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Ballistic, Cruise Missile, and Missile Defense Systems: Trade and Significant Developments, July-October 1995

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Ballistic, Cruise Missile, and Missile Defense Systems: Trade and Significant Developments, July-October 1995 Missile Developments BALLISTIC, CRUISE MISSILE, AND MISSILE DEFENSE SYSTEMS: TRADE AND SIGNIFICANT DEVELOPMENTS, JULY-OCTOBER 1995 CONTENTS OVERVIEW, 158 BRAZIL CROATIA Saudi Arabia, 167 Internal Developments, 162 Internal Developments, 165 Taiwan, 167 AFGHANISTAN with with Internal Developments, 160 GERMANY Argentina, 160 Russia, 165 with Internal Developments, 167 France, Germany, Italy, United States, 165 Pakistan, 160 with Russia, and U.S., 163 CZECH REPUBLIC Australia and U.S., 160 ARGENTINA Germany, 164 with Brazil, 163, 164 with India, Israel, and PRC, 164 Belarus, NATO, Russia, and Canada, Netherlands, Spain, Brazil, 160 MTCR, 181 Ukraine, 161 and U.S., 164 Russia, 164 AUSTRALIA France, Italy, and United Ukraine, 164 ECUADOR Internal Developments, 160 Kingdom, 166 United States, 164 with with France, Italy, and U.S., 166 Azores and Slovakia, 161 Germany and U.S., 160 BRUNEI India, 167 Russia, 160 Internal Developments, 164 EGYPT Iraq, 168 Russia and Sweden, 161 with Japan and U.S., 168 CANADA Kuwait, 166 MTCR, 181 AZORES with PRC, 166 Netherlands and NATO, 168 with Germany, Netherlands, Spain, Spain, 166 Netherlands, NATO, and Ecuador and Slovakia, 161 and U.S., 164 United States, 166 U.S., 168 BAHRAIN CHILE Netherlands and U.S., 168 EUROPEAN UNION Internal Developments, 161 with Russia, 168 Internal Developments, 166 Mauritius, 164 Syria, 168 BELARUS United Kingdom, 165 FRANCE United States, 168 with with Czech Republic, NATO, COMMONWEALTH OF HUNGARY Brazil, 163 Russia, and Ukraine, 161 INDEPENDENT STATES with CIS, South Africa, and Iran, 161 (CIS) Romania, 168 U.S., 165 Russia, 161 with Iraq, 166 INDIA United States, 162 France, South Africa, and Germany, Italy, and United Internal Developments, 169 U.S., 165 BOSNIA Kingdom, 166 with with COLOMBIA Germany, Italy, and Brazil, Israel, and PRC, 164 Russia and Serbia, 162 Internal Developments, 165 U.S., 166 Germany, 167 Iran and Russia, 162 with Italy, 167 Israel, 171 Russia, 165 Kuwait, 167 MTCR, 181 Pakistan and U.S., 172 156 The Nonproliferation Review/Winter 1996 Missile Developments PRC, 172 KAZAKHSTAN Germany, Netherlands, and RUSSIA Russia, 172 with U.S., 168 Internal Developments, 189 United Kingdom, 172 Russia and Ukraine, 180 with NORTH KOREA United States, 172 Australia, 160 KUWAIT Internal Developments, 182 Australia and Sweden, 161 IRAN with with Belarus, 161 Internal Developments, 173 Egypt, 166 Iran, 173 Belarus, Czech Republic, with France, 167 Iran and South Korea, 173 NATO, and Ukraine, 161 Belarus, 161 Russia, 180 PRC, 183 Bosnia and Iran, 162 Bosnia and Russia, 162 United States, 180 Russia, 184 Bosnia and Serbia, 162 Iraq and Sudan, 173 South Korea, 184 LIBYA Brazil, 163, 164 Libya, 173 United States, 184 Internal Developments, 180 Colombia, 165 North Korea, 173 with NORWAY Croatia, 165 North Korea and South Iran, 173 with Germany, 168 Korea, 173 Iraq, 175 Russia, Ukraine, and India, 172 PRC, 173 U.S., 184 Iraq, 175 United States, 173 LITHUANIA Kazakhstan and Ukraine, 180 with OMAN IRAQ Kuwait, 180 Russia, 180 Internal Developments, 184 Internal Developments, 174 Lithuania, 180 with MALAYSIA PAKISTAN MTCR, 181 France, 166 Internal Developments, 180 Internal Developments, 184 North Korea, 184 Germany, 168 with with Norway, Ukraine, and Iran and Sudan, 173 Italy, 178 Afghanistan, 160 U.S., 184 Libya, 175 United Kingdom, 180 India and U.S., 172 PRC, 188 Russia, 175 MTCR, 181 South Korea, 192 MAURITIUS Ukraine, 175 PRC, 185 Syria, 192 with PRC and U.S., 185 Ukraine, 192 ISRAEL Chile, 164 South Africa, 185 Ukraine and U.S., 193 Internal Developments, 175 United States, 185 United States, 193 with MISSILE TECHNOLOGY CONTROL REGIME Brazil, India, and PRC, 164 PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF SAUDI ARABIA (MTCR) India, 171 CHINA (PRC) with MTCR Developments, 181 PRC, 176 Internal Developments, 186 France, 167 South Korea, 176 NETHERLANDS with SERBIA Syria, 176 with Brazil, India, and Israel, 164 with Thailand, 177 Canada, Germany, Spain, Egypt, 166 Bosnia and Russia, 162 United States, 177 and U.S., 164 India, 172 Iran, 173 SLOVAKIA ITALY Germany and NATO, 168 Israel, 176 with with Germany, NATO, and North Korea, 183 Azores and Ecuador, 161 Brazil, 163 U.S., 168 Pakistan, 185 France, 167 Germany and U.S., 168 SOUTH AFRICA Pakistan and U.S., 185 France, Germany, and Internal Developments, 194 NEW FORUM Russia, 188 United Kingdom, 166 with Internal Developments, 182 Taiwan, 188 France, Germany, and CIS, France, and U.S., 165 with United States, 188 U.S., 166 South Korea, 182 MTCR, 181 Malaysia, 178 QATAR Pakistan, 185 NORTH ATLANTIC Internal Developments, 189 JAPAN TREATY ORGANIZATION SOUTH KOREA Internal Developments, 178 (NATO) ROMANIA Internal Developments, 194 with with with with Germany and U.S., 168 Belarus, Czech Republic, Hungary, 168 Iran and North Korea, 173 South Korea, 179 Russia, and Ukraine, 161 Israel, 176 United States, 179 Germany and Netherlands, Japan, 179 168 MTCR, 181 The Nonproliferation Review/Winter 1996 157 Missile Developments New Forum, 182 UNITED ARAB EMIRATES North Korea, 184 (UAE) Russia, 192 with OVERVIEW United States, 194 United States, 197 SPAIN UNITED KINGDOM International endeavors to limit the spread of missile with with technology appeared to move from strength to strength in Canada, Germany, Nether- Chile, 165 October when Russia and South Africa attended the 10th lands, and U.S., 164 France, Germany, and Plenary Meeting of the Missile Technology Control Egypt, 166 Italy, 166 Regime (MTCR) for the first time as full members . India, 172 SUDAN Brazil’s membership was also approved at the meeting. Malaysia, 180 with These new memberships are supported by each state’s United States, 198 Iran and Iraq, 173 adoption of regulations designed to control the trade in UNITED STATES technology that could contribute to the spread of missiles SWEDEN Internal Developments, 198 capable of delivering weapons of mass destruction. Be- with with Australia and Russia, 161 yond the regime’s expansion to 28 states, the MTCR’s Australia and Germany, 160 technical annex has also been updated to take into ac- SYRIA Belarus, 162 count new technical developments. Dialogue with states Internal Developments, 195 Brazil, 163, 164 outside the MTCR has also been accorded priority, with with Canada, Germany, Nether- an eye to promoting voluntary adherence to the regime’s Germany, 168 lands, and Spain, 164 Israel, 176 CIS, France, and South guidelines. Ukraine and South Korea have already sig- Russia, 192 Africa, 165 naled their intention to join the regime and are engaged Croatia, 165 in formulating the appropriate legislation. TAIWAN Egypt, 166 Paradoxically, such developments may not be entirely Internal Developments, 195 France, Germany, and desirable. For example, South Korea has indicated that with Italy, 166 it may use MTCR membership as a basis to withdraw France, 167 Germany, 168 from an agreement with the United States that prevents PRC, 188 Germany and Japan, 168 United States, 196 Seoul from developing missile systems with ranges in Germany and Netherlands, excess of 180 kilometers. Seoul believes this is a neces- 168 THAILAND sary hedge against the North Korean missile threat. with Germany, Netherlands, and Elsewhere, events have highlighted the challenge posed Israel, 177 NATO, 168 United States, 196 India, 172 to arms control by determined proliferators and commer- India and Pakistan, 172 cial interests. TURKEY Iran, 173 UNSCOM (the United Nations Special Commission Internal Developments, 196 Israel, 177 in Iraq) uncovered startling new evidence regarding with Japan, 179 Baghdad’s pre- and post-Gulf War initiatives to acquire a United States, 197 Kuwait, 180 long-range missile capability. Indeed, in an attempt to UKRAINE MTCR, 181 preempt the revelations of two senior-level Iraqi defec- Internal Developments, 197 North Korea, 184 tors, Baghdad informed UNSCOM that it had manufac- with Norway, Russia, and Ukraine, 184 tured Scud missile rocket motors, through reverse engi- Belarus, Czech Republic, neering and had flight-tested chemical warheads. More NATO, and Russia, 161 Pakistan, 185 ominously, U.N. and U.S. officials have accused Iraq of Brazil, 164 Pakistan and PRC, 185 Iraq, 175 PRC, 188 attempting to sustain its long-range missile program by Kazakhstan and Russia, 180 Russia, 193 covertly acquiring the necessary technology via a net- Norway, Russia, and Russia and Ukraine, 193 work of European and Russian arms dealers and front U.S., 184 South Korea, 194 companies. The Iraqi shopping list is said to have in- Russia, 192 Taiwan, 196 cluded accelerometers, gyroscopes, specialized metals, Russia and U.S., 193 Thailand, 196 machine tools, and a French-made furnace capable of Turkey, 197 manufacturing engine parts for missiles. The U.N. has UAE, 197 United Kingdom, 198 accused French, German, and Ukrainian commercial 158 The Nonproliferation Review/Winter 1996 Missile Developments interests of encouraging Iraq in its efforts to bypass U.N. NOTE: Security Council Resolution 687. A date marked with an “*” indicates that an event was re- Developments in several regions indicate that some states ported on that date; a date without an “*” is the date when lack confidence in arms control and are now exploring tech- an event actually occurred. nical responses to missile proliferation. For example, fear The numbers listed in parentheses following the biblio- over India’s potential deployment of Privthi missiles along graphic references refer to the identification number of the its western border has prompted Pakistan to commence document in the CNS Missile Database from which the news development of an ATBM system capable of intercepting summaries are abstracted. Because of the rapidly changing these short-range missiles. China’s conduct of two missile nature of the subject matter, The Nonproliferation Review exercises off the Taiwan coast (and doubts about the ability is unable to guarantee that the information reported herein of modified Patriot systems to fend off a real missile at- is complete or accurate, and disclaims liability to any party tack,) have led Taiwan to explore the possibility of partici- for any loss or damage caused by errors or omissions.
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