Atlantic Council BRENT SCOWCROFT CENTER ON INTERNATIONAL SECURITY

ISSUE IN FOCUS BY BILAL Y. SAAB AND MICHAEL S. TYSON ISIS War Game II: The Escalation Challenge

MARCH 2015

More than six months have passed since President Barack Obama delivered a speech outlining the Middle East Peace and Security Initiative administration’s strategy to “degrade and ultimately Established in 2012 as a core practice area of the destroy” the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS). Brent Scowcroft Center on International Security The US-led coalition of more than sixty allies and at the Atlantic Council, the Middle East Peace partners has launched a sustained air campaign, killing and Security Initiative brings together thought thousands of militants, destroying more than two leaders and experts from the policy, business, and hundred oil and gas facilities that fund ISIS’s civil society communities to design innovative operations,1 and stopping ISIS’s momentum in various strategies to tackle present and future challenges key areas in Iraq and Syria including Mount Sinjar, the in the region. Mosul Dam, Kobani, and around Baghdad. But ISIS is reportedly gaining ground in Syria and along the To continue to study the evolving strategic interaction Syria-Lebanon border, spreading its message among ISIS, the US-led coalition, and other state actors effectively, and recruiting foreigners at an increasing involved in this crisis, we ran the second iteration of rate. Washington’s tactical successes against ISIS the ISIS War Game series on February 25, 2015. In this notwithstanding, it is still far from achieving its all-day exercise, held in partnership with Foreign strategic goals. Affairs magazine, we focused on the potential for escalation on the part of ISIS and how Washington and In September 2014, we predicted in a simulation its allies and partners could anticipate and better exercise (ISIS War Game: The Coming Stalemate) prepare for such contingencies. conducted at the Brent Scowcroft Center on International Security’s Middle East Peace and Security Background Initiative that the most likely scenario was a military ISIS carries the seeds of its own destruction primarily stalemate.2 We also realized that such a stalemate was because it has an extremely small constituency within Islamist populations around the world, an apocalyptic ISIS’s regional attacks have increased in scope, vision, an unsustainable strategy of us-against-the- lethality,not stable. and Since level the of conclusion sophistication, of the as first evidenced war game, by its world, and a failed governance project. However, before military and terrorist operations in Libya, Saudi ISIS collapses—which could take years depending on Arabia, Egypt, and Lebanon. US and coalition policy responses—it will most likely

damage as possible, in the region and possibly beyond. 1 Susan Rice, “Remarks by National Security Advisor Susan Rice on Toattempt put it tosimply, inflict ISIS as muchwill not pain go andquietly cause into as the much night. the 2015 National Security Strategy,” White House, February 6, Therefore, anticipating its strategic moves can prevent 2015, further instability in the region. remarks-national-security-advisor-susan-rice-2015-national- http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2015/02/06/ security-stra ISIS can be labeled as a revolutionary group, an 2 Bilal Y. Saab and Michael S. Tyson, “ISIS War Game: The Coming Stalemate,” Atlantic Council, October 2014, http://www. insurgent movement, a terrorist army, and a nihilistic atlanticcouncil.org/publications/issue-briefs/isis-war-game-the- cult, but one thing it is not is a status quo actor. By coming-stalemate.

Bilal Y. Saab is the Resident Senior Fellow for Middle East Security at the Atlantic Council’s Brent Scowcroft Center on International Security. Michael S. Tyson is the US Marine Corps Senior Fellow at the Brent Scowcroft Center on International Security. The opinions expressed by Michael S. Tyson in this publication are his alone and do not represent those of the Department of Defense or any military service. Secretary of State, National Security Advisor, such as ISIS is offensive action and periodic escalation Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, CIA Director, (atdefinition, least until the their modus ultimate operandi objective, of revisionist which inactors ISIS’s and senior military and political advisers from case is a global caliphate, is fully accomplished). various government agencies with deep expertise Therefore, it matters less why ISIS might further on Iraq, Syria, and the broader Middle East. escalate. What is more relevant is that it has both the means and the innate desire to do so. This assessment • A Red Team simulated an ISIS consultative council led us to try to project not only how ISIS might further (also known as Shura Council), led by ISIS chief Abu escalate, but equally important, how the United States Bakr al-Baghdadi, using open source information and its allies and partners in the coalition could that is currently available. effectively counter. • A Green Team included representatives of Objectives European powers, Arab Gulf states, Turkey, and influential actors in the US-led coalition including military-operational in nature and approached from Iraq. This second war game was specifically designed to be the prism of operational containment. We deliberately • A Brown Team consisted of two senior chose to keep the objectives of this war game limited representatives from Russia, Iran, and Syria. because this kind of exercise is a critical stepping stone • A White Team (also called Control Team) assigned ISIS challenge in a holistic manner, looking at the one member to each of the above teams. This underlyingfor the next conditions—political, and final war game, which economic, will tackle social, the and team’s role was to observe, coordinate, and perhaps religious—that gave rise to ISIS. In that introduce new issues, challenges, and information respect, this second war game was part of a logical, to each of the scenarios under study. phased approach. As the saying goes, “we have to deal with the bug closest to the windshield.” The war game included two sessions. For each session, teams broke up into separate rooms and were given a Our expectation from this effort was to help US scenario describing escalatory actions by Red. Each policymakers pool collective expertise; expose senior team had two hours to discuss each scenario separately

Middle East responsibilities in the Department of sessions. These sessions gave each team a chance to Defense,officials andDepartment analysts ofwith State, Iraq/Syria and National and broader Security openlyand then discuss present and their ask findings questions in aboutjoint plenary the other Council to diverse opinions and options; and promote teams’ plans and procedures. better understanding within and communication among various US government agencies involved in the For both scenarios, the following general assumptions (from the real world) were made:

fight against ISIS. • Obama would not make major changes to the US three tasks: First, to assess how ISIS might fully test approach against ISIS. existingMore specifically, US strategy this by war resorting game sought to various to accomplish forms of escalation; second, to simulate the response of the • Coalition members would not independently United States and that of its allies and partners to intensify military actions against ISIS. potential escalation by ISIS; and third, to provide • The United States would not step up or relaunch its training program with moderate Syrian rebels. mitigate the repercussions of likely escalatory actions byrecommendations ISIS, and more broadly to US officials protect that core could US interests help in • There would be no sudden political leadership the region. change in Iraq or Syria anytime soon.

Design • US-led coalition efforts would continue to focus on Iraq, causing more ISIS elements to migrate to and record and applied a strict policy of non-attribution. possibly make advances in Syria and Lebanon’s However,Like the first unlike war its game, predecessor, this simulation this event was was off thebased northern borders. on role-playing.

• A Blue Team was represented by a small US national security cabinet consisting of the President, Vice President, Secretary of Defense,

2 ATLANTIC COUNCIL The scenarios were designed to meet the following The rapidly deteriorating security situation has caught criteria: the Iraqi government off guard and forced it to temporarily suspend operations. For security reasons, • Even though they were less than likely (it is always Iraqi Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi and President Fuad Masum are reported to be relocating to the large Shia city of Al Nasiriyah to establish an interim seat of difficult to assess the likelihood of hypothetical government. Iraqi security forces are mobilizing to • They were sensitive to local contexts as well as scenarios), they were definitely not unthinkable. attempt to neutralize the threat and push back the militants. • They presumably had strategic implications for regional dynamics and trends in the conflict. However, many government buildings, businesses, and regional security and US interests.

• They had the potential to cause a more forceful US northwest have closed or are predicted to close over response and possibly push Washington to rethink themarkets, days andas well weeks as schools to come. and Baghdad other offices International in the various aspects of its existing strategy toward ISIS. Airport has suspended all arrivals and departures until further notice. A large segment of Baghdad’s population Key Findings To ensure that each team separately engaged in and southern Iraq. Small-scale rioting, looting, and discussions on roughly similar levels and provided a variousis expected forms to fleeof criminal the city activity and seek are refuge taking in place.Kurdistan baseline feedback to all war game participants in the plenary sessions, White members suggested four key Blue Team considerations for Blue, Red, Green, and Brown to I don’t think we can ever be criticized for protecting address: our people and our assets. We have a huge installation. 1. What are the diplomatic, informational, military, We’ve got a lot of geography that is US, governed by and economic response options to the scenario at US law, and I think it’s our obligation to make sure it’s hand? properly protected. –Blue member playing the role of President of the United States 2. For the response chosen, what are the desired effects? Blue members agreed that evacuating the US Embassy in Baghdad and withdrawing the US military presence 3. What are the reactions and counteractions of all were not options. Doing so, Blue thought, would cause teams? the United States to “lose not only in Iraq, but also in the region.” However, Blue wanted to avoid a kneejerk 4. How will this event affect respective team reaction that would automatically lead it to step up strategies?

These suggestions notwithstanding, it was inevitable broadermilitary strategicengagement context. without first assessing the that each team, given its unique preferences, ramifications of military escalation and addressing the capabilities, and constraints, engaged the scenarios Blue judged that it was imperative for the Iraqi differently. Some placed a greater emphasis on the government to regain full operational capability. Blue strategic aspects of their response. Others focused more on operations and tactics. The following is a description of the scenarios and a synopsis of the key ensuringmembers thatidentified Iraq would the protection successfully of their defend military itself, and withcivilian massive personnel support as the from first Blue priority. and Green. The second Blue came was and objectively as possible. up with a set of judgments and strategic guidelines, findings, which we have tried to report as accurately including: Scenario 1: Baghdad under Siege Yesterday, hundreds of militants suspected to be loyal • Red’s attack would not require a major change to current US strategy. However, in the event that corner of Baghdad and reportedly established control Red’s follow-on actions reignite civil war in Iraq, ofto thatISIS infiltratedarea, overtaking the Sunni-concentrated the Trade Bank of northwestIraq and a Blue could not ensure Green Zone security and regional stability with the military assets currently is currently on a heightened state of alert and has deployed in the area, forcing adjustments to major oil refinery west of the capital. The US Embassy current force posture. has not yet issued a request for evacuation. notified Washington of withdrawal options, although it

ATLANTIC COUNCIL 3 • Blue has invested a great deal of blood and treasure Red Team in a stable government in Baghdad, thus it is Our number one goal is…to protect, to defend, and to expand the caliphate. We will make it impossible for • imperativeIn the medium to preserve term, Blue it and would fight signal for it. that it was anyone to sit on the fence. There is no fence. You’re not leaving, but could decide to maintain strategic with us or you’re against us… –Red member playing ambiguity as a useful tool to disrupt Red’s the role of ISIS leader planning.

• In the long term, Blue would assess strategic Then they articulated a strategy that would be options across all elements of national power— generallyRed members sensitive first definedto that objective, their ultimate but that objective. also diplomatic, information, military, and economic (DIME)—to enable “the type of Iraq we are hoping adversaries to its latest action. After that, they for.” would specifically help counter the response of its implement their strategy. Finally, they came up with The main operations and tactics Blue proposed tacticsdeveloped that specific supported operations their strategy. that helped them included: Within Red’s Shura Council, all members agreed that • Evacuating nonessential embassy personnel and there was no higher purpose than protecting and protecting remaining embassy staff, and tailoring expanding their Islamic caliphate. To achieve that US military presence accordingly critical priority and counter Blue’s reaction to Red’s escalation, Red’s strategy was to: • Encouraging the Iraqi government to return to Baghdad, with US security support • Maintain escalation dominance vis-à-vis adversaries • Ensuring that Red does not win the information battle • Dominate the media news cycle

• Communicating a clear and unambiguous statement • Disable and isolate the Iraqi central government to the American people about US interests and commitments • Promote the image of the caliphate and maintain momentum at multiple locations • Developing, executing, and sharing DIME plans with allies and partners to ensure they keep their level of • commitment, and encouraging them to increase • MagnifyPreserve the some fight’s measure sectarian of governance nature to showcase both the inadequacy of the Iraqi government and otheir The role Secretary in the fight of againstState proposed Red reaching out to the ability of Red to provide and administer close allies and partners, especially European services powers. The President stated he would call King Salman Bin Abdulaziz of Saudi Arabia and The main operations and tactics that Red proposed included: would also use its back channels—diplomatic, Governance military,President and Recep intelligence—to Tayyip Erdoğan communicate of Turkey. Blue with Iran and others who are willing and able to • Retaining or hiring technical experts to run public play constructive roles. services

• Leveraging indigenous forces as well as allies and • Extending racket network and formalizing criminal partners already in the region. This would be networks another priority for Blue because, without a • Establishing educational and medical services and other local forces, Red could not be effectively stopped.significant effort from the Iraq Security Forces (ISF) • Setting up sharia courts and establishing criminal and religious police • Applying deterrence through punishment by intensifying airstrikes and covert action against • Pooling economic resources by looting banks, and Red. Blue would clearly communicate to Red that it taking over homes of people and selling their items would swiftly and effectively counter escalation.

4 ATLANTIC COUNCIL • Encouraging like-minded groups elsewhere to set point for all parties involved and adding that the United up governance, such as in Libya and other States could use Russia as an intermediary to begin “provinces” talking with the Syrian government. Finally, the Russian President offered humanitarian support to • Reaching out to Sunni Arab populations refugees and internally displaced persons. Russia’s aggressively, including by means of extortion and Defense Minister showed willingness to discuss direct corruption military support to the Iraqi Kurds, rather than through the Iraqi central government. He also • Driving out foreigners both to undermine the Iraqi requested greater intelligence sharing with the Syrian sectarian nature government and to underscore the fight’s purely The Iranian Supreme Leader articulated that the Assad Military/Security and Iraqi governments on foreign fighters. regime and the Iraqi central government must survive. • Employing ground attacks to gain control of His top military commander in the room advised him

Al-Baghdadi, and the Haditha Dam Syrian government to stay away from events and strategic sites including Baiji Oil Refinery, town of politicsto separate in Iraq. the IraqIn one and of Syriahis interventions, fights and urge the the Iranian • Using ground vehicles to message its ability to Supreme Leader questioned the Red attackers’ identity, mobilize militarily hinting subtly at Saudi or Qatari involvement—possibly as a provocation to pull Iran into wider sectarian • against coalition forces could contain the situation in Iraq without jeopardizing Utilizing surface-to-air and indirect fire attacks itsconflict. position For in Iran, Syria the and ultimate elsewhere question in the was region. how Iran’sit • Conducting suicide bomber and Vehicle Borne immediate priority was to push Red out of Iraq. Toward Improvised Explosive Device (VBIED) attacks that end, Tehran would mobilize additional Iraqi Shiite • Employing improvised explosive devices (IEDs) militias and deploy a dozen more of its own commanders to Iraq. • locals The Syrian President’s number one priority in this new Boosting recruitment of both foreign fighters and turbulent environment was to control his government. • Upholding positions and expanding, subduing, and Following Red’s attack, he immediately sent public absorbing rivals in Syria condolences to the Iraqi leadership, condemning the attacks and emphasizing that Syria was also a victim of • Stepping up kidnapping and abduction efforts with Red’s terrorism. His goal of defeating the Free Syrian a focus on foreigners

• Conducting simultaneous attacks in Damascus and thatArmy his (FSA) forces and would leaving not Syria respond as a militarilytwo-party to fight Red’s with elsewhere to illustrate Red’s agility and to solidify attackRed remained in Iraq. Onthe an same. informational The Syrian level, President he emphasized clarified sectarian divides to the Syrian people in a public address that his secular • Disrupting infrastructure to inhibit adversaries’ government is essential for preventing Red terrorism. ground transportation network US delegation in Syria, should one be created, but looks Brown Team forwardHe also communicated to recognition thatby the he West, would and refuse the Unitedan official States in particular, of his government as the only Even the United States is reluctant…to put boots on legitimate government of Syria. He requested increased the ground, whereas Iran is doing exactly the security assistance from Iran and Russia to defeat the opposite. –Brown member playing the role of FSA. Anticipating that the US-led coalition would Supreme Leader of the Islamic Republic of Iran intensify its aerial bombing campaign against Red, the Syrian President privately stated that his forces might The Russian President vowed that he would continue to participate in a pinprick attack against Red and use the provide economic and military assistance to Syria. opportunity to attack FSA units while all attention is While Russia upholds international law, he said, the diverted toward Red. He also said he would not share West disregards it. To avert military intervention by intelligence with the United States, but would offer it to the West, he demanded a UN resolution authorizing the European powers to build bridges and pave the way for use of force. He also offered to host talks over the their recognition of the Syrian government. Syrian crisis, viewing his country as the connecting

ATLANTIC COUNCIL 5 Green Team • British and French representatives within Green were united in their response. Both took the lead in Our house is on fire and the next nearest fire station Europe’s response, but looked to the United States happens to be Iran…however, we [and the Iranians] to lead the international coalition. After Ukraine, both seem to be confident that Baghdad was secure, they, along with other European representatives there was no fear there…It turned out that the within Green, were concerned about having Iranian position in the other room was exactly what the Iraqi position in our room is. –Green member France said they were already committing playing the role of Prime Minister of Iraq another major conflict closer to home. Britain and they would prefer to refocus rather than add new As diverse a team as it was, Green’s immediate resources.substantial They diplomatic also preferred effort to a the sustained conflict. Thus, priorities were to recognize the severity of the dialogue instead of a one-off offer from Blue. Both registered serious concerns about the welfare of Iraqi government. This in itself was a complicated their diplomatic staff in Iraq. problem,situation givenin Iraq the and complex figure outinteractions how to best and support often the • Green representatives playing smaller European Turkey, and European countries in the coalition. countries were uninterested in escalating their conflicting dynamics among the United States, Iran, involvement. The combination of a recovering A Green member playing the role of Iraqi Prime economy, war-weariness and increasing European Minister surmised that any help would be welcome security threats also prevented them from regardless of the source. The message from Baghdad stepping up their involvement. Lastly, given the was clear: whoever invests the most in expelling Red record of Blue’s past military experience in Iraq, from Iraq would have the most to gain in that country. many European representatives doubted that a Green members made various statements and engaged military return to Iraq would produce any positive in the following policy deliberations: results.

• Scenario 2: Spectacular Terrorist Attack any help it could get. Though the Iraqi Yesterday, a suicide bomber driving what is thought to government’sIraq saw itself preference as a “house was on fire” the West, and looked the for be a stolen US-made Iraqi armored vehicle detonated Iranians’ willingness to provide additional forms of his explosives at Al-Asad Airbase, Iraq, killing at least assistance made them an even more attractive seventy-two coalition personnel, including thirty-two prospect. Americans and wounding 125. Among the US casualties is a high-ranking diplomat from the US Embassy. • Green members playing the roles of France, Britain, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, and other Arab and European powers expressed strong reservations over how the attacker managed to gain access to this increased Iranian intervention. The overall high-securityA joint US-Iraqi military investigation facility. is Complicating underway to thisfind effort out conclusion within Green, with the exception of Iraq, was that a more overt Iranian role in Iraq would to identify the perpetrator. However, hours after the attack,is the blast’s ISIS released size, which an online has made video it extremelyin which it difficult claimed Red. responsibility for the bombing. Intelligence gathered deepen sectarian fault lines, which would benefit from US satellite imagery shows that militants • suspected to be loyal to ISIS are marching toward the decisions and articulating its interests outside The Iraqi government had difficulty making pipeline, attempting to seize control of that strategic oil installation.nearby Hadithah Force refinery protection which measures connects in tothe a regionmajor • sectarianA Green member confines. playing the role of Saudi Arabia and around the globe have dramatically increased. offered to convene the Gulf Cooperation Council Operations originating from Al-Asad have been and help fund the Iraqi government so it could deal interrupted: airstrikes are suspended and training with the worsening refugee crisis. missions have been cut by 50 percent until airbase security is stabilized. • A Turkish representative offered to send arms to the Iraqi government. Refugees were already CENTCOM has reinforced US troops on the airbase and challenging Turkey’s security, and Ankara’s is requesting an increase in airstrikes originating from priority was to effectively contain the problem. US forces in the Gulf in order to minimize operational impacts. US European Command also directed its

6 ATLANTIC COUNCIL component commands to implement additional force- • Ensuring that other support bases in and around protection measures and random security Iraq would increase operations to maintain the enhancements at facilities across the EUCOM area of operational tempo with respect to airstrikes responsibility. On the diplomatic front, the United Nations Security Council is expected to hold an • Conducting a full-scale, timely investigation as to emergency meeting to discuss possible reactions to what happened on Al-Asad airbase and adjusting this event. US intelligence reports indicate the security measures prevent future Red offensive increased potential for ISIS attacks in Iraq and actions elsewhere, including on US soil. • Considering kill team options as tangible support Blue Team to Iraqi security forces

…it’s the central dilemma we’re up against, of how Red Team not to appear impotent, but also how not to take …and, even if there were a massive ground invasion, action that doesn’t inadvertently strengthen the we thought that we could still survive… –Red network you’re actually trying to degrade. –Blue member playing the role of ISIS leader member playing the role of Vice President of the United States Red members agreed that their ultimate goal remained the same—to defend and expand the caliphate. Their strategy was now focused on defense, at least protection of US citizens abroad. Communication of temporarily (an attack on Blue’s homeland was not an plansBlue members’ and procedures first priority to the Americanwas to ensure people the was also urgent priority for Red). Regardless of how Blue, Green, critical, as it would help garner support for any short- and Brown might respond, Red members were or long-term actions taken by the US government.

The scenario caused Blue to assess the type of event • Should Blue withdraw or step up military that would trigger a major change in strategy toward confident that they were in a win-win situation. engagement, Red would escalate its attacks. Red. In that regard, Blue members debated whether a However, the extent to which Blue would double higher number of US casualties—which would lead to down was somewhat important for Red. If it is the biggest loss of American lives since 9/11—would small-scale, it would be less of a concern for Red. have tipped the balance and “forced” the President to But if Blue steps up its military engagement by change his strategy. The President suggested that deploying large and multiple brigades, this would should a Red contingency cause a shift in US strategy, it help prop up the Iraqi government, undermining would include removing the Assad regime in Syria. one of Red’s objectives—destabilizing that Blue actions that had implications for long-term US government. goals included: • Red assumed that because Blue would immediately • Staying committed to the goal of a legitimate, resort to securing its facilities, forcing it to capable, and stable Iraqi government temporarily suppress airstrikes, this would allow it to pursue other military attacks. • along the border with Turkey and reassessing • Red debated the end state of Blue. If a safe and whetherReconsidering it would the ultimately option of ahelp no-fly degrade zone in and Syria sovereign Iraq were Blue’s ultimate goal, Red would try as hard as it could to destabilize it. If solution in Syria Blue doubled-down on airstrikes, Red assessed defeat Red. This would be a first step to a broader that those would impede its ability to have long Blue’s operational and tactical actions included: supply lines and use cell phones, but those would be tolerable effects. If the airstrikes lead to more • Securing Blue and Green forces on the base, civilian casualties, this would be a win for Red. determining who conducted the attack, and delivering a public message to the American people • Red viewed the worst-case scenario as a about how Blue would respond to this attack governance system that would retract into Syria temporarily. Blue’s deployment of a larger military • Conducting special operations in Iraq force, in Red’s mind, bolsters the narrative of “the West versus the Muslim world.” Should Blue send • Aggressively going after Red’s command and additional forces (even though Red thought it was control through cyberattacks

ATLANTIC COUNCIL 7 unlikely, given Blue public opinion), Red would aggressively use IEDs and snipers, and try to contingency as primarily a “Blue problem.” They also capture Blue soldiers for leverage. didGreen not members anticipate immediately this attack toidentified cause a strategicthis shift on the part of Blue. • Red hoped that Blue would overreact and make the same mistakes in Iraq. While Red’s biggest military • The Iraqi Prime Minister was concerned about possible reduction of US military involvement, but did not believe that Blue would leave. Attacks on oil resource is local fighters, refugees and foreign fighters are huge assets as well. Red would try to an Iraqi concern. preempt any US attempts to stem the flow of refineries and other key infrastructure were also systematicallyforeign fighters commit by doing barbaric more for acts people to frighten, displaced • The Iraqi Prime Minister proposed debating once intimidateby the fighting and (ideally,demoralize resettling its adversaries. them). Red would again the creation of a National Guard, although his enthusiasm was tempered—possibly because he Brown Team did not want the force to be an alternative to the regular Shia-dominated army that would be I hope it finally brings home to you that we are commanded by provincial governors, although fighting a common threat, that we would be much better off working together against this common communicated. threat…rather than embarking on programs of these specific concerns were not openly global hegemony. –Brown member playing the role • The European representatives’ response was of President of Russia focused on securing their own nationals. They anticipated Blue would escalate its offensive and For too long the United States has pretended that asked it to step up its military involvement, despite Iran has nothing to bring to the table. –Brown political concerns. With several European elections member playing the role of Supreme Leader of approaching, increased military intervention in the Islamic Republic of Iran Iraq could be a risky and politically costly issue.

The Russian President stated that his country was a Conclusions great power whose role in solving regional problems was essential. and active participation of a variety of analysts and This simulation benefited tremendously from the views Iran wanted Blue to remain engaged in Iraq in order to practitioners with relevant personal and professional defeat Red. Iran once again was operating with the backgrounds. Indeed, British, Russian, Swedish, Saudi, Syrian, Iraqi, Iranian, and other non-US participants in 2003 US invasion of Iraq and the occupation’s violent the war game played their roles so well partly aftermath,mentality of which, “you break among it, other you fix things, it,” in led reference to Iraq’s to civil the because—beyond their experience and expertise— war. Iran viewed the current terrorist attack as an they had matching nationalities. Of course, we could opportunity to engage Saudi Arabia, communicating to have added a few more members to Green, but we also had concerns about disparities in size among teams. against terrorist groups in the region. We could have also added additional layers of Riyadh that Tehran can be a critical partner in the fight complexity to the game’s design, but we opted not to, The Syrian President and his senior adviser had little to and felt we had to apply some controls. We had to strike a balance between realism and practicality. session. They were comfortable with the status quo add to the statements they made earlier in the first The Blue Team was almost entirely made up of effective ways to once and for all eliminate the FSA. Americans with long and prestigious government and were still focused on finding the most cost- careers; some had worked in the same administrations. Green Team Therefore, familiarity with these types of exercises was not an issue. To further encourage outside-the-box We’re going to have to be very reserved in what we can do with you if it looks like you’re determined to advisers who participated in the war game to the Red work with the Iranians…taking what is already Team.thinking, We weare assigned happy to current have made senior that US decision officials and becoming a sectarian war and exacerbating it. We because their views were extremely insightful. can’t have any part of that. –Green member playing the role of President of Turkey On a substantive level, in both scenarios, the Blue Team

was in a very difficult position. Its members had to

8 ATLANTIC COUNCIL immediately react to unfolding crisis situations while intentions and shared detailed plans and operations also making sure not to undermine their own strategic with its counterparts during the separate discussions. objectives. However, in real life, these types of contingencies happen frequently and more often than Even though the Brown Team was not directly not without advance notice. One could even argue that implicated in the scenarios, its members saw Blue could have seen any of these scenarios coming, opportunities to further their interests. And they were very active doing precisely that. Syria‘s representatives Red’s unmistakable trends of escalation in various were eager to show the world that their government— theatersgiven the throughout increasing signsthe region. from theRed battlefield was simply and not which they view as the only legitimate government on going to stay put, and it was only a matter of time Syrian territory—should be trusted to combat ISIS and before it made its next strategic move. A key takeaway other terrorist groups. The Russian representatives from the war game was that Red had the strategic used both scenarios as opportunities to remind the initiative and time on its hands, while Blue did not. United States of its failures in the Middle East and

Iranian representatives shrewdly and pragmatically in tone and arguably better prepared than all of its foundexpand ways Russian to partner influence with in the that United part of States the world. in Iraq The in adversaries.In both plenary But sessions, this was Rednot verysounded surprising. more confident Red, a order to eliminate any remaining foes there and nonstate actor with no known state sponsorship (unlike Hezbollah or Hamas, for example), was not region. operating under the same constraints as its increase their influence in other areas across the adversaries, all of whom were nation-states that had to It was telling, but perhaps not surprising to many, that be sensitive to a host of internal and external neither scenario caused the Blue Team to change its considerations including domestic audiences, national approach toward Red. Blue came up with more politics, budgets, reputations, capabilities, and other aggressive military plans against Red in response to foreign policy imperatives. Arguably, other than the latter’s escalation, but the strategy essentially physical capacity, Red had very few, if any, self-imposed remained the same, with no boots on the ground, and constraints. little consideration of drastically changing the dynamics in Syria to Washington’s favor. It was obvious from the Green Team’s separate discussions in both sessions, and from their Perhaps, had we designed a scenario whereby Red interactions with the Blue Team in the plenaries, that conducted a spectacular attack against the US they were actively looking for US leadership. Their homeland, Blue would have engaged in a much more willingness to cooperate and coordinate with the concerned effort, ideally in partnership with Green United States was evident, but they were concerned members, to forcefully go after Red. But even with that that Washington was still keeping its cards close to its chest, despite the worsening crisis. The Saudi-led GCC guarantees that Red would be instantly defeated. In showed increased willingness to tackle the ISIS fact,type anotherof intensified massive military US military response, deployment there were in the no problem more aggressively, but fell short of advancing a Middle East might strengthen groups like ISIS, and unilateral approach, without US involvement. possibly create a few more. After all, ISIS is only a symptom of a much deeper problem, and it cannot be The war game’s design obstructed direct bombed away. So when Red members during plenary communication between Blue and Green. We did not set sessions provocatively mentioned that “we are ready up telephone lines between the two sides (which we for anything” and “we welcome boots on the ground,” will keep in mind for the next simulation), but even if their words—while arrogant and bombastic—were not we had established such a connection, it remains entirely devoid of truth. unclear whether Blue would have actually clarified its

ATLANTIC COUNCIL 9 Atlantic Council Board of Directors

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