sign in sign up
<<
Home , Riyadh

05_PANORAMA_Geographical_Anuari_2016_EN.indd 237 1 War 1991 in (the revolts Gulf ses Arab the and andArabia, ), and regional cri- to Saudi contrast in , with relations excellent has ( homogeneous not is which of ception per the Iran, like threats Regional creation. GCC’s (1980-1988) against the of origin at the were it pitting war by the followed Iran of Republic Islamic the of advent the policeman, regional of role the played who Shah, its of ouster the lowing fol by Iran region the in generated fear the of Born and mistrust among its members. fear inspires it although contested, been never has pact the in role central Its role. apivotal played has Arabia ), Saudi and Oman , Emirates, Arab United Bahrain, Arabia, (Saudi peninsula the of monarchs Arab six the together brought which 1981 summit, 25 May on (GCC) Dhabi Abu at the Council Cooperation Gulf the of organism mental theSince creation of the and regional intergovern 14 on 2015.agreement July programme nuclear Iranian the of signature the with incomeback the and regional international arenas 2011 in movements Spring wave Arab of Iran’s and the since occurring changes the of emblematic is adynamic Such diplomacy. regional ventionist goals of Council’s the Gulf Cooperation new inter and motives the of stock takes contribution This (IRSEM), Institut derecherche stratégiquedel’écolemilitaire de défense desmonarchies delaPéninsule arabique” Programme Director – “Politiques desécuritéet Dazi-Héni Fatiha |The Euro-Mediterranean Overview PartnershipGeographical and Actors Other Spring? Driven by the Gulf States after the Arab Can We Speak of aNew Regional Order at IEP Lille. IEP at

Political analyst specializing in the monarchies of the , researcher at IRSEM (Paris) and professor of studies studies Arabic of professor and (Paris) IRSEM at researcher Council, Cooperation Gulf the of monarchies the in specializing analyst Political 1 - - - - and financial aid. aid. and financial eral or multilateral action military with humanitarian unilat combining interventionism by a hybrid tuted substi was power’ ‘soft religious and ner. Financial confused, often competing and disorganized man a power,’ in ‘hard pact’s emerged regional the ing embody tured binomial around the Saudi-Emirates The more aggressive diplomacy by struc the GCC, administration. Obama the under East Middle the ventionism and the decline of leadership in American inter to Iran’s increased aresponse as intended also to the Gulf States’ unprecedented interventionism, have led that Yemeni and crises, Syrian the with gether –, to nationals Shiite over 60% of face the in nority ami regime, dynastic Sunni the of survival the ened – Bahrain in particularly and , in revolts the is It are emblematic. dialogue, and 2013), mediation of apolicy on based (1995- Hamad Emir under Qatar of activism hard die the and arena Arab-Islamic the in weight able consider kingdom’s new. Saudi The nothing is East Middle the in activism diplomatic States’ Gulf The of? Diplomacy Consist Interventionist GCC New the Does What themaintain status political quo. to attempt an in years over 35 for heart at its been has Riyadh exacerbated. are troubles and threats regional as strengthened been has world, Arab the structure. This pact, which is the most long-lived in 2011)since constitute the for basis this regional where the uprising of the Shiite community threat community Shiite the of uprising the where ------09/09/2016 12:23:55

IEMed. Mediterranean Yearbook 2016 237 Geographical Overview | The EMP and Other Actors Panorama 05_PANORAMA_Geographical_Anuari_2016_EN.indd 238

IEMed. Mediterranean Yearbook 2016 238 Geographical Overview | The EMP and Other Actors Panorama sites/sciencespo.fr.ceri/files/art_fdh.pdf − − 2 6 5 4 3 Hezbollah, proxy, powerful its and Iran countering of act by the motivated all above is interventionism barding the population, this humanitarian-military against el-Assad’s Bashar regime, which is bom of protectingsponsibility the population Syrian re their emphasize and Riyadh when token, same the By groups. Islamist eradicating of a logic with was it Dawn, 2014 Operation of part as August in beginning Sisi President of side at the Libya in intervened Dhabi Abu when Nonetheless, − − GCC: the within agreement joint through derived not were goals wereThese separate interventions whose various La syrienne tragédie Fatiha Toby Toby Fatiha Karen E. E. Karen E. Karen itary interventionitary on a humanitarian basis. Nations in 2005 and consisting of deploying mil United the of Assembly General by the adopted to protect, responsibility the of doctrine scriptive 2011March pre the on NATO based in strikes, in UAE participated the and Qatar Libya, in And ofprinciple neutrality; to its true Oman, of exception the with GCC, the of rest by the enthusiasm less or more with backed and Dhabi by Abu supported decision 2015 26 on March a Saudi was coalition Sunni Arab- an with , started that In war the in principle;their solidarity expressed states member other the while line, ared is to tell there that order in troops Shield, only and Abu Dhabi Abu and Arabia Saudi only Shield, force, the Peninsulaand its military combined GCC the of banner the under campaign military 14 on 2011, March Bahrain, In a of guise the in inand ; hospitals camps refugee Syrian funding been has (UAE) Emirates Arab United the and it, undo can who anyone supporting been has and Tehran axis Saudi to wishes Arabia destroy the - while Brotherhood, Muslim by the dominated opposition an of interests the defending been 2011, of summer the since has , In Qatar M D D atthie azi azi Y Y oung oung - - H H s éni éni en , December 2013. , December Series/02 Paper Centre East Middle LSE London, GCC,” the of Interventionists Emerging . “The . The turn interventionist in Gulf States’ Foreign policies Confluences Méditerranée Confluences syrienne,” crise la dans Golfe du coopération de Conseil du monarchies des diplomaties . “Les . Sectarian Gulf: Bahrain and Saudi Arabia and the that Wasn’t that Spring Arab the and Arabia Saudi and Bahrain Gulf: . Sectarian : Une coopération de sécurité et de défense renforcée? défense de et sécurité de coopération : Une Golfe du coopération de Conseil Le , 89, Spring 2014, L’Harmattan, pp. 81-93. pp. 2014, L’Harmattan, Spring , 89, 2 , September 2011. 4 3 sent sent - - - - crisis. legitimacy political aserious undergoing been since has dynasty whose Bahrain, of exception notable the with populations, by some experienced being saturation” “revolt of phenomenon to the due fect ef Spring Arab the feeling not are regimes Gulf The Interventionism? GCC’s the behind Main Reason – the Counter-Revolution the Saudi TemptationThe Spearhead to plomacy. di of its mediation antithesis the interventionism, to Europe gas natural liquefied its to pipe designed Syria in ments tionary flag. Even Qatar, so quick to follow its own own its to follow quick so Even Qatar, flag. tionary willinglyarchies interact under the counter-revolu mon other The pact. GCC the of name the in so do to care taking though revolts, Arab to the reaction the of leader of role the assumed has Arabia Saudi in the East Middle the leadership decline of American Iran’s interventionism increased and also intended to aresponse as unprecedented interventionism, that have to led the States’ Gulf with the Syrian and Yemeni crises, together in Bahrain particularly isthe revoltsIt in Egypt, and – motivation nancial another in qualifying the situations as chaos. as situations the qualifying in another one to outdo elites ruling the Yemen, incite Libya) Iraq, (Syria, conflicts in deadlock the and Egypt) protectors of the Assad regime. For Qatar, For regime. Assad the of protectors , www.agsiw.org 6 Tension in countries in (Tunisia, transition , issue paper 4, June 2016. June 4, paper , issue – is a relevant factor in its military military its in factor a relevant – is , Stanford, SUP, 2013. , Stanford, in view of its significant invest significant its of view in , www.sciencespo.fr/ceri/ 5 the fi the : ------09/09/2016 12:23:56 05_PANORAMA_Geographical_Anuari_2016_EN.indd 239 trast to the Obama Doctrine. Obama to the trast 10 9 8 O 7 with the “leadership revolts Spring Arab the on disagreements from arises launched in 2011 March under the sovereign Abdullah, Saudi Arabia’s most diplomacy, offence-oriented Yemeni or crises. Bahraini the on silence its hence opposition, up put never agenda, diplomatic called their ambassadors on 5 March 2014, but Riyadh endorsed reconciliation on the following 16 November. following the on reconciliation endorsed 2014, Riyadh but 5March on ambassadors their called disburse financial aid to the amount of US$ 10 billion over six years to Bahrain and Oman. Oman. and Bahrain to years six over 10 billion US$ of amount the to aid financial disburse Jeffrey See sectors (defence, security and trade at the GCC’s GCC’s at the trade and security (defence, sectors certain in cooperation to expanded agreed but ture prema it found They by surprise. pact the in chies monar other the took initiative this Nonetheless, and counteract Iran’s growing influence. regional times revolutionary the to address order in world Arab the of monarchies Sunni eight to the unite Abu Dhabi) maintain close reflected ties, the desire and Riyadh (above all countries GCC the whom with Jordan, and to include appeal The region. the in dynamic curity ase to initiate quickest the and actors pivotal two GCC’s the Dhabi, Abu and Riyadh between accord by common undertaken actually was GCC, the of seal collegiate the under forth put initiative, first The 2013). (December Union Gulf into a GCC the turning advocating second the and 2011), (May Morocco and Jordan i.e. monarchies, Arab other two the to include GCC the to expand launched twoinitiatives, regional the designed first tempo of its interventionist diplomacy, Riyadh new the to establish and way inauguration By of East. Middle the in to reengage Washington push to order in period post-Obama the in itself positions Riyadh Iran’s comeback, of irreversibility the of aware hand, other the On influence. regional Iran’s growing to counteract desire the being denominator mon com sole the even , Jordan, and Egypt, countriesGCC and hybrid regional actors such as the of help player, the with central the as to emerge hopes Riyadh hand, one the On double. is goal The “guardian,” the so-called Salman Doctrine, gional diplomacy emancipated from the American are inaugurated kingdom the that Salman King under 2015, In was it Obama. to President dear East Middle

bai To ease social tension and prevent the worst unrest, the wealthiest four GCC countries (Saudi Arabia, UAE, Qatar and Kuwait) decided to to decided Kuwait) and Qatar UAE, Arabia, (Saudi countries GCC four wealthiest the unrest, worst the prevent and tension social To ease Iran. with dialogue and intelligence...) strikes, (drone action remote engagement, military decreased , towards aturn as defined be can It Nawaf See region. the in relations power of balance the restore to order in “proxies” its and Iran isolating of means developing of consists It Qatar’s pro-Muslim Brotherhood approach to Egypt caused a diplomatic crisis between Doha, Riyadh, and Abu Dhabi, who re who Dhabi, Abu and Manama Riyadh, Doha, between crisis adiplomatic caused Egypt to approach Brotherhood pro-Muslim Qatar’s d : “The Salman Doctrine: The Saudi Reply to Obama’s Weakness,” The National Interest Weakness,” Obama’s to Reply Saudi The Doctrine: Salman : “The G ol d berg : “The Obama Doctrine,” The Atlantic Doctrine,” Obama : “The

from

behind” approach in the 8

7 by con by , April 2016. , April ------Arab revolts led it to remain silent. silent. to it remain led revolts Arab to the regard with position out-of-step its Qatar, to 1990. regard With August in invasion Kuwait the after Hussein Saddam with solidarity its pressed ex had which Jordan, of liability to the due tions humanitarian and financial aid or multilateral action with military interventionism combining unilateral was substituted by ahybrid and religiousFinancial power’ ‘soft Qatar’s diplomatic isolation Thus, quo. status political monarchies’ the fect af not do they as insofar GCC the within proaches ap diverging accommodated thus has Arabia Saudi nowadays. advantage take can GCC the only which of quo status political the and stability the to maintain all above action takes Riyad case, any In to hegemony. temptation Saudi a as perceived being this maintained, was project (10-11 State of 2013) Union December Gulf the if Heads of Summit GCC 34th eve the of the on ance alli to the leave even threatening virulence, greatest the with reacted Oman monarchies. other by the 2011, March since sion rejected was initiative this supervi Saudi under Bahrain, of exception the With union. into apolitical GCC the to turn ambition by its generated rejection the was failure Riyadh’s other fare states. wel endangered with dealing already youth national for situation atense aggravate could which market, labour GCC to the Jordan and Morocco of entry the to hostility their expressed Oman and Bahrain Thus, 2011). 19-20 State, of Heads of December Summit 2017 until staggered (32nd GCC 5billion, US$ of amount to up the aid financial of allocation the foreign ministerial affairs meetings), together with 9 Kuwait likewise its expressed reserva , 30 March 2016. March , 30 10 has consisted of pun of consisted has ------09/09/2016 12:23:56

IEMed. Mediterranean Yearbook 2016 239 Geographical Overview | The EMP and Other Actors Panorama 05_PANORAMA_Geographical_Anuari_2016_EN.indd 240

IEMed. Mediterranean Yearbook 2016 240 Geographical Overview | The EMP and Other Actors Panorama Papers, 1. London, LSE Centre, April 2015. April Centre, East Middle LSE 1. London, Papers, 11 12 uprisings. wave the Arab of with occurring changes the with to deal by Riyadh taken direction the from learned to be lesson main the to be seems tendency authoritarian dynamic of the countries. GCC This the to up it step have incited Riyadh’s failures reinforcement pretext for the GCC’s security a more as destabilization, serves the origin as ofArabia regional which ispresentedIran, by Saudi the monarchies. to alternative an constitutes project political whose Egypt, in Brotherhood Muslim the by approaching particularly line, red the crossed having for it ishing country’s Constitution. See Fatiha bique,” Hasni Hasni bique,” Madawi Madawi

The Kuwaiti Parliament rejected ratification of this agreement on two separate occasions, considering certain amendments contrary to the the to contrary amendments certain considering occasions, separate two on agreement this of ratification rejected Parliament Kuwaiti The A 11 l - A R

bi a s d hee i (ed.): d Collected States. Arab Gulf of Intervention of Politics New The Gain?”, without Loss Policy: Foreign Arabia’s . “Saudi Monde arabe D azi : Entre transition et implosion - H éni . “Printemps arabes et Résurgence sécuritaire des monarchies dynastiques de la péninsule Ara , Geneva, Erik Bonnier éditions, 2015, Chapter XII, pp. 246-270. pp. XII, 2015, Chapter éditions, Bonnier Erik , Geneva, emancipated from tutelage. American States Gulf the of interventionism regional new the justifying nationalism ahyper of exacerbation the and reinforcement security GCC’s the for text apre as more serves destabilization, regional of gin ori the as Arabia by Saudi presented is which Iran, balance, On peers. by its contested often premacy, su supposed its than rather GCC the of leader as place its Arabia Saudi lends that quo status cal politi the of protector and context regional chaotic a in citadel abeleaguered of guardian of role its is It Saudi and Emirati human rights activists). also but ones, Bahraini and Kuwaiti the (particularly societies the among not but leaders, GCC among sensus on the standardization of policy security acon was There involved. countries the of semble a strengthening of in repressive measures the- en states, with the notable exception of Kuwait, of exception notable the with states, 2014 January member in the of by five ratification 14 on 2012 Riyadh in November agreement its and The signature of the GCC’s reinforced security 12 led to led ------09/09/2016 12:23:56