Wau and the Bismarck Se A

CHAPTER 3 2 WAU AND THE BISMARCK SE A HE defeat of the Japanese both in Papua and Guadalcanal represente d T the accomplishment of Task I as set out in the Joint Chiefs of Staff directive of 2nd July 1942. It will be recalled that Task II in this directiv e was the ejection of the Japanese from New Guinea and the investment o f the northern Solomons. The primary responsibility for this task was placed on General MacArthur who, for its purposes, was to have supreme command; supreme command, that is, on the western front with COMSOPAC undertaking the detailed planning on the Solomons front, but acceptin g MacArthur's authority for the coordination and timing of the operations . Already, in February, MacArthur was planning for a series of advance s that would take him back to the Philippines—planning that would be put into action long after the period with which this volume deals . Meanwhile he and General Kenney had to contend with the immediate reaction of the Japanese to their defeat in Papua . Since that defeat the only Allied land force immediately in contact wit h the enemy in the Pacific areas was the Australian Kanga Force, in th e Wau-Salamaua-Lae area . At the end of August the Japanese had pushed forward a strong force to Mubo, about 12 miles south-south-west of Sala- maua, and Kanga Force had withdrawn its main base to Kudjeru at th e start of the Bulldog Track, a route which had always been of tactical sig- nificance because of the likelihood of its use by the Japanese as an approac h to Port Moresby. Since then the Japanese had maintained their forward position and the opposing forces in the area had been engaged in counte r forays in a little war of their own. Kanga Force continued its "watching brief" until, in mid-January, it engaged the Japanese at Mubo in wha t for them was a major operation . It was a fierce engagement employing about 300 Australians and 400 native carriers . Partially successful, it resulted in the substantial reinforcement of the Japanese at Mubo and the arrival i n the area of the first elements of the 17th Australian Brigade who had begun an air move into Wau on 14th January, and whose arrival ended the guerilla phase of the operations of Kanga Force . The entry into action at this stage of the 17th Brigade, veteran troops from the campaigns in North Africa, Greece and, in part, Crete and Syria , reflected General Blarney's foresight . The brigade had reached Milne Bay in October but the Land Forces Commander, sensing the likelihood of a Japanese thrust on Wau in anticipation of Wau becoming an even more serious threat to their own hold on Lae and Salamaua, would not commi t the brigade to the Gona-Buna-Sanananda front . Wau lay 3,000 feet above sea level. From the south the land approaches were through some of the wildest and most rugged country in the worl d —massive mountain ranges with peaks rising to 8,000 feet, more frequently 680 WAU AND THE BISMARCK SEA 1942 than not covered in swirling cloud ; precipitous gorges torn by rushing torrents, and dense rain forest, the whole drenched at frequent interval s by heavy tropical storms. From Port Moresby the only practicable route to Wau was a very rugged foot track, from the Lakekamu River whic h empties into the Gulf of Papua about 150 miles north of Port Moresby , northward for 50 miles to Bulldog, thence to Kudjeru, on to Kaisenik an d BULWA O SALAMAUA 9ULOLOO Komlatum. MUBO O Edie Ck. 0 ,Au •Kaisenik OKUDJERU thence into Wau . From Wau to Salamaua there were various and deviou s tracks. Soon after the Japanese invaded New Guinea, Blamey, acutely awar e of the lack of a south to north overland transport route, studied the charts closely and noted the Bulldog-Wau track as the most practicable route for a road. At his orders Australian engineers began the formidable task of constructing this road which Blarney anticipated would be completed i n about four months . Meanwhile, with the Japanese threat to Wau building up, the only answer to the all-important problem of supply lay in air transport . Long Oct 1942-Jan 1943 TROOPS FLOWN IN 68 1 before war came to New Guinea aviation history had been made in th e Wau-Bulolo-Edie Creek area. Junkers aircraft, skilfully piloted by airmen who knew the tortuous route between the mountain peaks and the alway s treacherous weather, alighted on Wau 's steeply set landing ground to deliver huge consignments of mining machinery. Now a new and a very different chapter was to be added to this history . A grassed field 3,300 feet long, Wau aerodrome had the distinction that its "upper" threshold, disconcertingly, was 300 feet higher than its lower threshold, and since i t headed into the mountains there was but one approach for aircraft . The first airborne reinforcements for Kanga Force—the 2/7th Indepen- dent Company—had arrived in October in Douglas transports, two of which had been borrowed from Australian National Airways . Flying as second pilots to the captains of these two aircraft were Flight Lieutenants Mathe r and Fader, Catalina pilots with a good knowledge of the territory, both of whom had been co-opted as guides and navigators . On 15th January, the day after the air move of the first troops of the 17th Brigade into Wau, ten transports took off with more men of the 2/6t h Battalion. The movement was accomplished without a hitch, but next da y the weather lowered its impenetrable barrier . Six aircraft carrying further troops of the 2/6th, including Brigadier Moten l of the 17th Brigade who had been assigned to the command of Kanga Force, and his headquarter s staff took off, but the whole formation was forced to return . Next day several aircraft, one of them carrying Moten, did get through, though fou r were caught by cloud and so were forced back . On the 18th ten transport s were over Wau early, carefully shepherded, as always, by their fighte r escort. One of these crashed just short of the aerodrome and eight o n board were killed . Only 49 troops were landed from this formation, th e rest of the pay load being supplies. This operation prompted Moten to complain that the transport arrange- ments were uneconomical and haphazard . While his reaction was under- standable—he was responsible for the defence of a key base in circum- stances that could scarcely have been more critical—these were earl y days to complain . More than 100 reinforcements were flown in on th e 19th. On the 23rd and 24th more than 30 transports came in each day bringing quantities of supplies and the advance elements of the 2/5th Bat- talion, who moved swiftly into action against the approaching Japanes e who now were applying noticeably greater pressure . On the 26th the main force of the 2/5th were held weather-bound at Port Moresby whil e Moten contemplated the prospect of an increasingly heavy assault by the enemy who, he now learned, were moving forward by cutting their way along a disused track—later to become known to the Australian troop s as Jap Track—and closing on Wandumi . On the 27th Moten signalle d New Guinea Force that he must risk leaving insufficient reserves in Wau if he was to meet the new threat. That day rather more than 200 troops were flown in and these too were quickly committed to action . Brig M. J . Moten, CBE, DSO, ED . CO 2/27 Bn 1940-41 ; comd 17 Bde 1942-45. Bank officer ; of Woodville, SA ; b. Hawker, SA, 3 Jul 1899 . Died 14 Sep 1953 . 682 WAU AND THE BISMARCK SEA 27-29 Jan The Japanese were now strongly engaging the Australians with heav y mortar and machine-gun fire but their attacks were withheld resolutely and in one sector they were counter-attacked with bayonets . Even so the enemy's pressure was too great and at points along the front the Australian s were forced back . On the afternoon of the 28th the danger of Wau fallin g was extremely grave. Moten signalled most urgently for reinforcement s but the weather was in control of the situation and only four of 30 avail- able transports got through . These carried the remainder of the 2/5th Battalion who were immediately sent into battle . While adequate fresh troops waited idly beside the equally idle transport aircraft at Port Moresby, American fighter patrols kept close visual watc h on the weather over Wau, only to report that the aerodrome and it s approaches were closed tight by a dense barrier of cloud . Several transports had taken off, their pilots hopeful of finding some chink in an overcast that was like armour for the attacking enemy. The Japanese had now flowe d around the Australian forward positions and were, by 7 p .m ., reported to be "marching down the road to Wau", only two miles south-east of th e aerodrome. Moten had withdrawn two companies that earlier had pushed out well beyond the enemy 's forward positions . These troops, moving b y night, had passed through Japanese-held territory and by 7 a .m. on the 29Jan-1 Feb ARTILLERY FLOWN IN 68 3 29th were manning the aerodrome defences where, within about two hours, enemy small arms and mortar fire began to fall .

Load more