Force whose doctrines and techniques are Skylab, Galileo, and the space transporta­ tied solely on the equipment and process of tion system (STS) programs all contributed the moment. Present equipment is but a step to considerable national pride and the gen­ in progress, and any Air Force which does not eral impression that the space program was keep its doctrines ahead of its equipment, and its vision far into the future, can only delude on the verge of great accomplishments. the nation into a false sense of security.15 Popular magazines bristled with stories about future moon colonies, US space sta­ When the cost of a single communications tions, and interplanetary adventures. The satellite/booster reached $1 billion per mis­ Reagan administration broadened these ex­ sion in 1988, that false sense of security pectations by suggesting that space might came home to rest.16 US SPACE DOCTRINE 53

Is the United States lost in space? Many experts seem to think so.17 If this country is to clear up the confusion and get back on track, it must heed General Arnold’s time­ less advice and develop a doctrinal road map to the future. But. before getting too far into a discussion of what US space doctrine is and what it should be, we should briefly overview the history of space development to understand how the United States ar­ rived at its current predicament.

History of Space Development Many people consider the space age to be a post-World War II phenomenon, but some ideas about space flight are over a century old and can be traced to such visionaries as Konstantin Edwardovich Tsiolkovsky: “Though he never launched a rocket. Tsi- olkovskv’s contribution to the science of space travel was immense. He began in 1883 by explaining the principles by which rockets could fly in the vacuum of space." He was also the first person to introduce ideas about artificial earth satellites, liquid propellants, liquid oxygen-hydrogen en­ gines, staging, spin stabilization, and cor­ rect orbital velocity.18 In the 1920s hybrid “aerospace” vehicles were first conceived, and Austrian scientist Eugene Sanger proposed a transatmo- spheric idea that the US Air Force vigor­ ously pursued four decades later.1!l German scientists of the 1930s, under the tutelage of Wernher von Braun, perfected ballistic mis­ sile technology that culminated in the World War II production of the A-4 medium-range missile (the V-2 rocket). A prototype winged version—the A-4B—was

With the tragedy of the Challenger accident, the Air Force expanded its interest in expendable launch vehicles, including the development of new systems and the refurbishment of older systems such as this Titan II. 54 AIRPOWER JOURNAL FALL 1989

test-flown, but the war ended before it issued study contracts for the development came to fruition.20 of a totally reusable space launch system Following World War II, both the Soviet that would “shuttle” cargo and satellites to Union and the United States exploited Ger­ and from a space station and, in the pro­ man missile research, although the Soviets cess, make ELVs obsolete.24 did so with a more definitive objective in The original space shuttle (phase B) de­ mind: the development of an interconti­ sign called for a two-stage vehicle that nental ballistic missile (ICBM) to deliver combined a purely aeronautical first stage nuclear weapons. A less coordinated US with an aerospace orbiter second stage. The program, led by many of the German former proposed vehicle resembled the current experts, pursued space flight by means of shuttle orbiter in its Boeing 747 piggyback ballistic missiles and winged aerospace ferry mode. The phase B would carry a vehicles.21 Von Braun and his associates, as 22,600-pound payload—sufficient for most well as people in the National Advisory satellites of the time, even in that premicro­ Committee for Aeronautics (the forerunner chip period20—and featured an “offset- to NASA), believed that expendable mis­ launch” capability that could optimize siles were of questionable value over the space rendezvous capabilities. But the idea long term and that the correct road to space for a shuttle encountered two critical barri­ depended on some form of lifting surface. ers to development that would inevitably Therefore, winged vehicles such as the X- alter its character. First, the space shuttle 15 were an integral part of the early lacked sufficient launch demand to amor­ proposals.22 Because the race to be the first tize its large development cost. The infor­ into space took on increasing political sig­ mation age had only just begun, and no one nificance, however, the simpler ballistic in the 1960s could accurately forecast the missile approach received more support. coming explosion in space-based commu­ The step up from ICBMs to low earth nications systems. A second related, but orbit required only a small increase in different, factor was that NASA lacked the velocity. On 4 October 1957 the Soviets US Air Force’s moral support for the pro­ reached the pinnacle of international gram. prestige by orbiting a man-made satellite. In the early 1970s, the US Air Force made The 186-pound Sputnik, launched by a it known it did not want a shuttle and that 588,000-pound ICBM, served no practical it was content to continue using ELVs even purpose— it was simply first of a kind.23 though space shuttle development would What followed was a space race that de­ not require DOD funds. In a move to ac­ manded bigger and more powerful rockets. quire DOD’s moral support while simulta­ Rockets— more precisely, ELVs—were neously increasing launch demand, NASA the original choice of space engineers be­ agreed to double the shuttle’s payload ca­ cause. like balloons in the early days of pacity in order to accommodate all DOD aviation, they provided the most lift for the satellites.26 The impact of this decision on least technology when compared to reus­ shuttle design was profound, in that the able systems such as the US space shuttle, vehicle grew dramatically in size. Horizon­ as originally designed. But ELVs, like bal­ tal takeoff was no longer possible, and the loons, were inflexible, cumbersome, non- aerodynamic first stage was replaced by maneuverable, dangerous, and required two allegedly "refurbishable” solid rocket extensive facilities and manpower to oper­ boosters (SRBs). To make room for the ate. NASA formally acknowledged these cavernous payload bay, engineers added inherent limitations as early as 1963, real­ a $30 million expendable external tank izing it could not afford to keep throwing to carry fuel. A hands-off, computer- away priceless hardware into the waste­ controlled vertical launch became the only lands of space. By 1969 the agency had option for such a massive, unstable vehicle. US SPACE DOCTRINE 55 and the final design took on the very char­ size, vertical-launch requirements, and its acteristics of the ELVs it was supposed to limited operational envelope capabilities.20 replace.27 A brief examination of the shut­ Its "Primary Avionics Software system is by tle's operating characteristics will bear out far the most complex flight computer pro­ this fact (see table). gram ever developed.”30 The high total cost of each sortie can be attributed to these factors plus the obvious expense of throw­ US SPACE SHUTTLE away components. Still, the shuttle was a SORTIE OPERATIONS remarkable technological achievement for the 1970s, and it compared favorably with Operation Requirement ELVs of similar payload performance. By 1980 standards, it was the world’s premier Gross lift-off weight 4.463 million pounds Gross payload 65 thousand pounds spacecraft, and it satisfactorily served a US Costs per sortie3 $170 million policy calling for limited use of space. By Man-hours labor 600 thousand the late 1980s, however, Soviet threats and per sortieb domestic technological developments were Orbiter turnaround 30-60 days making the use of ballistic missiles for time space launch and its corresponding doc­ Minimum satellite 150 days trine obsolete. replacement time

Sources: (lift-off weight, payload, orbiter turnaround time) Space Shuttle System Summary (Los Angeles. Calif.: Rockwell International Space Systems Space Missions Group, 1980), 25-26; (costs per sortie) Donald E. Fink. *US Adopts New Space Strategy," Avia- tion Week & Space Technology 121 (27 August As with balloons in the early days of air 1984): 14—16: (man-hours labor per sortie) power, the first military use of space was Charles H. Eldred. "Shuttle for the 21st Cen- tury," address to the American Institute of for observation purposes.31 The dynamics Aeronautics and Astronautics Space System of orbits tracking high across hostile terri­ Conference, 18-20 October 1982. Washington. tory was an ironic by-product of the Sput­ D.C.. and officials of the Boeing Airplane Com- pany, discussions with author. March 1984; nik's maiden flight. Although not publicly (minimum satellite replacement time) Air Force admitted for almost 20 years, the satellite’s Space Plan (U) (Washington, D.C.: Head- quarters USAF/XOS. 1984), 9-14. ability to verify compliance with existing a. Space-launch sortie costs are often manipulated to treaties added considerably to the mainte­ make one alternative appear better than the next. Low figures nance of peace between the superpowers.32 often include only hardware ccets and leave out range and vehicle development, and manpower—costs that constitute The overflight right of satellites was sub­ the majority of the expense for vertical-launch systems. The sequently legitimized by United Nations figure quoted here i6 from NASA director James Beggs and protocol, but—like most international includes all costs. b. A large portion of manpower costs are attributable to agreements—it was relevant only as long as the time required to program the five onboard, general-pur- the signatories were not in serious disagree­ pose computers that control the shuttle during launch, orbit insertion, and most other portions of the mission. ment. In the late 1960s, the Soviets began development of an antisatellite (ASAT) sys­ tem that could be used during hostilities.33 Satellites capable of monitoring treaty The US space shuttle is the third largest compliance in peacetime could obviously vehicle ever to fly. having a lift-off weight be reassigned to help target ships, airfields, nearly seven times that of a fully loaded fortifications, and even cities in wartime. Boeing 747.~H Its thrust exceeds that of 280 Thus, the emergence of ASAT weapons was afterburning F-16s. Its extraordinary man­ no more surprising than was the develop­ power costs are the direct result of its large ment of fighter aircraft as an antireconnais­ 56 AIRPOWER JOURNAL FALL 1989

sance weapon during World War I.34 In fact, remained passive and was at odds with all the US military experimented with nuclear other US military doctrines.40 ASATs in the late 1950s and early 1960s.35 The Soviets were the first to develop a conventional ASAT weapon, which be­ Space Doctrine came operational early in the 1970s. Launched on an SL-11 ELV, the relatively The term doctrine has many different primitive weapon was designed to first meanings and is often confused with pol­ perform an on-orbit rendezvous with its icy. In its broadest form, it weaves the target before destroying it with a shotgun­ various threads of a nation’s armed forces like device.36 In response, the US began into a coherent pattern of warfighting strat­ work on a conventional ASAT in the 1970s. egy and, in the process, defines the types Never a popular program with Congress, and numbers of men and materiel needed the F-15-launched US ASAT was continu­ to support national security objectives. It ously delayed by its critics, who had some­ should be the guiding principle of all mil­ how concluded that unilateral US space itary programs. disarmament could preclude a future Failure of American military planners to space-weapons race.37 Unfortunately, this understand doctrine and its significance for hypothesis ignored both the Soviet threat future wars has cost many lives and re­ and Western allies’ weapon-development sulted in unnecessary defeats. Prior to trends. World War I. for example, the US military Not only did the Soviet Union continue had not given serious consideration to the its development of space weapons during potential of heavier-than-air aircraft and the 1980s but also the US Army. Navy, and had no doctrine for the airplane’s use, em­ Air Force became increasingly dependent ployment, or design. Consequently, on the on friendly space forces for terrestrial mis­ eve of the Great War, the United States sions. By the early 1980s, over 70 percent of government did not have an air force of any US military communications went through kind and ranked seventh worldwide in space, and all major US commands were financial support for aviation—just behind forced to rely upon satellites for command Mexico.41 And although Americans built and control, intelligence, weather, naviga­ the world's first airplanes, the Europeans tion. and other primary functions.38 Pro­ built the world’s first air forces. After four grams under development, like the global long years of war. US military aviation was positioning system, were expected to fur­ still without an adequate doctrine and was ther revolutionize warfare by permitting so disorganized that no US-designed-and- future munitions to improve their accuracy built aircraft ever reached combat in World to several meters. If one trend was clear by War I.42 the late 1980s, it was that military space In 1925 the US Naval Weapons Labora­ forces would play a critical role in future tory developed a system for locating ships terrestrial conflicts.30 Strangely, the US and aircraft at long range and coined the space doctrine of 1988 made no mention of name radar (for radio detecting and rang­ the importance of protecting friendly satel­ ing); yet because of overreliance on a doc­ lites; as a result, support for even the F-15 trine of offensive strategic bombing, it was ASAT continually eroded. By the summer the Europeans who first incorporated the of 1988, the Air Force had dropped the idea into an effective air defense system. funding request for its only near-term space Incredibly. 18 months after radar demon­ weapon. Although Defense Secretary Cas­ strated its capability to preclude a surprise par Weinberger, before his retirement, gave attack in the Battle of Britain, US forces some lip service to the need for space were caught asleep on that infamous day at control, official Air Force space doctrine Pearl Harbor. The tragic World War II story The space shuttle was a miracle of technology for its time. However, the United States needs to look forward in time in developing a viable space doctrine. That doctrine ihould envision reliable technologies for space launch that may not even exist today. of unescorted daylight bombing and the adapt warfighting doctrine to technological subsequent reacceptance of a doctrine of air change. superiority with long-range fighter escorts There exists a Military Space Doctrine is similarly revealing but too well known to (AFM 1-6), but—instead of explaining how repeat here. What needs to be said is that all US space forces will be employed in future oo often America's lead in weapons engi­ conflicts—it simply restates current public neering has been lost to its inability to policy. In many ways it actually contradicts

57 58 AIRPOVVER JOURNAL FALL 1989

AFM 1—1, Basic Aerospace Doctrine of the strategic bombing purists in early World United States A ir Force, on fundamental War II.46 In fact, space is not so unique as it issues. While AFM 1—1 requires aerospace is simply new, and the United States mili­ forces to be offensive and “act rather than tary has a long and successful tradition of r e a c t , ”45 A FM 1 - 6 states that U S sp a c e adapting to new environments—albeit forces will “react to threats to United States sometimes very slowly and usually as a space systems” and that “we must be able direct result of war. to defend friendly space systems by avoid­ In the late nineteenth century when ing or surviving attack.”44 This passive America was emerging as an international defense policy has been centered on the power, the US Navy was confronted with precept of survivability for the past 25 the task of developing a sea power doctrine years. for naval forces that were being revolution­ In his paper “Space Doctrines,” pub­ ized by the move from sail to steam. Capt lished in Strategic Review, Lt Col David Alfred Thayer Mahan, the father of US Lupton, USAF, described the survivability naval strategy and one of the most re­ principle as one founded on deterrence and spected military theorists of all time, wrote “tit-for-tat" retribution.45 The premise was that that satellites were indefensible; thus, the the purpose of naval strategy is to gain control only way to protect them was to discourage of the sea. . . . To control the sea in war, it is attack by threatening in-kind retaliation first necessary to destroy the enemy’s fleet. fi.e.. you break one of mine, and I’ll break The destruction of the enemy’s fleet is the first two of yours). Through on-orbit sparing task of a navy in war. Everything else is a and other passive defenses, we hoped to sideshow.49 achieve a “graceful degradation” of US Fifty years later, Gen William “Billy” space capability in time of war.46 This Mitchell, fresh from his experience as the unique hypothesis allowed for develop­ chief of Air Service for Group of Armies in ment of a retaliatory weapon like the F-15 World War I, similarly testified to Congress ASAT, but it totally disregarded the need to about the new environment of aviation: actively protect US satellites that were needed for mission support of terrestrial The principal mission . . . of aviation . . . forces. is the destruction of the hostile aviation, in To a large degree, the survivability doc­ the same way that the principal mission of the trine was a by-product of an inadequate US navy is the destruction of the hostile navy, or earth-to-orbit launch system; nevertheless, the principal mission of an army is destruc­ it ignored General Arnold’s charge to keep tion of the hostile army.50 doctrine far ahead of equipment in order to It would seem to follow that the principal drive thd type and number of machines that mission of US military space forces should the doctrine would later demand. Con­ be the destruction of hostile space forces; in versely, the conventional doctrines of the other words, we should strive for space US Navy, Army, Air Force, and Marines superiority rather than space survivability. have generally focused on the concept of Indeed, we may need such a doctrine to superiority. Whether on land, on sea, or in protect our national lifeline to the future. the air, each service has aimed at gaining Sea power became important when im­ command of the battle environment as a perialism created both colonies and the prerequisite to all other military opera­ need to protect ocean access to raw tions. Supporters of the survivability the­ materials.51 Air power became important as ory countered that space was unique and a result of the industrial revolution that that the lessons of the past were invalid in clustered war-making assets into strategic the newest theater of operations.47 A simi­ “vital centers." Now, space power has be­ larly incorrect argument was put forth by come an additional responsibility as a re­ US SPACE DOCTRINE 59

suit of the next major socioeconomic shift. for the US Space Command. Operational John Naisbett, in his well-researched and doctrine is derived from basic doctrine and, immensely popular book Megatrends, in turn, should apply the basic principles stated that "this book is about ten major within “the context of distinct objectives, :ransformations taking place right now in force capabilities, broad mission areas, and aur society. None is more subtle, yet more operations environments.”54 More specifi­ jxplosive. I think than this first, the mega­ cally, an operational doctrine of space su­ shift from an industrial society to an infor- periority should define the types of nation society.”33 The two causes of this personnel and equipment needed to fight a :hange, Naisbett claimed, were the jet air­ war in space, given a certain level of tech­ craft and the communications satellite— nology. This architecture should include the latter of which was by far the more future satellites, critical orbits, weapons, important because “it collapsed the infor­ space stations, orbital transfer vehicles, mation float . . . and turned us into a glo­ and, of course, earth-to-orbit systems. But bal economy.”33 the concepts cannot be so far ahead as to If Naisbett is correct, then active defense leave serious windows of vulnerability. of US military and commercial satellites is An operations doctrine of space superi­ no more an option than the US Navy is a ority would very likely have as its highest military luxury. To keep the commercial priority the development of a reliable, re­ space lanes open in the future, space forces sponsive, flexible, on-demand access to equipped with space weapons are just as space. AFM 1-1 states that “success in necessary as aircraft carriers and advanced warfare depends on getting sufficient men tactical fighter aircraft. Furthermore, if and machines in the right position at the space forces are to be successful and com­ right time.”53 Until the United States can plementary to other military operations, routinely get to and from orbit when nec­ they must have a doctrine of superiority. In essary. it can never protect, maintain, and order to enact such a doctrine, the Depart­ replace its assets there. This is not to say ment of Defense must initiate several fun­ that such a vehicle would eliminate the damental changes. need for other launch systems. In all likeli­ hood. the requirement for a few ELVs would still exist—just as blimps have sur­ Recommendations vived into the 1980s. But a doctrine of space superiority would very likely force a The first priority is to develop, coordi­ return to orbit insertion by means of a nate, approve, and issue a joint-service staged lifting body, which is inherently space superiority doctrine. This “basic more stable and flexible than the technique doctrine,” as AFM 1-1 describes it, should that uses the ballistic missile. Just as the include the most fundamental and endur­ need for air superiority forged the advance­ ing beliefs that guide the proper use of ment in aircraft as a whole, so may space aerospace forces in military action. Objec­ superiority change the entire nature of tives should be clear, well understood, and space operations. focused upon the need to achieve space Finally, the United States must develop a superiority in time of war by in-space de­ tactical space doctrine that applies basic struction of all enemy satellites and by and operational doctrine to specific terrestrial destruction of earth-based sys­ weapon systems to accomplish detailed ob­ tems such as ground-based laser ASATs. jectives. A tactical doctrine must supply Deterrence is certainly a goal of such a practical solutions to real problems and not doctrine but cannot be an end in itself. depend on technological breakthroughs for The second objective should be the de­ success or failure. Quantifiable require­ velopment of an operational space doctrine ments for operational statements of need 60 AfRPOVVER JOURNAL FALL 1989

should evolve from this process. For exam­ flight and ignored the more fundamental ple. one might develop a concept of opera­ issue of maneuverability. To the Army’s tions for a fleet of military vehicles dismay, both of Langley’s machines allowing them to stage on alert; launch on crashed into the Potomac River during their strategic warning; fly an atmospheric offset- first takeoff, sinking with them the mili­ launch profile: inject into a nominal low tary’s interest in airplanes. Still embar­ earth orbit; rendezvous within a minimum rassed by the incident three years later, the time with a desired target; identify, inspect, same board would not accept evidence of destroy, or replace the subject vehicle; and the Wright brothers’ success, forcing the return to base in short order to combat-turn ingenious inventors to market their ideas and restage on alert. Again, tactical doc­ abroad.56 The United States returned to its trine should be based on tactical require­ reliance on balloons while its competitors ments rather than permitting technological forged ahead in aviation. adventurism to drive the end product. Real As before, other nations are busy exploit­ needs demand practical solutions. ing the US lead in space and have begun to develop small, maneuverable, reusable, staged aerospace vehicles of their own. If Conclusions the United States is to maintain its position as the leader in space, it will first have to At the beginning of the twentieth cen­ update its military space doctrine to ad­ tury. the US Army Board of Ordnance gave dress twenty-first-century issues and bring Samuel Pierpont Langley a very large sum it in line with our other proven theories ol of money to build two prototype aero­ superiority in war. Or, as Maj Gen I. B. planes. Professor Langley, as secretary of Holley, USAFR, concluded in his book the Smithsonian Institution and associate Ideas and Weapons, "Failing here, the na­ of Alexander Graham Bell, appeared to be tion will repeat the sorry pattern of the aii an aviation expert. But Langley's model weapon, wastefully groping forward with concentrated on the problems of power in each innovation.”57

Notes 1. "How to Get America Off the Ground," Newsweek, 17 10. Gene D. Carlow. "Architecture of the Space Shuttle August 1987. 3. Primary Avionics Software System." Communications of the 2. Craig Covault. "White House. NASA Act to Regain U.S. ACM 27 (September 1984): 926-36. Space Leadership Role." Aviation Week 8- Space Technology 11. Air Force Space Command, briefing to Gen John Vessey 127 (10 August 1987): 18-19: Donald E. Fink. "A Glimmer of USA. chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Spring 1984. Hope," ibid., 11. 12. Michael A. Dornheim. "Air Force Awards Contracts foi 3. "NASA-Pentagon Turf War Puts US Behind in Space," El Phase 1 ALS Studies." Aviation Week 8 Space Technology 127 Paso Times, 18 November 1987. 1. (20 |uly 1987): 25. 4. Craig Covault. "Political. Technological Needs Spur New 13. Donald E. Fink, "Short Shift." Aviation Week 8 Space National Launch Strategies." Aviation Week 8 Space Technol­ Technology' 127 (3 August 1987): 21. ogy 126 (15 |une 1987): 262-67. 14. Covault. "Political. Technological." 262-67; and Keith F 5. William B. Scott. "Static Firing of Solid Rocket Motor Mordoff. "Need for Key Aerospace Decisions Puts West Ger­ Clears USAF Titan 34Ds for Launch," Aviation Week 8- Space many at Crossroads." Aviation Week 8 Space Technology 126 Technology 127 (20 July 1987): 26. (15 June 1987): 163-67. 6. Ibid., and Donald E. Fink. "Access Platform Damages 15. AFM 1 1. Ba sic Aerospace Doctrine of the United States Centaur; NASA Inquiry Team Assesses Impact on Next Atlas Air Force, 1984, 4-7. Launch." Aviation Week 8 Space Technology 127 (20 lulv 16. Donald E. Fink. “Milstar Satellite Booster Cost Reaches 1987): 27. Si Billion Per Mission." Aviation Week 8 Space Technology 7 Lt Col David E. Lupton. On Space W arfare: A Space 128 (9 May 1988): 27. Power Doctrine (Maxwell AFB. Ala.: Air University Press. 17. Covault. "White House." 18-19; "NASA-Pentagon." 1; June 1988). 145. note 6. Donald E. Fink. "Space Station—Round 2." Aviation Week & 8. Covault, "Political. Technological." 262-67. Space Technology 126 (27 April 1987): 25. 9. Donald E. Fink. "Soviets Will Offer Space Launch Insur­ 18. Kenneth William Gatland. The Illu stra te d Encyclopedia ance at Competitive Prices." Aviation Week 8 Space Technol­ of Space Technology (New York: Salamander Books. 1981). ogy 127 (28 September 1987): 138-39. 11. US SPACE DOCTHINE 61

19. Ibid.. 198. Alternatives lo r the 1990s (Washington, D.C.: National De­ 20. Ibid. fense University Press. 1982). 63. 21. Richard P Hallion. The Path to the Space Shuttle 36. Soviet Military Power. 65. (Edwards AFB. Calif.: Air Force Flight Test Center History 37. Fink. "Milstar Satellite/Booster Cost.” 27. Office. 183). 4-6. 38. Giffen. 22-23. 22. David Baker. The Shape of Wars to Come (New York: 39. Soviet M ilita ry Power. 67. Stein and Day. 1982). 31. 40. Fink. 'Milstar Satellite/Booster Cost." 27. 23. Gatland. 290. 41. I B. Holley. Ideas and Weapons (Washington. D.C.: 24. David Baker. Space Shuttle (London: Waterlow Ltd., Office of Air Force History. 1984). 15. 19791. 6: and Jerry Gray, Enterprise (New York: Morrow, 1979). 42. Ibid.. 29. 53. 43. AFM 1-1. 2-6. 25. Baker. Space Shuttle. 6. 44. AFM 1-6. Military Space Doctrine, 15 October 1982. 3. 26. Ibid.. 7: and Hallion. 56. 6 . 27. Carlow. 924. 45. Lt Col David Lupton. "Space Doctrines." Strategic 28. |ohn W. Taylor, ed.. lane's A ll the W orld’s A ircraft (New Review 11 (Fall 1983): 41. York: Jane's Publishing. Inc.. 19841. 399. 46. Ibid. 29. Edward A. Gabris et al.. "Concepts. Technology, and 47. Charles D. Friedenstein. “The Uniqueness of Space Operations for a Quick Response Highly Maneuverable Doctrines." Air University Review 37. no. 1 (November- Launch Vehicle." speech presented at the 21st Space Con­ Decetnber 1985): 13-23. gress. Cocoa Beach. Florida. 24-26 April 1984. 1-6. 48. Dr Noble Frankland, "The Combined Bomber Offensive: 30. Carlow. 926. Classical and Revolutionary. Combined and Divided. Planned 31. Basil Collier. A History of Air Power (New York: and Fortuitous." in Proceedings of the 2nd Military' History Macmillan Publishing Co.. 19741. 1—42. Symposium. US A FA, 2-3 May 1968, ed. William Griffen 32. As President Lyndon B. Johnson was reported to have (Washington. D.C.: Office of Air Force History. 1971). 253-67. said in 1965. "I wouldn't want to be quoted on this but we 49. Russell F. Weigley. The American Way of War (New spent 35 to 40 billion on the space program and. if nothing York: Macmillan Publishing Co., 1973). 175. else has come out of it except knowledge that we gained from 50. Robert Frank Futrell. Ideas. Concepts. Doctrine: A space photography, it would be worth 10 times what the History of Basic Thinking in the United States Air Force. whole project cost because tonight we know how many 1907-1964 (Maxwell AFB. Ala.: Air University, 1974). 18. missiles the enemy has and it turns out that our [earlier] 51. Bernadotte E. Schmitt and Harold C. Vedeler, The World guesses were way off . . . we were doing things we didn't in the Crucible. 1914-1919 (New York: Harper and Row. need to do. we were building things we didn't need to build, 1984). 5. we were harboring fears we didn't need to harbor" (Baker. The 52. John Naisbett. Megatrends (New York: Warner Books. Shape of Wars. 71). Inc.. 1982), 11. 33. Soviet Military Power: An Assessment of the Threat 53. Ibid.. 68. 1988 (Washington. DC.: Government Printing Office. 1988). 54. AFM 1-1. vi. 64. 55. Ibid.. 2-9. 34 Collier, 1-12. 56. John W. R. Taylor and Kenneth Munson. History of 35. Gatland. 117: Baker. The Shape of Wars. 157; and Col Aviation (London: Octopus Books, Ltd., 1975). 45-50. Robert B. Giffen. L'.S. Space System Survivability: Strategic 57. Holley, 172. A US AIR FORCE ROLE IN C O U NTERIN S U RG EN CY SUPPORT

M aj Ric h a r d D. N ewt o n , USAF

Low-intensity conflict is the prime challenge we will face, at least through the remainder of this century. The future of peace and freedom may well depend on how effectively we meet it. —George P. Shultz

T Col David J. Dean, in his book The Air Force Role in Low-Intensity' Con- flict, established a framework for 1 developing a capability appropriate Lto low-intensity conflict (LIC) in the third world. He suggested three levels of partici­ pation in third world-related LIC for the US military: assistance (training and equip­ ment sales), integration (advising and min­ imal participation), and intervention (unilateral direct action).1 The extent of US, and thus the military’s, involvement de­ pends upon the political climate of the moment. The US Air Force’s training abil- COUNTERINSURGENCY SUPPORT 63

tv and the equipment it offers for export spectrum representative of conflict from limit its effectiveness in the assistance and our perspective. To fully appreciate what integration roles. This article proposes a we are dealing with, we should also lay out way for the Air Force to assist allies who a similar model for the environment on face revolutionary conflicts at the low end which this article is focused: revolutionary of the conflict spectrum—a capability no­ war (see fig. 2). According to Samuel B. ticeably lacking in the Air Force of the 1980s. PHASE 1 PHASE 2 PHASE 3

LIC/Insurgency Environment Figure 2. Revolutionary Warfare The phrase low-intensity conflict, while often used in a narrow context, actually Griffith, classic Maoist revolutionary war­ defies easy definition. LIC’s broad, ambig­ fare encompasses three phases—progres­ uous nature makes it difficult for us to sing from initial political organization address policy and force-structure issues. through guerrilla warfare and culminating In 1987 the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) ap­ in conventional military operations.3 The proved the definition of LIC contained revolution itself may progress from one in the National Security Strategy of the phase to the next or revert to a previous United States, which attempted to catego­ stage should circumstances require it. Sig­ rize the concept and eliminate its ambigu­ nificantly, each phase provides the under­ ity. The general agreement is that LIC pinnings of subsequent stages: thus, phase involves many uses of force up to, but not 1 and phase 2 activities are present during including, sustained engagements between phase 3 and never lose their initial impor­ conventional forces/ This article limits its tance. In our approach to revolutionary focus to dealing with insurgency, which war, we must always consider the necessity involves protracted, revolutionary warfare. of dealing with phases 1 and 2 even if a Dr Richard Schultz. Jr., in Low-Intensity conventional military response to phase 3 Conflict and Modern Technology, offered a is required. Our goal, in the context of model to describe the spectrum of conflict Colonel Dean's framework, should be to from normal diplomacy through strategic restrict insurgency (revolutionary warfare) nuclear holocaust (see fig. 1). He also to—and defeat it in—phase 1 if possible showed what he thought the range of LIC to (certainly, no higher than phase 2), and our be as a subset of the total spectrum. Insur­ efforts should focus on assistance (and per­ gency falls in the center of the LIC range. haps integration) to avoid any need for Schultz’s model should be understood as a intervention.

r> - c »:_1 MkMrtenaity High-Intensity Theater Strategic Sabotage Low Intendty Conventional Conventional Nudear Nudear Terr on wh & Invifpncy Convm®ond Warlara & Warfare A Wars Un- War & Uncon- □ Momecy SancfeneS Coup* W tffar* Unoonvan Unconven- oonvantional venionnl tonal Wart ara tional W arfare Warlara Warfare

Range of Low-intensity Conflicts

* * * " ' Dr Richard H. Schultz. Jr.. "Low-Intensity Conflict and US Policy: Regional Threats, Soviet Involvement, and the American Response " in Low-Intensity Conflict and Modem Technology, ed. Lt Col David J. Dean (Maxwell AF8, Ala : Air Umverwty Press, 1986), 77 inure I Spectrum of Conflict 64 AIRPOWER JOURNAL FALL 1989

The common mistake is to consider in­ The limited funds and resources usually surgency as simply an action, when it is available to the nation experiencing an in­ more appropriately a number of activities surgency ought to be directed at the inter­ growing out of and appropriate to an envi­ nal conditions that fomented the conflict ronment of revolutionary war. In effect, and not on multimillion-dollar weapon insurgency is both an environment and a systems. While it may be a status symbol collection of actions suited to it. Counter­ for those developing countries wanting our insurgency (COIN) is the aggregate of polit­ help to have F-16s on their ramps, one has ical, economic, informational, and military to question if these aircraft are proper for actions taken by the target government to the COIN job. More important is the ques­ defeat the insurgency, and—for our pur­ tion of whether the particular country has poses—foreign internal defense (FID) is the the industrial, educational, and technical aggregate of like actions we take to assist base to support such high-technology air­ the target government in its COIN activi­ craft. ties. The military aspects of COIN cannot be denied. They must, however, fit hand in glove with the other objectives and are, properly, less important to solving the root causes of the conflict than other factors. During (he Vietnam War. the Air Force built a strong capability to support its own counterinsurgency oper­ The military has to mesh with and comple­ ations and to assist allied nations. However, the ment the political, social, diplomatic, and inactivation of the Special Air Warfare Center signif- economic variables in the equation. icantly diminished that capability. COUNTERINSURGENCY SUPPORT 65

Once the political decision is made to provide US assistance, the Air Force has a responsibility to offer effective help to those nations that have asked for it. That obligation includes advocating the proper aircraft, if any. for the situation at hand. It goes against congressional sensitivities for the Air Force to endorse other countries’ products—even though our own defense industry might not produce the aircraft appropriate to a particular F1D/COIN re­ quirement. Moreover, Air Force research and development funds cannot be spent for systems intended for the exclusive use of foreign forces.4 The Defense Guidance of the secretary of defense requires the Air Force as well as t/S Air Force personnel regularly train and exercise the other three services to prepare for com­ ivith allied air forces for conventional air operations. is did this US Air Force pilot and Royal Thai Air bat across the entire spectrum of conflict. rorce pilot at Cope Thunder. The Air Force needs However, political factors and fiscal reali­ n-place capability to train for low-intensity conflict ties force the Air Force to prepare for the is well. upper end of the conflict spectrum. Strate­ gic nuclear war constitutes the greatest threat to our national survival. The Ameri­ can public understands the Soviet threat to Europe and its consequences for US na­ tional interests. Because we have prepared to fight and win World War III, a case can be made that we have effectively deterred it. World War III has since become the least likely scenario, and our near-total preoccu­ pation with the upper end of the conflict spectrum has driven Air Force doctrine, training, and organization away from the very arena of conflict and combat that our military would most likely face (see fig. 3).5

Figure 3. Speclrum of Conflict: Probability of Occurrence 66 A1RPOWER JOURNAL FALL 1989

In fact, the Department of Defense (DOD) Current expenditures for special operations forces (SOF) have averaged between one-tenth Air Force Capability and one-half of 1 percent of its budget.6 The Historian Richard P. Hallion noted that Air Force—because it has optimized its doctrine, training, and equipment for the “because the Air Force as a service is wed­ ded to technology, there is always the upper end of the conflict spectrum—has danger that technology will make one’s effectively excluded itself from assisting or doctrine obsolete and will replace doctrine integrating with those allies facing conflict as the determinant of the future course of below midintensity conventional warfare, the Air Force.”7 Although maintaining our particularly insurgency. In short, our lim­ place on the leading edge of technology is ited capacity to fight protracted conflicts at critically important, we should not ignore the low end of the spectrum together with constraints on our ability to provide the proper equipment and training to countries fighting a revolutionary conflict has re­ The US Army has prepared itself for low-intensity stricted the Air Force’s flexibility. Our conflict by sending mobile training teams to third world countries to teach foreign internal defense present situation is analogous to the one (belowI and to assist with local civic activities—the during the late 1950s when we were faced mission of this Special Forces medical team in Hon­ with the option of massive retaliation. duras (opposite page). COUNTERINSURGENCY SUPPORT 67 an appropriate mix of older and leading- tional interests warrant greater Air Force edge technology for the insurgency envi­ emphasis on support to COIN. ronment. The sophisticated, high-tech, The prevalent attitude among Air Force expensive weapon systems used by the Air leaders and planners seems to be that prep­ Force make its equipment, management arations for and successful deterrence of practices, and training incompatible with World War LII mean we will have no trouble the needs of nations most likely to be "stepping down” to combat at the low end involved in a protracted, revolutionary of the spectrum. Apparently they feel that conflict. Developing nations tell us they an F-16 can be just as effective in El Salva­ require simple, inexpensive, easily oper­ dor as in the Fulda Gap (West Germany). ated and maintained systems.8 Currently, This article does not deny that the Air however, the Air Force does not advocate Force can fight and win a limited (not weapon systems unique to COIN and lacks necessarily low-intensity) conflict. Indeed, the ability to train and educate our allies to our interventions in Grenada and Libya employ such systems. The increased risk demonstrated that we can successfully con­ and frequency of warfare in and among duct short-duration operations with con­ developing nations, and those same na­ ventional or special operations forces. tions’ increasing significance to US na­ The problem is that shifting to FID/COIN is not a matter of “stepping down”; it is a matter of sidestepping to a new environ­ ment. But our current doctrine, training, and equipment are not suited to our allies’ COIN efforts or their capabilities. The mes­ sage the Air Force seems to be sending is that it can fight and win at any level of conflict. It would be better, as previously noted, for us to help others to fight and win their own counterinsurgencies. Since the end of the Vietnam War, there has been a reluctance to commit US forces to combat. This attitude causes the Ameri­ can public and the Congress to fear and resist any involvements that may draw into another foreign conflict.9 In fact, former Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger went so far as to propose strict guidelines— prerequisites for committing our military to combat. Thus, a commitment to combat— made only as a last resort—would require the sustained support of the American peo­ ple and Congress, clearly defined political and military goals, and the intent to win.10 COIN does not lend itself to enthusiastic support by the Congress or the American people. With its propensity for protracted­ ness and unclear political goals, COIN is extremely difficult to justify to an Ameri­ can public that tends to think in terms of nuclear confrontation with the Soviet Union. Furthermore, the unique morality 68 AJRPOU'ER JOURNAL FALL 1989 and ethics of insurgency and revolutionary surgence. But, as Col Kenneth Alnwick warfare are foreign to traditional American pointed out in 1986, there has been a norms.11 “major shift in emphasis . . . moving the Because of America’s reluctance to com­ Air Force SOF community away from tra­ mit forces to direct action (intervention) or ditional SOF missions in counterinsur­ even to integrate with an ally’s forces, se­ gency, nation-building, and psychological curity assistance has become our primary warfare toward special operations behind military alternative in the third world.1” enemy lines—more reminiscent of the This option is usually (but not always) World War II experience than the experi­ politically more palatable to a wary public. ences of the last two decades.”14 Special The Army, through its First Special Opera­ operations forces are neither familiar with tions Command, has developed an enviable capability to assist others with FID support to COIN efforts. It sends mobile training teams (MTT) to teach basic health and sanitation, to improve standards of living, as well as to teach small-unit infantry skills needed to fight insurgents. However, the Air Force lost its ability to train allied personnel for the insurgency environment with the demise of the USAF Special Air Warfare Center (USAFSAWC). The best we seem to be able to do is minimally integrate our forces with those of our allies. For example, tactical and strategic intelligence systems have successfully supplied some of our allies’ information needs. By and large, though, integration is tantamount to intervention in the eyes of the American public and is carefully avoided or dis­ guised. Traditionally, special operations forces have assumed primary responsibility for COIN-related foreign internal defense, es­ pecially in the Army and Air Force. Since the 1980 disaster at Desert One, these forces have received a great deal of attention. Though much work remains to be done. Air Force special operations forces have come a long way since that April night in the desert of Iran. The resounding success of Air Force SOF (MC-130 Combat Talon and AC-130 Spectre forces) during the Grenada operation attests to their remarkable re-

Counlerinsurgencv is not simply a military concern. Any military action must mesh with social, economic, and political reforms, reflected by this turnout of voters during the free election of representatives in El Salvador. COUNTEHINSUHGENCY SUPPORT 69 nor proficient in concepts or systems of low-intensity conflict—assisting third unique to 'revolutionary warfare in deve­ world air forces, integrating with them, or loping nations. directly intervening in a situation that re­ By and large, when the Air Force says it quires activity beyond [emphasis added] a does well in LIC, it means that it excels single mission,” says Colonel Dean, "are in executing a one-time raid (like the Lib­ not currently within the means of the Air yan action), in conducting limited joint Force Special Operations Forces.”14 operations (like the one in Grenada), or in In 1961 the Air Force activated the supporting the theater commanders' un­ 4400th Combat Crew Training Squadron conventional warfare (UVV) requirements. (CCTS) at Eglin AFB, Florida. Using the ‘Capabilities for the broader missions older, surplus aircraft the United States was 70 AIRPOWER JOURNAL FALL 1989 exporting to allied nations, this squadron pensive for the developing nations of the trained foreign aircrews and ground crews world. Procurement of these systems rein­ to fly and maintain attack, reconnaissance, forces Colonel Alnwick’s assertion that the and airlift aircraft. The squadron also de­ Air Force special operations forces tend to vised doctrine and tactics for employing air concentrate on their own operations to the power in an insurgency environment.1^ In exclusion of FID support to COIN. 1962, responding to pressure from Presi­ dent John F. Kennedy to create forces to fight “Communist-sponsored wars of na­ A Proposed Solution tional liberation,” the 4400th CCTS was absorbed into the newly created Special Air A master plan for Air Force SOF calls for Warfare Center, also at Eglin AFB. four special operations wings: three opera­ The responsibility for training allied tional wings oriented to geographical areas crews in COIN and counterguerrilla tech­ of responsibility and one training wing.19 niques fell to the center’s 1st Air Com­ The operational wings are designed to sup­ m a n d o G r o u p . 16 A s t h e w a r i n S o u t h e a s t port the theater commanders’ conven­ Asia continued and the requirement for tional, high-intensity war plans. They are COIN air strikes and airlift increased, the not organized, trained, or equipped to as­ role of the center changed from training sist other countries needing to develop var­ allied crews to training US crews for direct ious forms of air power for revolutionary intervention. Reflecting the increasingly warfare environments. That is a different conventional response of the Air Force to mission, requiring a uniquely integrated hostilities and the spiralling numbers of US organization: however, it is a mission that troops committed to the war, by late 1966 still belongs in the SOF arena. the air commandos were flying mostly in I suggest a fifth special operations wing support of our own activities.17 In 1974, within Twenty-Third Air Force, the air with the US withdrawal from Southeast component of the US Special Operations Asia, the Special Air Warfare Center (since Command. Modeled on the Special Air renamed the USAF Special Operations Warfare Center of the 1960s, this fifth wing Force) was inactivated. With it went the Air would be dedicated to training and educat­ Force's former capability to train friendly ing third world air forces in COIN air power nations to fight their own counterinsurgen­ employment, as well as to developing and cies with doctrine and equipment appro­ testing the doctrine, tactics, and techniques priate to the unique situations in those necessary for COIN operations. Army crew countries. members should be included in the cadre Currently, the four major Air Force SOF since the wing should manifest joint oper­ acquisition programs concentrate on the ations and since Army flyers are the experts high-technology aircraft necessary for un­ in certain missions (for example, heliborne conventional warfare and special opera­ insertions and extractions). This special air tions. These aircraft include the MC-130H warfare wing could consist of a technical Combat Talon II. AC-130U gunship, MH- training squadron (TTS), a flying training 53J Pave Low III. and MCV-22A Osprey.18 squadron (FTS), and a combat development While all these programs are vitally impor­ squadron (CDS). The wing should also tant and long overdue, none are designed sponsor mobile training teams that are tai­ for export to developing allied nations or to lored to fit the needs of a host country and fight alongside indigenous forces in those able to instruct indigenous air forces in the environments where the Air Force signa­ required employment doctrines and tactics. ture might be less than desirable. Those Aircraft assigned to the wing ought to rep­ MC-130s and AC-130s, or even “vanilla" resent technologies most nearly approach­ C-130s in meaningful numbers, are too ex­ ing those found in the developing nations COUNTERINSURGENCY SUPPORT 71

that the wing would service—but available function for students attending operations in the United States. and support training at the wing, and it The intent is to build experience in de­ should maintain a central Air Force techni­ veloping and flying the missions needed by cal library for equipment common to third the host nations, rather than to build expe­ world nations as well as Air Force equip­ rience in the actual types of aircraft those ment assigned to the wing. countries might own. The issue is one of The flying training squadron might con­ training and education assistance instead sist of three flights: a C-23. a UH-1, and an of equipment advocacy. The days of T-6s, A-10. These aircraft may not be optimum T-28s, B-26s, and C-47s donated through for the job at hand nor do many developing foreign assistance programs are gone. There countries possess all or even some of them, are not many of those aircraft left in the but they are simply suggested starting boneyard. and that older technology is not points for a discussion of proper types. All suited to today’s version of COIN. The are similar in performance and capability commercial marketplace is full of aircraft to those aircraft available at a reasonable that are better suited to developing nations’ price to developing nations; they represent needs, cheaper to buy, and easier to main­ a source of experienced crew members tain and operate. The goal should be to from the Air Force community; and all are develop an experienced US cadre that is presently in the Air Force inventory and knowledgeable about working in a low- supported by our logistics system. The FTS technology aeronautical environment. The would provide flying instructors for the aircrew and support personnel could tran­ mobile training team or could provide fly­ sition to and apply their Air Force opera­ ing instruction at the wing in the equip­ tional background to the aircraft and ment types available, for those countries support environment peculiar to the re­ wishing it. questing nation. For example, experienced The combat development squadron Air Force C-130 pilots who fly short takeoff should be organized into an attack-/fire- and landing (STOL) airlifters in the special support flight, an airlift flight, and a recon­ air warfare wing might serve on a mobile naissance flight. The flights should not be training team in such aircraft as the Shorts weapon-system specific but should con­ Sherpa. CASA 212, or the Broman BR2000. centrate on integrating weapon systems Their credibility would be based on their and mission requirements. A key obligation background in COIN airlift employment of the CDS should be to develop innovative rather than on the number of flying hours uses for common equipment (for example, they have in general transport. The same intelligence gathering from helicopters). basis of credibility would apply to attack Crew members assigned to the CDS ought pilots and so on. to be graduates of the various Air Force The technical training squadron of the advanced weapons and tactics courses. special air warfare wing could function in With information gleaned from mobile much the same way as similar units in our training teams, the CDS should reevaluate transition training units (TTU) and replace­ and refine doctrine and tactics or develop ment training units (RTU) do now. That is. new concepts as required. Additionally, the it could offer an array of classroom instruc­ CDS should have a function much like that tion geared to specific weapon systems, if of the current USAF Special Operations appropriate, and to the operating condi­ School. Supported by the generic flights tions peculiar to COIN. All classroom in­ within the squadron, the school should struction required prior to flying training teach employment doctrine and concepts and for support training offered by the wing for the COIN environment at both the should be the responsibility of the TTS. In tactical and operational levels. Lessons addition, it should perform the registrar learned from experience and research 72 A1RPOWER JOURNAL FALL 1989 could be applied to the development and assist without directly intervening. Doc­ refinement of doctrine, tactics, techniques, trine, along with fiscal and political reali­ and procedures appropriate to portions of ties, has dictated an Air Force force the low-intensity spectrum and could be structure and organization unsuited for disseminated among ourselves and our al­ COIN support. lies for application. We must resurrect the concept repre­ sented by the Special Air Warfare Center in order to successfully influence those con­ flicts important to our national interests— Conclusion and we must do so within the constraints imposed by the political and social facts of The Air Force, in both its conventional life. With creativity and minimal invest­ and unconventional roles, is preparing to ment, we could shift assets and restore our fight the war most threatening to our na­ capability. Our present doctrine addresses tional survival— World War III. However, it unconventional and limited warfare in cer­ has sacrificed its ability to assist our allies tain areas but passes over counterinsur­ who are combatting protracted revolution­ gency. This article has proposed a way for ary warfare. During the early 1960s, the the Air Force to assist our allies as they Special Air Warfare Center helped counter fight in the environment of revolutionary Communist-sponsored wars of national lib­ warfare, while minimizing the impact on eration. The need for that capability is still Air Force programs that are necessary to valid, but the Air Force is no longer able to fight and win World War III.

Notes

1. Lt C o l D av id J. D ea n . T h e A ir Fo r c e Hole in Low-Intensity 10. Caspar W. Weinberger. "The Uses of Military Power.” Conflict (M axw ell A FB . A la.: A ir U niversity Press. 1986), 78. remarks to the National Press Club, Washington. D.C., 28 2. lerome W. Klingaman. "US Policy and Strategic Planning November 1984. 5-6. for Low-Intensity Conflict." in Low-fnfensity Conflict in the 11. Dr Sam C. Sarkesian, "Low-Intensity Conflict: Concepts. Third World, ed. Lewis B. Ware (Maxwell AFB. Ala.: Air Principles, and Policy Guidelines." in Low-Intensity Conflict University Press. 1988), 166. and Modern Technology, ed. Lt Col David J. Dean (Maxwell 3. Moo Tse-tung on Guerrilla Warfare, ed. and trans. Samuel AFB. Ala.: Air University Press, 1986). 21-22. B. Griffith (New York: Praeger Publishers. 1961). 20-22. 12. National Security Strategy of the United States (Wash­ 4. Mai Eric M. Pettersen. "Providing Tools for Victory in the ington. D C.: The White House. January 1987), 33-34. Third World." Armed Forces Journal International 126. no. 2 13. Col Kenneth J. Alnwick, "Perspectives on Air Power at (September 1988): 109. the Low End of the Conflict Spectrum." Air University Re­ 5. Sam C. Sarkesian, "The Myth of US Capability in Uncon- view, March-April 1984. 18. ventional Conflicts." Military Review. September 1988, 12. 14. Dean. Air Force Hole. 197. 15. Lt Col David |. Dean. "The USAF in Low-Intensity 6. Stephan O. Foster. "Pentagon Slow-Rollers Stymie SOF Conflict: The Special Air Warfare Center." Air University Improvements.“ Armed Forces /oumol International 126. no. Review, (anuary-February 1985. 47. 3 (October 1988): 102. 16. History, USAF Special Air Warfare Center (TAC). 1 7. Dr Richard P. Hallion, "Doctrine, Technology, and Air April-31 December 1962. 2. Warfare: A Late Twentieth-Century Perspective." Airpower 17. Dean. "The USAF in LIC." 55. Journal. Fall 1987. 16. 18. Robert S. Dudney. "Towards a Fifth Armed Service." Air 8. Pettersen. 108. Force Magazine, May 1988. 24. US 9. Stephen T. Hosmer. Constraints on Military Strategy 19. USAF Special Operations Force Master Plan (U) (Wash­ in Past Third World Conflicts, Rand Report no. N-2180-AF ington. D.C.: Department of the Air Force, 1983). B-l-5. (Santa Monica, Calif., 1984), viii. • •. BUT HOW DO I SUBSCRIBE?

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73 Solving the WARTIME COMBAT-SUPPORT MANPOWER EQUATION

G. F. M at ecko M ai Clifford R. B or ofsky, USAF

N most military operations, the essen­ tial key to success is getting the right people to the right place at the right time. Unfortunately, a commander will probablyI not have the proper numbers and types of airmen available for battle without effective advance planning. The US Air Force management engineering program (MEP) has been established to determine the skills and numbers of personnel needed to perform specific tasks for both peacetime and wartime. However, there are serious problems in the portion of the system that forecasts wartime manpower requirements for Air Force support functions. The development of wartime manpower standards to forecast contingency person­ nel requirements is of importance to every leader and decisionmaker in the Air Force because wartime manpower demands are an essential element in developing plans to

74 75 76 A1RPOWER J O U R N A L F A L L 1989 fight the next war and in programming the the 612th Tactical Fighter Squadron's mu­ next budget. There is no argument over the nitions section found that it had arrived need for sound wartime manpower fore­ with an inadequate number of personnel. casts for support functions, but such fore­ Despite the fact that personnel worked 12- casting is very difficult to develop. It is hour on/off shifts with no relief days for hampered by a peacetime operational per­ over a month, they were still unable to spective and by an aversion to planning for perform needed aircraft gun checks.3 The known limiting factors in the conduct of turnaround times for aircraft engaged in realistic combat-support exercises. Addi­ critical missions were markedly affected. tionally, functional managers tend to plan Three years later, the lack of proper man­ for their own version of “the war" without power planning was still being highlighted a sufficient overarching discipline to mold by the commander of the 14th Special Op­ a cohesive fighting force that can be accu­ erations Wing (SOW), who lamented that rately forecasted and measured. “Manpower doesn’t talk to Personnel, Ops doesn’t talk to Maintenance, and Plans doesn’t talk to anybody.”4 The Need for The problem of estimating combat- support requirements continues to this day. Wartime Standards In 1986, 41 years after the end of World War II, the General Accounting Office (GAO) They aim at fixed values, but in war reported that military leaders still lack the is uncertain. everything necessary tools to assess wartime force —Clausewitz structure and trade-offs.3 With the im­ Historically, the wartime Air Force has proved lethality and effectiveness of to­ had difficulty determining needed combat- day’s weaponry, military leaders need that support manpower. During World War II, capability more than ever. Gen George C. Marshall found the 1942 In the early 1970s, the Warsaw Pact’s deployments of B-17s to Java “stunning,” ability to strike North Atlantic Treaty Orga­ but he was less than elated when they were nization (NATO) air bases in Europe was all grounded or destroyed within 14 days limited. Its forces can now strike NATO due primarily to the lack of combat-support airfields in all types of weather. Those personnel.1 At the same time that the Army large, relatively secure Air Force installa­ Air Forces were attempting to project air tions of the past are now prime targets for power against the enemy, they were also tactical ballistic missiles (TBMs) such as coping with a force expansion in the conti­ the SS-21 and the SS-23. NATO has only nental United States (CONUS) and finding limited defense against these weapons, that the number of needed combat-support some of which are accurate to within 100 personnel had been severely underesti­ meters. Their reported deployment in such mated. The US Navy found that it, too. had third world nations as Syria (SS-21s) pro­ a problem because it had underestimated vides even "poor” owners the ability to by 26 times the number of combat-support temporarily alter the balance of air power. vessels required.2 In general, commanders These weapons, in the hands of the Soviets in World War II never ceased their de­ or their clients, are the very instruments mands. But because of their exaggerated that could enable the execution of Soviet requirements, senior leaders made arbitrary doctrine calling for the surprise and neu­ decisions without analytical support and tralization of the high-priority NATO air were unable to accurately predict campaign bases. needs. Former Secretary of the Air Force Ed­ More recently, after deployment into ward C. Aldridge reported that the evolu Phan Rang, South Vietnam, in June 1966, tion of these standoff and precision-guidoi Commanders discovered early in World War II that relative invulnerability.8 While the ties be­ :hey had badly underestimated their need for both tween an airframe and the now-vulnerable supplies and combat-support personnel. Although air base continue to be unbreakable, ad­ 'he situation improved over time, available man­ vances in technology have fundamentally power never caught up with requirements. Unfortu­ nately. this same Jack o/ manpower planning still changed the way the Air Force will have to exists today. fight. Rigorous wartime manpower model­ ing is necessary to determine how many people are required to operate in today's AirLand Battles. conventional munitions will have a revolu­ Answering that call for standards, only tionary impact on the way the Air Force two Air Force support functions—civil en­ employs its forces.6 More explicitly, the gineering (CE) and explosive ordnance dis­ Rand Corporation stated that in future com­ posal [EOD)—have published manpower bat each base must be able to absorb major models that consider the potential effects of attacks and then quickly produce sorties.7 current offensive weapons directed at air According to the editor in chief of Jane’s bases. The absence of other vitally needed All the World’s Aircraft, the reliance on the wartime models leaves the Air Force with existing airfield structure is unlikely to an undesirable void in planning for war. change in the near future. He writes that Other functions must soon develop and even as the Air Force debates stealth- publish wartime manpower models. versus-agility trade-offs, it still plans to use A shrinking defense budget, the decline runways built 40 years ago during a time of of the dollar, and the political difficulty of

77 78 AIRPOWER JOURNAL FALL 1989

maintaining foreign bases demand an im­ mediate definition of manpower standards because these factors will force more reli­ ance on deploying, vice deployed, US forces. Although many planners begin to conceptualize the air battle at 20,000 feet and Mach 1, the Air Force must first be able to deploy, launch, recover, and relaunch in order to fly and fight. Accurate manpower standards for composing deploying support forces are a must for ensuring the ability to launch and fight as required. Preparing the manpower budget to pro­ vide the numbers of combat-support per­ sonnel needed in wartime is akin to Clausewitz’s comparison of resource plan­ ning to actual battle. It’s like comparing the making of cutlery to the skill of fencing.9 Nevertheless, swordsmen must have blades to be effective, and we must develop the dollar and manpower budgets to provide them. The latter can be done well only if objective wartime manpower models exist. If the Air Force is to reduce end strength in the present environment of force reduc­ tions without a marked decrease in combat capability, adequate models are vital. Without wartime manpower models to guide the development of Operation Plans (OPlans), there is an increased risk of inad­ equate planning. Key support functions such as intelligence or communications cannot forecast the manpower needs for our contingency OPlans without man­ power models. Many OPlan deployment annexes are being built randomly without regard to missions, work loads, or the ef­ fects these missions or work loads have on other functions. It is also important to real­ istically estimate how many people should remain behind in the CONUS for the sup­ porting operations, but often this informa­ tion is also lacking. While manpower standards for wartime operations are not panaceas, they can add discipline and con­ The combat environment places on all units sistency to OPlans. In addition, the war­ many demands that do not exist in peacetime, in- time model can assist in determining what cluding unit security, extended working hours, force structure the Air Force should main­ and deployment of units. Few A ir Force functional areas have devoted the effort needed to project tain. those combat manpower requirements. Other manpower programs that can affect WAHTIME COMBAT-SUPPORT 79 wartime manpower planning often seem to ducted using set, theoretical scenarios that exist in a vacuum. In 1983. for example, the prevent identifying or solving real tactical Air Force civilianized or contracted out the problems. As long as the predetermined supply function at four bases—Kirtland objectives of an exercise are accomplished, AFB. New Mexico: Vandenberg AFB. Cali­ supporting functions are “assumed" to fornia: Peterson AFB. Colorado: and Shep­ have done their jobs. Combat-support func­ pard AFB. Texas—without the benefit of a tions such as intelligence, services, aircraft wartime manpower model. Only after con­ battle-damage repair, and communica­ ducting a thorough wartime manpower tions—which are unable to benefit from study will the Air Force know whether the free-play exercise realism—are shielded contracting effort was appropriate to all the from accurate measurement efforts. Salty mission taskings of those units. Demo, an exercise that simulated a moder­ In a 1987 study, the GAO reported that ate attack on an overseas air base, vividly the lack of a credible manpower model for demonstrated that the combat-support medical functions was causing congres­ functions were not prepared to work to­ sional skepticism of wartime medical man­ gether to support sortie generation in a power needs.10 Dr William Mayer, former realistic combat environment. assistant secretary of defense for health CONUS exercises also have additional affairs, responded that the medical commu­ limitations that impair their utility for mea­ nity had been working on a wartime man­ surement activities and data collection. power model for the last 10 years but CONUS commanders often do not have progress had been “slow.”11 The problems money to spend on civilian overtime in the of the medical community are neither conduct of exercises. This drawback can be unique nor inconsequential. Similar con­ a two-edged sword. While the absence of cern is appropriate for most other combat the civilian work force during nonduty support functions. hours provides a skewed measurement of a CONUS-based unit’s ability to conduct its wartime CONUS mission, the presence of Difficulties in Setting the civilian work force during normal duty hours can also skew measurement of the Wartime Standards uniformed force’s ability to accomplish its deployed mission. Furthermore, exercise Without an accurate perception of danger. scenarios rarely call for both the deploy- we cannot understand war. —Clausewitz It should be clear that we need tools (models) to estimate how many combat- The Air Force wartime manpower model. It needs to support personnel are required to execute be used by more organizations and monitored at the command and Headquarters USAF level. Air Force OPlans. Barriers preventing the major development of these models may be of an AF/LEX OPR institutional, environmental, or organiza­ tional nature. Combat Tactical Support Concepts ot Industrial engineering procedures stress Doctrine Operation that manpower standards should be ven­ ► ded by multiple means prior to their use. AFMEA OPR and field-training exercises should provide excellent opportunities to gather data on wartime tasks. However, the reality of the Wartime situation is that most exercises, particularly Tasks for combat-support personnel, are con­ i WARTIME COMBAT-SUPPORT 81

identified functional limitations or short­ Demo 1985 after-action reports to see that falls are not always considered in the light integrated planning for a commonly under­ of their impact outside of their immedi­ stood threat is lacking. ate organizations. The known, significant Each of our Air Force functions seems to shortfall of explosive ordnance disposal take great latitude in developing its view technicians—currently manned at less of the threat to sustained operations. For than 50 percent of wartime requirements— instance, the Air Force morale, welfare, should be driving changes in operating and recreation (MWR) function plans to de­ concepts of other functions. However, civil ploy into combat zones with portable Pac- engineering, fire protection, and muni­ Man games and to work 60-hour weeks, tions maintenance functions—all of which while the EOD function plans to deploy in heavily rely on EOD performance—have armored vehicles and work 84-hour weeks. not published operating doctrine to com­ Appropriate wartime manpower models pensate for the shortages. in each case reflect that function’s peace­ The problem of inadequate wartime time orientation toward wartime operating concepts of operation could be partially concepts—concepts that may or may not attributed to the Air Force management be mutually supportive of each other’s engineering community's desire for "effi­ mission or the overall mission in a given ciency.” For instance, in May 1989 the environment. As another example, Air disaster preparedness community formally Force Communications Command’s (AFCC) asked for temporary relief from a peacetime communications-repair function was plan­ "efficient” manning standard based on war­ ning on Security Police (SP) convoy protec­ time considerations; this relief was denied tion during deployment, a task that the SPs by the Air Staff manpower community. The were not planning to perform. On further fact that the US Air Force, after 42 years, investigation. AFCC discovered that United does not have manpower doctrine that States Air Forces in Europe (USAFE) and identifies functions to be manned at war­ Pacific Air Forces (PACAF) expected all time levels (and, conversely, those to be CONUS units tasked for deployment in manned at peacetime support levels) leads OPlans to purchase and deploy with their to the acceptance of many "efficiencies" own weapons. Thus, a manpower model without a real view of the “effectiveness” that accurately portrays a deployed com­ from a warfighting perspective. Since war­ munications work center should include time concepts of operation are not consid­ manpower for accomplishing both primary ered vital to manning combat-support and security weapons control tasks, and functions, rarely does much effort go into perhaps other tasks as well. their development.IB A lack of task discipline can also be seen in functions that intend to transfer work loads to others in combat. Although the Environmental Barriers: Army has assigned medics to most pla­ Integrating Functions in W artime toons, the Air Force surgeon general has Differing assessments of the wartime envi­ declared that Buddy Care (the care and ronment significantly affect functional op­ transfer of wounded fellow airmen) is ev­ erations and erode the accuracy of wartime eryone’s task.19 Recently, the mortuary af­ manpower models. That is, it is almost fairs community decided that Buddy Care impossible to get separate functions to is also the optimum solution for moving agree on their assumptions or on an inte­ dead airmen to mass graves, effectively grated strategy to meet future threats. There transferring that work load out of its is little doubt that the environment has a function.20 significant impact on manpower needs, but Accurate manpower forecasting models one need only read the poignant Salty must be based on as precise a definition as 80 AIRPOWER JOURNAL FALL 1989

ment of active forces and the mobilization may be explained by the difficulty of com­ of reserve forces as might be expected dur­ ing to grips with rising peacetime costs for ing wartime. training; personnel; support programs; and research, development, and production of weapon systems. Additionally, the military In stitu tio n a l B arriers establishment has not embraced the con­ The lack of an effective wartime combat- cept that potential force multipliers, when support force structure is a problem unavailable, become force reducers. For throughout the Department of Defense example, without an envisioned vehicle to (DOD). One of the primary barriers to clear debris and—more important—unex­ the successful manpower study of wartime ploded munitions and bomblets from criti­ operational doctrine is the peacetime orien­ cal runways, a score of unprogrammed tation of the military establishment, par­ augmentees may be required to clear run­ ticularly in combat-support work cen­ ways for launching sorties. Two people ters. According to Congress, it stems from manning an armored vehicle with a blade “ineffective planning, not inadequate on the front could do the work of 20 funding.”12 people—and more quickly and safely at In the Air Force Journal of Logistics, one that. If such a vehicle is unavailable, people contributor identified the problem at sev­ will have to be drawn from other key mis­ eral organizational levels: Headquarters sions to do the work. USAF is involved with the Planning, Pro­ In a similar vein. Tidal W. McCoy, former gramming and Budgeting System (PPBS); assistant secretary of the Air Force for the major commands (MAJCOMs) are fo­ readiness support, requested that the ad­ cused on peacetime management: and few vanced tactical fighter (ATF) be initially programming functions at any level are designed with thrust reversers so it could concerned with wartime operations.13 In land on partially repaired runways, offset­ 1986 the GAO noted that DOD had no focal ting NATO’s limited capability for runway point for coordinating wartime forecasting restoration. However, this short-landing re­ models for resources such as manpower.14 quirement was recently dropped and, de­ That criticism reinforces what an Air Uni­ spite the known runway-repair liability, we versity researcher found. In a study of Air have yet to address the increases in man­ Training Command’s (ATC) role in war­ power and equipment for repair that are time, Col Richard G. Thompson found that now called for.11’ the official ATC point of contact for all Air The Air Force Audit Agency recently Force wartime training guidance was a found that many Air Force functions are lieutenant and. further, that no one in ATC planning to deploy with microcomputers had a job dedicated solely to wartime to save manpower. However, since no capa­ readiness.15 bility exists to repair (or sometimes even The lack of an institutional emphasis on to power) these computers, they may a community of combat-oriented planners prove to be a false economy.1. Addition­ and programmers makes it difficult to de­ ally, peacetime-proven microcomputers velop wartime-oriented accommodations have displayed limited capabilities under to combat shortfalls, even when they are field conditions in both exercise Silver Flag recognized. That is, there is little or no and Operation Urgent Fury. These exam­ continuing capability to “bird-dog” identi­ ples illustrate how an incorrectly oriented fied shortfalls until they are resolved institution can encourage or allow wartime through equipment procurement, adjusted planning based on peacetime capabili­ wartime manpower requirements, or mod­ ties—planning that is not compatible with ified OPlans more in consonance with lim­ manpower modeling for field or combat iting factors. Part of the shortfall problem conditions. WARTIME COMBAT-SUPPORT 81

Identified functional limitations or short­ Demo 1985 after-action reports to see that falls are not always considered in the light integrated planning for a commonly under­ of their impact outside of their immedi­ stood threat is lacking. ate organizations. The known, significant Each of our Air Force functions seems to shortfall of explosive ordnance disposal take great latitude in developing its view technicians—currently manned at less of the threat to sustained operations. For than 50 percent of wartime requirements— instance, the Air Force morale, welfare, should be driving changes in operating and recreation (MWR) function plans to de­ concepts of other functions. However, civil ploy into combat zones with portable Pac- engineering, fire protection, and muni­ Man games and to work 60-hour weeks, tions maintenance functions—all of which while the EOD function plans to deploy in heavily rely on EOD performance— have armored vehicles and work 84-hour weeks. not published operating doctrine to com­ Appropriate wartime manpower models pensate for the shortages. in each case reflect that function's peace­ The problem of inadequate wartime time orientation toward wartime operating concepts of operation could be partially concepts—concepts that may or may not attributed to the Air Force management be mutually supportive of each other’s engineering community’s desire for “effi­ mission or the overall mission in a given ciency.” For instance, in May 1989 the environment. As another example, Air disaster preparedness community formally Force Communications Command's (AFCC) asked for temporary relief from a peacetime communications-repair function was plan­ "efficient” manning standard based on war­ ning on Security Police (SP) convoy protec­ time considerations; this relief was denied tion during deployment, a task that the SPs by the Air Staff manpower community. The were not planning to perform. On further fact that the US Air Force, after 42 years, investigation, AFCC discovered that United does not have manpower doctrine that States Air Forces in Europe (USAFE) and identifies functions to be manned at war­ Pacific Air Forces (PACAF) expected all time levels (and, conversely, those to be CONUS units tasked for deployment in manned at peacetime support levels) leads OPlans to purchase and deploy with their to the acceptance of many “efficiencies" own weapons. Thus, a manpower model without a real view of the “effectiveness” that accurately portrays a deployed com­ from a warfighting perspective. Since war­ munications work center should include time concepts of operation are not consid­ manpower for accomplishing both primary ered vital to manning combat-support and security weapons control tasks, and functions, rarely does much effort go into perhaps other tasks as well. their development.18 A lack of task discipline can also be seen in functions that intend to transfer work loads to others in combat. Although the Environm ental Barriers: Army has assigned medics to most pla­ Integrating Functions in Wartime toons, the Air Force surgeon general has Differing assessments of the wartime envi­ declared that Buddy Care (the care and ronment significantly affect functional op­ transfer of wounded fellow airmen) is ev­ erations and erode the accuracy of wartime eryone’s task.19 Recently, the mortuary af­ manpower models. That is. it is almost fairs community decided that Buddy Care impossible to get separate functions to is also the optimum solution for moving agree on their assumptions or on an inte­ dead airmen to mass graves, effectively grated strategy to meet future threats. There transferring that work load out of its is little doubt that the environment has a function.20 significant impact on manpower needs, but Accurate manpower forecasting models one need only read the poignant Salty must be based on as precise a definition as 82 A1RPOWER JOURNAL FALL 1989

possible of the tasks that must be per­ bat support planning was by surveying the formed. This has been a problem. In 1966 whole organization himself and not relying Maj Cyril L. Sponaugle, the SP commander on other people.24 Commanders who have at Da Nang Air Base (AB), South Vietnam, the responsibility for executing the war believed that inadequate manpower was plans cannot do everything by themselves. his biggest problem. He reported that since Nonetheless, they do become the primary the vehicle maintenance section was not customers of wartime manpower models manned to support his fleet of M-151 jeeps, and should provide an input to and overall his security policemen were forced to do it, assessment of the models’ realism and util­ thereby detracting from other missions.'1 A ity. However, finding those commanders in few years later. Col Clyde S. Cherry at Phan the peacetime organizational structure is Rang AB stated that each function unilater­ difficult. ally decided which activities it would per­ Maj Gen George E. Ellis, the former Air form; neither Headquarters PACAF nor Force chief civil engineer, observed that the Headquarters USAF was viewing problems existing situation in which the combat- in their entirety, and all the staffs were in support group elements do not work or functional tunnels.22 deploy with the wartime combat-support While some tasks are transferred to other commander (CSC) reflects a totally unstruc­ functions without prior coordination, oth­ tured approach to warfighting.25 Not sur­ ers simply remain in limbo. One example is prisingly, the Air Force concept of “pickup the need to establish a runner network in units,” where several different bases send the likely event of communications out­ small teams to one location to form a pro­ ages. The Holloway Report on the 1980 visional unit, caused chaotic command and Desert One debacle stated that a contribut­ control problems in Grenada in 1983. ing cause of the on-site confusion was the One bright spot in this situation is the lack of a runner network to relay com­ civil engineering community. Beginning in mands from the Air Force site commander to the refueling aircraft.23 Remarkably sim­ 1988. CE squadrons are to deploy as cohe­ ilar problems were encountered in Salty sive entities. The same personnel who Demo. Without specified tasking, the man­ work together in peace will fight together in hours for performing this task will not be war. Most important, the same commander factored into any functional manpower will determine if there are enough people model. to do the job. This CE initiative highlights The lack of task definition and a poor the concept of peacetime commanders ob­ conception of how to develop integrated taining more authority over their resources. functional wartime models have been Taking the lead from the civil engineers, harmful to combat units. In fact, current a special task force was convened at the Air organizational concepts have an added neg­ Staff in April 1989 to review the options for ative impact on developing wartime man­ improving combat-support deployments. power models. This group is now struggling to determine how the Air Force can meld a cohesive fighting unit from multiple CONUS loca­ Organizational Barriers tions. Simple answers are elusive, since the The existence of a complex organizational Air Force does not provide each wing com­ hierarchy for wartime, coupled with an mander with the wartime combat support increasing trend toward decentralization, required (for instance, a Tactical Air Com­ has clouded the need for wartime man­ mand (TAC) base may have a contract- power forecasting tools. In World War II operated dining hall and may rely on three Gen Erwin Rommel said the only way a ATC bases to provide it with food-service commander could be sure of adequate com­ personnel in contingencies). WARTIME COMBAT-SUPPORT 83

Decentralization programs are gaining study by the Tactical Air Warfare Center credence, and the DOD model installation (TAWC). The TAWC paper on manpower program (MIP) has proven to be a popular management stresses that all personnel way to cut through local red tape. However, should be pooled under the CSC. who must the lack of strong centralized planning decide how many personnel to allocate control over organizations and procedures for each task and which tasks are non- can affect wartime operations. Early on in essential.27 Thus, TAWC identifies the CSC Vietnam, our logisticians found that they as the true customer for wartime combat- had a significant problem with the supply support manpower forecasting tools. Un­ function. Multiple MAJCOM-specific pro­ fortunately. with no CSC functional staff at cedures and equipment hampered stan­ either the MAJCOM or Air Staff level, the dardized work load efforts in the war zone. individual CSC has no access to the man­ Logisticians are still working to improve agement engineering program system. The centralized planning control in the Air Force. user becomes the last one to know what Centralized planning-control issues are manpower resources the various functional also a problem in other functional areas. managers have planned for the wartime For example, in 1987 the Air Force had mission. identified a significant shortfall of deploy­ able Security Police air base ground- defense forces, and was programming 4.900 Recommendations more positions to meet this critical requirement.26 At the same time, however, While we may be left with a somewhat the lack of centralized planning control pessimistic view of the current state of allowed Lackland AFB, Texas—with coor­ wartime manpower planning, there are dination from Headquarters ATC but with­ possible actions that can alleviate or correct out prior coordination with the affected the situation. wartime commanders—to disband critical The Air Force must establish a solid SP deployment teams for more efficient foundation to accurately forecast combat- peacetime use of manpower at Lackland. In support wartime manpower demands as this case, planning decentralization could currently required in existing doctrine and have weakened security in a combat envi­ operation plans. It should develop common ronment. Wartime manpower standards are useful only if resources can be controlled to scenarios, create realistic wartime operat­ some extent by the potential wartime user. ing concepts, and link authority and re­ As a minimum, the user must be allowed to sponsibility to assure planning control of coordinate on any proposed changes to deploying support forces. resources he anticipates receiving in war­ Detailed combat-support planning sce­ time. narios should be published annually in the Though the concept of decentralization USAF War and Mobilization Plan, volume is gaining support in the Air Force, there is 1 (WMP-1). These scenarios should not also a clear need for centralized planning only cover the threat in quantitative terms control, which is necessary to ensure suc­ but also must assess the threat’s impact on cess on the battlefield. The base CSC will utilities, transportation, communications, surely need strong control of all deployed and other support functions. combat-support functions during combat; The combat-support planning scenario just as surely, this commander needs some should be used as a yardstick for evaluating peacetime control—through programmed functional operating doctrine. Scenario wartime manpower models—to identify evaluations should be conducted annually the right number of people for each task. by a panel chaired by Headquarters USAF’s This concept is now being championed in a director of logistics plans and programs 84 A1RPOWER JOURNAL FALL 1989

(the office of primary responsibility [OPR] ing or MIP “efficiency” actions by peace­ for AFM 1—10, Combat Support Doctrine). time organization commanders, woulc The panel should permit only threat- and reduce the combat effectiveness of the de­ capability-sensitive wartime planning ployable wartime organization. Such an Aii guidance to be published in the WMP-1. Staff office would also provide a link be­ By including all combat-support functional tween its constituency and the Air Force OPRs (including the CSC) as panel mem­ Management Engineering Agency, allowing bers, the group should be able to resolve the management engineering program tc interfunctional support issues without target the measurement of activities and waiting for either inspections or actual op­ work loads of concern to the wartime com­ erations to discover flaws in logic or coor­ manders. dination. Finally, Air University (AU) should in­ In order to realistically exercise combat- fuse all professional military education support functions, the Air Force inspector (PME) with coverage of wartime support general should change current evaluation operations. AU should request that each criteria to those based on the environment combat-support function provide an assess­ described in the proposed WMP-1 scenar­ ment of its wartime roles and taskings and ios. The wartime CSC should have Air Staff an account of how it will accomplish them. representation, preferably in the logistics With implementation of the above cor­ community. This staff office would serve as rective actions, the MEP will be in a posi­ a coordinating agent between the peace­ tion to genuinely assist Air Force combat time organizational commanders and war­ leaders in getting the right people to the time CSCs. These steps would ensure that right place at the right time for the success­ no programmatic changes, such as contract­ ful employment of air power.

Notes 1. "Logistics: An Illustrated History of AFLC and Its Ante­ 8. John W. R. Taylor. "Jane's Aerospace Survey 1988." Air cedents, 1921-1981." in The Logistics of Waging War: Amer­ Force Magazine. lanuary 1988. 53. ican Military Logistics 1774-1985, ed. Lt Col David C. 9. Carl von Clausewitz. On War. trans. O. J. Matthijs Jolles Rutenberg and fane S. Allen (Gunter AFS, Ala.: Air Force (Washington. D.C.: Infantry Journal Press. 1950). 68. Logistics Management Center. 1986). 94. 10. US Auditor General. "Medical Readiness: Progress in 2. Rear Adm Henry E. Eccles. USN. Retired. Logistics in the Stating Manpower Needs GAO Code 391030 Final Report National Defense (Harrisburg, Pa.: Telegraph Press, 1959). NSIAD 87-126." 29 April 1987. 10. 138. 11. William Mayer, "DOD Response to GAO Final Report. 3. SMSgt lames T. Stell. "End of Tour Report, NCOIC. 612th Medical Readiness: Progress in Stating Manpower Needs." 24 Tactical Fighter Squadron Munitions Section. Phan Rang AB. September 1987. 9. June 1966-April 1967." in Corona Harvest files (Maxwell 12. Richard A. Gabriel. Military Incompetence (New York: AFB. Ala.: US Air Force Historical Research Center), 2. Hill and Wang. 1985), 30. 13. Lt Col Joseph B. Corcoran, "Letter to the Editor," Air 4. Col Clyde S. Cherry. "End of Tour Report. Commander, Force Journal of Logistics. Spring 1987. 36. 14th SOW . Phan Rang AB. March 1969-March 1970," in 14. Measuring Military Capability, 2. Corona Harvest files (Maxwell AFB Ala.: US Air Force 15. Col Richard G. Thompson and Maj Rex W. |ones. ATC Historical Research Center). 4. and War (Maxwell AFB. Ala.: Air University Press. 1983), 53. 5. US General Accounting Office (GAO). Report to the 16. |ohn D. Morrocco. “USAF Drops Thrust Reverser for Chairman. Committee on Armed Sendees. House of Represen­ ATF." Aviation Week & Space Technology. 1 February 1988. tatives: Measuring Military Capability-Progress, Problems, 18. and Future Direction, GAO/NS1AD 86-72 (Washington. D.C.: 17. Headquarters Military Airlift Command/Director of Per­ GAO. 1986), 19. sonnel Plans (HQ MAC/DPX). "Urgent Fury After Action 6. Edward C. Aldridge. “Keynote Address,” Phalanx (The Workshop Report." 6 January 1984: in the Air Force Auditor Bulletin of Military Operational Support). September 1987, 3. General. Report of Audit. DOD Wide Review of the Air Force 7. M. B. Berman and C. L. Batten. Increasing Future Fighter Use of Computers in Combat Service Support Functions, Weapon System Performance by Integrating Basing. Support, Project 5195422 (Norton AFB, Calif.: Air Force Audit Agency. and Air Vehicle Requirements. Rand Report no N-1985-1-AF 16 March 1987). 6. (Santa Monica, Calif.: Rand Corporation. April 1983), 3. 18. Brig Gen Donald G. Hard. Headquarters USAFXOO. to WARTIME COMBAT-SUPPORT 85

Headquarters USAFOCPM. subject Implementation of Disaster 23. "Iran Rescue Mission—3: Review Group's Conclusions Preparedness Manpower Standard. FAC 4751, 8 May 1989 Reported." Aviation Week 6- Space Technology. 29 September 19. Headquarters USAFXOX. USAF War and Mobilization 1980. 89. Plan. vol. 1 (WMP—lj. Basic Plan (U). 20 April 1987. F-1 24. B. H Liddell Hart. The Rommel Papers (New York: 20. Leonard N'ester. “HQ Air Force Engineering and Service Harcourt Brace & Co.. 1953), 77. Center (AFESCI DEHM Point Paper on Mortuary Affairs." for 25. Maj Gen George E. Ellis. "In Search of a Better Eagle's the USAF MAICOM PRIME RIBS Conference, 8 February Nest." Air Force Journal of Logistics. Summer 1986, 10. 1988 26. Capt lames Harper. Headquarters Air Force Office of 21. Maj Cyril L. Sponaugle. "End of Tour Report. Com­ Security Police (AFOSP|/SPOAC Background Paper on Air mander. 366th Security Police Squadron. Da Nang AB. Sep­ Base Ground Defense (ABGD) PDP W928. for the USAF Air tember 1966-May 1967." in Corona Harvest files (Maxwell Base Operability Conference. 27 August 1987. 3. AFB. .Ala US Air Force Historical Research Center). 3. 27. Pat Dalton. "Innovation Urged to Protect European 22. Cherry. 10. Bases." Air Force Times. 8 February 1988. 10.

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Lt C ol Price T. B in g h a m, USAF

ALLING air interdiction a classic air campaign. Of course, if he thought air in­ mission that is little studied and un­ terdiction and ground maneuver should be derstood,C Col Clifford R. Krieger worries part of the same campaign, then it would be that in the future the potential of air inter­ illogical for him to believe a component diction “will be ignored, or worse, lost by commander, not the theater commander, mismanagement” (“Air Interdiction,” Air- should be in charge of conducting the cam­ power Journal, Spring 1989). To prevent paign. this from happening, he argues for giving Colonel Krieger opposes the theater com­ the air component commander (ACC) the mander directing air interdiction because mission, tools, and authority to conduct an he believes a theater commander does not air-interdiction campaign. Although I share have the required expertise. This raises an his concern regarding our ability to realize interesting question. What expertise does the potential of air interdiction, I have Colonel Krieger think a theater commander serious doubts as to whether the approach needs to be qualified to assign tasks and he recommends would prove effective. forces to his subordinates? My doubts begin with Colonel Krieger’s I find Colonel Krieger’s lack of confi­ dence in the theater commander’s air inter­ assertion that the ACC should be responsi­ diction expertise especially surprising ble for conducting an air-interdiction cam­ given his admission that the Air Force has paign. For one thing, I am not sure I know yet to develop the education needed to give air interdiction what he means by the term the ACC and his officers in the tactical air campaign land cam- or. for that matter, control center (TACC) a comprehensive un­ paign. Since he recognizes that air interdic­ derstanding of air power (note 9). More­ tion should complement the efforts of over, although Colonel Krieger does not friendly surface forces rather than be em­ address it directly, a commander directing ployed in isolation, it is puzzling that he air interdiction also needs a comprehensive does not consider air interdiction and ground maneuver as key parts of the same Continued on page 88

86 FIRE/COUNTEHFME 87

Rebuttal from Colonel Krieger ter (TACC) and lines running directly to the wings represents a very short and interruption-prone chain of command. aiting to read a copy of Lt Col Price When the issue is support to one corps, this T. Bingham’s comments on my arti­ arrangement is likely a satisfactory chain of cleW on air interdiction, I wondered about command, assuming that an alternate what he would say. I had recently read his TACC is equipped and manned. However, I article on air interdiction in Parameters, agree that when one is in a theater with the professional journal of the US Army multiple corps and with Army groups or War College, and believed that we were their like, one needs additional air head­ close on many aspects of the topic. I had quarters. As in the discussion at Carlisle forgotten the many discussions Colonel Barracks, the model is Allied Command Bingham and I have had together and with Europe (ACE). Within ACE, Allied Forces other people on the proper command and Central Region (AFCENT) has two Army control arrangements for both air and land groups (although no overall land compo­ forces. nent commander, a deficit that poses its Having read Colonel Bingham’s com­ own problems). Working for the theater ments, I was reminded of an Army Strategic commander is an air component com­ Studies Institute half-day meeting on the mander, who in turn has two subordi­ question of echelons above corps. This nates—Second Allied Tactical Air Force meeting took place at Carlisle Barracks, (TWOATAF) and FOURATAF. Under com­ Pennsylvania, in either late 1982 or early mand of a Luftwaffe lieutenant general, 1983. At this time the then-new doctrine of FOURATAF—whose area contains most of AirLand Battle emphasized the corps as the the peacetime US Air Force forces in West key formation for fighting and winning in a Germany—is collocated with CENTAG, just theater. The idea was that the advance as the Condensed Analysis of the Ninth Air across France and Germany in 1944 and Force recommends. Further, each ATAF has 1945 was fought by the corps commanders, two offensive subordinate headquarters— such as Gen Joseph Lawton “Lightning Joe” allied tactical operations centers (ATOCs)— Collins. The Army commanders, such as and the organization is building to two General Patton, were, presumably, logistics defensive subordinate headquarters— arrangers for the warfighters. The concept sector operations centers (SOCs)—for each of land and air component commanders ATAF. The interesting feature, which is an under the theater commander. General improvement over the World War II expe­ Eisenhower, was not even mentioned. The rience, is that each of the four ATOCs is discussion at this colloquium proceeded capable—by doctrine and communica­ for quite some time, with all the Army tions—of supporting either ATAF’. This ca­ participants assuring themselves that the pability was not possible in Ninth Air Army did not need and did not use eche­ Force’s World War II experience, after the lons above corps. However, after some dis­ rapid elimination of General Eisenhower’s cussion I raised my hand and asked about air component commander soon after the Central Army Group (CENTAG, the NATO Normandy invasion. Army formation in southern Germany), This NATO command arrangement is not which was then, as now, commanded by a unique to the Central Region. In wartime US Army general. Mentioning CENTAG quite a few US Air Force squadrons could opened the door for Northern Army Group deploy to the Allied Forces Southern Eu­ (NORTHAG) and. in Korea, Combined rope (AFSOUTH). AFSOUTH, which suf­ Forces Command. fers from many problems due to geography. I fully agree with Colonel Bingham that the concept of a tactical air control cen­ Continued on page 89 88 AIRPOWER JOURNAL FALL 1989

Bingham ordinating the operations of a variable Continued from page 8(3 number of fighter-bomber groups (normally four to eight, each of which was roughly understanding of surface forces so he will equivalent to today’s wing) with its associ­ know how to ensure that air interdiction ated field army. A TAC would then appor­ complements ground maneuver. (Similarly, tion its assigned groups to counterair, aii a ground component commander needs the interdiction, or close-air-support missions same understanding of air power so he can as the situation demanded. This organiza­ ensure that ground maneuver complements tion did not prevent Ninth Air Force from air interdiction.) This means current Air continuing to exercise centralized control Force professional military education is over its TACs because, according to the even more deficient than he admits. Condensed Analysis of the Ninth Aii Colonel Krieger’s treatment of the prob­ Force, it retained “full prerogative to shifl lem caused by span-of-control limitations forces from one TAC to another or to com­ adds to my doubts regarding his proposal. bine and employ the forces of all TACs on While he asserts that a theater commander any one of several fronts when necessary to is not qualified to direct air interdiction implement air force-army group plans or to because of these limitations, Colonel meet critical situations at any point in the Krieger does not address the fact that these army group area.” same limitations also apply to the ACC, Besides reducing its span-of-control especially if he is fighting a war character­ problem, TACs provided Ninth Air Force ized by significant ground maneuver. These with still another advantage: a more surviv- limitations result from the fact that the able system of control. Colonel Krieger tactical air control system, the Air Force’s does briefly address survivability, noting organization for controlling the employ­ that “su b o rd in a te air c o m m a n d e r s . . . ment of air power, is more a product of our can continue the [air] campaign despite experiences in Korea and Southeast Asia, interruptions in communications with where enemy ground forces consisted higher headquarters.” What he does not say mainly of light infantry, than in Europe in is that under current Air Force doctrine the World War II, where enemy ground forces wing is the only air echelon subordinate to were mechanized. the TACC with air-interdiction responsibil­ To see how the ACC’s span-of-control ities. problem could be reduced, we need to look The absence of an echelon like the World at Ninth Air Force’s World War II organiza­ War II TAC increases the TACC’s planning, tion. Colonel Krieger quite properly holds coordinating, and control responsibilities. up Ninth Air Force as a model for how to This makes the TACC an extremely critical enhance cooperation with the Army by command facility and therefore a lucrative noting that its headquarters was collocated target. Adding to the problem, the TACC’s with Twelfth Army Group. What he does responsibilities make it a large facility that not mention was that Ninth Air Force also is difficult to move or conceal, increasing had a subordinate echelon consisting of the likelihood that an enemy will make the three tactical air commands (TACs). By effort to cause “intermittent communica­ collocating a TAC with each of Twelfth tion.” Should this happen, effective air Army Group's three field armies (a World interdiction would soon be impossible be­ War II field army was roughly equivalent to cause wings possess neither the staff nor today’s corps). Ninth Air Force further en­ the communications needed to plan and hanced cooperation with the Army. At the control air interdiction in a way that en­ same time. Ninth Air Force greatly reduced sures responsiveness to the dynamics of its span-of-control problem because it ground maneuver. Even if they did, there made each TAC responsible for closely co­ would be no way for the efforts of various FIRE/COUNTEBFIHE 89

vings to be effectively integrated with each by a lack of intermediate air headquarters )ther. and the dangers inherent therein. In short. I believe that there are plenty of During the application of air power in a easons for doubting the effectiveness of combat environment that encompasses Zolonel Krieger’s proposal should we fight large numbers of forces, the intermediate m enemy as powerful as the Soviets. In- headquarters between the air component tead of adopting his proposal, we will commander and the wings is vital. This lave the best chance of success if we make structure grew out of the World War II he theater commander responsible for di- experiences in North Africa and France. ecting a campaign that integrates air inter- Given the peacetime constraints of dollars liction and ground maneuver. But this is and manpower—the latter perhaps the tot enough; his theater components need to most constraining—there is little likeli­ •e organized in a way similar to Twelfth hood for such an intermediate organization vrmy Group and Ninth Air Force in World in Tactical Air Command between the Var II so as to enhance cooperation, reduce numbered air forces and the wings. If the pan-of-control limitations, and decrease headquarters did exist, exercises such as he risk of paralysis from enemy attacks the recent headquarters manpower evalua­ gainst our headquarters. Finally, success tion by Derek Vandershaft, Department of - ill depend on whether we are as thorough Defense (DOD) assistant inspector general, 1 preparing the theater commander and would quickly eliminate them. Even if we is subordinates (including component could keep them, they would be valuable :ommanders and their staffs) to fight cam- only if we used them, not for administra­ jaigns as we now are in preparing our tive matters, but as training schools for air orces to fight battles. power experts at the operational level. Likewise, they do not make sense in United Crieger States Air Forces in Europe (USAFE), Continued from page 87 which is organized to support rather than fight. However, where we need them— ias an air component (AIRSOUTH), with where we are face to face with our potential enemies—we and our allies have thought ubordinate ATAFs. Further, the ATAFs through this process and come up with lave intermediate offensive organizations workable solutions. Only in Korea, where >elow them: the regional operations centers our own doctrine has probably been domi­ ROCs) in FIVEATAF and the tactical air nant, has the concept of intermediate head­ orces (TAFs) in SIXATAF as well as the quarters been dropped. lefensive SOCs. Even with the unfortunate This still does not answer Colonel Bing­ plit in the Southern Region, between ham’s first charge—that the concept of an Ireece and Turkey, there is still a 28 TAF in air interdiction campaign run by the air Ireece and 1 and 2 TAF in Turkey. In the component commander does not meet the vent of war with the Warsaw Treaty test of common sense. He asks what is )rganization—if the rift could be quickly meant by campaign, a term that is much ewn up—centralized command with de- abused. The closest we come to a definition entralized execution could be made to is the DOD Dictionary definition of cam- vork. paign plan: “a plan for a series of related The situation in the Northern Region is military operations aimed to accomplish a lot similar in that the geography, climate, common objective, normally within a given nd lack of forces result in the fight being time and space." Some people talk of the landled by geographic commanders, with unified commander, such as the com­ eparate geographic air organizations, mander of US European Command lowever. the situation in Korea is marked (USEUCOM)—more properly. Supreme Al­ 90 AIRPOWER JOURNAL FALL 1989

lied Commander Europe (SACEUR)— land commanders, air interdiction must be having a single campaign plan for his based upon the theater commander in theater. In fact, there are several theaters chief’s strategy. Although CINCENT can within Allied Command Europe, and each develop the strategy and then ensure its needs a strategy and a number of campaign proper execution by involving himself in plans. The number of campaign ribbons on its day-to-day conduct, such a course the Army or Air Force flag suggests that would be a misuse of his staff and his there are many campaigns in a war, and in subordinate commanders. If Headquarters a theater such as the Central Region, several Allied Forces Central Region became the campaigns may be conducted simulta­ executing headquarters, its proper concen­ neously. The series of related military oper­ tration on issues at the theater strategic ations with a common objective conducted level would fall by the wayside. Currently by the CENTAG commander (COM- CENTAG) within a given time and space in the Central Region, the duties of the land may be different from those of COM- component commander have been ab­ NORTHAG. Both, however, support the sorbed by Headquarters AFCENT. It is theater strategy laid down by the com­ neither efficient nor effective for a head­ mander in chief. Allied Forces Central Re­ quarters that is working one level of a gion (CINCENT). The air component problem to involve itself in the details ol commander. Allied Air Forces Central Eu­ another level. While doing so mighl rope (COMAAFCE), will have a counterair shorten the chain of command, it makes foi campaign that will support CINCENT’s the­ poorer staff work and increases the dangei ater strategy and provide both direct and of obscure but important issues falling indirect support to the Army group com­ through the crack. manders. At the same time, he will be Yes, any commander at any level can providing offensive air support to meet the train his headquarters to conduct an aii immediate tactical needs of the Army interdiction campaign. Although the logi­ group commanders, thereby preventing de­ cal choice is the headquarters of the aii feat at the front. Even while the first shots component commander, control of air in­ of a war are being fired, we need to be terdiction can and will be done at other thinking about the longer-term issues of the levels. In some cases it will be successful, war: that is where air interdiction comes and in some it will not. However, in war, into play. when victory may depend on making fewer An air interdiction campaign is air power mistakes than the enemy, it is smart to do at the operational level, not the tactical, the work of the day on the day and at the and while there will be key inputs from the place it is best done. FIRE/COUNTERFIRE 91

Ricochets thoroughbred is chomping away at the bit unly Continued from page 3 to be reined in by the timid horseman? TSgt Raymond A. Gill, USAF Pittsburgh AFB, New York sioned officers are capable of flying airplanes. Yes. indeed, gentlemen; the paradox of a head­ less horseman is still galloping. Are the authors looking a gift horse in the CHANGE OF COMMAND FOR POWS? mouth? A rudimentary solution lies in their When I was a B-52 crewmember in the 1970s, I reference to glamorous weapon systems and to observed that it was common for navigators who armored bulldozers. I say. equip EOD senior were majors to report to aircraft commanders NCOs with armored bulldozers. They can use who were captains. Today as an Air National them to remove the unexploded ordnance Guard (ANG) combat communicator, 1 see which is preventing them from implementing squadron commanders who are junior to their vision and doctrine. Leave the bureaucracy to chiefs of maintenance or operations. Are these the commissioned officer. normal reporting relationships to be reversed in In summary, isn't it pretty frustrating when a the POW situation? Maj Frederick D. Dunn, CANG Ago urn, California net assessment

The Doolittle Raid by Duane Schultz. New York I must forewarn the reader that Schultz does 10010; St. Martin's Press, 1988, 325 pages, in one instance interpret the early background of $18.95. the raid as would a revisionist historian. Specif­ ically, his reading concerns the desire Franklin On 18 April 1942, exactly 167 years after Paul D. Roosevelt expressed five months before the Revere's famous ride, an even more daring epi­ attack on Pearl Harbor to ship to the Chinese sode of American history took place. This was the famous aircraft-carrier-launched B-25 attack twin-engine bomber aircraft, which would be on military targets in Tokyo and four other capable of striking Japan. Support of the Chinese Japanese cities. Duane Schultz’s history of the defense effort w^as deemed to be in US interests, raid is quite engaging and comprehensive, in­ although all that could be scraped together cluding many contextual details, judgments, for China were 100 P-40 fighters previously and anecdotes not found in other sources. His designated for Great Britain. Schultz concludes approach is on a slightly higher level of abstrac­ from these facts that “Roosevelt had wanted to tion than Carroll V. Glines’s The Doolittle Raid: attack the Japanese Empire even before Pearl America's Daring First Strike against Japan Harbor . . . [but] Japan won the race for execut­ (1988). employing fewer quotes and more text. ing a surprise attack." Such mitigation of Japan's Schultz masterfully integrates into a coherent infamous attack serves well to intimidate and unity the numerous aspects of the mission, thus w'ake up sleepy students in early morning gleaned from documents at the Office of Air history lectures but seems out of place in an Force History and the Air Force Historical Re­ account of stirring national heroism designed search Center, personal interviews, and 57 for a general readership. There is a considerable books. In a fluid but logical manner he adeptly difference between supplying military equip­ describes developments in the Pentagon; the ment to an aggressor nation's victim and directly White House; Eglin Field, Florida: McClellan executing a surprise attack on another nation. Field, California; aboard the Hornet: in Japan; in Schultz does an admirable job of explaining China; and in Russia. the role that the Doolittle raid played in provok- 92 AIRPOWER JOURNAL FALL 1989

ing (to prevent further attacks on Japan) the and explained by the author—forms an all- ill-advised Japanese attack on Midway Island, encompassing focus for any future wars. Colonel which ended in the loss of four aircraft car­ Warden stresses the indirect approach and ar­ riers—the backbone of Japanese sea power. gues convincingly that the most difficult place However, Schultz might have added one more to obtain air superiority is in the sky over the conclusion, pointed out by Fletcher Pratt in The battlefield. The alternatives he offers are killing Battles That Changed History, to complete his aircraft on the ground, in the factories where discussion of the ramifications of this mission. they are made, or even where the aluminum ore Because Japan lost so many good and experi­ is mined. His constant instruction is to look for enced fliers and future air combat teachers in the center of gravity and put the major efforts the Battle of Midway, its air arm never recov­ there. Subordination of interdiction and close ered. As Pratt states, “Their seed corn was eaten air support to air superiority, even in times of up." Consequently, two years after Midway, dire peril to ground forces, may turn a few Army though many aspiring pilots had in the interval heads and could conceivably change the face of been taught to fly after a fashion, 404 Japanese US Air Force doctrine. fliers were shot down in a morning over the Two other concepts introduced here concern Philippine Sea. This decimation of Japanese air air reserves and key force. Air reserves were power was the decisive "dividend” of the Battle used very effectively in the Battle of Britain and could be again, even when the enemy possesses of Midway that the Doolittle raid helped bring a theaterwide superiority of numbers. The about. phrase key force refers to using the most appro­ M aj T h o m a s C. Blo w 11, U SA F priate branch of service to spearhead a conflict, Beale AFB, California with the other services in support as required. For example, in an island campaign, the Navy would be the key force. The suggestion is lovely, The Air Campaign: Planning for Combat by but it remains to be seen if this relatively simple John A. Warden III. National Defense Univer­ concept can overcome half a century of jockey­ sity, Washington, D.C. 20402: Government ing for the lead. Printing Office. 1988, 193 pages, $6.00. Throughout the book, Colonel Warden ham­ mers home lessons from history, the most out­ Although the title suggests a heavy textbook, standing of which are (1) do not be predictable guaranteed to cure the severest cases of insom­ and (2) do not accept the defensive role easily. nia, nothing could be further from the truth. These seem patently obvious, yet predictability This book should have carried a catchy moniker is a habit well learned in air operations in to seduce a sleepy-eved or jaded reader into Vietnam and in countless “canned” exercises sneaking a peek. Something on the order of Kick since then, to the point that thinking along Ass with Air Power or Air Superiority: Love It or unconventional lines can quickly garner the Shove It would have done the job. This is no “not-a-team-player" award. ordinary book, bowing politely to the accepted Most books on strategy are written by people conventions and allowing us to rest comfortably outside the military. Part of the explanation with our platitudes. In the span of 193 pages, for this situation lies in the task saturation of Colonel Warden elucidates the most effective our daily jobs. The result is that too often Air uses of theater air power and the wartime Force leadership, from wing commander on up, choices facing an air commander, tying them does not consider the employment of forces in snugly together with tough lessons from the detail. Pieces of the puzzle—such as sortie rates, past. In doing so, he boldly labels the ingredi­ training accomplishments, and success on an ents for success in an air campaign, without operational readiness inspection (ORI)—are all regard for any dogmatic toes that might be looked at and carefully scrubbed, of course. underfoot. Colonel Warden’s most salient point Even tactics is mulled over, discussed, and is that air superiority is the key to success in changed, but strategy always falls into the "too- modern warfare and “clearly all operations must hard" or "not-my-job" pile. Those thinkers who be subordinated—to the extent required— to its do dive into the deep water generally swim back attainment.” Granted, this idea is not so star­ into the shallows of Monday-morning quarter- tlingly new as to make one wet one’s pants with backing. In contrast. Colonel Warden has exam­ the joy of it, but the concept—as dissected ined air warfare in the broad scope, culled out NET ASSESSMENT 93

prescriptions for success and failure, and—most ary warfare, or what the Soviets term wars of important—courageously set forth some guide­ national liberation in the third world, has be­ lines for planning future wars. He is a theorist come especially prevalent since the late 1960s linked directly to those famous names of the through the present day. past. The second chapter provides a long-term per­ This is a blockbuster of a book, clearly written spective of the Soviet Union's involvement in ind intensely interesting. I recommend it to a what was referred to at the time of the 1917 zross spectrum of followers and leaders, mili- revolution as "the colonial world." It was in 1915, in fact, that Lenin used the phrase na­ :ary and civilian. The Air Campaign: Planning tional liberation movements for the first time. or Combat is the essence of what the profession The remainder of the section traces the develop­ of arms is all about. ment of Soviet thought and writings on revolu­ Lt Col William P. Stroud III, USAF tionary warfare leading up to the expansion of Langley AFB. Virginia third world conflicts in the 1970s. The author wraps up by discussing the political measures and means used to prosecute revolutionary war­ fare through political and paramilitary measures The Soviet Union and Revolutionary Warfare: as well as the surrogate assets of countries such Principles. Practices and Comparisons by as Cuba and East Germany. Richard H. Shultz. Jr. Stanford. California Four chapters deal with Soviet involvement 94305: Hoover Institution Press, 1988, 283 in key world areas and groups such as Vietnam; pages, $25.95. the Middle East and the Palestine Liberation Superpower relations will wax and wane, but Organization; southern Africa and the South ow-intensity conflict will always be with us. West Africa People’s Organization tSWAPO); That statement is particularly true in light of and involvement, along with the Cubans, in Soviet policies and doctrine in support of revo- Central America. Although the Soviet involve­ utionary warfare at points of opportunity ment and collusion with the North Vietnamese hroughout the world. Dr Richard Shultz, a during the Southeast Asian conflict is well professor in the Fletcher School of Law and known, the author includes extensive coverage Diplomacy of Tufts University, is well qualified of the political, economic, and psychological o examine Soviet views and practices in the support provided. Throughout all four chapters, idw-intensity conflict arena. He is a recognized the author discusses not only the relations with .vriter on subjects of military strategy, low- allies in each region but also the ways in which ntensity conflict, and political-psychological international front organizations, foreign propa­ warfare with the publication of such previous ganda. arms transfers, and advisory support are books as Dezinformatsia: Active Measures in used to abet and achieve Soviet objectives. Soviet Strategy and Lessons from an Unconven- Dr Shultz closes by looking at how the Soviet tional War. pursuit of revolutionary warfare fits into its The Soviet Union and Revolutionary Warfare strategy and the implications for US foreign is not an abstract, theoretical examination of policy. As a result, he concludes that low- low-intensity conflict and the Soviet Union’s intensity conflict is part of the US-Soviet equa­ practice of it. The author begins with an excel­ tion, an important factor that the United States lent discussion of what revolutionary warfare is must cope with in the years ahead. and has been, particularly since World War II. Maj Don W. Rightmyer, USAF He points out that Soviet support for revolution­ Langley AFB, Virginia notams

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Naval History Symposium accomplishments. Their specialty should be in The Ninth Naval History Symposium will be aeronautics, astronautics, or other military- held on 18-20 October 1989 at the US Naval related areas. A wide variety of military-related topics may be covered in the proposed research. Academy. Topics include such items as the US Preference wall be given to those proposals that Marine Corps' small-war heritage, naval opera­ involve the use of primary sources held at the tions between the wars, naval doctrine and center. Applicants may request an application technology, and the role of the Navy in the from the Commander. USAF Historical Research postwar world. For details, contact the History Center, Maxwell AFB AL 36112-6678. The dead­ Department. US Naval Academy, Annapolis MD line for submission of applications is 31 Decem­ 21402-5044. ber 1989.

Command and Control Workshop Medical Career The Joint Services Working Group on Command Opportunities in the M ilitary and Control Decision Aiding will host a work­ The Uniformed Services University of the shop at the Air Force Institute of Technology, Health Sciences in Bethesda, Maryland, is seek­ Wright-Patterson AFB. Ohio, on 3-5 April 1990. ing qualified applicants to attend the medical Attendees must possess a Secret clearance to school and graduate programs in health sci­ attend. For information, contact Lt Col J. R. ences. Medical students are commissioned as Valusek. AFIT/ENS. Wright-Patterson AFB OH second lieutenants on active duty reserve status 45433-6583. or AUTOVON 785-3362. while in school and receive full pay and bene­ fits. There are no fees or tuition for the school. Historical Research Center Grants Upon graduation students are promoted to the rank of captain and serve a seven-year commit­ The United States Air Force Historical Research ment for the training they receive. Anyone, Center (USAFHRC) has announced the avail­ civilian or military, wdth a bachelor's degree ability of research grants to encourage scholars may apply for the program. The graduate pro­ to study the history of air power through the use grams lead to both master's degrees and PhDs in of the Air Force historical document collection basic sciences. Civilian applicants serve as at the USAF Historical Research Center, located teaching and research assistants to the faculty in at Maxwell AFB, Alabama. Grants up to $2,500 exchange for their tuition-free education. For are available for qualified applicants who will more information, contact the Office of Admis­ visit the center for research during fiscal year sions, Attn.: PAC, Uniformed Services Univer­ 1990. Applicants must have a graduate degree in sity. 4301 Jones Bridge Road. Bethesda MD history or related fields, or equivalent scholarly 20814-4799. or call (202) 295-3103.

94 contributors

Communications Station at Nurrun- University Center for Aerospace Doc­ gar. Australia, and has flown several trine. Research, and Education (AU- tours on maritime aircraft, including CADRE). His previous assignments the P-3 Orion Wing Commander Ka­ include standardization/evaluation vanagh is a graduate of the USAF Air flight examiner, Headquarters Ninth War College and the Royal Australian Air Force. Shaw AFB, South Caro­ Navy Staff College. lina. and forward air control tactics officer. Tactical Fighter Weapons Center. Nellis AFB, Nevada. Major Westenhoffs articles have appeared in Military Review, Fighter W eapons Review. Tactical Analysis Bulletin, Air Scoop, and The MAC Flyer. Major Westenhoff is a graduate of Squadron Officer School. Air Command and Staff College, and the Marine Corps Command and Staff College.

trig Gen Raymond E. Bell. Jr.. USAR. tetired (USMA: MA, Middlebury ^ \ 7 '\ iillege; PhD. New York University), vas commander of the 220th Military ’olice Brigade. Gaithersburg. Mary- and. at the time of his retirement in anuary 1989. He has been deputy lirector of the War Gaming and Sim- ilations Center at the National De- ense University. Washington. D.C.. Wing Comdr David J. Schubert (BSc. nd has published in US and foreign Melbourne University) is on special oilitary publications. General Bell is assignment from the chief of the Air . graduate of the Army War College Staff of the Royal Australian Air nd the National War College. Force (RAAF) to write air power doc­ trine. He has had flying tours as a navigator on P-3 Orion aircraft and was an instructor navigator and oper­ ations officer at navigation school. Wing Commander Schubert is a grad­ uate of the USAF Air War College and the RAAF Academy.

Lt Col Alan J. Parrington (BS, Colo­ rado State University; MA. Univer­ sity of Alabama) is chief. Forces > ' O' \ **» and Basing Division, Directorate of Plans. Headquarters Pacific Air Forces. Hickam AFB. Hawaii. Colo­ nel Parrington has also been chief, i Standardizatioii/Evaluation Division. iai , . 49th Tactical Fighter Wing, Holloman AFB. New Mexico, and a command- Wing Comdr Brian L. Kavanagh is on sponsored research fellow at the Air • pecial assignment from the chief of University Center for Aerospace Doc­ he Air Staff of the Royal Australian trine, Research, and Education (AU- ' ir Force |RAAF| to write air power CADRE). Maxwell AFB. Alabama. loclrine He has held command posi- Maj Charles M. Westenhoff (USMA) Colonel Parrington is a graduate of ions. has worked with the US Air is a military doctrine analyst at the Air Command and Staff College and Force in the Joint Defence Space Airpower Research Institute. Air Air War College.

95 Maj C. R. Borofsky (BA. Dartmouth College; MS. Troy State University) is US Air Force wartime manpower adviser. Headquarters Air Force Man­ agement Engineering Agency. Ran­ G. F. Matecko (BS. Pennsylvania Maj Richard D. Newton (USAFA; dolph AFB. Texas. His previous State University: MA. Webster Uni­ MA, Webster University) is a student assignments include chief and direc­ versity) is chief. Wartime Manpower at the US Army Command and Gen­ tor of mission support. Advanced Se­ Division. Headquarters Air Force eral Staff College. He has served as a curity Police Training and Security Management Engineering Agency, special operations helicopter flight Police Division. Ho has also been a Randolph AFB, Texas. He is also a examiner and tactics officer and as an faculty member at the US Air Force Security Police officer in the US Air Air Staft training officer. Major New­ Academy. Major Borofsky is a gradu­ Force Reserve. Matecko is a graduate ton is a previous contributor to the ate of Squadron Officer School and of Air Command and Staff College Airpower Journal. Air Command and Staff College. and Air War College. BOARD OF ADVISERS

Col Kenneth J. Alnwick. USAF, Retired. Kapos Associates Lt Col Donald R. Baucom. USAF. Office of Air Force History Col James L. Cole. Jr., USAF, Inspector General. M ilita ry A ir lift C om m and Col Raymond A. Hamilton. Jr., USAF, AFROTC, University of Alabama Maj Gen I. B. Holley, Jr., USAFR, Retired. Duke University Dr Richard H. Kohn, Chief, Office of Air Force History

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