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Cambridge University Press 978-1-316-63806-4 — the CIA and the Politics of US Intelligence Reform Brent Durbin Index More Information Cambridge University Press 978-1-316-63806-4 — The CIA and the Politics of US Intelligence Reform Brent Durbin Index More Information Index 40 Committee, 112, 135, 137, 145, See also Aspin-Brown Commission, 27, 204 covert activities under Central critics of, 201 Intelligence Agency (CIA) recommendations, 199–201 9/11 attacks, 8, 15, 17, 20, 22, 23, Association of Former Intelligence 24, 207 Officers, 151 blame for, assignments of, 218, 219–220 national security, redefinition of, 209 Barrett, David, 54, 271 9/11 Commission, 21, 220–224 Bay of Pigs invasion, 105, 110 Congress, impact on, 227 Blair, Dennis, 242 9/11 Family Steering Committee, 220, 231 Blandford, John B. Jr., 58 9/11 Recommendations Implementation Blumenthal, Richard, 246 Act, 229 Boggs, Caleb, 85 Boland Amendment, 14 Abourezk, James, 135 Boland, Edward, 151, 165 Acheson, Dean, 59, 94, 95, 96 Bolten, Joshua, 231 al Qaeda, 8, 20, 238, Boren proposal, 27 Allende, Salvador, 135, 268 Boren, David, 170, 177, 180–181 Allison, Graham, 267 Boston Globe, 156 Ameringer, Charles, 99 Brennan, John, 27, 253–255 Ames, Aldrich, 9 British Secret Intelligence Services (SIS), 56 scandal, 191, 192, 193 Brown, Clarence, 86 Anderson, Gary, 153 Brown, Harold, 198 Andres, Janet, 193 Bryan, William Jennings, 72 Apple, 244 Bush, George H.W., 7, 152–153 Arbenz, Jacobo, 110 advice to Bill Clinton, 187–188 Armey, Richard, 213 CIA, view of, as president, 166–167, 168 Army intelligence unit G-2, 57, 60 covert activities, views on, as president, Ashcroft, John, 212–213 172 Aspin Commission, 197–199, See also DCI, appointment as, 154 Aspin-Brown Commission executive power, views on, as president, creation of, 194 168 Aspin, Les, 170, 189, 193 Soviet Union, views on, as president, death of, 197 169–170 321 © in this web service Cambridge University Press www.cambridge.org Cambridge University Press 978-1-316-63806-4 — The CIA and the Politics of US Intelligence Reform Brent Durbin Index More Information 322 Index Bush, George W., 20, 214, 217 modernization of, 253–255 Homeland Security Act, promotion of, National Clandestine Service (NCS), 253 215 National Intelligence Officer system, Intelligence Reform and Terrorism creation of, 134 Prevention Act of 2004 (IRTPA), National Security Council, relationship and, 233, 234 to, 86–87, 89 intelligence reform, executive actions North Korea, and, 99 promoting, 225–226 North Korea, assessment of threats posed National Security Presidential Directive 5 by, 95, 96–97 (NSPD), 210 NSC50, compliance with, 94–95 Bush, George W. administration Office of Military Affairs, 183 9/11 Commission, and, 223 Office of National Estimates (ONE), 98 counterterrorism fusion efforts, 217 elimination of, 133–134 Iraq invasion, intelligence justifications Office of Reports and Estimates (ORE), for, 237, See also Office of Special 94 Plans Office of Research and Reports (ORR), USA PATRIOT Act, influence in, 98 212–213 Office of Special Projects (OSP), 90 War on Terror, and, 239 private contractors and, 253 Byrd, Robert, 215 Soviet National Intelligence Estimates, Byrnes, James, 68, 69, 71, 72–73, 74 153–157 Soviet Union, debates over, 168–170, Cannistraro, Vincent, 176 175–176 Carns, Michael, 195 Team A/B exercise. See Team A/B exercise Carpenter, Daniel, 35 Central Intelligence Group (CIG), 26 Carter, Jimmy, 149, 163–164 Congressional authorization of, 76–78 Casey, William, 7, 164 creation of, 73 Castro, Fidel, 147 daily intelligence digests, and, 74–75 Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), 80 expansion of, 75–78, 82, 265 303 Committee, 111, See also covert input on creation of CIA, and, 82–85 activities under Central Intelligence leadership of, 75–76, 77–78 Agency (CIA) Legislative Liaison team, 82 American Gestapo, as, fears of, 11, 64, planning for, 69–73 66, 85, 100, 181, 256 structure and mission of, 74–75 assassinations, allegations of, and, Chambliss, Saxby, 250 142–143 Cheney, Richard, 181, 188, 223, 238 budget, 93, 99 and USSR, 169 Clandestine Services, 98 Chicago Tribune, 66 Cold War consensus, effects of on agency, Church Committee, 10, 20, 26, 31, 49, 131, 99–101 213, 264 coordination of intelligence agencies establishment of, 144 during 1947–1949, and, 89–93 findings of, 145–146 covert activities, and, 86–88, 90, impact of, 146 110–112, 136–138, 164, 172 Church, Frank, 144 Directorate of Operations, 10 CIA Act of 1949, 26, 49, 93, 99, 100, 229 domestic surveillance, and, 86, 150–152 Clapper, James, 242, 245 Dulles Report, response to, 92, 94 Clark, Tom C., 63–64 extraordinary rendition and enhanced Clements, William, 145 interrogation, 239 Clifford, Clark, 77, 78, 82, 87 founding of, 2, 7, 10, 26, 39, 43 Cline, Ray, 95, 268 illegal activities of, 138–144, 148 Clinton, Bill, 186 © in this web service Cambridge University Press www.cambridge.org Cambridge University Press 978-1-316-63806-4 — The CIA and the Politics of US Intelligence Reform Brent Durbin Index More Information Index 323 CIA, vision for, as president, 188–189 Department of the Navy, 67 election of, 187 CIA, input on creation of, 82–83 Coelho, Tony, 198 post-war centralized intelligence, Cohen, Ben, 58 planning for, 71–73 Colby, William, 10, 107, 111, 126, Department of War, 67 132–134, 136–137, 138, 139, 142, CIA, input on creation of, 82–83 182 post-war centralized intelligence, Chile, relevations about to Congress, 135 planning for, 69–70, 71–73 Church Committee, and, 145 détente, 2, 106, 134, 158 DCI, appointment as, 132–133 Deutch, John, 191, 195 dismissal of, 152 appointment as DCI, 195–196 Pike Committee, views on, 147 Dicks, Norm, 199, 221 Team A/B exercise, resistance to, Director of Central Intelligence 153–154 redefinition of role, 225 Cold War, 2, 14, 22 weaknesses of, 116–117 Cold War consensus Director of National Intelligence (DNI), 8, breakdown of, 2, 26, 29, 103–104, 127, 15, 21 134, 158 Directors of Central Intelligence (DCI), 6, Collins, Susan, 227 93 Combating Terrorism Act of 2001, 211 DNI Review Group on Intelligence and Combest, Larry, 196, 201–202 Communication Technologies, 246 Commission on CIA Activities within the domestic surveillance, 211–214, See also United States. See Rockefeller under Central Intelligence Agency Commission (CIA); under National Security Commission on the Organization of the Agency (NSA); and USA PATRIOT Executive Branch of Government. Act See Hoover Commission Donovan, William, 1, 2, 16, 55, 59, 80, consensus, See also Cold War consensus; 93, 99 post-9/11 consensus; and under creation of U.S. centralized intelligence, intelligence reform and, 55–59, 60–61, 62–63, 67–68 definitions of, 44 Distinguished Service Medal, and, 73 measures of, 44 pre-WWII intelligence, criticisms of, 58 World War II, during, 79 Downs, Anthony, 32 Council of National Defense, 77 Dulles Report, 91–92, 101, 116, 125, See Cox, Christopher, 217 also Intelligence Survey Group under Cuban Missile Crisis, 106 National Security Council (NSC) Cushman, Robert, 123 Dulles, Allen, 91, 98, 108 Daschle, Tom, 210, 222, 227 Eagleburger, Lawrence, 187 DeConcini, Dennis, 9, 189–190, 192 Eberstadt Report, 69, 73 Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), 105 Eberstadt, Ferdinand, 69, 91 Denver Post, 242 Elsey, George, 77 Department of Defense, 12, 37 Executive Order 11828, 142 Defense Planning Guidance of 1992, 188 Executive Order 11905, 130, 131, 147–148 Office of Special Plans, 20, 237–238, 262 Schlesinger Report, response to, 119–120 Facebook, 244 Department of Homeland Security (DHS), Family Jewels report, 26, 127, 131, 138, 27, 207, 215 139–141, See also Illegal activities Department of State, 60 under Central Intelligence Agency post-war centralized intelligence, (CIA); covert activities under Central planning for, 65, 67, 69, 70–71, 73 Intelligence Agency (CIA) © in this web service Cambridge University Press www.cambridge.org Cambridge University Press 978-1-316-63806-4 — The CIA and the Politics of US Intelligence Reform Brent Durbin Index More Information 324 Index Family Jewels report (cont.) Google, 244 congressional response to, 139, See also Gorbachev, Mikhail, 171, 175 Rockefeller Commission Goss, Porter, 199, 217, 221, 241–242 White House response to, 140–142 Graham, Bob, 217 Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), 1, 5, Great Britain, 80 57 Greenstein, Fred, 271 CIA, relationship with, 38, 76 Greenwald, Glen, 243 National Security Branch, 241 Guardian, 243 post-war centralized intelligence, Gulf War of 1991, 16, 170–172 planning for, 62, 63–64 Feingold, Russell, 214 Haig, Alexander, 112, 116 Feinstein, Dianne, 211, 247–248 Haldeman, H.R., 114 Feith, Douglas, 238 Hall, Albert C., 123 Fingar, Thomas, 209 Halperin, Morton, 267 FISA Improvements Act of 2013, 248 Hamilton, Lee, 222 Fitzwater, Marlin, 182 Harman, Jane, 224, 242 Foley, Tom, 173 Harrington, Michael J., 135 Ford, Gerald, 7, 26, 135, 147 Hart, Gary, 157 Church Committee, and, 144–145 Hastert, Dennis, 229 covert activities, position on, 135 Hatch, Orrin, 211 Ford, Gerald administration Haver, Richard, 171 Rockefeller Commission, response to, Heinz, Edward, 168 140–143, See also Executive Order Helms, Richard, 106, 107, 109, 112, 120, 11905 125 Foreign Assistance Act, 135, 136 Schlesinger Report, resistance to, Foreign Economic Administration (FEA), 123–124 60, 65, 67 Hersh, Seymour, 131, 135, 139, 141 Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA), Chilé exposé, 135 131, 150–152, 198, 213 Family Jewels Report exposé, 139–142 Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court Hillenkoetter, Roscoe H., 85, 88–89, 93, 94, (FISC), 151, 244 96, 101, 240 Forrestal, James, 66, 69, 72, 86, 91 Hirohito, Emperor, 67 Freeh, Louis, 219 Hitler, Adolph, 65 Frist, Bill, 227 Hoffman, Clare E., 87 Froehlke, Robert, 123 Holder, Eric, 246 Fulbright, William, 122 Hollings, Ernest “Fritz”, 175 Homeland Security Act (HSA), 214–217, Gates, Robert, 8, 27, 165–166 See also Information Analysis and confirmation hearings, 176–177 Infrastructure Protection (IAIP) National Security Review task forces, Directorate 177–179, See also National Security Hoover Commission, 90, 101 Directive (NSD) 67 Hoover, J.
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