DOCSLIB.ORG

Frustrating Evolution of the Defense Intelligence Agency

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
Frustrating Evolution of the Defense Intelligence Agency INFORMATION TO USERS This manuscript has been reproduced from the microfilm master. UMI films the text directly from the original or copy submitted. Thus, some thesis and dissertation copies are in typewriter face, while others may be from any type of computer printer. The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the copy submitted. Broken or indistinct print, colored or poor quality illustrations and photographs, print bleedthrough, substandard margins, and improper alignment can adversely affect reproduction. In the unlikely event that the author did not send UMI a complete manuscript and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if unauthorized copyright material had to be removed, a note will indicate the deletion. Oversize materials (e.g., maps, drawings, charts) are reproduced by sectioning the original, beginning at the upper left-hand corner and continuing from left to right in equal sections with small overlaps. Each original is also photographed in one exposure and is included in reduced form at the back of the book. Photographs included in the original manuscript have been reproduced xerographically in this copy. Higher quality 6" x 9" black and white photographic prints are available for any photographs or illustrations appearing in this copy for an additional charge. Contact UMI directly to order. University Microfilms International A Bell & Howell Information Com pany 300 North Zeeb Road. Ann Arbor. Ml 48106-1346 USA 313/761-4700 800/521-0600 Order Number 1353496 The frustrating evolution of the Defense Intelligence Agency Jeszenszky, Elizabeth, M.A. The American University, 1992 Copyright ©1992 by Jeszenszky, Elizabeth. All rights reserved. UMI 300 N. ZeebRd. Ann Arbor, MI 48106 THE FRUSTRATING EVOLUTION OF THE DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY by Elizabeth Jeszenszky submitted to the Faculty of the School of International Service of The American University in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of Master of Arts in International Affairs Signatures of Commi Chair Dean of the School of International Service Date 1992 The American University Washington, D.C. 20016 7407 ffES AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LIBRARY ® COPYRIGHT by Elizabeth Jeszenszky 1992 ALL RIGHTS RESERVED THE FRUSTRATING EVOLUTION OF THE DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY BY Elizabeth Jeszenszky ABSTRACT In 1961, the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) was established to meet the foreign military and military-related intelligence requirements of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), the Unified and Specified (U&S) Commands, and other components with defense intelligence needs. DIA has had difficulty fulfilling this mission, however, because many intelligence consumers perceive DIA as a second-rate organization. DIA's struggle to become the nationally recognized leader of military intelligence stems from its turbulent beginnings. Resistance by the three armed services, personnel problems, mission complexity, and organizational matters are the core issues that contributed to DIA's initial difficulties. To affect positive change, defense decisionmakers need to understand DIA's history and provide solutions for these troublesome areas. Unfortunately, minimal literature exists about the DIA; therefore, this thesis is a compilation of interviews and information gleaned from various intelligence books, journals, and Congressional documents. Today, the end of the Cold War and the declining defense budget is forcing the entire Intelligence Community to undergo an in-depth reorganization. Thus, DIA has an opportunity to continue to make substantial improvements. This thesis reviews DIA's history, traces its recurring problems, and offers prescriptions for DIA's future. The DIA has the potential to be the premier military intelligence authority, but restructuring efforts must address its core weaknesses. ii TABLE OF CONTENTS Chapter 1. INTRODUCTION 1 2. LITERATURE REVIEW 11 3. THE HISTORY OF THE DIA 19 Post WWII Intelligence and the National Security Act Studies of the 1950s The Making of the Defense Intelligence Agency 4. INITIAL PROBLEMS 35 Service Resistance Personnel Wars Complex Mission - Production Complex Mission - Customers DIA's Organizational Structure and Resources 5. A DECADE OF CRITICISM 61 The Fitzhugh Report The 1970 Reorganization The Pike Committee Report The Church Committee Report 6. DIA MAKES STRIDES 81 Service Resistance Personnel Issues Complex Mission Organization and Structure 7. REORGANIZATION IN A NEW ERA 103 The End of the Cold War Desert Shield/Desert Storm Lessons Learned The DOD Plan for Restructuring Defense Intelligence Congressional Actions DIA's Internal Reorganization 8. REFORM PRESCRIPTIONS 119 Service Resistance Personnel Issues Complex Mission and Customer Support In Conclusion 9. SOURCES CONSULTED 128 CHAPTER ONE INTRODUCTION Within the U.S. Intelligence Community, the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) is often regarded as less than equal. Established in 1961 by Department of Defense (DOD) Directive 5105.21, DIA's mission was to "satisfy the foreign military and military-related intelligence requirements of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), the Unified and Specified (U&S) Commands, other Defense components, and, as appropriate, non-Defense agencies."1 In addition, DIA was chartered to provide the military intelligence input to National Intelligence Estimates, and to lead the military intelligence community. Despite DIA's apparent status, this agency has continuously fought an uphill battle to be accepted as the primary authority for military intelligence matters. Among the dozen or more intelligence organizations that comprise the U.S. Intelligence Community, the primary all-source analytical agencies are the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), the DIA and the State Department's Bureau of Intelligence, (INR). Although all three play a major role, DIA has long been 1 DIA, "History of the Defense Intelligence Agency," (Washington, D.C.: DIA Publication, 1985), no page numbers. l regarded as the weakest of the three. Why is DIA often perceived as a second-rate agency? If DIA's poor reputation is warranted, where did its problems begin? Can DIA join the ranks of CIA and State, or is it fated to function on the margins? I first became interested in these questions after taking a graduate class taught by Professor Duncan Clarke. He mentioned some of the problems that DIA has had over the years, and he provided several prescriptions for reform. As a former Army intelligence officer, I had worked with several DIA products, and at my level I was unaware of any turmoil surrounding DIA. Thus, DIA's reputation varies from customer to customer. Indeed, quality is a subjective judgement based on a multitude of factors. There is no standard scale by which to measure an intelligence agency. The fact that most of the products are classified makes this a more arduous task. Reputation does play a role in assessing the effectiveness of an agency, however, comparing the quality of the DIA to the CIA or the INR is similar to comparing the quality of the New York Times to the Washington Post. DIA does have a reputation problem, but that is not the central focus of this thesis. Instead, this thesis traces DIA's struggle to become the nationally recognized leader of military intelligence from its turbulent beginnings to the present day. One former DIA Director referred to the creation of DIA as an agency "founded in frustration."2 Several factors contributed to this initial frustration: resistance by the three armed services, personnel problems, mission complexity, and organizational difficulties. The combination of these elements has hindered DIA from effectively achieving its full potential. Understanding DIA's tumultuous background is especially significant today, since the end of the Cold War and the rapidly declining defense budget are forcing planners to restructure U.S. intelligence support. If real improvements are to continue to be made, it is imperative that decisionmakers reflect on lessons learned from the past. DIA has the potential to be the accepted leader of the military intelligence community, but it is still often characterized as a second-rate agency. To address these issues, my paper comprises three main sections. The first section is a history of DIA. The second segment reviews several critical reports that evaluated DIA's progress a decade after its formation. The final pages discuss the present-day intelligence reorganization measures, and suggestions for reform. By tracking DIA's evolution, I will show why DIA has had difficulty becoming the premier authority of military intelligence. 2. Lt Gen. James Williams, Interview by Author, former DIA Director, 3 April 1992, Bethesda, MD. Literature Review Since the CIA is a high-profile agency, it attracts the majority of the media and research attention. In contrast, very little has been published about DIA's history or performance. Chapter Two is a brief literature review that examines the material available in various books, journals and documents regarding intelligence. Since the literature is sparse, most of my research efforts consisted of interviews with former intelligence officials from DIA, CIA, INR and the Services, members of the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) and Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), Congressional staff personnel, academia, and the media. By combining the meager literature and the documentation from Congressional reports, with the data from over thirty interviews, my study
Load more

Recommended publications
  • Directors of Central Intelligence As Leaders of the U.S
    All statements of fact, opinion, or analysis expressed in this book are those of the author. They do not necessarily reflect official positions of the Central Intel- ligence Agency or any other US government entity, past or present. Nothing in the contents should be construed as asserting or implying US government endorsement of the authors’ factual statements and interpretations. The Center for the Study of Intelligence The Center for the Study of Intelligence (CSI) was founded in 1974 in response to Director of Central Intelligence James Schlesinger’s desire to create within CIA an organization that could “think through the functions of intelligence and bring the best intellects available to bear on intelli- gence problems.” The Center, comprising professional historians and experienced practitioners, attempts to document lessons learned from past operations, explore the needs and expectations of intelligence consumers, and stimulate serious debate on current and future intelligence challenges. To support these activities, CSI publishes Studies in Intelligence and books and monographs addressing historical, operational, doctrinal, and theoretical aspects of the intelligence profession. It also administers the CIA Museum and maintains the Agency’s Historical Intelligence Collection. Comments and questions may be addressed to: Center for the Study of Intelligence Central Intelligence Agency Washington, DC 20505 Printed copies of this book are available to requesters outside the US government from: Government Printing Office (GPO) Superintendent of Documents P.O. Box 391954 Pittsburgh, PA 15250-7954 Phone: (202) 512-1800 E-mail: [email protected] ISBN: 1-929667-14-0 The covers: The portraits on the front and back covers are of the 19 directors of central intelligence, beginning with the first, RAdm.
    [Show full text]
  • Keeping the US Hand Well Hidden: the Role of the Church Committee in Rethinking US Covert Intervention in the 1970S
    Keeping the US Hand Well Hidden: The Role of the Church Committee in Rethinking US Covert Intervention in the 1970s Julia Kropa A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of BACHELOR OF ARTS WITH HONORS DEPARTMENT OF HISTORY UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN April 2, 2018 Advised by Professor Victoria Langland TABLE OF CONTENTS Acknowledgments…………………………………………………………………………..ii Timeline……………………………………………………………………………………iii Introduction…………………………………………………………………………………1 Chapter 1: US Covert Involvement and the Death of General Schneider…………………14 The Election of 1970 and Escalation of US Involvement…………………………16 Creating an Atmosphere of Overthrow……………………………………………26 The Aftermath of General Schneider’s Death……………………………………..37 Chapter 2: The Formation of the Church Committee……………………………………..42 The Origins of the Church Committee…………………………………………….45 White House Opposition to the Church Committee……………………………….59 The Committee’s Purpose for Investigating Assassination Plots………………….66 Chapter 3: The Church Committee Investigates Assassination Plots……………………..70 The Church Committee’s Investigation…………………………………………...73 The Investigation Reaches the White House………………………………………81 The Committee’s Interim Report and its Findings………………………………...91 Conclusion…………………………………………………………………………………96 Appendix 1……………………………………………………………………………….102 Appendix 2……………………………………………………………………………….107 Bibliography……………………………………………………………………………...109 i Acknowledgments First and foremost, thank you to my advisor, Professor Victoria Langland, for her guidance and encouragement at every stage of this project from my initial thoughts to the end product. I would like to thank the LSA Honors Program and the History Department for generously providing funding for my research and writing. I am also thankful to my writing group, Maggie and Noah, for reading my many drafts and offering feedback at every step in the process. Many thanks to Emily for listening to me for a year and a half talking and brainstorming out loud, and for forcing me to always keep on working.
    [Show full text]
  • Cryptologic Quarterly, 2019-01
    Cryptologic Quarterly NSA’s Friedman Conference Center PLUS: Vint Hill Farms Station • STONEHOUSE of East Africa The Evolution of Signals Security • Mysteries of Linguistics 2019-01 • Vol. 38 Center for Cryptologic History Cryptologic Quarterly Contacts. Please feel free to address questions or comments to Editor, CQ, at [email protected]. Disclaimer. All opinions expressed in Cryptologic PUBLISHER: Center for Cryptologic History Quarterly are those of the authors. Th ey do not neces- CHIEF: John A. Tokar sarily refl ect the offi cial views of the National Security EXECUTIVE EDITOR: Pamela F. Murray Agency/Central Security Service. MANAGING EDITOR: Laura Redcay Copies of Cryptologic Quarterly can be obtained by ASSOCIATE EDITOR: Jennie Reinhardt sending an email to [email protected]. Editorial Policy. Cryptologic Quarterly is the pro- fessional journal for the National Security Agency/ Central Security Service. Its mission is to advance knowledge of all aspects of cryptology by serving as a forum for issues related to cryptologic theory, doc- trine, operations, management, and history. Th e pri- mary audience for Cryptologic Quarterly is NSA/CSS professionals, but CQ is also distributed to personnel in other United States intelligence organizations as well as cleared personnel in other federal agencies and departments. Cryptologic Quarterly is published by the Center for Cryptologic History, NSA/CSS. Th e publication is de- signed as a working aid and is not subject to receipt, control, or accountability. Cover: “Father of American cryptology” William Friedman’s retirement ceremony in the Arlington Hall Post Theater, Arlington, VA, 1955. Lieutenant General Ralph Canine is at left, Solomon Kullback is seated left, Friedman is second from right, and Director of Central Intelligence Allen Dulles is at far right.
    [Show full text]
  • Security and Society in the Information Age Vol. 3
    SECURITY Katarzyna MANISZEWSKA, Paulina PIASECKA Editors AND SOCIETY IIt is our pleasure to present a third scholarly volume bringing together a unique series of research papers by talented students – participants in the Security and Society in the Information Age program held at Collegium Civitas University in AGE IN THE INFORMATION Warsaw, Poland. In 2020, due to the pandemic, the program was held for first time online and included a component on the security-related implications of Covid-19. The students took part in a fully-fledged online course followed by an online research internship at the Terrorism Research Center. This book presents the results of their SECUR TY work – research papers devoted to contemporary security threats. The contributors not only analyzed the issues but also looked for solutions and these papers include recommendations for policy makers. We hope you will find this book interesting and valuable and we cordially invite you to learn more about the Security and Society in the Information Age program at: www. AND securityandsociety.org Volume 3 SOCIETY IN THE INFORMATION AGE Volume 3 ISBN 978-83-66386-15-0 9 788366 386150 Volume 3 COLLEGIUM CIVITAS „Security and Society in the Information Age. Volume 3” publication is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike 4.0 International License under the following terms – you must keep this information and credit Collegium Civitas as the holder of the copyrights to this publication. To view a copy of this license, visit http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/ Reviews: Daniel Boćkowski, PhD, University of Bialystok Marek Jeznach, PhD, an independent security researcher Editors: Katarzyna Maniszewska, PhD ( https://orcid.org/0000-0002-8021-8135) and Paulina Piasecka, PhD ( https://orcid.org/0000-0003-3133-8154) Proofreader: Vanessa Tinker, PhD e-ISBN: 978-83-66386-15-0 ISBN-print: 978-83-66386-16-7 DOI 10.6084/m9.figshare.13614143 Publisher: Collegium Civitas Press Palace of Culture and Science, XI floor 00-901 Warsaw, 1 Defilad Square tel.
    [Show full text]
  • Strategic Latency: Red, White, and Blue Managing the National and International Security Consequences of Disruptive Technologies Zachary S
    Strategic Latency: Red, White, and Blue Managing the National and International Security Consequences of Disruptive Technologies Zachary S. Davis and Michael Nacht, editors Center for Global Security Research Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory February 2018 Disclaimer: This document was prepared as an account of work sponsored by an agency of the United States government. Neither the United States government nor Lawrence Livermore National Security, LLC, nor any of their employees makes any warranty, expressed or implied, or assumes any legal liability or responsibility for the accuracy, completeness, or usefulness of any information, apparatus, product, or process disclosed, or represents that its use would not infringe privately owned rights. Reference herein to any specific commercial product, process, or service by trade name, trademark, manufacturer, or otherwise does not necessarily constitute or imply its endorsement, recommendation, or favoring by the United States government or Lawrence Livermore National Security, LLC. The views and opinions of authors expressed herein do not necessarily state or reflect those of the United States government or Lawrence Livermore National Security, LLC, and shall not be used for advertising or product endorsement purposes. LLNL-BOOK-746803 Strategic Latency: Red, White, and Blue: Managing the National and International Security Consequences of Disruptive Technologies Zachary S. Davis and Michael Nacht, editors Center for Global Security Research Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory February
    [Show full text]
  • Article Presidential Intelligence
    VOLUME 129 JANUARY 2016 NUMBER 3 © 2016 by The Harvard Law Review Association ARTICLE PRESIDENTIAL INTELLIGENCE Samuel J. Rascoff CONTENTS INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................................................ 634 I. THE PRESIDENT AND THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY: A BASELINE .............. 646 A. Analysis and Covert Action: Highly Presidentialized .................................................. 646 B. Organization and Budget: Somewhat Presidentialized ................................................ 648 C. Intelligence Collection: Weakly Presidentialized .......................................................... 651 II. THE EMERGENCE OF PRESIDENTIAL INTELLIGENCE ............................................. 659 A. The New Political Economy of Intelligence .................................................................. 660 1. Technology Firms and Economic Misalignment ...................................................... 662 2. Allies and Strategic Misalignment ............................................................................ 665 B. The Shape of Presidential Intelligence .......................................................................... 669 III. ASSESSING PRESIDENTIAL INTELLIGENCE ................................................................. 674 A. The Benefits of Presidential Intelligence ....................................................................... 674 1. Strategically Sound Intelligence ...............................................................................
    [Show full text]
  • Welcome to the Pentagon • 2021 Foreward 2021 Orientation and Guide
    WELCOME TO THE PENTAGON • 2021 FOREWARD 2021 ORIENTATION AND GUIDE PENTAGON RESERVATION COVID-19 OPERATIONS Right now, the Pentagon is operating in a unique COVID-19 environment. The Department of Defense (DoD) implemented precautionary measures when the COVID-19 pandemic began and continues to monitor and assess the situation carefully with the assistance of expert guidance from the Centers for Disease Control, and local, state, and federal authorities. In response to the COVID-19 pandemic, the Pentagon Reservation adopted the Department’s Health Protection Condition framework known as HPCON levels. They range from Alpha to Delta, and each one has specific guidelines for employees to follow. You will find a detailed list of these guidelines on the Washington Headquarters Services (WHS) website: www.WHS.mil. Hours of operation and Operating Status for certain services on the Pentagon Reservation are subject to change. Log on to www.whs.mil/ coronavius for most up to date information. Stay safe, stay healthy and welcome to the Pentagon. 2 3 TABLE OF CONTENTS PENTAGON RESERVATION COVID-19 OPERATIONS 3 THE PENTAGON RESERVATION 9 TRANSPORTATION 11 METROPOLITAN AREA TRANSIT OPTIONS ..........................................................................................................................................................................................................11 WASHINGTON HEADQUARTERS SERVICES TRANSPORTAION MANAGEMENT PROGRAM OFFICE (WHS TMPO) .......................................................................................11
    [Show full text]
  • Bansemer: Intelligence Reform: a Question of Balance
    Brig Gen Kenneth Newton Walker Kenneth Walker enlisted at Denver, Colorado, on 15 December 1917. He took flying training at Mather Field, California, getting his commission and wings in November 1918. After a tour in the Philippines, he returned to Langley Field, Virginia, in February 1925 with a subsequent assignment in December 1928 to attend the Air Corps Tactical School. Retained on the faculty as a bombardment in- structor, Walker became the epitome of the strategic thinkers at the school and coined the revolutionary airpower “creed of the bomber”: “A well-planned, well-organized and well-flown air force attack will constitute an offensive that cannot be stopped.” Following attendance at the Command and General Staff School at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, in 1933 and promotion to major, he served for three years at Hamilton Field, California, and another three years at Luke Field, Ford Island, and Wheeler Field, Hawaii. Walker returned to the United States in January 1941 as assistant chief of the Plans Division for the chief of the Air Corps in Washington, DC. He was promoted to lieutenant colonel in July 1941 and colonel in March 1942. During this time, when he worked in the Operations Division of the War Department General Staff, he coauthored the air-campaign strategy known as Air War Plans Division—Plan 1, the plan for organizing, equipping, deploying, and employing the Army Air Forces to defeat Germany and Japan should the United States become embroiled in war. The authors completed this monu- mental undertaking in less than one month, just before Japan attacked Pearl Harbor—and the United States was, in fact, at war.
    [Show full text]
  • Top Secret Studies on U.S. Communications Intelligence During World War II
    A Guide to the Microfilm Edition of World War II Research Collections Top Secret Studies on U.S. Communications Intelligence during World War II Part 3. Organization and Administration UNIVERSITY PUBLICATIONS OF AMERICA A Guide to the Microfilm Edition of World War II Research Collections Top Secret Studies on U.S. Communications Intelligence during World War II Parts. Organization and Administration Project Editor Robert E. Lester Guide compiled by Blair D. Hydrick A microfilm project of UNIVERSITY PUBLICATIONS OF AMERICA An Imprint of CIS 4520 East-West Highway • Bethesda, MD 20814-3389 LCCN 90-956381 Copyright ® 1989 by University Publications of America. All rights reserved. ISBN 1-55655-183-5. TABLE OF CONTENTS Introduction v Scope and Content Note xi Source Note xm Editorial Note ...• xiii Abbreviations xv Reel Index 1 Subject Index 19 INTRODUCTION Soon after declassif ¡cation of selected communications intelligence material from World War 11 was undertaken by the National Security Agency in the late 1970s, many valuable documents were made available to researchers in the National Archives. An early scholar of this material, the late Ronald Lewin, said to the press in Washington, D.C., in 1981, "If I were writing a Ph.D. [dissertation], I'd rush over to Archives this minute." Since then much more material has been declassified; some of the Top Secret Studies in this collection of microfilm were declassified only in the late 1980s. SRH Case Studies Special Research Histories (SRHs), a series of studies, monographs, and reports principally concerning cryptographic operations in World War II, were compiled mostly from highly classified contemporary files by wartime participants.
    [Show full text]
  • ARLINGTON HALL STATION 4000 Arlington Boulevard Ar I.Lngton
    ARLINGTON HALL STATION HABS NO." VA-1270 4000 Arlington Boulevard Ar I.lngton Ar1ington County Virginia LPH- PHOTOGRAPHS WRITTEN HISTORICAL AW) DESCRIPTIVE DATA Historic American Buildings Survey Mid-Atlantic Region National Park Service Department of the Interior Phi ladephia „ Pennsylvania 19 106 'hP \ C* t HISTORIC AMERICAN BUILDINGS SURVEY ARLINGTON HALL STATION HABS No. VA-1270 Location: 4000 Arlington Boulevard, Arlington, Arlington County, V i rg i n i a USGS Alexandria, VA Quadrangle. Universal Transverse Mercator Coordinates: 18.317500.4304000 Present Owner: General Services Administration Present Occupant: United States Army Present Use: Military Post Significance: Arlington Hall Station is significant as the location of both Arlington Hall Junior College, a women*s educational institution established in 1927, and as the headquarters of United States Army intelligence activities from 1942 to 1989. Arl ington Hall Junior College was one of the first post- secondary women's educational institutions established in the Washington, D.C. area. The school provided both liberal arts and home economics-oriented curriculum. The school's founder, Dr. William E. Martin, stressed the importance of physical activity in conjunction with education and, as a result, Arlington Hall Junior College included an active program of physical education, most notably an award-winning riding club. Arlington Hall Junior College also provided social opportunities for its students with an active schedule of dinners, teas, balls, and formal dances. In 1942 the United States Army took over Arlington Hall Junior College and established its Signal Intelligence Service (SIS) at the former campus. The SIS had responsibility for cryptoanalysis of intercepted enemy messages, development of codes and ciphers for the Army, and production of Army cipher machines.
    [Show full text]
  • Strategic Studies Quarterly an Air Force–Sponsored Strategic Forum on National and International Security
    WINTER 2019 Vol 13, No. 4 On Great Power Conflict: Entangled or Untangled Alliances? An Interview with Charles A. Kupchan Attrition and the Will to Fight a Great Power War Emma Moore FEATURE ARTICLE Through the Glass—Darker James Wood Forsyth Jr. Ann Mezzell Missile Defense for Great Power Conflict: Outmaneuvering the China Threat Henry Obering III Rebeccah L. Heinrichs Ambiguity, Risk, and Limited Great Power Conflict Thomas G. Mahnken Gillian Evans Techniques for Great Power Space War Paul Szymanski Minding the Gaps: US Military Strategy toward China Derek Grossman John Speed Meyers Decide, Disrupt, Destroy: Information Systems in Great Power Competition with China Ainikki Riikonen Strategic Studies SSQ Quarterly Chief of Staff, US Air Force Gen David L. Goldfein, USAF Commander, Air Education and Training Command Lt Gen Marshall B. Webb, USAF Commander and President, Air University Lt Gen Anthony J. Cotton, USAF Director, Academic Services Dr. Mehmed Ali Director, Air University Press Lt Col Darin Gregg, USAF Editor Col W. Michael Guillot, USAF, Retired Content Editor Illustrator Jeanne K. Shamburger Daniel M. Armstrong Prepress Production Coordinator Webmaster Megan N. Hoehn Kevin V. Frey Advisors Contributing Editors Gen Michael P. C. Carns, USAF, Retired David C. Benson, PhD James W. Forsyth, PhD Mark J. Conversino, PhD Christina Goulter, PhD Kelly A. Grieco, PhD Robert P. Haffa, PhD Michael R. Kraig, PhD Jay P. Kesan, PhD Col Kristi Lowenthal, USAF, PhD Charlotte Ku, PhD Dawn C. Murphy, PhD Benjamin S. Lambeth, PhD David D. Palkki, PhD Martin C. Libicki, PhD Nicholas M. Sambaluk, PhD Allan R. Millett, PhD https://www.af.mil/ https://www.aetc.af.mil/ https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/ Strategic Studies Quarterly An Air Force–Sponsored Strategic Forum on National and International Security WINTER 2019 VOL.
    [Show full text]
  • The Way Forward
    Information Sharing in the 21st Century The Way Forward REPORT TO THE MARKLE FOUNDATION OF THE COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY CAPSTONE TEAM May 2012 A Project of School of International & Public Affairs Columbia University New York, New York [This page is intentionally left blank] INFORMATION SHARING IN THE 21ST CENTURY: THE WAY FORWARD 1 Table of Contents Overview ...............................................................................................................................5 Disclaimer ............................................................................................................................6 Acknowledgements .......................................................................................................6 Executive Summary ......................................................................................................7 Introduction .......................................................................................................................13 Information Sharing – Where We Are Today .............................................15 Legislative History of U.S. Intelligence Activities Pre 9/11 ...........................15 The National Security Act of 1947 ......................................................................................15 Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 ...................19 The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (FISA) ........................................19 Executive Order 12333 (1981)............................................................................................21
    [Show full text]