• Challenges and opportunities • Trends to address • New concepts for: – Offensive sea control – Sea‐based AAW – Weapons development – Increasing offensive sea control capacity – Addressing defensive and constabulary missions • Capability and program implications Text • In 2001, the Navy planned a new surface warfare approach – New family of CG(X), DD(X), LCS – Employing “Network‐centric warfare” – All three ships now cancelled/truncated • Navy has an opportunity to implement new surface warfare concept – Final specifications for Flight III DDG‐51 – Concept and design of follow‐on SSC and modifications to LCS – Phased modernization of remaining CGs – New weapons and sensors • This study proposes a plan focused on: – Large and small surface combatants – Results possible by mid‐2020s

China the “pacing challenge” but not the only, or most likely, A2/AD threat the surface forces will face Iran shows less capable militaries can combine geography and “fire and forget” weapons in effective A2/AD network Number of Active Conflicts 40

35 30 25

20

15 10

5

1950 1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 Types of Active Conflicts 100% 9% 13% 20% 28% 80% 38%

53% 60% 57% 67% 40% 67% 55% 16% 20% 23% 23% 13% 0% 6% 5% 7% 1946 1961 1976 1991 2006 Extrasystemic Conflict Interstate Conflict Internal Conflict Internationalized internal conflict Proxy, paramilitary, and indirect conflicts on the rise Historical Budget Authorities 900,000 Army Navy Air Force Defense Wide OIF/OEF DRAWDOWN 800,000 $ 700,000 DoD‐wide COLD WAR DRAWDOWN 600,000 FY2015

500,000 VIETNAM DRAWDOWN of KOREA DRAWDOWN

400,000 Air Force

300,000

Millions 200,000 Navy

100,000 Army 0

Historical Budget Authorities as Percent of Total DoN Budget Authority 100% Other Spending 90%

80% Category

70% R&D and Procurement by 60%

50% Budget 40% Operations and Maintenance of 30%

20% MILPERS

Percent 10% DoN Share of Healthcare 0%

Budgets unlikely to rise; pressure continues on R&D and procurement

Cold War “Outer Air Battle” – Enabled carriers to approach within striking distance of Russia – Surface fleet’s contribution was “Up, Out and Down” – Ships & aircraft able to engage Soviet bombers outside anti‐ship missile range Combatant Combatant Enemy Enemy Range: Range: Variation in Y-values is for illustration only, Kosar C-701 C-801 C-801

not intended to Nasr reflect relative altitude Karus C-704 ** Extended-range Harpoon Block variantI previ * RGM-84L, a Harpoon Block II variant, is the onl NavalNavy Strike IHS Jane’s Missile International. range from Tondar 0n 0 m10n 0 m20n 300 nm 250 nm 200 nm 150 nm 100 nm 50 nm 0n 0 m10n 0 m20n 300 nm 250 nm 200 nm 150 nm 100 nm 50 nm Surface-Launched Missile Combatants to U.S.Surface Surface-Launched Threat ouslyin U.S.and foreignservice. y variant in service with theU.S. Navy. All other ranges from IHS Jane’ All ranges from other BrahMos U.S. Surface Combatant SS-N-19 s Defence: database.Weapons • Surface combatants will conduct bulk of sea control – Subs, carriers, amphibious ships conducting power projection in future scenarios • Defeat enemy weapon launchers, not just enemy weapons

BAMS

SM-6

Future Anti-Ship Missile Secure Data Link

DDG

Future Anti-Submarine TAGOS Weapon Mission Missile Number Long‐range SM‐616 100 Defensive AAW

90 Mid‐range SM‐232 Defensive AAW

80 ESSM 32 (8 cells) BMD SM‐36 70 Strike Tomahawk 24

60 SUW Harpoon 8 non‐VLS S‐L‐S SS‐L‐S ASW VLA 10 50 Engagements

40 Successful 30

20

10

0 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0

Defending Missile Single Shot Pk • Shift to a single, dense defensive AAW layer – Smaller interceptors; just as capable and more numerous as longer range – Acknowledges challenges against OTH targets – Enables integration of lasers, railgun and electronic warfare • Long‐range interceptors used for offensive AAW

ASBM EMRG

30 nm

Defensive AAW

ASCM Salvo 5 nm Ship Self-Defense

RAM Laser

LCS ESSM DDG JHSV CIWS LCS • Laser on some Flight III DDG‐51 – 300‐500 kW able to conduct air defense – Needed power and cooling (~1500kW) too high for other ships – Smaller laser (~60‐100 kW) could be used for counter‐ISR, counter‐UAV

• EM railgun on JHSV, DDG‐1000 – 32 MJ able to conduct air defense, strike – Power requirement of 17MW – 64 MJ EMRG on DDG‐1000 for strike

• Shift defensive AAW to ~30 nm range – Smaller ESSM‐like interceptor – EW systems – Laser – Electromagnetic railgun Mission Missile (replacement) Number • More capacity needed Offensive AAW SM‐6 32 from each VLS cell Defensive AAW ESSM Blk II 96 (24 cells) BMD SM‐36• Emphasize: Strike Tomahawk (NGLAW) 24 – relevant capability SUW Harpoon (LRASM) 8 non‐VLS – multi‐mission applicability ASW VLA (None) 10 – smaller size; > 1 per cell

• Planned solutions are large, single‐ mission weapons

• No ASW weapon able to outrange sub‐launched anti‐ship missiles

Getting the most out of the ship’s main battery –the VLS magazine Mission Current Missile Number Future Missile Number

Offensive AAW SM‐616SM‐642

Defensive AAW SM‐232ESSMBlk II 96 (24 cells)

ESSM 32 (8 cells) BMD SM‐36 SM‐34 Strike Tomahawk 24 LRASM 18 SUW Harpoon 8 non‐VLS LRASM / SM 18/42

ASW VLA 10 New ASW Missile 8

Multi‐mission LRASM Long‐range ASROC SM‐6 for offense ESSM for defense 25

20

Phased Mod CGs CGs Count

15 of Ship

CG‐47 Replacement Number 10

Operating CG 63‐73 5 Operating CG 52‐62

0 FY15 FY16 FY17 FY18 FY19 FY20 FY21 FY22 FY23 FY24 FY25 FY26 FY27 FY28 FY29 FY30 FY31 FY32 FY33 FY34 FY35 FY36 FY37 FY38 FY39 FY40 FY41 FY42 FY43 FiscalFiscal Year Year

Cruiser phased modernization needed for offensive sea control, air defense commander capacity Misawa Air Base

THAAD Batteries PAC-3 Batteries Tokyo Iwakuni Naval Sasebo Air Station Naval Base Yokosuka Naval Base

Shore‐based BMD systems should replace BMD ships in defense of fixed Cruiser phased modernization needed for offensive sea control, air defense locations overseas commander 150 to 300 nm range engagement

Future Anti‐Ship Missile Mutually-Supporting Air Defenses

Secure Data Link

Variable Depth Sonar Future Anti‐Submarine Weapon Passive Listening

Passive Towed Array

Enabling small surface combatants able to contribute to offensive sea control with CGs and DDGs or on their own 160 Follow on SSC

SSC reqmt LCS 140 MCM

120 PC

FFG 100 Large Surface Combatant reqmt DDG‐1000 Combatants

80 BMD stations Future Large Surface Combatant Surface DDG‐51 Flight III of 60 CSG escorts DDG‐51 Flight IIA

Number 40 DDG‐51 Flight II

DDG‐51 Flight I 20 CG

0 FY14 FY15 FY16 FY17 FY18 FY19 FY20 FY21 FY22 FY23 FY24 FY25 FY26 FY27 FY28 FY29 FY30 FY31 FY32 FY33 FY34 FY35 FY36 FY37 FY38 FY39 FY40 FY41 FY42 FY43 FY44

Growing SSC shortfall requires new approaches to escort, training and security missions so CGs and DDGs can focus on offense LCS Procurement • Modify LCS to be the follow‐on SSC FY05 FY06 FY07 FY08 FY09 FY10 FY11 – Only one variant 1100222• Equip for defensive AAW, ASW and FY11 FY12 FY13 FY14 FY15 FY16 FY17 SUW missions 4443333 – VLS (24 cell) Follow‐on SSC Procurement – 3D radar (not SPY) – ASW mission package FY19 FY20 FY21 FY22 FY23 FY24 FY25 – Same gun 2333333• Upgrade selected LCS with VLS • Evolve to dedicated LCS crews – Forward base 16 LCS • Upgrade selected LCS with VLS • Consider buying more JHSV 4 LCS 8LCS 8 LCS 8LCS

4 LCS

117 117 117 117 117 117 117 117 Days Days Days Days Days Days Days Days LCS 1 Deployed Homeport Deployed Homeport LCS 3 Homeport Deployed LCS forward 60‐120 days 30 days Crew LCS 1Off LCS 3LCS 1Off LCS 3LCS 1Off 101 Hull Hull Hull LCS CONUS 120‐210 days 180 days Crew Off LCS 3LCS 1Off LCS 3LCS 1Off LCS 3 102 Hull Hull Hull

Crew LCS 3LCS 1Off LCS 3LCS 1Off LCS 3LCS 1 103 Hull Hull

Shift LCS to dedicated crews; base some in today’s overseas SSC ports • Separate mission packages from LCS program – Whole MCM mission package – Whole SUW mission package – Parts of ASW mission package

• Add new mission packages – Electronic warfare – Humanitarian assistance – Maritime security

• Consider expanding non‐ combatant fleet – Less expensive option for some operations in low‐threat environments • Challenges demand a new approach to surface warfare – Networked family of CG(X), DD(X), LCS no longer viable – Access threats increasing defensive demands on all surface combatants – Instability will increase demands for training, cooperation and security – Budgets will preclude new designed until 2030s

• Navy has opportunity to implement a new surface fleet concept – Flight III DDG‐51 – Follow‐on SSC and modifications to LCS – Phased modernization of CGs – New weapons and sensors (LRASM, AMDR variants, ESSM Block II, SEWIP) – Potential of the National Fleet

• Surface fleet must refocus on offensive sea control – CGs and DDGs equipped and available to defeat enemy platforms – Restore ability of SSCs to do escort, training and constabulary missions

Restoring the surface fleet’s ability to gain sea control, protect non‐ combatant ships, train allies and partners, and secure sea lanes