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The Specter of War Between Saudi Arabia and Iran

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The Specter of War Between Saudi Arabia and Iran BEYOND THE PROXY POWDER KEG: THE SPECTER OF WAR BETWEEN SAUDI ARABIA AND IRAN BILAL Y. SAAB MAY 2018 POLICY PAPER 2-2018 CONTENTS * KEY POINTS * 1 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY * 4 IRAN AND SAUDI ARABIA: A MILITARY COMPARISON * 9 IRANIAN DOMESTIC AND FOREIGN MILITIA * 10 HYPOTHETICAL SCENARIO * 14 RISK OF WAR IS REAL * 16 SAUDI ARABIA’S POLITICAL-STRATEGIC GOALS * 17 SAUDI ARABIA’S MILITARY STRATEGY * 21 SAUDI ARABIA’S TACTICS AND CAPABILITIES * 25 IRAN’S POLITICAL-STRATEGIC GOALS * 26 IRAN’S MILITARY STRATEGY * 26 IRAN’S TACTICS AND CAPABILITIES * 31 DILEMMAS OF RIYADH, TEHRAN, AND WASHINGTON © The Middle East Institute * 36 ABOUT THE AUTHOR The Middle East Institute * 36 ABOUT THE MIDDLE EAST INSTITUTE 1319 18th Street NW Washington, D.C. 20036 KEY POINTS * An Iran-Saudi Arabia war is unlikely, but it is now more likely than ever before. * A military confrontation between Saudi Arabia and Iran should command respect and inspire concern because it could cause tremendous harm to an already volatile Middle East and possibly to the global economy. * Iran seems to have an upper hand in a direct military confrontation with Saudi Arabia because of its combat experience, geography, manpower, strategic depth, and greater cost tolerance. However, none of these attributes give Iran any decisive advantages in a contest with Saudi Arabia. Saudi Arabia is neither helpless nor without military options. * While it is easy to start a war with Iran, it is anything but to finish it. Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman would have to think hard about the capabilities of the Saudi military and the resilience of Saudi society before embarking on such a risky course. * In any war dynamic between Iran and Saudi Arabia, U.S. military intervention or support would be the most decisive exogenous factor for both Riyadh and Tehran. * The United States has a security commitment to Saudi Arabia, but the extent to which Washington can tolerate subtle Iranian aggression against the kingdom that falls below the threshold of conventional warfare, while potentially upending Saudi stability, is unclear. Photo: AFP/Getty Images deliberate and well-thought-out EXECUTIVE decisions by either side, when in reality SUMMARY it is more likely to erupt following accidents and escalatory actions. he predominant view of the A military confrontation between Saudi U.S. foreign policy community Arabia and Iran should command is that the probability of direct T respect and inspire concern because military conflict between Saudi Arabia it could cause tremendous harm to and Iran is small, largely because of an already volatile Middle East and these antagonists’ preferences and possibly to the global economy. Such capabilities, as well as the U.S. military a war could also intensify religious- deterrent in the Gulf. However, this view sectarian tensions across the Middle might be mistaken for four reasons. East and beyond, leading to more First, it fails to appreciate Riyadh’s intractable civil wars. evolving national security On the surface, Iran seems to have considerations, which might lead it an upper hand in a direct military under certain circumstances to initiate confrontation with Saudi Arabia military action against Iran. Second, it is because of its combat experience, insufficiently sensitive to the leadership geography, manpower, strategic depth, transitions that have occurred in Riyadh and greater cost tolerance. That said, and Washington. Third, it incorrectly none of these attributes give Iran any judges Saudi Arabia’s understanding decisive advantages in a contest with of its own military capabilities. Fourth, Saudi Arabia. Iran would still have to it assesses that war between Saudi consider serious trade-offs, operate Arabia and Iran will be a result of with various constraints, and deal with 1 a number of real challenges at every Mohammed bin Salman is trying to step of its decision-making process. project an image of a responsible Balancing between conventional and reformist Saudi leader, initiating warfare against Saudi Arabia and a conventional war with Iran would uncontrollable escalation that might very much run counter to that goal. lead to U.S. intervention would be A military conflict with Iran would both absolutely crucial and especially also be a major distraction from the difficult. crown prince’s top priority—domestic It is true that Iran survived eight years modernization—and pose a serious of war with Iraq almost alone in 1980– challenge to the success of Saudi 88, but that does not guarantee it could Vision 2030, on which Crown Prince do the same today. Iran would also Mohammed’s credibility rests. have to weigh the ramifications of war Furthermore, while it is easy to start with Saudi Arabia against its broader a war with Iran, it is anything but to interests and agenda in the region. finish it. That is an important reason Iran sacrificed a lot to carve its sphere why Washington has been reluctant of influence, stretching from Beirut to to pursue that option throughout its Baghdad and with a foothold in Yemen. problematic relationship with Iran. Iran’s main interest is the consolidation Crown Prince Mohammed would have of those gains. An escalated conflict to think hard about the capabilities of with the Saudis might risk serious the Saudi military and the resilience Iranian overstretch—militarily, politically of Saudi society before embarking on and economically. such a risky course. Saudi Arabia would have to struggle It is obvious that in any war dynamic with some tough choices of its own between Iran and Saudi Arabia, U.S. too. At a time when Crown Prince military intervention or support would 2 be the most decisive exogenous factor and manage to avoid conventional for both Riyadh and Tehran. The U.S. escalation, could Riyadh still count on and its allies have every interest in Washington to intervene? averting a military conflict between On the one hand, the U.S. prefers to Saudi Arabia and Iran. But Washington avoid war with Iran, assuming that would have some difficult decisions to Tehran does not blatantly cross red make, and possibly some juggling to lines concerning its nuclear program, do should direct hostilities between the safety of American troops in the Riyadh and Tehran erupt. region, freedom of navigation in the Every American president since Gulf, and the regime survival of U.S. Franklin Roosevelt has committed to regional partners. On the other hand, ensuring the safety and security of the extent to which Washington can Saudi Arabia. Even Barack Obama, tolerate subtle Iranian aggression who lacked any affinity with the against the kingdom that falls below Saudis, reaffirmed America’s security the threshold of conventional warfare commitment to Saudi Arabia. When Iraq but that could still upend Saudi stability invaded Kuwait and threatened Saudi is unclear. Arabia in 1991, Washington assembled But the search for clarity does not have the most powerful coalition in history to be purely an American exercise. to act decisively against Saddam and Indeed, it should not be. Such a search thus protect the kingdom. There is no needs to be a joint effort between compelling reason why the U.S. would allies. Nonetheless, the reality is that not do the same today if Iran overtly Washington does not consult nearly attacked Saudi Arabia, which was the enough with its Arab partners about destination of President Donald Trump’s the scenarios and contingencies that inaugural international trip. That is might lead to war. All talk and strategy precisely why U.S. Central Command is is centered on deterrence, but should stationed in the region: to act quickly deterrence fail, what happens next? and authoritatively against threats There is almost no joint planning when to U.S. interests and the security of it comes to mutual threats beyond America’s partners. transnational terrorism. But given that Iran’s leader, Ayatollah U.S. and Saudi interests would be Ali Khamenei, probably will not be well served by a meaningful and rolling his tanks into Saudi Arabia and broad dialogue that touches on some seeking to capture territory, how would of these difficult matters from both Washington react to Iranian violence perspectives. Needless to say, it is against the kingdom that falls short better to have that kind of conversation of outright, conventional aggression? before a military crisis erupts with Iran. If the Iranians play their cards right 3 IRAN AND SAUDI ARABIA: A MILITARY COMPARISON Overview Iran Saudi Arabia Defense Budget 2016 - 13.729 50.165 Constant 2018 USD billion Percent of GDP 3.39% 7.47% Defense Budget 2017 – 16.201 52.098 Constant 2018 USD billion Percent of GDP 3.85% 7.55% Defense Budget 2018 – 17.393 56.000 Constant 2018 USD billion Percent of GDP 3.95% 7.93% Active Personnel 398,000 129,500 Active IRGC and SANG 145,000 (plus IRGC Air 100,000 Force—unknown size) Army Iran Saudi Arabia Strength 350,000 75,000 Primary Combat Units 4 Infantry divisions 1 Guards brigade 4 Independent Infantry 6 Mechanized infantry Brigades brigades 4 Armored divisions 3 Armor brigades 3 Independent armored 8 Artillery battalions brigades 1 Airborne brigade 7 Artillery regiments 2 Special forces commando divisions 3 Independent special forces brigades 1 Special forces brigade 1 Airborne brigade 4 Army Iran Saudi Arabia Armored Vehicles 480 T-72M1 (T-72S) main 373 M1A2S main battle tank battle tanks AMX-30S main battle tank 200 Safir-74 (T-72Z) main 460 M60A3 main battle battle tanks tank T-55 main battle tanks 570 AMX-10P armored T-54C main battle tanks infantry
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