Frustrating Evolution of the Defense Intelligence Agency

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The frustrating evolution of the Defense Intelligence Agency

Jeszenszky, Elizabeth, M.A.

The American University, 1992

UMI 300 N. ZeebRd. Ann Arbor, MI 48106

THE FRUSTRATING EVOLUTION OF THE DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY by

Elizabeth Jeszenszky

submitted to the

Faculty of the School of International Service

of The American University

in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of

Master of Arts

International Affairs

Signatures of Commi

Chair

Dean of the School of International Service

Date

1992

The American University

Washington, D.C. 20016 7407

ffES AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LIBRARY ® COPYRIGHT by

Elizabeth Jeszenszky

1992

Elizabeth Jeszenszky ABSTRACT

In 1961, the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) was

established to meet the foreign military and military-related intelligence requirements of the Secretary of Defense, the

Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), the Unified and Specified (U&S) Commands, and other components with defense intelligence

needs. DIA has had difficulty fulfilling this mission, however, because many intelligence consumers perceive DIA as

a second-rate organization. DIA's struggle to become the nationally recognized leader of military intelligence stems

from its turbulent beginnings.

Resistance by the three armed services, personnel problems, mission complexity, and organizational matters are the core issues that contributed to DIA's initial difficulties. To affect positive change, defense decisionmakers need to understand DIA's history and provide solutions for these troublesome areas. Unfortunately, minimal

literature exists about the DIA; therefore, this thesis is a compilation of interviews and information gleaned from various

intelligence books, journals, and Congressional documents.

Today, the end of the Cold War and the declining defense budget is forcing the entire Intelligence Community to undergo an in-depth reorganization. Thus, DIA has an opportunity to continue to make substantial improvements. This thesis reviews

DIA's history, traces its recurring problems, and offers prescriptions for DIA's future. The DIA has the potential to be the premier military intelligence authority, but restructuring efforts must address its core weaknesses.

ii TABLE OF CONTENTS

Chapter

1. INTRODUCTION 1

2. LITERATURE REVIEW 11

3. THE HISTORY OF THE DIA 19 Post WWII Intelligence and the National Security Act

Studies of the 1950s

The Making of the Defense Intelligence Agency

4. INITIAL PROBLEMS 35 Service Resistance Personnel Wars

Complex Mission - Production

Complex Mission - Customers

DIA's Organizational Structure and Resources

5. A DECADE OF CRITICISM 61

The Fitzhugh Report

The 1970 Reorganization

The Pike Committee Report

The Church Committee Report

6. DIA MAKES STRIDES 81

Service Resistance

Personnel Issues

Complex Mission

Organization and Structure 7. REORGANIZATION IN A NEW ERA 103 The End of the Cold War

Desert Shield/Desert Storm Lessons Learned

The DOD Plan for Restructuring Defense Intelligence Congressional Actions

DIA's Internal Reorganization

8. REFORM PRESCRIPTIONS 119 Service Resistance

Personnel Issues

Complex Mission and Customer Support

In Conclusion

9. SOURCES CONSULTED 128 CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

Within the U.S. Intelligence Community, the Defense

Intelligence Agency (DIA) is often regarded as less than

equal. Established in 1961 by Department of Defense (DOD)

Directive 5105.21, DIA's mission was to "satisfy the foreign

military and military-related intelligence requirements of the

Secretary of Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), the

Unified and Specified (U&S) Commands, other Defense

components, and, as appropriate, non-Defense agencies."1 In

addition, DIA was chartered to provide the military

intelligence input to National Intelligence Estimates, and to

lead the military intelligence community.

Despite DIA's apparent status, this agency has

continuously fought an uphill battle to be accepted as the

primary authority for military intelligence matters. Among the

dozen or more intelligence organizations that comprise the

U.S. Intelligence Community, the primary all-source analytical

agencies are the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), the DIA

and the State Department's Bureau of Intelligence, (INR).

Although all three play a major role, DIA has long been

1 DIA, "History of the Defense Intelligence Agency," (Washington, D.C.: DIA Publication, 1985), no page numbers.

l regarded as the weakest of the three. Why is DIA often perceived as a second-rate agency? If DIA's poor reputation is warranted, where did its problems begin? Can DIA join the ranks of CIA and State, or is it fated to function on the margins?

I first became interested in these questions after taking a graduate class taught by Professor Duncan Clarke. He mentioned some of the problems that DIA has had over the years, and he provided several prescriptions for reform. As a former Army intelligence officer, I had worked with several

DIA products, and at my level I was unaware of any turmoil surrounding DIA. Thus, DIA's reputation varies from customer to customer.

Indeed, quality is a subjective judgement based on a multitude of factors. There is no standard scale by which to measure an intelligence agency. The fact that most of the products are classified makes this a more arduous task.

Reputation does play a role in assessing the effectiveness of an agency, however, comparing the quality of the DIA to the

CIA or the INR is similar to comparing the quality of the New

York Times to the Washington Post. DIA does have a reputation problem, but that is not the central focus of this thesis.

Instead, this thesis traces DIA's struggle to become the nationally recognized leader of military intelligence from its turbulent beginnings to the present day. One former DIA

Director referred to the creation of DIA as an agency "founded in frustration."2 Several factors contributed to this initial frustration: resistance by the three armed services, personnel problems, mission complexity, and organizational difficulties. The combination of these elements has hindered DIA from effectively achieving its full potential.

Understanding DIA's tumultuous background is especially significant today, since the end of the Cold War and the rapidly declining defense budget are forcing planners to restructure U.S. intelligence support. If real improvements are to continue to be made, it is imperative that decisionmakers reflect on lessons learned from the past. DIA has the potential to be the accepted leader of the military intelligence community, but it is still often characterized as a second-rate agency.

To address these issues, my paper comprises three main sections. The first section is a history of DIA. The second segment reviews several critical reports that evaluated DIA's progress a decade after its formation. The final pages discuss the present-day intelligence reorganization measures, and suggestions for reform. By tracking DIA's evolution, I will show why DIA has had difficulty becoming the premier authority of military intelligence.

2. Lt Gen. James Williams, Interview by Author, former DIA Director, 3 April 1992, Bethesda, MD. Literature Review

Since the CIA is a high-profile agency, it attracts the majority of the media and research attention. In contrast, very little has been published about DIA's history or performance. Chapter Two is a brief literature review that examines the material available in various books, journals and documents regarding intelligence.

Since the literature is sparse, most of my research efforts consisted of interviews with former intelligence officials from DIA, CIA, INR and the Services, members of the

Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) and Joint Chiefs of

Staff (JCS), Congressional staff personnel, academia, and the media. By combining the meager literature and the documentation from Congressional reports, with the data from over thirty interviews, my study recounts DIA's history and helps explain the reasons for its constant battle to become the foremost authority of military intelligence. DIA' History

To comprehend the reasons for creating the DIA, the third chapter provides a brief overview of post-war military intelligence organizations, and the growing concern among planners for centralization. As a result of numerous studies conducted in the 1940s and 1950s, decisionmakers recognized the need to form a single defense intelligence organization.

Yet the manner in which DIA was finally established led to the challenges it has faced ever since. Initial Problems

The fourth chapter identifies the troublesome areas in detail. First of all, the individual Services greatly resented this new agency. Traditionally, the three Services, Army, Navy and Air Force, whose parochial outlooks dominate the internal politics of the Pentagon, have opposed any joint agency; DIA was no exception. This Service resistance severely hampered

DIA's ability to recruit quality personnel (both military and civilian) . Secondly, DIA was chartered to provide intelligence to a broad, yet extremely disparate group of customers.

Since the requirements of these intelligence consumers range from tactical support to strategic security issues, DIA must be able to respond with an assortment of products. The diverse set of customers combined with the complex product responsibilities formed another set of problems for DIA.

Lastly, DIA has been unable to decide on the most efficient structure, and it has had trouble gaining the resources it needs to support this structure. DIA has wrestled with its organization and budget from its inception.

These topics - Service resistance, personnel issues, dissimilar product responsibilities, and constant reorganization - comprise the core issues for my analysis of

DIA. I believe that the difficulties encountered in these areas have frustrated DIA's ability to become an effective intelligence agency. Therefore, I will address these problem 6 areas throughout my paper to determine if DIA has been able to solve them satisfactorily.

Critical Evaluations

Chapter Five focuses on several reports that reviewed DIA's progress after a decade of operation. The Fitzhugh

(1970), Pike (1975) and Church (1976) reports specifically examined the activities of the DIA, and all were dissatisfied with its performance record. In fact, the Pike Committee advocated DIA's abolition. By using these documents as a benchmark, I can ascertain if DIA's initial problems remained unresolved. By the 1970s, DIA was still grappling with its original difficulties. I will compare my assessment of these matters with the conclusions of the three reports. I want to determine if the reports addressed DIA's core problems, or if the reports disregarded DIA's recurring conflicts.

A Decade of Progress

During the 1980s, DIA matured as an intelligence agency.

Improvements made by the Goldwater-Nichols legislation, the construction of a new building, and the move to officially designate DIA the head of military intelligence did much to boost DIA's image and reputation. These topics are key issues in my sixth chapter.

Current Reorganization Measures

Chapter Seven discusses four present-day intelligence reorganization measures. Since 1991, there have been a variety of plans designed to reorganize the Intelligence Community to meet the challenges of the changing world order. The

Department of Defense's classified Plan for the Implementation of Defense Intelligence Restructuring, approved in 1991, was the first measure that directly affected DIA. I will review this plan (as far as is publicly known) to determine if it addresses the fundamental problems that have remained with DIA over the years.

The next reform measures that impacted on DIA's operations are found in the National Defense Authorization Act for FY1992 and FY1993 and in the FY1992 Intelligence

Authorization Act. These bills include language concerning

DIA's organization, however, several provisions contradict those of the Department of Defense's Intelligence Plan.

I will examine the motivation for the bills' suggestions to see if Congress is attempting to strengthen DIA, or if it is merely addressing its own agenda.

Lastly, Senator Boren and Congressman McCurdy introduced their own intelligence reorganization legislation in 1992; if passed, the Eoren-McCurdy initiative would also impact the

DIA. Though their proposals are primarily concerned with the

CIA and the role of the Director of Central Intelligence

(DCI), I will compare their proposals against the other reorganization measures. Reform Prescriptions

The last chapter of my thesis provides some suggestions forreform. For DIA to continue to improve, solutions to the core problems must be addressed. Today DIA has the opportunity to achieve its full potential, but decisionmakers need to understand why DIA has not already reached this goal. A commitment must be made to give DIA the authority to truly lead the defense intelligence community.

The 1990s are a decade of dramatic change for the

Intelligence Community. In several interviews, people have told me that DIA is the "wave of the future." I believe DIA's problems stem from its creation, and I think the current restructuring movement offers DIA an opportunity to resolve these persistent trouble areas.

What is Intelligence?

Before reviewing DIA's history, it is important to understand the concept of intelligence. One Department of

Defense official describes intelligence as:

the requisite support for timely, sound decisions of all sorts, both in and out of conflict. And from a purely military standpoint, it's to ensure the flow of facts, analysis and estimates to optimize the effectiveness of our armed forces.3

Expanding on this definition, another author explains that

3 Richard G. Stillwell quoted in C3I: Issues of Command and Control. ed. Thomas P. Coakley, (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University, 1991), 335. intelligence should not only provide support, but it should also seek to educate the consumer.4

This relationship between producer and consumer touches upon one of the most difficult aspects of intelligence. Intelligence is of no value unless it is believed by those who receive it. Gaining the confidence of the consumer is a laborious task. Intelligence is based on uncertainty which means the analyst is usually making a best guess rather than a statement of fact. In addition, decisionmakers are sometimes reluctant to receive intelligence since it often makes options more complex, not more simple. Thus intelligence is not always welcomed by those who need it.5

Establishing a positive link between the intelligence producer and consumer is vital. If this bond does not exist, the product will never be used. As I will demonstrate throughout my paper, part of DIA's problem over the years has been its inability to gain credibility with its audience.

Lieutenant General Faurer (USAF-ret.), who worked for DIA in the 1960s, acknowledged that DIA has had a reputation for not succeeding. He went on to explain that once there is a history of failure, it is very difficult to break away from that perception.6 Another intelligence official bolstered this

4 Alfred C. Mauer, Marion D. Tunstall and James M. Keagle, ed. Intelligence: Policy and Process. (Boulder: Westview Press, 1985), 11. 5 John Macartney, Intelligence: What It Is and How To Use It. AFIO Monograph, 1991, 18. 6 Lt Gen. Faurer, Interview by Author, former DIA Chief of Production, 22 June 1992, McLean, Va. 10 belief by stating that DIA has never been totally respected.

He depicted DIA as the "poor cousin" of the Intelligence

Community.7 Thus DIA has had to work twice as hard to overcome the negative image that has persistently clung to its name.

Intelligence is a complicated process. Policymakers must trust that the information they receive is correct. Without the consumers' confidence, intelligence feeds a black hole. As the largest producer of military intelligence, DIA serves a unique audience; their products range from peacetime database files, to wartime, time-sensitive information. This paper will explore DIA's success in attempting to fulfill the requirements of its numerous consumers.

7 Non-Attribution source, Interview by Author, Former Military Intelligence analyst, 29 June 1992, McLean, Va. CHAPTER TWO

LITERATURE REVIEW

In Chapter One I mentioned that literature describing DIA is limited and often difficult to find. Indeed, while more than one hundred books have been written about intelligence activities in the United States, DIA is often ignored or briefly mentioned. At best it gets two or three pages of discussion. In a telling example, a book about intelligence policy and process listed the following as the U.S. intelligence agencies: CIA, NSA, FBI and INR.8 Though DIA is a major member of the U.S. Intelligence Community, it rarely receives equal billing with the other organizations. Patrick Mescall's Dissertation

The most complete research on DIA to date is by Patrick

Neil Mescall, a Ph.D. candidate studying at the University of

Edinburgh. He is currently completing his dissertation on the history of the DIA. Focusing solely on the DIA's first decade,

Mescall devotes his research to uncovering the reason for establishing a centralized military intelligence agency. He posits that Robert McNamara created DIA primarily as a means to produce the unified military position for National

8 Maurer, Tunstall and Keagle, ed., index.

11 12

Intelligence Estimates (NIEs). He states that McNamara's main objective was to find a way to consolidate conflicting Service estimates.9

In presenting his argument, Mescall asserts that McNamara was more concerned about briefing a unified military position at the United States Intelligence Board (USIB), than he was about working to reduce the redundancy that existed within military intelligence. Pentagon press statements emphasized that the DIA would eliminate duplication among the Services, but Mescall believes that this important goal was sacrificed to McNamara's underlying motive for creating DIA. Mescall explains that McNamara struck a compromise with the Joint

Chiefs (who are also the individual Service Chiefs) in order to get their support for the new agency, and in doing so he reinforced duplication instead of eliminating it.10

In a major concession to the JCS, McNamara allowed the

Director of DIA to report through the Joint Chiefs to the

Secretary of Defense. Thus Mescall argues that, in essence, the Services still maintained control over the DIA. He further asserts that this compromise prevented DIA from becoming an effective organization. Central to his thesis, Mescall maintains that "by entrusting the development of the DIA to the Services, organizations opposed to the very reforms that

9 Patrick Neil Mescall, "The birth of the Defense Intelligence Agency", in North American Spies: New Revisionist Essays, ed. Rhodri Jeffrey-Jones and Andrew Lownie, (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1991), 180. 10 Ibid., 182 - 183. 13 the agency was charged with enacting, McNamara had doomed the

DIA to failure."11

Though Mescall's argument makes sense, he does not address all the intricacies that affected DIA from the beginning. In this paper I will show how Service rivalry, personnel problems, a complex mission, and poor organization contributed to DIA's difficult development. Mescall's comments are valid, but they portray only a portion of a complicated problem. Nevertheless, his essay provides the most thorough account of the creation of the DIA published to date. Lvman Kirkpatrick

Very few other works exist that describe DIA in detail.

In 1985 the Agency itself published a ten page "History of

DIA," and the DIA's in-house historian is currently in the process of writing a book on the organizational history of

DIA. The remainder of the intelligence literature either mentions DIA as a comparison to the CIA, or DIA as an aside by an author with a personal connection to the agency. For example, Lyman Kirkpatrick dedicates several pages to the DIA in his book, The Real CIA, because he headed the Study Group that originally recommended a consolidated military intelligence organization.

Thus, he includes a description of DIA because he was instrumental in laying the groundwork for its creation. Yet even Kirkpatrick merely highlights the results of his Study

11 Ibid., 188. 14 Group. He acknowledges that the creation of the DIA "was a major step forward in modernizing our military intelligence system," but he does not provide much insight into the organization itself.12 John Prados

John Prados' book, The Soviet Estimate; U.S. Intelligence

Analysis and Russian Military Strength, makes several brief observations about the creation of DIA. Prados discusses the effects of Kirkpatrick's Joint Study Group, and he reviews

McNamara's desires for unified military intelligence estimates. In his cursory examination of DIA's beginnings,

Prados describes the impact of the DIA's first director,

General Carroll, and he details some of the initial challenges this first director faced. Unfortunately, Prados, like his fellow intelligence authors makes only passing references to the DIA and spends a majority of his research addressing issues of the CIA.13

Marchetti. Marks and Corson

Two books, The CIA and the Cult of Intelligence, by

Victor Marchetti and John Marks and The Armies of Ignorance:

The Rise of the American Intelligence Empire by William

Corson, attempt to provide a bit more analysis about DIA's position in the Intelligence Community. Both books agree that

12 Lyman B. Kirkpatrick, The Real CIA. (London: The Macmillan Company), 1968, 225. 13 John Prados, The Soviet Estimate: U.S. Intelligence Analysis and Russian Military Strength. (New York: The Dial Press, 1982). 15

DIA's creation was designed to overcome the parochial analysis that prevailed in the individual Services, and both books acknowledge that DIA has had difficulty achieving this goal.

However, neither book delves too far into DIA's turbulent

development.

Both Marchetti and Marks dismiss the effectiveness of DIA by explaining that "although the DIA was originally intended to take over many of their functions, the Service intelligence agencies have continued to grow and flourish since its founding."14 Their comments, however, fail to account for the numerous obstacles DIA faced as a new, joint agency. While criticizing the new agency, Marchetti and Marks do not assess why DIA has had so many problems in meeting its mission.

Corson, on the other hand, presents a more thorough overview of DIA's growing pains. He regards DIA as a

"remarkable bureaucratic tour de force ..."15 Corson discusses the challenges DIA encountered as it sought to consolidate military intelligence. Other authors agree that parochial estimates and duplication were problems that the establishment of DIA hoped to solve by bringing the various Service intelligence arms together, but only Corson acknowledges the immensity of DIA's task. In a scant four pages, Corson mentions Service resentment, the complexity of DIA's mission,

14 Victor Marchetti and John D. Marks, The CIA and the Cult of Intelligence. (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1974), 89. 15 William R. Corson, The Armies of Ignorance: The Rise of the American Intelligence Empire. (New York: The Dial Press, 1977), 386. 16 and the burdens that stem from DIA's "bureaucratic breech birth." Though Corson does not develop his argument, his remarks are more comprehensive than those found in other works.

Other Works

Several other books and journal articles also offer a glimpse into the world of DIA. Books worth mention include works by Jeffrey Richelson, Gerald Hopple and Bruce Watson,

Duncan Clarke and Mark Lowenthal. Journals such as American

Intelligence Journal. SIGNAL, and Intelligence and National

Security sometimes feature articles on DIA. A brief examination of these works again demonstrate the limited literature regarding DIA.

For example, Richelson's book, The United States

Intelligence Community, includes a short section on the

Defense Intelligence Agency. He provides a quick sketch of

DIA/s history, and then he methodically discusses the functions of each directorate. His work is helpful in understanding DIA's various tasks, but it does little to explain how DIA fits in as a member of the Intelligence

Community. In addition, his book has been quickly outdated since DIA has undergone several reorganizations since its publication.16

16 Jeffrey Richelson, The United States Intelligence Community. 2nd Edition, (Cambridge: Ballinger Publishing Co, 1989). 17

The edited work of Hopple and Watson, The Military

Intelligence Community, has disappointingly few pages about the DIA. One contributor offers a chapter on the Defense

Attache system, an element of the DIA, and another author describes the defense intelligence community, but a detailed analysis of DIA is missing. This book serves as a testament that the military intelligence community clearly does not envision the DIA as its focal point.17

Duncan Clarke's American Defense and Foreign Policy

Institutions: Toward a Sound Foundation briefly touched upon some of these questions. In his book he quickly traced DIA's history, and looked at some of the problems DIA has endured since its creation. Clarke concluded his brief analysis with several prescriptions for reform. Dr. Clarke isolated some critical flaws of DIA; in my research I tried to uncover more information about them. I hope to present a more thorough analysis of DIA so that the current reorganization proposals can be critically evaluated.18

Mark Lowenthal's newly published book, U.S. Intelligence:

Anatomy and Evolution, provides the reader with a broad overview of DIA's activities up through the 1990s. Similar to

Clarke's book, Lowenthal also raises several flaws that have

17 Gerald W. Hopple, and Bruce W. Watson, ed., The Military Intelligence Community. (Boulder: Westview Press, 1986). 18 Duncan Clarke, American Defense and Foreign Policy Institutions: Toward a Sound Foundation. (Hew York: Harper and Row, 1989). 18 affected DIA's performance, however, he does not present measures for reform. Nevertheless, other than journal articles, Lowenthal's book is one of the most current discussions of DIA.19

Lastly, journals periodically include articles on DIA.

The Autumn 1991 edition of American Intelligence Journal, for instance, was dedicated to pieces on intelligence in transition. Two of the articles explicitly addressed defense intelligence and the role of the DIA. Thus, by scouring magazines one can find material concerning DIA, but these articles usually cover a specific topic; a complete analysis of DIA's development is too complex for a magazine entry.

By piecing together the information from the literature and combining it with the information I gathered from my interviews, I will offer a better explanation of DIA's dilemmas, and of its efforts to become the undisputed leader of the military intelligence community. To understand the DIA of the 1990s, however, it is imperative to know the reasons for creating a combined military intelligence agency in the first place.

19 Mark M. Lowenthal, U.S. Intelligence; Evolution and Anatomy. 2nd Edition, (Westport: Praeger Press, 1992). CHAPTER THREE

THE HISTORY OF THE DIA

POST WWII Intelligence and the National Security Act

The concept for consolidating military organizations can be traced to the National Security Act of 1947. This Act worked to integrate the policies and procedures for the organizations concerned with national security. To achieve better coordination, it created the Air Force, placed the separate military services under the National Military

Establishment (later renamed the Department of Defense), founded the National Security Council (NSC) as an advisory group for the President, and established the Central

Intelligence Agency.

As its title suggested, the CIA sought to centralize intelligence activities. The military intelligence components, on the other hand, remained autonomous due to the nature of their warfighting missions and to internal parochial pressures. Combat commanders need organic intelligence capabilities. No Service would be willing to forsake its intelligence units. For the Armed Forces, complete centralization equalled a loss of responsiveness. Each military component depended on its own intelligence sources to provide support for its specific mission. The military

19 20 services tend to think in terms of tactical level intelligence, or intelligence used to fight on the battlefield.

Nonetheless, the 1947 National Security Act recognized the value of coordinated military intelligence and subsequently established a Joint Intelligence Group (JIG) within the Joint Staff. This staff focused primarily on strategic, or national level intelligence. This small staff wrote joint estimates for the Secretary of Defense, provided intelligence support to the Joint Staff and acted as a liaison with other intelligence agencies.20

Though the JIG attempted to integrate intelligence from the different Services, it was never very powerful nor very effective. During its tenure the Services had no motivation to work together, and the Joint Staff lacked the authority to impose its will on them.21 In the Post-World War II era the

Services quickly established the precedent that individual needs clearly outweighed benefits gained from consolidation.

The goals set forth in the National Security Act were greatly challenged by the tenacity of Service independence.

The Hoover Committee

Recognizing the obstacles in implementing this new legislation, President Truman appointed former President

Hoover in 1948 to examine the effectiveness of the national

20 Mescall, 168. 21 Ibid. 168 -169. 21 security structure. Not surprisingly, the Hoover Commission uncovered "disturbing inadequacies" regarding intelligence coordination and control. The report stated that "... the continuance of intense interservice rivalries hampers and confuses sound policy at many points. One of our greatest needs is to elevate military thinking to a plane above individual Service aims and ambitions."22

Ironically, the criticisms of the Hoover Report continue to haunt the military intelligence community. In order to break this cycle, policymakers, as well as military leaders, need to recognize that they are repeating history. The Hoover

Report issued its report more than a decade before the creation of the DIA. Yet interservice rivalry and duplication are two of the major criticisms plaguing DIA today. It is apparent that when DIA was created, it would be tasked to solve a problem that the Services were purposefully perpetuating.

Studies of the 1950s

The lack of cohesion within the military intelligence community concerned those who relied upon its information. In

1953 the Secretary of Defense remained dissatisfied with the community's support; therefore, he decided to create the

Office to Special Operations (0S0) in an effort to fulfill his own intelligence needs. Headed by an Assistant Secretary of

22 Quote from Hoover Report cited in Deane Allen's "The Defense Intelligence Agency: a 21-Year Organizational Overview", 17. 22

Defense for Special Operations, this new office provided

organic intelligence staff support to the SECDEF.23

Thus, by the early 1950s the Office of the Secretary of

Defense (OSD) relied on an internal staff to provide its

intelligence functions, the Joint Staff turned to the JIG for

intelligence matters, and the Services continued to operate

independently in intelligence and all other fields. Though the

consumers of military intelligence each had access to

information, intelligence within the Defense Department was

fragmented, and suffered from duplication and parochialism.24

A flurry of studies regarding the structure of the Department of Defense resulted in the Defense Reorganization

Act of 1953. This act solidified the role of the Secretary of

Defense over the Department, and it transferred the

operational chain of command from the Military Departments to

the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Secretary of Defense. Under

this reorganization the JIG became the J2 of the Joint Staff,

giving it the additional task of providing intelligence

support to the Unified and Specified (U&S) Commands. Yet the

J2 still lacked sufficient manpower, and much of the

intelligence support fell back on the individual Service

components. Once again, the organic Service structure remained

23 Mescall, 169. 24 Non-Attribution source, "The Defense Intelligence Agency: A 21 Year Organizational Overview" (working papers), (Washington, D.C., 1983), 23. 23

intact, and the vertical lines of organization were reinforced.25 The USIB and NIEs

Concurrent with the Reorganization Act of 1958, the White

House level National Security council established the United

States Intelligence Board (USIB). The Board essentially combined the functions of the former Intelligence Advisory

Committee and the United States Communications Intelligence

Board. In essence, the USIB provided a forum for leaders of the Intelligence Community to decide intelligence matters affecting national security issues. Members included a representative from the JCS, the Department of State's INR, the CIA, the Atomic Energy Commission, and the FBI. In addition, the three Service Intelligence Chiefs, the newly appointed Assistant Secretary of Defense for Operations and the Director of the National Security Agency attended as well.26

One of the primary missions of the USIB was to issue

National Intelligence Estimates (NIEs). NIEs are finished intelligence products, endorsed by the entire intelligence community, that discuss specific items of interest regarding national security. Since the USIB worked to achieve a consensus from the community, voices of dissent are recorded as footnotes to the estimate.27 Though the concept of the USIB

25 Ibid., 27. 26 Ibid., 28. 27 Clarke, 173. 24 appears sound in theory, the organizations often did not try to achieve the "best guess" of the intelligence community.

Instead, meetings frequently turned into heated debates over conflicting opinions.28

To compound the problem, the three Service Intelligence Chiefs often aggravated the situation. Rather than presenting a unified military estimate, each Service fought for its own opinion to be included in the main body of the estimate.

Outside observers remarked that "each service tended to adopt a self-serving party line and pursue it relentlessly ... "29

Frequently the Secretary of Defense had to reconcile disputes between the individual military intelligence chiefs. Without a centralized military intelligence structure, the Pentagon continued to be fraught with parochialism, duplication, and inefficient intelligence coverage.30

Dissatisfaction with the intelligence system and NIEs grew more profuse with the technology explosion of the 1950s.

Arguments over Soviet strategic capabilities led to the

"bomber gap" and then later the "missile gap." The Eisenhower administration grew increasingly frustrated over the lack of cooperation within the military intelligence community.31 For

28 Non-attribution source, Interview by author, Former Chief of Intelligence for one of the Services, 23 April 1992, Washington, D.C. 29 Thomas Ross and David Wise, The Invisible Government. (New York: Vintage, 1964), 211. 30 Non-attribution source, Interview by Author, Former Chief of Intelligence for one of the Services. 31 Prados, 122. 25 example, many believed that the newly created Air Force was trying to validate its existence by increasing the Soviet threat. By fostering competition instead of teamwork, military contributions to intelligence estimates lost their credibility.32

The Joint Study Group

In 1959, Secretary of Defense Thomas Gates directed the

JCS to determine if the intelligence needs of the U&S

Commands, the JCS and the Secretary of Defense were being met.

Concomitantly, President Eisenhower designated a special task force to research the same issue. Chaired by Lyman Kirkpatrick, Jr. and staffed by representatives from the State

Department, the White House, DOD the Bureau of the Budget, and the CIA, this Joint Study Group (JSG) studied the military intelligence support process.33 Specifically the group was asked to pay "particular attention to possibilities for closer integration under the authority of the DOD Reorganization Act of 1958.1,34

After months of interviewing and discussion, the Joint

Study Group submitted forty-three recommendations for change.

The group determined that military intelligence channels did not conform to changes mandated by the Defense Reorganization

Act of 1958. Instead of following the new joint chain of

32 Mescal 1, 170. 33 "The DIA ..." (working papers), 30. 34 Joint Study Group, "Term of reference," 12 July 1960 in Mescall's "The birth of the Defense Intelligence Agency," 172. 26 command, which flowed from the Secretary of Defense, through the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the CINCs, the intelligence community worked as they always had by passing information from Service headquarters, through Service channels, to

Service components. They found the system "duplicatory and cumbersome" since the three Service intelligence branches were often doing the same thing simultaneously.35 Secondly, the JSG discovered a multitude of intelligence periodicals. They feared that commanders received too many points of view on the same issue. Kirkpatrick wrote, "thus we sought to have one periodical for greater unification ...',36

Additionally, the Joint Study Group commented on the NIE process. They objected to the lack of a unified military view and found it inappropriate that the military used the USIB as their debating forum. Concurring with previous assessments, the JSG believed the USIB should be limited to debates between the Department of Defense and the other members of the

Board.37

Essentially, the findings of the JSG reinforced the need to establish a focal point for the military intelligence community; they wanted centralization. Stated another way, the combination of the JSG's recommendations suggested founding a single, joint military intelligence agency. The group released

35 Lyman Kirkpatrick, The Real CIA. (London: Macmillan Company, 1968), 225. 36 Ibid., 226. 37 Ibid., 227. 27

their report in December 1960 just before the Kennedy

administration entered office. To the JSG's relief, the new

Secretary of Defense, Robert S. McNamara, endorsed the report and planned to follow their recommendations. The Making of the Defense Intelligence Agency

Robert McNamara wholeheartedly endorsed creating a joint defense intelligence agency, because he felt uncomfortable in his relationship with military intelligence. As Secretary of

Defense, he was responsible for most of the intelligence collection, but he lacked the ability to control both collection and production.38 A former senior military intelligence officer explained that McNamara felt ill-served by separate military intelligence units. He wanted a single agency responsive to his needs; he wanted something he could task.39 The Kirkpatrick report provided McNamara with the information he needed to create a new organization. In

February 1961, McNamara tasked the JCS to develop a plan for a new consolidated military intelligence agency.

Not surprisingly, the Joint Chiefs recommended a Military

Intelligence Agency (MIA) that reported directly to them. They envisioned an agency that provided coordination, but not necessarily integration. The Joint Chiefs recognized the

Services steadfast resistance to jointness in all areas, including intelligence. They believed a loosely structured

38 Prados, 124. 39 Non-attribution source, Interview by Author, Former Chief of Intelligence for one of the Services. 28 organization would be responsive to national needs, yet would not disrupt individual Service operations. The Joint Chiefs wanted to support their own Services. They argued then, as they do now, that they need organic intelligence capabilities to conduct their individual missions. The powerful military

Services were not enthusiastic about forming a unified organization, and the Joint Chiefs yielded to their preferences.40

McNamara, on the other hand, did not accept the Joint

Chiefs' plan. First of all, he believed that a Military

Intelligence Agency would fail to effectively serve as a focal point for military intelligence. McNamara did not want a confederation of DOD intelligence units; he wanted an integrated agency. To emphasize his point, McNamara insisted that the new organization be named the Defense Intelligence

Agency. Secondly, McNamara preferred to have an agency subordinate to his office, not the JCS. Discussions regarding the objectives and the reporting structure for this proposed agency continued to be debated between the SECDEF and the

Joint Chiefs.41

Other members of the intelligence community debated the merits of a defense intelligence agency as well. For instance,

Allen Dulles, the Director of Central Intelligence, questioned the viability of a centralized military intelligence agency.

40 Clifford Opper, Interview by Author, Former DIA analyst, 26 May 1992, Arlington, VA. 41 "The DIA ..." (working papers), 39. 29 He feared that opinions from a consolidated agency would limit

CIA access to conflicting military viewpoints. He felt that in particular, NIE's would be weakened if their was a unified DIA position instead of separate Service points. Authors Wise and

Ross report that the Services helped sway Dulles' viewpoint.

The Services attempted to convince Dulles that they deserved an independent voice in forming NIE's. McNamara assured Dulles that the DIA would be a coordinating, not a usurping body, though he did not promise that the Services would retain full representation on the USIB.42

Eventually, McNamara and the Joint Chiefs agreed on a concept and plan for the DIA. In a July 6, 1961 classified memo to the President (declassified March 1985), McNamara outlined the proposal for his Commander in Chief. He wrote:

The DIA will be responsible for the operation of a large part of the intelligence resources now assigned to the separate services and the Joint Staff. It will also review and coordinate the intelligence functions retained by the military departments. DIA will assume the vital task of supplying military intelligence to the major components of the Department of Defense, the United States Intelligence Board, and other organizations in the national intelligence community. It will not, however, interfere with conduct of the intelligence activities in the unified and specified combatant commands which will remain under operational control of their respective commanders. It is contemplated that under the general supervision of DIA, some major intelligence activities; such as, personnel, ... intelligence

42 Ross and Wise, 213 - 214. 30 security and intelligence training will be retained by the military departments.43 McNamara concluded his memo by suggesting five alternate chain of command structures. They ranged from reporting to an individual military departments, to reporting to the Office of the Secretary of Defense, to answering to the JCS.

Surprisingly, McNamara's final recommendation placed the DIA under the Joint Chiefs of Staff.44

This choice is perplexing, since in a memo to the JCS dated July 5, 1961, Deputy Secretary of Defense Gilpatric wrote that the DIA would report through the JCS to the

Secretary of Defense.45 Documentation regarding this debate is sketchy, but the end result is not. On August 1, 1961

(effective October 1, 1961) DOD Directive 5105.21, Defense Intelligence Agency," stated that DIA's chain of command would run "from the Secretary of Defense, through the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Director, DIA.1,46 Somehow McNamara and the

Joint Chiefs reconciled their differences by compromising on

DIA's chain of command. Further examination of the directive suggests that McNamara and the Chiefs compromised on other intelligence matters as well.

43 Robert S. McNamara, Classified Memorandum for the President, Subject: The Establishment of a Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), July 6, 1991, declassified March 1985, 2. 44 Ibid. , 3. 45 "The DIA ..." (working papers), 39. 46 DOD Directive 5105.21, "Defense Intelligence Agency," (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1 August 1961), 2. 31 DOD Directive 5105.21

On August 1, 1961 the Department of Defense published DOD

Directive 5105.21, "Defense Intelligence Agency." This document is a vaguely worded directive that contains no mission statement nor specific descriptions of intelligence units or resources under DIA's command. In the very first paragraph under organization and control, the directive states that DIA shall consist of:

a Director, a Deputy Director, a Chief of Staff, a headquarters establishment, and such subordinate units, facilities, and activities as are specifically assigned to the Agency by the Secretary of Defense or by the Joint Chiefs of Staff... (emphasis added)47

By not defining the mission, subordinate units, nor resource management, Secretary McNamara left the Services room to grow, and he gave DIA an ambiguous authority position.

Under the list of DIA's six responsibilities, the first responsibility charged DIA with the "organization, direction, management, and control of all Department of Defense intelligence resources assigned to or included within the

DIA." Since the resources were never explicitly mentioned, the directive provided minimal guidance and authority for its

Director. Responsibilities two and three give DIA "review, coordination and supervision" powers for functions retained by or assigned to the military. Paragraph four made DIA responsible for obtaining "maximum economy and efficiency" in allocating DOD intelligence resources, yet it did not give DIA

47 Ibid., 1. 32 control over all the resources. Finally, responsibilities five and six required DIA to respond to USIB and major DOD component requests.48

The list of six responsibilities is a strangely ordered list. It mentions resources and functions, but it never clearly defines which resources or what functions. Perhaps the generalities of the directive were an attempt at flexibility, but perhaps the generalities of the directive were the victim of too much compromise. By endeavoring to negotiate a plan acceptable to all parties, McNamara and the Chiefs obscured and limited the capabilities of their newly created agency.

Following this list of Responsibilities was a list of nineteen Functions. The first function assigned to the new agency is to "develop and produce" the DOD contribution for the National Intelligence Estimates. This bolsters Pat

Mescall's thesis that McNamara's prime motive in creating DIA was to achieve a unified military estimate. Interestingly, the rest of the list appears to support the second tenant of

Mescall's thesis which states that in order for McNamara to obtain his goal, he allowed the Joint Chiefs to shape the rest of the DIA's tasks.49 Indeed, the remainder of the Functions' list directs DIA to integrate and validate DOD intelligence requirements, provide plans and policies for collection, conduct coordination, etc.. but it does not necessarily

48 Ibid. ,1-2. 49 Mescall, 188. 33 prohibit the military agencies from continuing their organic

intelligence activities.

While there is much truth in Mescall's assertion, the root of DIA's turbulent history cannot be placed squarely on

McNamara. Service resistance fueled by interservice rivalry is perhaps the biggest factor to DIA's struggles. Secondly, many hoped that DIA would perform a seemingly endless number of complex missions. The sheer volume of tasks and the lack of a clearly focused mission statement would overwhelm any agency.

McNamara's vague guidance probably contributed to DIA's difficulties. The third problem area, organization and resource capabilities, does reflect insufficient planning by the Secretary of Defense. DIA's organizational structure and control of resources has hindered its progress from the beginning. DIA did not begin with a well defined organization plan, nor did it have an accurate statement of which resources it managed.

In sum, it is difficult to determine the policymakers' main purpose in creating the DIA. Literature accompanying the release of the directive better states the SECDEF's goals than did the charter itself. In July 1961, Deputy Secretary of

Defense Roswell Gilpatric stated that the main objectives of the DIA were to "obtain unity of effort among all components of the DoD in developing military intelligence and a strengthening of the overall capacity of the DoD for the collection, production, and dissemination of intelligence 34

information."50 Roswell continued to explain that secondary goals of the new agency were to obtain "a more efficient allocation of scarce intelligence resources, more effective management of all DOD intelligence activities, and the elimination of all duplicating facilities, organizations, and tasks.1,51

The words accompanying the establishment DIA contained a real "vision" for DIA, but the charter did not. A recent article written by Lt. Gen. Clapper, the current DIA director, quoted the two above passages to emphasize that DIA's original charter is still "on-target" today.52 Ironically, both passages were from the press statements; neither passage is in

DIA's directive. The concept to create a defense intelligence agency was an idea whose time had come, but the people behind the plan did not prepare a detailed charter that would ensure the success of their new organization.

50 Deane J. Allen, "DIA...Committed to Excellence: An Historical Overview," Communique. (October 1991): 1. 51 Ibid. 52 Lt Gen. James R. Clapper, "Defense Intelligence Reorganization and Challenges," Defense Intelligence Journal (Spring 1992): 3. CHAPTER FOUR

INITIAL PROBLEMS

Troublesome beginnings

The concept behind a consolidated military intelligence agency worked well on paper, however, transferring the plan from paper to reality proved much more difficult than its creators envisioned. KT Johnson, an Air Force civilian at the time of DIA's creation, remarked that the new intelligence agency was put together with a "stapler."53 In other words, many diverse units and activities were mixed together and were held intact without an orderly framework. Any new organization faces challenges; unfortunately DIA had more than most.

General Joseph F. Carroll

Robert McNamara realized that running his new intelligence agency would be a formidable task for any director. Nevertheless, Lieutenant General Joseph F. Carroll,

United States Air Force, accepted McNamara's offer to head the

DIA. Carroll was a former FBI agent who later served as the

Air Force Inspector General. Having worked closely with

McNamara for two years, the Secretary of Defense felt confident that Carroll could take charge of the DIA, and

53 KT Johnson, Interview by author, Former DIA analyst, 16 June 1992, McLean, VA.

35 36

Carroll believed he could handle the challenge.54 To help accomplish his goal, Major General William Quinn (USA-ret.), a former Public Relations officer for the Army, became

Carroll's deputy, and a small joint staff of colonels and high-ranking civilians formed the DIA activation committee.

Many officials questioned the rationale of choosing a non-intelligence officer as the first director of DIA. Yet there was a general consensus that General Carroll was a patient man who would not intentionally provoke the other

Services. Carroll believed in cooperation and he wanted DIA to serve the common cause. Thus, he approached DIA's takeover process with caution in an attempt to gain the acceptance of the Services. His willingness to listen and compromise made him a good candidate for the job.55

The first obstacles Carroll and his committee encountered were physical. Though the Secretary of Defense provided DIA with a directive, a director, and a working staff, he did not give them a building for operations! Carroll and his team had to fight with other agencies in order to get rooms to set up shop. The first offices were borrowed rooms in the Pentagon.

Over the years every Director would lobby Congress for a DIA building. In 1962 the Agency moved into two buildings at

Arlington Hall, but not until 1981 did Congress approve the

54 General William Quinn, Interview by Author, 22 June 1992, Washington, D.C. 55 Quinn, Interview by Author; Johnson, Interview by Author; Opper, Interview by Author. 37 money for a separate facility. In addition to the lack of space, Carroll also had to overcome the physical complications of preparing a classified workplace. This ranged from setting up document registries, to establishing secured facilities, to managing personnel clearances.56

Though these physical problems were irksome, they all had identifiable solutions. The next set of hurdles plagued DIA throughout its entire development. Carroll had the unenviable task of establishing an agency with personnel who resented its creation. Furthermore, he had to identify which intelligence functions DIA would control, he had to design DIA's organizational structure, and he had to designate the resources DIA needed to operate effectively. Starting a new agency is a daunting assignment; starting a new intelligence agency that would usurp already existing units' personnel, mission and budget proved almost impossible.

Service Resistance

The concept for a defense intelligence agency originated from a series of studies conducted in the 1940s and 1950s. The concept became a reality due to the determined efforts of

Secretary of Defense McNamara. Creating a centralized agency that would prepare intelligence products of common concern seemed to McNamara to be the logical solution for obtaining

56 Quinn, Interview by Author.

t 38

unity and efficiency from the Defense Department. The three Services, on the other hand, disagreed.57

Notoriously parochial, the Services have always opposed

jointness, and they saw the creation of the DIA as an invasion of their intelligence turf; they were afraid that a consolidated agency would produce "bureaucratized” and

"purplized" intelligence. The Army, Air Force and Navy felt that DIA would be unresponsive to their individual needs, and they balked at the idea of a joint organization. Above all, they believed (and still believe) that DIA and other joint defense agencies threaten their budgets and their turf. This initial lack of confidence marked the beginning of the turmoil surrounding DIA.

Interservice Rivalry

Unfortunately, Service resistance to joint operations has a long history in the United States. Carl H. Builder's The

Masks of War; American Military Styles in Strategy and

Analysis describes the personality differences between the

Services. He questions whether the military forces are means to political ends, or if they are merely ends in themselves.

He argues that the Services are the most powerful institutions in the Department of Defense. Indeed, he writes that though individual members are usually loyal to the nation, the units

57 Opper, Interview by Author. 39

to which they belong often place institutional interests first.58 Understanding interservice rivalry is paramount in

understanding the trials faced by the new Defense Intelligence

Agency. Builder defines the personalities of the three

Services as "profound, pervasive and persistent.1,59 By

summarizing his key points it becomes easier to appreciate DIA's uphill battle to be the head of the military

intelligence community; the agency devoted to common concerns.

Essentially, Builder portrays the Navy, Air Force and Army as

three separate institutions with three very different

identities and behaviors.

Builder characterizes the Navy as the most independent and most solitary-minded military force. The Navy has its own

aviation and its own army; therefore, it sees no need to

cooperate with another outside Service. Of the three, the Navy

is most ardently against any type of jointness or unification.

The Army, however, portrays itself as the "essential

artisan" of war. This military branch argues that in the end,

all battles are decided on the ground. Yet unlike the Navy,

the Army recognizes the necessity of collaboration. The Army

stresses the interdependence of combat and Service support

branches. Of the three armed forces, the Army more frequently

58 Carl H. Builder, The Masks of War: American Military Styles in Strategy and Analysis. (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1989), 12 - 14. 59 Ibid., 5. 40 acknowledges the benefits of integration. Nevertheless, this

is not to say that the Army prefers joint operations to individual activities.“

Lastly, Builder states that the Air Force is not only the newest Service, it is also the least confident of the

Services. He writes that the Air Force is more dedicated to the art of flying than to institutional ties. Unlike the Navy and the Army, the Air Force owes its existence to modern technology. Thus, the Air Force often feels compelled to defend its legitimacy as an essential and independent organization. Builder asserts that the Air Force is usually reluctant to support joint endeavors for fear of weakening its identity.61

Builder concluded his book by questioning whether the

Services will ever be more compatible, or more willing to work together. He says that funding constraints may force cooperation, but not without much protesting. He believes that the only way to change the American military is to first understand the separate institutions and the personnel that comprise them.62

To comprehend how DIA operates, the same principles apply. One first needs to understand the background of the three Services, but one also must examine the interactions between personnel. DIA is an agency made up of personnel from

60 Ibid. , 27 - 33. 61 Ibid., 33 - 36. 62 Ibid., 202. 41 three fiercely independent Services, but DIA civilians also account for a large portion of the workforce. To learn where

DIA first had major difficulties, it is imperative to examine personnel issues.

Personnel Wars

When the Services were ordered to transfer some of their analysts to DIA, the response varied from Service to Service.

The Navy and the Army both objected to consolidated intelligence. They preferred to fend for themselves.

(Interviewees stated that the Navy was more opposed to the idea than the Army, but that the Army was not very supportive either). Surprisingly, the Air Force backed the DIA. They offered to send an entire group of analysts to the new agency.

However, this act was not altruistic, rather it fulfilled an immediate self-interest for the Air Force.

A retired Air Force intelligence general explained that during the 1960s, the Air Force was under pressure to reduce their intelligence staff. The Air Force had two separate organizations, the Air Force Intelligence Center (AFIC), and the Air Force Technical Intelligence Center at Wright

Patterson Air Base (in Ohio). By transferring the AFIC to the

DIA, the Air Force not only solved an internal problem, but it also provided a core group of analysts for the new agency. 42 In this manner, the Air Force filled DIA billets without hurting its own institution.63

Unfortunately, this situation did not apply for the Navy or the Army. Neither had an "extra" set of analysts to relocate. Instead, these Services allegedly used DIA as a chance to get rid of some of their less qualified personnel, both military and civilian. Numerous interviews substantiate this view. Words such as "deadwood," "mediocre," and

"offloading less competent personnel" were used to describe the some of the people sent to DIA.64 Bobby Inman, once the

Vice Director of DIA stated, "the organization [DIA] had been created in 1961 by establishing billets and then filling them by permitting the Services to send the agency the 60 percent of their people they wanted to get rid of, while holding on to the 40 percent they wanted to have."65

The reasons for sending lesser qualified personnel stem from the institutional imperatives that Builder so adeptly explained. The Services resisted transferring their best people because they wanted to maintain the quality of their own intelligence shops. By the same token, the best people avoided DIA out of loyalty to their Service, which continued

63 Non-attribution source, Interview by Author, Former Chief of Intelligence for one of the Services. 64 RADM Thomas Brooks (USN-ret.), Interview by Author, Former J2, 15 May 1992, Rosslyn, Va.; RADM Harvey, Phone Interview by Author, 12 March 1992, KT Johnson, Interview by Author. 65 Thomas P. Coakley, ed., C3I; Issues of Command and Control. (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University, 1991): 220. 43 to control promotion. Therefore, instead of DIA receiving the

"best and the brightest," they had to make due with what the

Services were willing to spare. One intelligence official remarked, "DIA was born old; McNamara just gathered the drones and put them all in one building."66 This Service reluctance encumbered DIA's genesis, and the Agency evolved very slowly.

It must be emphasized that this is a gross generalization of events that occurred during DIA's formative years. General Quinn, the first deputy director, stated that when DIA requested certain individuals by name, DIA received the "cream of the crop." In particular, he mentioned that DIA was able to transfer an especially sharp analyst from the Strategic Air

Command to an Agency shop.67 Clifford Opper, another former senior intelligence official, corroborated this statement by remarking that among the many mediocre people assigned to DIA, "sometimes outstanding people slipped in too."68

Though the disparaging comments regarding DIA1 s personnel applied to both the military and civilians personnel, DIA had different types of problems regarding each group. Two intelligence officials, one civilian and one military, described DIA as having various "subcultures." They were referring to the differences between civilian and military

66 Non-attribution quote in Prados, 179. 67 Quinn, Interview by Author. 68 Opper, Interview by Author. 44

personnel as well as differences between Army, Air Force and

Navy personnel.69

Military analysts, for example, are trained to perform

the same basic tasks, but procedures and terms vary from

Service to Service. This dilemma is faced by every joint

agency, but it compounded an already strained situation for

the DIA. Instead of a smooth transition from the individual

Service to DIA, analysts became bogged down trying to learn each other's operating procedures.

Civilians, on the other hand, grappled to learn three

military languages simultaneously. Additionally, civilians had

to learn the assorted military customs. Duncan Clarke recognized this dilemma and stated that "... many civilians

leave, or if they stay, [they] become frustrated by the

practices and ambiance of this essential military

organization."70 Overcoming these "cultural" differences was

hampered due to the caliber of the new DIA employees.

Mediocrity does not encourage motivation or innovation.71

A problem unique to the military employees of DIA was

overcoming the stigma of serving in a "joint" assignment.

Every military officer knows that to reach the top, one must have certain "ticket punches," this is one must hold certain positions within one's own Service. During DIA's formative

69 Brooks, Interview by Author; Non-attribution source, Interview by Author, SSCI Staff member, 6 April 1992, Senate Hart Building. 70 Clarke, 180. 71 Brooks, Interview by Author. 45 years, military officers were hard pressed to find any reward

in working for a joint agency. Officers knew they would be out of the promotion loop if they altered their career path.

Jim Davis, a senior civilian official in Army

intelligence, explained that working for the DIA did not play

a part in the very structured military career progression

pattern. It was hard to convince an officer to aspire to serve

in the DIA.72 As a testimony to the above, General Faurer

(eventually a DIA Directorate Chief) stated that when he first

worked for DIA as a junior officer in the mid-60s, his boss

welcomed him by saying, "It's too bad you're coming to DIA.

Your career will end here."73 Although this did not happen in

General Faurer's case, it demonstrates the strength of the

"joint assignment" stigma.

Whereas the very fact of "jointness" is a contentious

issue for the military, civilians view a joint assignment as

neither a positive nor a negative attribute. Nonetheless,

working in DIA presented disincentives for civilians as well.

First of all, both the CIA and NSA had well established

civilian career programs; DIA did not. Secondly, senior

civilians had to compete with flag officers for the high level

positions. Since DIA was a defense agency, the Services did not want civilians to hold too many senior analyst positions which drastically limited civilian promotion possibilities. In

72 Jim Davis, Interview by Author, Assistant DCSINT (Management), 30 April 1992, Pentagon. 73 Faurer, Interview by Author. 46 addition, DIA did not have a civilian career plan to guide a civilian's progress within the agency.74

The combination of these factors encouraged many of the best civilian analysts to leave DIA and pursue a career with one of the other intelligence agencies. Lastly, DIA had to observe regular civil service rules and did not possess the special hire/fire authority that CIA and NSA had. This made it difficult for DIA to retain high caliber people and eliminate less qualified analysts.

To further complicate matters for DIA, the Agency also had to grapple with tensions between the civilian and military employees. Though a common dilemma in any DOD agency, this friction aggravated an already stressful situation for DIA.

Some civilians had a negative image of their military counterparts. Since DIA is just one assignment during a military tour of duty, military personnel turned over every three or four years. This rotation practice frustrated some

DIA civilians, since their long term view of the Agency was not shared by their military counterparts. For a civilian, who regarded the DIA as a long term career, the constant turnover of military personnel upset continuity and stability.75

Many in the military agreed that civilian-military dichotomy was disruptive, but they cited a different reason.

A senior military officer explained that military personnel

74 Opper, Interview by Author. 75 Non-Attribution source, Interview by Author, HPSCI staff member, 29 October 1990, Russel House Building. 47

sometimes felt they were being treated as "temporary help."

When assigned to DIA, younger officers who were used having great responsibility were often given less challenging jobs.76 During several interviews, many senior intelligence officials emphasized that the potential of military members should not be underestimated based on their short tours at

DIA. Instead, they asserted that new personnel could provide fresh insight.77

At the same time, however, the military services persisted in aggravating the situation. They still refused to send their best analysts to DIA, which did little to promote good relations with the civilian experts. Caught in a vicious cycle, DIA continued to be staffed with many second-rate military and civilian analysts who viewed each other with suspicion. During these initial years, Service reluctance and the lack of a clear civilian career program hindered the profession growth of the DIA.

Complex Mission - Production

Those opposed to DIA said the new agency would "take away

[intelligence] from the services."78 In essence, this was true. One of Secretary McNamara's primary reasons for creating the DIA was to develop a counterweight for Service

76 Lt. General Tom Weinstein (USA-ret.), Interview by Author, Former Army Chief of Intelligence, 12 MAy 1992, Arlington, VA. 77 Non-Attribution source, Interview by Author, Senior Military Intelligence Analyst, 28 May 1992, Washington, D.C. 78 Williams, Interview by author. 48

intelligence. Clifford Opper, a civilian analyst who worked

for DIA from the beginning, explained that McNamara envisioned one analyst preparing "common cause" intelligence for all parties. In other words, McNamara wanted the Joint Staff, the

Secretary and the U&S Commands to receive the same product

from a single source.79 Ironically, DIA's original directive did not specify the production requirements.

Indeed, DIA lacked a clear vision; its initial charter omitted a general mission statement. Without a mission statement, it is difficult to establish guidelines or a definitive goal. Not until December 17, 1962, did DIA add a paragraph describing its production mission. This insertion empowered the agency to "develop, produce, and provide all DoD finished intelligence and supporting data ... "80

Unfortunately, this addition did not provide clear guidance; it left much room for independent interpretations.

The difficulty in implementing this amendment was that the Services still had room to maneuver. All three felt resentment as the DIA began to infringe on their production territory. As DIA sought to define its mission and goals, it continued to provoke the Services. Several former intelligence officials remarked that DIA tended to act bureaucratically rather than expeditiously. Instead of being sensitive to the

79 Opper, Interview by author. 80 DOD Directive 5105.21, First amendment, 12/16/61. 49

Services' fears, DIA attempted to control intelligence in as many areas as possible.81

Retired Lieutenant General Graham (USA-ret.), a former

DIA director, remarked that when DIA first began, it tried to do too many tasks. For instance, he stated that DIA wanted to take over the Navy's ship tracking operations. Graham argued that DIA should have tasked the Navy for the information, rather than try to produce a specialized Navy product. Graham said that the DIA should have left the highly technical products with Services, and should have tasked the Services when necessary.82

By examining DIA's original production categories, it becomes evident that no central plan directed requirements. KT

Johnson, a former civilian Air Force intelligence official, observed that DIA "inherited" many disparate intelligence products from the Services. The Air Force, for instance, brought many of their standing products (such as a bombing encyclopedia) with them. The problem was that many of these standing products were outdated. At some point in time a user had requested information, but without a centralized control system the request remained on the books indefinitely. DIA intended to make production its first priority, but it did not seem to be able manage the system efficiently.83

81 Non-Attribution source, Interview by Author, Former Air Force Chief of Intelligence; Johnson, Interview by Author. 82 Lt Gen. Daniel Graham, Interview by Author, Former DIA Director, 10 March 1992, Arlington, VA. 83 Johnson, Interview by Author. 50 Science and Technology

Science and technology (S&T) was a prime example of a

production area that DIA failed t manage effectively. Analysts

working in S&T are essential for weapons procurement.

Determination of the threat becomes the basis for the process.

Hence the Services regard their own S&T centers as a crucial

element of their intelligence programs. Concomitantly, those

outside the military feared that S&T centers bowed to

parochial pressures.

Decisionmakers hoped that the new agency would mitigate

tendencies toward inflated threat estimates. Predictably, the

Services resisted transferring this function to DIA, and they

backstaffed their respective S&T centers to prevent DIA from

gaining total control. In this manner, Service resistance

again thwarted DIA's attempts to consolidate production.84 National Intelligence Estimates

Another area DIA sought to dominate was the military

portion of the NIEs. The intelligence community used the

United States Intelligence Board (USIB) to prepare NIEs, and

in order to give DIA more influence, McNamara asked DCI McCone to remove the individual military service intelligence chiefs and replace them with the Director of DIA. McCone was not willing to lose the Service intelligence chiefs' input altogether, but he did reduce their status by making them observers instead of active members. As observers, however,

84 Opper, Interview by Author. 51

they still could contribute to the meetings, and they maintained the ability to add notes of dissension to the NIEs.

A former Service intelligence chief during this time of transition (1963) stated that at first McCone's change did not have a tremendous effect on Service chiefs' input.

Nevertheless, over time DIA's stature grew, and independent

Service opinion diminished. The Attache System

DIA responsibilities increased, and in 1965 it took over the military attache system. Until then, every Service had its own attaches, who provided overt information on foreign militaries. Before DIA took over the attache system, each

Service sent their own representatives to embassies.

Unfortunately, duplication of effort and lack of coordination typified the system. Therefore, DIA's new role in the Defense

Attache System was one of management. Each Service still provided its own officer for the attache mission, but now DIA directed the tasking and reporting operations. Naturally, the

Services regarded the DIA's new position as interference, and the move was not popular among the armed forces.85

When DIA first took control of the attache system, mission support fluctuated. For example, General Larkin, a

Deputy Director in the early 80s, was a Defense Attache during

DIA's early years. He explained that initially DIA's tasking was too broad, too non-specific. Support for the attaches

85 Hfjhe d i a ..." (working papers), 127. 52 varied from country to country, and few officers welcomed

DIA's involvement. Gradually, the situation improved and tasking requirements even told the attaches "which corner to

stand on.nB6 Over the years the attache program continued to

grow in importance; this reporting is DIA's only means of organic collection.

Imagery

One activity that DIA did not pursue was Imagery

Intelligence (IMINT). Lt. General Williams (USA-ret.), a DIA director during the 1980s, said that when DIA was founded, DOD struck a deal to split IMINT between the National

Reconnaissance Office (NRO) and the CIA.87 During the 1960s, the imagery process suited those who needed the information.

Department of Defense imagery requirements filtered through DIA, but CIA and the NRO handled production.

In sum, DIA had an extremely complicated production demand to fulfill. Products ranged from finished intelligence reports, to current intelligence summaries and briefings, to attache management. DIA attempted to gain control of these diverse taskings, but it was always pulled in many directions at once. To further exacerbate the problem, DIA's customers desired products on various levels, from tactical to strategic intelligence. The new intelligence agency's consumers ranged from national security policymakers, to defense planners, to

86 General Larkin, Interview by Author, Former DIA Deputy Director, 1 April 1992, McLean, VA. 87 Williams, Interview by Author. 53 weapons acquisitioners, to field commanders, to aircrew

members. With only the ambiguous DOD directive to guide them, DIA attempted to answer its assorted constituency to the best

of its abilities.

Complex Mission - Customers

The DIA's list of customers included the SECDEF, the OSD,

the CJCS, the Joint Staff, the U&S Commands, and the Services,

as well as other non-defense agencies. Interestingly, when

polling the various interviewees to name DIA's primary

customers, the answer was never exactly the same. The person's

affiliation (military, civilian ...) affected the response.88

Most agreed, however, that DIA was originally designed to

serve the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the Joint

Staff. By dividing the consumers into these two main camps,

some argued that DIA had to perform two opposing tasks which

could lead to a conflict of interest. Others maintained that

DIA merely suffered a conflict of priority instead.

To help clarify this confusion between serving the OSD

and the Joint Staff, one must first make a distinction between

their support staffs. By July 1963, DIA had assumed the entire

intelligence role for the Joint Staff, and the J2 position was

discontinued. The Director of DIA now acted as the J2, though

DIA also appointed a flag officer to represent the Director on

88 The same thing happened when interviewees were asked to define DIA's primary products; answers were never identical. This demonstrates how the lack of a clearly defined mission affected DIA's ability to be an efficient intelligence agency. 54 the Joint Staff. The SECDEF, however, did not have a DIA support staff as part of its office.

Secondly, the requirements between the JCS and the OSD

varied significantly. The Joint Staff needed intelligence

primarily for operational purposes, while the OSD most often

needed intelligence for resource analysis. By understanding

these differences, it is evident that DIA did not necessarily

have a conflict of interest, though it could have a conflict

of priority. Nonetheless, several intelligence officials

acknowledged that conflicts of interest did sometimes

surface.89

For instance, OSD often wanted information that exceeded

their responsibilities; they requested operational

intelligence. Operational intelligence is often more

intriguing than intelligence for functional applications, but

OSD does not conduct operations. When the SECDEF needs

operational information, the JCS works the position and then

presents it to the SECDEF. However, if the SECDEF becomes very

involved in intelligence, then the OSD will too.

In this manner, DIA was not really being pulled in two

opposing directions, rather it was attempting to separate the

types of intelligence each office needed in order to complete

their disparate mission. Due to the division of intelligence

emphasis between the JCS and the OSD, the perception that DIA

89 Johnson, Interview by Author; Davis, Interview by Author. 55

provided better support to the former than the latter slowly

emerged.90

Another factor that contributed to DIA's apparently uneven consumer support was that it did not understand the needs of all of its customers, and its customers did not understand DIA's capabilities. To improve consumer relations, DIA solicited help from the RAND corporation in 1969. RAND held a conference to help DIA address the needs of its customers. At the same time, RAND emphasized that intelligence is not a free good; users must also be active participants in the process. KT Johnson, who was present at this conference, suggested that DIA was sometimes its own worst enemy. DIA did not do a good job of selling itself. To assist DIA, RAND initiated a series of product surveys that helped the consumer and DIA in refining the intelligence product lists.91 Struggle for Recognition

Despite DIA's efforts to satisfy all requirements for all consumers, few beyond the military community recognized DIA as a viable source of intelligence. Those in the national intelligence community were not yet aware nor convinced that

DIA was the military intelligence expert. In 1968, Lyman

Kirkpatrick, the self-proclaimed "father of DIA," captured this sentiment by stating;

90 Brooks, Interview by Author; Johnson, Interview by Author; Davis, Interview by Author. 91 Ibid. 56 the creation of the DIA has provided an excellent vehicle for the DOD to satisfy its own intelligence requirements, but it is not equipped for the preparation of national intelligence. By its military nature it could never attract the type of civilian intelligence officers that have manned the Central Intelligence Agency for the last two decades.92

The intelligence community accepted a centralized defense

intelligence agency, but during its first decade, DIA's complex mission confused most customers.

DIA's Organizational Structure and Resources

Since DIA was such a diverse agency, devising its organizational structure proved to be an immense challenge.

Not only was its original charter a vague guide, but genuine

Service opposition also impeded proper management. To handle the innumerable tasks that faced the new agency, General

Carroll, in 1961, formed a planning group to help shape DIA.

The group developed an "Activation Plan" which sought to slowly integrate the other defense intelligence activities into the DIA. They realized that they would be confronted with

Service opposition, but they hoped that a phased consolidation plan would ease the transition.93

The planning group followed two principles during their activation phase. First, they decided DIA would be organized horizontally. They made two operating-level directorates

(Acquisitions and Processing), and they divided these into functional elements. Secondly, the planners gave the two

92 Kirkpatrick, 267. 93 "The DIA ..." (working papers), 53. 57 directorates management staffs to help manage and control external intelligence activities. The planners hoped DIA would be able to coordinate all Defense intelligence and eliminate functional overlap and redundant resources.94

As would be expected, DIA's planners met with difficulties from the beginning. One trouble area involved operations in the Directorate of Acquisition (DIAAQ). This Directorate comprised two sections, the Office of Requirements and the Office of Collection Management. The Office of Requirements proceeded smoothly, but operations in the Office of Collection Management did not. Requirements received clear instruction and support from DIA planners, and within a year it published its first consolidated registry. Collection

Management, on the other hand, was charted to oversee Defense collection, but at first, DIA had no collection assets under its control. (Attaches were not incorporated into DIA's structure until 1964.) DIA's directive gave it responsibility for DOD intelligence resources, but DIA did not own any assets. This resource issue would become a recurring dilemma for the agency.95

DIA's other directorate, Processing, contained the core functions of DIA. DIA envisioned itself primarily as a producer of intelligence, and this directorate housed the heart of DIA. By the end of 1963, (the same year the DOD

94 Ibid., 55. 95 Ibid., 95. 58

directive was amended giving DIA control of DOD finished

intelligence), the Processing Directorate had five offices:

Production Planning, Estimates, Current Intelligence and

Indications, Science and Technology and support for the

National Military Command System.96 These sections faced the overwhelming task of combining previously separate Service activities under one organization.

For example, the targeting support cell consolidated the

Army, Navy, and Air Force targeteers into one unit.

Unfortunately, instead of appointing one director, DIA merged the entire Service sections to include the three chiefs.

According to one account,

this produced the worst of all possible worlds in the DIA, because besides the difficulty of producing intelligence by committee, it created internal strains among the individuals involved as each struggled in a bureaucratically ordered environment which contended that all views were equal.97

In an effort to become operational quickly, DIA's structure compounded its problems. After several years of organizational turmoil, both the JCS and DIA reviewed the agency's progress and recommended a significant reorganization.

The First Reorganization - 1966

As discussed above, a majority of DIA's organizational problems were due to the haphazard manner in which the agency

96 Ibid. 97 William Corson, The Armies of Ignorance: The Rise of the American Intelligence Empire. (New York: The Dial Press, 1977), 390. 59 attempted to integrate Service activities. This led to

duplication and overlap, and it also further exacerbated the

already reluctant Services. At the same time, this fractured

structure failed to earn the confidence of its diverse

consumer base. In addition, it was unclear what each section was capable of producing. Thus, DIA sought to realign the

agency to gain better control of management.98

The solution devised by DIA's reorganizers transformed

DIA from a functional to a geographical organization. Each of the geographic regions broke down into functional subunits.

Intelligence agencies typically follow one of these two methods of organization — function or geography. DIA's administration created a list of pros and cons and determined that geography would better suit the needs of DIA as it met the challenges of the changing world.99 A Recap of the First Decade

Intelligence requirements increased dramatically during the 1960s. Technology advances, increased Cold War tensions

(to include the Cuban Missile Crisis), Vietnam and other foreign policy matters quickly taxed the new intelligence agency. According to DIA Historian Deane Allen, " ... during

DIA's growing pains in the 1960's, what often was mistaken as ineptitude was in fact the unheralded entry into a new

98 "The DIA ..." (working papers), 138. 99 Ibid., 143 - 144. 60 intelligence era— for which the Agency had become the unwitting DoD standardbearer. ,,10°

At the same time, DIA's management system also delayed

progress. There was no program in place to encourage military

and civilian personnel to request a DIA assignment. DIA's

mission was broad and vaguely defined, and DIA's organization

and reorganization reflected the attempts to preform all tasks for all people.

From the very beginning, DIA had to settle for "second- best" in many areas. Many of its first analysts were personnel the Service intelligence organizations wanted to transfer. Its directive provided minimal guidance for an extraordinarily complex mission. Lastly, DIA was charged to serve a diverse, yet demanding group of customers but was not given the resources to do so. DIA labored to find an organizational structure to meet its needs, but was denied many of the resources it needed and it inherited many of the Service sections intact.

In sum, Service resistance, personnel mediocrity, and mission complexity adversely affected DIA's early efforts in becoming a consolidated, highly efficient defense intelligence agency. A poorly articulated directive and a "stapled" together structure further intensified the problems. The concept behind the Defense Intelligence Agency was sound; the implementation of the concept was not.

100 Ibid., 109. CHAPTER 5

A DECADE OF CRITICISM

The Fitzhuah Report

After a decade of difficult beginnings, DIA entered the

1970s under intense scrutiny. The Administration was anxious to evaluate the status of the defense intelligence community

in general, and the impact of DIA in particular. Preliminary observations made by Assistant Secretary of Defense Robert

Froehlke raised concern over the quality of management within the DOD intelligence community. Follow-on studies reinforced his findings.101

In 1969, President Nixon and Defense Secretary Laird commissioned Gilbert Fitzhugh to head a Blue Ribbon Defense

Panel to study the "organization, management, and operating procedures of the Department of Defense."102 The section dedicated to defense intelligence issues provided an in-depth analysis of problems identified in Froehlke's initial review.

Not surprisingly, Fitzhugh's main findings can be categorized as Service resistance, personnel issues, mission complexity and organizational structure.

101 "The DIA ..." (working papers) , 164. 102 Ibid., 165.

61 62 The Panel astutely observed that the Services still did not accept DIA as the body to lead defense intelligence.

Indeed, by 1970 each Services' intelligence branch had increased in size despite the creation of DIA. The Services justified their growth by claiming that DIA could not satisfy their individual needs. Their report stated:

It is interesting that DIA cannot develop a capability to perform its assigned functions, while the Military Departments, which provide a large proportion of DIA personnel, maintain the required capability and continue to perform the functions.103

Trapped in a vicious cycle, DIA was chartered to consolidate intelligence activities, but the Services refused to surrender their functions and quality personnel to the Agency. Thus, the report marked Service resistance as a major problem area.104

The most crucial problem of DIA, according to Fitzhugh,

"can be summarized as too many jobs and too many masters."105

Fitzhugh argued that the Director of DIA had to respond to demands of both the SECDEF and the CJCS. The report determined that the positions of these two organizations were often diverse which could lead to areas of conflict. This report argued that DIA did too many tasks for too many customers, and thus was unable to do any one mission to its full ability.106

103 Fitzhugh Report quoted in U.S. Congress Senate, Final Report of the Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations, Foreign and Military Intelligence. Book 1, April 26, 1976. (Church Committee Report) 104 Blue Ribbon Defense Panel, GPO: Washington D.C., July 1970, 45. (Fitzhugh Report) 105 Ibid. 106 Ibid., 45. 63

As discussed earlier, the problem was really more a conflict

of priority, but the perception of the latter persisted.

Another observation of the Blue Ribbon Panel focused on DIA's organization and resource management. The Panel recognized that DIA was charged with the responsibility for managing collection and production, but the Panel argued that

DIA lacked proper resource authority and effective organization. In an effort to solve the resource problem, the

Panel suggested creating an Assistant Secretary of Defense for

Intelligence (ASD/I) to manage all defense intelligence community resources. The Department of Defense endorsed this suggestion and an ASD/I took office in 1971.107

To remedy the organizational problems, the Panel recommended making the ASD/I the Director of Defense

Intelligence (DDI) . This would give him control over the entire Defense intelligence community, to include DIA. In addition, the Panel sought to reorganize DIA's internal structure along functional lines, making collection and production into two separate agencies. In turn, the heads of these two agencies would report directly to the new DDI.108

After further review, this second recommendation was not approved. Appointing a DDI would have increased control over the Services, but it would have decreased the DIA Director's authority. The Fitzhugh Panel recognized DIA's difficulty in

107 Church Committee Report, 342. 108 Ibid., 342. 64 leading a community that resented its existence, but its solution for DIA's problems would have transferred authority outside of the agency, rather than giving more power to the agency. In the midst of these investigations, DIA recognized the critical atmosphere surrounding its progress, and decided to implement another internal reorganization project.

The 1970 Reorganization

Partly in response to its critics, and partly due to internal pressures, DIA conducted a sweeping reorganization in

1970. After a decade of operations, DIA needed to improve its reputation within the intelligence community. By 1970 DIA had managed to consolidate as many operations as possible; now DIA had to focus on its mission and future role. During this evaluation process, DIA also had to contend with a severe manpower reduction. From 1968 to 1975, in the aftermath of

Vietnam, the military suffered a 31 percent personnel decrease. Thus DIA had to incorporate limited personnel figures into its plans.109

DIA listed three main objectives as the purpose of its reorganization. First of all, it wanted to establish the DIA

Director as the principal intelligence advisor to the SECDEF,

CJCS and DOD community. Secondly, DIA wanted to improve the support for the U&S Commands and the military units. Thirdly,

DIA wanted to modify its management responsibilities in light

109 Allen, 2. 65 of the new ASD/I.110 The first two objectives reinforces the

notion that DIA still had trouble defining its mission and realm of authority. The last goal merely addressed a new

element in DOD.

Four other factors also affected DIA's reorganization efforts. One addressed DIA's image problem. A second examined the dilemma of decreasing resources amidst increasing requirements. A third stressed that DIA must play a bigger role in its strategic support, and a fourth acknowledged that the poor physical facilities of Arlington Hall were unlikely to improve in the near future.111 The addition of these four statements demonstrates that DIA understood its limited progress of the 60s, and its recognized that it needed to improve itself in the 70s.

The reorganization effort began under the guidance of a new director, General Donald V. Bennett, (USA). General

Bennett remarked that DIA's problems were "... not simple problems with quick and easy solutions."112 At the same time he understood that ways to fix DIA's situation included consumer education, requirement evaluation, elimination of duplication, and renewed emphasis on career progression.

During his tenure, General Bennett redefined the manner in

110 "The DIA ..." (working papers), 168 - 169. 111 Ibid., 169. 112 Ibid., 172. 66

which DIA functioned. He refocused many of the directorates,

and he consolidated many other areas of activity.113

In 1972 Vice Admiral de Poix became the new director of

DIA. His term did little to improve DIA. One of his peers

stated that "de Poix couldn't even spell intelligence."114 The selection of de Poix as the third director was a peculiar

choice. During an agency's formative years, one would

anticipate the appointment of extremely qualified directors.

Oddly this was not the case for DIA. It is worth quickly

reviewing how DIA directors were chosen up to this point.

DIA Director Selection

A former DIA Chief of Staff explained the nomination process in detail. Each Service nominates a candidate for

director. Since the director's slot is a three star officer

(or its equivalent), the number of candidates is perforce a

select group. Successive Directors are supposed to come from

different Services, and the DIA Director is not supposed to be

from the same Service as the NSA Director since both serve on

the Intelligence Community staff. Each Service has a limited

number of flag officer slots, so they are hesitant to

surrender a three star billet to intelligence, let alone to

DIA.115

113 General Bennett quoted in "The DIA ..." (working papers), 170. 114 Non-Attribution source, Interview by Author, Former DIA military analyst, 12 March 1992, Washington, D.C. 115 Ibid. 67

The former DIA Chief of Staff further explained that each

Service rated the importance of filling this slot differently.

The Army, for instance, considered the position worthwhile;

the Air Force, he believed, had a somewhat lesser opinion; the Navy, on the other hand, "had to be whipped to nominate

someone." In fact, when reviewing the list of DIA Directors,

one is immediately struck by the fact that only one Director came from the Navy, VADM de Poix.

Once in office, each director's term in office has varied greatly. DIA's original charter specified that each director should serve for a period of four years. Later revisions of the charter no longer included the length of a term.

Regardless, this section of the charter was loosely followed.

Rapid turnover disrupts continuity and stability in any organization. For DIA, an organization with a convoluted history, constantly rotating Directors further weakened the

Agency.116

Reorganization under Lieutenant General Graham

In 1974, Lieutenant General Daniel 0. Graham, (USA-ret.), assumed the directorship. As the first director with a solid intelligence background, General Graham had a better understanding of the challenges DIA faced. Therefore, he decided the agency needed to be reorganized and refocused.

Graham believed that it was too easy for an agency to get

116 DOD Directive 5105.21, (Washington, D.C.: DOD, 19 May 1977): 4. 68 bogged down in management issues, thus his reorganization efforts emphasized production, not regulation.117

One of the initial measures General Graham instituted was delegated production. Graham realized that much of the technical expertise still remained within individual Services, so he decided to transfer some of the production responsibilities to them. Under this system, the Services concentrated on what they knew best. For example, U.S. Army

Europe units produced intelligence on Soviet forces, and then fed the information to DIA. General Graham believed that DIA should not try to do everything itself, instead it should task the Services and make them respond to requests. 118 On the one hand, Graham alleviated some of the tension between DIA and the Services. On the other hand, he gave the Services less incentive to regard DIA as the premier authority, and he lost the ability to control quality.

In 1974 General Graham introduced another project; this one was designed to improve estimates. Having worked extensively on National Intelligence Estimates earlier in his career, General Graham determined that DIA needed to designate a group of experts similar to the CIA's National Intelligence

Officers. Hence Graham established Defense Intelligence

Officers.119 These positions were reserved for the substantive experts in the field. In addition to providing a

117 Graham, Interview by Author. 118 Ibid. 119 Ibid. 69

central figure for estimates, the creation of DIOs also gave analysts something to which they could aspire. During DIA*s

first decade, the career progression for analysts was limited and uncertain. With the creation of DIOs, analysts could have the beginnings of a career ladder. Though the DIO program encountered several setbacks (which will be discussed later),

DIOs marked a positive change for DIA personnel.120

A third innovation initiated by General Graham also involved production and personnel. Broadly defined, intelligence can be divided into two main categories: current intelligence, and basic, or long term, intelligence. General

Graham explained that personnel working in the current shop are the "flash and glitter" analysts. They often brief high ranking officials, and they receive alot of "face time." Basic intelligence analysts maintain data bases and produce valuable, in-depth reports, but they receive little recognition or visibility.121

General Graham realized that many analysts desired current intelligence slots because of the exposure. At the same time, he realized that too often basic intelligence attracted "academics" who become concerned with the logic of the information rather than the needs of the consumer. General

Graham believed it was very important for analysts to experience both elements of intelligence. Thus he implemented

120 Johnson, Interview by Author. 121 Graham, Interview by Author. 70

a rotation system which rotated analysts between the two

shops. This plan both improved the personnel career track, and consumer relations.122

Another change directed by General Graham affected DlA's organizational structure. As Graham reviewed the reporting chain, he determined that too many senior officers (Lieutenant

Colonels and Colonels) were reporting directly to him. He wanted a less top-heavy staff and he called for a complete overhaul of the military billets. Though this did not affect senior civilian positions, Graham was trying to rid DIA of some its excess management-level military slots.123

Under General Graham's direction, DIA was becoming a more focused agency, yet many consumers still questioned DIA's capabilities. In fact, the entire intelligence community came under intense scrutiny during the 1970s. The combination of the Bay of Pigs, Laos, Cambodia, Chile and Watergate aroused suspicion and distrust of the intelligence community in general. Thus in mid-1970s, not only did DIA undergo another critical examination, but the entire Intelligence Community did as well. Two reports in particular addressed DIA's development, the House's Pike Report and the Senate's Church

Report. Both will be examined in detail.124

The Pike Committee Report

Of the two Congressional Reports, the Pike Committee

122 Graham, Interview by Author. 123 Harvey, Interview by Author. 124 Church Committee Report, 5. 71 Report issued the most severe judgment of DIA. After analyzing

DIA's problems it recommended that the agency be abolished.

Though General Graham believed that Chairman Pike was merely grandstanding since Pike never called him to testify about the

DIA, the Select Committee raised a number of pertinent issues regarding DIA's capabilities.125

Excerpts from the hearings reveal that by the mid-70s there was still confusion over DIA's role in the Intelligence

Community. What was its real relationship with the military services? What was its primary intelligence mission? Who were the most important customers? Who should control military intelligence resources, and what was the role of the ASD/I?

Except for the last question, these queries were the same concerns DIA addressed during its creation. Little progress had been made over its first decade.

For example, Mr. Hall, the ASD/I in 1975, testified before the Committee and answered questions regarding DIA's purpose, mission, and the relationship between the Director of

DIA and the ASD/I. His own testimony demonstrates the lack of clarity regarding DIA's responsibilities. When asked what was the fundamental reason for establishing DIA he answers ".. to insure that intelligence was not used to justify weapons development."126 In other words, Mr. Hall stated that DIA's

125 Graham, Interview by Author. 126 U.S. Congress, House, Hearing before the Select Committee on Intelligence. U.S. Intelligence Agencies and Activities; Intelligence Costs and Fiscal Procedures. Part 1. July 31, August 1,4,5,6,7,8, 1975. (Pike Committee Report), 72 main mission was to improve the estimates function. Indeed,

this was a primary purpose behind creating a DIA, but DIA's charter extended far beyond this function.127

A committee member pursued this discussion by asking

"wasn't the purpose of DIA to consolidate and coordinate the separate branches' intelligence programs?" Mr. Hall replied that DIA was set up to coordinate finished intelligence products, but nothing more. DIA's charter, however, stated that DIA shall be responsible for "review and coordination of those Department of Defense intelligence functions retained by or assigned to the military departments..."128

Though a rather ambiguous statement, DIA's planners clearly intended DIA to coordinate more than finished intelligence products. As made evident by this exchange, DIA's relationship with the Services remained elusive. If the ASD/I and the Congressional Committee had difficulty explaining this relationship, it is understandable why defense decisionmakers have had such trouble clarifying DIA's role and respons ibilities.

In conjunction with the issue of mission and responsibilities, the Committee also questioned DIA's relationship with its diverse body of customers. One committee member declared, •'.. .DIA has had a very bad reputation ... one of the things that helped spur that reputation was whether or

197. 127 Ibid. 128 DOD Directive 5105.21, 19 May 1977, 2. 73 not it serves two masters, first the Joint Chiefs and then the

Secretary of Defense ... is this a problem?1,129 The ASD/I answered the question indirectly by stating that "... if we do

a fine professional job the fact that the DIA reports to the

JCS doesn't make any difference..."130 Pressed further, Mr.

Hall argued that there was no difficulty having DIA report to both. His reasoning was weak, but his conclusion coincided with the majority of interviewees who said that serving two masters was not a conflict of interests, rather a conflict of priorities.

The Pike Committee also raised the issue of the role of the ASD/I versus the role of the Director of DIA. The committee could not differentiate between the two positions and asked for elucidation. Mr. Hall, the ASD/I, explained that the principal job of the Director was to produce intelligence, whereas his job was to control the intelligence resources.131

This delineation of responsibilities proved to be a contentious matter, especially in later years. DIA continuously fought to use resource control as leverage over the Services, and interference by the ASD/I weakened DIA's authority.

In sum, the Pike Committee conducted extensive research regarding DIA's operations. Upon completion of their review, the Committee recommended abolishing the DIA. Their rationale

129 Pike Committee Report, 196. 130 Ibid. 131 ibid. 74 was based on DIA's inability to perform to its expectations.

The Committee's final verdict listed the following reasons for their decision:

...frequent reorganizations of DIA; the fact that DIA's management functions are now vested in the ASD/I; the fact that the DIA performance has been unsatisfactory the fact that DIA military functioning has been assumed by the services' that DIA has failed to coordinate defense intelligence functions as was the idea in 1961.132

The Pike Committee did identify many of DIA's troubles.

They recognized that the Services still had control over many of the intelligence functions. They noted the potential for conflict between the ASD/I and the DIA Director. In addition, the Committee realized DIA's difficulty in serving many customers and producing a wide assortment of products. At the same time, the Final Report admitted that the defense intelligence community lacked overall coordination and guidance. Thus they identified many causes for problems, but instead of offering solutions they suggested eliminating the

Agency altogether. Abolishing DIA would not fix the deficiencies within the defense intelligence community, it would merely shift the problems elsewhere.

Ironically, the Pike Committee's report was compromised and was never officially released. Most of the Committee's findings were leaked to a CBS correspondent, who in turn gave the story to the Village Voice. As a result of this incident, many distrusted the House's capability to conduct intelligence

132 Pike Committee Report, Part VI, 2161. 75 oversight. Though the Pike Committee had done a professional

investigation, much of its work was discredited. The Senate

Committee, which was formed after the House Committee, was

extremely careful not to repeat the Pike Committee's errors. The Church Committee Report

The Senate began its own investigation shortly after the

House initiated its intelligence review. Chaired by Senator

Frank Church, this Senate Committee provided a more in-depth perspective of the development of the Defense Intelligence

Agency. Unlike the Pike Committee, the Church Report believed

DIA still had a valid mission. They examined the limits of

DIA's influence in the intelligence community, and they tried to isolate the reasons for DIA's spotty reputation. Instead of eliminating the DIA, this group wanted to correct DIA's deficiencies to help the Agency achieve its intended goals.

One of the major problems pinpointed by this Committee concerned DIA's relationship with the Services. The Report stated: "in retrospect, a strong case can be made that DIA has never really had a chance. Strongly resisted by the military services, the Agency has been a creature of compromise from the outset."133 Furthermore, the Church Report knew that the

Services did not readily accept the DIA because they feared their organic intelligence capabilities would be downgraded.

133 Church Committee Report, 350. 76

The Church Committee realized that this Service reluctance was

the root of many of DIA's difficulties.134

Not only did Service resistance affect the acceptance of

the Agency as the leader of military intelligence, the

Committee acknowledged that this resistance affected the quality of personnel as well. Through their research the

Church Committee concluded that the best military analysts continued to remain with their respective Services.

Unfortunately, the limited quality of military personnel complemented the poor quality of the original cadre of civilian personnel.

In the 1970s, DIA still fell under the Civil Service program. CIA and NSA were exempted from federal civil service regulations and could hire and fire their analysts; DIA could not. DIA's inability to overcome Service resistance, coupled with the civilian personnel program, topped DIA's list of troublesome issues.135

Another set of issues highlighted by the Church Committee concerned DIA's mission complexity. The Church Committee noted that the Department of Defense was the nation's prime user of intelligence. The Committee stated that the "sheer size and complexity" of this establishment makes it difficult to determine the needs of the consumers. In examining this situation, the Report concluded that poor communications

134 Ibid., 325. 135 Ibid., 351. 77 between producer and consumer presented the largest obstacle in improving efficiency. Additionally, the Report cited that

DIA had responsibility for both national and tactical level

intelligence, and since the bulk of intelligence needed by the military establishment was tactical, DIA did a better job providing this type of intelligence.136

Overall, the Committee assessed that DIA did not serve as the coordinator for defense intelligence activities and information. It remarked that officials needing national level information frequently looked to sources other than DIA. The

Church Committee realized that DIA was performing too many jobs for too many customers, and that the jobs it did perform were not highly regarded.137

In searching for problem areas beyond Service resistance, personnel problems, and mission complexity, the Church

Committee also examined DIA's resource management capabilities. With the establishment of the ASD/I, the

Committee reported that the DIA Director, who had control over substantive intelligence matters, now had "... direct control over only 4% of the Secretary's intelligence budget."138 The

Committee later remarked that DIA had limited control over the activities of the Services because its lacked "... the follow- up authority over intelligence activities."139

136 Ibid., 463. 137 Ibid., 347 138 Ibid., 341. 139 Ibid., 351. 78 Recommendations

After compiling the results of their research, the Church

Committee considered two courses of action for DIA. The first

suggested retaining the DIA in its present form, but

increasing the Director's authority so he could better manage the DOD intelligence system. Like the Pike Committee, the second suggestion advocated disbanding the Agency and returning all resources to the individual Services. This second option, however, received little support, and the

Church Committee decided to pursue their first recommendation. In the end, the Church Committee presented a list of measures they hoped would strengthen the performance of the DIA.140

The Committee decided that all changes affecting DIA should be incorporated in a newly written charter. They recommended that the charter include three specific provisions to strengthen the DIA. The first measure addressed DIA's limited success in providing national intelligence. To improve this process the Committee directed that DIA become a part of the Office of the Secretary of Defense, thereby eliminating reporting through the JCS. The Committee also suggested maintaining a small support staff for the JCS to answer operational questions.141

The second provision stated that the Director of DIA should be appointed by the President and receive Senate

140 Ibid., 353. 141 Ibid., 465. 79

confirmation. The Report continued to declare that either the

Director or the Deputy should be a civilian. This process

would increase the caliber of the Director, would heighten

civilian influence in DIA, and would weaken the Services'

ability to nominate less desirable officers.142

Lastly, the Committee recommended that DIA be relieved

from Civil Service regulations. They believed DIA should have

the same hire and fire power as CIA and NSA. The Committee

wanted to give DIA the means to upgrade the quality of its

personnel. Additionally, the Committee requested that more

supergrade positions be granted to civilian personnel. In

other words, the Committee wanted DIA to formally establish an

exempted service civilian career track.143

Earlier in the Report, several other suggestions were

made to improve DIA's performance, however, these measures

were not included in the final recommendations. One provision

called for an increase in DIA's management authority over the

Service intelligence agencies. This measure tried to match

DIA's authority with its responsibilities. A second measure gave more authority to the ASD/I. Under this provision, the

Committee would have given the ASD/I control over both

substantive intelligence programs as well as over resources.144

142 Ibid. 143 Ibid. 144 Ibid., 354. 80

Upon examination, these two provisions seem to contradict

each other. In any agency management authority and control of

resources must be controlled by the same headquarters. Without the power of the budget, it is difficult to exert influence over other units. This inability to impress authority on the military services was DIA's most difficult problem. The

Committee identified this dilemma, but their final recommendations did not attempt to remedy this situation.

Instead of investing more power with the Director of DIA, the

Committee preferred to enhance the Secretary of Defense's role.

The Committee conducted the most thorough study of DIA's performance to that date. Yet their final recommendations for improvement did not address all of DIA's core problems.

Implementing a better civilian career program would help raise the personnel standards of DIA. Making the Director subject to

Senate confirmation might help ensure that DIA was guided by an officer who was well versed in the intelligence field. In this manner perhaps the reorganization process would address legitimate defense intelligence concerns.

Unfortunately, the Committee failed to recommend strengthening DIA's biggest flaw: its lack of authority over

Services intelligence. Instead, The Church Committee preferred to boost the ASD/I's position. In the end the Committee was more concerned with the community's need for national intelligence than it was with DIA's total mission. The Church

Committee offered superficial solutions rather than trying to tackle the intransigent military services. CHAPTER SIX

DIA MAKES STRIDES

In the decade following the Pike and Church Reports, the majority of the intelligence experts that I interviewed concurred that DIA made important strides in establishing itself as a more effective member of the Intelligence

Community. Changes resulted due to Congressional Committee recommendations, new administration policies, and DIA

Directors' modifications. DIA continued to face the same difficulties that had plagued it since its creation — Service resistance, personnel problems, mission complexity and organizational issues. However, during the late 70s and early

80s, DIA was finally able to devote its attention to solving some of these persistent trouble areas.

A New Charter

One change that affected DIA's operations resulted from a general reorganization of defense intelligence. In February

1976, President Ford signed Executive Order 11905 which implemented new restrictive measures on the entire

Intelligence Community. This order prompted Deputy Secretary of Defense Ellsworth to introduce legislation that would realign the defense intelligence community with President

Ford's plan. Ellsworth's revisions would have had a tremendous

81 82

impact on the OIA if they had been passed. Instead, a new

Secretary of Defense replaced Ellsworth before his proposals took effect.145

Mad Ellsworth's plan been implemented, the powers of the

Assistant Secretary of Defense (Intelligence) would have been broadened considerably. Ellsworth believed the ASD/I should serve as the Director of Defense Intelligence, and that the

Director of DIA should be the Deputy Director. Under this plan, the DIA Director would only report to the ASD/I, which would essentially remove the Director from the JCS loop.146

This plan never took effect since the new Secretary of

Defense, Harold Brown, issued his own directive when he assumed office in 1977.

Secretary Brown's directive abolished the ASD/I and created a new position, an Assistant Secretary of Defense for

Command, Control, Communications and Intelligence (ASD/C3I).

According to Brown's directive, this new Assistant Secretary had staff supervision over the DIA. Yet the reporting chain remained the same, and the Director of DIA responded directly to both the SECDEF and the CJCS.147 This created a closer relationship between the DIA and the Secretary of Defense, and at the same time, the Director of DIA was not placed under

145 "The DIA ..." (working papers), 244 - 245. 146 Non-Attribution source, Interview by Author, Former Chief of Intelligence for one of the Services. 147 Ibid. 83 another layer of bureaucracy. Brown's directive left the DIA

Director in charge of defense intelligence.

To ensure that DIA had a voice in this latest series of reorganization plans, the Agency rewrote its own charter in

May, 1977. Unlike the original document, this directive contained a mission statement and a more definitive list of responsibilities and functions. The directive also spelled out DIA's relationship with the SECDEF, the CJCS (and the U&S

Commands), and the ASD/C3I. Furthermore, this directive stated that the DIA Director would be the liaison for all DOD components and government agencies. Once again though, the directive failed to give DIA additional control over resources. Without the power of the purse, the DIA failed to gain any real leverage over the Services.148 Service Resistance

Lt. General Tom Weinstein (USA-ret.), the senior ranking

Army intelligence officer during part of this era, remarked that DIA and the Services continued to be at odds with one another. He explained that DIA was a coordinating body, not an organization with command capability. Additionally, DIA did not control the Services' intelligence budgets, so DIA could not exert influence in that manner. Instead, DIA had to work through a system of cajoling and requesting, rather than issuing orders and demanding information. As the supposed military leader, this situation put DIA at a distinct

148 DOD Directive 5105.21, May 19, 1977. 84 disadvantage. The Services did not usually feel compelled to comply with DIA's requests in a timely manner. They often fulfilled their own requirements first and DIA's second.

Competition continued to override cooperation.149

General Weinstein also commented on the Services' lack of trust for DIA. He was quick to point out that this distrust was not entirely the fault of DIA, rather it resulted from the friction commonly found between subordinate and superior agencies. General Weinstein explained that the Services often did not have a substantive difference with DIA, but they clung to their own position as a matter of principle. Weinstein tried to help his intelligence staff overcome this barrier by reminding them that their fellow analysts were the ones working at DIA. Nevertheless, this reasoning seldom convinced the analysts to work with DIA, and the relationship usually degenerated to an "us" versus "them" climate.

A more serious issue was that the Services frequently viewed the DIA perspective as out of touch. General Weinstein referred to this as a "resolution" problem. For example, if a

Service asked for specific information, such as the terrain features for a drop zone, DIA would usually respond with a generic country description. Services need precise information, and DIA seldom provided such specific details.

Yet, this last example also highlights the difficulties DIA

149 General Tom Weinstein, Interview by Author, Former Army Chief of Intelligence, 12 May 1992, Arlington, VA. 85 had in determining what its responsibilities were. Neither the

Services nor DIA had a clear understanding of who had jurisdiction over which type of intelligence. In the above example, the Services should have been able to generate the data requested.150

As time progressed, General Weinstein commented that the relationship between DIA and the Services gradually improved.

By working together on various projects the two sides began to understand the each others' needs, abilities and requirements.

The Services slowly grew more tolerant of DIA's role in the defense intelligence community. Throughout the 1980s, the military intelligence units grew less resistant toward DIA, though for the most part they still preferred their own products.151

Personnel Issues

After two decades of operation, DIA recognized that its personnel issues remained unresolved. Neither military nor civilian analysts had much incentive to work at DIA. Military officers preferred to serve in their respective Services, while civilian analysts preferred to work for an agency that offered a better career program. The Church Committee realized that DIA needed to enhance its civilian and military personnel programs; during the 1980s personnel issues finally became a priority concern for DIA.

150 Ibid. 151 Ibid. 86 Changes for civilian personnel were easier to procure and

implement. In 1979 DIA no longer limited the number of civilian analyst positions below grade GS-15. Hence DIA analysts could now advance based on their performance and not on the position they held. Several years later, legislation granted DIA its own Senior Executive Service. In addition, and more importantly, DIA was granted authority for the Excepted

Service which gave DIA the power to hire and fire civilian employees without the usual OPM rules. By the mid-80s DIA matched the CIA and NSA civilian career structure.152

The combination of these measures greatly enhanced DIA's ability to attract and keep quality analysts. At the same time

DIA could remove individuals with poor performance records, in accordance with DIA's new 1977 Charter, the Agency established and operated an entire career development program to include training, guidance and evaluation. By becoming competitive with the other intelligence agencies, DIA increased the quality of its civilian personnel and thereby improved its overall image.

Making DIA more appealing to military personnel, however, was a much more daunting task. DIA could not initiate change regarding the military system unless it had the support of the entire Department of Defense. Fortunately, in 1986 DOD underwent a Congressionally mandated reorganization, the

Goldwater-Nichols Act. This legislation affected DIA in two

152 Allen, 284 and 304. 87

ways: the first impacted on the military officer personnel

structure, the second affected DIA as an organization, and

will be discussed later in the paper. Prior to Goldwater-Nichols, there were no tangible benefits for serving in a joint agency. Under this new

legislation, military officers were required to serve in a

joint duty assignment (JDA) in order to be promoted to the

higher ranks. Therefore, working for DIA could fulfill a

condition that military officers needed for advancement.

Unfortunately, less than half of the DIA slots were coded as

joint duty billets, since the majority of the JDA positions

were reserved for combat officers and not for those in Service

support (which includes intelligence). Thus, being assigned to

DIA was desirous for some officers, but remained unattractive

to many others.153

Defense Intelligence Officers

The Defense Intelligence Officers program that Lt.

General Graham instituted in 1974 was having difficulty

establishing itself within DIA and the Intelligence Community.

From the outset DIA wrestled with the DIOs use. On the one hand, these officers resembled their CIA counterparts by

acting as the senior analysts in each field. Unlike NIOs, however, DIOs had not status outside the DIA. NIOs were viewed as key players in the policy community and as de jure members

153 Non-Attribution source, Interview by Author, OSD Staff member, 21 April 1992, Pentagon. 88 of the NSC working groups; DIOs did not enjoy this policy

status.

Furthermore, unlike NIOs, DIOs had no managerial

authority within their own Agency. They were not responsible

for specific products, such as NIEs, and they often had

trouble gaining the cooperation of DIA's various departments.

Much of the a DIO's success depended on personal relationships established with the various section chiefs. Instead of being able to task different sections to answer a requirement, DIOs had to use persuasion and personal connections.154 Of note, one of DIA's DIOs, Pat Lang, shows up as the key intelligence figure in Bob Woodward's book about the Gulf War. Long was the first to issue a definitive warning that Saddam Hussein's forces would invade Kuwait in 1990.

The presence of DIOs also introduced a new step in the DIA career ladder. Since DIOs were supposed to be DIA's top analysts, both military and civilian analysts could now strive to achieve the number one position in their field. After several years, however, all DIO positions became civilian slots. Many former military DIOs regarded this change as detrimental because exceptional military officers could no longer aspire to this assignment. One former DIO said that removing military personnel from the personnel pool hurt DIA since it automatically eliminated a large body of experts.155

154 Faurer, Interview by Author. 155 Ibid. 89 Nevertheless, a review of the 1980s shows significant

personnel improvements for both military and civilian personnel. In the 1970s, DIA joined the rest of the Intelligence Community in a critical examination of

intelligence organizations in general. DIA used the 1980s to turn to internal issues, such as personnel matters. The director of any organization knows that the only way to

improve performance is to increase the quality of the staff.

The 1980s were growth years that afforded DIA the opportunity to concentrate on areas that would make a marked difference. Complex Mission

While DIA sought to improve the quality of its personnel, it also attempted to rework the customer, mission, and product priorities. For example, when Lt. General James Williams became the DIA Director in 1981, he shifted DIA's focus from the SECDEF to the CJCS. He explained that two of his predecessors, General Graham and General Tighe, both had closer personal ties to the SECDEF. Williams, on the other hand, had a better relationship with the CJCS. However, the primary reason for emphasizing JCS concerns was the fact that the world was changing. Indeed, during the 1980s the military started to give more credence to the Unified and Specified

Commands. Thus, Williams began to upgrade his support to the

JCS.156

156 Williams, Interview by Author. Though Graham and Tighe had closer ties to the SECDEF, it

was Tighe who instituted the J2 Secretariat during his

directorship. This new office manned the National Military

Intelligence Center (NMIC), they operated the D.C. hotline,

and the designated J2 provided the Chairman of the Joint Staff

his daily brief.157 Essentially this group conducted all

current intelligence needs for the DIA. Later, when General

Williams served as Director, he increased the strength of this

section. By the time Rear Admiral Thomas Brooks joined the J2

staff in 1985, the CJCS had grown accustomed to looking to the

J2, and not the Director of DIA, as his primary intelligence

officer. Hence this separate office instigated much controversy among intelligence officials.158

During RADM Brooks' term as J2, the section of approximately forty people began to act as a team. The

analysts were responsive to the needs of the JCS, and they were well received. Concomitantly, the J2 staff began to experience a strained relationship with the other 5000+ personnel of DIA. Over time the two began competing with each other rather than assisting one another. Admiral Brooks explained that as long as the J2 remained under the DIA, they could not be totally objective. He believed that the J2 should not have to follow the DIA position; he argued that the J2 section should remain autonomous. Admiral Brooks advocated an

157 Ibid. 158 Brooks, Interview by Author. 91 independent 32 because he believed they could better serve the

JCS.159

Other intelligence officials, however, asserted that the

creation of a designated 32 section was a mistake, and that

the establishment of an entirely independent section would be disastrous. Lt. General Lincoln Faurer, former Director of NSA who had also once been DIA's chief of production, contended that by creating a 32, the role of the Director of DIA was weakened. Under this bifurcated system, the Chairman of the

Joint Chiefs received his daily briefing from the 32, not the

DIA Director. This effectively removed the Director from the

JCS loop, thereby diminishing his role as the supposed leader of military intelligence.160

At the same time, General Faurer explained that by operating as a separate section, the 32 had to rely on his own analysts for support. Closer cooperation with the DIA would give the 32 (and therefore the JCS) a pool of analysts many time larger to access for information. Thus, instead of arguing for an independent 32, General Faurer recommended eliminating the separate section altogether. Despite the differing views to strengthen to weaken the 32 Section, the section continues to operate semi-autonomously.161

159 Ibid. 160 Faurer, Interview by Author. 161 Ibid. 92 Regardless of the internal DIA debates over the support

for the JCS, it was apparent that by the mid-1980s, DIA seemed

to favor the JCS over its other customers. The passage of

Goldwater-Nichols in 1986 reinforced this alleged bias. Not

only did this bill help improve the quality of military

analysts (mentioned previously), but the legislation also

shifted DIA's mission requirements.

Goldwater-Nichols was designed to restructure the U.S. defense posture by stressing jointness and Service cooperation. The bill increased the power of the JCS, and it

gave the U&S Commands greater authority. According to this

act, DIA was now a Combat Support Agency, which meant that DIA

needed to give high priority to the operational needs of the

armed forces. In practical terms, this created a stronger bond

between DIA and the JCS and U&S Commands. Due to this

Congressional restructuring, DOD organizations had to ensure

they made military issues their first priority.162

Accompanying the new emphasis on the JCS and U&S Commands

came a growing perception that DIA provided better service for

these components. Indeed, many intelligence officials asserted

that OSD was not completely satisfied with DIA's support.

General Williams stated that during his tenure as Director,

1981-86, the CJCS and the SECDEF had diametrically opposed views on military matters. He said he would often have to

162 Office of the Secretary of Defense Study Team, "Reassessment of Defense Agencies and DOD Activities," Washington, D.C.: Pentagon, October 1987, D-17. 93 prepare two different papers, one for the CJCS and one for the

SECDEF. Since Williams had a closer relationship with the

CJCS, the OSD staff felt that their sister office received more carefully prepared reports.163

Additionally, the requirements of the two offices differed dramatically. As mentioned earlier in the paper, the

JCS (and U&S Commands) dealt with operations, whereas OSD dealt primarily with policy and resource management. RADM

Brooks and several other officials explained that OSD often wanted to be involved in the more exciting area of operations. By being denied access to this information, OSD felt left out of the loop. DIA was accused of showing favor to the Joint

Staff, but they were merely following the DOD division of labor.164

Lastly, the relationship between the DIA and OSD became strained due to the relationship between the DIA Director and the ASD/C3I, and the control of billions of dollars of intelligence budget authority under the General Defense

Intelligence Program (GDIP). In 1977, under the Carter administration, a reorganization in OSD returned control of the GDIP to the DIA. The Services, JCS, ASD/C3I and the DIA agreed that the GDIP would be managed independently, but that the DIA Director would chair the GDIP. This practice created much friction since the staff functioned on its own, but

163 Williams, Interview by Author. 164 Brooks, Interview by Author. 94 answered to the DIA Director. Marty Hurwitz, the GDIP staff

director during the 1980s, maintained that DIA directors

identified with JCS needs and not those of the OSD. Hurwitz's opinion helped perpetuate the view that OSD received second-

rate intelligence.165

Thus, up through the 1980s, DIA's division of labor remained a difficult issue. As discussed above, product quality often became entangled with product priority. This confusion was further aggravated by a customer relations problem. An OSD Report conducted in 1987 stated that customers were not certain what fell under DIA's jurisdiction, and what types of products DIA could produce. Throughout the 1980s, DIA attempted to improve its production record.166 Product Responsibilities

Since DIA was officially designated the head of military intelligence in 1976, it was supposed to control all finished military production. One product that generated high level attention was the preparation of the National Intelligence

Estimates (NIEs). During the 1970s, many intelligence officers criticized DIA for overstating the Soviet threat at the United

States Intelligence Board. Therefore, many believed that DIA's positions were not always credible. By 1981, however, both

General Larkin and General Williams, DIA Deputy Director and

Director respectively that year, stated that Bill Casey, the

165 Marty Hurwitz, Interview by Author, Former GDIP Staff Director, 18 May 1992, Pentagon. 166 OSD Study team report, October 1987, D-10. 95

DCI, respected DIA's point of view and treated DIA as an

equal. Both men felt that during their tenure, DIA achieved its rightful place as the DOD representative.167

This is not to say that DIA was free of criticism.

Several years after CIA Director Stansfield Turner retired, he wrote several highly critical evaluations of DIA's performance. In a 1986 article in the Washington Post. Turner referred to DIA as "a good idea that went bad .. . "168 He argued that DIA was too weak to overcome Service pressures, and that consumers "are likely to suspect bias in the DIA's work."169 His solution was to abolish the individual Service intelligence organizations. He believed that this would diminish DIA's tendencies to yield to parochialism.

Turner's comments about bias were not without merit, but his solution was faulty. Services do tend to justify their existence by the size of their opposition, and since the military operates according to worst case scenarios they would often overstate the threat. Eliminating Service intelligence would severely hamper the armed forces fighting capabilities.

Furthermore, Service pressures against DIA were no greater than external pressures on other intelligence agencies.

Indeed, several CIA analysts stated that DIA had no more

167 General Larkin, Interview by Author, Former DIA Deputy Director, 1 April 1992, McLean, VA.; Williams, Interview by Author. 168 Stansfield Turner, "The Pentagon's Intelligence Mess," The Washington Post. January 12, 1986, Dl. 169 Ibid., D2. 96 built-in bias than the rest of the Intelligence Community.

What was more troubling, however, issue was the presence of political pressure exerted at the senior level.170

Politicization

As the 1980s got underway, there was a general consensus among the intelligence analysts that I interviewed, that the quality of DIA's research was improving greatly. Yet, these same interviewees also stated that there was a weakness in

DIA's production system. Since DIA was created by a Secretary of Defense to serve the Defense Department, it was more susceptible to politics than was the CIA, an independent organization. Oftentimes analysts in DIA produced sound research, but when presented to superiors, the conclusions were sometimes twisted to support policies. The

"politicization" of intelligence is perhaps the most difficult challenge to overcome.171

The annual, glossy publication, Soviet Military Power, became an example of this intelligence "tilting." When

Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger assumed office in the early 1980s, he wanted to take a strong stand against the

Soviets. An officer who helped produce this journal stated that Weinberger used intelligence to bolster his perspective.

170 Non-Attribution sources, Interviews by Author, Former CIA analysts, 26 October 1990, McLean VA; 1 July 1992, Rosslyn, VA. 171 Non-Attribution sources, Interviews by Author, Senior DIA analyst, 30 October 1990, Clarendon, VA.; Senior CIA analyst, 26 October 1990, McLean, VA. 97 In this manner, DIA's annual publication, Soviet Military

Power. turned into a political report asserting Weinberger's personal views, rather than a document used to analyze the

Soviet threat at an unclassified level.172

A sizeable portion of DIA's products, however, were not for national level consumers. With its new title as a combat support agency, DIA directly supported units in the field. At this level, politics were not often involved, and DIA compiled comprehensive reports for planning and operating purposes.

Since DIA had a high concentration of analysts in one location and had access to raw intelligence from all sources, it was able to maintain an extensive, worldwide data base.

Unfortunately, dissemination of this intelligence to the tactical commander was not always easy to accomplish.173

Dissemination and Communication Issues

One obstacle that hampered the dissemination of products was over-bureaucratization. A common complaint voiced among analysts was that DIA began as a top-heavy organization and continued to operate as a top-heavy agency. Before a product reaches a customer, it must travel through many "wickets." DIA is an agency fraught with deputy directors, and each extra layer decreases DIA's responsiveness. Product quality was

172 Non-Attribution source, Interview by Author, Senior DIA analyst, 30 October 1990, Clarendon, VA. 173 Elizabeth Jeszenszky, "The Defense Intelligence Agency: Working Within the Military," course paper for Dr. Clarke, American University, December 2, 1990, 15. 98

improving, but this accomplishment was being overshadowed by poor consumer relations.174

Not only was dissemination a problem, but communication was a problem as well. By the 1980s there was a tremendous increase in intelligence communication's capabilities, and a dramatic decrease in compatibility of equipment. More intelligence was being produced more quickly, but each Service operated its own unique telecommunications equipment, and these systems did not necessarily interface with each other or with DIA. Due to the proliferation of equipment, it became imperative to institute a coordinated approach that forced DOD to work together.

To address this dilemma, DIA began a multi-year project called INCA, Intelligence Communications Architecture in 1985.

This program evolved after Congress threatened to withhold funds unless significant improvements were made toward communications interoperability. INCA sought to resolve critical communications problems between the defense agencies and the Services and commands.175 General Williams explained that "... many of the problems in communications support to intelligence are traceable to a mutual lack of understanding or failure to consult on requirements."176

174 Brooks, Interview by Author. 175 Lt Gen. James Williams, "INCA: The Issues and the Opportunities," SIGNAL (September, 1984): 25. 176 Ibid. 99 Technology advancements further complicated the situation by blurring the differences between national and tactical

information. What was once only available to strategic planners at the national level was rapidly becoming available to tactical commanders as well. In an effort to improve data management, DIA initiated another process which aimed to centralize and standardize data transfer. Called the DOD Intelligence Information System (DODIIS), this network included the Unified and Specified Commands as well as their components. In conjunction with INCA, this new data management program attempted to bring the Intelligence Community closer to near real time exchange of information.177

Working to overcome interoperability problems remained a difficult challenge since Service resistance was strong. DIA tried to standardize intelligence traffic, but to guarantee success, both the Unified and Specified Commands and the

Services need to cooperate. The following chapter will discuss operations during Desert Shield/Desert Storm which demonstrates that intelligence communications still has room for improvement.

Organization and Structure

While DIA sought to improve the Intelligence Community's communication structure, it also attempted to improve its own effectiveness through another series of internal

177 Lt Gen. Leonard H. Perroots, "New Approaches to C3 Interoperability in the Intelligence Community," SIGNAL (September 1988): 32. 100 reorganizations. The first change following the overhaul of

defense inte.lligence in 1976 broke the DIA into two directorates: Operations Support Staff, and Productions.

General Faurer, Chief of Production in 1975, explained that

for the first time in DIA's history there was one place to go

for all production matters. His office covered estimates,

current issues, data base functions, etc. Under this structure he answered production questions ranging from Joint Staff requests to tactical battlefield commanders' queries.178

This bifurcated structure only lasted until 1979. Lt

General Eugene Tighe (USA-ret), who had already served as acting Director in 1976, assumed command again, and he believed that the dual directorate organization needed to be refined. His new plan expanded the DIA structure from two to five major directorates. Through this new organization,

General Tighe hoped to strengthen management and planning. He wanted to be more responsive to consumer needs. For example,

Tighe created the separate office for the J2.179

General Faurer believed that this reorganization was a mistake. First of all, he argued that as Chief of Production under the earlier structure in 1975, he had all assets available to him. He believed that this enabled him to be more, not less responsive to requests. Faurer stated that with a highly compartmented system, each section could rely only on

178 Faurer, Interview by Author. 179 Ibid. 101

its specific analysts. For instance, he said the J2 now could only tap the J2 analysts, and not analysts throughout DIA.

Faurer feared that the division of labor would weaken, not strengthen the DIA.180

Major differences of opinion such as the above, illustrate the difficulties as DIA still struggled to determine its role as an intelligence organization. Where should its emphasis lie? What direction should it take as a leader and manager of defense intelligence? A comment often echoed in interviews was that DIA lacked a central vision, a clear cut goal. DIA represented different things to different people, and this is one of the reasons that each Director introduced a new way to organize its structure. The DIAC

One event that did create a focal point for DIA was the construction of its own building, the Defense Intelligence

Analysis Center (DIAC), which DIA occupied in 1984. This accomplishment not only allowed DIA to physically consolidate its activities under one roof, but it also helped strengthen the concept that the Agency was the centralized defense intelligence organization.

Since DIA's inception, all the Directors fought to house

DIA in its own building. Every year some Committee of Congress would disapprove the request for various reasons. General

Tighe became the first director to actually produce a set of

180 Ibid. 102 building blueprints. When Congress killed the funding again, he set up tours of their current offices in Arlington Hall and

invited Congress to examine their working conditions. After they saw the deplorable conditions for themselves, Congress promised General Tighe funding for a new location. A groundbreaking ceremony was held in 1981, and the building was finished in 1984.181

The completion of the building was a tremendous boon for the DIA. It allowed for better integration, easier access to the various departments, installation of new computers, but most of all, it increased employee morale. After two and a half decades of second rate treatment, the DIA finally started to look and operate like a professional intelligence agency.

The 1980s did not solve all of DIA's trouble areas, but by the end of the decade it was able to identify and address many of these persistent issues.

181 Williams, Interview by Author. CHAPTER SEVEN REORGANIZATION IN A NEW ERA The End of the Cold War

As the DIA was beginning to make improvements, the end of

the Cold War turned the entire intelligence world upside down.

For over forty years the United States had shaped its national

security around the Soviet Union. Without this focal point,

U.S. decisionmakers had to redefine the nation's security posture, and the Intelligence Community needed to refocus its concept of the threat.

Many political leaders immediately saw an opportunity to

cut back on defense spending. Their proposals included reducing the intelligence budget. Yet, observers rightly stated that "the real reason for maintaining an intelligence community is that the formulation of national security policy and its implementation require information."182 There is always a need for a healthy Intelligence Community.

In 1989, Secretary of Defense Cheney tasked Duane

Andrews, the ASD/C3I, to examine defense intelligence and to make recommendations for the future. Specifically, Cheney

182 Bruce D. Berkowitz and Allan E. Goodman, "Why Spy — and How — in the 1990s?," Paper prepared for the Conference on Intelligence in a New World Order, Washington, D.C., (August 29, 1991): 1.

103 104 challenged Andrews to streamline the management layers without

sacrificing effectiveness and efficiency. Andrews was also

instructed to develop a plan that would extend beyond the

1990s, and that would address the new, dynamic security environment.183

Andrews realized that his proposals would be constrained

by a smaller defense budget, and he also knew that the

intelligence requirements would probably be more demanding. To

reconcile this dilemma, Andrews placed a strong emphasis on

the need for a joint approach; he used the Goldwater-Nichols

Act of 1986 as a guide for alternatives.The result of his

study culminated in the classified 1991 DOD document entitled,

Plan for Restructuring Defense Intelligence.184

This report not only addressed the end of the Cold War and budget cuts, but it also examined how the defense

intelligence community operated during Desert Shield/Desert

Storm. This document reflected the changes in the international sphere as well as the lessons learned during the first major conflicts of this new era.185

Desert Shield/Desert Storm Lessons Learned

DIA's successes and difficulties during Desert

Shield/Desert Storm mirrored the Agency's successes and difficulties throughout its history. An after action report

183 Duane Andrews, "Restructuring Defense Intelligence," American Intelligence Journal (Autumn 1991): 5. 184 Ibid., 6. 185 Ibid. 105 stated shortcomings in defense intelligence were caused by interservice rivalry, the blurring of tactical and strategic

missions, and organizational conflicts. Nevertheless, by the

end of Desert Storm, many agreed that DIA had overcome many of

the areas that complicated operations in the beginning of the war.186

For example, one of the biggest obstacles faced by the

Service intelligence units and DIA was interoperability. This

condition affected both communication and analytical

capabilities. In the first instance, the Services were unable to communicate with each other due to differences in their equipment. Over the years, the Services gave little attention to integration. Individual units ensured equipment met their standards; they did not factor compatibility into their procurement equations. Therefore, in a time of crisis, the

Services had to waste time and energy to "jury-rig" their communications systems. Obviously, the INCA program had not yet succeeded in forcing the Services to standardize their equipment.187

The second problem concerned analyst-to-analyst cooperation. Rear Admiral Brooks (a former J2 who sat on a

Desert Shield/Desert Storm Blue Ribbon Panel) observed that when the various analysts had to work together, they

186 Department of Defense, "Conduct of the Persian Gulf Conflict," An Interim Report to Congress. (Washington, D.C.: GPO, July 1991), 14-3 and 15-5. (Interim Report) 187 Brooks, Interview by Author. 106

frequently could not understand one another. Each Service used

different procedures to accomplish the same tasks. The lack of

standardization hurt operations in the early stages of Desert

Shield.188 Eventually these types of concerns were addressed

at Military Intelligence Board (MIB) meetings. During Desert

Shield/Desert Storm, the MIB gained a reputation as an

organization capable of quickly resolving conflicts.189

Indeed, the MIB effectively managed Command, Control and

Communication (C3) problems that hampered the flow of

information. Though the MIB had been in existence for many years, Desert Shield/Desert Storm was one of the first times that the DIA Director took control and used the Board as a decisionmaking body. In a review of the conflict, numerous observers commented that the MIB was the most efficient forum to coordinate and direct various intelligence actions. As the chairman of the MIB, the DIA Director demonstrated real leadership and guidance, and the status of the DIA

Directorship greatly improved within the Intelligence

Community. One senior military officer emphasized that overall, the DIA Director "acted forcefully and decisively.1,190

The Military Intelligence Board also helped intelligence officials define a wartime architecture for the defense

188 Ibid. 189 Ibid. 190 Non-Attribution source, Interview by Author, Senior Military Intelligence analyst, 28 May 1992, Washington, D.C. 107

intelligence community. In the initial phases of the campaign,

leaders discovered that the Central Command (CENTCOM) was not

structured for a deployment or conflict the magnitude of

Desert Shield/Desert Storm. To better manage operations, DIA established a DOD Joint Intelligence Center (JIC) in

Washington, D.C. on September 2, 1990. Analysts from various

intelligence organizations manned this center.191

Running the JIC was not an easy task for the DIA. Since the passage of Goldwater-Nichols, DOD had concentrated on fighting as joint commands, however, intelligence doctrine had not developed at the same rate. Many praised DIA for skillfully handling the JIC operation, but many also realized that joint activities needed to be more clearly defined for the Intelligence Community.192

Another discovery made during Desert Shield/Desert Storm reflected the tremendous impact of technology on the battlefield. Improvements in imagery, for instance, gave commanders almost instantaneous images of events. The demand for imagery soon became the new battle cry among combat commanders. Unfortunately, the ability to feed hard-copy imagery down to the tactical level proved extremely difficult.

General Clapper, the DIA Director, stated that "the war brought further recognition of the need for a closer interface

191 Interim Report, 14-1. 192 Non-Attribution source, Interview by Author, Senior Military Intelligence analyst. 108 between national-level imagery activities and those at the

departmental, theater and tactical levels."193

Elaborating on this theme, Admiral Brooks commended DIA's

efforts for IMINT support saying that DIA "broke their back" providing imagery. He qualified his statement, though, by saying that most of the imagery never went beyond General

Schwarzkopf's shop which was DIA's primary focus.194 Once again, DIA's mission priorities fueled discontent among DIA's customers. Tactical commanders complained that they did not have access to information they needed to fight the battle. On the other hand, the JCS and CENTCOM were usually pleased with

DIA's support.195

During Desert Shield/Desert Storm, demands for DIA's products far exceeded its capabilities. Advances in technology were blurring the differences between national and tactical requirements and requests. DIA learned that compatible equipment, refined joint doctrine, and a more detailed explanation of DIA's abilities would improve relations with its customers. The experiences of Desert Shield/Desert Storm helped DIA and the Defense Department establish new goals for reorganization.

193 Lt. Gen James Clapper, Jr., "Imagery— Gulf War Lessons Learned and Future Challenges," American Intelligence Journal (Winter/Spring 1992): 16. 194 Brooks, Interview by Author. 195 Non-Attribution source, Interview by Author, OSD Staff member, 21 April 1992, Pentagon. It must be noted, however, that General Schwarzkopf did complain about some of the intelligence from "Washington" because it often contained too many caveats to be useful to the consumer. 109 The DOD Plan for Restructuring Defense Intelligence

As mentioned previously, when the Assistant Deputy Secretary for Defense (C3I) outlined his plan to restructure defense intelligence, he stressed jointness. Andrews wanted to consolidate programs and increase DIA's role as the leader in

DOD intelligence. To ensure DIA's success, Andrews asserted that "the roles of DIA and the Services will be carefully defined."196 He stated that DIA would concentrate on strategic matters, while at the same time it would integrate defense intelligence efforts for all levels of DOD.

Specifically, Andrews suggested forming a permanent

Washington, D.C. based Joint Intelligence Center to support both the SECDEF and CJCS. (One senior military officer explained that a JIC has always existed, but now it would be formalized.)197 Due to the JIC's performance during Desert

Shield/Desert Storm, Andrews believed this center was the best way to provide support during a crisis. In addition, Andrews wanted to consolidate all current intelligence at the

Pentagon. Services would no longer publish daily reports.

Instead, DIA would produce an intelligence daily report, and the Services could tailor articles for their own staffs.19*

Andrews also advocated establishing an office dedicated to the OSD. This Policy Issues Office would help smooth the

196 Andrews, 7. 197 Non-Attribution source, Interview by Author, Senior Army Intelligence Officer, 3 March 1992, Pentagon. 198 Ibid. 110

feelings of "benign neglect" that had characterized many of

the past relationships between the OSD and DIA. Andrews' program changed the process of threat validation for major weapons' acquisitions as well. The OSD had never been completely satisfied with the threat validation process, so

Andrews wanted DIA to publish an independent System Threat

Assessment Report for specified programs.199

To strengthen production, Andrews recommended that DIA maintain management and oversight of the basic data base. He also suggested that DIA oversee all collection, analytical, and production requirements. This would ensure that defense intelligence products had quality control. Concomitantly,

Andrews wanted to improve interoperability with the automatic data processing equipment. He believed that establishment of defense-wide standards would help solve some of the compatibility problems experienced during the Gulf conflict.200

Finally Andrews' plan recommended transferring the GDIP responsibility from the Director, DIA to the ASD/C3I Principal

Deputy for Intelligence. Andrews thought this would ameliorate centralized resource management and would ensure that the appropriate resources would be applied to the most essential tasks. Andrews wanted to be able to offer a consolidated

199 Andrews, 7; Non-Attribution Source, Interview by Author, OSD staff member. 200 Andrews, 8-9. Ill budget to the DCI, and he felt that the OSD could best

accomplish this mission.201

Closer examination of this last proposal, however,

reveals that OSD hoped to profit by this plan. As anyone in

Washington knows, power of the budget is power. Without

control of resources, DIA would lose control over DOD

intelligence. This plan would give OSD a better grasp of the

Intelligence Community, but it would be a self-defeating

change. Shifting control of the budget would weaken DIA as an agency. If Andrews' goal is to strengthen the role of the DIA, he should not advocate removing the GDIP from the DIA director.

Congressional Actions

While Duane Andrews was in the midst of formulating his

Plan for Defense Intelligence Restructuring, Congress decided to examine defense intelligence issue as well. Both of the

Armed Services Committees and the Intelligence Committees wrote their own initiatives. The Senate Armed Services

Committee (SASC) briefly touched upon DIA issues in its FY1991

National Defense Authorization Act, and addressed the issues in more detail the following year. Likewise, the Intelligence

Authorization Acts of FY1991 and 92 both included language designed to provide guidance for the Defense Intelligence

Agency.

201 Ibid., 9. 112

For instance, in the FY91 Defense Authorization Act, the

SASC stated that the various Science and Technological Center programs should be combined to reduce overlap and redundancy. They also mandated a future 25% reduction in intelligence personnel across the board.202 A 1991 Conference Report by the

Intelligence Committees believed that a 25% reduction would be premature. The report recognized that intelligence was in a state of transition, and that a widespread reduction may leave gaps in intelligence coverage.203

On the other hand, the report did agree with SASC's assessment that DOD intelligence priorities, resources and organizations needed to be reviewed and consolidated. The

Intelligence Committees argued that the Department of Defense could no longer afford the luxury of completely independent intelligence programs.204

The following year both the National Defense

Authorization Act and the Intelligence Authorization Act included more in-depth guidance for the DOD intelligence community, and for DIA in particular. Congress agreed with most of the DOD recommendations for improving DIA and defense intelligence, but they contested OSD's plans to make DIA subordinate to the ASD/C3I. Specifically, they felt that the

202 U.S. Congress, Senate, Report 101-384, National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1991. (July 20, 1990): 215. 203 U.S. Congress, House, Report with Minority Views 101- 725, Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1991. (September 19, 1990): 32-33. 204 Ibid. 113 DOD Restructuring Plan essentially sought to make DIA a staff element of the ASD/C31.205

Congress believed this plan would further hamper DIA's

real problem of "a lack of authority to manage defense

intelligence."206 Therefore, in Section 921 of the 1992

Defense Authorization Act (Public Law 102-190), the SASC

prescribed several measures that would enhance the authority

of the Director of DIA, and would increase the authority of the Director of DIA.

For the first time, Section 921 codified in law the officials to the whom the DIA Director reported. The SASC wanted to ensure that the Director had access to the Secretary of Defense, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, the DCI, and commanders of the Unified and Specified Commands. The

Committee recognized that the ASD/C3I has certain DOD intelligence responsibilities; thus, the Committee gave the

Assistant Deputy oversight powers but not day-to-day operational control of DIA.207

In conjunction with these changes, the SASC returned management of the GDIP to the DIA Director. They believed that to be an effective leader the DIA Director needs control over the budget. To assist the DIA Director in managing the GDIP,

205 Senate Armed Services Committee, "Report on DOD Reorganizatior and Management: National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 1992 and 1992," American Intelligence Journal (Autumn, 1991): 16. 206 Ibid. 207 P.L. 102-190, National Defense Authorization Act for FY 1992 and 1993. (December 5, 1991): 1452. 114 the legislation transferred budget control to DIA's functional

managers as opposed to the GDIP functional managers.208 These

two measures dramatically increased DIA's clout among the

Services. Congress certainly recognized that to have control

of an organization, one needs control of the budget.

Finally, Public Law 102-190 included two provisions designed to reinforce consolidation and centralization. The first provision transferred the Armed Forces Medical

Intelligence Center (AFMIC) and the Missile and Space

Intelligence Center (MSIC) to DIA. Congress believed that the

Science and Technology (S&T) Centers that contributed to a common cause should be managed by a single agency, the DIA.

Some members of Congress wanted to transfer all S&T centers to

DIA, but the final bill affected only the two organizations mentioned above. The second provision concerned forming the

Washington, D.C. Joint Intelligence Center (JIC). As initially proposed in DOD's own plan, Congress agreed that there should only be one JIC serving the D.C. area.209

Boren and McCurdy

Not to be outdone by the Armed Services Committees,

Congressman McCurdy and Senator Boren, the respective chairmen of the Intelligence Committees, proposed their own bills for reorganizing the whole Intelligence Community. The direct impact on DIA would be minimal. They set a fixed tenure for

208 Ibid. 209 Ibid. 115

the Director, and they codified DIA's current tasks. More importantly was the legislation's impact on the Intelligence Community overall.210

Boren and McCurdy suggest creating a new Director of

National Intelligence (DNI) to decrease wasteful duplication.

Through bureaucratic centralization, the bill's authors intended to clarify the chain of command and streamline redundant programs. One staff member said, "...if the Joint

Chiefs needed reform, intelligence needs it twice as badly."211 Congress adjourned in October 1992 without passing the Intelligence Reorganization Act. When Congress reconvenes in 1993, the new Clinton Administration is likely to introduce even more changes.

DIA's Internal Reorganization

While the Intelligence Community as a whole sought to restructure itself in 1991-92, the DIA initiated another series of internal reorganizations. The primary impetus behind this action was the DOD Restructuring Plan. Dennis Nagy, DIA's

Deputy Director, stated that a memorandum from Secretary

Cheney asked DIA's leadership to "streamline and reconfigure

[the Agency] to strengthen management, and [to] emphasize

210 U.S. Congress, House, H.R. 4165, National Security Act of 1992 (February 5, 1992): 31 - 35. 211 Staff member in Roy Godson's "Intelligence Reorganization," American Intelligence Journal (Winter/Spring 1992): 27. 116

quality analysis, production and reporting of strategically important intelligence."212

The memo directed DIA to reduce middle-management and to pare down its organization to obtain a minimum number of

deputy directorates. DIA was also given more responsibility in

the areas of Science and Technology, weapons acquisition and

human intelligence (HUMINT). Essentially DIA was tasked to manage a wider assortment of intelligence activities, while maintaining its primary focus on producing finished intelligence products.213

This increase of responsibility, of course, is coming during a period of immense world turmoil combined with growing fiscal constraints. DIA, the Department of Defense, and the rest of the Intelligence Community, will have to do much more with much less. To accomplish these goals, DIA leadership is endorsing delegating more production tasks to the newly forming Joint Intelligence Centers at the U&S Commands. DIA will manage these operations, but will distribute the workload to lower levels.214

DIA will also gain greater managerial control over the

Science and Technology centers. Congress has already placed two S&T agencies under DIA's direct control, and the other

212 Dennis M. Nagy, "Defense Intelligence Agency Reorganization," American Intelligence Journal (Autumn 1991): 1 1 . 213 Nagy, 11; Lt Gen. James R. Clapper, "A Statement for the Record." to the Senate Armed Services Committee. (Washington, D.C., January 22, 1992): 18 - 19. 214 Nagy, 12. 117 three organizations will now be more closely monitored. The weapons acquisition process will also undergo tighter

scrutiny. Lastly, DIA has begun to prepare a new HUMINT plan that would redefine the HUMINT mission and collection priorities. In a statement before the Senate Armed Services

Committee, General Clapper assured the members of Congress that he is making this latest series of reforms "the centerpiece of my agenda.1,215

By the fall of 1991, DIA reduced the number of DIA directorates from eight to six, and it renamed three others.

Furthermore, DIA combined functions within the directorates in an attempt to streamline middle-management. One of the major changes merged the Deputy Directorate of Estimates with the

Deputy Directorate for Research. The newly named directorate, the Office for Research and Assessments, now handles all order of battle information as well as the estimative tasks.216

This massive DIA reorganization campaign began in 1991, and it has not stopped. Directorates are continuing to reorganize, and panels are discussing better methods of reform. Constant change will persist until defense decisionmakers determine their needs in today's dynamic world environment. At the moment, the DIA, as well as the rest of the Intelligence Community, is in a reactive mode.

215 Clapper, 18. 216 Nagy, 12. 118 Intelligence is for the consumer, but the consumer needs

to specify the focus. DIA is attempting to respond to the new

challenges, and to anticipate others. The real question is whether DIA's internal reforms, and the community's external measures are being implemented wisely, or if they are being conducted in a random, ineffective manner. CHAPTER EIGHT

REFORM PRESCRIPTIONS Service Resistance

Throughout DIA's history, the Agency has been plagued by recurring problems: Service resistance, personnel matters, a complex mission, and organizational difficulties. Current reform measures must address these troublesome areas. DIA has undergone improvement since it was established in 1961, but it must continue to progress. Though recent reorganization programs have addressed some of these issues, many remain unresolved.

One negative trend is the movement to increase DIA's managerial tasks instead of increasing its production tasks. A majority of the interviewees agreed that DIA should be the primary producer, not manager, of finished defense intelligence products. Many agree that the best way to eliminate duplication is to transfer common cause, finished intelligence products to DIA. The DIA is the logical organization to fulfill this task since it has the personnel and available resources. Merely increasing DIA's management role will do little to stop redundancy.

For example, products such as order of battle data bases, should be compiled at a joint military intelligence center.

119 120 DIA has the manpower, the computer systems, and the desire to maintain this labor intensive product. Yet the latest

reorganization proposals suggest delegating the data bases to

the U&S Command intelligence centers and using the DIA only as

quality control. DIA attempted to delegate production in the

past, and the system often failed. Furthermore, transferring

the data bases to the U&S Commands would promote the

duplication of effort, because to ensure quality control DIA would have to still have to maintain some sort of data base.

The better solution would be to produce order of battle data at DIA, and task U&S Commands and other sources for specific pieces of information. Reorganization efforts should enhance the production system, and not weaken it. If presented properly, the Services would even endorse this type of proposal. Under this system, Services could easily access information, but they would not have to sacrifice manpower and time to prepare these detailed data bases.

On the ether hand, DIA lacks expertise in the highly specialized fields, such as Science and Technology.

Subordinating the Armed Forces Medical Intelligence Center and the Missile and Space Intelligence Center was a good idea since these organizations serve all three Services. However, most interviewees do not think that the Service specific S&T

Centers should come under control of the DIA as Congress suggested. In this case, the real experts reside in the 121 individual Service units; DIA does not have the depth to provide this type of specialized scientific intelligence.

One could argue that the specialized analysts should be moved to DIA, but S&T centers do not produce information common to all the armed forces; they are unique to the individual Services. DIA should provide quality control, but in this instance, DIA should not absorb the remaining three agencies into its structure. Adhering to this plan would help ease relations between the Services and the DIA. Personnel Issues

Personnel issues were not discussed in detail in any of the reorganization programs, though Dennis Nagy listed protecting the "outstanding work force" as a central objective in DIA's reform plan. Specific measures should be incorporated into reorganization plans since personnel issues have been a primary source of DIA's difficulties. According to those interviewed, DIA has greatly upgraded the quality of its personnel over the past decade, however, much more could be done to continue this progress.

From the military perspective, most officers still think of DIA as an undesirable assignment. The Goldwater-Nichols requirement for officers to serve in a JDA slot before being promoted to the higher ranks has made DIA more attractive for a few officers, but officers without JDA status have little incentive to work at DIA. Perhaps the rapidly shrinking defense budget, and the emphasis on jointness will convince 122

officers that DIA is a desirable assignment. First, however,

decisionmakers must determine which agencies will perform which intelligence functions.

While influencing military officers to work at DIA may take some time, DIA has the ability to positively affect its

civilian employees immediately. The career development program

initiated in the 1980s was a positive step in promoting better performance from civilian analysts. Part of the career program

includes mandatory training which includes military familiarization, computer classes, and effective writing skills. As long as the quality of the training remains high, civilians employed by DIA will become more proficient in their specialized fields. Apparently this program is effective, because several interviewees who currently work outside of

DIA, stated that they have been very impressed with the level of expertise available within DIA.217

DIA's next step in improving its civilian workforce should focus on the new hire selection process. One senior CIA analyst remarked that DIA generally has not sought the cream of the application pool. He stated that instead of searching for the Ivy League graduates, or the technical wizs, DIA has often settled on the second best.218 With today's economy, DIA

217 Non-Attribution source, Interview by Author, Senior CIA analyst; Non-Attribution source, Senior Military Intelligence Analyst. 218 Non-attribution source, Interview by Author, Senior CIA analyst, 1 July 1992, Rosslyn, Va. 123 should take advantage of the flood of SF-I7ls by toughening its selection criteria.

As DIA redesigns its qualification standards, it should be aware of "creeping civilianization." Numerous former military intelligence officials are worried that DIA is becoming more and more "civilianized." They fear that too many positions are switching to civilian control, and that too few civilian employees now have any prior military experience.

Their concern is that DIA may start to lose touch with its defense oriented consumer base.

Though civilians work hard and are dedicated to the mission, these officials argue that minimal or no military experience puts them out of touch with what is needed by military planners. Previously, a majority of the civilians had some military background due to the draft; today most of the new hires have had no exposure to the military. DIA cannot alter this situation, but they can ensure that a healthy balance is maintained between military and civilian employees.

Complex Mission and Customer Support

One area that has already been affected by the reforms was DIA's affiliation with its various customers: in particular the JCS and the OSD. A senior OSD staff member remarked that for many years DIA had a somewhat ambiguous relationship with OSD. With the downsizing of the military and 124

the change in the world environment, this staffer declared

that the DIA-OSD issue had now become a cause celeb.219

The Secretary of Defense, however, said he does not have

the time to attend to DIA matters, so instead, the SECDEF

suggested transferring DIA issues to the ASD/C3I. It was this decision that angered Congress because they believed placing

DIA under the ASD/C3I weakened the Agency. In a compromise, the ASD/C3I was given supervision of DIA, but not for daily operational matters. In addition, a new Policy Issues Office was created which gave OSD a body immediately responsive to its needs.

Though the reforms have attempted to examine the issue of

DIA's customer support, questions remain regarding DIA's primary mission. Gary Sojka, the Senate staff member responsible for the Senate's intelligence legislation, explained that two central questions continue to be asked about DIA. First, should there be a DIA? Second, if yes, what should it be? For Sojka, there is no easy answer to this question.220

Sojka explained that DIA has its foot in every door; it is constantly being pulled in all directions at once. Some people fear it is a powerful agency, and want to weaken it; others lament its weakness and want to strengthen it. In

219 Non-attribution source, Interview with Author. OSD staff member. 220 Gary Sojka, Interview by Author, SSCI Staff member, 28 April 1992, Senate Hart Building. 125 Sojka's opinion, the military is full of fiefdoms in which

each organization is fighting for autonomy. He believes that

if the JCS, OSD, CINCs and the Services were left to their own

devices, each would try to have it all. There would be

separate intelligence agencies for each office and the DIA

would be obsolete.221

In Conclusion

These comments help illustrate why DIA has been unable to reach its full effectiveness. More than thirty years have passed since DIA's creation, yet defense planners continue to have difficulty defining what they would like DIA to

accomplish. Until defense decisionmakers agree on DIA's proper mission, DIA will continue to waste valuable time and effort adjusting to recommendations from studies and commissions. In this decade of reduction, DIA should be given the clear charter it needs to become the true leader of military intelligence. Production, the budget, and quality control of

Service specific intelligence should emanate from this joint agency.

Despite the inability of defense planners to recommend one course of action for DIA, all the people interviewed acknowledged that DIA leadership has improved. The current DIA director, Lieutenant General James Clapper, possesses the skills needed to lead the DIA and the defense intelligence community. During Desert Shield/Desert Storm, observers

221 Ibid., Interview by Author. 126 commented that this was DIA at its very best.222 General

Clapper has a solid intelligence background, and he is viewed with respect by the rest of the Intelligence Community.

Since the 1980s, DIA has steadily improved its reputation with its customers. Nevertheless, many still do not accept this Agency as the authoritative source for all military

intelligence production, nor as the leader of DOD

intelligence. Restructuring is necessary and beneficial, but the measures must strike at the core issues. DIA must be given the defense intelligence community backing to be the principal producer of finished military intelligence products.

The Agency needs to achieve a healthy balance between quality civilian and military analysts. Military personnel must be given incentives to serve in an assignment outside of their Service. Internal reorganization should seek to eliminate burdensome middle layers and should remove the extra layers that slow down the dissemination cycle. If DIA can successfully address these issues then the OSD, JCS, CINCs and the Services will turn to the DIA for defense intelligence needs.

When Secretary McNamara proposed a joint military intelligence agency in 1961, he had a good concept but a poor blueprint. For thirty years DIA has been trying to catch up to its sister agencies. DIA has the potential to be the type of

222 Non-attribution source, Interview by Author, Senior Military Analyst; Non-Attribution source, Interview by Author, OSD staff member. 127 organization that McNamara first envisioned. Defense decisionmakers need to make the commitment to let DIA effectively lead the military intelligence community. 128

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