The Moral Standing of Animals: Towards a Psychology of Speciesism

Journal of Personality and Social Psychology

Lucius Caviola, Jim A.C. Everett, and Nadira S. Faber University of Oxford

We introduce and investigate the philosophical concept of ‘speciesism’ — the assignment of different moral worth based on species membership — as a psychological construct. In five studies, using both general population samples online and student samples, we show that speciesism is a measurable, stable construct with high interpersonal differences, that goes along with a cluster of other forms of prejudice, and is able to predict real-world decision- making and behavior. In Study 1 we present the development and empirical validation of a theoretically driven Speciesism Scale, which captures individual differences in speciesist attitudes. In Study 2, we show high test-retest reliability of the scale over a period of four weeks, suggesting that speciesism is stable over time. In Study 3, we present positive correlations between speciesism and prejudicial attitudes such as racism, sexism, homophobia, along with ideological constructs associated with prejudice such as social dominance orientation, system justification, and right-wing authoritarianism. These results suggest that similar mechanisms might underlie both speciesism and other well-researched forms of prejudice. Finally, in Studies 4 and 5, we demonstrate that speciesism is able to predict prosociality towards animals (both in the context of charitable donations and time investment) and behavioral food choices above and beyond existing related constructs. Importantly, our studies show that people morally value individuals of certain species less than others even when beliefs about intelligence and sentience are accounted for. We conclude by discussing the implications of a psychological study of speciesism for the psychology of human-animal relationships.

Keywords: speciesism, prejudice, prosocial behavior, human–animal relations, helping

© 2018, American Psychological Association. This paper is not the copy of record and may not exactly replicate the final, authoritative version of the article. Please do not copy or cite without authors permission. The final article will be available, upon publication, via its DOI: 10.1037/pspp0000182

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The Moral Standing of Animals: Descriptively, speciesism is a concept that Towards a Psychology of explains how people behave; namely that they do, as a matter of fact, assign moral Speciesism worth to individuals on the basis of species membership, such that people can Human relationships with non-human therefore be accurately described as animals are complex. Some animals are having speciesist attitudes. Normatively, treasured as pets, receive our love and much work on speciesism is rooted in the devotion and are provided with a diet and claim that people should not assign quality of health care better even than different moral values to individuals some humans in the developing world. based solely on their species membership, Other animals, in contrast, are factory with analogies made with treating people farmed and slaughtered so that their differently solely based upon their race bodies can provide the meat we share (racism) or gender (sexism). This paper is with our pets. Yet other animals are concerned with speciesism as a regarded as experimental subjects, sources psychological phenomenon and, of entertainment, or industrial equipment. therefore, in a descriptive sense. Any observer who had not been socialized Speciesism manifests itself in the near- to view this as normal would likely be universal belief that humans are struck by this inconsistency of moral intrinsically more valuable than worth attributed to animals in human individuals of other species. It also societies. In this paper, we attempt to manifests itself in the belief that understand this paradoxical treatment by differential treatment of species that have importing the philosophical concept of comparable mental and emotional speciesism into a social-psychological capabilities, such as pigs and dogs, is examination of human-animal morally justifiable. These manifestations relationships. of speciesism are ubiquitous, underpinning practices such as the mass The Philosophy of Speciesism factory farming of animals for food, the use of animals for human entertainment Philosophers have long noted the in circuses, and legal systems that view inconsistency in our regard for animals, animals as property and deny them basic but it is only in recent decades that the rights such as the right to bodily integrity. systematic consideration of human-animal For example, we treat dogs with special relations has really flourished and entered moral status while simultaneously factory the public domain. Our relationships with farming and eating pigs — despite the fact animals have been called “speciesist” — a that dogs and pigs have similar mental term introduced and popularized in the and emotional capabilities (Mendl, Held, 1970s and specifically intended to draw a & Byrne, 2010). Such manifestations of parallel with other forms of unjustified speciesism are, descriptively, familiar to discrimination, such as racism and sexism all, even if one might deny there is (Horta, 2010; Ryder, 2006, Singer, 1975; anything, normatively, wrong with this. 1979; Singer & Mason, 2007). Speciesism, Speciesism—like racism and sexism—is in the philosophical literature, refers to the observed throughout history and across assignment of different inherent moral cultures. Just like ethnic prejudice is status based solely on an individual's observed in all societies but is directed species membership. As implicit in the against different groups based on local definition of speciesism and its very traditions and history, speciesism appears name, speciesism can be understood in evident across cultures but is expressed both a descriptive and a normative sense. differently across the world (see Amiot &

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Bastian, 2015). Consider dogs and cats: in And yet, careful analysis suggests that this China they are considered food and thus is not the case. When each of the above akin to other animals like pigs, but in reasons is investigated more fully, they Western societies they are seen as ‘one of are shown to be incomplete explanations the family’ and thus have a much higher (see, for example, Horta, 2010). status than pigs (Simoons, 1990). Or a) First, the argument from cognitive consider cows: routine fare on the dinner abilities (i.e. that humans devalue plate in many Western countries, but animals because they are less forbidden from being eaten and revered cognitively able than humans) fails as sacred animals in Hindu societies. to account for why people place These culturally determined different moral value on different manifestations of speciesism occur not just animals that have similar cognitive across cultures but also across time. abilities. Pigs, for example, have Horses were once routinely consumed in higher cognitive abilities than Western countries for centuries, but now dogs, and even pass a weak horsemeat consumption has substantially version of the mirror test, declined and the perceived moral status of indicating some level of self- horses has increased (Gade, 1976). awareness (Broom, Sena & At this point, one might ask whether it Moynihan, 2009). It cannot, is really speciesism that best explains why therefore, simply be cognitive we treat people and animals differently abilities that determine treatment, based on their species (for philosophical because otherwise pigs would be criticism of speciesism as a concept see treated as equal, and maybe even Diamond, 1978; Kagan, 2016, Williams, superior, to dogs. Of course, some 2009). Just as it has been argued in history people might morally value pigs that unequal treatment of races is morally less than dogs because they justified because members of different incorrectly assume that pigs are races (supposedly) differ in their less intelligent than they actually intelligence or physical capabilities, might are, which might be driven by it not be species membership per se that motivated reasoning (e.g. Bastian results in differential treatment, but rather et al., 2012). But such incorrect other traits that happen to correlate with assumptions and/or motivated species membership? Three of the most reasoning cannot explain clear common objections to the utility of the cases of people valuing certain speciesism concept, raised by individuals less despite being fully philosophers and laypeople alike, are that aware that they are equally or rather than reflecting a speciesist bias, more intelligent than others (for humans devalue animals because: a) example, chimpanzees vs. severely animals are less cognitively able than mentally disabled humans, see humans; b) animals, unlike humans, point b). cannot be moral agents (i.e. they cannot b) Second, the arguments from both reciprocate in moral interactions and cognitive abilities and moral cannot be held morally or legally agency (i.e. humans devalue responsible for their actions); or c) animals animals because animals, unlike are less sentient (i.e. able to feel and humans, cannot be moral agents) experience things such as suffering) than are countered with the example of humans. severely mentally disabled Were any of the above the true cause humans. Humans grant equal of human treatment of animals, moral status to severely mentally speciesism would be a redundant concept. disabled humans and healthy

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individuals despite their lack of species membership. And even if one cognitive and reciprocal abilities— disagrees on just how unconvincing these they may even grant such criticisms are, it seems clear that they are individuals enhanced moral status not strong enough to halt discussion of in light of their vulnerability. speciesism in its tracks. From a Moreover, it seems that most philosophical perspective, the paradoxical people would place less moral treatment of animals can be usefully, and value on a chimpanzee than on a informatively, described as speciesist. human with very severe mental And indeed this is where speciesism has disabilities even in cases where most often been used—in philosophy. But they know that the chimpanzee could speciesism also be a useful has higher cognitive abilities than psychological construct, shedding deeper said human. Neither cognitive light on the way that humans think about abilities nor the potential for animals? We argue that it can. reciprocal morality, then, seem to accurately account for the way we The Psychology of Speciesism treat members of different species, because otherwise we should In this paper, we present speciesism as afford greater weight to the a psychological construct, suitable for treatment of intelligent animals psychological investigation. Specifically, over severely disabled humans. we are interested in the empirical truth of c) Third, the argument from the psychological claims implicit in the sentience (i.e. animals do not feel philosophical discussion of speciesism: and experience things such as first, the primary claim that people assign suffering) fails because empirical moral worth to individuals on the basis of data has shown that many animals species membership alone; and second, — and in particular vertebrate, like the claim that speciesism is a form of pigs, dogs, and cows — are prejudice analogous to other prejudicial capable of suffering to an extent attitudes. Philosophers have debated analogous to humans (Low et al., these claims, but relatively little empirical 2012). It is possible, however, that work has been conducted to test whether people systematically these claims are, as a matter of fact, true. underappreciate the level of Do people, in actuality, assign moral sentience in many animals. worth to individuals on the basic of Moreover, even in the absence of species membership; and are these this overwhelming scientific data, speciesist attitudes connected to other we can observe that people do not prejudicial attitudes? By rigorously typically doubt the sentience of, examining this, it becomes possible to for example, human infants — bring the concept of speciesism into the despite the fact that the behavior study of intergroup relations and of infants offers weaker evidence prejudice more generally, thus providing for sentience than the behavior of, new insights and directions for research for example, an average adult for both topics. chimpanzee. Our preliminary aim, upon which all later aims depend, was (Aim I) to develop Given these arguments, the standard a reliable and valid scale to measure objections to the utility of the speciesism as a psychological construct philosophical concept of speciesism are (Studies 1 and 2). Once this was achieved, unconvincing. People do seem to assign we aimed to look at (Aim II) the extent to worth to different species solely on which speciesism can psychologically be

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considered a form of a prejudice (Study 3), Previous Research by testing whether (Aim IIa) speciesism As noted above, surprisingly little correlates with other forms of prejudice, psychological research has focused on the and whether (Aim IIb) speciesism, like discrimination against animals (for one of other forms of prejudice, is driven by the first papers, see Plous, 1993). There socio-ideological factors such as social are, however, some previous and more dominance orientation that maintain other recent studies on human-animal relations, forms of intergroup conflict. To the extent their underlying attitudes, mechanisms that speciesism is a form of prejudice it and resulting practices that suggest it is in should be correlated with prototypical fact useful to consider speciesism in terms examples of prejudice and be driven by of intergroup bias, prejudice, and the same kind of processes that drive discrimination. other prejudices. Moreover, we aimed to explore the relationship between The Social Dominance Human-Animal speciesism with empathic concern and Relations Model (SD-HARM) actively open-minded thinking (Aim IIc). The first connection between Finally, we aimed to look at (Aim III) speciesism and intergroup bias comes in whether speciesism predicts behavior, the form of social dominance orientation such as the degree of help directed (SDO: Pratto, Sidanius, Stallworth, & towards individuals of different species or Malle, 1994). People differ in how much the likelihood of choosing certain food they support or oppose group-based products over others (Studies 4 and 5). dominance and inequality amongst social To what extent is it reasonable, on groups, and this variance can be referred empirical grounds, to view speciesism as a to as differences in social dominance form of prejudice? It is here that orientation. Differences in SDO predict psychology has a real and important role prejudicial attitudes towards a variety of to play. If it can be shown that speciesism human social groups, including ethnic is psychologically related to other forms minorities, housewives, people with of prejudice, the philosophical case for it mental health difficulties, and people who can be strengthened. One typical are obese or perceived as unattractive (e.g. definition of prejudice is that it refers to Duckitt & Sibley, 2007). Critically for a “any attitude, emotion, or behavior discussion of speciesism, SDO also relates toward members of a group, which to how people feel about inequality directly or indirectly implies some between humans and animals. Recent negativity or antipathy toward that studies suggest that people who believe in group” (Brown, 2010, p. 7). Speciesism the superiority of humans over animals seems to fit that definition as it involves also believe in the superiority of some negative beliefs, emotions, and behavior humans over others (Costello & Hodson, directed towards others based on species 2009; Dhont & Hodson, 2014; Dhont, membership. Most people believe that Hodson, Costello & MacInnis, 2014). pigs matter less than dogs (attitude), feel Accordingly, Dhohnt, Hodson and Leite disgust towards rats but love towards cats (2016) have proposed the Social (emotion), and accordingly treat pigs and Dominance Human-Animal Relations rats much worse than they treat dogs and Model (SD-HARM) whereby the same cats (behavior). Moreover, in addition to socio-ideological beliefs that legitimize fitting the definition of prejudice, we aim hierarchies amongst human groups also to show that speciesism shares properties seem to legitimize hierarchies of humans and underlying psychological over animals. Such findings suggest that it mechanisms with other phenomena would be fruitful to consider speciesism in referred to as prejudice. terms of intergroup conflict, if both

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speciesism and other forms of prejudice people who endorse social dominance are depend on similar psychological beliefs. able to remove their victims from the Dehumanization and the Interspecies ‘human’ sphere of moral concern and Model of Prejudice (ISMP) place them in the ‘animal’ sphere where no moral consideration is necessary. The The second connection between existence of the human-animal gulf speciesism and intergroup conflict comes therefore functions to facilitate prejudice from work on dehumanization, and and discrimination between groups of specifically research suggesting that humans as well as between humans and intergroup dehumanization is linked with animals. In support of this theory, it was beliefs in the superiority of humans over demonstrated that when similarities animals. Dehumanization is the between animals and humans are pointed psychological process by which other out not only speciesism is reduced but people are seen as less “human” and also moral concern for marginalized therefore not worthy of full moral human out-groups is increased (Bastian, concern, and is a critical part of intergroup Loughnan, Costello, & Hodson, 2012). conflict (Haslam, 2006). The language of dehumanization, such as referring to The Meat Paradox and Carnism black people as “apes”, Jews as “rats” and A related emerging field of research women as “bitches”, works to strip the has started to investigate the psychology victim of moral worth, as it is assumed surrounding practices of eating animals that actual apes, rats, and dogs could not (Loughnan & Bastian, 2014). Most people merit full moral consideration. Two do not want to hurt animals, yet continue distinct accounts have been proposed to to eat meat. This widespread phenomenon explain the relationship between has been referred to as the ‘meat paradox’ dehumanization and attitudes towards (Loughnan et al., 2010; Loughnan, Bastian, animals. & Haslam, 2014). Both active (motivated One the one hand, it has been reasoning) and passive (e.g. social norms) suggested that just as some people dissonance avoidance can account for the dehumanize human out-groups by meat paradox (Bastian & Loughan, 2017). reducing attribution of mental states, they A main driver of the meat paradox is also de-mentalize animal out-groups. de-mentalization (discussed above). Specifically, the denial of animals’ People tend to de-mentalize animals they capability to suffer, known as de- classify as food (e.g. Bastian et al., 2012) mentalization, can reduce moral concern and judge animals that are categorized as for animals (Bastian et al., 2012; Kozak, food (e.g. pigs, cows, chickens) as having Marsh, & Wegner, 2006). Indeed, research lower capability to suffer than animals shows that a person’s moral concern for that are typically not categorized as food animals is closely related to how much (e.g. cats, dogs, horses; Bilewicz, they believe animals can suffer (Waytz, Michalak, & Kamińska, 2016; Bratanova, Gray, Epley, & Wegner, 2010). Loughnan, & Bastian, 2011). Moreover, On the other hand, according to the people are more likely to de-mentalize Interspecies Model of Prejudice (ISMP: animals if they have recently eaten meat Costello & Hodson, 2014), belief in an (Loughnan, Haslam, & Bastian, 2010) or if insurmountable human–animal divide is they anticipate eating meat soon (Bastian the foundation for out-group et al., 2012; Bastian & Loughnan, 2016). dehumanization. That is, dehumanization It has been argued that meat is made possible by the moral gulf consumption is legitimized by a set of between human and animals: By likening ideological beliefs referred to as ‘carnism’ out-group members to ‘inferior’ animals, (Joy, 2011; Monteiro, Pfeiler, Patterson &

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Milburn, 2017). Eating meat, for example, unavailable in the existing literature, for is justified on the basis of it being natural, multiple reasons. normal, necessary, and nice (“The 4 Ns”; First, existing scales do not explicitly Piazza et al., 2015). Furthermore, carnism capture speciesism, as it is properly shows in the justification of killing defined: Attributing moral status to an animals for food purposes (Monteiro et individual solely on the basis of their al., 2017). Conceptually, carnism is a species. Instead, existing scales capture specific subset of speciesist beliefs and related, yet distinct, concepts such as practices, namely those related to the general attitudes towards animals or categorization of certain animals as food. views on animal rights. Psychologically, we would expect carnism Second, some items in existing scales and speciesism to be to some extent confound empirical and normative issues. distinct due to the fact that many people Consider the following item by Wuensch care about animals in general while at the et al. (2002): “Most cosmetics research same time defending meat consumption done on animals is unnecessary and and its practices (i.e. meat paradox). invalid”. This item is limited as it Overall, however, it seems likely that the confounds the normative belief that two are not just conceptually but also animals should not be subjected to psychologically strongly linked. suffering with the empirical belief in the efficacy of scientific testing. There is no Measuring Speciesism way to accurately respond to the item if, To study speciesism, we need a for example, you believe the research is convenient way of measuring speciesist scientifically valid but morally abhorrent, attitudes. There are currently two or if you believe the research is morally established scales that attempt to capture acceptable but scientifically useless. Or general attitudes towards animals: consider another item on the scale, which Herzog, Betchart, and Pittman’s (1991) reads: “There are plenty of viable Animal Attitude Scale and Wuensch, alternatives to the use of animals in Jenkins, and Poteat’s (2002) Animal Rights biomedical and behavioral research” Scale. Both scales capture important (Wuensch et al., 2002). Again, this item is aspects of people’s attitudes towards flawed as it relates to an empirical fact, animals. For many reasons, however, we not a belief about the moral standing of argue that a new scale is needed in order animals. A coherent anti-speciesist could to examine the psychology of speciesism believe that there are few viable specifically with sufficient precision. alternatives to the use of animals in Dhont et al. (2014; 2016) and Piazza et al. research while maintaining testing on (2015) have also recognized the need for a animals is morally wrong. new way to measure speciesism, and to Third, a common difficulty in this end developed ad hoc measurement capturing speciesism is that people who instruments to help elucidate how endorse anti-speciesism can come to humans think about animals. However, different conclusions about certain while these instruments have been used to practices depending on the philosophical good effect to advance our understanding position they hold, such as of human-animal relationships, they consequentialism and deontology. suffer from theoretical limitations and Consequentialism, including were produced without statistical utilitarianism, is the moral view that the validation and established scale rightness of an action depends only on its development procedures. A consequences (Bentham, 1789/1961; Mill, comprehensive validated measuring tool 1861). Deontology is the moral view that for speciesism therefore remains certain actions are forbidden irrespective

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of the consequences (Kant, 1785/1964). A To capture all relevant manifestations consequentialist anti-speciesist might, for of speciesism the item pool should consist example, agree to harm animals (or of both abstract-general and concrete- humans) if this were to result in better empirical items. There are benefits and overall outcome for all sentient beings drawbacks to including concrete items. (Kahane et al., 2015). A deontological anti- On the one hand, benefits of concrete speciesist, however, would refuse to harm items include the fact that people’s animals (or humans) even if the outcome attitudes are likely to be inconsistent and would be better for everyone. Given this limited by self-serving biases, and divergence, unless carefully devised, concrete items can expose this items that, for example, assess people’s inconsistency. For example, people might attitudes on using animals for medical agree with an abstract item such as testing can be unhelpful (e.g. some items “species membership is not a morally by Herzog et al., 1991). This is because relevant criterion”, but disagree with a they might distinguish between a concrete item such as “animals should not consequentialist anti-speciesist (who may be hunted for sport”. Another advantage endorse research using animals if it results of concrete items is that they may be in the development of a drug that saves easier for laypeople to understand and many lives in the long run), and a respond to. As this scale is primarily for deontological anti-speciesist (who may use by laypeople and not philosophers, reject research using animals because it ease of comprehension is an important violates a general rule of not harming factor. On the other hand, disadvantages others). Such a distinction, however, is a of concrete items include the fact that they factor that should not be captured by a inevitably create empirical confounders. speciesism scale as, ultimately, the scale Take a person’s views on animals must be able to identify speciesism performing in the circus, for example. To without being confounded by unrelated some extent, the issue poses the empirical specifics of the underlying moral position question of how far circus animals suffer. a person may hold. People might have different experiences of circuses, which might cause them to Requirements for a Speciesism Scale have different views on the level of In order to ensure that our scale suffering circuses cause for animals. These captures the precise philosophical beliefs about circus conditions might be meaning of speciesism, we outlined the entirely independent of their moral following requirements to be met: values. Given these arguments about First, the initial set of items (subjected concrete items, we aimed to strike an to exploratory factor analysis) should appropriate balance between capture speciesism both exclusively and philosophically rigorous items and exhaustively. We assume that speciesism concrete items in the final scale. will manifest itself both in general beliefs Second, items should avoid about the moral inferiority of certain normative confounders. In particular, it is species and in the endorsement of important that items do not prompt concrete practices involving the use of different responses from deontological animals. All major manifestations of and consequentialist anti-speciesists. As speciesism must be covered and core we have explored above, there is the manifestations of speciesism must receive potential for consequentialist and appropriate representation, such as the deontological anti-speciesists to be use of animals for entertainment, food, divided on a number of issues related to and medical experiments. the treatment or rights of animals. Therefore, when we referred to an

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empirical situation in our items, we For all studies in this paper, our ensured the situation was such that most institution’s ethical guidelines were consequentialist and deontological (anti-) followed and the research was approved speciesists would reach the same through University of Oxford’s Central conclusion. University Research Ethics Committee, with the reference number MSD-IDREC- Study 1. Scale Development C1-2014-133. In Study 1 we began our process of Participants and Procedure developing the Speciesism Scale (Aim I) by formulating and testing a pool of 1,122 US American participants took theoretically-validated items to measure part in the study online via Amazon speciesism. Mechanical Turk (MTurk), and received a payment of $0.50 for their participation.. Method Five participants were excluded for not Item Selection completing the study, and nine because they failed a simple attention check To formulate a list of items, we used a embedded in the survey where people combination of partially modified were asked to select a certain scale point versions of items from existing scales to confirm they were paying attention. (Herzog et al. 1991; Wuensch et al. 2002) This left a final sample of 1,108 and entirely new items. We then sent participants (457 female; Mage = 33, SD = these proposed items to renowned experts 11.56), representing an excellent sample from a number of disciplines, including size. In contrast to experimental studies the philosophers Peter Singer and Oscar there are no straightforward and 1 Horta, and the legal scholar Steven Wise . commonly accepted techniques to After incorporating feedback from these determine sample size for factor analyses experts and excluding items that did not (Mundfrom, Shaw, & Ke, 2005). One meet our criteria, we were left with a 27- approach is to rely on the absolute sample item pool (see Table 1). In line with our size. Estimations by Comrey and Lee prerequisites for the scale, these items (1992) suggest that a sample size of 300 is included both concrete (e.g. “It is morally adequate, and that 1,000 or more is acceptable for cattle and pigs to be raised excellent. In general, the literature agrees for human consumption”) and abstract that in exploratory factor analyses the items (e.g. “Some beings are morally more higher the sample size the better (e.g. important than others just because they Costello & Osborne, 2005). A different belong to a certain species.”); and items approach is to aim for a subject-to-item tapping both the belief in the superiority ratio of at least 5:1 (Gorsuch, 1983), better of humans over animals (“Morally, 10:1 or higher (Everitt, 1975; Nunnally, animals always count for less than 1978). Our final sample of 1,108 therefore humans”) and the superiority of certain represents a size that is more than animals over other animals (“Pigs should adequate, and with 27 items, gave us an be taken care of by humans just like dogs excellent final subject-to-item ratio of 41:1. are”: reverse-scored). Items were presented in randomized Ethics Statement order and participants were asked to indicate to which extent they agreed with the statements on a Likert scale from 1 (strongly disagree), over 4 (neither agree nor disagree) to 7 (strongly agree). If not further 1 Of course, while we sought feedback specified this response scale was used for from these experts, we are fully responsible for these items should any criticism occur.

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all established measures throughout our and the fifth factor 3.83% of the variance five studies. (eigenvalue = 1.04). We chose to conduct the study online The scree plot displayed a clear for a number of reasons. Research inflexion point, which justified retaining suggests that data obtained via online two factors. As such, we ran a further platforms such as Amazon analysis, specified to extract two factors. MechanicalTurk is of high quality The first extracted factor seemed to (Paolacci & Chandler, 2014) and that capture our intended construct of results are comparable to results from speciesism including both abstract items campus studies (Bartneck, Duenser, and more concrete items capturing Moltchanova, & Zawieska, 2015). attitudes towards animal exploitation and Importantly for our purposes, it was animal rights. The second factor captured critical to have a broad sample that is ethical vegetarianism (e.g. “It is morally representative of the general public in wrong to eat fish”). terms of education background, gender, Based on theoretical and statistical (see and age, as speciesism is likely to correlate CFA below) considerations, we decided to with such factors. Online participants retain the first factor only. It best captured have been shown to be more diverse the “pure” theoretical construct of (Shapiro, Chandler, & Mueller, 2013) and speciesism, in isolation from other highly representative (Buhrmeister, constructs. In this context, it is notable Kwang, & Gosling, 2011), more so than that factor analysis extracted speciesism traditional samples (e.g. Berinsky, Huber, and ethical vegetarianism as separate & Lenz, 2012; Rand, 2012)—largely constructs. This is evidence that the two because online studies allow for the constructs are psychologically distinct. recruitment of broader population The speciesism factor and the ethical samples than the often-limited university vegetarianism factor correlated negatively student samples. with each other, r = -.35, p < .001. Items for the further development of Results the scale were selected or excluded on the Exploratory Factor Analysis basis of theoretical and statistical We first conducted Exploratory Factor considerations. In particular, we focused Analysis (EFA) using the principal axis on including items with high factor factors extraction method to determine the loadings while ensuring that theoretically factor structure of the 27 items. Oblique relevant aspects of speciesism were direct oblimin rotation was chosen as we captured by the set of items. We expected that underlying factors would prioritized items that did not include correlate. The Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin (KMO) empirical assumptions about the measure of sampling adequacy was .94, intelligence or suffering of animals to which is above the recommended value of avoid confounding assumptions (e.g. .6, indicating that individual items shared items three or eight). Our set of selected enough common variance for such an items contained ten items (Table 1). analysis. Bartlett’s test of sphericity was significant: χ2(351) = 12,748.82, p < .001. [Table 1] The first factor explained 34.04% of the variance (eigenvalue = 9.20), the second Confirmatory Factor Analysis factor 9.39% of the variance (eigenvalue = In order to examine the model fit of 2.54), the third factor 5.30% of the variance the ten extracted items we performed a (eigenvalue = 1.43), the fourth factor Confirmatory Factor Analysis (CFA) 5.08% of the variance (eigenvalue = 1.37), relying on maximum likelihood

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estimation in R using the lavaan package entertainment and as such tapped into a (version 0.5). distinct sub-form of speciesism. Similar We used a combination of fit indices to redundancies were found between items judge the model fit. Our primary model fit five and seven that were both highly index was the Comparative Fit Index abstract without tapping into real-world (CFI) score, which indicates how well the examples, items six and nine both tapped data fits the target model compared to an into the domain of research use with independent model that assumes animals, and items twelve and seventeen uncorrelated variables. CFI is frequently both captured attitudes towards animal reported and, in comparison to other fit rights. Given these redundancies, we indices, not unduly influenced by sample chose to exclude items four, six, seven, size (Fan, Thompson, & Wang, 1999). and twelve from the final scale, as they Based on recommendations in the did not serve any additional explanatory literature we considered a model to have purpose. an acceptable fit if its CFI score was .93 or A second CFA with the remaining six higher (Byrne, 1994). Due to the items was then conducted. The CFI was robustness of the CFI we decided to reject .98, which suggests adequate model fit. any model that would not meet the TLI was .96, which indicates excellent fit. required CFI standard. SRMR was .07, which is in the range of For models with an acceptable fit acceptable values. In contrast, to the according to CFI we furthermore already mentioned fit indices, the Chi- considered the Tucker-Lewis Index (TLI), square test yielded a poor fit, χ2(9) = 52.87, which is an incremental fit index and p < .001. However, as mentioned the Chi- must lie above .90, and ideally above .95 square test is considered to be an (Hu & Bentler, 1999; Marsh, Balla, & unreliable fit index for which reason we McDonald, 1988). We also applied the did not strongly weight its result but still more traditional Chi-square test. report it for completeness sake. As such, However, it must be noted that the Chi- CFA indicated that the model of the six- square test for CFA is considered to be an item scale was an appropriate fit. unreliable fit index since it is very Furthermore, a Kolmogorov-Smirnov test sensitive to sample size and will usually for normality suggested that the scores result in significant outcomes for sample were normally distributed, D(1108) = .02, sizes larger than 200 (Steiger, 2007). p = .20. Finally, we considered the Standardized Finally, we conducted a third CFA in Root Mean Square Residual (SRMR), which we tested the model fit of a two- which represents the standardized factor model, which includes both the discrepancy between the predicted and speciesism and ethical vegetarianism observed correlation and must lie below factor. The model included the six .08 to justify adequate model fit (Hu & speciesism items and five ethical Bentler, 1999). vegetarianism items that loaded onto the A first CFA revealed an unsatisfactory second extracted factor (Table 1). The model fit with a CFI of 0.88, which lies model fit, however, was unsatisfactory below the required standard (TLI = .85; (CFI = .88; TLI = .85; SRMR = .08). Only SRMR = .06). Results showed that after removing items 26 and 27 the model unexplained variances correlated highly fit became satisfactory (CFI = .96; TLI = among each other. This implied that .94; SRMR = .05). However, due to its low certain items shared variance among each item count and its non-normally other that was not captured by general distributed scores (Kolmogorov-Smirnov speciesism. For example, items two and test for normality: D(1108) = .11, p < .001) four both captured the use of animals for we do not recommend using the ethical

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vegetarianism factor as a measurement and empirically sound Speciesism Scale. A instrument. combination of EFA, CFA, and reliability Confirmatory Factor Analysis on a analysis supported the development of a Separate Dataset one-dimensional scale. All six items strongly loaded onto a single speciesism In order to confirm our six-item one- factor, which had good model fit and high factor solution we collected a new set of internal consistency, and this model was data with which to test our model. 200 US confirmed by an additional CFA American participants took part in the conducted on a separate dataset. Most study online via MTurk and received importantly, the scale fulfills all $0.70 for taking part. Four participants did requirements that were stipulated at the not complete and nine were excluded for beginning of the study: all items explicitly failing the attention check question. This capture speciesism and the scale left a final sample of 187 US American encompasses crucial aspects of the participants (89 female; Mage = 35.73, SD = theoretical concept; experts in relevant 10.36). This sample size is again adequate fields validated all items; the scale consists according to the rule of thumb of aiming of both abstract and empirical items; and for a subject-to-item ratio of at least 1:10 does not contain items eliciting empirical (Everitt, 1975; Nunnally, 1978) as in our and normative confounding factors. case the ratio was 31:1. Furthermore, our It is interesting that speciesism and sample size nearly equals Jackson’s (2001) ethical vegetarianism were — despite recommendation to recruit a minimum of being strongly correlated — 200 participants for CFA relying on psychologically distinct factors. At first maximum likelihood estimation. blush, this result might be surprising, as Participants responded to the speciesism one might expect that endorsement of items and demographic questions. This anti-speciesism would consistently result new data set provided very strong in endorsement of ethical vegetarianism. evidence for the six-item model, where the However, this finding is consistent with CFI was .99, TLI was .99, the SRMR was previous research on the meat paradox .02, and even the Chi-square test yielded (Bratanova, et al, 2011; Bastian & an acceptable fit, χ2(9) = 11.87, p = .22. Loughnan, 2016). People might endorse The Speciesism Scale anti-speciesism in the abstract or in Based on a series of EFA and CFAs, domains where it does not conflict with we arrived at our final items to form a their personal preferences, but they Speciesism Scale (Table 2). The Speciesism employ specific beliefs and practices in Scale consists of six items all loading onto the context of food (i.e. carnism; Monteiro a single factor. Speciesism scores were et al., 2017; Piazza et al., 2015). normally distributed across the sample with a mean of 3.64 (SD = 1.25) where the Study 2. Temporal Stability minimum was 1 and the maximum 7. Reliability analyses yielded that the six- We have hypothesized that speciesism items scale had high internal consistency, is a psychological form of prejudice with a Cronbach’s alpha of .81. analogous to other psychological forms of prejudice such as racism or sexism. If this [Table 2] is the case speciesism should — like other forms of prejudice — be a relatively stable construct that persists over time. Of Discussion course, like any other form of prejudice, The goal of Study 1 was the the extent to which a person holds development of a theoretically informed speciesist attitudes can fluctuate

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depending on the situation and other Mage = 36.82, SD = 11.51) completed the conditional factors. Ultimately, however, retest study (giving a higher-than- the extent to which a person holds expected response rate of 49%), and all speciesist attitudes should stay relatively participants again received $0.50 payment stable over time because otherwise for taking part. No participants were speciesism could not be considered a excluded at this stage, and this final psychological prejudice analogous to sample of 333 is more than adequate, racism or sexism, but a short-term belief exceeding minimum recommendations for connected to spontaneous emotional test-retest analyses (Shoukri et al., 2004). reactions. In order to investigate the Results and Discussion temporal stability of speciesist attitudes, we examined the test-retest reliability of Internal consistency was high for both the Speciesism Scale over a period of four stages of the study with a Cronbach alpha weeks. To the extent that speciesism does of .89 for the first stage and .90 for the represent a stable prejudice, scores at the second stage of the study, and— two times should be highly correlated. critically—a retest analysis with the 333 cases revealed a test-retest correlation Methods coefficient of r = .88, p < .001. That is, The study consisted of two stages: a participants’ scores on the Speciesism first stage in which participants completed Scale were very highly correlated with the speciesism scale, and then a second their scores on the same scale four weeks stage four weeks later in which these same later. The high test-retest reliability is an participants were invited to again important part of establishing speciesism complete the scale. In the first stage, 685 as a temporally stable psychological participants took part via MTurk and prejudice and demonstrates that received a payment of $0.50 for their speciesism—similar to racism or sexism— participation. Eight participants were is not just a short-term belief or emotional excluded for failing the attention check reaction, but a stable view that persists question, leaving a final sample of 677 US over time.

American participants (305 female; Mage = Although our primary purpose for this 34.37, SD = 10.94). We conservatively study was to consider test-retest assumed a response rate of around 30% reliability, given that for the first sample for the second stage of the study and an we had a sample size of 677, we decided expected effect size (Pearson correlation to subject the resulting speciesism ratings coefficient) between 0.6 and 0.8. Based on to an additional CFA to investigate if our sample size calculations for test-retest six-item one-factor structure revealed in analyses in the literature (Shoukri et al., the two independent samples of Study 1 2004) we decided to aim for at least 200 holds a third confirmatory test. Results responding participants in the second confirmed once again that our six-item stage and as such aimed to recruit 680 in model had excellent fit (CFI = 0.98, TLI = the first stage (given the expected 30% 0.97, SRMR = 0.02). response rate). Participants completed the Overall, in Study 2 we provided Speciesism Scale but were not informed further psychometric support for our about the follow-up study. Other filler Speciesism Scale, finding excellent fit for measures were included to distract from our model in an independent data sample the speciesism items. and finding good test-retest reliability In the second stage four weeks later, over time. Of course, the results from all 677 participants were contacted again Study 2 cannot show that speciesism is a with information about the retest study. result of similar psychological processes 333 US American participants (164 female; to other forms of prejudice, only that

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speciesism can in fact be considered a factor analyses yield a generalized stable and measurable attitude like racism prejudice factor explaining 50% to 60% of and sexism. In Study 3 we turned to look the variance in different forms of at how similar speciesism is to other forms prejudice (Ekehammar & Akrami, 2003). If of prejudice in terms of content. speciesism is indeed to be usefully considered a form of prejudice, people who hold stronger speciesist attitudes Study 3. Convergent Validity should also exhibit other prejudicial In Study 1 we developed a new and attitudes. reliable scale to measure speciesism, and Our second aim—Aim IIb—is a result in Study 2, we confirmed that speciesism of the reasoning, as suggested by the SD- scores were persistent over time. HARM model (Dhont et al., 2016), that if Combined, the results of Studies 1 and 2 speciesism is a form of prejudice it should highlight that speciesism is a stable share psychological roots with other psychological construct. Having met our forms of prejudice. In this way, we hoped first aim—to develop a reliable and valid both to further validate the Speciesism scale to measure speciesism—we next Scale by showing it to be correlated with turned to our second aim: to better social dominance orientation and related understand the nature of speciesism by socio-ideological constructs, as well as looking at what other attitudes speciesism providing independent support for the is associated with, and which more claims of the SD-HARM model. general psychological orientations drive As a third and more exploratory such speciesist attitudes. By doing so we aim—Aim IIc—, we aimed to investigate sought to establish convergent validity of the relationship between speciesism with the Speciesism Scale. empathic concern and actively open- In Study 3, equipped with our new minded thinking. A previous study has scale, we explored whether speciesism already identified a relation between might usefully be described as a form of empathy levels and attitudes to animals prejudice by shedding light on the (Taylor & Signal, 2005) and as such we relationship of speciesism with other hypothesized that people higher in psychological constructs. We took a two- empathic concern would care more about pronged approach: first, we tested the suffering of animals and subsequently whether speciesism correlates with other endorse less speciesist attitudes. Similarly, forms of prejudice (Aim IIa); and second, because speciesist attitudes predominate we looked at whether speciesism, like in society, we predicted that actively other forms of prejudice, is driven by open-minded people, people who are socio-ideological factors such as social more willing to change their beliefs dominance orientation or right-wing (Baron, 2000) and think beyond the authoritarianism that maintain other currently accepted norms, are more likely forms of intergroup conflict (Aim IIb). to endorse anti-speciesism. Our first aim—Aim IIa—was drawn Method and Results from the personality approach to prejudice, which suggests that prejudice is 257 US American participants took typically a generalized phenomenon: a part in the study online via MTurk, and person who is high on ethnic prejudice received $1 payment for their will also be high on gender-based participation. Fifteen participants were prejudice, and so on (Allport, 1954). For excluded for failing an attention check, example, prejudice toward various targets leaving a final sample of 242 people (110 tend to be significantly correlated female; Mage = 36.33, SD = 11.88). With that, (Akrami, Ekehammer, & Bergh, 2011), and our sample size met the recommendations

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of Comrey and Lee (1992) to recruit at extent that speciesism is—as philosophers least 200-300 participants for scale have argued it to be—a form of prejudice, validation. Furthermore, a review of over it should be correlated with other forms of a hundred scale validation studies prejudice. Specifically, we looked at three revealed that the median sample size of prototypical forms of prejudice: prejudice such studies was 121, and so with a final based on ethnic background or race sample of 242 we were confident that our (racism), prejudice based on gender sample size was more than adequate (sexism), and prejudice based on sexual (Anthoine, Moret, Regnault, Sébille, & orientation (homophobia). A growing Hardouin, 2014). body of research has suggested that In the main part of the study, speciesism is associated with prejudice, participants were asked to complete to the but most of this has used simple feeling Speciesism Scale and a number of separate thermometer type questions (Dhont et al., scales presented in a random order, which 2014; 2016). In our study, therefore we are discussed in turn along with their drew upon this work but relied on widely results below. At the end of the study used and empirically validated scales. participants responded to demographic First, to tap racism, we used the questions including age, gender, Modern Racism Scale (McConahay, 1986). education (six-step continuous scale from This consists of 7 items and includes items “less than high school degree” to such as “Blacks are getting too demanding “graduate degree”), income (10-step in their push for equal rights” (internal continuous scale from “under $5,000 per consistency: α = .75). Second, to look at year” to “over $100,000 per year”), and sexism we used the Modern Sexism Scale whether they are vegetarian (yes or no). (Swim, Aikin, Hall, & Hunter, 1995). This Median education level was “attended consists of 8 items and included items college” (M = 4.22, SD = 1.29) and median such as “Women often miss out on good annual income level was “$25,001- jobs due to sexual discrimination” (α = $35,000” (M = 5.22, SD = 2.34). .92). Third, to look at homophobia, we We note that two items from the used the revised short version of the original item pool that in Study 1 were Attitudes Toward Lesbians And Gay Men shown not to load on the main speciesism Scale (Herek, 1998). This consists of 10 factor were included in this (and all items including “The idea of homosexual following) studies. To ensure that our marriages seems ridiculous to me” (α = results for the main Speciesism Scale hold .97). To the extent that speciesism is a over and beyond the inclusion of these form of prejudice analogous to other two items, we explored whether results kinds, speciesist attitudes should be changed when these two items were associated with increased ethnic, gender, added to the scale. As it did not, this issue and sexuality-based prejudice, just like is further ignored. Due to the multiple these types of prejudice are typically correlation analyses we conducted with associated with one another (Pratto et al., speciesism we relied on a Bonferroni 1994). Indeed, confirming the contention adjusted alpha level of .006 per test (.05/9) that speciesism is correlated with other as an indicator for statistical significance forms of prejudice, we found significant (see Table 3 for all correlation coefficients). positive correlations of speciesism with Prejudicial Attitudes racism (r = .32, p < .001), sexism (r = .41, p < .001), and homophobia (r = .17, p < .001). Our first set of measures was intended to address Aim 2a: to what extent does Socio-Ideological Beliefs speciesism correlate with other, Our second set of measures were prototypical forms of prejudice? To the intended to address Aim 2b: to explore

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whether speciesism, like other forms of speciesist norm. And fourth and finally, prejudice, is driven by socio-ideological we looked at right-wing authoritarianism factors. Four such socio-ideological factors (RWA; Altemeyer, 1988), a construct stand out in previous research on tapping into the extent to which people prejudice and intergroup conflict: Social adhere to established authorities and Dominance Orientation (SDO; Pratto et conventions and their hostility towards al., 1994); political conservatism (e.g. Jost those who do not. The scale consists of 15 et al., 2003); system-justification (Kay, & items including “The established Jost, 2003); and right-wing authorities generally turn out to be right authoritarianism (RWA; Altemeyer, 1988). about things, while the radicals and We first looked at Social Dominance protestors are usually just ‘loud mouths’ Orientation (SDO; Pratto et al., 1994). As showing off their ignorance” (α = .92). discussed above, the SD-HARM (Dhont et Results showed that, supporting al., 2016) model posits that SDO predictions, speciesism was significantly underpins both speciesism and human- correlated with SDO (r = .42, p < .001), human types of prejudice, and so we political conservatism (r = .25, p < .001), predicted that SDO would be correlated system-justification (r = .25, p < .001). The with speciesism and that SDO would correlation between speciesism and RWA account for the correlation between was positive, but not considered speciesism and human-human types of statistically significant under the adjusted prejudice. SDO was measured using the Bonferroni alpha level of .006 (r = .14, p = SDO-6 scale (Pratto et al., 1994), which .03). People that were more speciesist consists of 8 items including “Some were also more likely to endorse groups of people are simply inferior to hierarchies between groups, report a more other groups” (α = .93). Second, we looked conservative political ideology, and more at political conservatism, which has been likely to engage in system justification. previously found to correlate with Recall that the SD-HARM model suggests speciesism (Dhont et al., 2016). We that SDO is the common ideological root measured conservatism using a standard of both speciesism and human-human measure (e.g. Graham, Haidt, & Nosek, types of prejudice. In order to test this 2009; Stern, West, Jost, & Rule, 2013; hypothesis we conducted partial Poteat & Mereish, 2012) where correlation analyses between speciesism participants indicated on two Likert scales and the other measures in which we from 1 (very liberal) to 7 (very controlled for SDO. And indeed, when conservative) the degree to which they controlling for SDO we found that all identify as economically and socially partial correlations but sexism and conservatives respectively. The two empathic concern became non-significant measures were aggregated in the analysis. (Table 2). Third, we looked at system- Empathic concern and Actively Open- justification (Kay, & Jost, 2003), which to Minded Thinking our knowledge has not been investigated Finally, we addressed Aim 2c: in the context of speciesism before. The identifying the relation between scale consists of 8 items including “In speciesism and empathic concern as well general, you find society to be fair” (α = as actively open-minded thinking. We .86). People who score high in system- used the Empathic Concern scale, which justification tend to justify and defend the forms part of the Interpersonal Reactivity status quo, and given that the status quo Index (IRI; Davis, 1983) and consists of 7 places strict hierarchies amongst animals, items such as “When I see someone being we therefore assumed that they would taken advantage of, I feel kind of also be more likely to defend the current

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protective toward them” (α = .97). As Discussion predicted the results revealed that As hypothesized, speciesism was speciesism correlated negatively with positively associated with prejudicial empathic concern (r = -.46, p < .001). attitudes such as racism, sexism, and Next, we looked at actively open- homophobia. Speciesism was also minded thinking (Baron, 2000). The scale positively associated with socio- we relied on (Stanovich & West, 1997) ideological beliefs such as social consists of the subscales dogmatic dominance orientation, conservatism, thinking, categorical thinking, flexible system justification, and right-wing thinking, counterfactual thinking, and authoritarianism. Furthermore, speciesism openness. In total it consists of 40 items was negatively associated with actively such as “A person should always consider open-minded thinking and empathic new possibilities" (α = .92). Speciesism concern. Note, however, that the correlated negatively with actively open- correlations between speciesism and minded thinking (r = -.17, p = .01). This right-wing authoritarianism and actively was mainly driven by dogmatic thinking open-minded thinking were relatively (r = .21, p < .001) and flexible thinking (r = weak and not statistically significant -.16, p = .01) and less so by openness (r = under the adjusted Bonferroni alpha level .10, p = .07), categorical thinking (r = .10, p of .006. = .13) or counterfactual thinking (r = .03, p Our findings lead us to conclude that = .63). speciesism can be considered a Vegetarianism psychological prejudice analogous to Fourteen of the 242 participants (6%) other forms of prejudice. First, our results stated that they were vegetarian, and they are consistent with Allport’s assumption were more likely to disagree with (1954) of an underlying generalized speciesism than the rest of the sample, prejudice: a person who exhibits one type t(240) = 5.64, p < .001, d = 1.77. Like in of prejudice will likely also exhibit other Study 1, speciesism correlated negatively types of prejudice, and importantly this with items capturing attitudes towards extends to prejudice based on species vegetarianism (second extracted factor of membership. This suggests that there is a Study 1, see Table 1), r(240) = -.31, p < common component of generalized .001. prejudice that drives different types of Demographics specific prejudicial attitudes such as racism, sexism, homophobia as well as There was a significant effect of speciesism (Akrami et al., 2011). Second, gender such that men (M = 3.82, SD = our results support the SD-HARM theory 1.30) were more likely to show speciesist (Dhont et al., 2016), which assumes that attitudes than women (M = 2.91, SD = the same ideological roots that underpin 1.26), t(239) = 5.46, p < .001, d = 0.71. The human-human forms of prejudice also negative correlation between speciesism underpin speciesism. More specifically, and age did not reach significance, r(240) the fact that SDO accounted for the = -.11, p = .08, and there were no relation between speciesism and other significant correlations between types of prejudice supports the notion that speciesism and level of education r(247) = a general endorsement of social hierarchy -.02, p = .75, or income r(247) = .10, p = .11. and inequality drives these different manifestations of prejudice. The [Table 3] generalized prejudice and SD-HARM hypotheses are not mutually exclusive: research has shown, for example, that the

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generalized prejudice factor is strongly metaphor for masculinity (Rozin, Hormes, related to SDO, RWA as well as empathy Faith, & Wansink, 2012). (Bäckström & Björklund, 2007; McFarland, 2010) — findings that are consistent with Study 4. Helping via Donation our results. Further, our results suggest that Allocations people who endorse views on the political Thus far we have argued that right are more likely to display speciesist speciesism is a psychological construct attitudes. Considering that speciesism is and developed a valid and reliable the accepted social norm in Western measure of speciesism (Study 1); society, it is not surprising that those who confirmed that speciesist attitudes are endorse the status quo are more likely to consistent over time (Study 2); and shown endorse speciesism. These findings are in that speciesism can usefully be considered line with previous research showing that a form of prejudice, being associated with people who consume meat score higher other forms of prejudice and sharing on SDO and RWA scales than vegetarians common ideological roots with them (Allen & Baines, 2002; Allen, Wilson, Ng, (Study 3). Next, we turned to the more & Dunne, 2000). behavioral effects that speciesist attitudes The observation that speciesism might have by looking at whether correlated negatively with actively open- speciesism can predict decision-making in minded thinking supports our the context of charitable giving. Previous assumption that those who accept anti- work has exclusively focused on self- speciesism are more willing to think report items relating to feelings or beliefs beyond contemporary social norms. And about the relationship between humans as expected, speciesism correlated and animals. In Studies 4 and 5 we negatively with empathic concern. This addressed our third aim: to determine correlation remained strong even when whether speciesist attitudes translate into controlling for SDO, which suggests that observable decision-making and behavior. empathic concern is an additional and Our initial assumption was that independent route to reach anti-speciesist participants who scored high for attitudes. This is in line with previous speciesism would be willing to allocate research showing that in addition to SDO more money to a charity that helps and RWA low empathy is one of the roots individuals of a “superior” species (rather of generalized prejudice (McFarland, than an “inferior” one). In particular, we 2010). hypothesized that speciesism would drive As in the first study, we found that participants to a) help humans more than male participants were more likely to animals, b) help severely mentally endorse speciesist views than female disabled humans more than chimpanzees, participants. This confirms a similar and c) help dogs more than pigs. These finding that women have kinder attitudes examples capture three crucial aspects of towards animals than men (for a review speciesism (as defined in philosophy) in see Mathews & Herzog, 1997; Herzog, et our society: a) the view that animals are al., 1991). Notably, previous research has morally inferior to humans; b) the view pointed out that meat consumption is that (a) is true even when the humans and often related to masculinity. Rothgerber animals in question have similar cognitive (2013) has found that for some men meat abilities; and c) the view that some consumption makes them feel like “real animals are morally inferior to other men”. People who consume meat are animals (even when these animals have perceived as more masculine (Ruby & similar cognitive and emotional Heine, 2011) and meat has become a capabilities). As such, this study also

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serves as a philosophically grounded Method validation of our Speciesism Scale. The Participants final items of the scale do not directly capture aspects (b) and (c). Yet, if it is true 140 US American participants took that there is a single psychological part in the study online via MTurk (110 construct that captures speciesism in its female; Mage = 33.60, SD = 10.54), and entirety (as defined in philosophy), we received $1.70 for their participation. All should expect the scale to predict aspects participants successfully passed the two (b) and (c) in addition to aspect (a). attention check questions, so nobody was With these parameters in mind, we excluded. We deemed a sample size of 140 hypothesized that speciesism would be participants appropriate, as our a priori able to predict donation allocations above power analysis showed that 135 and beyond established discrimination participants were required to detect an and pro-sociality measures such as SDO anticipated medium effect size of f=0.15, and empathic concern. One of the taking an alpha of .05 and power of .80 conclusions reached in our third study (Soper, 2017; Cohen, Cohen, West, & was that speciesism can be considered a Aiken, 2003). sub-type of SDO as proposed by SD- Materials and Procedure HARM (Dhont et al., 2016). In this study Participants were presented with three we aim to show that speciesism despite its independent scenarios of donation strong relation to SDO is able to explain allocation questions in a random order. In discriminatory behavior above and each scenario, one of the charities focused beyond it. We would expect speciesist on helping a “superior” type of species behavior to particularly be observed in (humans, mentally severely disabled contexts in which individuals of different humans, or dogs), while the other focused species are contrasted. In such contexts, on helping an “inferior” type of species we would expect speciesism to give more (animals, chimpanzees, or pigs). specific predictions than the more The two charities were presented as generalized concept of SDO. follows in the first donation scenario: Finally, we were also interested in the Charity A: This charity focuses on link between speciesism and people’s helping animals. On average, $10 will keep explicit beliefs about the intelligence and one individual from pain and suffering for sentience of animals. It is possible, for one day. example, that people are not treating Charity B: This charity focuses on certain animals differently because of helping humans. On average, $10 will keep speciesism, but simply because they one individual from pain and suffering for believe that they are less intelligent or less one day. able to feel pain. We hypothesized that In the second scenario the words explicit beliefs about intelligence and “animals” and “humans” were replaced sentience were likely to be associated with by “chimpanzees” (Charity A) and speciesist views, but would not be able to “mentally severely disabled humans” fully explain the differential treatment (Charity B), in the third scenario by “pigs” between different species. Instead, we (Charity A) and “dogs” (Charity B) expect that speciesism itself—moral respectively. In all three scenarios, discrimination based on species participants were asked to allocate 100 membership alone—would be able to donation points, which were independent explain differences in donation allocations of participants’ payment, between the two above and beyond explicit beliefs about charities. They were told that their intelligence and sentience. decisions would have a real-world effect,

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as the experimenters would donate $100 Results to the charities in proportion the People allocated significantly more to responses received from all participants the “superior” than to the “inferior” (which we did). species charities in all three cases (Figure After participants responded to the 1). As the allocations to the respective donation allocation questions, they were charities were negatively proportionate to presented with the Speciesism Scale and each other, one sample t-tests were the following additional measures: Social conducted to compare whether allocations Dominance Orientation was included significantly differed from an equal because of the strong link found to distribution of 50 donation points each. speciesism in the previous study. Participants allocated more to help Attitudes Toward Disabled Persons humans (M = 67.92, SD = 26.36) than (Yuker, Block, & Young, 1970; from now animals (M = 32.08, SD = 26.36), t(139) = - on referred to as ableism) was included in 8.04, p < .001, more to help mentally order to control for discrimination against severely disabled humans (M = 72.46, SD disabled people in the donation case = 23.61) than to chimpanzees (M = 27.54, involving mentally severely disabled SD = 23.61), t(139) = 11.26, p < .001, and humans. Empathic concern (IRI; Davis more to help dogs (M = 68.57, SD = 31.43) 1983) was included because it showed a than pigs (M = 31.43, SD = 19.43), t(139) = strong negative correlation with -11.29, p < .001. speciesism in the previous study. Speciesism correlated positively with Perspective taking, Other-oriented moral SDO (r = .35, p < .001) and negatively with reasoning and Mutual concerns moral empathic concern (r = -.26, p < .001) and reasoning scales of the pro-social other-oriented (r = -.23, p < .05) and personality battery (Penner, Fritzsche, mutual concern moral reasoning (r = -.20, Craiger, & Freifeld, 1995) were included p < .05). However, it did not correlate because we assumed that these pro- significantly with ableism (r = -.04, p = .60) sociality traits could potentially play a and perspective taking (r = -.09, p = .32). role in reducing prejudice. Speciesism correlated negatively with Further, participants were presented most measures of beliefs about suffering with a list of six different types of capability and intelligence of animals (but individuals: humans in general, animals not humans), and strongest for members in general, chimpanzees, mentally of “inferior” species (Table 4). Participants severely disabled humans, dogs, and pigs. believed that humans were more First, participants were asked to indicate intelligent (t(139) = 8.25, p < .001) and to which extent each type of individual more capable of suffering (t(139) = 26.63, p was capable of experiencing physical pain < .001) than animals (Table 4). However, and fear (aggregated and from now on despite allocating more money to help referred to as ‘suffering capability’). Then, mentally severally disabled humans than participants were asked to indicate how chimpanzees, they believed the former intelligent they perceived each type of were less intelligent (t(139) = 4.98, p < individual to be. By framing this task as a .001) and — although only on a biology quiz, participants were told that descriptive level — less capable of they should be as accurate as possible in suffering (t(139) = 1.71, p = .09) than the their assessment of these traits. Finally, latter. Also, participants believed that participants were asked to respond to dogs were more intelligent (t(139) = 2.22, p demographic items. = .03) and more capable of suffering (t(139) = 5.58, p < .001) than pigs.

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[Table 4] helping dogs than to a charity focusing on helping pigs. Speciesism was able to Hierarchical regression analyses were explain these allocation decisions above conducted in order to assess whether and beyond demographic measures; speciesism is able to uniquely predict discrimination and pro-sociality measures participants’ allocations. Demographics (including SDO and empathic concern); (gender, age, education, income) were and measures of explicit beliefs about entered at Step 1; Social psychological suffering capability and intelligence. We discrimination and pro-sociality conclude that speciesism makes a unique constructs (SDO, empathic concern, contribution to our understanding of how perspective taking, other-oriented moral people judge and treat individuals of reasoning, mutual concerns moral different species over established social reasoning, and ableism in the case and psychological constructs. It uniquely involving mentally severely disabled captures an important but neglected humans) were entered at Step 2; Beliefs aspect of discrimination and pro-sociality. about suffering capability and intelligence These findings further demonstrate the of the respective two entities per case (philosophical) content validity of the were entered at Step 3; Speciesism was Speciesism scale. The psychological entered at Step 4. construct that the Speciesism Scale Tests of collinearity indicated that measures reliably predicts all major multicollinearity was not a concern (all aspects of speciesism in our society as variance inflation factors (VIF) were defined in philosophy. below 2.7). The analyses revealed that People who displayed speciesist speciesism was able to predict the amount attitudes were more likely to believe that of allocations in all three cases animals have a reduced capability to significantly above and beyond suffer (particularly animals of “inferior” demographic, discrimination and pro- species) as well as have lower intelligence. sociality measures and perceived This is consistent with studies that have suffering capability and intelligence. Thus, found people tend to ‘de-mentalize’ despite the fact that people with high animals classified as food (Bastian, scores on speciesism believed animals’ Loughnan, Haslam & Radk, 2012) and suffering capability and intelligence were that the extent of moral value they reduced, speciesism significantly attribute to animals is related to the predicted allocations above and beyond animal’s degree of intelligence and these beliefs (Table 5). sentience (Piazza & Loughnan, 2016). Our study, however, did not investigate the [Table 5] causal direction of this association. It could be that speciesism drives people to attribute lower mental capabilities to Discussion animals or that lower attributed mental In Study 4, we looked at whether capabilities drive speciesism. In the speciesist attitudes translate into decisions present study, people’s explicit beliefs of about donation allocations. On average, the ability to suffer and the level of participants allocated higher donations to intelligence did explain their donation a) a charity focusing on helping humans allocations to some extent. However, than to a charity focusing on helping speciesism was able to explain it above animals; b) a charity focusing on helping and beyond these beliefs in all three cases. mentally severely disabled humans than An interesting finding was that our study to a charity focusing on helping showed that in some cases people morally chimpanzees; and c) a charity focusing on value individuals of certain species less

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than others even when knowing that the Study 5. Helping via Time former (e.g. chimpanzees) are more Investment and Food choice intelligent and more sentient than the latter (e.g. mentally severely disabled In Study 4, we demonstrated that speciesism predicts decision-making humans). These findings confirm our about donation allocations above and hypothesis that the differential treatment beyond other related psychological of animals is not motivated by people’s constructs. We conducted Study 5 with explicit beliefs about sentience and three purposes in mind. First and perceived intelligence alone; it is at least foremost, we aimed to replicate the in parts motivated by speciesism. finding that speciesism is able to predict It is important to note that participants helping. Second, instead of decisions in our study were explicitly asked to rate regarding allocations of donations, we the suffering capability and level of instead asked participants in this study intelligence as biologically accurate as whether they would invest their personal possible. In real life settings, in contrast, time to help individuals, and we explored motivated reasoning can distort these whether speciesism predicts food choices. beliefs — as demonstrated, for example, In doing so we introduce measures that by studies investigating the meat paradox are clearly behavioral. Third, we aimed to (Bastian & Loughnan, 2017). People’s confirm that speciesism was able to perceptions of these mental properties are predict real-world behavior in an offline, thus very flexible and depend on the university context relying on a student context and motivational incentives. As sample. such, even though our study In this study, we asked participants to demonstrates that differential treatment of read promotional material from a charity individuals of different species cannot be and asked for their feedback on how it fully explained by people’s explicit and could be improved. Each participant had accuracy-motivated beliefs about the their to choose from two charities; one focused mental capabilities, it is still possible that on helping animals and the other on people’s intuitive and biased perceptions helping humans. We hypothesized that significantly drive this tendency. participants scoring low on speciesism A possible criticism of the study is that would be more likely to invest time in the even though participants were aware of animal charity. We further hypothesized the fact that their decisions were not just merely hypothetical, they did not have to that speciesism would be able to predict invest personal resources in order to help which charity participants helped above the respective individuals. Instead, they and beyond social dominance orientation, decided how to allocate the available empathic concern, perceived suffering resources of the experimenter. In this capability and intelligence of the type of light, their responses are better described individuals, and demographic data. as resource allocation or decision-making, We also included an exploratory test but not necessarily as truly behavioral. In related to food choices. At the end of the the next study, we aimed to address this study, participants could choose either a issue by relying on a response technique, meat snack or a vegetarian snack as an which required participants to invest their additional reward for participating in the personal resources. study. Based on our findings from the previous studies showing that speciesism correlates negatively with ethical vegetarianism we hypothesized that those participants scoring high in speciesism would be more likely to choose the meat

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snack. This exploratory test can be seen as The two charities were described as a proxy for meat consumption but it follows: should be interpreted with caution as we The Nonhuman Rights project: The measured food choice at a certain point in Nonhuman Rights Project, an time only, not general meat consumption. organization working towards achieving actual legal rights for chimpanzees. Method Homeless Shelters: Homeless Shelters, Participants an organization providing temporary 102 students from a British university residence for people who can no longer took part in the study and received a afford to pay rent themselves. payment of £5 for their participation. Participants were presented with two Three participants were excluded for sealed envelopes labeled with the failing an attention check, leaving a final respective names of the charities. Promotional material from the charities sample of 99 students (55 female; Mage = 25.52, SD = 4.88). This sample size meets was contained inside the envelope. the recommendation by Long (1997), who Participants were instructed to open one suggests that a minimum sample of 100 envelope only, and to provide written should be considered for logistic feedback about the campaign. Participants regression, and our sample size is were told that their feedback would be comparable to work by Crimston et al. forwarded to the charity of their choice. (2016), who conducted a structurally very At the end of the study, after receiving similar study to ours and recruited the the payment, participants were offered a same number of participants as we did. snack as an additional reward. They were presented with two meat options (beef Materials and Procedure jerky, pork crackling) and two vegetarian Participants completed the study in options that clearly did not include any “paper & pencil” form. They first read a animal products (salted peanuts, rice general information sheet and signed a crackers) and were asked to choose one. consent form. They then completed the Speciesism Scale, SDO scale, and Results Empathic Concern scale. Next, they were As predicted, participants who chose asked to indicate their beliefs in the to invest their time to help the animal intelligence and suffering capability of charity (Non-Human Rights Project) humans, chimpanzees and dogs. And scored significantly lower on speciesism finally, participants responded to (N = 33, M = 2.73, SD = .96) than those demographic questions (age, gender, and who chose the human charity (Homeless study subject). Shelters) (N = 66, M = 3.31, SD = .83), t(97) Our method for measuring = -3.16, p = .002. However, participants participants’ willingness to invest time to who chose to help Homeless Shelters help a certain cause was inspired by scored higher on empathic concern (M = Crimston et al. (2016). On a further sheet, 5.58, SD = .75) and lower on SDO (M = participants were given instructions about 2.14, SD = 1.04) than participants who a seemingly unrelated task. Participants chose the animal charity (empathic were informed that they should provide concern: M = 5.18, SD = .89 t(97) = -2.32, p feedback to one of two non-profit = .02, SDO: M = 2.72, SD = .89 t(97) = 2.76; organizations (from now on referred to as p = .01). Notably, SDO was left skewed charity) on how to improve their and therefore not normally distributed. campaigns. They were told that both Hierarchical logistic regression charities were specifically seeking analyses were conducted in order to feedback from students. assess whether speciesism was able to

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predict participants’ choice of the charity with these two options only). This is in above and beyond the other measures. spite of the negative correlation between Demographics (gender, age, study subject) speciesism and empathic concern. One were entered at Step 1; SDO and empathic possible explanation for this result is that concern were entered at Step 2; Beliefs people feel empathic concern to those who about suffering capability and intelligence are close to them, and people feel more of chimpanzees and humans were entered closely connected to other humans than to at Step 3; Speciesism was entered at Step animals. Another explanation might be 4. The analyses revealed that speciesism that fighting homelessness triggers more was able to predict participants’ time- empathy than establishing animal rights investment choices significantly above because the former is perceived as more and beyond all other factors listed. Results imminent and more directly tractable than are shown in Table 6. the latter. Other results were also puzzling at [Table 6] first. For example, people who chose to help the animal charity also scored higher Further, participants who chose the in SDO than people who chose to help the meat snack (N = 26, M = 3.47, SD = .90) human charity. At first glance, this scored also significantly higher on appears inconsistent with our previous speciesism than participants who chose findings. However, we should be cautious the vegetarian snack (N = 72, M = 2.98, SD to attribute much weight to this result, as = .88), t(96) = -2.40, p = .018. Hierarchical SDO was strongly left skewed in the logistic regression analysis predicting the university student sample. In contrast, in snack participants chose analogously to the online pilot study SDO and empathic the above analysis was close to being concern were normally distributed and no significant, R2 = .23, p = .07. correlations between the charity chosen and SDO and empathic concern were Discussion revealed. This study demonstrated that This study further demonstrated that speciesism is able to predict how people speciesism can predict real-world food will invest their time when faced with a choices. The lower people scored on choice between helping animals or speciesism, the more likely they were to humans. After controlling for choose the vegetarian snack. This finding demographics, empathic concern, SDO, confirms the result of the online pilot and beliefs about suffering capability and study in which participants were asked a intelligence of humans and chimpanzees, hypothetical question about what food each one-point increase in speciesism they would choose. The food-choice increased the likelihood of people element of the study was exploratory, and choosing to help the human charity by there were many other factors that could 195%. Significant results supporting this have affected participants’ choice of snack. finding were also found in an online pilot These might include the social demand study (N = 51) we conducted prior to the effect, different tastes, and the time of day, student sample study. among others. A further limitation of this Interestingly, people who chose the study was that we did not control for animal charity showed less empathic vegetarianism. Due to the relation concern than people who chose the between speciesism and vegetarianism, it human charity. Empathic concern, is not clear to which extent food choices therefore, seems to be a stronger predictor were driven by speciesism versus for helpful behavior towards humans than vegetarianism. However, given that only towards animals (when one is only faced 6% of US participants of Study 1 indicated

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that they were vegetarian, and recent polls First, we describe the philosophy of suggest only 2% of the British public is speciesism and introduce it as a consistently vegetarian (Bates et al., 2014), psychological phenomenon, suitable for only little variance in food choices could empirical investigation. Speciesism has have been explained by vegetarianism been purported to be a reliable form of alone. Given that 74% of our participants prejudice analogous to racism and sexism, chose the vegetarian snack, yet estimates and yet the empirical claims behind this suggest only a small fraction of the have received little attention so far. population to be vegetarian, it seems clear Second, we present the Speciesism that many non-vegetarians must have Scale: A theoretically driven and chosen the vegetarian snack and there are empirically validated explicit measure of many reasons for why this might be— speciesism with high internal consistency lower scores in speciesism is likely to be and test-retest reliability. This scale one of them. Future research can confirms that speciesism is an accurately hopefully shed more light on the relation measurable, stable form of prejudice with of speciesism, vegetarianism, carnism, and high interpersonal differences. actual food choices. Third, we demonstrate that, as A general methodological limitation of originally proposed by philosophers, the study is the possibility that demand speciesism can be considered a form of effects or consistency motives could have prejudice. We have found that speciesism driven the correlation between responses is psychologically related to human- to the scale and responses to the tasks. human types of prejudice such as racism, Participants might have guessed what the sexism, and homophobia. This is aim of the study was after responding to consistent with the generalized prejudice the scale and might have been motivated theory, which assumes that prejudice to remain consistent in the next task. towards various targets is significantly Future studies could attempt to alleviate correlated and can be explained by an this problem by trying to obfuscate the underlying generalized prejudice factor purpose of the study, introducing time (Akrami, Ekehammer, & Bergh, 2011). delays between the tasks, or by other Our finding that speciesism is strongly means. related to SDO confirms the SD-HARM model (Dhont et al., 2014), which assumes

that speciesism and human-human types General Discussion of prejudice are underpinned by the same socio-ideological beliefs, namely a general Throughout its history, speciesism has endorsement of social hierarchy and been a concept largely confined to inequality. The fact that speciesism shares philosophy. Ultimately, however, these psychological properties with other speciesism is a hypothesis about human phenomena we refer to as prejudice seems psychology; it is the assumption that to strengthen the case that speciesism can people morally discriminate against be referred to as prejudice as well. We individuals on the basis of their species note that in comparison to human-human membership. The purpose of this paper is forms of prejudice, speciesism is the to transition speciesism from a dominant and explicitly accepted social philosophical hypothesis to a matter of norm and ideology in current Western empirical psychological investigation. societies. Consequently, people who These investigations have only just begun endorse the current status quo and people in recent years and with this paper we on the political right tend to score high on make the following four contributions to speciesism, whereas actively open- that transition. minded thinking seems to facilitate

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questioning that norm. We also identified certain categories (i.e. speciesism), lower levels of empathic concern as an exceptions can be made; for instance, additional factor associated with one’s personal pet pig will be placed into speciesism. a different category than all other pigs. Fourth, we demonstrate that Future research will hopefully further speciesism can predict behavior above investigate the specifics of the different and beyond existing constructs. In doing kinds of categories that speciesism seems so, we believe we are the first to to rely on. systematically show effects of speciesist Similarly, more research is needed to attitudes on actual, observable behavior. understand the cognitive mechanisms that In two studies we found that speciesism facilitate speciesist attitudes and practices. predicts people’s willingness to help In this regard, it is likely that the humans and “superior” animals such as psychological process of moral dogs (rather than “inferior” animals such disengagement (Bandura, 1999) plays a as pigs), in terms of allocating donation critical role. Bandura’s theory of moral money and investing time. We also found disengagement proposes that cognitive that speciesism predicts people’s (meat vs. restructuring mechanisms allow us to vegetarian) food choices. This indicates view inhumane practices as benign by that speciesism captures an important but disabling moral self-condemnation. These neglected aspect of both discrimination mechanisms may include moral and prosociality. justification, euphemistic language, displacement of responsibility, Limitations and future research dehumanization, and a disregard for the Our investigation of speciesism victims’ suffering. Moral disengagement focused on the general tendency to theory has not yet been applied to morally discriminate between individuals speciesism, but it is a plausible on the basis of their species membership. explanation for tolerating practices such However, we did not explicitly analyze as factory farming (Graça, Calheiros, & how this occurs. It is possible that—in line Oliveira, 2016). with research on stereotypes and social Moral philosophers have reasoned categorizations (Haslam, 1997)—people that anti-speciesists are morally compelled place individuals of certain species into to adopt ethical vegetarianism (Singer, different categories such as food, pets, 1975; 1979). Descriptively, however, we entertainment, equipment, pest, wild have found that empirically this is not animals, humans, etc. These culturally and always the case. People do not historically contingent categories might consistently bridge the gap between define the general connotation, caring about animals and consuming perceptions, values, and common animal products (i.e. meat paradox). Our properties associated with their results from Studies 1 and 3 suggest that individuals. For example, animals in the speciesism and ethical vegetarianism are food category (e.g. cows) seem to be psychologically distinct to some extent. associated with low moral value as well as Overall, however, the two are strongly perceptions of low mental capabilities. linked and indeed as Study 5 suggests Animals of the pest category (e.g. rats) speciesism predicts whether people seem furthermore to be associated with choose to eat meat or a vegetarian option. disgust-eliciting characteristics such as Carnism has been suggested as a major being dirty. The categories ultimately ideological driver of the continuation of define (or are defined by) how we relate meat consumption in our society to the respective individuals. And while (Monteiro et al., 2017). Future studies in usually whole species are placed into this area will now be able to use the

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Speciesism Scale to investigate the onto the so far neglected area of human- relations and causal mechanisms between animal discrimination. speciesism, carnism and the meat paradox with greater rigor and accuracy. Further research is needed on how Lucius Caviola, Jim A. C. Everett, and speciesism varies between cultures. Amiot Nadira S. Faber, Department of and Bastian (2015) have summarized Experimental Psychology and Oxford existing studies that may help to point the Uehiro Centre for Practical Ethics, way. Their work focused on cross-cultural University of Oxford. attitudes towards animals. They found, for example, that attitudes towards pet This project was supported by a grant keeping vary strongly between cultures. of the Oxford Martin School (Oxford In order for the Speciesism Scale to Martin Programme on Collective facilitate cross-cultural research, however, Responsibility for Infectious Disease), it might need to be adapted for cultures awarded to Nadira Faber. We thank Oscar where certain animals are categorized Horta, Guy Kahane, Adriano Mannino, differently to Western norms. Brian Parkinson, Peter Singer, Elliot Many more avenues for future Teperman, and Steven Wise for their research are yet to be discovered. Despite helpful comments and suggestions. We the apparent ubiquity of speciesism in our also thank Tanya Terzieva for her every-day lives and despite the fact that assistance in collecting the data. speciesism is a well-known phenomenon to philosophers, speciesism is hugely Correspondence concerning this under-investigated in the field of social, article should be addressed to Nadira S. personality, and moral psychology. We Faber, Oxford Uehiro Centre for Practical hope that this paper can transfer some of Ethics, Suite 8, Littlegate House, St Ebbe’s the energy with which psychology has Street, Oxford OX1 1PT, United Kingdom. pursued human-human discrimination E-mail: [email protected]

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Table 1 Factor loadings from the second EFA (Study 1) Item Item Label Factor 1 Factor 2 1* Humans have the right to use animals however they want to. .742 It is morally acceptable to keep animals in circuses for human 2* .701 entertainment. It is morally acceptable to kill animals, because they are less 3 .682 intelligent than humans. 4* It is morally acceptable to hunt animals for sport. .665 5* Morally, animals always count for less than humans. .638 6* It is morally acceptable to do cosmetic research on animals. .631 Some beings are morally more important than others just because 7* .602 they belong to a certain species. 8 A pig has a lower capacity to suffer than a human baby. .598 It is morally acceptable to perform medical experiments on animals 9* .597 that we would not perform on any human. 10 A pig has a lower capacity to suffer than a dog. .585 It is morally acceptable to kill animals even it is not necessary for 11 .582 our own survival. Basic rights that are enjoyed by humans – like protection from 12* -.582 harm – should also be granted to animals. Reducing pain and suffering in animals is morally equally 13 -.577 important as reducing pain and suffering in humans. It is morally acceptable to breed animals just to produce leather out 14 .560 of their skin. 15* It is morally acceptable to trade animals like possessions. .545 If an elephant hurts itself in nature, it is morally acceptable not to 16 help even if it were morally required to help a human in the same .532 situation. Chimpanzees should have basic legal rights such as a right to life 17* -.527 or a prohibition of torture. It is morally acceptable to kill animals that destroy human 18 .502 property, for example, rats, mice, or pigeons. 19 It is morally worse to kill any human than to kill a chimpanzee. .485 20 Factory farming of animals is morally wrong. -.397 21 Pigs should be taken care of by humans just like dogs are. -.373 Faced with a decision of killing one human embryo or one pig, we 22 .365 should always kill the pig. 23† It is morally wrong to eat fish. .820 24† It is morally wrong to consume milk and eggs. .743 It is morally required to become vegetarian in an effort to save 25† .648 animals. It is morally acceptable for cattle and pigs to be raised for human 26† -.529 consumption. 27† It is morally acceptable to hunt wild animals for food. -.528

Notes. * included in CFA’s first factor, † included in CFA’s second factor

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Table 2 Speciesism Scale

Item Item Label 1 Morally, animals always count for less than humans. 2 Humans have the right to use animals however they want to. 3 It is morally acceptable to keep animals in circuses for human entertainment. 4 It is morally acceptable to trade animals like possessions. Chimpanzees should have basic legal rights such as a right to life or a prohibition of 5 torture. (r) It is morally acceptable to perform medical experiments on animals that we would not 6 perform on any human.

Notes. Answers on a 7-point scale from "Strongly disagree" to "Strongly agree". (r) indicates reversed scoring.

Table 3 Correlations between speciesism and other constructs as well as partial correlations (pr) when controlled for SDO (Study 4)

Constructs r pr

Social Dominance Orientation .42***

Racism .32*** .01

Sexism .41*** .20**

Homophobia .17** .04

Conservatism .25*** .07

System Justification .25*** .15†

Right-Wing Authoritarianism .14* -.08

Empathic Concern -.46*** -.31***

Actively Open-Minded Thinking -.17* .05

Notes. Degrees of freedom were 243. † p < .10. * p < .05. ** p < .01. *** p < .001. Bonferroni adjusted alpha level was .006.

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Table 4 Beliefs about intelligence and suffering capability (ratings on a scale from 0 to 100) and correlations of these beliefs with speciesism (Study 4)

Beliefs in M (SD) Correlation with speciesism Suffering Suffering Species Intelligence Intelligence capability capability Humans 87.79 (12.88) 96.88 (6.82) -.04 -.15

Animals 39.71 (19.71) 84.20 (20.39) -.27*** -.29*** Mentally severely disabled 54.14 (26.44) 89.96 (15.31) 0.6 -.10 humans

Chimpanzees 66.84 (22.61) 91.92 (13.37) -.20* -.25**

Dogs 55.09 (21.25) 91.33 (12.34) -.18* -.28***

Pigs 51.43 (25.70) 87.07 (18.38) -.23** -.29***

Notes. * p < .05. ** p < .01. *** p < .001.

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Table 5 Hierarchical regression predicting donation allocations to “superior” individuals (humans, mentally severely disabled humans, dogs) vs. “inferior” individuals (animals, chimpanzees, pigs), displaying the standardized coefficients (beta) (Study 4) Humans vs. Animals Mentally Severely Disabled Humans vs. Chimpanzees Dogs vs. pigs

Predictor measures Step 1 Step 2 Step 3 Step 4 Step 1 Step 2 Step 3 Step 4 Step 1 Step 2 Step 3 Step 4

∆R2 .02 .04 .11** .17*** .03 .04 .17*** .07*** .01 .05 .04 .07**

Gender -.01 -.03 -.14 -.15† .06 .02 .16 .17† .05 .03 .03 .01 Age -.10 -.13 -.09 -.03 .12 .13 .08 .04 -.07 -.09 -.07 -.01

Education .03 .03 .03 .08 .12 .12 .12 .09 .02 .03 .00 .04

Income .05 .06 .04 .00 -.06 -.08 -.13 -.09 -.07 -.07 -.07 -.10

SDO -.08 .04 .06 .02 .03 -.08 -.15 -.13 -.01

Empathic concern .07 -.11 -.06 .00 .05 .12 .14 .06 -.01

Perspective taking -.14 .04 -.01 .19 .21† .14 .12 .15 .22†

Other-oriented -.08 -.11 -.13 .03 .04 .08 -.11 -.13 -.18

Mutual concern .23† -.07 .21† -.08 -.14 -.14 -.11 -.06 -.07 Ableism .12 .04 .05

Suffering “superior” .05 .04 .18† .17† -.43* -.43*

Suffering “inferior” .14 .06 -.21* -.18† .47* .42*

Intelligence “superior” -.26* -.21* .29** .25** .02 -.01

Intelligence “inferior” .25** .13 -.27** -.22* .05 .01

Speciesism -.46*** .30*** -.27***

Notes. † p < .10. * p < .05. ** p < .01. *** p < .001.

Caviola, Everett, & Faber (2018) Journal of Personality and Social Psychology Table 6 Hierarchical logistic regression predicting whether participants chose the human or animal charity, displaying Exp(B) (Study 5)

Predictor measures Step 1 Step 2 Step 3 Step 4

R2 .00 .09* .11 .23*** Gender 1.04 .85 .99 1.23 Age 1.02 1.01 1.01 1.02

SDO .64† .64† .62†

Empathic concern 1.58 1.69† 1.97† Suffering humans 1.00 1.01 Suffering chimpanzees .996 1.00 Intelligence humans 1.02 1.00 Intelligence chimpanzees .98 .99

Speciesism 3.43**

Notes. † p < .10. * p < .05. ** p < .01. *** p < .001.

Figure 1. Average donation allocations to the charities (Study 4). In all three scenarios allocations significantly differed from an equal distribution of 50 donation points each. Error bars represent standard errors of the mean.

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Appendix Speciesism Scale

1. Morally, animals always count for less than humans. 2. Humans have the right to use animals however they want to. 3. It is morally acceptable to keep animals in circuses for human entertainment. 4. It is morally acceptable to trade animals like possessions. 5. Chimpanzees should have basic legal rights such as a right to life or a prohibition of torture. (r) 6. It is morally acceptable to perform medical experiments on animals that we would not perform on any human.

Participants answer on 7-point scale from “Strongly disagree” to “Strongly agree”. The fifth item (labelled with ‘r’, indicates reversed scoring). After reverse-coding this item, scores should be averaged together to create an overall mean score of speciesism

Caviola, Everett, & Faber (2018) Journal of Personality and Social Psychology