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The Challenge: Nato in the Realm of New Geopolitical Realities

The Challenge: Nato in the Realm of New Geopolitical Realities

StRAtEGic ADViSoRS GRouP iSSuEBRIEF Rob de Wijk iDEAS. inFluEncE. iMPAct.

The Challenge: naTO in the Realm of new geopolitical Realities

hould NATO remain primarily a collective defense alliance or should it be transformed into a worldwide the Strategic Advisors Group S security provider? This question lies at the core of To tackle the tough issues facing NATO and the the debate in allied capitals as NATO develops its next transatlantic community, the Atlantic Council created Strategic Concept. New security challenges, as well as the Strategic Advisors Group (SAG). Co-chaired NATO’s military operations in , suggest that the by Atlantic Council Chairman Senator pressure for change has become irresistible. and Airbus CEO Tom Enders, the SAG is comprised As NATO considers its future strategic posture, it must of North American and European preeminent take into account three dramatic new security challenges defense experts. Founded in 2007 by then-Atlantic that will impact the interests of its members. First, it must Council Chairman James L. Jones, General account for the impact of rising poles in the international and former Norwegian Minister of system. Second, it must prepare for the security impact of Defense Kristin Krohn Devold, the SAG provides the competition among world powers for scarce resources. timely insights and analysis to policymakers and the Third, NATO must consider how climate change will impact public on strategic issues in the transatlantic security international security and Alliance interests. These three partnership through issuing policy briefs and principal challenges in this emerging strategic environ- reports, hosting strategy sessions for senior civilian ment require that NATO reconsider its role and mission, in and military offi cials and providing informal expert particular the meaning of Articles 4 and 5 of the Wash- advice to decision-makers.

ington Treaty, military transformation and partnerships - The SAG and its activities are generously sponsored most importantly the NATO– relationship. by the Scowcroft Group, EADS North America, and Airbus. new Security challenges Rising Poles in the international System • The of power are shifting as U.S. hegemony The 2007 cyber attacks in , the 2008 South Ossetia gives way to a multipolar world in which the United War between Russia and and the 2009 gas crisis States and Europe compete with , and between Russia and Ukraine heightened fears that Russia Russia as centers of military, political and economic would once again become NATO’s principal adversary. power. scholars maintain that a This focus on Russia distracts attention from security multipolar system is less stable than a unipolar or challenges that will require new and unorthodox responses bipolar one. In a multipolar world there is heightened and from the impact the rise of other geopolitical powers risk of misperceptions, which undermines trust and will have on the Alliance. This fi rst challenge is of a stability. Moreover, emerging powers will reshape the geopolitical nature: geopolitical landscape because they are likely to be

Dr. Rob de Wijk, a member of the Atlantic Council’s Strategic Advisors Group, is Director of the Hague Centre for Strategic Studies and professor of International Relations at Leiden University in The Netherlands. The views expressed do not neces- sarily represent the views of the Atlantic Council. more assertive, casting a larger shadow on their • Scarce resources will threaten NATO’s interests in a regions and the world. number of ways. In resource-rich countries resource nationalism and nationalistic appeals could, if they have • Due to the reshaping of geopolitics the West’s shaping gripped the populace, lead to emotional and irrational power will decline. This trend is reinforced by the confrontational policies. Venezuela’s resource nation- difficulties encountered in counterinsurgency opera- alism could foreshadow a shifting energy landscape tions. As the shaping power of the West is weakened, it and its impact on the interests of NATO member states. will be increasingly difficult to protect interests. This will Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez has long threat- make the West less reluctant to use its armed forces if ened America with an oil boycott, but up until recently vital interests are not affected. he had no other logical choice but to provide the United • A power struggle with new poles could have important States with its heavy sour oil because only American repercussions for international security, the efficacy of refineries can refine it. But Chavez may be able to strike international law and the functioning of international a future deal with China now that has decided to institutions. New centers of power may see it to their build similar power plants. advantage to block western action in multilateral • For the sake of domestic stability resource-poor institutions. The difficulties of reaching agreement countries have no other choice but to defend their within the Security Council on and economic interests. China is already pursuing increas- Sudan are a clear prelude to how this might work. ingly assertive policies in an attempt to gain access to • Anti-western sentiment is growing in many parts of the raw materials in , and now in South America as world, with both states and non-state actors trying to well. Countries could try to acquire bases in resource- undermine liberal democratic systems. Many new rich countries and could transfer arms to resource-rich NATO members see Russia as the real threat and view or transit countries. In , China is building a its increasingly assertive tactics as an attack on their naval base and a listening post in Gwadar, and a deep- own democratic systems of government. These fears water port in Pasni. On the southern Coast of , are no longer contained to Central and . China is building a fuelling station and facilities are The 2009 Russia-Ukraine gas crisis forced many West being built in and Myanmar as well. Finally, Europeans to realize the extent of the continent’s China is one of the biggest arms suppliers to resource- worrisome energy dependence on Russia. rich African states such as Sudan and Zimbabwe. This development could turn the Indian Ocean into the Competition over Scarce Resources flashpoint of future geopolitical strife.

The geopolitical challenge is closely related to the issue • Resource-rich countries and major consumers such as of scarcity: China could form blocks to advance geopolitical

• Industrialized and industrializing nations demand interests. The formation of new blocks will increase the unrestricted access to resources, particularly energy negative effects of mulipolarity. In Rising Powers, supplies and scarce minerals, as a prerequisite for Shrinking Planet, Michael T. Klare warned of the continued economic growth and socio-political stability. destabilizing effects of proto-blocks led by the United The most pressing issue is perhaps not energy, but States and Japan, and Russia and China. As an minerals. Substitutes are available, but their develop- example, in November 2008, Russian warships sailed ment may still be some years off. As competition for into a Venezuelan port in the first deployment of its kind resources is a zero-sum game, scarcity is becoming a in the Caribbean since the end of the . major source of geopolitical strife, putting the stability of Miscalculations become more likely when gunboat the entire system at risk. Scare resources are now the diplomacy is used in boundary disputes over key driver for China’s foreign policy and increasingly so resources, such as in the East China Sea, the South for the and Europe, although many China Sea and the North Pole region. Europeans still consider raw materials in terms of trade • Resource-poor western democracies may have to deal instead of . with stronger resource-rich autocracies with a state

2 Atl antic Council capitalist economic system. As China’s wealth grows, perceptions and different opinions about NATO’s role Beijing’s could even replace America’s and mission. Different threat perceptions, together soft power. with the lack of political will to deploy sufficient troops, for instance in Afghanistan, and investments in expedi- • The vulnerability of pipelines and the stability of tionary capabilities weakened the core principles of providers of energy and minerals remain a serious Alliance solidarity. Consequently, NATO’s new Strategic challenge as well. The world’s largest oil reserves, Concept should: together with trans-national pipelines and major shipping routes, all lie within a ‘zone of instability’ that • Bridge the gap between the different threat percep- encircles the globe. This zone of instability faces tions within NATO. It is not acceptable that some numerous challenges, including proliferation of countries deploy forces in the risky areas of Afghani- weapons of mass destruction and their means of stan because they believe that their vital interests are at delivery, as well as a growing risk of terrorism, orga- stake, while others reluctantly deploy and only to less nized crime and piracy. Instability is compounded in risky areas or with limited numbers in the hope to some parts by the destabilizing effect of youth bulges, minimally satisfy allied expectations. Thus, a two-tier competition for scarce drinking water and localised Alliance is emerging with one part focusing on collec- conflicts for regional domination. tive defense and another part on cooperative security. The new Strategic Concept must bridge these two Threats Posed by the Impact of visions, for they are not unrelated. Climate Change • Make clear that NATO as a collective defense Climate change, the third new challenge, is a threat organization is weakened if the Alliance fails as a catalyst: cooperative security organization. A credible contribution to risky “away” operations is a prerequisite • The conflict in Darfur is seen by some experts as the for NATO’s survival as a credible defense organization. first climate war. Climate change could lead to migra- The Strategic Concept should also explain how tion, undermining social and consequently political expeditionary capabilities can be used for classic stability of industrialized liberal democracies. War Article 5 operations as well. From a military operational games and intelligence studies concluded that over the perspective the deployment of Dutch troops for the next 20 to 30 years, vulnerable regions - particularly defense of the Baltic States is an expeditionary opera- sub-Saharan Africa, the Middle East and South and tion. The same holds true for the Baltic States deploying Southeast - will face the prospect of food short- troops to defend Turkey. ages, water crises and catastrophic flooding that could demand humanitarian relief or a military response. • Make the defense of common interests - one of which is territorial defense - the centerpiece of the • Climate change could also lead to new resource new strategy. Consequently, the Strategic Concept conflicts. It is estimated that the Arctic region contains should provide a new understanding of Article 4 of 13% of the world’s unproven oil reserves and 30% of the Washington Treaty. Article 4 states that, “The the world’s unproven gas reserves. Melting ice caps Parties will consult together whenever, in the opinion makes these reserves more accessible. of any of them, the territorial integrity, political independence or security of any of the Parties is The Challenge for NATO threatened.” The Strategic Concept should spell out the Geopolitical change, resource conflicts and the security consequences of such a consultation. This should be consequences of climate change compel NATO to rethink done in two ways: its role in the world and the future of transatlantic coopera- ■ Turn NATO into an enabler of coalitions of the tion. As not all member states share the same threat willing and able. In case the vital interests of one or perception, the biggest challenge for the Alliance more member states are affected, a NATO coalition leaders charged with drafting and negotiating the of the willing and able could be tasked to deal with Strategic Concept is to deal with divergent threat the crisis. This coalition should be able to use

The Challenge: NATO in the Realm of New Geopolitical Realities 3 collective NATO assets and elements of NATO’s command, control, communications, computers, command structure and should not be hindered by intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (C4ISR). the views of non-participating member states. • For political reasons, Article 5 should not be

■ Borrow ideas from the (EU) that questioned, nor should it be broadened. In 2006, could make NATO more effective. Constructive U.S. Senator called on the Alliance to abstention is the idea of allowing an EU Member come to the aid of any member whose energy sources State to abstain on a vote in the European Council are threatened by using the organization’s Article 5 under the Common Foreign and Security Policy mutual defence clause. Some suggest that Article 5 (CFSP), without blocking a unanimous decision. In must be invoked in case of a cyber attack. But NATO addition, the EU Lisbon Treaty features Permanent cannot possibly deal with challenges that will not Structured Cooperation, for “those Member States require a military response. A cyber attack, for whose military capabilities fulfil higher criteria and example, requires economic sanctions, which should which have made more binding commitments to one be imposed by the EU and United States collectively. another.” Member States willing to take part commit to common levels of defense investments; to “bring Conclusion their defence apparatus into line with each other as Together, new global concerns have huge implications for far as possible.” Creating core groups with a shared western security and will require NATO leaders to redefine mindset and military capabilities that fulfil higher the Alliance’s underlying political and defense objectives, military criteria is the way forward for NATO. its geographic reach and the military mechanisms they are

■ The desire to join such a core group is a much prepared to employ. The shift in emphasis from protecting stronger incentive to restructure one’s armed forces territory to defending strategic interests requires NATO to than continuous pledges by the NATO Secretary transform the armed forces of all member states into General or the U.S. President. As a matter of fact, deployable armed forces, remove obstacles for risky such a core group already exists unofficially and is “away” operations and forge a new understanding of plain to see in the south of Afghanistan. Moreover, Alliance solidarity. the NATO Special Operations Forces Transformation February 2010 Initiative(NSTI) approximates the idea of a core group as well.

• The Strategic Concept should provide new defense STRATCON 2010 planning guidance based on the shift from clas- The Strategic Advisors Group’s STRATCON 2010 sical territorial defense to the defense of interests. project seeks to shape and inform the transatlantic The latter requires expeditionary combat operations debate over NATO’s new Strategic Concept. and sustained complex stabilization missions. The STRATCON 2010 will issue publications to define document should emphasize that there is no contradic- the critical issues NATO must confront in drafting a tion between capabilities needed for collective defense new Strategic Concept. For more information about and expeditionary means for cooperative security. the SAG or STRATCON 2010, please contact Vice Therefore, it should emphasize deployable combat President and Director of the Program on Interna- power for short, high-intensity “away” operations and tional Security Damon Wilson at [email protected] further investments in quickly deployable power or Program Associate Director Jeff Lightfoot at projection capabilities, including strategic lift and [email protected].

The Atlantic Council of the United States has as its mission the renewal of the Atlantic community for 21st century global challenges through constructive U.S.-European leadership and engagement in world affairs. Led by Senator Chuck Hagel, Chairman, and , President and CEO, the Atlantic Council embodies a network of policy, academic and business leaders who foster transatlantic ties through non-partisan and cross-national discussions and studies.

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4 Atl antic Council The Atlantic Council’s Board of Directors

CHAIRMAN John Craddock L. Kevin Kelly John Studzinski *Chuck Hagel *Ralph D. Crosby, Jr. *James V. Kimsey William H. Taft, IV CHAIRMAN, Thomas M. Culligan *Roger Kirk Peter J. Tanous INTERNATIONAL W. Bowman Cutter Henry A. Kissinger Peter Thomas ADVISORY BOARD Brian D. Dailey Paul Twomey Brent Scowcroft Kenneth W. Dam Anthony Lake Henry G. Ulrich, III PRESIDENT AND CEO Robert E. Diamond, Jr. Muslim Lakhani Enzo Viscusi *Frederick Kempe Paula Dobriansky Robert G. Liberatore Carl E. Vuono Lacey Neuhaus Dorn Henrik Liljegren Charles F. Wald CHAIRMAN EMERITUS Conrado Dornier *Jan M. Lodal Jay Walker *Henry E. Catto Stanley Ebner Wendy W. Makins Mark R. Warner VICE CHAIRS Eric S. Edelman William E. Mayer J. Robinson West *Richard Edelman Thomas J. Edelman Barry R. McCaffrey John C. Whitehead *Brian C. McK. Henderson Stuart E. Eizenstat James P. McCarthy David A. Wilson *Franklin D. Kramer Robert F. Ellsworth Eric D.K. Melby Maciej Witucki *Richard L. Lawson Julie Finley Jack N. Merritt R. James Woolsey *Virginia A. Mulberger Lawrence P. Fisher, II Franklin C. Miller Dov S. Zakheim *W. DeVier Pierson Lucy Reilly Fitch *Judith A. Miller Anthony C. Zinni TREASURERS Barbara Hackman Franklin Alexander V. Mirtchev HONORARY DIRECTORS *Ronald M. Freeman *Chas W. Freeman *George E. Moose David C. Acheson *John D. Macomber *John L. Fugh William A. Nitze Madeleine K. Albright Carlton W. Fulford Hilda Ochoa-Brillembourg SECRETARY James A. Baker, III Jacques S. Gansler Philip A. Odeen *Walter B. Slocombe Frank C. Carlucci, III *Robert Gelbard Ana Palacio Warren Christopher DIRECTORS Richard L. Gelfond Torkel L. Patterson Alexander M. Haig, Jr. *Robert J. Abernethy *Edmund P. Giambastiani, Jr. William J. Perry Colin L. Powell Timothy D. Adams *Sherri W. Goodman *Thomas R. Pickering Carol C. Adelman John A. Gordon Andrew Prozes Edward L. Rowny Michael A. Almond C. Boyden Gray Arnold L. Punaro James R. Schlesinger *Michael Ansari Joseph W. Ralston George P. Shultz *David D. Aufhauser Stephen J. Hadley Norman W. Ray Nancy Kassebaum Baker Ian Hague Teresa M. Ressel William H. Webster Donald K. Bandler Harry Harding Joseph E. Robert, Jr. LIFETIME DIRECTORS Lisa B. Barry Rita E. Hauser Jeffrey A. Rosen Lucy Wilson Benson Thomas L. Blair Marten H.A. van Heuven Charles O. Rossotti Daniel J. Callahan, III Susan M. Blaustein Richard C. Holbrooke Stanley Roth Geraldine S. Kunstadter *Julia Chang Bloch Mary L. Howell Michael L. Ryan Steven Muller Harold Brown Benjamin Huberman Marjorie M. Scardino Stanley R. Resor Dan W. Burns *Robert E. Hunter William O. Schmieder William Y. Smith R. Nicholas Burns Robert L. Hutchings John P. Schmitz Ronald P. Verdicchio *Richard R. Burt Mansoor Ijaz Jill A. Schuker Togo D. West, Jr. Michael Calvey William Inglee Matthew R. Simmons Sarah C. Carey Kiron K. Skinner Michael P.C. Carns Robert Jeffrey *Helmut Sonnenfeldt ­*members of the *Daniel W. Christman *A. Elizabeth Jones Richard J.A. Steele Executive Committee Wesley K. Clark Arnold Kanter Philip Stephenson as of January 1, 2010 Curtis M. Coward Francis J. Kelly *Paula Stern

The Challenge: NATO in the Realm of New Geopolitical Realities 5 Strategic advisors Group

Senator chuck Hagel – u.S. SAG co-chairman Chairman, Atlantic Council Co-Chair, President’s Intelligence Advisory Board thomas Enders – European SAG co-chairman President and CEO, Airbus S.A.S.

Frederick Kempe – President and cEo Atlantic Council

General Brent Scowcroft – chairman, Atlantic council international Advisory Board President and Founder, The Scowcroft Group

Damon Wilson – Vice President and Program Director Paul Gebhard - Rapporteur Atlantic Council The Cohen Group – Rapporteur Mike Durkee – Rapporteur Booz Allen Hamilton Former Special Advisor to SACEUR neyla Arnas – Rapporteur Jeff lightfoot – Secretariat National Defense University Atlantic Council

Rafael l. Bardají Ashraf Ghani Fabrizio W. luciolli Strategic Studies Group Institute for State Effectiveness Atlantic Council of Italy Marshall Billingslea Edmund Giambastiani Alexander Mirtchev Deloitte Former Vice Chairman of the Krull Corporation Hans Binnendijk Joint Chiefs of Staff Boyko noev CTNSP Sebastian l. Gorka Center for the Study of Democracy Sven Biscop National Defense University ioan Mircea Pascu The Royal Institute for Marc Grossman Member of the European Parliament International Relations The Cohen Group Jean-Paul Perruche charles Boyd Annette Heuser Former Director-General, EU Military Staff Business Executives for Bertelsmann Stiftung thomas R. Pickering Yves Boyer Robert Hunter Hills & Company Ecole Polytechnique RAND Corporaton norman Ray Edgar Buckley Robert Hutchings The Spectrum Group Thales Woodrow Wilson School tomas Ries Richard Burt Josef Janning Swedish National McLarty Associates Bertelsmann Stiftung Defense College Ralph crosby Karl Heinz Kamp Walter Slocombe EADS North America NATO Defense College Caplin & Drysdale Brian Dailey Arnold Kanter Harlan K. ullman Atlantic Council Board Director The Scowcroft Group Atlantic Council chris Donnelly Franklin D. Kramer Kurt Volker UK Defence Academy Atlantic Council Vice Chair Atlantic Council/Center for conrado Dornier Harald Kujat Dornier Aircraft Former Chairman of chuck Wald Julian lindley-French NATO Military Committee Deloitte Netherlands Defence Academy Rob de Wijk Hague Centre for Strategic Studies

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