FROM THE G7 TO THE D-10 : STRENGTHENING DEMOCRATIC COOPERATION FOR TODAY’S CHALLENGES FROM THE G7 TO A D-10: Strengthening Democratic Cooperation for Today’s Challenges Ash Jain and Matthew Kroenig (United States) With Tobias Bunde (Germany), Sophia Gaston (United Kingdom), and Yuichi Hosoya (Japan) ATLANTIC COUNCIL A Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security The Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security works to develop sustainable, nonpartisan strategies to address the most important security challenges facing the United States and the world. The Center honors General Brent Scowcroft’s legacy of service and embodies his ethos of nonpartisan commitment to the cause of security, support for US leadership in cooperation with allies and partners, and dedication to the mentorship of the next generation of leaders. Democratic Order Initiative This report is a product of the Scowcroft Center’s Democratic Order Initiative, which is aimed at reenergizing American global leadership and strengthening cooperation among the world’s democracies in support of a rules-based democratic order. The authors would like to acknowledge Joel Kesselbrenner, Jeffrey Cimmino, Audrey Oien, and Paul Cormarie for their efforts and contributions to this report. This report is written and published in accordance with the Atlantic Council Policy on Intellectual Independence. The authors are solely responsible for its analysis and recommendations. The Atlantic Council and its donors do not determine, nor do they necessarily endorse or advocate for, any of this report’s conclusions. © 2021 The Atlantic Council of the United States. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means without permission in writing from the Atlantic Council, except in the case of brief quotations in news articles, critical articles, or reviews. Please direct inquiries to: Atlantic Council 1030 15th Street NW, 12th Floor Washington, DC 20005 For more information, please visit www.AtlanticCouncil.org. FROM THE G7 TO THE D-10 : STRENGTHENING DEMOCRATIC COOPERATION FOR TODAY’S CHALLENGES TABLE OF CONTENTS I. Executive Summary 2 II. Strategic Context—The Contest for a Rules-Based Democratic Order 5 III. The D-10: Mission and Membership 7 IV. The D-10 in Action: What Will It Achieve? 14 V. Avoiding a New Cold War, and Other Concerns 18 VI. Making It Real—A Practical Way Forward 22 VII. Conclusion 25 About the Authors 26 ATLANTIC COUNCIL 1 FROM THE G7 TO THE D-10 : STRENGTHENING DEMOCRATIC COOPERATION FOR TODAY’S CHALLENGES British Prime Minister Boris Johnson hosts a virtual meeting of G7 leaders on February 19, 2021. Geoff Pugh/Pool via REUTERS I. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY s the world emerges from a devastating pan- Joe Biden highlighted during his remarks to the Munich demic, the United States and its democratic Security Conference in February, the world is in the midst allies and partners face a daunting array of of a fundamental debate—an inflection point—between global threats and challenges. Authoritarianism “those who argue that autocracy is the best way forward” is rising, Iran and North Korea continue to advance and “those who understand that democracy is essential A 1 their nuclear programs, and the race for advanced to meeting [today’s] challenges.” technologies is heating up. Climate change is irre- versibly altering the planet, while wage stagnation and China is growing more powerful and Russia more asser- unemployment threaten to derail the makings of a global tive in challenging key tenets of the global system, each economy recovery. in their own ways but increasingly aligned, as they en- gage in coercive tactics to expand their influence. Mean- More profoundly, the world is entering new era of strate- while, democracies are on the defensive as they seek to gic competition. For the first time in more than three de- contend with these global threats even as many, includ- cades, the United States and its allies face a systemic ing the United States, face deeply polarized electorates challenge from autocratic rivals that seek to disrupt or and growing political dysfunction at home. displace the rules-based democratic order. As President 1 “Remarks by President Biden at the 2021 Virtual Munich Security Conference,” White House, February 19, 2021, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/speeches-remarks/2021/02/19/remarks-by-president-biden-at-the-2021-virtual-munich-se- curity-conference/. President Biden’s remarks on the autocratic challenge liberal democracies are facing were echoed by many Euro- pean leaders speaking at the the MSC Special Edition. See Tobias Bunde, “Beyond Westlessness: A Readout From the Munich Secu- rity Conference Special Edition 2021,” Munich: Munich Security Conference, February 2021, https://doi.org/10.47342/NLUJ4791. ATLANTIC COUNCIL 2 FROM THE G7 TO THE D-10 : STRENGTHENING DEMOCRATIC COOPERATION FOR TODAY’S CHALLENGES To position themselves to succeed in this new era, the fair trade, and a new climate initiative to collectively ad- United States and its democratic allies and partners will vance green technologies. A D-10 can organize collec- need new means to strengthen cooperation. They need tive strategies to counter authoritarianism and support institutions, formal and informal, that are fit for purpose, democratic movements around the world. And it can fa- and reflect the evolving global distribution of power and cilitate a common approach to nuclear proliferation by nature of today’s challenges. While many institutions cre- Iran and North Korea, and coordinate defense strategies ated after World War II, including NATO, continue to play and military investments across the free world.2 an important role in convening democracies, others, such as the Group of Seven (G7), require adaptation to address While the concept of a D-10 was developed more than a the challenges of today’s world. The United States and decade ago,3 it has recently risen to the top of the global its allies need to update existing entities or create new agenda and has garnered widespread interest.4 British ones to facilitate deeper cooperation among the world’s Prime Minister Boris Johnson signaled his support for democracies. the idea by inviting the leaders of Australia, South Korea, India, and, more recently, South Africa, to the June G7 With the rules-based democratic order under threat, summit. Separately, President Biden has called for revi- leading democracies need to develop common strate- talizing cooperation with democratic allies, and is seek- gic approaches that pool their collective influence to con- ing to organize a Summit for Democracy next year. And, front today’s challenges. To this end, this paper proposes several other leaders, including German Chancellor An- a formal Democracies Ten—a “D-10”—aimed at foster- gela Merkel, have called for closer democratic coopera- ing strategic alignment and coordinated action among tion on challenges, including those posed by China and a group of like-minded, influential democracies to ad- Russia. While there are differing views among govern- vance a rules-based democratic order. ments on the merits and format of a D-10, the concept has Membership in the D-10 would be based on criteria identifying a select group of nations that are strategi- The D-10 can serve to drive a cally likeminded and have also demonstrated a capacity for global influence. The resulting group would bring to- common approach to counter the gether the current members of the G7, including the Eu- wide range of autocratic threats ropean Union, plus Australia and South Korea. In addi- tion, the D-10 could include—though not necessarily from posed by Russia and China. It the outset—India, South Africa, and/or Brazil, if concerns can forge a technology initiative over like-mindedness can be overcome. With about 60 to develop common norms percent of global gross domestic product (GDP), a new D-10 would serve as a powerful mechanism to align the and standards for advanced world’s most influential democracies around a coordi- technologies and more resilient nated set of strategies to address global challenges. supply chains. It can provide a The D-10 can serve to drive a common approach to channel for rebuilding commitments counter the wide range of autocratic threats posed by Russia and China. It can forge a technology initiative to to free and fair trade, and a new develop common norms and standards for advanced climate initiative to collectively technologies and more resilient supply chains. It can pro- vide a channel for rebuilding commitments to free and advance green technologies. 2 Ash Jain and Alex Pascal, “Alliances First: Joe Biden’s Historic Opportunity to Reshape Global Order,” National Interest, December 1, 2020, https://nationalinterest.org/blog/buzz/alliances-first-joe-biden%E2%80%99s-historic-opportunity-reshape-global-order-173564. 3 The D-10 construct was initially developed as a US-Canada policy planning dialogue in 2008. The Atlantic Council has been convening the D-10 Strategy Forum as a Track 1.5 platform with officials and experts since 2015. See also Ash Jain, “Like-minded and Capable Democ- racies,” Council on Foreign Relations, January 3, 2013, https://www.cfr.org/report/minded-and-capable-democracies; David Gordon and Ash Jain, “Forget the G-8. It’s Time for the D-10,” Wall Street Journal, June 17, 2013; Matthew Kroenig and Ash Jain, Present at the Re-Cre- ation, Atlantic Council, October 30, 2019, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/03/Present-at-the-Re-Creation.pdf.