CHAPTER 3 2

WAU AND THE BISMARCK SE A

HE defeat of the Japanese both in Papua and Guadalcanal represente d T the accomplishment of Task I as set out in the Joint Chiefs of Staff directive of 2nd July 1942. It will be recalled that Task II in this directiv e was the ejection of the Japanese from New Guinea and the investment o f the northern Solomons. The primary responsibility for this task was placed on General MacArthur who, for its purposes, was to have supreme com- mand; supreme command, that is, on the western front with COMSOPAC undertaking the detailed planning on the Solomons front, but acceptin g MacArthur's authority for the coordination and timing of the operations . Already, in February, MacArthur was planning for a series of advance s that would take him back to the Philippines—planning that would be put into action long after the period with which this volume deals . Meanwhile he and General Kenney had to contend with the immediate reaction of the Japanese to their defeat in Papua . Since that defeat the only Allied land force immediately in contact wit h the enemy in the Pacific areas was the Australian Kanga Force, in th e Wau-Salamaua-Lae area . At the end of August the Japanese had pushed forward a strong force to Mubo, about 12 miles south-south-west of Sala- maua, and Kanga Force had withdrawn its main base to Kudjeru at th e start of the Bulldog Track, a route which had always been of tactical sig- nificance because of the likelihood of its use by the Japanese as an approac h to Port Moresby. Since then the Japanese had maintained their forward position and the opposing forces in the area had been engaged in counte r forays in a little war of their own. Kanga Force continued its "watching brief" until, in mid-January, it engaged the Japanese at Mubo in wha t for them was a major operation . It was a fierce engagement employing about 300 Australians and 400 native carriers . Partially successful, it resulted in the substantial reinforcement of the Japanese at Mubo and the arrival i n the area of the first elements of the 17th Australian Brigade who had begun an air move into Wau on 14th January, and whose arrival ended the guerilla phase of the operations of Kanga Force . The entry into action at this stage of the 17th Brigade, veteran troops from the campaigns in North Africa, Greece and, in part, Crete and Syria , reflected General Blarney's foresight . The brigade had reached Milne Bay in October but the Land Forces Commander, sensing the likelihood of a Japanese thrust on Wau in anticipation of Wau becoming an even more serious threat to their own hold on Lae and Salamaua, would not commi t the brigade to the Gona-Buna-Sanananda front . Wau lay 3,000 feet above sea level. From the south the land approaches were through some of the wildest and most rugged country in the worl d —massive mountain ranges with peaks rising to 8,000 feet, more frequently

680 WAU AND THE BISMARCK SEA 1942 than not covered in swirling cloud ; precipitous gorges torn by rushing torrents, and dense rain forest, the whole drenched at frequent interval s by heavy tropical storms. From Port Moresby the only practicable route to Wau was a very rugged foot track, from the Lakekamu River whic h empties into the Gulf of Papua about 150 miles north of Port Moresby , northward for 50 miles to Bulldog, thence to Kudjeru, on to Kaisenik an d

BULWA O SALAMAUA 9ULOLOO Komlatum. MUBO O Edie Ck. 0 ,Au •Kaisenik OKUDJERU

thence into Wau . From Wau to Salamaua there were various and deviou s tracks. Soon after the Japanese invaded New Guinea, Blamey, acutely awar e of the lack of a south to north overland transport route, studied the charts closely and noted the Bulldog-Wau track as the most practicable route for a road. At his orders Australian engineers began the formidable task of constructing this road which Blarney anticipated would be completed i n about four months . Meanwhile, with the Japanese threat to Wau building up, the only answer to the all-important problem of supply lay in air transport . Long

Oct 1942-Jan 1943 TROOPS FLOWN IN 68 1 before war came to New Guinea aviation history had been made in th e Wau-Bulolo-Edie Creek area. Junkers aircraft, skilfully piloted by airmen who knew the tortuous route between the mountain peaks and the alway s treacherous weather, alighted on Wau 's steeply set landing ground to deliver huge consignments of mining machinery. Now a new and a very different chapter was to be added to this history . A grassed field 3,300 feet long, Wau aerodrome had the distinction that its "upper" threshold, disconcertingly, was 300 feet higher than its lower threshold, and since i t headed into the mountains there was but one approach for aircraft . The first airborne reinforcements for Kanga Force—the 2/7th Indepen- dent Company—had arrived in October in Douglas transports, two of which had been borrowed from Australian National Airways . Flying as second pilots to the captains of these two aircraft were Flight Lieutenants Mathe r and Fader, Catalina pilots with a good knowledge of the territory, both of whom had been co-opted as guides and navigators . On 15th January, the day after the air move of the first troops of the 17th Brigade into Wau, ten transports took off with more men of the 2/6t h Battalion. The movement was accomplished without a hitch, but next da y the weather lowered its impenetrable barrier . Six aircraft carrying further troops of the 2/6th, including Brigadier Moten l of the 17th Brigade who had been assigned to the command of Kanga Force, and his headquarter s staff took off, but the whole formation was forced to return . Next day several aircraft, one of them carrying Moten, did get through, though fou r were caught by cloud and so were forced back . On the 18th ten transport s were over Wau early, carefully shepherded, as always, by their fighte r escort. One of these crashed just short of the aerodrome and eight o n board were killed . Only 49 troops were landed from this formation, th e rest of the pay load being supplies. This operation prompted Moten to complain that the transport arrange- ments were uneconomical and haphazard . While his reaction was under- standable—he was responsible for the defence of a key base in circum- stances that could scarcely have been more critical—these were earl y days to complain . More than 100 reinforcements were flown in on th e 19th. On the 23rd and 24th more than 30 transports came in each day bringing quantities of supplies and the advance elements of the 2/5th Bat- talion, who moved swiftly into action against the approaching Japanes e who now were applying noticeably greater pressure . On the 26th the main force of the 2/5th were held weather-bound at Port Moresby whil e Moten contemplated the prospect of an increasingly heavy assault by the enemy who, he now learned, were moving forward by cutting their way along a disused track—later to become known to the Australian troop s as Jap Track—and closing on Wandumi . On the 27th Moten signalle d New Guinea Force that he must risk leaving insufficient reserves in Wau if he was to meet the new threat. That day rather more than 200 troops were flown in and these too were quickly committed to action . Brig M. J . Moten, CBE, DSO, ED . CO 2/27 Bn 1940-41 ; comd 17 Bde 1942-45. Bank officer ; of Woodville, SA ; b. Hawker, SA, 3 Jul 1899 . Died 14 Sep 1953 .

682 WAU AND THE BISMARCK SEA 27-29 Jan The Japanese were now strongly engaging the Australians with heav y mortar and machine-gun fire but their attacks were withheld resolutely and in one sector they were counter-attacked with bayonets . Even so the enemy's pressure was too great and at points along the front the Australian s were forced back . On the afternoon of the 28th the danger of Wau fallin g was extremely grave. Moten signalled most urgently for reinforcement s

but the weather was in control of the situation and only four of 30 avail- able transports got through . These carried the remainder of the 2/5th Battalion who were immediately sent into battle . While adequate fresh troops waited idly beside the equally idle transport aircraft at Port Moresby, American fighter patrols kept close visual watc h on the weather over Wau, only to report that the aerodrome and it s approaches were closed tight by a dense barrier of cloud . Several transports had taken off, their pilots hopeful of finding some chink in an overcast that was like armour for the attacking enemy. The Japanese had now flowe d around the Australian forward positions and were, by 7 p .m ., reported to be "marching down the road to Wau", only two miles south-east of th e aerodrome. Moten had withdrawn two companies that earlier had pushed out well beyond the enemy 's forward positions . These troops, moving b y night, had passed through Japanese-held territory and by 7 a .m. on the

29Jan-1 Feb ARTILLERY FLOWN IN 68 3 29th were manning the aerodrome defences where, within about two hours, enemy small arms and mortar fire began to fall . Less than an hour earlier the freakish weather had broken. Fighter pilots on reconnaissance over Wau, tensely aware of what this meant , signalled the transport base at Port Moresby . Almost immediately Dakotas , heavily laden with men and arms, began to roar off the runways . In rapid succession each of 57 transports swept down to land on Wau aerodrome , disembark their troops and with their engines still running, roar off agai n to make way for the next aircraft . They brought 814 troops to the aid of Moten's hard-pressed force. Just before dawn on the 30th the Japanese made a determined effort t o overrun the aerodrome, but the weather still favoured the Australians . At 9.15 a.m. two 25-pounder guns of 2/1st Field Regiment were flown in. Enemy fire was reaching the airfield as the aircraft taxied to a stop and rifl e shots threatened the gunners as they unloaded and assembled their guns . Gun sites had already been selected and in two hours the artillery wa s in action. That afternoon between 300 and 400 Japanese emerged on t o a road leading from Leahy' s Farm. Almost instantly the gun crews had the range of this promising target and their shells were soon falling fairl y among the enemy troops. Minutes later a formation of Beaufighters from No. 30 Squadron, who had answered an urgent call for air support, swept i n low over the target to blast the enemy troops with 22,000 rounds of cannon and machine-gun fire . One of the Beaufighters piloted by Sergeant Downing with Sergeant Box 3 as observer, was directly over the target when a dump of high explosiv e blew up, devastating the surrounding area and killing a large number o f Japanese. Downing's aircraft was caught in the blast and hit by debris. When the aircraft returned to Port Moresby the crew counted 58 hole s in the starboard wing and many more in the fuselage . The squadron records claim that the explosion was caused by cannon fire from the Beaufighter . On the other hand the army's account of the incident is that "there wa s suddenly a major burst at the farm as a shell set off a supply of explosives . The ground rocked, a great cloud of billowing smoke rose, and many Japanese were killed. "4 To whom the credit for the explosion is due will always be in doubt, but the incident provided a vivid illustration of ho w closely the ground and air forces were linked in combat. If the claim for the artillery gunners was correct, then their shells must have been falling on the target when the Beaufighters struck . Elsewhere the enemy was resisting fiercely, but the defenders receive d further reinforcements on the 31st, and that night it seemed to them tha t the crisis had passed . Next day 53 transports flew in, carrying 26,61 2 pounds weight of men and supplies . In 16 days the strength of Kanga Force had been built up from 403 officers and men to a total of 3,16 6 ' F-Lt G . R . Downing, DFC, 408640 ; 30 Sqn . Clerk ; of Melbourne ; b . Melbourne, 13 Jan 1921 . 3 W-0 D . K . Box, 8186 ; 30 Sqn. Contractor ; of Mt Lawley, WA ; b . Bunbury, WA, 12 Jan 1917 . Died 12 Feb 1956 . 4 D. McCarthy, South-West Pacific Area—First Year, pp . 555-6.

684 WAU AND THE BISMARCK SEA Ian-Fe b (201 officers and 2,965 men) practically all of whom with their arms, equipment and supplies, had come by air. The strain on the resources of the American No . 374 Troop Carrie r Group was intense and the task of maintaining the over-worked Dakota s and other freight-carrying aircraft was an extreme test of endurance b y both men and aircraft. By great good fortune the arrival in Australia in January of No. 317 Troop Carrier Group with 52 new Dakotas coincided with this most exacting period . The new aircraft were immediately trans- ferred to the veteran group and No . 317 Group took over the assorted fleet that had been giving such splendid service . In four days (29th January to 1st February) the transport aircraft had made 244 sorties into Wau . Credit for the efficiency of the whole air lift was shared notably by No . 4 (R.A.A.F.) Fighter Sector at Port Moresby , which accepted responsibility for the coordination of the operation . At its peak there were as many as 18 aircraft in a formation and at times thre e such formations got through in one morning . Each was covered by between 40 and 50 American Airacobra or Kittyhawk fighters with Lightnings flying as top cover . Fighter Sector's task in regulating air traffic of suc h density and in such difficult conditions was one of the most notabl e examples of efficient air traffic control in the Pacific war theatre.5 Air support by both No. 30 Squadron Beaufighters and the Bostons of No. 22 was continuous in this period . On the 31st four Beaufighters swept from Bakumbari to Salamaua, strafed Mubo and enemy posts at the mout h of the Waria River and reconnoitred the Ramu and Markham Valleys , while four Bostons bombed Mubo and surrounding enemy strongpoints, i n which they started fires. They then strafed the enemy line of communica- tion from Komiatum to Mubo . That afternoon they were again attackin g the same targets and, having been airborne for three hours, landed at Dobodura to refuel . In January the squadron had been airborne for 20 4 hours and had dropped 30 tons of bombs and spent more than 83,000 rounds of ammunition in their support attacks. No. 30 Squadron, in the same period, had flown for 448 hours in 29 operations . On the last day of January No. 4 Squadron assumed its own special role in the battle when four officers and 26 men, with their equipment , moved from their base at Berry near Port Moresby to Wau as an advanc e party. Next day two Wirraways were over the area photographing th e enemy's positions. From then until the end of the battle, these aircraft wer e constantly engaged in reconnaissance and artillery spotting and in leadin g Beaufighters to specific targets, which they did by diving and then with - drawing. To aid in target selection and identification Major Muir, 6 brigade major of the 17th Brigade, flew (on 2nd February) with the leader of a forma -

' In this period flying escort to Wau became an exacting and all-absorbing task for the America n fighter pilots, a fact that was amusingly illustrated in one group's roneoed news sheet which depicted an attractive young woman accompanied by two pilots ; the caption was "Escort to Wow! " Lt-Col R . A . C. Muir . 7 Cav Regt ; 25 Bde ; BM 17 Bde 1941-43 . Chartered accountant ; of Brisbane ; b . Perth, WA, 20 June 1910 .

Jan-Feb JAPANESE REPULSED 685 tion of Australian Bostons which, prevented by heavy cloud from attackin g in the Crystal Creek area, effectively bombed enemy positions on th e Buisaval Track. In very marked contrast with the excellent coordination between th e Allied ground and air operations in this battle, was the enemy's almost total disregard of their need for air support until, with the Australian troop s now forcing their ground troops back, their opportunity to capture Wau was clearly lost . As a counter to Allied air operations the Japanese ha d only the weather, and when this turned against them a stream of Allie d transports was able to turn the tide of the battle . Without any effort on the part of their own air units, their ground troops were being overwhelmed at a time when resolute air attacks on the Allied transports landing a t Wau might well have been decisive. Belatedly, on 6th February, they made a highly spectacular air raid on Wau with nine bombers escorte d by many fighters . There were four Allied Dakotas on the aerodrome and five more were in circuit awaiting their turn to land . Despite strong Allied fighter cover the enemy bombers came through unmolested an d bombed the aerodrome accurately, one stick of bombs falling fairly along it s centre. All the Dakotas but one escaped harm. A Wirraway, piloted by Flight Sergeant Rodbourn7 with Sergeant Cole as observer, had just landed as the bombing began . The crew were only a few yards from their aircraft when, flinging themselves to the ground, they saw the Wirraway dis- integrate as one bomb exploded alongside it . Cole received a minor wound. The raiders also scored a direct hit on the Air Cooperation Signals hut, killing several of the staff. For this degree of success the Japanese pai d a big price. Allied fighters, whose number had been supplemented by thre e squadrons sent by Whitehead in ready response to a call for aid, shot down at least one of their bombers and 23 (if not more) of their fighters, whil e gunners of the American 156th Light Anti-Aircraft Battery, who ha d arrived on 1st February, shot down one bomber and two Zeros . In providing the Allied air support for the Australian forces engage d at Wau, General Whitehead was striving his utmost. On 6th February Whitehead was informed that Kanga Force needed 23 transport plane s every day, or 70 every three days, purely for maintenance and provision of reserves. This the air commander readily accepted . Lieut-General Mackay,8 then temporarily relieving General Herring in command of New Guinea Force, wrote to General Blarney on 4th February : I have found Brigadier-General Whitehead of the U .S.A. Air Force extremely cooperative. In fact there is no question of asking for help—he takes the initiative . By 9th February the Japanese opposition in the Wau Valley had bee n completely crushed. Ten days later New Guinea Force Headquarters issue d an operations instruction providing for the future defence of the Bulol o

7 F-0 A . Rodboum, 407806 ; 4 Sqn. EFTS instructor 1943-45. Clerk; of Walkerville, SA ; b. Adelaide, 4 Apr 1915. 8 Lt-Gen Sir Iven Mackay, KBE, CMG, DSO, VD . (1st AIF : CO 4 Bn 1916-17, 1 MG Bn 1918 ; comd 1 Inf Bde 1918-19.) GOC 6 Div 1940-41, Home Forces 1941-42, NGF 1943-44 . High Com- missioner for Australia in India 1944-48 . Schoolmaster ; of Sydney; b . Grafton, NSW, 7 Apr 1882 .

686 WAU AND THE BISMARCK SEA Feb 1943 Valley. This emphasised that "as our maintenance is at present entirel y dependent on air transport the airfields at Wau and Bulolo and the road joining them must be retained . The airfield at Bulwa will be required for future use." Mackay was convinced that, though the Japanese had been beaten back with severe loss, they had not finally accepted defeat in th e Wau and Bulolo Valleys, which were vital tactically if they were to con- tinue to hold Lae and Salamaua . Though they had been defeated in their purpose, the enemy's retiremen t was controlled. The troops who had made the thrust on Wau were fresh elements—men of the 51st Division—who had been in combat at Shanghai and had come to Rabaul in December 1942 and January 1943 fro m French Indo-China. As the advance force of their division they had lande d at Lae on 7th January . There had been a substantial movement of troop s from Lae to Salamaua where the garrison had been increased to almos t 4,000, the total for the two bases being about 6,500 . Though the battle for Wau had ended and much of the strain had bee n lifted, the momentum of close air support for the army was being main- tained at much the same intensity. Wherever targets offered—and there was no lack of them—the Australian Bostons and Beaufighters were fully engaged as were the American Mitchells, Bostons and Marauders . On 21st February, for example, seven R .A.A.F. Bostons attacked a group of vil- lages (Waipali, Lalibu and Buibaining) reported to be occupied by a forc e of several hundred Japanese. Bombing from low altitude and then strafin g from just above the trees, the aircraft made such havoc that there wa s little or no opposition when the troops moved in . One report claimed that apart from such casualties as the infantry may have inflicted, they foun d 250 Japanese dead in the area . After the Bostons had swept enemy positions from the mouth of th e Waria River from Sappa to Kobo in three strafing runs on the 24th, a report from a Papuan Infantry Battalion stated simply, "Many Japanes e killed in air raid ." These operations were the measure of the proper application of air attack to ground action that Blarney and Kenney had now achieved .

No survey of the task that lay ahead of MacArthur's forces could mis s the significance of the success of Halsey's forces in the Solomons . Both strategically and tactically it was reasonable to expect that the Japanese answer to the frustration experienced there would be an increasingly heav y concentration of their forces in New Guinea . Mackay's Intelligence officers had submitted reports to him from whic h he had compiled a despatch to Blarney on 13th February in which h e emphasised this possibility and gave estimates of the enemy strength i n New Guinea as 8,000 at Lae and Salamaua (an over-estimate probabl y of about 1,500), 5,000 at Madang and 9,000 at Wewak, with "another division arriving" . Intelligence reports received by S .W.P.A. Headquarters also told of increasing Japanese activity in airfield development along the

Jan-Feb RABAUL BOMBED 687 north coast of New Guinea from as far west as Babo eastwards to Lae . This included a 1,400-yards runway on Wakde Island, one of 1,300 yard s on a site inland from Hollandia Bay, a large airfield at Wewak which already had 77 dispersal bays, and road construction at both Madang and Alexishafen. There were, too, reports of comparable activity on Cap e Gloucester. Rabaul remained, of course, a South-West Pacific Area responsibility and, while the long-range reconnaissance and heavy bombers of th e S.O.P.A.C. air units could now well care for the whole of the Solomons , Buin and Buka were within more convenient range of S .W.P.A. bases. Late in January, Kenney—"after adding up all the columns of figure s showing what I had to fight with"—had written to General Arnold pointing out that in the last three months he had received from the United States a total of 89 aircraft . In that period his losses "from combat, accidents, wea r and tear and all other causes combined" totalled 146 and his total strengt h was 537 of which about 200 were constantly under repair .9 The greatest weakness was in heavy bomber strength and, with Rabaul more conspicuous than ever among the air targets, this was worrying. In January the base had been attacked by the Fifth Air Force 13 times . These raids had been made chiefly at night with a maximum force of 12 heavy bombers . More experienced, and therefore more confident, the crews were now bombing from medium altitude (5,000 to 9,000 feet) and at times from as low a s 250 feet. A notable variation was a daylight attack on 5th January when a force of Flying Fortresses dropped 40 500-lb and 24 1,000-lb bomb s on shipping in Simpson Harbour. Two of the aircraft were lost through intense anti-aircraft fire and fighter interception . In one of these aircraft Brigadier-General Walker, the gallant and able commander of 5th Bombe r Command, lost his life. The crews returning from this raid, which was mad e from 8,500 feet, claimed to have either sunk or left burning nine enem y ships.' The much over-worked heavy bombers now required considerable nurs- ing. No. 43 Group, which had been operating in the area for six months , had a strength of 55 Flying Fortresses, about 20 per cent of which wer e regularly under overhaul . Only about 50 per cent of the remainder could be counted on as available daily for combat missions . Even then about 25 per cent of this final total was needed for regular reconnaissance, whic h reduced the group's striking strength to only 12 or 14 aircraft for regula r attack operations. However, the striking strength could apparently be sub- stantially increased by temporarily suspending Flying Fortress reconnais- sance and, after adequate warning and by making a special effort, releasin g more aircraft from the overhaul and maintenance shops . There was proof of this on the night of 14th-15th February when 32 Flying Fortresses and four Liberators—the largest bomber force yet used—dropped 50 tons

9 General Kenney Reports, pp . 185-6. A subsequent survey by the Joint Army-Navy Assessment Committee reported that only tw o Japanese ships were sunk at Rabaul in January, one of them, the Keifuku Maru (5,833 tons) , on the 5th.

688 WAU AND THE BISMARCK SEA 1942-43 of demolition bombs and 4,000 incendiary bombs on Rabaul, starting widespread fires in the town. 2 As mentioned No. 90 Group, with Liberators, had not been assigned any important share of the burden until January . Of the 60 aircraft so far delivered to it not more than 15 could be sent on strike at one time . The Liberator at this time was noticeably weak in its forward fire power, a fact Japanese fighter pilots were quick to detect . Kenney's engineers adapted a tail turret with two power-operated .50-calibre guns to replace the four-gun arrangement in the nose, in which only one gun could be fired at a time. 3 There was now some relief for the 5th Bomber Command by reaso n of its ability to base some of the heavy bombers at Port Moresby and Milne Bay. This was only one indication of recent airfield development by both American and Australian construction units . Round Port Moresby there were now six airfields with taxiways and dispersal areas, and a t Milne Bay there were two, and Dobodura also was now being developed as a major operating base . 4 By this time transport aircraft had flown 150 tons of steel matting to Dobodura so that a fighter runway could be lai d down. Aircraft warning systems had also been installed. An American uni t had been operating from Port Moresby since September and radar units had been placed at Milne Bay, at Tufi Point, and on Goodenough an d Normanby Islands. In fighter strength Kenney had nine squadrons, with a total of 33 0 aircraft operating in New Guinea . Most important in that total were 8 0 Lightnings. Among the remainder were 74 well-worn Airacobras . Such was now the Japanese respect for the Allied fighter strength an d capacity that severe air raids were exceptional in January and February . One notable exception had been an assault on Milne Bay on 17th January by more than 20 bombers escorted by fighters in about equal strength . The target was Turnbull airfield on which the raiders dropped more than 20 0 fragmentation bombs . Surprisingly, there were no casualties, but about six grounded aircraft were completely destroyed and a large number dam- aged. No. 6 Squadron suffered severely. Though only one of its Hudson s was completely demolished, six others were seriously damaged and no t one of its aircraft escaped some degree of harm . Motor transport and fuel dumps were also destroyed . There is no record of Allied fighter inter- ception.

2 Kenney, pp . 191-2. 3 Kenney ordered 35 of these turrets from the United States and asked that all future aircraf t of this type should be so fitted. The turrets did not arrive until March and in May he was asking for 36 more for use on recently delivered aircraft . Belly and tail guns were also added to the Liberator ' s armament . 4 The six airfields near Port Moresby were Jackson (formerly Seven Mile), 5, miles north-east of the town, Ward's, 4 miles to the north-east, Kila (formerly Three Mile), Waigani (later to be known as Durand), 81 miles to the north-north-east, Laloki (later Schwimmer), 9 miles t o the north-east, and Bomana (later Berry) in the same area . The two at Milne Bay were Gurne y and Turnbull (a third was planned but not developed) . 6 The records do not agree about the precise number of Allied aircraft destroyed . Apart from No . 6 Squadron's losses, it appears that two Flying Fortresses, one Liberator and two Airacobra s were demolished on the ground .

Jan-Feb ROTATION SYSTEM 689 There was a raid by three aircraft on the 21st and several more raid s in February, the heaviest of which was made by at least six bombers on th e night of the 23rd-24th . Turnbull Strip was straddled with 18 bombs an d three aircraft were slightly damaged . Seven bombs dropped near by kille d one and wounded five . In February No . 75 Squadron, now commanded by Squadron Leader Arthur,6 returned to Milne Bay, after refitting in Australia. It was joined there by No. 77 (Squadron Leader Cresswell) from Darwin . In medium and light bomber strength (the effective part of which wa s at Port Moresby) Kenney's force appeared better on paper than it wa s in fact. Of six squadrons of medium bombers the two (in No . 38 Group ) equipped with Mitchells were practically at full strength, but the fou r Marauder squadrons (in No. 22 Group) had been withdrawn to the main- land to recuperate from the strain of a long period of operations . Though classed as light bomber units Nos . 13 and 90 Squadrons (No . 3 Group) were still equipped with Mitchells, while Nos . 8 and 89 of the same group had Bostons, though these had been so reduced as to have become virtuall y a single squadron. Kenney was allocating his force on a rotation basis with one-third on combat operations, one-third on alert, and one-third resting or training. Always aggressive and hard-hitting in his attitude to his task, the ai r commander was deeply interested in any development that would give hi m greater striking power. And, if there was one aggressive purpose more than another occupying his mind at this stage, it concerned ways and means o f sinking Japanese ships . Every interpretation of enemy intentions pointe d to the likelihood of that capacity being tested under extreme pressure , perhaps in the very near future. Kenney needed no prompting to appreciat e that the Japanese would almost certainly make their next aggressive thrus t in the form of a large-scale seaborne reinforcement operation from Rabaul , probably into the Huon Gulf; that it would be his responsibility to stop that force before it reached New Guinea shores ; and that, if he failed, the Allied Land Forces would face a far more difficult task . In view of this very critical prospect the armament of the light an d medium bombers and low-attack aircraft and the tactics to be applied were absorbing most of the attention of 5th Bomber Command, now commande d by Brigadier-General Howard Ramey, who had arrived on 18th Januar y to fill the vacancy caused by Walker's death . The most recent type of Mitchell to arrive in the theatre (the C-1) ha d been made a particular subject for armament experiment . The lower turret and tail gun on the standard model had been eliminated and the forward - firing guns supplemented to provide four in the nose and four more mounte d on each side in "blisters" . An upper turret carried two more guns, and th e bomb rack was adapted to carry 60 small fragmentation bombs for low - level attack, in addition to six 100-lb demolition bombs. In the result the aircraft was slower and less manoeuvrable, but, having increase d e Gp Capt W. S . Arthur, DSO, DFC, 565 . 3 Sqn ; comd 75 Sqn 1943, 2 OTU 1944, 81 Win g 1944-45, 78 Wing 1945 . Student; of Yelarbon, Q1d ; b . Sydney, 7 Dec 1919 .

690 WAU AND THE BISMARCK SEA Feb 1943 range and much greater fire-power, it was the type of attack aircraft Kenne y most needed .' Meanwhile there had been great activity over the old wreck outsid e Port Moresby Harbour where seemingly countless practice bomb runs were being made with low-attack bombers, particularly those of No . 90 Squadron. Skip-bombing, the ricochet method of beam-on attack on ships whic h had so fascinated Kenney on his way to Australia and on which two of his bomber squadron commanders—Majors William Benn and Ed Larner- had spent much time experimenting, was still being practised . 8 There was, however, a growing preference for direct attack using a reference poin t on the nose of the aircraft to serve as a bombsight . The bombs used had a modified delayed-action fuse, the effectiveness of which was prove d rather too realistically when two of the aircraft in these exercises wer e damaged by flying debris . On two occasions in February the Mitchel l crews had hopes for real "practice" when they went out on shipping attac k missions but in neither instance could the enemy vessels be found . Further anticipation of the nature of the task the Allied squadrons migh t be expected to undertake was demonstrated late in February when, co - ordinating with No . 30 Squadron's Beaufighters and the American Bostons, the Mitchell crews engaged in attack rehearsals that were most assiduousl y performed .

Allied Intelligence reports, well respected for their accuracy, had give n warning on 19th February 1943 that further enemy troop movements to the Lae area could be expected. Nine days later further reports from th e same source predicted that the Japanese would attempt a landing at La e on 5th March and at Madang, probably on the 12th . Bomber Comman d thereafter began planning to meet such a threat on three different assump- tions: (1) Lae would be the direct destination of the enemy force whic h must therefore come within the striking range of virtually the whole of the Allied Air Forces based in New Guinea ; (2) the convoy might divid e (probably to the north of Dampier Strait), one force heading for Madan g and the other for Lae ; and (3) Madang might be the destination of th e entire force. If the enemy chose the first of these courses the plan wa s for a coordinated attack with all strength and regulated initially only b y the range of the aircraft to be employed at various stages . If the second course was chosen the heavy bombers would accept responsibility fo r the Madang-bound force, while medium bombers and light attack aircraf t would assail the Lae-bound convoy as the ships came within their range . For the third course the assault plan concerned heavy bombers only, while other units would attack and try to neutralise all enemy airfields within their range .

7 By April 1943 about 30 Mitchells had been so modified. A change in the standard 3-man crew was also made, the bombardier being replaced by a co-pilot . s Though there are claims, at least by implication that "skip-bombing" was initiated in the South - West Pacific theatre as a result of Kenney ' s interest, the method had in fact been devised an d used by the R.A.F . in European waters . General Arnold, in Global War (pp. 230-1), notes this and records that as a result he himself stimulated U .S .A .A .F . experiments in the technique . R

A surprise strafing attack by F-Lt R . F. Uren and F-O R . H . Roe on Malahang airfield, nea r Lae, on 4th March 1943 in which six Zeros and one refuelling tanker were destroyed . The fire power of the Beaufighters from 20-mm cannon and six .303-inch machine-guns i s illustrated by the fact that only a few seconds had elapsed between the taking of the uppe r photograph in which one of the Beaufighters is beginning a diving attack and of the on e below showing three Zeros in flames . (R .A .A .F . ) Ward's Field, Port Moresby, on 3rd April 1943 . showing the extensive develop - ment of the base and dispersed Liberator bombers and Douglas transpor t aircraft . The staggered and curved lines of the built-up dispersal pens reduce d the risk from strafing .

(Australian War Memorial ) Groups of parked Kittyhawks at Milne Bay seen from the nose of a Beaufort bombe r in April 1943 .

27Feb-3Mar CONVOY SIGHTED 69 1 The Allied Air Forces as a whole had available for combat on 1s t March, 154 fighters, 34 light bombers, 41 medium bombers and 39 heavy bombers. These totals excluded all aircraft assigned for escort and recon- naissance. Alerted for action, Whitehead had under his immediate com- mand, 95 fighters, 49 medium and light bombers, and 37 heavy bombers . Between 27th February and 1st March stormy weather rolled across th e Solomon and Bismarck Seas, enshrouding the coasts of New Britain an d making the task of the now tensely watchful reconnaissance crews mor e than difficult. But on the 1st the crews of two Liberators on patrol off New Britain reported that the weather was clearing . A third Liberator was dispatched almost immediately to strengthen the reconnaissance and th e crew of this aircraft at 3 p.m. reported the first sighting of the expecte d convoy, described in their signal as 14 ships, escorted by Zero fighters , on a westerly course about 40 miles north-west of Ubili. The crew of another Liberator, sent off to shadow the enemy ships , reported that the weather was again closing in and a force of eight Flyin g Fortresses, over the area in the late afternoon, failed to find the convoy . At dawn on 2nd March six R .A.A.F. Bostons swept low over Lae aerodrome to bomb the runway and dispersal areas, a successful operation that temporarily checked the enemy's use of the base for air support . Meanwhile, searching Liberator crews were flying through poor weathe r until, about 10 a .m ., one crew again found the convoy, reporting it to consist of a light cruiser, five destroyers and eight transports (the "cruiser " proving to be a large destroyer) . A formation of 8 Flying Fortresses, fol- lowed an hour later by a second of 20, took off to attack . Finding the enemy ships without difficulty, the first formation attacked with 1,000-l b demolition bombs, returning to claim two of the transports as sunk, one of them "breaking in half and sinking in two minutes". The second forma- tion then struck . These crews returned to report, with understandable excite- ment, that they had left one transport "burning and exploding", another "burning amidships" . A third was "seen to explode " and a fourth was "i n a sinking condition ". Probably there was some exaggeration in these claims , but it was clear that the initial attacks had met with some success . As the main convoy, holding course, approached the entrance to Vitiaz Strait shortly before dark, they were set upon by 11 more Fortresses whos e crews claimed two direct hits and one vessel sinking. The first American formations were without fighter cover, the Lightnings having failed t o make rendezvous, but there were no casualties among the bomber crews ; enemy fighters, one of which was shot down, were not very aggressive. Doubt about the exact composition of the convoy remained . A Flying Fortress crew, shadowing until darkness, thought that two unidentified ships had joined the convoy in mid-afternoon and that about one hour later two "possible light cruisers " had left it . That night R.A.A.F. Catalina crews relieved the American crews and kept watch in fitful moonlight, occasionally dropping bombs to add to th e anxiety of the Japanese . A Flying Fortress relieved them early next morn-

692 WAU AND THE BISMARCK SEA 3 Ma r ing. During the night a lone Beaufort from Milne Bay, piloted by Squadro n Leader Smibert,9 sought the enemy ships without success . It was now beyond doubt that, of the three possible courses the enem y might follow, their intention was to accept the boldest and most dangerous ; the convoy had turned south-east into Vitiaz Strait and was headed directly for Lae . If the Japanese were anxious up to this stage of their progress—the passage through Vitiaz Strait which was accomplished i n darkness—they had infinitely greater reason for anxiety as they rounde d the Huon Peninsula on the morning of the 3rd . They had now come within range of the Allied attack squadrons which had been schooled for weeks in anticipation of the very assault the convoy must now face . Allied reconnaissance reports varied considerably, but the best assess- ment of them possible suggested that overnight the convoy had been joine d by a supplementary force of perhaps as many as seven vessels . At 4 a.m. eight Beauforts from No. 100 Squadron, armed with torpedoes , took off from Milne Bay and flew northward through a heavy weather fron t in search of the enemy force . Only two of these aircraft got through . One, piloted by Pilot Officer Waters,' made an attack run on a destroyer (mis- taken by the crew for a light cruiser) . The torpedo was launched but there was no hit . The second Beaufort, captained by Flying Officer Hall, 2 selected a transport of about 8,000 tons but the torpedo hung up in the aircraft 's bay and in desperation Hall dived and made a strafing run over the ship . The weather, which so often had been an ally to such aggressive sea - borne expeditions as the Japanese were undertaking, now favoured their opponents. That morning a clear sky over Port Moresby resounded wit h the roar of more than 90 aircraft taking off to keep rendezvous over Cap e Ward Hunt. The plan for the attack was being followed precisely . Thirteen Beaufighters, their four cannon in the nose and six machine-guns in th e wings fully tested and checked, took off to make formation and meet , about 9.30 a.m., two formations of Mitchells, one of 13 and the other of 12 of the latest C-1 type from No. 9 Squadron . Higher overhead were 1 3 Flying Fortresses, moving out to open the attack with, above them again, 28 Lightning fighters on their way to meet the enemy's fighter cover. While these aircraft were assembling Bostons from No . 22 Squadron were very effectively repeating their neutralising attack on Lae aerodrome . In the beginning, with the enemy convoy steaming resolutely for Lae, the Flying Fortresses made their assault, bombing from medium altitude (abou t 7,000 feet) and attracting the attention of a large formation of enem y fighters. The sky was suddenly filled with combat. As the Zeros dived on the Fortresses the Lightnings dived on them. One of the heavy bombers, shat- tered by cannon fire from attacking Zeros, dived out of control, its crew o f

9 W Cdr J . A . Smibert, 250276 . 7 Sqn ; comd 100 Sqn 1943 . Research physicist ; of Toorak, Vic ; b . Elsternwick, Vic, 4 Jul 1917 . F-Lt K. N . Waters, DFC, 408192 . 100 and 8 Sqns ; Instructor 6 OTU 1943-44 . Foreman ; of Launceston, Tas ; b. Lefroy, Tas, 26 Aug 1915 . 2 F-Lt L. W. Hall, DFC, 406717. 6, 13, 100 and 2 Sqns . Clerk ; of Perth, WA ; b . Subiaco, WA , 21 May 1919.

3Mar DEVASTATING ATTACKS 693 seven baling out before their aircraft disintegrated . As they parachuted down, Zero pilots strafed them and all died either from enemy gunfir e or in the sea below where the battle was now at its height . Three Lightnin g pilots, diving to their aid through heavy anti-aircraft fire from the ships , were also shot down, but their fellow pilots revenged them to the exten t of about 15 Zeros destroyed in combat, the Fortress gunners adding anothe r five to that total. The Fortresses completed their bombing runs and claimed five direct hits. They were credited with the sinking of one ship and probably another, but their own combat reports, expressively honest, included the comment s "Ships left burning—exact number of hits unknown—at least four nea r misses observed" ; "Due to interception results were not observed ."3 This bombing had scarcely ended when the Beaufighters led in th e low-level attackers. Some of the aircrew gained the impression that the Beaufighters' approach was mistaken for an impending torpedo attack a s some of the ships altered course to meet the aircraft bows on . This had the effect of improving the targets for the Beaufighters which, changin g course, were thus able to make beam-on strafing runs over more than one ship at a time made at little more than mast height . The attack had its intended effect of silencing many of the anti-aircraft gun crews, among whom the casualties, as torn and burning superstructure indicated, mus t have been considerable ; and so the way was prepared for the most devastat- ing attacks of all, the assault by the American Mitchells—a standard medium-altitude bombing attack by the first formation, followed by the Mitchell C-1s at 500 feet with each pilot selecting his own target . With their heavy fire power from their nose guns shattering those of the enemy's gun crews who had not been suppressed by the Beaufighters ' attack, their bombs tore into the ships' hulls . Seventeen direct hits were claimed in this onslaught . Soon ships were listing or sinking, their super- structure smashed and blazing, and great clouds of dense black smoke rising into a sky where aircraft circled and dived over the confusion they had wrought among what, less than an hour earlier, had been an impressively orderly convoy. As the aerial battle continued one Beaufighter pilot, with a burst o f cannon fire, rid a Mitchell crew of a Zero that was fiercely attacking them . Two Zeros dived upon another Beaufighter, setting its port engine on fir e and wounding both the pilot and observer—Sergeants Downing and Box —who, in the same aircraft, had been caught in the explosion at Leahy' s Farm in the battle for Wau . Downing, with a shell splinter in his left shoulder, was now forced to withdraw . Though able to use only one arm he flew to Popondetta and landed safely. With their bombs and ammunition spent, the attack aircraft withdrew, but only to rearm for renewed assaults . That afternoon the Allied aircraft returned, though deteriorating weather prevented a formation of Boston s and six of a formation of 29 Mitchells from reaching the target area . Even

3 Craven and Cate, The Army Air Forces in World War II, Vol IV, p. 144n .

694 WAU AND THE BISMARCK SEA Mar1943 so the vigour of the attack was maintained. Direct hits were claimed by Fortress crews and the Mitchell crews returned after their second assaul t to report "four hits on a destroyer, four on a cruiser and one each on tw o transports—all left in a sinking condition" . Fifteen more Mitchells then swept in to bomb, sometimes from as low as 200 feet . Their crews later claimed ten direct hits . Five of No. 22 Squadron's Bostons, led by Squadron Leader Learmonth,4 followed closely into the attack, while Flying Fortresse s were simultaneously bombing from medium altitude . The Australian crew s claimed two direct hits and several near misses and were credited with th e sinking of one more enemy ship. The Bostons were repeatedly attacked by Zeros, one of them by four at one time, but the pilot, Flying Office r Craig,5 turned boldly into them with his guns firing and the enemy pilots broke away. As a postscript to the battle proper, five American motor torpedo boat s sortied from their base at Tufi on the night of 3rd-4th March to search for quarry. They found one crippled ship and sent it to the bottom of th e darkened sea . That morning the bombers, continuing the hunt, sank a solitary and badly damaged destroyer—the last that was seen of the grea t Japanese Lae convoy . But still the devastating task of the air attackers wa s not over and still there was urgent need to deny the enemy air units an adjacent base. Thus, on the morning of the 4th, eleven Beaufighters cooperated with American Bostons in a heavy raid on Malahang airfield , adjacent to Lae, where they were met by heavy anti-aircraft fire and 1 2 enemy fighters . Engaged by Lightnings covering the attack, the Zer o pilots refrained from serious interception . After the attackers had drenched the target area with gunfire and bombs, two Beaufighters, one piloted by Flying Officer Roe and the other by Flight Lieutenant Uren,6 returned to attack camouflaged grounded fighter aircraft they had detected on thei r initial runs. As they withdrew six of these aircraft and a refuelling waggon were in flames . The port engine of Roe's aircraft had been hit by an anti - aircraft shell but he was able to fly it back to base, while Uren, with hi s aircraft severely damaged by enemy ground fire, made a crash landin g at Dobodura in which the Beaufighter was destroyed though the cre w escaped unharmed . On the 5th, and for several days thereafter, there was the terrible ye t essential finale : Beaufighters, Bostons and Mitchells swept to and fro ove r the waters of the Huon Gulf seeking out and destroying barges and raft s crowded with survivors from the sunken enemy ships . It was grim an d bloody work for which the crews had little stomach . Some of the men in Beaufighter crews confessed to experiencing acute nausea . The realistic and grimly objective comment from one of their flight leaders was that every one of these troops was an enemy pledged to kill his opponents

4 W Cdr C . C. Learmonth, DFC, 385 . Comd 22 Sqn 1943, 14 Sqn 1943-44 . Regular air force offr ; of Tyrendarra, Vic ; b . Portland, Vic, 2 May 1917 . Killed in action 6 Jan 1944. 5 F-Lt H. B . Craig, DFC, 402228 . 1451, 1457 Fits RAF and 22 Sqn . Jackeroo ; of Sydney ; b. Sydney, 3 Oct 1914. e Sqn Ldr R. F. Uren, DFC, 260535 . 6, 22 and 30 Sqns . Aircraft engine mechanic ; of Kogarah, NSW ; b. 26 Apr 1920 .

1943 ASSESSING THE LOSSES 695 and so every one the Beaufighters' guns prevented from getting ashore wa s "one Jap" less for the army to kill . At the Allied headquarters there was very natural elation over what General MacArthur was later to describe as "the decisive aerial engage- ment" of the war in the South-West Pacific .? At advance headquarters of the Fifth Air Force, Intelligence officers were absorbed in the difficul t task of comparing and evaluating the reconnaissance sighting reports , combat reports and aircrew interrogations, which had been streaming in since the battle began . Despite careful assessment it was impossible then t o produce precise statistics of the enemy's losses . On the other hand it wa s clear that, by comparison, those of the Allied air units had been infinitesima l -13 aircrew members killed—10 in combat and 3 in an accident—an d 8 wounded; 6 aircraft destroyed—one Flying Fortress and three Lightning s in combat and two, one Mitchell and one Beaufighter, by accident . There was no certainty about the precise strength of the Lae convoy until some time after the battle. Apart from conflicting counts by a large number o f reporting aircrew, there was the puzzling inference that a supplementary force of seven vessels had joined the one orginally sighted . By adding thes e to the number of ships reported in the first sighting (14) and a "smal l transport" reported sunk by a reconnaissance plane in Wide Bay, abou t 50 miles south of Rabaul, the total number of ships was brought to 22 . Not one report was received of any ship in the convoy escaping so that , on the evidence then available, all 22 were presumed to have been sunk . On 7th March General MacArthur issued a communique which later aroused much discussion and some controversy . This gave the compositio n of the enemy convoy as 12 transports, 3 cruisers, and 7 destroyers—2 2 ships—which, it was claimed, had been totally destroyed together wit h 12,762 troops, 59 aircraft and large quantities of equipment and supplies . Painstaking research using captured enemy documents, the interroga- tions of prisoners and all available relevant Allied documents, undertake n at Army Air Force Headquarters, Washington, several months after th e battle, seemed to leave no doubt that there was no supplementary convoy , that no additional vessels joined the convoy en route, and that the tota l number of ships at no time exceeded 16—8 destroyers and 8 transports . A report on the action, issued by Advance Headquarters Fifth Air Force, a month after the battle, asserted that "only 12 or 13 ships were actuall y sighted sinking or in obviously desperate condition".8 Final adjudication , after all the evidence had been sifted, later established that 16 ships set ou t for Lae—eight destroyers (no cruisers were employed) and eight transports , one of which was a naval special service ship serving as a transport . Four of the eight destroyers did in fact escape from the Allied bombers . All eight of the transports were sunk making the total ships lost 12 .

7 Interview with General MacArthur, Washington Post, 4 Sep 1945, p . 2 . S GHQ, SWPA, when these conclusions were submitted declined to accept them, holding to th e claims of the original communique. MacArthur in fact, in a message to Washington on 7 Se p 1943, even went so far as to suggest that action might be taken against those responsible fo r calling the claims made in the communique into question .

696 WAU AND THE BISMARCK SEA Feb-Ma r On board the transports there were about 6,000 army troops and 400 marines who, with the complements of the ships themselves—destroye r crews 1,650, army transport crews 440, naval transport crew 250—made up a total roll-call of 8,740 officers and men . Of these about 2,890 were drowned or killed—in contrast with the claim by G .H.Q. that the death roll was 12,762. The losses were divided thus : army approximately 2,300 , marines 150, destroyer crews 250, army transport crews 140, naval trans - port crew 50. Of those rescued, 3,800 were saved by the surviving destroyer s (whose crews numbering 825 must be included in the total saved), 27 5 by submarine, 850 put ashore at Lae by destroyers and 21 reported to hav e swum ashore. The total so saved adds up to 5,771, leaving 79 unaccounte d for.

Post-war study of Japanese documents and interrogation of Japanese participant s show that assembled in Simpson Harbour, Rabaul, on the afternoon of 28th February under the command of Rear-Admiral Kimura, commander of the 3rd Destroye r Flotilla, were the escort of eight destroyers—Shirayuki (wearing Kimura's flag) , Arashio, Asashio, Tokitsukaze, Yukikaze, Uranami, Shikinami and Asagumo ; and seven army transports—Aiyo Maru (2,750 tons), Kembu Maru (700 tons), Kyokusei Maru (5,500 tons), Oigawa Maru (6,500 tons), Shinai Maru (3,800 tons), Taime i Maru (3,750 tons) and Teiyo Maru (6,870 tons) . The naval special service ship Nojima (8,251 tons) made the convoy's eighth transport. These eight ships between them carried about 6,000 troops, the main body of the 51st Division, and the 23rd Anti-Aircraft Defence Unit . Kimura apparently had no illusions about the gravity of his task and, acceptin g that the convoy could not escape detection by Allied aircraft, decided to take th e shortest route to Lae so that his obviously slow convoy could reach its destinatio n and return to Rabaul in the shortest possible time . This route would lead alon g the north coast of New Britain to a point north of Cape Gloucester, then west b y north to a point north-east of Long Island, where it would turn south by eas t through Vitiaz Strait, lead past Cape Cretin and then south into the Huon Gulf . Fighter cover would be provided for the convoy by the 253rd Air Group. At midnight on 28th February the convoy moved out from Rabaul . Its speed was seven knots. The voyage was uneventful until, at 4 p .m . on 1st March when the ships were 45 miles west-south-west of Cape Lambert, an Allied aircraft was sighted . That night another Allied aircraft could be heard overhead and flares dropped from it were seen . At 6.20 a.m . on the 2nd an Allied aircraft was again seen and an hour and a half later 10 Flying Fortresses appeared flying at 9,000 feet to make the first bombing attack. The convoy's air escort of 33 fighters intercepted these bombers and their fighter escort. Three Japanese fighters were shot down. The transport Kyokusei Maru was hit and fatally damaged . At 9 .22 a .m . she sank, but 850 troops who were on board were first transferred to the destroyers Asagumo and Yukikaze, which then made all speed direct for Lae where they landed the troops at midnight and returned to rejoin the convoy next morning without havin g been detected. Meanwhile the convoy had moved westward and from 2.30 p .m . to 4 p .m . had circled to the north-east of Long Island (presumably to give the two absent destroyers a margin of time for rejoining) and then turned south . A quarter of an hour after resuming course the ships were again attacked, this time by eigh t Flying Fortresses. The accounts of the action make no reference to any bomb hits , nor do they do so when recording an attack on the destroyer escort that night .

Sources for these statistics include Bismarck Sea narrative compiled from various Japanes e sources by HQ, FEAF ; interrogation of Lt-Cdr Handa, Staff Officer 3, Destroyer Squadron : Great East Asia War Summary, compiled for GHQ (US Army) Tokyo, 14 Apr 1950, and Majo r New Guinea Operations, 13 Apr 1950 .

Mar 1942 LAND LINE TO DOBODURA 697

A few minutes before 8 a .m. on the 3rd March, when the convoy was abou t 30 miles south-east of Finschhafen, the main Allied attack began . About 30 Flying Fortresses and 30 Mitchells came in from the south, then about 20 Bostons at low level with 20 unidentified aircraft above the Fortresses and 30 to 40 fighters at high Ievel .1 The flagship Shirayuki was the first vessel hit and Admiral Kimura wa s wounded . The vessel was attacked "in waves of three planes which came in a t extremely low level . . . in strafing and bombing attacks . Most personnel on the bridge were killed or wounded . A bomb hit the after turret . . . a fire started, a powde r magazine exploded, and the stern section broke off and the ship was flooded and sank."2 An hour and a half later and after her crew had been transferred to Shikinami, she was scuttled . About this time a second destroyer, Arashio, also hit, collided with Nojima which was disabled, and abandoned . Later this transport was sunk by bombs . Arashio , in the meanwhile, was listing 30 degrees and later she also was abandoned . Early in the engagement another destroyer, Tokitsukaze, was seriously damaged . She sank later but her crew by then had been trans-shipped to Yukikaze. All seven army transports had now been badly hit and most of them were o n fire . "One or two" blew up and all eventually sank . At 4 .50 p .m . on the 3rd Kimur a decided to withdraw through Dampier Strait, his ship, Shikinami, having been full y engaged in rescue work as had the three other surviving destroyers, Uranami, Yuki- kaze and Asagumo, two of which also withdrew while a third remained for a time , presumably to rescue survivors from Nojima, before also withdrawing. All fou r surviving destroyers made rendezvous to the east of Long Island with the destroye r Hatsuyuki and other vessels, which had been summoned from Rabaul (or Kavieng ; the reports are not clear on this point) to refuel the destroyers with the convo y and take off 2,700 survivors and transport them to Rabaul . Early on the mornin g of the 4th there were between 20 and 30 lifeboats containing about 1,000 me n adrift over a wide area . Two days later the submarines 1-17 and 1-26 rescued 17 0 of these survivors . On the 8th 1-26 picked up 54 men from an islet to the west o f Goodenough Island and on the 11th put them ashore at Lae.

Dobodura, which had served so well as a forward base in the Gona - Buna-Sanananda campaign and had become increasingly important i n forward planning for future air and land operations, had one particularly serious drawback—poor communications . The Owen Stanleys combined with the tropical weather to make radio reception unreliable . Australian and American signallers with a large team of native carriers and supplied fo r the most part by air dropping tackled the difficult task of laying a land telephone line from Port Moresby along the Kokoda Track . With this additional link, which was completed in about five weeks, Kenney con- sidered it prudent to set up a forward air headquarters at Dobodura. Estab- lished in March, with operational control over the Allied air units on th e north coast, this headquarters was named initially the Buna Air Tas k Force. Even with the new telephone line—itself subject to the effects o f storm and damage from other causes—communications between Advo n Fifth Air Force and the new headquarters were far from good, but th e commander of the task force could, when need be, accept responsibility for combat operations . Kenney replied to criticism of this development fro m Washington, insisting that his new headquarters were well justified, but th e

1 The inaccuracies in this report as to the numbers and types of Allied aircraft in the attac k are understandable. 2 Account by Lt-Cdr Handa who was on board Shirayuki .

698 WAU AND THE BISMARCK SEA Mar-Apr War Department gave no official authority for its formation and it there- fore had no accepted establishment; its officers, from the commander , Colonel Frederick H. Smith Jr, down, retaining nominally the posts to which they had been designated originally . Smith, for example, remaine d listed as deputy Chief of Staff, Fifth Air Force . At this stage the task force consisted mainly of a group of American fighter squadrons.3 In preparation for the next Allied forward movement in New Guinea , American ground troops moved up the coast to the mouth of the Mambare River in the middle of March . Finding that the Japanese had withdrawn to the north of Morobe an American Army force (MacKechnie Force ) formed chiefly from the I Battalion, 162nd Regiment, moved on 31st March to the mouth of the Waria River and to Dona airstrip, whic h provided an emergency landing point that could also be used by liaiso n aircraft. On 3rd April MacKechnie Force landed at Morobe and reported , three days later, that the nearest enemy patrols encountered were te n miles farther to the north-west. Though Kenney's air forces now dominated the New Guinea scene , the Japanese air units were still effective . On 9th March the commander of the enemy's army and navy air units at Rabaul, Admiral Kusaka, bega n a spirited effort to regain control . On that day Wau was attacked by about 26 bombers escorted by more than 20 fighters. Little was achieved in this raid but on the 11th a comparable force struck at Dobodura . Two American ground staff were killed and three aircraft were destroyed o n the ground. American fighter pilots claimed to have destroyed at least nine of the enemy's aircraft for the loss of one Kittyhawk. On the night of th e 14th 15 Japanese bombers raided the American base at Oro Bay and caused some damage . Again, on the 17th, 18 bombers with the unusuall y heavy escort of 32 fighters struck at Porlock Harbour, though without much effect. This spate of air attacks reached its peak on the 28th when , after the local fighter sector had given a raid warning prompted by a par- ticularly large radar plot, about 40 enemy bombers with a large fighte r escort swept in over Oro Bay, smashed a newly built wharf, sank tw o small ships and killed a number of men . American fighter pilots intercepte d and claimed 13 enemy aircraft . The advanced New Guinea bases were the n given a respite while Kusaka directed his strength against targets in the Solomons. For the Australian squadrons in New Guinea the days following the end of the Bismarck Sea battle were days of constant pressure on th e enemy's remaining bases and lines of communication. In these attacks there was heavy concentration on Lae and Salamaua which were repeatedl y bombed by the Bostons of No. 22 Squadron and strafed by the Beau - fighters of No. 30 Squadron. In this period the isthmus of Salamaua wa s attacked by the Bostons with particular severity and from very low level. During March No . 22 Squadron flew 72 sorties and as the Japanese anti- aircraft batteries were strong and their gunners highly experienced th e 3 By June 1943 there were 7 squadrons under this headquarters—2 of Lightnings, 2 of Kittyhawks , 1 of Beaufighters (No . 30 RAAF), 1 of Bostons (US) and 2 of Mitchells.

16-29 Mar FLIGHT LIEUTENANT NEWTON 699 Boston crews were subjected to grave risks over the target area . In one such raid, made on 16th March, one Boston commanded by Flight Lieu - tenant Newton' with Flight Sergeant Lyon 5 and Sergeant Eastwood6 as crew members, dived in through intense anti-aircraft fire and bombed wit h devastating accuracy . A large fire followed the bomb explosions and thi s was increased by the bombs of the following aircraft . When Newton pulled his aircraft out of the dive four direct hits by enemy fire had damage d severely both wings and one engine and had punctured the fuel tanks . Even so he succeeded in flying the aircraft 180 miles back to its base and i n landing it. The attack had been so successful that it was repeated tw o days later. Newton again dived his aircraft low to blast a building adjacen t to an anti-aircraft battery. The Japanese gunners' aim was accurate and as the Boston cleared the target it was seen to be severely damaged and on fire. Newton had no alternative but to ditch the aircraft in the se a close to the isthmus . Other Boston crews saw his aircraft go down and later reported having seen two crew members swimming towards the beach . There was some hope that, having reached the shore, they might escap e the attention of the enemy and perhaps be picked up by one of the A .I.F. patrols that were known to be making daring sorties along the coast . This proved vain and Newton and his crew were posted missing . ? With this additional loss intensifying their purpose, the members of No . 22 Squadron continued their low-level attacks on the enemy's positions . $ ' F-Lt W . E . Newton, VC, 250748 . 21 and 22 Sqns . Warehouseman ; of St Kilda, Vic ; b. St Kilda , 8 Jun 1919. Executed by Japanese 29 Mar 1943 . Before enlisting Newton had been a keen all-round amateur sportsman engaging in cricket, football, golf and water polo . His future in cricket had been regarded as very promising as he was an outstandingly fast bowler, for which he won th e V .C .A. Colts' Bowling Average Cup for 1937-38, and was selected in the Victorian second eleve n for the same season. In August 1938 he was a member of the Victorian team for the Interstat e Amateur Games held in Hobart . s F-Sgt J . Lyon, 401706 ; 22 Sqn . Foundry moulder ; of Footscray, Vic ; b . Glasgow, Scotland , 19 Apr 1916. Missing air operations 18 Mar 1943 . s Sgt B . G . Eastwood, 13055 ; 22 Sqn . Clerk ; of Caulfield, Vic ; b . Healesville, Vic, 26 Feb 1912 . Killed in action 18 Mar 1943 . 7 This was Newton' s 52nd operational sortie. 8 Seven months later (on 20th October 1943) Newton was honoured by the posthumous awar d of the Victoria Cross . The citation stated that 90 per cent of his attacks had been made throug h anti-aircraft fire. After captured enemy documents had been examined, one Japanese soldier's diar y was found to contain a detailed account of the beheading of an Allied airman—"one of tw o members of the crew of a Douglas which was shot down by anti-aircraft [fire] on the 18t h [March] ". The author of the diary claimed that the airman was "accorded a Samurai's death" . A footnote to the diary entry included the statement that "the prisoner killed today was an Ai r Force Tai [captain or flight lieutenant] from Port Moresby". Thus the date of capture, the reference to the aircraft by the maker's name, the rank of the victim and the general circumstances, al l seemed to identify the Allied airman as Newton . On 5th October, GHQ, SWPA, released to th e Allied Press this Japanese account of the execution in all its grim detail, but without identifyin g the airman . At this time the Director of Intelligence, Allied Air Forces (Wing Commander Charlton) informed both GHQ and RAAF HQ that since the document from which the pres s release on the atrocity was written was not an official Japanese document and since the evidence , though very circumstantial, did not contain conclusive proof of identity, he was not prepared t o state definitely that the victim of the execution had in fact been identified . AVM Bostock, as air officer commanding RAAF Command, held that announcement of the identification of th e victim would alter the reaction of members of the particular squadron "from the impersonal t o the closely personal " and could therefore "seriously affect morale ". This view was supported by th e Chief of Press Relations GHQ, Col LeGrande A. Diller . On 12th October 1943 the Australia n Press published a statement by the Prime Minister, Mr Curtin, announcing that, because of widespread anxiety among relatives of captured or missing members of the forces which ha d followed the public disclosure of the execution, the relatives of the Allied airman who ha d been beheaded by the Japanese had been informed of his identity . In May 1945 a photograp h taken at the scene just before the execution and found among enemy documents, was widely circulated through the Allied newspapers . Sir William Webb, Chief Justice of Queensland, wh o had been appointed to investigate crimes committed by the Japanese in the war period, referre d to the Salamaua atrocity in the course of his report . He stated that when about to complete hi s report on this particular atrocity he received evidence that the body of an Australian airman who had been beheaded had been recovered from a bomb crater at Kela Point, Salamaua , where the airman mentioned in the diary had been executed . "This," Sir William Webb reported , "tended to confirm the authenticity of the account from enemy sources." CORRECTION p. 699, in footnote 8, nine lines from end, delete sentence beginning " In May 1945 . .

Insert: In May, 1945, a Japanese photograph of an execution found among captured enemy documents was circulated through Allied newspapers . Captioned "An Allied Airman ", it was widely believed at the time to be that of Newton. It has since been established that the photograph wa s of an Australian scout and radio operator captured at Aitape in 1943 .

700 WAU AND THE BISMARCK SEA Mar-Apr That fear of defeat was now entering the minds of the enemy commanders has been revealed in post-war records . As one Japanese chronicler has stated it : The Pacific war had run through its first full cycle and the enemy was on the move . . . it was necessary to hold back the mounting enemy blows until we had secured our defences . . . . The effectiveness of the enemy air strength was brought to the admiral [Yamamoto] with the news of a crushing defeat [Bismarck Sea battle ] which, if similar events were permitted to occur in the future, promised terrifyin g disasters for Japan .9 Admiral Yamamoto had now personally assumed command of all hi s air forces in the area and had set up advanced command headquarters at Rabaul. A commander with the highest reputation for skill and determina- tion, and holding immense respect and admiration among his troops, Yama- moto saw as his most immediate and urgent purpose the destruction o f Allied air power in the New Guinea and Solomons areas . He could have had no illusions about this formidable task, which was labelled Operation- A or, to the Japanese—I-Go Sakusen. To attempt it he had a total of 35 0 aircraft—190 operated by the 26th Air Flotilla of the XI Air Fleet which, under Rear-Admiral Kusaka, had been brought to Buin ; 160 of the 1st Carrier Division commanded by Vice-Admiral Ozawa (who had replace d Vice-Admiral Nagumo) ; and the balance drawn from the 21st Air Flotilla at Kavieng (Rear-Admiral Ichimaru), and the 2nd Carrier Division (Vice- Admiral Kakuda) nominally based on Rabaul but at this stage at Ballal e Island, near Buin. These forces, though the main strength of Japanese ai r power, were weaker than those with which Nagumo had assaulted Pear l Harbour, or the force that initiated the attacks on the Philippines and Malaya. Though Yamamoto's use of twin-engined attack bombers gave him a bomb-carrying capacity rather greater than that of the bombers use d by the forces that had made those first assaults, the very grim fact he ha d to accept was that the Japanese now had fewer aircraft in action tha n when they first went to war, whereas Allied aircraft production had mounted steadily. Added to this disability the wastage in combat aircrews had been acute so that pilots for Operation-A were now being drawn from pilot training schools—men who virtually were fledglings with but 30 day s of carrier training and whose inexperience was such that losses from aircraf t destroyed in flying accidents mounted even before the pilots had had tim e to meet the more experienced Allied pilots in combat . Operation-A was given its first real impetus on 7th April when America n ships, assembled at anchor off the Guadalcanal coast, were attacked i n strength. Four days later 45 Japanese dive bombers and fighters raide d Oro Bay and, though Allied radar was now proving its worth—the Japanes e were met by a force of 50 Lightnings and Kittyhawks which reported the destruction of 17 of the enemy aircraft in battle—the attackers gained two direct bomb hits on a 2,000-ton cargo ship and damaged a small suppl y ship and a corvette .

e Okumiya, Horikoshi and Caidin, Zero, p . 236 .

Apr1943 ADMIRAL YAMAMOTO 70 1

On 12th April the enemy made their 106th air raid on Port Moresby . l Though adequate radar warning permitted Allied interception, which cost the Japanese 15 bombers and at least 9 fighters for the loss of only 2 American fighters, the defenders suffered considerably on the ground . Four aircraft (one Beaufighter and 3 Mitchells) were destroyed and 15 other s were damaged, some of them severely . At Ward ' s, Berry and Schwimmer aerodromes the runways were damaged, and at Kila several men working at a fuel dump were burned to death when enemy bombs exploded the drums . After one more raid on Milne Bay on the 14th, which was in- effective, this series of enemy air attacks ended . It was now clear that Allied fighter pilots were more than a match in tactics, skill and morale, for their adversaries, who were losing aircraft a t a rate that promised to become disastrous for them . In a post-war review of Operation-A, a Japanese commentator ha s written :

Pilots' reports of the four heavy raids indicated that we had inflicted sever e damage on the enemy, and intelligence officers reported to Admiral Yamamoto tha t we sank one cruiser, two destroyers and twenty-five cargo and transport ships ; shot down in air combat 134 planes, and wrecked others in ground attacks which severely damaged four enemy air bases . (Again our pilots over-estimated the efficiency of their attacks, for post-war investigation revealed that the Americans , while hit hard, suffered far less damage than we were led to believe .) Our losse s included at least forty-nine planes shot down and missing, in addition to those which were damaged . Convinced by his pilots' reports that his original goal of wreaking great havo c among the American airfields and reducing the effectiveness of enemy air powe r had been accomplished, Yamamoto declared Operation-A as concluded successfull y and ordered his land-based air forces to resume their original attack missions . He sent the carrier-based planes back to Truk, where they rejoined their original groups . . . . The demands of Operation-A disorganised the 1st Carrier Division's air groups , which was ordered to return to Japan for reorganisation, new aircraft and extende d training . To compensate for the loss of the 1st Carrier Division's planes, Admira l Kakuda regretfully split into two units his own 2nd Carrier Force, assigning hal f his strength to Truk and the remainder to the Marshall Islands . 3 Believing Operation-A to have been completed with great damage to the American forces, Yamamoto decided to make a personal assessmen t of his forward bases in the Solomons and hold discussions with the com- mander of the XVII Army, General Hyakutake. At 6 a .m. on 18th April he took off from Rabaul in a Betty bomber for the Japanese air base at Ballale. With him were three of his staff officers while Vice-Admiral Matome Ugaki, chief of staff of the combined Japanese Fleet, with fou r other staff officers, followed in a second bomber . When off the west coas t of Bougainville and approaching Ballale the two Betty bombers wer e

I To the end of March the Japanese had made 105 air attacks on Port Moresby, 23 on Milne Bay , and 19 on Merauke in Dutch New Guinea . 2 Early in May Allied Intelligence reports indicated that the Japanese aircraft strength between 7th April and 4th May had declined by 145—from 611 to 466 . 3 Masatake Okumiya, air staff officer to Admiral Kakuda throughout the period .—Zero, pp . 240-1 .

702 WAU AND THE BISMARCK SEA Mar-Ap r attacked by four American Lightning fighters which broke through th e Japanese fighter cover . Ugaki, anxiously watching the other bomber i n which his commander-in-chief was flying, was (as he expressed it later ) "horrified to see it flying slowly just above the jungle, heading to th e south with bright orange flames rapidly enveloping the wings and fuselage. . . . Although I hoped for the best I knew only too well what the fate of the aircraft would be . As our [own] bomber snapped out of its turn I scanned the jungle . The Betty was no longer in sight . Black smoke boiled from the dense jungle into the air. . . ."4 And so Yamamoto died. Ugaki's own bomber was also shot down into the sea but he himself escaped . A Japanese coded message having been "cracked" by American naval Intelligence, the American headquarters on Guadalcanal were in - formed of Yamamoto's full itinerary, the identity of the staff officers wh o would travel with him, the types of aircraft to be used and the strength o f their fighter escort . It was even noted that the Japanese admiral was mos t punctilious. It remained for the Lightnings to be sent from Henderson Field , make the long flight to Ballale (approximately 450 miles) and time their arrival with equal punctuality. This they did most effectively . While 1 2 American aircraft flew as top cover, the four attack aircraft quickly ha d the Japanese bombers at their mercy. The Zeros accounted for one Light- ning shot down and several others were damaged .

From the single viewpoint of the R .A.A.F. the task ahead was pro- portionately as great as it had been when the war began . One measur e of the effort the Service was now putting into the war was expressed in the number of aircrew trained for combat . The total at 31st March 1943 was 20,670. Of these 13,390 were trained in Australia-5,571 for R.A.A.F. squadrons and 7,819 for service with the R.A.F. ; 7,208 aircrew had been sent overseas to complete their basic training . With more than 20,000 aircrew representing what has been referred to as the "cutting edge" of the force, there had, of course, to be a very heav y manpower commitment for all the essential non-combatant ancillary duties . Among these were officers and men whose contribution has been somewha t overshadowed in these chapters by the attention necessarily devoted to combat and the planning for combat . There were those who undertook without hesitation the hazardous work of bomb disposal. It was their task to dig out and render ineffective the unexploded bombs left by the enemy after each air raid. Though their skill was such that casualties were few , they repeatedly worked under the threat of death . Theirs was a distinctiv e type of courage . As occasion has dictated, attention has been directe d to the state of morale in the force in given situations . This, in itself, has underlined the need for and the value of the physical, psycho- logical and spiritual aids provided by such organisations as the Chap- lains' Branch, the Rehabilitation Section, the Red Cross, the Salvatio n

' Zero, p . 248 .

1942-43 AIDS TO MORALE 703 Army, the Young Men's Christian Association and the Australian Comfort s Fund. From members of the Air Board and the operational commanders t o the humblest of aircraftmen, the work of those engaged in administerin g these welfare services was fully recognised and appreciated . It was work performed with great thoughtfulness and diligence, and performed best where it was most needed—in conditions ranging from acute boredom to the highest tensions of combat at least as they were endured on the ground . It had also, of course, considerable psychological influence on those engaged in air combat. Air Board policy laid it down that the spiritual welfare o f members of the R .A.A.F. should be provided by duly appointed R .A.A.F. chaplains representing the various denominations and that "no other body or organisation be permitted to take any official part in any work of a spiritual nature in any R .A.A.F. unit or station" . Chaplains also engage d readily and effectively in a very practical way in cooperation with the variou s welfare organisations both Service and civilian . Of all aids to morale none had greater influence than the work per - formed by the R.A.A .F. Postal Service whose task presented many difficult problems of administration and transport that varied exactly as did th e operational situation on every front on which the men of the R .A.A.F. were engaged. As with supplies of any kind it was the men who wer e actually engaged in combat whose need was greatest and most difficult t o meet. Yet served they were by the Postal Service and with remarkable felicity. Duties performed in a non-combatant capacity often imposed their ow n peculiar psychological penalty on the individual . In no role was this penalty heavier than in that of the flying instructor . By virtue of the very skill and technical capacity he had acquired he was the more conscious of hi s individual fitness for combat . Perhaps no words sum up this consciousness more effectively than a piece of cynical doggerel verse that was curren t among instructors. The first verse and chorus were : "What did you do in the war, Daddy ? How did you help us to win? " "Circuits and bumps and loops, Laddie , And how to get out of a spin ."

So it's "Woe and alack and misery me , I trundled around in the sky , And instead of machine-gunning Japs 5 I was teaching young —s to fly! "

Throughout this volume there has been much emphasis on what was , in effect, an endemic complaint—frustration caused by shortages in th e supply of aircraft . This condition was aggravated by the almost equally fitful supply of other types of equipment . And, since plans to form new squadrons

5 In the original, a product of the RAF, the reference was to Nazis instead of "Japs " .

704 WAU AND THE BISMARCK SEA 1942-4 3 had to be changed from time to time in the most disconcerting way, th e whole problem of the expansion of the Service was most complex . These difficulties were still acute at the end of March 1943 . It will be recalled that, in March 1942, the War Cabinet had approved the 73-squadron plan ; that, two months later, the plan was for 45 squadrons by the en d of 1943 ; and that, in September, the Air Board had decided cautiousl y that planning "for the present" should be restricted to a total of 35 squad- rons by April 1943 . When the plan for 35 squadrons was approved by the War Cabinet o n 5th October 1942, it instructed that the plan was to be reviewed in six months' time, or earlier if additional aircraft should become available . Two months later the Australian Legation in Washington informed the Ai r Board that there were indications that during 1943 the R .A.A.F. might receive from overseas sufficient aircraft for a further six squadrons, where- upon the board decided to submit a 51-squadron plan to the War Cabine t with April 1943-September 1944 as the development period . This woul d include 3 Beaufort, 5 Boomerang, 6 Mosquito and 2 CA-11 (bomber ) squadrons. 6 The Minister, Mr Drakeford, was critical . In a minute to the Air Board dated 9th January 1943, he noted that the proposed development could be achieved from Australian production alone . This, however, implied the manufacture of aircraft in numbers much in excess of the totals for which War Cabinet approval had been given. ? The Minister told the board that the availability of the CA-11 was at this stage "too hypothetical" to b e regarded as appropriate for such purposes "having in view our recent advices to D.A.P. [Department of Aircraft Production] concerning defer- ment of production [of this type] . . . pending satisfactory tests . . . ." He directed that the scale of expansion should be governed by the numbe r of additional squadrons that could be formed in 1943 from existing order s and the number of aircraft that "could reasonably be expected" from th e United States in that year. Orders additional to those already approved b y the War Cabinet must be so approved before being accepted as availabl e for further expansion . The Air Board must closely examine this last poin t and provide details of the additional aircraft required, together with a delivery program, an estimate of costs, and the number of squadrons tha t could be so formed, "to permit early submission to War Cabinet" . The Minister reminded the Air Board that Cabinet approval was necessary fo r all changes in organisation . Full manpower details covering the curren t

° As at December 1942 production estimates were : Beauforts, 25 a month to provide 409 aircraft by September 1944; Boomerangs, 36 a month—592 by September 1944 ; Mosquitos, 146 by December 1943 and thereafter 20 a month to provide 326 by September 1944 ; CA-11, 105 o n order with production (expected to total 300 by September 1944) to begin at a date dependent on deliveries of engines from the USA and in production at Lidcombe . Though the total anticipate d production of the CA-11 by September 1944 was expected to exceed requirements, it was held tha t the excess could be exported and the number so disposed of offset against allocations of the othe r types of aircraft to be obtained from overseas . 7 The comparative figures for the various types of aircraft with the number required and the numbe r approved by Cabinet shown in parentheses, were : Beauforts, about 700 (450), Boomerangs, 600-700 (200), Mosquitos, 326 (150) .

Jan-Feb SUPPLIES OF AIRCRAFT 705 35-squadron plan and the proposed new program were called for . Could the manpower authorities, he asked, meet the needs of all establishment s under the proposed expansion ? On 14th January the Australian Minister in Washington, Sir Owen Dixon , informed the Prime Minister that the American Chiefs of Staff would recommend to the Combined Chiefs of Staff the allocation to Australia of sufficient aircraft from overseas for nine new squadrons.8 This recom- mendation was approved 11 days later . Dixon, in his cable message , noted that the remainder of the new squadrons needed to raise the strengt h of the force from 30 to 45 squadrons, would be equipped with locally produced aircraft—3 squadrons of Beauforts and 4 of Boomerangs . This would bring the total increase to 16 squadrons, but the number of Hudso n units had been reduced from three to two . The total number of aircraft in the R.A.A.F. would be increased from 615 under the 30-squadron state, to 873 for 45 squadrons . To bring existing units to strength, equip the new ones and replace wastage caused by attrition, up to the end of December 1943, the contribution from American production would be 65 4 aircraft. It now seemed that the Air Board's rather cautious expectation of air- craft supplies from overseas was no longer in question and there was a n understandable note of irritation and uneasiness in the reaction of the Chief of the Air Staff to the Minister's minute of 9th January . This was revealed in a supplementary paper which Air Vice-Marshal Jones pu t before the Air Board on 6th February. In this he claimed that if additional aircraft orders were placed locally to the full extent of the manufacturers ' capacity, a further eight squadrons could be formed and maintained by the end of 1944 . It was desirable, however, to make this aspect the subject of a further submission after the types to be produced had been clarified , and to confine the current submission to expansion on the basis of presen t allocations from overseas and local orders actually placed. "There is n o reason to suppose," Jones wrote, "that the urgency for the maximu m development of the air force has in any way slackened and the absence of War Cabinet's full approval to proceed with that development, to th e maximum possible in all respects, is viewed with concern ." There followed a long memorandum, dated 9th February, addresse d to the Minister, in which Cabinet approval was sought for 45 squadrons by December 1943 and 51 squadrons by December 1944 . The memorandum referred to Dixon 's message and to the clarification of the aircraft alloca- tion from the United States . In assessing the contribution in aircraf t expected from local production the additional requirement in Beaufort s was maintained at 700, but the number of Boomerangs and Mosquito s was left at the initial order level—200 and 150 respectively. The curren t and two future stages of operational squadron strengths were set out thus :

Of these 9 squadrons, 2 would be of Catalinas, 3 of Kittyhawks, 3 of C-47 Dakota transport s and one of C-60 Lodestar light transports. 706 WAU AND THE BISMARCK SEA 1943

Number at Number at Number a t Type of Sqn Jan 194 3 Dec 1943 Dec 1944 G/R bomber 6 5 9 Torpedo 1 4 4 G/R flying-boat 2 4 4 Dive bomber 5 8 8 Interceptor fighter 6 12 1 2 Long-range fighter 2 4 6 Army cooperation 2 2 2 Fleet cooperation 1 1 1 Transport 5 5 5

30 45 51 Expansion was proposed on definite allocations and local orders place d to date for the stage to December 1943 ; the next stage would be propose d "in due course" on the basis of the manufacturers' capacity in 1943 and 1944. As submitted the plan did provide for a "balanced force " . The Minister was reminded that the War Cabinet in a minute dated 2nd Marc h 1942, approving the principle of the 73-squadron plan, had stated : "The implementing of the proposals is to be progressive, having regard to the indications which may be obtained as to the availability of aircraft for thi s purpose; financial authority may be anticipated to the extent required t o give effect to this decision." The Minister was assured that "continuous touch" was maintained with the manpower authorities who had not in an y way queried the R.A.A.F. demands and had indicated that there was a "reasonable prospect" of meeting the estimated needs for ground staff , amounting to approximately 20,000 airmen and airwomen in the first si x months of 1943 . 9 Emphasising that the supply position was "very difficult", the memo- randum warned the Minister that unless additional orders were placed immediately, there was a "definite risk" that the Service would be unable to put the aircraft available to it into operation against the enemy for lack of essential facilities and equipment . It was "most strongly " urged that War Cabinet approval should be obtained for the development of th e air force as proposed together with the needed ancillary units, and for th e establishment of such other ancillary units as were required to meet th e operational needs of the Allied Air Forces in the South-West Pacific Area . This statement of the Air Board's problems at this time is, of course , very far from complete . To bring the picture into its full perspective it can be thought of as a vast jigsaw made up from very small pieces . It may well be doubted whether any armed force had ever before accepted such a multiplicity of obligations in so many areas, under so many commands and with such assorted and limited facilities . As war came in September 193 9 the first pieces of this jigsaw were being only tentatively fitted together . e A manpower statement appended to the memo showed the total strength of the force (RAAF an d WAAAF, and excluding aircrew under trainin g ) at 1 January 1943 as 105,115 . This was expected to rise to more than 133,000 by 31 December. The wastage allowance to cover reserves was 7 per cent of establishment in operational units and 5 per cent in training units ; the annual wastage in the total of 133,000 was set at 6,000 .

Apr1943 AIR SUPERIORITY LOST 707 Now at the end of the first quarter of 1943, it had been filled in t o include Australian airmen being trained in their own country, in Canada , in Britain and in Rhodesia and—much more significantly—Australia n airmen fighting in the skies over Britain, France, Germany, Italy and the Middle East . Then, with the onslaught of the Japanese, they are see n fighting over India, Malaya, Burma, the Netherlands East Indies, Papua and New Guinea, the Solomon Islands, Australia itself and over the vas t stretches of sea separating these territories . Eulogy is superfluous. On the other hand, it is against this intricate pattern that all criticism for such weaknesses, errors and failures as are revealed in these pages should b e matched. Quite apart from its continuing and—in proportion to its strength — very considerable share in the war against Germany and Italy, the R .A.A.F. had now taken a very vital part in 16 months of most bitter conflict agains t the Japanese—again in a way that was the more remarkable in view o f the limitation in the size of the force available . And now, in this theatre, a very fundamental change had taken place . The Allied forces in the South-West and South Pacific Areas were conscious of two vital develop- ments. One was that, though from their viewpoint all too slowly, their ow n strength was growing . The other was that the strength of the enemy wa s weakening. Most apparent was the fact that the enemy had lost thei r air superiority ; Japanese mastery in the air, which for so long ha d helped to determine successive phases of combat in their favour, had ended .