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EurSafe News

VOLUME 21 NO. 1 FEBRUARY 2019

Dear EurSafe members,

It is my pleasure to send you the spring issue of the EurSafe Newsletter 2019. Due to a growing demand for knowledge concern- ing the different laws within Europe, I have decided to focus this issue on EurSafe recent developments on the status of ani- mals in current laws within Europe, with a special emphasis on Switzerland and Germany. CONTENTS

Our first contributor, Dr. iur Michelle Richner, works as a legal Animals are not things Paper by Michelle Richner | 3 employee at the Foundation for the Animal in the Law (Stiftung für das Tier im Recht), based in Zurich, Switzerland. Her focus The Animal Person lies on a very recent historical development: in Austria, Germany Paper by Samuel Camenzind | 7 and Switzerland, animals have been freed from their status as Rights: The things (in legal terms). Due to the changing values and habits Philosophers‘ Brief of Western societies, animals have been reclassified into a new Book review by Judith Benz- Schwarzburg | category: that of non-things. Centering on the legal situation of 10 Switzerland, she informs us of the background of this new sta- EurSafe executive committee tus and fleshes out the practical consequences that will follow. Update by Franck Meijboom | 12

Call for papers: Special Issue Although I am not a law scholar – and therefore risk many ‘: Questioning the shortcomings – I use the new legal denomination of animals Orthodoxy’ | 13 as non-things in the second contribution as a starting point. It can be seen as bursting a dam for other legal concepts, which I Announcements | 14 would like to outline. scholars in Germany and later Contact | 17 Switzerland introduced the term ‘animal person’ (Germ. ‘tierliche Person’) into the academic debate. Defining sentient beings as animal persons means, in practical terms, that they would be bearers of subjective legal rights and therefore can be represented in court. Besides its potential compatibility with current legal regulations, the concept of the animal person is at present only of theoretical nature. Animals are not things

Not like the topic of our review: within the Michelle Richner cantonal popular initiative Fundamental rights for primates, the citizens of Switzerland’s Only ten years ago, animals were legally regarded as things in Switzerland, and thus canton Basel will be able to vote whether paper non-human primates should be granted the as impersonal, physical objects subject to fundamental rights of mental and physical the power of disposition of their owner. integrity. This initiative has to be seen within However, given the changing values and a larger, global context of calling for funda- habits of our society, this was increasingly mental rights to ensure a better legal protec- perceived as unacceptable, which is why, in 2003, it was tion of primates. Picking up on the current decided to free animals from their status as mere things. state of this issue in the USA, Dr. Judith Benz-Schwarzburg reviews the recently pub- Animals have since been reclassified and given a separate lished book Chimpanzee Rights: The Philos- legal category, which has affected various legal fields. ophers‘ Brief, where thirteen internationally renowned philosophers dismantle the legal Initial situation arguments used to defend that For an even longer time than Austrian and German law, the Swiss Civil can’t be persons in a legal sense. Code made a distinction between legal persons, i.e. the holders of rights and duties, and legal objects, i.e. entities in respect of which legal persons may hold rights and duties. The Swiss Civil Code reserves this legal subjec- With this issue we hope to continue the tra- tivity to natural and juristic persons according to article 11 paragraph 1 and dition of presenting up- to-date information article 53. Up until 16 years ago, animals were still considered legal objects on the wide variety of topics that are relevant in consistence with Roman legal tradition and were therefore subject to for the EurSafe community. If you want to law provisions. contribute to the EurSafe Newsletter, don’t Michelle Richner Dr. iur. Michelle Richner is a legal The human-animal relationship, however, has changed considerably over hesitate to contact one of the members of employee of Tier im Recht (TIR) in the years so that nowadays there is hardly any serious doubt that animals the editorial board. The focus of the summer Zurich (Switzerland) are not mere things but are sentient living beings capable of suffering. Af- issue will be ‘Water and agricultural ethics’, [email protected] ter the Swiss Supreme Court had already recognized animals as living and edited by Simon Meisch. sentient beings in 1989, the legal system followed suit and freed animals Katarina Stoykova from their status as things on April 1, 2003. After many years of prelim- This text has been translated by inary work, a number of legal provisions have come into force aimed at Samuel Camenzind lic. iur. Katerina Stoykova, legal improving the legal status of animals and taking into account the altered University of Veterinary Medicine Vienna, employee of Tier im Recht (TIR) in sense of justice. With this, a more than two-thousand-year-old categoriza- Messerli Research Institute, Vienna (Austria) Zurich (Switzerland) tion and strict distinction between persons and things has been overcome [email protected] in Switzerland. Instead, there is now a tripartite division, in which animals form a separate category with their own civil position.

2 3 loss of an animal can never truly be compen- created for lost and found animals and finders sated for, the animal owner can cover at least are obligated under threat of penalty to report a part of his or her non-material damage. The law lost animal. does not determine the amount due and leaves it to the discretion of the court to specify a sum A provision has been included in inheritance according to the specific circumstances of each law according to which a gift to an animal in individual case. The material value of the animal a will or in an agreement of succession is an is irrelevant here because an animal acquired explicit obligation placed upon the heirs or leg- for little money (for example, a dog adopted atees to take appropriate care of the animal (ar- from a shelter) can have great emotional sig- ticle 482 paragraph 4 of the Civil Code). Accord- nificance for its owner. There is no established ing to article 482 paragraph 1 of the Civil Code, court practice concerning sentimental value yet. anyone with an interest in the proceedings (for However, in cases of very close human-animal example, an animal welfare organization) can relationships, claims for sentimental damage sue for compliance with the obligation. Also, can easily reach thousands and even tens of the testator has an option to establish a foun- thousands of Swiss francs. Also, in tort law, dation according to article 493 of the Civil Code, claims for medical costs can be made even if which can, for example, be combined with the they exceed the animal’s monetary value (article 42 paragraph 3 of the Code of Obligations). References The allocation of pets in the event of the dis- solution of joint ownership, for example in the Bolliger Gieri, Goetschel Antoine F., Richner event of a separation of spouses or partners, Michelle, Spring Alexandra (2008). Tier im was also newly regulated in 2003 (article 651a of Recht Transparent. Zürich/Basel/Genf: 179- the Civil Code). If a companion animal belongs 183, 185-198, 231-245; to both partners and they cannot agree on who Goetschel Antoine F., Bolliger Gieri Legal basis is to keep it, the judge allocates the animal to (2003). Das Tier im Recht, 99 Facetten der Article 641a of the Civil Code expressly states One important change, for example, concerns the party that can provide better living condi- Mensch-Tier-Beziehung von A bis Z. Zürich: that animals are not things and grants them a debt enforcement. Before 2003, creditors had the tions, thereby deciding from an animal welfare 44-46, 55-58, 139-141, 250-251; separate status that applies to all living animals, option of having a debtor’s animal seized or sold perspective and placing the focus on the ani- Krepper Peter (2011). Affektionswert-Ersatz thereby extending far beyond the scope of the (i.e. auctioned) to cover their claims even if the mal’s well-being. When allocating the animal, bei Haustieren. Schriften zum Tier im Swiss Animal Welfare Act, which only protects animals were of no substantial material value. the first priority is to ensure that the future Recht, Band 2, Zürich/Basel/Genf: 19-46; vertebrates with very few exceptions (article 2 However, due to the reclassification of animals, owner is equipped to take care of the animal in Richner Michelle, (2014). Heimtierhaltung paragraph 1 of the Animal Welfare Act). How- the legal situation has changed: Domestic ani- terms of time, organization, and costs. If the aus tierschutzstrafrechtlicher Sicht. Schriften ever, this additional category does not confer mals are exempt from execution, meaning they court cannot persuade the parties to reach an zum Tier im Recht, Band 12, Diss. Zürich/ any actual enforceable rights on animals. The may not be seized (article 92 paragraph 1 nr. 4 of amicable solution in favor of the animal, it will Basel/Genf: 84-113; expression ‘’ is an ethical and the Dept Enforcement and Bankruptcy Act). This conduct a personal interview in order to obtain Schneider Kayasseh Eveline (2009). Haftung philosophical concept rather than a legally exact takes into account the strong emotional bond a precise picture of who is better suited to pro- bei Verletzung oder Tötung eines Tieres - un- term. Therefore, the property law provisions between the debtor and his companion animals vide for the animal. ter besonderer Berücksichtigung des Schweiz- continue to apply to animals unless specific and the fact that the latter are usually considered erischen und U.S.-Amerikanischen Rechts: provisions exist (article 641a paragraph 2 of the family members. Significant changes have also been made to the 21-22, 87-99, 128-174; Civil Code). law regarding finder’s rights and responsibili- Stucki Saskia (2016). Grundrechte für Tiere, Furthermore, the Swiss Code of Obligations ties: Under certain circumstances, the owner- Eine Kritik des geltenden Tierschutzrechts Specific legislative amendments was amended to include a sentimental value for ship of an animal passes from the original own- und rechtstheoretische Grundlegung von The legal recognition of animals as autono- animals (article 43 paragraph 1bis of the Code er to the finder two months after it was found Tierrechten im Rahmen einer Neuposition- mous living beings is not only of great symbolic of Obligations). In the event of damage, the ani- - not after five years as was previously the case ierung des Tieres als Rechtssubjekt, Diss. importance, but has also entailed specific legis- mal keeper has a claim for compensation of the (article 722 paragraph 1bis of the Civil Code). In Baden-Baden: 31-80, 88, 173-329. lative amendments in various legal fields: sentimental value of their animal. Although the addition, special notification offices have been

4 5 obligation to ensure the life-long maintenance In fact, the Criminal Code now contains a of the animal using the foundation assets or provision specifying that criminal provisions with a more general obligation to fund certain relating to property continue to apply to offens- animal welfare projects. es against animals. As a result, animals can be stolen or ‘damaged’ (article 110 paragraph 3bis Limited scope to companion animals of the Criminal Code). The fact that animals are no longer things ap- plies to all animals. It must be borne in mind, Animals have no legal capacity however, that most of the amendments made Although animals no longer count as things, The Animal Person to individual laws on the basis of this principle they have no rights of their own. Despite offi- Samuel Camenzind only apply to animals which, according to the cial recognition as sentient beings, they remain wording of the law, are ‘kept in the domestic without legally enforceable rights and obliga- The law scholar Steven Wise describes the sphere and not for commercial purposes’. The tions. Despite the fact that for years legal and current legal situation of animals by use of domestic sphere is understood as the entirety ethical efforts have been made to grant animals paper of options for the housing of animals within the legal and there is repeated use a metaphor of a massive wall that has sep- owner’s spatial sphere of influence. The domes- of the colloquial term ‘animal rights’, legally arated one species – human beings – from tic sphere is therefore not limited to the owner’s speaking, animals remain assets that can be household or yard but can also encompass a owned or possessed by humans. The latter are, all other animals for the last four thousand barn or stable that is located outside the resi- however, bound by the Animal Welfare Act and years (Wise 2014: 4). This separation dates dential estate. other mandatory regulations that acknowledge back to the technical distinction, in the Roman law, between that animals have demands and interests, for Due to the limitation of the scope of the new example, in animal-friendly husbandry, care and (legal) persons and (legal) things. To stand on the side of provisions to animals that are not kept for com- treatment or in being protected in their well-be- persons means to be a legal subject and therefore to be bear- mercial purposes almost all legislative amend- ing and dignity and against unjustified pain, er of subjective rights. To stand on the side of animals, plants ments only impact companion animals, i.e. suffering, harm and fear. animals that are primarily kept out of interest in and objects means to be a legal object, which can be protect- the animal or for the pleasure of their company. Anyone who violates the provisions of the ed by legal regulation, but can’t be a bearer of juridical, sub- Animals kept for commercial purposes, such as Animal Welfare Act is liable to prosecution and, jective rights. farm and laboratory animals, are exempt from depending on the severity of the offense, may most of these new regulations. Drawing a line face a prison sentence, a monetary penalty or a between these two categories can prove diffi- fine. Non-things treated as things cult in certain cases, for example, when a dog As mentioned in the previous contribution by Richner, the wall and its strict is occasionally used for breeding or displayed dualism between persons and things started to crumble with the introduction at animal shows, thus generating profit for its of the third category of animals as non-things in the Austrian law (1988), Ger- owner. Ultimately, the decisive factor is whether man law (1990), and Swiss law (2003). But still animals don’t have the status the owner’s non-material interests in the animal of legal subjects and have to remain on the other side. This means that they outweigh their commercial interest and vice are neither bearers of fundamental rights, such as a right to life, individual lib- versa. erty, or bodily integrity, nor can they hold property or be represented in court. This is first of all surprising, because according to the Swiss animal protection Lack of legal adaptations act (Art. 3, lit a) animals are beings with an inherent worth and therefore have In many legal fields, however, everything has a dignity that has to be respected. In addition, the German animal protection remained the same despite the reclassification act speaks of animals as fellow creatures (Art. 1). Still, animals are not granted of animals under civil law. For instance, where Samuel Camenzind any subjective rights, they are only protected by laws comparable to protect an no specific regulations for animals have been University of Veterinary Medicine old building by monumental protection. enacted, the provisions governing property (ar- Vienna, Messerli Research Institute, ticle 641a paragraph 2 of the Civil Code), such Vienna (Austria) From a philosophical point of view, this is unexpected, because since Joel as those found in sales or labor law, still apply. [email protected] Feinberg’s prominent essay The Rights of Animals and Unborn Generations (1974) it is widely acknowledged that, at least in the case of all sentient

6 7 First of all, it has to be determined, which rights This brings us to the third and final question: animals should be granted. Obviously, rights that it must be clarified how much the rights of the are already part of current animal welfare protec- animal person weighs in relation to other rights. tion acts, like the right to life or the prohibition Without a large support from the general public of pain, suffering, harm or anxiety, should be and officials, the recognition of subjective rights maintained. But one important addition would and stronger protection of animals remains an be the fundamental right to legal personality. This (utopian) idea. This doesn’t have to be under- means that animals could be represented in court stood only negatively, because the animal per- by a legal representative like an animal lawyer or son is still an idea that bears potential for social animal party. change concerning the situation of animals.

Secondly, the two authors give different answers to the question of whether an animal person can still be the property of a human being. Based on pragmatic considerations, Raspé (2013: 316–318) suggests that we should maintain the property References status of animals. She gets support from Da- Favre, David (2012). Animals as Living Pro- vid Favre, who claims that from a legal point of perty. In: Michel, M., Kuhne, D., Hänni, J. view (at least with respect to American law), it is (Hrsg.), Animal Law. Tier und Recht. Develop- possible that an animal can be a bearer of rights ments and Perspectives in the 21st Cen- tury – and still remain property of someone. According Entwicklungen und Perspektiven im 21. Jahr- to Favre, this category should be called ‘living hundert, Zurich: DIKE, S. 409-431. property’ (Favre 2012). Stucki (2016: 367) argues, Feinberg, Joel (1974): The Rights of Animals in contrast, that a right to legal personality would and Unborn Generations. In: Blackstone, necessarily imply the repeal of the property status William T. (Hrsg.), Philosophy & Environmen- of animals. Interestingly, a third way can already tal Crisis, Athens: The University of Georgia animals, they can be right bearers. So the ques- for the Swiss law. According to this category, be found in Immanuel Kant’s Doctrine of Right. Press, S. 43-68. tion that is at stake is: should we grant animals animals are legal subjects and therefore bearer of Immanuel Kant (1797). Doctrine of Right. In: subjective rights? Surprisingly, this isn’t a central juridical, subjective rights (see table below). The solution may be not to see property as a mere The Metaphysics of Morals, translated and ed- question in German jurisprudence (Raspé 2013: relation of domination (‘complete property’), ited by Mary Gregor 2013 [1996], Cambridge: 15; Stucki 2016: 27). but also as relation of allocation, which implies Cambridge University Press. Things Persons certain duties of care. This was how Kant saw Raspe, Carolin (2013). Die tierliche Person. The animal person in theory and the relation between parents and children: ‘For Vorschlag einer auf der Analyse der Ti- practice Corporeal Incorporeal when we speak of the rights of parents to children er-Mensch- Beziehung in Gesellschaft, Ethik Nevertheless, the fact that animals are nominally things things Natural as part of their household, we are referring not und Recht basierenden Neupositionierung des not things anymore, but can still be treated as merely to the children’s duty to return when they Tieres im deutschen Rechtssystem, Berlin: things if no special regulation exists (Stucki 2016: Things Legal have run away but to the parent’s being justified Dunker & Humbolt. 90), is unsatisfying for some legal scholars. In the in taking control of them and impounding them Stucki, Saskia (2016). Grundrechte fur Tiere. quest for solutions, without giving up the strong as things (like domestic animals that have gone Eine Kritik des geltenden Tierschutzrechts und Animals Animal legal protection of human beings and without astray)’ (Kant 1797, AA VI: 282). Nevertheless, the rechtstheoretische Grundlegung von Tier- subsuming human and animals under the same reference to Kant is not completely satisfying, be- rechten im Rahmen einer Neupositionierung Table: Mod. from Raspé (2013): 306. legal category (that of natural persons), two dis- cause the question remains whether, contrary to des Tieres als Rechtssubjekt, Baden-Baden: sertations were published. The category of ‘animal children, members of the category ‘animal person’ Nomos. person’ (Germ. ‘tierliche Person‘) has been inno- What are the concrete effects of this new catego- can still be bought, sold and lent, and additionally Wise, Steve M. (2014, 2000). Rattling the vatively introduced by Caroline Raspé’s work Die ry? Once animals are recognized as legal subjects, to this, whether they can still be captured, harmed Cage. Toward Legal Rights for Animals, Bos- tierliche Person (2013) for the German law and by three points must be specified. and killed. ton: Da Capo Press. Saskia Stucki in her Grundrechte für Tiere (2016)

8 9 which Kiko and Tommy are held captive constitute situates beings in webs of interpersonal relation- an outrageous injustice’ and the ‘belief that the ships) chimps can be considered as members of discipline of philosophy has a vital role to play in the relevant communities (p. 103). Last but not debates about defining personhood and deter- least, the authors defend the capacities approach mining who should be counted as persons’ (p. favored by the NhRP because chimpanzees pos- 3). Indeed their considerate and careful examina- sess morally and legally relevant capacities, such tion of the main arguments used by the judges as autonomy (pp. 103-104). Their specific focus to dismiss the petitions reveal that the concepts in this most interesting chapter is on autonomy of ‘personhood’ and ‘person’ are often used in as a sufficient condition for personhood within a Chimpanzee Rights an inconsistent and incoherent way (p. 116). The cluster concept of persons (pp. 80-84). philosophers analyze three distinct notions of The Philosophers‘ Brief personhood which were employed in the rulings The authors clearly stick to their expertise: their (the species membership conception, the social con- main angle is conceptual and logical problems tract conception, and the community membership with the courts’ rulings to reveal flawed reasoning conception) (p. 9). Lastly, they review the NhRP’s and invalid arguments. In best philosophical man- Review by Judith Benz-Schwarzburg capacity conception of personhood which refers to ner they conclude that ‘the reasons provided by review the animals’ complex social and cognitive capac- the courts are either inadequate, or they actually For Chimpanzee Rights. The Philosophers’ Brief no less than ities. support the personhood of Kiko and Tommy’ (p. 101). But luckily philosophers are not immune to thirteen internationally well-known scholars with very differ- Each of these arguments is examined and dis- the emotional side of the NhRP’s mission. Thus, ent backgrounds (from bioethics to philosophy of mind, from cussed in detail, providing the latest insights from the book also shows how turning to these charis- philosophy of science to political philosophy) assembled to philosophical and biological debates. Thereby, the matic animals can actually shape one’s perception authors take care not to downplay the challenges of the human animal relationship as much as it make a point. This in itself is outstanding. Their original task of the personhood concept. They for example pro- can shape one’s way to do philosophy. was to provide philosophical insights to the question whether vide preliminary reflections from critical race and animals can be regarded as persons in form of an amicus cur- disability scholars on the intersection of differ- ent social justice struggles right from the outset iae brief which had been submitted to the New York Court of (pp. 5-8). And they clearly state that they aim ‘to Appeals in February 2018. The book constitutes an expanded broaden the concept of personhood to include version of this brief. chimpanzees without excluding other humans and other persons’. They ‘reject any construction of personhood that fails the test’ (p. 8). Also, they In December 2013 the Nonhuman Rights Project (NhRP) had filed a petition critically explore an alternative strategy to animal for the common law writ of habeas corpus in the New York State Supreme personhood that is the introduction of a third cat- Court on behalf of Tommy, a chimpanzee living alone in a cage in a shed in ru- egory between persons and things, the category of ral New York. Soon thereafter, they had filed a second such petition on behalf sentient beings (pp. 104-107). of Kiko, another chimpanzee housed alone in Niagra Falls. The NhRP wants to achieve retirement in an ape sanctuary for Kiko and Tommy and the habeus Still, they arrive at clear conclusions: species corpus petition is their choice of legal strategy. It’s the kind of legal strategy membership arbitrarily privileges Homo sapiens that can free slaves – and actually has done so in U.S. history. Under current and is ‘inconsistent with contemporary evolu- U.S. law, an entity can either be a person or a thing. A habeus corpus writ can tionary biology’ (pp. 102-103). The social contract Chimpanzee Rights: The Philosophers‘ only be issued on behalf of a person, meaning that she has rights that confine- conception does not help either, because ‘the real Brief by Kristin Andrews ment violates. function of the social contract is to create and define citizenship’ – thereby it presupposes from London; New York: Routledge. What we face here is a theoretical argument from animal rights philosophy the outset that ‘to be a contractor, one must be ISBN-13: 978-1138618664 put to the practical test in courthouses – a most interesting play to observe a person first’ (p. 103). Finally, in both versions Hardcover: € 85.- despite the fact that no judge has been willing to rule in favor of the chimps’ of the community membership conception (one Paperback: € 19.- personhood and freedom, so far. The thirteen philosophers of the book stand links personhood to social recognition, the other Kindle: € 12.- united in two assumptions: ‘the conviction that the current conditions in

10 11 EurSafe executive committee Special Issue ‘Animal Ethics: Many of you have been working on the abstracts and papers Questioning the Orthodoxy’ for EurSafe 2019 congress during the last weeks. Also for the Dear Colleagues, EurSafe board the next conference is an important point on It has become commonplace to refer to the success of ani- the agenda. Together with the team in Tampere (Finland) we mal ethics and the animal turn in philosophy. Since Singer are looking forward to the next conference on Sustainable gov- and Regan published their ground-breaking works more than ernance and management of food systems: ethical perspectives forty years ago, animal ethics has become an institutionalised (19-21 September 2019). field of research.

On 5 March the Executive Committee will have its board meeting. We try to This is mirrored in the appearance of entire journals, book series, text books, discuss and meet as much as possible via Skype or phone, but at least once a BA, MA and PhD programmes, conferences, research institutes, etc. devoted update year we plan a meeting to meet each other in person. This year we will meet in to it. To use a metaphor, animal ethics is no longer a toddler, but a teenager, Utrecht. On the agenda will be the organization and planning of the next con- full of energy, beginning to question its heritage and its future. This Special gresses, finances, and communication strategy. We also will inform you later Issue aims to channel this rebellious spirit in order to help lay down the foun- this Spring on the (postponed) initiative of a members survey that we aim to dations for a prosperous adulthood. Therefore, we invite submissions that call start in order make EurSafe an (even) more attractive society. into question the orthodoxy in animal ethics.

If you have any questions or ideas, please do not hesitate to contact the In particular, we aim to collect a series of papers that question: board! • Classical premises: papers that address key terms and claims that were previously taken for granted, such as , the dichotomy moral Best regards, agents/patients, the inherent disvalue of animal pain and suffering, the is/ ought gap, etc. Franck Meijboom • Classical theories and methodologies: papers that bring innovations into On behalf of the Executive Board, 18 February 2019 animal ethics by applying methodologies that until recently were often ne- glected, such as phenomenology, pragmatism, feminism, interdisciplinary and empirically-informed approaches, etc. • Classical topics: papers that pick up topics that were ignored or under- call for papers treated in the canonical texts, such as human interventions in nature, the predator–prey problem, companion animals, cognitive enhancement and disenhancement of animals, representation of animals, duties towards invertebrates, meaning in , etc.

We welcome submissions addressing these and further relevant topics. With this Special Issue, we aim to deliver an overview of new solutions to canonical problems and new problems that were previously unseen. We expect to map out new directions in the field of animal ethics and contribute to clarifying the self-understanding of the discipline. Please kindly note that for submissions to this special issue there is a word limit of 8,000 words (references not includ- ed). The deadline for manuscript submissions is 30 September 2019.

Prof. Herwig Grimm and Dr. Susana Monsó Guest Editors Online information

12 13 MARCH 1 JUNE 26-29 SEPTEMBER 18-21 Canadian Animal Policy Symposium Finding Home in the ‘Wilderness’ Sustainable governance and management of Vancouver, USA Association for the Study of Food and Society and the food systems: Ethical perspectives website Agriculture, Food, and Human Values Society Conference EurSafe Conference 2019 Anchorage, Alaska, USA Tampere, Finland MARCH 21-23 website website Living with Animals/Living with Horses Eastern Kentucky University, USA JUNE 30- JULY 3 OCTOBER 24-25 website Decolonizing Animals Ninth International Conference on Food Australasian Animal Studies Association (AASA) 2019 Studies MARCH 21-23 Conference Kaohsiung, Taiwan Animal/Language: An Interdisciplinary Conference Ōtautahi , New Zealand website Texas Tech University, Lubbock, TX, USA website website JULY 1-4 APRIL 26-27 Animals in the Public Eye: Interactions and Emotion Perceptions of Animals Publications British Animal Studies Network Meeting The International Society for (ISAZ) 2019 Glasgow, Scotland Conference Dürnberger, C., Pfeilmeier Se., Schleissing, S. website Orlando, USA (2019). Genome Edition in Agriculture: Bet- website ween Precaution and Responsibility. Nomos APRIL 26-27 Björn H., Schröder, K. (Hg.) (2019). Tierethik Maritime Animals: Telling Stories of Animals at sea JULY 10-13 transdisziplinär: Literatur – Kultur – Didaktik. Greenwich, London, UK International Society for Environmental Transcript website Ethics (ISEE) Ach, Johann S., Borchers, D. (2018).Handbuch The 16th annual summer meeting Tierethik: Grundlagen – Kontexte – Perspek- APRIL 29-30 H.J. Andrews Experimental Forest Research Station, Cascade tiven. Herausgeber Springer Animals remains Mountains east of Eugene, Oregon, USA Biennial Conference of The University of Sheffield Animal Studies Research Centre (ShARC) website Humanities Research Institute, The University of Sheffield, UK website JULY 10-19 Animal Rights and Animal Politics in Asia MAY 1 11th International Convention of Asia Scholars (ICAS 11) Animals and the Home University of Leiden, the Netherlands London, UK website website JULY 16-19

announcements MAY 22-24 Animal Rights and Animal Politics in Asia Rethinking revolution: Nonhuman animals, antispeciesism and power 11th International Convention of Asia Scholars (ICAS 11) 6th Conference of the European Association for Critical Animal Studies (EACAS) University of Leiden, the Netherlands Universitat Pompeu Fabra, Barcelona, Spain website JULY 21-27 Animal Welfare, Veterinary Ethics, Law and Communication Skills VetNEST Summer School Vienna, Austria website

14 15 EurSafe membership Helena Röcklinsberg administration Swedish University of Agricultural Verenigingenbeheer Nederland Science, Sweden Spinozalaan 33 [email protected] NL-2273 XC Voorburg Ariane Willemson the Netherlands Federal Ethics Committee on tel. (+31) (0)70 4162940 Non-Human Biotechnology, fax (+3 1) (0)70 4162959 Switzerland [email protected] [email protected]

President Website Kate Millar www.eursafe.org Centre for Applied Bioethics, University of Nottingham, United EurSafe News Kingdom Chief-editor [email protected] Bernice Bovenkerk Wageningen University Secretary [email protected] Bernice Bovenkerk Philosophy Group, Wageningen Publications editor contact University, the Netherlands Howard University [email protected] United States [email protected] Treasurer Dirk de Hen Editorial Board the Netherlands Raymond Anthony [email protected] University of Alaska Anchorage, US [email protected] Vice-president Mariska van Asselt Franck L.B. Meijboom Aeres University of Applied Sciences Ethics Institute, Utrecht University, Dronten, the Netherlands the Netherlands [email protected] [email protected] Samuel Camenzind Messerli Research Institute Vienna, Members Austria Stefan Aerts [email protected] Odisee University College / KU Jes Harfeld Leuven, Aalborg University, Denmark [email protected] [email protected] Diana Dumitras Simon Meisch University of Agricultural Science and University of Tuebingen Veterinary Medicine [email protected] Cluj-Napoca Kate Millar [email protected] University of Nottingham, UK Leire Escajedo [email protected] University of the Basque Country, Svenja Springer Spain Messerli Research Institute, Vienna, [email protected] Austria Herwig Grimm [email protected] Messerli Research Institute Mark Stein University of Veterinary Medicine Salford University, Manchester, UK Vienna [email protected] [email protected] Thomas Potthast Layout University of Tuebingen, Germany Luc Dinnissen [email protected] studio ds Nijmegen, the Netherlands www.studiods.nl EurSafe