Decoding Indo- Nepal Relations from the Prism of Indian Military Diplomacy

Home , Indian Military Academy, Treaty of Sugauli

No. 300 August 2021

Captain Avinash Chhetry was Decoding Indo- commissioned into the First Battalion The Ninth Gorkha Rifles in 2017. He is an alumnus of Nepal Relations RIMC, Dehradun, NDA, Pune and IMA, Dehradun. The officer has from the Prism of served in High Altitude Areas along the LAC in Eastern Ladakh. He has been awarded COAS Indian Military Commendation Card. The young officer was awarded the Sword of Diplomacy Honour, Gold Medal in IMA, and the President’s Gold Medal at NDA.

Introduction Key Points

In the backdrop of a rapidly changing  India and Nepal shares a strong bond geostrategic scenario of the 21st century of friendship based on mutual interests and strong cultural ties wherein emerging powers are challenging the where Indian Military’s linkages have existing world powers and pushing for a new played a major role. world order, cementing India’s historical ties  The changing geopolitical scenario around Indo-Nepal ties demands India with its neighboring countries is essential for to leverage the underpinnings that securing own national interests. Therefore, the Indian Military Diplomacy can offer in Nepal. potential of the Indian Military apparatus, as a  Amidst the recent hiccups due to the supplementary diplomatic tool, needs to be Kalapani issue, Indian Military Diplomacy can strengthen sustainable explored. The aim of this paper is to discuss cooperative relationship and enhance the role of the Indian Military as an alternative mutual trust. tool for diplomatic engagements with Nepal  India needs to change its outlook towards the external players having with a view of establishing long-lasting strategic interests in Nepal which has friendship between the two countries. potential to become a mutual threat for both India and Nepal. Historical Perspective  The inherent threats involved needs to be re-calibrated and strong historical linkages between the Indian and The Indian Army’s relationship with Nepal can Nepalese Armies needs to be be traced back to the Treaty of Sugauli, leveraged to deter the same. signed between Nepal and British India in

The Centre for Land Warfare Studies (CLAWS), New Delhi, is an independent Think Tank dealing with national security and conceptual aspects of land warfare, including conventional & sub-conventional conflict and terrorism. CLAWS conducts research that is futuristic in outlook and policy-oriented in approach. Website: www.claws.in Contact us: [email protected] CENTRE FOR LAND WARFARE STUDIES (CLAWS): ISSUE BRIEF

1815, that allowed the British to recruit Gorkhas in the British Army. 1 However, it was Maharaja Ranjit Singh of the Sikh Empire who realised the valour and hardiness of the Gorkhas in 1809, during the Kangra confrontation, where they were stopped by the Sikh Army during their expansionary quest and had to accept a truce. 2 Enthralled by the highlanders, the first recruitment of Gorkhas was made in India which continues till date. During the Rana regime (1846-1951) in Nepal, the bond between British India and Nepal grew stronger when Nepal committed their Gorkha soldiers to tackle the initial revolt of 1857, proving themselves as a reliable ally. 3 They also mobilised around 1,00,000 and over 1,10,000 Gorkhas in both World Wars I and II, respectively.4

During India’s independence, a tripartite agreement was signed between India, Nepal, and Britain to split the Gorkha regiments between the three countries.5 Since then, the Gorkha regiments have been the pride of the Indian Army. The Indian Army’s bond with Nepal grew further when General K M Cariappa became the first Indian Army Chief to be decorated with the honorary rank of General of the Nepalese Army in 1950.6 The tradition to confer the honorary rank of General to each other’s Army Chiefs have continued ever since.

Post-independence, the first Indian Air Force mission that was undertaken was to evacuate King Tribhuvan of Nepal who was under threat due severe military revolt and coup in 1950.7 The King was subsequently restored to the throne and the monarchy re-established. The signing of Treaty of Peace and Friendship between India and Nepal in 1950 led to the renewal of the ties between the two.

India aided Nepal through military missions to help reorganise Nepal’s Armed Forces. The need for reorganisation of the Army first appeared in 1952 when a small armed force revolted against King Tribhuvan8― this led to the establishment of the Indian Military Mission in Nepal which was responsible for the training of the Nepalese Army. The security cooperation was further enhanced in 1965 when both countries signed the Arms Assistance Agreement, enabling the Indian Army to assist in reorganisation and modernisation of the Royal Nepal Army9. However, Nepal’s major arms procurement from China in 1989 created minor hiccups with India. Post Jan Andolan I and II, Nepal embraced democracy and started diversifying its strategic vision.

Emerging Strategic Scenario in Indo-Nepal Ties

The erstwhile Himalayan kingdom, which was once treated as a buffer state between India and China, is now slowly transforming into a transit zone. The Dragon’s increasing strategic partnership with Nepal along with other catalysts in place, is a serious security threat for

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India. The evolving geopolitical and geostrategic dynamics around Nepal in the present scenario has initiated several broad security concerns which needs to be addressed by the Indian Armed Forces in its own capacity to assist India achieve its desired goal.

 Political Instability in Nepal. The nascent democracy in Nepal has recently witnessed its political hierarchy undergoing a tumultuous and noteworthy shift. A volatile government in the neighbourhood has become a major concern for India as it hinders continuity of smooth relations which facilitates mutual prosperity and progress. Moreover, the regular political vacuum created in Nepal gives external actors like China, to exert their political and economic influence. An unstable government may lead to internal security threats brewing in the shadows for which the Nepalese Army needs to be prepared. The same was seen after the ‘Royal Massacre’ in Nepal followed by an attempt to establish Absolute Monarchy by King Gyanendra which paved way for the uprising of various insurgent groups.10 Last year when the Kalapani issue was brought into the limelight by Nepal, former, Foreign Minister Pradeep Gyawali proposed to review the 1947 Tripartite Agreement between India, UK, and Nepal, which permits India and Britain to recruit Gorkhas, advocating its irrelevance in the changed political context.11 Should such statements, negating the sanctity of established tradition, be seen as an attempt to gain political mileage to achieve short term goals? Or are they genuine concerns? If yes, then why was it raised around the time when the Kalapani issue had caused tensions between both the countries?  Increasing Footprint of China. China’s engagement, earlier restricted to state-to- state level, has seen a major shift post the monarchical era12— China has been trying to expand itself at all institutional levels in Nepal including the Nepalese Army. China’s attempt to marginalise India by gaining a strategic foothold in Nepal gained momentum since the Royal takeover of Nepal in 2005. 13 Soon after the Royal takeover by King Gyanendra, India along with USA and UK stopped its military supplies to Nepal demanding restoration of democracy. 14 King Gyanendra’s desperate attempt to subdue Maoist movement drew Nepal closer to China. Since then, Nepal started leaning further towards China for military supplies. This gained further momentum after the Communist Party came into power in 2008.15 China has certainly leveraged Nepal’s intention to find an alternative to India. The blockade imposed due to Madhesis’ protest in the Terai region in 2015 did stir anti-India sentiments in Nepal.16 China saw this as an opportunity to deepen its ties with Nepal. China’s military engagements with the Nepalese Army rose significantly post 2005

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which further rose after India resumed the military supplies (after temporary suspension) in 2013.17 The pattern of increasing China’s footprint in Nepal’s military domain is amplified in Table 1. Table 1: Increasing Military Cooperation between Nepal and China

S No Year Milestone Achieved

1. 1988 Bilateral military cooperation started between both the countries.

2. 1989 Nepal procured military hardware such as anti-aircraft guns, medium range SSM, and AK- 47 rifles among others.

3. 1998 China started offering training to Nepalese Army in various training establishments located in China.

4. 1999 Royal Nepalese Army Chief visited China thereby, enhancing military cooperation between both countries.

5. 2002 PLA started sending personnel to attend adventure activities organised by the Nepalese Army.

6. 2005 Soon after the Royal seizure in 2005, China pledged military assistance of $ 989,000 to Nepal to fight the Maoist insurgency.

7. 2007 During the tour of Nepalese Defence Minister to China, Nepal received a military assistance package of $1.3 million.

8. 2008 Nepal and China signed an agreement on military assistance worth $ 2.6 million aimed at modernisation of the Nepalese Army.

9. 2009 China agreed to provide military aid worth 20.8 million Yuan (Rs 220 million) to Nepal.

10. 2011 The then Chinese Army Chief Chen Bingde, during his visit to Nepal, announced military aid of $ 7.7 million for the Nepal Army.

11. 2013 China agreed to build the National Armed Police Force Academy in Nepal during Chinese State Councillor Yang Jiechi’s visit to Kathmandu and pledged to provide NPR 3.6 billion.

12. 2014 During Nepalese Army Chief General Gaurav Shumsher Rana’s visit to Nepal, China pledged $ 8 million military package to focus on border security.

13. 2015 China pledged to provide $6.54 million worth of material aid post-Earthquake in Nepal.

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14. 2017  Chinese Defense Minister General Chang Wanquan became ‘the first Chinese Defense Minister to visit Nepal’ since the establishment of diplomatic ties in 1955.

 China pledged an assistance of $32.3 million to the Nepalese Army.

 Nepal and China began ‘the first ever joint military drill’, which was a major turning point in bilateral defence cooperation.

15. 2018 China announced to provide an assistance worth RMB 150 million (Rs 2.53 billion) to the Nepal Army for the next five years.

16. 2019 China pledged to provide Nepalese Army about $21 million in unspecified “disaster relief materials” over the next three years.

17. 2020 China's Defence Minister and State Counsellor General Wei Fenghe visited Nepal amidst the political turmoil. He also interacted with the Nepalese Army Chief during his visit.

Source: Compiled by the Author

In 2019, Xi Jinping became the first Chinese President, in 23 years, to visit Nepal, bringing both the countries closer 18 , raising strategic concerns for India. Nepal’s ambition to transform from a ‘land-locked country’ to a ‘land-linked’ country led to joining China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) in 2017.19 The ongoing Qinghai-Lhasa railway project which is an all-weather road network has already reached Zhangmu on the border with Nepal and Yadong across Sikkim. 20 It will subsequently be connected to Kathmandu and then to Lumbini which is barely 30 kilometres from the Indian borders.21 This will not only increase Nepal’s economic dependence on China but also the latter may use the strategic underpinnings of the connectivity corridors. This has the potential to threaten the northern plains of India.

China did not just restrict itself to leverage its ideological linkages to facilitate its political ties but also stepped further to increase its influence in Nepal— it recently allocated around 12.7 lakh Nepalese rupees to an NGO in Nepal to carry out a study on what motivates the members of the Gorkha community to join the Indian Army.22 The combination of politically unstable Nepal, collaboration in BRI, increased Chinese involvement in Nepalese Army and the need to understand the bond between the Indian Military and Nepal surely raises questions about China’s intentions.

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 The Pakistan Factor. The growing nexus between China and Pakistan in terms of bilateral and multilateral engagements across various domains, is another major strategic concern. Nepal has recently said that terrorist modules backed by Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) have been using its soil for terrorist activities against India. 23 This is not the first time that ISI has come under the scanner. In the 1980s, ISI gained initial success by using Nepal as a transit point for the movement of Khalistani terrorists to and from India which expanded the scope of its anti-India operations to include trafficking of explosives, weapons, and fake currency in huge quantities by the mid-1990s.24 Pakistan has certainly learnt a lot from its new ally and therefore has not restricted itself to our western borders. The nexus between Pakistan and China has the potential to elevate Pakistan’s strategic role as part of China’s game of “Wei Qi” — where the goal is to gradually and patiently build up assets to tip the balance of the strategic game in its own favour.

Relevance of Indian Military Diplomacy in Contemporary Scenario

As per Ministry of Defence’s Annual Report 2018-19, India has been actively involved with 99 countries through defence cooperation activities. However, Nepal is one of the countries where Indian Military diplomacy has a significant and active role to play; with respect to India’s immediate neighbourhood, in the last five years, Nepal has been visited the most by the Indian Army Chiefs. This is testimony of the fact that the Indian Armed Forces are synchronised with India’s ‘Neighbourhood First’ policy in which Nepal holds a significant strategic importance. The strong commitment and military cooperation extended by India is a step towardsits strategic goal of becoming a regional power.

The Indian Army Chief, General Naravane’s visit to Nepal in November 2020, to receive the traditional Honorary rank of General of the Nepalese Army 25 is a testimony to the same. His visit helped to create a conducive atmosphere, thus soothing the minor hiccups faced due to the recently flared up Kalapani border issue.

General Naravane’s visit came soon after the visit of the Research and Analysis Wing (RAW) chief to Nepal 26— an increasing synergy between the intelligence and defence wings on an issue which predominantly belonged to the Ministry of External Affairs, is an evidence of the emerging role of military in the diplomatic space. 27 However, such scenarios are common for both the countries. In 2015, the protests by Madhesis in the Terai region led to the blocking of key border points between India and Nepal, resulting in severe shortages of medicine, fuel, and other supplies.28 It was the then Indian Army Chief General Dalbir Singh Suhag, who after a series of talks with his Nepalese counterparts and discussions at the 6 CENTRE FOR LAND WARFARE STUDIES (CLAWS): ISSUE BRIEF highest level of political hierarchy, played an instrumental role in bringing normalcy in the border areas.29 Such visits however, are not restricted at the highest levels only, but multiple visits at all the levels by the officers of the Indian Army has ensured that the special bond between both countries remain alive.

The Defence Wing under the Embassy of India in Nepal acts as a bridge between both the armies. It assists in fulfilling the aspirations of both serving and retired personnel in the ever evolving and demanding environment. Presently, there are more than 32,000 Nepalese personnel in the seven Gorkha regiments of the Indian Army 30 and around 1,22,000 pensioners residing in Nepal. If we include their families on an average of four per family, it will account for around seven lakh Nepalese i.e. 2.5 percent of Nepal’s total population which has inherent part of the Indian Army’s large family. This emotive connect is one of the biggest strengths of the Indian Army’s role in Nepal. There are a total of 25 District Soldier Boards (DSBs) across Nepal, under the Defence Wing, and is responsible for the implementation and supervision of the Government of India’s sponsored welfare related programs in their respective areas. 31 The three Pension Paying Offices (PPO) at Kathmandu, Pokhara and Dharan are vested with the responsibility of disbursement of pension to the ex-servicemen staying even in the remotest of the localities.

Table 2: List of Pension Paying Offices in Nepal

S No Pension Paying Office Number of Pensioners

01. Kathmandu 47,458

02. Pokhara 59,196

03. Dharan 15,648

Total 1,22,302

Source: Bhu Puu Magazine, Indian Embassy in Nepal 2020

Pensions worth INR 16,201.60 Crore has been disbursed during the year 2015-20, as shown in Graph 1 below.

A sizeable number of 15,773 retired Assam Rifles personnel are also present in Nepal. They are looked after by the Assam Rifles Ex-Servicemen Welfare Association (ARESA).32

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Graph 1: Pension disbursed by India from 2015-2020

Pension Disbursed by India in the Last Five Years

. Pension disbursed to Ex-servicemen in Crores

5000

4500

4000

3500

3000

2500

2000

1500

1000

500

0 2015-16 2016-17 2017-18 2018-19 2019-20

Source: Bhu Puu Magazine, Indian Embassy in Nepal 2016-20 and compiled by the Author

India has also been actively involved in training personnel from Nepal in various training academies of India. Four Nepalese alumni from Indian Military Academy, namely General Arjun Narsing Rana, Bharat Kesar Singh, Rishi Kumar Pandey and Rukumangud Katwal have also risen to the rank of General in the Nepalese Army.33The presence of Nepalese alumni in the Nepalese military hierarchy shows an unbreakable bond between both the armies. This enables the Nepalese to understand India’s sensitivities and security apprehensions.

Outlook for the Future

Nepal’s efforts to look for an alternative to India and external actors like China, has created considerable security concerns for India. India needs to act fast take the help of the Indian Military to achieve its national interests. Thus, it becomes important to analyse the role of the Indian Military as an effective tool, at all levels, to get the desired objective of a purposeful partnership between India and Nepal.

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Political Stability in Nepal

India and Pakistan were carved out of the same country in 1947 but seven decades hence, military coups are a regular affair in Pakistan. The very existence of democracy is more of an ‘illusion’ than reality in Pakistan’s present context . On the other hand, the Indian Military has been one of the key organisations in strengthening and complementing India’s sustenance as the largest and one of the most successful democracies of the world— from protecting India from external threats to joining the national efforts to fight the Covid-19 pandemic,34 the Indian Armed Forces have risen to every occasion. In the present political chaos in Nepal, the Indian Armed forces can assist and guide the Nepalese Army to effectively guard the country against both internal and external security threats. An unstable political environment may give an opportunity for the revival of insurgent groups in Nepal. The Indian Army should offer training and support to the Nepalese Army to counter any such eventuality. The successful execution of the same will strengthen the Nepalese Army’s role in nation building which will ultimately lead to the collaboration for a purposeful partnership.

The Chinese Matrix

On one hand, China is increasing its military cooperation with Nepal, and on the other hand , there are serious allegations that China is encroaching into Nepalese territory. 35 There were widespread anti-China protests held last year in Nepal when reports emerged that China had constructed nine buildings in Nepal’s Humla district.36 The Nepalese media reports also cited a recent survey conducted by Nepal’s Ministry of Agriculture which claims that there have been illegal Chinese encroachments in bordering districts including Gorkha, Dolakha, Darchula, Sindhupalchowk, Sankhuwasabha, Rasuwa and Humla.37

Map 1: Recent Land Encroachments by China Inside Nepalese Territory

Source: Adapted from https://www.researchgate.net/figure/Map-of-Nepal-showing-district-boundaries-ecological-zones-and- research-sites-Map-by_fig1_320063047 and Annotated by Author 9

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Although, the Nepalese political hierarchy has denied such allegations, but this can be a security concern for both Nepal as well as India. China’s encroachment into Nepalese territory in areas closer to Indian states of Uttarakhand and Sikkim, which are at high altitude, may give China an opportunity to ascertain certain locations so that it is at a strategic height and can look deep into India and Nepal using effective surveillance resources. Both, the Indian and Nepalese Armies,needs to be prepared for any such eventualities.

Assistance to Develop Defence Capability

India has been assisting the Nepalese Army in its modernisation efforts by supplying equipment as well as imparting training. India had resumed military supplies to Nepal in 2013 after a hiatus of nine years.38 This lapse gave China ample opportuninities to get closer to Nepal. India needs to leverage its ties with Nepal through the spectrum of the Indian Army before it becomes too late. Nepal has recently approved a reorganisation of its army of eight divisions in four geographical commands, with one strategic command in Kathmandu valley.39 The restructuring will also include the introduction of corps for logistics, medical services, engineering, signals, intelligence and others. 40 The Nepalese Army is likely to reorganise the commands based on the three geographical river basins which was earlier based on the political boundaries that excluded any military considerations.41

India must facilitate the smooth reorganisation of the Nepalese Army by offering necessary assistance as it did in 1950s and 60s. The same could be done in a phased manner with strict deadlines to provide Nepal with the necessary arms, equipment, and training to help the Nepalese Army reach its desired aim. The modernisation plan will incur heavy expenditure for which India’s Ministry of Defence should coordinate with Ministry of External Affairs to allocate additional defence aid to Nepal. At the same time, the Nepalese Army’s needs to assess security threats that it is likely to face from China and incorporate the same in its reorganisation plan.

The Gorkha Connection

The Indian Prime Minister in his historic address to the Constituent Assembly of Nepal in 2014, highlighted the significant role played by the Gorkhas in all the wars and paid homage to the Nepalese citizens who laid down their lives while defending India.42 It comes as no surprise that why this strong bond has raised China’s eyebrows. The foundation of Indo- 10

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Nepal ties goes beyond the materialistic opportunities that China can woo Nepal with. India’s soft power influence has always been a challenge to China’s approach to economic diplomacy. The emotive connect that binds both the countries is beyond imagination. There are serving Nepalese personnel in the Indian Armed Forces who take pride to serve in the same battalion or subunit as their forefathers did. India should take the views of serving officers and ex-servicemen in Nepal for perception management. In this digital media age, the Gorkhas who are recruited from across Nepal can be effectively play a role to shape India’s image at the ground level. India’s umbilical cord of Gorkhas can certainly ensure India’s soft power influence in Nepal.

Joint Training and Military Exercises

Presently, the armies of India and Nepal jointly conducts a battalion level annual ‘Exercise Surya Kiran’. 43 In 2018, Nepal’s decision to withdraw from the first ever Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation (BIMSTEC) military exercise held in India was alarming.44 The Nepalese Army withdrew a day before there scheduled departure from Nepal. As the BIMSTEC connectivity is being seen as a counter to China's BRI, withdrawal of Nepal certainly seemed like a politically motivated decision, rather than an issue of logistics and timing.45

Joint military exercises are not only conducted with military objectives in mind but also aims to increase cooperation and mutual understanding. Thus, India needs to engage in more military exercises including bilateral and multilateral exercises with Nepal. This could be more effective by making the military exercises more lucrative for Nepal. With the upcoming re-structuring of the Nepalese Army, joint exercises with India will enable Nepalese Army to validate its battle drills and tactics on ground enhancing the military cooperation between both sides.

Bilateral Defence Engagements

The increasing presence of ISI in Nepal cannot be negated. Both countries must be in a similar strategic frequency to tackle the mutual concern of global terrorism. The synergy between defence and intelligence agencies of both India and Nepal will prevent Nepal from becoming a launchpad for ISI sponsored terrorist groups threatening the peace and security of India and Nepal.

India also needs increase bilateral engagements with Nepal in the form of defence dialogues, military conferences and seminars which would enable both the countries to understand mutual security concerns and areas of mutual interest. India can host annual 11

CENTRE FOR LAND WARFARE STUDIES (CLAWS): ISSUE BRIEF defence summits with its neighbours with mutual security concerns and include Nepal as an inherent component. The defence think-tanks of both countries can collaborate on regular intervals to come up with innovative mutual solutions to ensure continuation of smooth ties between the two.

Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief (HADR)

In 2015, India was one of the first countries to respond to the devastating earthquake of 7.9 magnitude that hit Nepal and launched the largest ever relief operation in response to a natural disaster on foreign soil.46 The joint operation of the Indian Army and Indian Air Force displayed India’s deepest commitment towards Nepal. India can conduct joint HADR exercises with Nepal as well as train the Nepalese Forces in various disaster management institutes. This would enable both neighbours to mobilise swiftly in times of natural crisis on either side.

Medical Assistance

During the peak of the Covid pandemic, the Indian Army provided medical equipment worth NPR 42 Cr to the two field hospitals of Nepal’s Army during the visit of Indian Army Chief last year.47 The Indian Army also gifted one lakh doses of Covid-19 vaccines to the Nepalese Army in 2021.48 India’s commitment towards providing necessary assistance has always been seen as a goodwill gesture. This major diplomatic effort is based on India’s core values of “Vasudhaiva Katumbakam” or the “world as one family” which goes beyond the concept of “Wei Qi”.

Conclusion

The Indian Armed Forces’ efforts need to be synergised and leveraged as an effective tool of Indian foreign policy. India needs to develop more mechanisms to use the potential that Indian Military Diplomacy possesses especially concerning Nepal. Indian Army Chief’s recent visit to Nepal has ‘broken the ice’ and created a positive environment for the diplomatic channels to untangle the chaos. Such steps will certainly enable India to be in a conducive relation with Nepal. India needs to establish concrete mechanisms with Nepal which would lead to meaningful partnership between both the countries. The time-tested military linkages between both the countries have always been a strong pillar since times immemorial. It is indeed high time for India to use the collaborative strength of the Indian Military Diplomacy and re-strengthen the mutual trust and cooperation with Nepal.

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End Notes

1 Virgil Miedema & Stephanie Spaid Miedema, Mussoorie and Landour : Footprints of the Past, (New Delhi: Rupa Publications, 2014). ISBN: 9788129124340.

2 Former Indian Ambassador to Nepal, “Need to sustain Gorkha units in Army”, The Tribune, 10 August 2020. Accessible at https://www.tribuneindia.com/news/reviews/story/need-to-sustain-gorkha-units-in-army-124498. Accessed on 25 June 2021.

3 Gaurav Bhattarai, “Assessing Nepal’s Military Diplomacy: Neighbour and Beyond”, Unity Journal Volume I, February 2020. Accessible at https://www.nepjol.info/index.php/unityj/article/download/35694/27882/. Accessed on 25 June 2021.

4 “The Gurkhas”, The National Army Museum. Accessible at https://www.nam.ac.uk/explore/gurkhas . Accessed on 25 June 2021.

5 “1947 Tripartite Agreement on Gurkha soldiers” , Drishti IAS, 01 August 2020. Accessible at https://www.drishtiias.com/daily-updates/daily-news-analysis/1947-tripartite-agreement-on-gurkha-soldiers. Accessed on 25 June 2021.

6 PTI, “Gen Naravane conferred the honorary rank of General of Nepali Army by President Bhandari”, The Economic Times, 05 November 2020. Accessible at https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/defence/gen- naravane-conferred-the-honorary-rank-of-general-of-nepali-army-by-president bhandari/articleshow/79062710.cms. Accessed on 25 June 2021.

7 Jasjit Singh, Defence from the Skies: 80 Years of the Indian Air Force , (New Delhi: KW Publisher, January 2013), Second Edition, Ch-8.

8 Sangeeta Thapliyal, “Contesting Mutual Security: India- Nepal Relations”, Observer Research Foundation, 26 June 2003. Accessible at https://www.orfonline.org/research/contesting-mutual-security-india-nepal-relations/. Accessed on 25 June 2021.

9 Ibid.

10Ganga B Thapa and Jan Sharma, “From Insurgency to Democracy: The Challenges of Peace and Democracy- Building in Nepal”, International Political Science Review, Vol. 30, No. 2 ,March 2009, Accessible at https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/0192512109102437. Accessed on 25 June 2021.

11 “1947 tripartite agreement on Gurkha soldiers ‘redundant’: Nepal Minister”, News Vibes of India, 31 July 2020. Accessible at https://newsvibesofindia.com/1947-tripartite-agreement-gurkha-soldiers-redundant-nepal-minister- 31081/ . Accessed on 25 June 2021.

12 Nihir R Nayak, “China’s Growing Military Ties with Nepal”, Indian Defence Review, 04 April 2017. Accessible at http://www.indiandefencereview.com/spotlights/chinas-growing-military-ties-with-nepal/ , Accessed on 27 June 2021.

13 Pramod Jaiswal, “Caught in The India-China Rivalry Policy Options for Nepal”, Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies, March 2014. Accessible at https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/178444/IB249-Pramod-NepalChinaIndia.pdf. Accessed on 27 June 2021.

14 Ibid.

15Ibid.

16 Christian Wagner, “The India-China Competition in the Himalayas: Nepal and Bhutan”, Italian Institute for International Political Studies, 15 November 2020. Accessible at https://www.ispionline.it/en/pubblicazione/india- china-competition-himalayas-nepal-and-bhutan-28258. Accessed on 28 June 2021.

17 “India resumes military aid to Nepal”, NDTV, updated on 24 October, 2013. Accessible at https://www.ndtv.com/india-news/india-resumes-military-aid-to-nepal-538798. Accessed on 28 June 2021.

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18 Sangeeta Thapliyal, “Political Developments in Nepal and the Chinese Involvement”, United Services Institute, India Journal, Vol CL 1, No 623, January 2021 -March 2021. Accessible athttps://usiofindia.org/publication/usi- journal/political-developments-in-nepal-and-the-chinese-involvement/. Accessed on 28 June 2021.

19 Darshana M Baruah, “Nepal Joined the Belt and Road: What Does That Mean for India?” , The Diplomat, 15 May 2017. Accessible at https://thediplomat.com/2017/05/nepal-joined-the-belt-and-road-what-does-that-mean- for-india/. , Accessed on 28 June 2021.

20 Jayadeva Ranade, “China rises in Nepal, eyes Lumbini”, The Sunday Guardian Live, 11 March 2018. Accessible at https://www.sundayguardianlive.com/news/13054-china-rises-nepal-eyes-lumbini. Accessed on 28 June 2021.

21 Ibid.

22 IANS, “Beijing funds a study on Gorkhas joining Indian Army”, The Daily Guardian, 18 August 2020. Accessible at https://thedailyguardian.com/beijing-funds-a-study-on-gorkhas-joining-indian-army/. Accessed on 29 June 2021.

23 Dipanjan Roy Chaudhury, “Nepal cracks down on ISI module”, The Economic Times, 10 February 2020. Accessible at https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/politics-and-nation/nepal-cracks-down-on-isi- module/articleshow/74055544.cms?utm_source=contentofinterest&utm_medium=text&utm_campaign=cppst. Accessed on 29 June 2021.

24 “Misuse of Nepal’s territory by Pakistan’s Intelligence Agencies to foment Terrorism”, European Foundation for South Asian Studies (EFSAS), July 2018. Accessible at https://www.efsas.org/publications/study-papers/misuse- of-nepal%E2%80%99s-territory-by-pakistan%E2%80%99s-intelligence-agencies-to-foment-terrorism/. Accessed on 29 June 2021.

25 Elizabeth Roche, “Indian Army Chief Naravane conferred honorary rank of General of Nepali Army”, The Mint, 05 November 2020. Accessible at https://www.livemint.com/news/india/indian-army-chief-naravane-conferred- honorary-rank-of-general-of-nepali-army-11604578448746.html. Accessed on 29 June 2021.

26 Sentinel Digital Desk, “Military diplomacy to tide over India-Nepal ties”, The Sentinel, 01 November 2020. Accessible at https://www.sentinelassam.com/topheadlines/military-diplomacy-to-tide-over-india-nepal-ties- 509799. Accessed on 29 June 2021.

27 Ibid.

28 “Protesters clash with riot police in Nepal over new constitution”, Deutsche Welle (DW), 16 May 2016. Accessible at https://www.dw.com/en/protesters-clash-with-riot-police-in-nepal-over-new-constitution/a- 19259832. Accessed on 29 June 2021.

29 Ritu Raj Subedi, “Can Military Diplomacy Reset Nepal-India Ties?”, The Rising Nepal, 18 October 2020. Accessible at https://risingnepaldaily.com/opinion/can-military-diplomacy-reset-nepal-india-ties. Accessed on 29 June 2021.

30 “Bhu Puu 2020”, Indian Embassy in Nepal, January 2020, Accessible at https://www.indembkathmandu.gov.in/docs/Bhu%20Puu%20Magazine%20final%202020.pdf. Accessed on 29 June 2021.

31 Ibid.

32 Ibid.

33 Arvind Dutta, “Role of India’s Defence Cooperation Initiatives in Meeting the Foreign Policy Goals”, IDSA, 03 July 2009. Accessible at https://www.idsa.in/system/files/jds_3_3_a dutta.pdf. Accessed on 02 July 2021.

34 Anil Gupta, “True to Their Tradition of Being India’s Last Bastion”, Voice of the Nation Organiser, 17 May 2021. Accessible at https://www.organiser.org/Encyc/2021/5/17/True-to-Their-Tradition-of-Being-Indias-Last- Bastion.html. Accessed on 03 July 2021.

CENTRE FOR LAND WARFARE STUDIES (CLAWS): ISSUE BRIEF

35 Himalayan News Service, “What does the PM have to say about encroachment by China?”, The Himalayan, 24 June 2020. Accessible at https://thehimalayantimes.com/nepal/what-does-the-pm-have-to-say-about- encroachment-by-china. Accessed on 10 July2021.

36 Ratnadeep Chakraborty, “Border disputes between China and Nepal”, Observer Research Foundation, 26 November 2020. Accessible at https://www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/border-disputes-between-china-and- nepal/. Accessed on 10 July 2021.

37 Sohini Nayak, “Nepal: Denying an undeniable border dispute with China”, Observer Research Foundation, 01 October 2020. Accessible at https://www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/nepal-denying-undeniable-border-dispute- china/. Accessed on 15 July 2021.

38 N.17.

39 Arun Budhathoki, “Nepal Restructures Its Army”, The Diplomat, 10 May 2021. Accessible at https://thediplomat.com/2021/05/nepal-restructures-its-army/. Accessed on 15 July 2021.

40 Ibid.

41 Jagadish C Pokharel, “NA’s Transition To Command Structure”, The Rising Daily, 26 April 2021. Accessible at https://risingnepaldaily.com/opinion/nas-transition-to-command-structure. Accessed on 15 July 2021.

42 “Summary of Prime Minister’s address to Constituent Assembly of Nepal (August 3, 2014)”, Ministry of External Affairs, India, 05 August 2014. Accessible at https://www.mea.gov.in/Speeches Statements.htm?dtl/23817/Summary+of+Prime+Min. Accessed on 16 July2021.

43 PIB, “Curtain raiser Indo-Nepal joint military Exercise SURYA KIRAN – XIV”, Ministry of Defence, India, 29 November 2019. Accessible at https://pib.gov.in/PressReleasePage.aspx?PRID=1594165. Accessed on 16 July 2021.

44 PTI, “Nepal to skip BIMSTEC military drill in India”, The Hindu, updated on 08 September 2018. Accessible at https://www.thehindu.com/news/international/nepal-to-skip-bimstec-military-drill-in-india/article24904586.ece. Accessed on 20 July 2021.

45 Geeta Mohan , “Nepal snubs India, refuses to join first military drill of BIMSTEC Nations in Pune”, India Today, 09 September 2018. Accessible at https://www.indiatoday.in/india/story/nepal-snubs-india-refuses-to-join-first- military-drill-of-bimstec-nations-in-pune-1335773-2018-09-09. Accessed on 21 July 2021.

46 HT Correspondent, “Nepal earthquake: India ends Op Maitri as foreign rescuers asked to leave”, Hindustan Times, 05 May 2015. Accessible at https://www.hindustantimes.com/india/nepal-earthquake-india-ends-op- maitri-as foreign-rescuers-asked-to-leave/story-iyo7QUKgsc1pAbWoW0YWLN.html. Accessed on 21 July 2021.

47 N.30.

48 Staff Writer. “India gifts Nepal Army one lakh doses of Covid-19 vaccine”, The Mint, updated on 29 March 2021. Accessible at https://www.livemint.com/news/india/india-gifts-nepal-army-one-lakh-doses-of-covid-19- vaccine-11616982078572.html. Accessed on 21 July 2021.

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