Vol 03 Issue 3

Autumn Readings Air Base Defense Kenney in the Pacific Wartime Manpower Secretary of the Air Force Dr Donald B. Rice Air Force Chief of Staff Gen Larry D. Welch Commander, Air University Lt Gen Ralph E. Havens Commander, Center for Aerospace Doctrine, Research, and Education Gol Sidney J. Wise Editor Col Keith W. Geiger Associate Editor Maj Michael A. Kirtland Professional Staff Hugh Richardson, Contributing Editor Marvin W. Bassett, Contributing Editor John A. Westcott, Art Director and Production Manager Steven C. Garst, Art Editor and Illustrator The Airpower Journal, published quarterly, is the professional journal of the United States Air Force. It is designed to serve as an open forum for presenting and stimulating innovative think- ing on military doctrine, strategy, tactics, force structure, readiness, and other national defense matters. The views and opinions expressed or implied in the Journal are those of the authors and should not be construed as carrying the official sanction of the Department of Defense, the Air Force, Air University, or other agencies or departments of the US government. Articles in this edition may be reproduced in whole or in part without permission. If reproduced, the Airpower Journal requests a courtesy line. JOURNAL FALL 1989, Vol. Ill, No. 3 AFRP 50-2 To Protect an Air Base Brig Gen Raymond E. Beil, fr., USAR, Retired 4 One-A-Penny, Two-A-Penny Wing Comdr Brian L. Kavanagh, RAAF Wing Comdr David J. Schubert, RAAF 20 Aggressive Vision Maj Charles M. Westenhoff, USAF 34 US Space Doctrine: Time for a Change? Lt Col Alan J. Parrington. USAF 50 A US Air Force Role in Counterinsurgency Support Maj Richard D. Newton, USAF 62 Solving the Wartime Combat-Support Manpower Equation G. F. Matecko Maj Clifford R. Borofsky, USAF 74 Fire/Counterfire! Col Clifford R. Krieger, USAF Lt Col Price T. Bingham. USAF 8 6 Ricochets 2 Letters Net Assessment 91 Reviews of Current Literature Notams 94 Notices of Interest Contributors 95 ricochets Letters to the editor are encouraged. A ll corre- effective for these types of missions. Their over spondence should be addressed to the Editor. all size and stability provide excellent platforms Airpower Journal, VV'alker Hall. Maxwell AFB for even the nost advanced cameras and equip AL 36112-5532. We re s e r v e the right to edit the ment. The medium-threat environment can cer material for overall length. tainly be met by such platforms as the RF-4 and other reconnaissance aircraft that are equipped with electronic countermeasures devices. It is RECONNAISSANCE within the high-threat environment that I feel (Editor's Note: The following letter is in re most changes could and should be made. sponse to two articles from earlier editions of As an example, let’s look at the mission of Airpower Journal—specifically. “Tactical Em- battle-damage assessment. Under heavy fire and ployment of Strategic Air Power in Korea” from in situations requiring up-to-the-minute intelli Winter 1988 and "Air Battle 200(1 in the NATO gence, we have relied upon the audacity and Alliance: Exploiting Conceptual and Techno- daring of reconnaissance pilots and their expen logical Advances” from the Winter 1987-88 sive hardware. issue.] Now, imagine a scenario in which an RPV carrying advanced sensing equipment were to accompany a strike force on a run. After the first We are living in the age of information. Telecom aircraft made an attack, the inexpensive drone munications and the electronic transfer of data could loiter in the vicinity of the target and and information occur at a rate that is staggering instantaneously relay information to the striking to the mind. The battlefield of tomorrow is no aircraft, showing whether a second aircraft different. The battle lines will demand faster needed to attempt a run. This would reduce the means of gathering and disseminating informa exposure of manned aircraft to enemy fire. The tion than ever before. I believe that the future of RPVs I have mentioned are certainly not a new aerial reconnaissance lies in remotely piloted idea, but an idea whose time has come. vehicles (RPVs) and in improved systems for Advances in the technology associated with aircraft that are currently in the inventory. Each such vehicles clearly point the way. Providing threat level—low, medium, and high—presents that drones remain inexpensive, I see no reason a different challenge to the designers of any why we could not expect to see them opera system or platform that will meet the needs of tional within four to five years. By “inex each situation. pensive." I mean that the optical and sensing Aerial reconnaissance is worth its weight in equipment would account for the major portion gold. Some of the missions in which it will most of the cost. likely be used include (1) advance warning of Shifting this mission to unmanned vehicles troop transfers (indicating escalation, potential would free up more equipment and funds for outbreaks of hostilities, and related informa primary attack and fighter aircraft. As men tion), (2) target acquisition (including identify tioned earlier, the ideal system would include ing. pinpointing location, and assessing strength the ability to directly transfer the imagery to the of materials needed to engage ground targets), aircraft accompanying an RPV on the mission. (3) battle-damage assessment (determining the This could also be expanded to include the results of strikes against targets), and (4) other transfer of information to the rear, where unit general-purpose intelligence gathering. commanders could assess the situation first This list is by no means complete. 1 believe hand. Other advantages would be that the drone that the current platforms are adequate for mis could then be expendable, since the information sions in low-threat environments and most of would not have to be retrieved and processed those in medium-threat environments. Aircraft like film before it could be used. “Expend- such as the C-130 Hercules and even the older abilitv" in this sense means that the drone could C-47s have proven themselves reliable and cost- be directed into hostile fire and remain close to HICOCHETS 3 joth the ground and the target. Even as it goes to iron majors better than that. He won’t survive its destruction, it could provide close-up images long in the big world of Washington yuppie ;hat would allow more accurate assessments of politics unless he mends his ways. the damage. To make this program a success. Major Hillson Increased availability to instantaneous infor will have to address safety consideration (how mation implies emphasis on the associated do we keep our own pilots from running into training that would be required of unit com them? I suggest we install global positioning manders. In fact, there would be a need for system [GPS] locating beacons on each balloon personnel at every level to become aware of the and exchange precision location information via principles of photo/imagery interpretation so as Joint Tactical Information Distribution System to prevent good information from becoming bad [JTIDS] Class IV terminals). He will also have to analysis. If commanders are to have access to address how to make them capable of with more information, they must also increase their standing hurricane-force winds (hurricanes are ability to mentally process and use the infor very common in the Central Region. 1 suggest we mation. Of course, this could not replace the tether them to a ground control module [GCM], experience and talents of professional photo suitably configured for nuclear, biological, interpreters. There will always be a demand chemical [NBC] operations, all-terrain traversal, within the military for this skill, and any efforts and with interactive-distributed, precision, made toward remotely piloted aerial reconnais semiactive, redundant control capabilities. The sance would merely enhance their work rather tether could be of fiber-optic-capable, multilay than replace it. Oddly enough, there is a fear ered, KEVLAN II, composite construction.) Ma among pilots that their positions are somehow jor Hillson will also have to address cost rhreatened by remotely piloted reconnaissance sharing, multislice funding, and balloon-off test drones. I do not see this as a valid concern. ing before we can even begin to consider going There will always be a need for trained, skilled, to the acquisition board for consideration. He and talented pilots. Yet, to fend off the inevitable has a lot of work to do. advances in the field of remote drones is to be A good first effort, though. rather shortsighted. Let us welcome the future technological breakthroughs with open arms; Col Wayne A. Possehl, USAF they will allow us to put lives on the line only Norfolk, Virginia when there is no viable alternative. Where we have the capability, I do not see how we could take any other course. After all, is not the AN EOD DEFICIENCY preservation of life and the quality of that life the reason for a military system in the first Lt Col Joe Boyles and Capt Greg K. Mittelman place? (“Paradox of the Headless Horseman,” Spring 1989) point out that the deficiency concerning Cadet Jeffrey J. Godfrey, AFROTC Brigham Young University. Utah explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) is one of ill-equipped but otherwise capable and adept noncommissioned officers (NCOs). Yet, their solution is not to properly equip these capable HOT AIR BALLOONS NCOs but to provide long-term (commissioned) Congratulations to Maj Franklin J. Hillson on his officer leadership. Their solution doesn't fit the Summer 1989 article "Barrage Balloons for Low- problem-another paradox. Level Air Defense.” It was well written and Because all solutions must fit problems, provocatively supported.

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