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University of Birmingham Why American Grand Strategy Has Not University of Birmingham Why American Grand Strategy Has Not Changed: Porter, Patrick DOI: 10.1162/isec_a_00311 License: None: All rights reserved Document Version Peer reviewed version Citation for published version (Harvard): Porter, P 2018, 'Why American Grand Strategy Has Not Changed: Power, Habit and the U.S. Foreign Policy Establishment', International Security, vol. 42, no. 4, 1, pp. 9-46. https://doi.org/10.1162/isec_a_00311 Link to publication on Research at Birmingham portal Publisher Rights Statement: Article published in International Security on 04/05/2018 DOI: 10.1162/isec_a_00311 Why America's Grand Strategy Has Not Changed: Power, Habit, and the U.S. Foreign Policy Establishment, Patrick Porter, International Security 2018 42:04, 9-46 General rights Unless a licence is specified above, all rights (including copyright and moral rights) in this document are retained by the authors and/or the copyright holders. The express permission of the copyright holder must be obtained for any use of this material other than for purposes permitted by law. •Users may freely distribute the URL that is used to identify this publication. •Users may download and/or print one copy of the publication from the University of Birmingham research portal for the purpose of private study or non-commercial research. •User may use extracts from the document in line with the concept of ‘fair dealing’ under the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988 (?) •Users may not further distribute the material nor use it for the purposes of commercial gain. Where a licence is displayed above, please note the terms and conditions of the licence govern your use of this document. When citing, please reference the published version. Take down policy While the University of Birmingham exercises care and attention in making items available there are rare occasions when an item has been uploaded in error or has been deemed to be commercially or otherwise sensitive. If you believe that this is the case for this document, please contact [email protected] providing details and we will remove access to the work immediately and investigate. Download date: 26. Sep. 2021 1 Why U.S. Grand Strategy has not Changed: Power, Habit and the Foreign Policy Establishment Why has U.S. grand strategy persisted since the end of the Cold War? If grand strategy is the orchestration of power and commitments over the long haul, in an integrated and consistent way, “to cause security” for oneself in a world where war is possible, the United States’ way of pursuing security is remarkably stable.1 Long before the fall of the Soviet Union, the U.S. formed a grand strategy of “primacy,” often coined as “leadership.”2 This strategy was only occasionally interrupted, and by the 1960’s it set the parameters for foreign policy debate.3 It has four interlocking parts: to be preponderant, or overwhelmingly militarily strong; to reassure and contain allies; to integrate other states into the “openness” of US-designed institutions and markets; and to inhibit the spread of nuclear weapons.4 These fundamental For their advice and feedback, the author thanks the anonymous reviewers, David Blagden, Francis Gavin, Ted Hopf, Hal Brands, Stephane Baele, Beverley Loke, Gregorio Bettiza, Jason Reifler, Ryan Grauer, Catarina Thomson, Robert Saunders, Tarak Barkawi, Sergio Catignani, Huw Bennett, Peter Feaver, Burak Kadercan, Jonathan Golub, Tim Vlandas, the editors at The National Interest, and participants at seminars at the International Studies Association and the University of Exeter. 1 I draw this phrase from Barry R. Posen, The Sources of Military Doctrine: France, Britain, and Germany between the World Wars (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1984), p.13. 2 For accounts of ‘primacy’, and the continuity in U.S. grand strategy since the Cold War, see Hal Brands, Making the Unipolar Moment: U.S. Foreign Policy and the Rise of the Post Cold War Order (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 2016), pp.332-333; Colin Dueck, Reluctant Crusaders: Power, Culture and Change in American Grand Strategy (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2006), p.114; Stephen Biddle and Peter D. Feaver, “Assessing Strategic Choices in the War on Terror,” in James Burk, ed., How 9/11 Changed our Ways of War (Stanford, Calif: Stanford University Press, 2013), pp.27-56, pp.28-29; Paul D. Miller, American Power and Liberal Order: A Conservative Internationalist Grand Strategy (Washington, DC.: Georgetown University Press, 2016), pp.17, 266; Barry R. Posen, Restraint: A New Foundation for US Grand Strategy (Ithaca, N.U.: Cornell University Press: 2014), pp.5-12; Christopher Layne, The Peace of Illusions: American Grand Strategy from 1940 to the Present (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 2006), pp.105-117. 3 On the post-war evolution of U.S. strategy, see Melvyn P. Leffler, A Preponderance of Power: National Security, The Truman Administration, and the Cold War (Stanford, Calif: Stanford University Press, 1992), p.496; G. John Ikenberry, Liberal Leviathan: The Origins, Crisis and Transformation of the American World Order (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2011), pp.2, 169-193; Michael Lind, The American Way of Strategy: U.S. Foreign Policy and the American Way of Life (New York, N.Y: Oxford University Press, 2006), pp.3-42, 125-150; Stephen Brooks, G. John Ikenberry and William C. Wohlforth, “Don’t Come Home America: The Case against Retrenchment,” International Security, Vol. 37, No. 3 (Winter 2012/2013), pp.7-51, pp.10-14; Robert Art, A Grand Strategy for America (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 2003), p.140; John Lewis Gaddis, Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of American National Security Policy During the Cold War (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982). 4 On grand strategy within particular issue areas, see Michael Hogan, “Revival and Reform: America’s Twentieth Century Search for a New International Economic Order,” Diplomatic History, Vol. 8, No. 4 (Fall 1984), pp.287-310; Francis J. Gavin, “Strategies of Inhibition: U.S. Grand Strategy, the Nuclear Revolution, and Non-proliferation,” International Security, Vol. 4, No.1 (Summer 2015), pp.9-46, pp.19-38; Charles L. Glaser & Rosemary A. Kelanic, “Should the United States Stay in the Gulf?” in Glaser & Kelanic eds., Crude Strategy: 2 security commitments proved hard to change, even amidst shocks and changing conditions. Why? These are important questions. Scholars vigorously debate the sources of U.S. grand strategy. Some emphasise the structural-international drivers, claiming that the persistence of “primacy” is a response to the global distribution of power, and that the liberating effect of unipolarity, the large imbalance of material power in America’s favour, drives the superpower to predominate beyond its region.5 Others incorporate domestic factors and ideas.6 Much of this debate focuses on explaining change. In fact, U.S. grand strategy has shown more continuity than change. Despite the pressures of war-weariness and the Global Financial Crisis, primacy prevails. The absence of change is what needs explaining. This question has practical significance. In recent years, some analysts have recommended significant changes in U.S. grand strategy, calling for a shift to an alternative posture of “restraint” to retrench commitments, shift burdens and manage rather than resist Rethinking the US Military Commitment to Protect Persian Gulf Oil (Washington, DC.: Georgetown University Press, 2016), pp.233-251, p.233. 5 Kenneth Waltz, “The Emerging Structure of International Politics,” International Security, Vol.18, No. 2 (Fall 1993), pp.53-67, p.77; Michael Mastanduno and Ethan Kapstein, ‘Realism and State Strategies after the Cold War’ in Unipolar Politics (New York: Columbia University Press, 1999), pp.138-181, p.147; William C. Wohlforth, “The Stability of a Unipolar World,” International Security Vol. 24, No. 1 (Summer 1999), pp.5-41, p.37; John J. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (N.Y, New York: WW Norton, 2001, 2014 edn.), pp.365-368; Benjamin Miller, “Explaining Changes in US Grand Strategy,” Security Studies 19 (2010), pp.26-65, pp.28-32. 6 Colin Dueck, “Ideas and Alternatives in American Grand Strategy, 2000–2004,” Review of International Studies, Vol. 30, No.4 (2004), pp.511-535, p.512; Jeffrey W. Legro, Rethinking the World: Great Power Strategies and International Order (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 2005), pp.7-8, p.15; Nuno P. Monteiro, Theory of Unipolar Politics (New York, N.Y.: Cambridge University Press, 2014), pp.70-71; Peter Feaver, “Debating American Grand Strategy After Major War,” Orbis Vol.53, No. 4 (2009), pp. 547-552, p.548; Christopher Layne, “From Preponderance to Offshore Balancing: America's Future Grand Strategy,” International Security Vol.22, No. 1 (Summer 1997), pp.86-124, p.88; Peter Trubowitz, Politics and Strategy: Partisan Ambition & American Statecraft (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2011), pp.9-10; Randall L. Schweller, Unanswered Threats: Political Constraints on the Balance of Power (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2008), pp.46-69; Richard N. Rosecrance and Arthur A. Sein, eds., The Domestic Bases of Grand Strategy (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1993), pp.3-22; Stacie E. Goddard and Ronald R. Krebs, “Rhetoric, Legitimation and Grand Strategy,” Security Studies Vol. 24 (2015), pp.5-36, p.15; Brendan R. Green, “Two Concepts of Liberty: U.S. Cold War Grand Strategies and the Liberal Tradition,” International Security Vol.37, No.2 (Fall 2012), pp.9-43, pp.42-43. 3 multipolarity.7 Others warn against such shifts, urging policymakers not to abandon the country’s traditional leadership role.8 Attempts to shift U.S. grand strategy are unlikely to succeed, however, unless advocates of change understand why the current order persists, and unless they can identify the atypical conditions in which it might alter.9 The best explanation for the stability of U.S.
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