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The Maduro-Hezbollah Nexus: How Iran-Backed Networks Prop up the Venezuelan Regime

The Maduro-Hezbollah Nexus: How Iran-Backed Networks Prop up the Venezuelan Regime

Atlantic Council ADRIENNE ARSHT CENTER

THE MADURO- NEXUS: How -backed Networks Prop up the Venezuelan Regime By Joseph M. Humire The Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center broadens understanding of regional transformations through high-impact work that shapes the conversation among policymakers, the business community, and civil society. The Center focuses on Latin America’s strategic role in a global context with a priority on pressing political, economic, and social issues that will define the trajectory of the region now and in the years ahead. Select lines of programming include: ’s crisis; -US and global ties; in Latin America; ’s future; a changing Brazil; Central America’s trajectory; development; commercial patterns shifts; energy resources; and disinformation. Jason Marczak serves as Center Director.

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Cover photo: /Carlos Garcia Rawlins

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ISBN-13: 978-1-61977-127-7

October 2020 Atlantic Council ADRIENNE ARSHT LATIN AMERICA CENTER

THE MADURO- HEZBOLLAH NEXUS: How Iran-backed Networks Prop up the Venezuelan Regime By Joseph M. Humire Table of Contents

INTRODUCTION...... 2

HEZBOLLAH AND CRIME-TERROR CONVERGENCE...... 3

HEZBOLLAH’S SUPPORT NETWORK IN VENEZUELA AND TIES TO THE MADURO REGIME...... 5

The Saleh Clan...... 6

The Nassereddine Clan...... 8

The Rada Clan...... 8 FROM TO VENEZUELA...... 10

PARIAH STATES: IRAN AND VENEZUELA...... 12

POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS...... 13

AUTHOR BIO...... 15

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS...... 15

ENDNOTES...... 16 THE MADURO-HEZBOLLAH NEXUS: HOW IRAN-BACKED NETWORKS PROP UP THE VENEZUELAN REGIME

Introduction

n the face of another fated sham election in terrorist group Hezbollah.2 Venezuela, countries throughout the Americas These actions by the DOJ highlight a debate in the and Europe are focusing on the many illicit tactics United States and Europe about the presence and role Nicolás Maduro uses to hold on to power. Top of Hezbollah in Venezuela and Latin America overall. Iamong them: the far-reaching illicit networks that Too often this debate is characterized by simplistic prop up the Maduro regime. This includes armed views that see Hezbollah in Venezuela as only a groups that control vast swaths of territory, establish- potential terrorist threat. Equally, other views diminish ing a parallel state structure that conjoins the Maduro the role and relationship between Hezbollah and the regime to international terrorism and transnational Maduro regime altogether. Neither position captures . In this environment, US policy shifted the nuance of how Hezbollah operates in Venezuela from “incrementalism” to “maximum pressure” in and neighboring countries, nor does it establish a 2019, in an effort to constrain Nicolás Maduro’s grip on baseline for understanding how Hezbollah fits into the power in Venezuela. larger strategic picture of the illicit networks propping This approach led to a March 2020 US Department up the Maduro regime, and its relationship with Iran. of Justice (DOJ) announcement of multiple narco- Adding to this deficit of knowledge is that, for many terrorism indictments against the Maduro regime, Latin American policymakers, Hezbollah is viewed as including charges against Nicolás Maduro him- a distant problem far from local concerns. Likewise, self.1 Two months later, the DOJ indicted a former for US and European policymakers, Latin America is member of Venezuela’s National Assembly, the not a top priority for counterterrorism efforts focused Syrian-Venezuelan dual national Adel El Zebayar, for mostly on the Middle East and North Africa. This state allegedly working with Maduro and several top regime of affairs has allowed legal and policy vacuums to arise leaders in Venezuela on a conspiracy regionwide, which the Maduro regime and Hezbollah that involved dissidents of the Revolutionary Armed have exploited to turn Venezuela into a central hub for Forces of Colombia (FARC), drug cartels in Mexico, the convergence of transnational organized crime and the Islamic Republic of Iran, Syria, and the Lebanese international terrorism.3

“…THE MADURO REGIME AND HEZBOLLAH HAVE EXPLOITED [LEGAL AND POLICY VACUUMS] TO TURN VENEZUELA INTO A CENTRAL HUB FOR THE CONVERGENCE OF TRANSNATIONAL ORGANIZED CRIME AND INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM.”

2 miraflores palace/handout H AMIA attack shocked many counterterrorism analysts Argentina (AMIA)Jewish community center in1994, Venezuela withfinanciers,fixers, and facilitators connected totheMaduro regime. Picture taken onOctober 25, 2019. Venezuela’s Nicolás Maduro next to Iranian President Hassan Rouhani duringthe18thSummitofHeadsState andGovern 00901 in the day after the 1994 bombing Hezbollah outsideofLebanon ortheMiddleEast. The also suspected ofdowning theAlas Chiricanas Flight at thetimebecauseitwas thefirst terrorist attack by and fourteen peopleandinjuring hundreds more. The is infamously known for the bombingsoftheIsraeli embassy in1992 andtheAsociaciónMutualIsraelita both inBuenosAires, collectively killingonehundred long armofIran andHezbollah’s terror networks is ment oftheNon-Aligned Movement inBaku, Azerbaijan. Iran-backed Hezbollah operates clandestine networks ofclansin Convergence Hezbollah andCrime-Terror Arabia, andBulgaria. Argentina, Panama, United Kingdom,Saudi terrorist attacks in Israel, , Kuwait, ezbollah isresponsible for carryingout 4 InLatin America,it America, aswell astheCaribbean. 1994 AMIA attack—is still active today. The work of Organization (ESO) or“Unit910,” responsible for its Since theAMIAattack, Hezbollah’s External Security from merely a terrorist network in Latin America to Paraguay, Brazil, and Argentina—to carryoutthe Lebanon to Colombia to theTri-Border Area, between the late Argentine specialprosecutor Alberto Nisman aboard. in BuenosAires, killing all twenty-one passengers extraterritorial operations, hassuccessfully co-opted ensured that Latin America remembers this fact. many Lebanese families throughout Central andSouth Throughout theyears, Hezbollah’s ESOhasmorphed The Hezbollah terror network that moved from 5 HEZBOLLAH ANDCRIME-TERROR CONVERGENCE 3 - 6

4 THE MADURO-HEZBOLLAHNEXUS: HOW IRAN-BACKED NETWORKS PROPUPTHEVENEZUELANREGIME Hezbollah outsideofLebanon ortheMiddleEast. Since then,Hezbollah terror networks inLatin Americahave morphedinto Members oftheArgentine Jewish community holduppictures ofthevictims1994AMIAHezbollah attack during transnational criminalorganizations, withimportantoperations inVenezuela. Picture taken onJuly18,2008. the commemoration ofthe14thanniversary oftheattack in Buenos Aires. The AMIAattack was thefirst terrorist attack by (DEA) to name asubunit of Hezbollah’s ESO that Component,” orBAC. transnational crimeportfolio iscurrently ledby the the AMIAterrorist attack inArgentina. Hezbollah’s the samefounder asthe ESO, ImadMugniyeh, the to Hezbollah. the USgovernment asforeign narcotics kingpins, almost two hundred are affiliated with or connected deceased Hezbollah leaderwhoisalso implicated in uals and entities around the world designated by is sometimesreferred to asthe“Business Affairs of cocaine ledtheDrug Enforcement Administration engage intheregion’s most lucrative illicitenterprise: not new. Its criminal activities were established by money-laundering schemesandmulti-ton shipments narcotics. Ofthemore thantwo thousandindivid Hezbollah’s involvement in drug trafficking is “NAMING HEZBOLLAHALONGSIDE THREEMAJORMEXICAN CARTELS FOR LATIN AMERICA TO REALIZETHAT, INTODAY’S AGE, HEZBOLLAH AND THECENTRAL AMERICAN GANGMS-13 WAS AWAKE-UP CALL 7 IS EQUAL TO THECARTELS INORGANIZEDCRIMEANDTERROR.” Its growing involvement in massive 8 - Together, Tabaja andSafieddineare tiedto avast Tabaja hassetupmany investment mechanismsand Al-Inmaa EngineeringandContracting, basedin with Adham Hussein Tabaja. Hezbollah’s status intheUnited States by listing it Muhammad Qansu, has a Venezuelan . Lebanon andIraq, whosefinancial manager, Jihad Hezbollah’s illicitproceeds. The most notableis transnational criminalnetwork that includesanarray In October 2018, theJustice Department elevated Iran, AbdallahSafieddine, whoshares thisportfolio secretary general’s cousin and Hezbollah’s envoy to construction—used to launderHezbollah’s illicitfunds. of businesses in Latin America—namely in textiles, cash- andcredit-intensive businesses to launder beef, charcoal, electronics, tourism, real estate, and member who owns its media propaganda arm, 9 Aprominent Hezbollah 10

reuters/enrique marcarian hezbollah’s support network in venezuela and ties to the maduro regime

as one of the top five transnational criminal organi- outreach and collaboration via networks, as well zations (TCO).11 Naming Hezbollah alongside three as horizontal diversification.” major Mexican cartels and the Central American gang MS-13 was a wake-up call for Latin America to realize This description is apt for Hezbollah, which inher- that, in today’s age, Hezbollah is equal to the cartels in ently has a multidimensional model for its organiza- organized crime and terror. tional structure with foreign relations and social-ser- The National Defense University (NDU) has been vice sectors, a political party, and media groups—but ahead of the curve in assessing the convergence blends these legitimate activities with its clandestine of organized crime and terrorism. In the foreword illicit networks, both in Lebanon and worldwide. Most to NDU’s seminal 2013 publication on the topic, of the Lebanese diaspora worldwide is not involved the former NATO Supreme Allied Commander and in these criminal or terrorist activities; however, given Atlantic Council board member Admiral James that approximately 14 percent of Lebanon’s gross Staviridis described the convergence.12 domestic product (GDP) comes from remittances, “[Transnational] organizations are a large part Hezbollah’s ESO is actively infiltrating these commu- of the hybrid threat that forms the nexus of nities to build financial support networks abroad.13 In illicit drug trafficking—including routes, profits, Latin America, these support networks are nested and corruptive influences—and terrorism, both primarily in Lebanese and Arab communities, of which homegrown as well as imported Islamic terrorism… the largest in the region reside in Brazil, Argentina, They have achieved a degree of globalized Colombia, and Venezuela.

Hezbollah’s Support Network in Venezuela and Ties to the Maduro Regime

or more than one hundred and fifty years, support networks. Often without the larger Lebanese waves of mass migration arrived from community aware of this clandestine activity, an Lebanon, Syria, and Armenia to Venezuela. “army” of logistical professionals—entrepreneurs, The first wave arrived in the late nineteenth lawyers, accountants, and others—emerged within Fcentury, during the Ottoman era.14 In the early twenti- the diaspora as a support network in Venezuela who eth century, another wave of mass migration arrived in help to raise, conceal, move, and launder illicit funds Venezuela from Lebanon, mostly Maronite Christians, for Hezbollah, some of which is used to advance its who settled largely in Margarita Island, Puerto Cabello, terror operations worldwide (as shown in the “Saleh Punto Fijo, and La Guaira.15 By 1975, at the onset of the Clan” subsection below). Lebanese civil war, Venezuela became well known as a In Venezuela, Hezbollah’s support network operates prominent destination for those seeking to escape the through compartmentalized, familial clan structures harsh conditions of the war. that embed into the Maduro regime-controlled illicit Venezuela’s vibrant economy and relatively high economy and the regime’s political apparatus and standard of living at the time offered a beacon bureaucracy. Many of the clans are assimilated within for many Lebanese. While many in the Lebanese- the Venezuelan state and society through the robust Venezuelan community have made significant Lebanese and Syrian communities that extend to contributions to society, this historic refugee route neighboring Colombia. to Venezuela was exploited by Hezbollah to build

“IN VENEZUELA, HEZBOLLAH’S SUPPORT NETWORK OPERATES THROUGH COMPARTMENTALIZED, FAMILIAL CLAN STRUCTURES THAT EMBED INTO THE MADURO REGIME-CONTROLLED ILLICIT ECONOMY AND THE REGIME’S POLITICAL APPARATUS AND BUREAUCRACY.”

5 H THE SALEH CLAN A Lebanese soldierstands besideposters ofHezbollah leaderSayyed Hassan Nasrallah andthen-Venezuelan President Oficina. Colombian investigators were targeting a Medellín- ficking cocaine with inMexico and,accord Colombia, ledby Ayman SaiedJoumaa.AColombian- 6 THE MADURO-HEZBOLLAHNEXUS: HOW IRAN-BACKED NETWORKS PROPUPTHEVENEZUELANREGIME Lebanese drugkingpin,Ayman Joumaa,was indicted the large Lebanese community along theCaribbean through theLebanese CanadianBank. and thirty arrests and the seizure of $23 million of dering, Operation Titan took down atransregional unraveled themany connections ing to theTreasury Department,runsanextensive in the United States by a federal grand jury for traf illicit fundsmoved through West Africa into Lebanon ened by Hezbollah facilitators whoestablished a coast inColombia. cocaine-trafficking andmass money-laundering based cartel called maritime shippingnetwork tied to Hezbollah. ring runby Hezbollah through localfacilitators in most significantcasesontrade-based money laun Hezbollah networks operating inVenezuela today. Picture taken December 1,2006. Hugo Chávez onabridgeinBeirut,Lebanon. Chávez’s relations withNasrallah were criticalinpaving theway for many Operation Titan started in 2008 when USand year investigation that resulted inonehundred and Venezuela was revealed in2011 after atwo- ezbollah’s crime-terror network inColombia ” 18 Over thetwo-year investigation, authorities 19 These connections were strength La Oficinade La Oficina 16 In one of the Inoneofthe had with hadwith 17 , or“ La La - - - - year earlier. For many years, theSalehclancontrolled State, benefitfrom thisillicitcross-border trade once Saleh was alsodesignated asanarcotics kingpina Maicao, Colombia (see below for more on Maicao) Foreign Assets Control (OFAC), whileAliMohamad to Venezuela after beingsanctionedin2012, andare the illicitmarkets for drugs, weapons, contraband, as terror financiers in 2012 by Treasury’s Office of drug cartels inwestern Venezuela controlled by uncovered duringOperation Titan. AliMohamad and close to thenorthernborder withVenezuela. Local crime-terror network inColombia andVenezuela operative, AliMohamadSaleh,ledthecross-border couriers between Colombia andVenezuela. complex maze ofcross-border trade andbulk-cash regime bureaucracy. prominent Lebanese clanembeddedinto theMaduro now reportedly inMaracaibo working withanother keepers inMaicao, theSalehbrothers fled overnight managed by theSalehclan. members oftheMaduro regime, prominently inZulia bulk-cash smuggling,andmoney launderingin his brother, Kassem MohamadSaleh,were designated A prominent Shiabusinessman andHezbollah 21 20 According to shop -

reuters/sharif karim HEZBOLLAH SUPPORT CLANS

Legend

Department of Justice Indictment Formal connection Department of Treasury Sanction Informal connection Specially Designated Narcotics Trafficker (SDNT) Specially Designated Global Terrorist (SDGT) Hezbollah Unit 910 External Security Organization: ESO

Nicolas Maduro Venezuelan Regime Leader Venezuelan Regime Leader SDN in 2017 • Illicit economy – drugs, gold, contraband, etc. Indicted in 2020 • National industry – oil, mining, crypto, etc. • Immigration + customs SDNT in 2017 Indicted in 2019

FINANCIERS FIXERS FINANCIERS Saleh Clan Nasr Al-Din Clan Rada Clan Ali Mohamad Saleh Ghazi Nassereddine Amer Mohamed Akil Rada SDNT in 2011 SDGT in 2008 • , textiles, SDGT in 2012 • Weapons and drug traffick- charcoal, etc. • Bulk-cash smuggling ing, cocaine, small arms, etc. • Terror finance, implicated in 1994 • Terror finance, money • Immigration and AMIA attack in Argentina laundering documentation • Valencia, Carabobo State • Drug trafficking • Former Venezuelan diplomat • Maracaibo, Zulia State • Margarita Island, Nueva Esparta State

FACILITATOR Hezbollah Hezbollah Ayman Saied Joumaa Abdallah Safi-Al-Din Salman Raouf Salman SDNT in 2011 SDGT in 2018 SDGT in 2019 Indicted in 2011 • Hezbollah Illicit Networks • Crime terror leader, implicated in • Trade based money • Representative to Iran 1994 AMIA attack in Argentina laundering • Brother of Hashem • Hezbollah ESO • Illicit maritime network Safieddine, head of Hezbollah • Interpol Red Notice • Hezbollah Business Affairs Executive Council Component

Hassan Nasrallah SDGT in 2018 Islamic Revolutionary Guard Hezbollah Secretary General Corp-Quds Force

created by: the center for a secure free society. designed by: the atlantic council. 7 THE MADURO-HEZBOLLAH NEXUS: HOW IRAN-BACKED NETWORKS PROP UP THE VENEZUELAN REGIME

THE NASSEREDDINE CLAN

hazi Nassereddine was sanctioned by OFAC but are integral to organizing support networks in 2008 for his ties to Hezbollah and listed as in Venezuela that connect Hezbollah to the Maduro a person of interest by the Federal Bureau of regime. These fixers provide distance and a measure G 22 Investigation (FBI) in 2015. Ghazi’s older brother, of deniability for Hezbollah leaders to hide their con- Abdallah Nassereddine, is a prominent businessman nection to the Maduro regime, and establish pathways on Margarita Island who owns several real-estate to the regime’s bureaucracy and political apparatus in properties and commercial centers on the once-pop- Venezuela. ular vacation destination in Venezuela.23 Originally from Lebanon, the Nasserredine clan rose to political prominence in Venezuela once Hugo Chávez became president. Ghazi entered the Foreign Ministry in Venezuela, attaining official diplomatic status, and THE RADA CLAN Abdallah became an important, although low-pro- file, figure in the United Socialist Party of Venezuela he city of Maicao is a historic commercial hub in (PSUV), serving as a regional coordinator for Nueva La Guajira department in Colombia, with a large Esparta State.24 Tconcentration of Lebanese immigrants dating While stationed at the Bolivarian Republic’s embassy back to the nineteenth century. In 2017, Colombian in Damascus, Syria, Ghazi Nassereddine helped arrange immigration authorities deported one of its residents, meetings between senior Venezuelan officials and a Hezbollah financier and Venezuelan-Lebanese dual high-ranking Hezbollah operatives. According to DEA national, Abdala Rada Ramel, who was suspected of informants, in or about 2009, Ghazi fixed a meeting in running a drug-trafficking and contraband-smuggling Syria between Hezbollah and Venezuela’s then-Interior ring from Maicao to Cartagena.29 He is a prominent Minister Tareck El Aissami, and the Venezuelan military member of the Rada clan, known to have close ties to counterintelligence chief, Hugo Carvajal Barrios.25 The a high-level Hezbollah leader. According to Semana, meeting allegedly prompted a cocaine-for-weapons a well-known Colombian magazine, in his initial scheme between the FARC and Hezbollah that mate- interrogation, Abdala Rada Ramel revealed that his rialized in 2014 when a Lebanese cargo plane full of illicit activities in Colombia were in coordination with small arms (AK-103s, rocket-propelled grenade launch- his “supervisor” Salman Raouf Salman, a shadowy ers, etc.) arrived at the presidential hangar (rampa 4) Hezbollah ESO leader who has been implicated in of the Maiquetia International Airport in .26 The numerous terrorist operations worldwide.30 weapons were reportedly a partial payment for the Cutting his teeth in Argentina as Hezbollah’s on-the- cocaine the FARC provided to the Maduro regime, and ground coordinator for both bombings in Buenos Aires was transferred to a military base in Guárico, Venezuela. in 1992 and 1994, Salman Raouf Salman—whose alias Still a close associate of Nicolás Maduro, the former is Samuel Salman El Reda El Reda—continues to direct diplomat Ghazi Nassereddine currently runs the Hezbollah’s ESO crime-terror network in Latin America, Venezuelan Global AZ and has taken several including in Venezuela.31 With an international arrest trips to France, Germany, and Italy since leaving Syria warrant issued by Argentina in 2009, an OFAC terrorist in 2011.27 Other members of the Nassereddine clan are designation in 2019, and a $7 million reward for infor- suspected of running political indoctrination, para- mation leading to his capture, Salman Raouf Salman, military training, and weapons and drug smuggling along with his brother Jose Salman El Reda El Reda, is in Venezuela. One Nassereddine clan member is also credited with building Hezbollah’s support networks in believed to be in charge of security for Venezuela’s Latin America.32 current Minister of Petroleum and former Vice Salman Raouf Salman’s ties to the Rada clan date President Tareck El Aissami.28 back to the 1994 AMIA attack. Argentine authori- In the counterterrorism lexicon, the Nassereddine ties suspect a Venezuelan-Lebanese dual national clan would be characterized as “fixers”—or, in the case named Amer Mohamed Akil Rada of being involved of Ghazi, a “super fixer”—because the members aren’t in the Hezbollah attack of the AMIA building.33 Amer part of Hezbollah’s hierarchical chain of command, Mohamed, who is also suspected of being involved in

“…THE NASSEREDDINE CLAN [CHARACTERIZED AS ‘FIXERS’ IN THE COUNTERTERRORISM LEXICON] PROVIDES DISTANCE AND A MEASURE OF DENIABILITY FOR HEZBOLLAH LEADERS TO HIDE THEIR CONNECTION TO THE MADURO REGIME.”

8 IRAN-HEZBOLLAH NETWORKS IN VENEZUELA

Hezbollah support cells and clans

National Iranian Oil Company (NIOC)

Mahan Air

Josefa Camejo International Airport in Punto Fijo Punta Cardón Margarita Island Simon Bolivar Puerto International Airport Nassereddine Clan Cabello Maicao Maracaibo Puerto la Cruz Hezbollah Saleh Clan Support Valencia Cell Rada Clan

Venezuela

created by: the center for a secure free society. designed by: the atlantic council.

“THE RADA, SALEH, AND NASSEREDDINE CLANS ARE PART OF A MUCH LARGER GLOBAL ILLICIT NETWORK OF FIXERS, FINANCIERS, AND FACILITATORS FOR HEZBOLLAH, OPERATING OUT OF VENEZUELA WITH PROTECTION FROM THE MADURO REGIME.”

the 1992 terrorist bombing of the Israeli embassy in out of Venezuela with protection from the Maduro Buenos Aires, is alleged to have worked closely with regime. Members of two of the three clans have Salman Raouf Salman throughout the 1990s to case been designated by the US Treasury Department as various targets for Hezbollah’s ESO in Argentina, Brazil, global terrorists for their ties to Hezbollah.39 Unlike Colombia, and Venezuela. the Nassereddine clan, members of the Rada clan and Decades later, a fifty-three-year-old Amer Mohamed Saleh clan are not formally a part of the Maduro regime; Akil Rada, has set up small import-export businesses in however, they each manage aspects of the illicit econ- Panama, sending textiles to Colombia and charcoal to omies of drugs, weapons, contraband, smuggling, Lebanon, with as much as 80 percent of the proceeds and money laundering between Venezuela, Lebanon, used to support Hezbollah.34 In counternarcotics circles, and Syria. Each provides a specific service and com- charcoal is often called “black cocaine” because it is parative advantage for connecting Hezbollah to the frequently used to disguise the transfer of cocaine.35 Maduro regime, acting as “convergence points” to the Akil Rada’s relatives continue to operate in Venezuela regime-controlled illicit economy and specific sectors and are involved in the cryptocurrency industry, which of its licit economy, establishing a degree of plausible is controlled by the Maduro regime.36 Joselit de la deniability for both the Maduro regime and Hezbollah’s Trinidad Ramirez Camacho, the Maduro regime’s crypto leadership, which both deny any direct cooperation.40 chief responsible for the state-backed petro, was The US-Colombia joint Operation Titan, which, by recently indicted by DOJ and has a $5-million bounty 2014, led to ten separate but interrelated kingpin des- for helping regime officials evade OFAC sanctions.37 ignations by OFAC and three federal indictments by The indictment states that Ramirez Camacho has “deep DOJ, described some of these convergence points that political, social, and economic ties to multiple alleged established air and sea bridges between Venezuela, narcotics kingpins, including Tareck El Aissami.”38 The Iran, and Hezbollah.41 As the US “maximum pressure” Rada clan connections to the Maduro regime are campaign ensues, this bridge becomes increasingly nested in this relationship with Tareck El Aissami. important to maintain a transregional threat network The Rada, Saleh, and Nassereddine clans are that enables Iran and Hezbollah to prop up the Nicolás part of a much larger global illicit network of fixers, Maduro regime in Venezuela and the Bashar al-Assad financiers, and facilitators for Hezbollah, operating regime in Syria.

9 I “little Venezuela,” As-Suwayda iscurrently occupied Venezuela. Venezuela’s strategic location inSouthAmericaandat thecrossroads oftheCaribbeanprovides Iran andHez Venezuela’s Nicolás Maduro andIranian Foreign Minister, MohammadJavad Zarif, embrace duringameetinginCaracas, bollah withanabilityto diminishtheirgeographic disadvantage against theUnited States. Picture taken August 27, 2016. As-Suwayda. 10 THE MADURO-HEZBOLLAHNEXUS: HOW IRAN-BACKED NETWORKS PROPUPTHEVENEZUELANREGIME Damascus, andTehran iswhat Maduro protects and thousand reside in a city called In Venezuela, thelogistical airbridge between Caracas, ate inSyria alsocalled As-Suwayda. Known inSyria as ing almost two thirds oftheprimarilyDruze governor has served profitable for Hezbollah andIran. From Syria to Venezuela In southwestern Syria, more thanthree hundred foothold ofIran’s landbridgethrough theLevant. Bashar al-Assad inSyria to protect thelogistical in Venezuela follows thestrategy ofitssupportto ran andHezbollah’s supportto theMaduro regime “IN VENEZUELA,THELOGISTICAL AIRBRIDGEBETWEENCARACAS, DAMASCUS, ANDTEHRAN ISWHAT MADUROPROTECTS AND 42 Many ofthemdualnationals, compris HAS SERVED PROFITABLE FORHEZBOLLAHANDIRAN.” - - Guard Corps (IRGC),andHezbollah militantsthat are Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah insists ondenying Hezbollah’s financialsupport from Iran inorder to dis these samelines,Nasrallah repeatedly emphasized tract from itsother illicitsources ofrevenue. transnational organized crimein order to maintain the group’s growing global footprint in the world of affiliated with 60 percent of all armed groups in the controversial inLebanon. Since Hezbollah’s inception, province defending Basharal-Assad. by Russian military forces, Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary legitimacy inLebanon—even to thepointof admitting Hezbollah’s defense of the Assad regime in Syria is 43 44 Along Along - -

reuters/carlos garcia rawlins reuters/manaure quintero America andat thecrossroads oftheCaribbeanpro Venezuela. Air flew seventeen flights andthe National Iranian Oil Company (NIOC)sailed five tankers from Iran to Venezuela to provide vides Iran andHezbollah withanabilityto diminish States. To hidethisrelationship, Chávez, andthen Syria the“backbone”ofaxisresistance. Middle Easterners, building a clandestine network that But, in2013, hepubliclyconfirmed Hezbollah’s support that Hezbollah hasnointerests outsideofLebanon. the Maduro regime, provided dual identities to some their geographic disadvantage against theUnited of theAssad regime, inaspeechwhichhecalled Iranian airline MahanAirisseenat SimonBolivar International AirportoutsideCaracas, Venezuela. Earlierthisyear, Mahan regimes. plies, andknow-how to boththeMaduro andAssad provides intelligence, training, funds,weapons, sup by Iran andHezbollah for theMaduro regime in bare Hezbollah’s globalinterests outsideofLebanon. public supportbroke withdecadesofdenial,andlaid Picture taken April8,2019. parts from China,Iranian technicians, andapproximately 1.5millionbarrels ofgasolineto thefuel-starved Maduro regime. Across theAtlantic, similarsupportismounting 47 46 Venezuela’s strategic location in South 45 This - - The Maduro regime’s reliance onillicit networks Venezuela that allows the Maduro regime and asso while theLebanese terror group benefitsfrom state Colombian clansare partofthistransregional threat Hemisphere, multiplyingthelogistical andfinancial and ELN guerrillas,to expand their operations. activities and,equally, establishes alogistical basein sonnel inandoutoftheregion. Combined, Hezbollah support inVenezuela to move itsillicitfundsandper is enhanced by Hezbollah’s transregional nature, crime andinternational terrorism intheWestern ciated criminalgroups, includingFARC dissidents benefits for both. hub for theconvergence oftransnational organized has helpedtheMaduro regime become thecentral network that provides supportto Hezbollah’s illicit The aforementioned Lebanese-Venezuelan- from

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venezuela 48 11 - -

THE MADURO-HEZBOLLAH NEXUS: HOW IRAN-BACKED NETWORKS PROP UP THE VENEZUELAN REGIME

Pariah States: Iran and Venezuela

ecent nationwide shortages of gasoline Saab to the United States for eight counts of money have added to the complexity of the crisis laundering has forced the Maduro regime to turn to in Venezuela. Despite having the largest other facilitators to manage the Iran portfolio. reserves of petroleum in the world, the state- One likely candidate is Lebanese-Venezuelan busi- Rowned oil enterprise, Petroleós de Venezuela (PDVSA), nessman Majed Khalil Mazjoub, who, along with his cannot refine its heavy crude due to mismanagement brother, Khaled, has amassed an empire in Venezuela and , leading to mass shortages and pent-up in the shadows of the Chávez and Maduro regimes.55 demand. In April 2020, the Maduro regime turned to The Khalil Mazjoub brothers also reportedly received Iran to partner in helping fix the oil refineries on the many preferential business deals from the Evo Morales Paraguana peninsula, and to provide much-needed regime in , according to a 2017 legislative inves- fuel to Venezuela. The newly minted oil minister, Tareck tigation by a Bolivian senator.56 Immigration records El Aissami, and the regime’s special envoy to Iran, from Bolivia show that Khaled Khalil Mazjoub traveled Lebanese-Colombian businessman Alex Saab, seem- to La Paz at least seven times in the last five years, ingly worked out a gold-for-gas deal with Tehran.49 including a trip to Bolivia with his brother in 2015.57 A Shortly after, in a period of a month and a half, the close relative of the Khalil Mazjoub brothers in Lebanon, Iranian airline, Mahan Air, flew seventeen flights and former Lebanese Finance Minister Ali Hassan Khalil, was the National Iranian Oil Company (NIOC) sailed five recently sanctioned by OFAC for his “material support tankers from Iran to Venezuela to provide parts from to Hezbollah” and other corruption charges.58 A master China, Iranian technicians, and approximately 1.5 million of Middle Eastern networking with intimate knowledge barrels of gasoline to the fuel-starved Maduro regime.50 of Venezuelan kleptocracy, Majed Khalil Mazjoub has Months later, the refineries on the Paraguana penin- the trust, access, and placement in Venezuela to help sula still do not operate, and Venezuela is once again Iran and the Maduro regime continue their strategic facing fuel shortages. But, according to Bloomberg, the cooperation should Alex Saab be sent to a US prison. Islamic Republic received almost half a billion dollars’ Part of this cooperation is a new Iranian supermarket worth (nine tons) of gold bars as payment.51 called “Megasis,” launched in Caracas in July. According The Iranian entities involved in this reported gold- to , the supermarket is an off- for-gas scheme—namely Mahan Air, NIOC, and the shoot of an Iranian retail chain, Etka, that is a subsidiary Islamic Republic of Iran Shipping Lines (IRISL)—are all of the Ministry of Defense and Armed Forces Logistics sanctioned by OFAC for connections to Iran’s feared (MODAFL) in Iran.59 For the last fourteen years, the clerical army, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps MODAFL has partnered with Venezuela’s defense-lo- (IRGC). The nature of the IRGC and these state-owned gistics agency, the Venezuelan Company of Military or controlled entities raises a concern for potential Industries (CAVIM), setting up opaque military projects dual-use operations, which have less of a commercial and shielding financial transfers through PDVSA’s com- or humanitarian intent and are more militaristic in their mercial exchange with China.60 ambitions.52 A civil-forfeiture complaint filed in a dis- The dual-use nature of Iran’s cooperation with the trict court in Washington, DC, suggests that the IRGC Maduro regime, layered with the illicit finance con- is behind the fuel shipments to Venezuela, citing the nections of its facilitators and Hezbollah’s established corporate records of four additional Liberian-flagged crime-terror network in Venezuela, creates a tier-one tankers from Iran that were stopped from arriving in national security concern for the United States—one Venezuela.53 The contents of these tankers were seized that is multifaceted and requires a robust response. by the United States in what has been described as the “largest U.S. seizure of Iranian fuel” to date.54 Much like in Syria, the IRGC’s ability to operate in Venezuela is due to the heightened capability of Hezbollah’s support network. Hezbollah’s influence within, and infiltration of, Lebanese expat communities “MUCH LIKE IN SYRIA, [THE gives Iran a gateway to grow its footprint in Venezuela. ABILITY OF IRAN’S ISLAMIC Prominent businessmen, such as Alex Saab, are needed REVOLUTIONARY GUARD CORPS] to facilitate this relationship with Iran because of their language, culture, and in-depth understanding of the TO OPERATE IN VENEZUELA IS DUE Middle East. The June 2020 arrest in , off TO THE HEIGHTENED CAPABILITY OF the coast of West Africa, and possible extradition of HEZBOLLAH’S SUPPORT NETWORK.”

12 reuters/carlos garcia rawlins T American efforts focused onfindingasolution tothe gence theory, is criticalfor US,European, andLatin Hezbollah isoneoftheless visiblenon-state actors ates inVenezuela, through thelensofthreat-conver and non-state actors. Unlike Colombia’s FARC orELN, . In order to neutralize the threat, crime-terror network inVenezuela requires arobust response from theinternational community. Picture taken July20, 2019. eration withtheMaduro regime, layered withtheillicitfinance connections ofits facilitators andHezbollah’s established Iran’s Foreign Minister MohammadJavad ZarifandJorge Arreaza shake handsandposefor aphoto during the Ministerial nonetheless. helping theMaduro regime, butanimportantone proven resilient becauseitrelies onexternal state Meeting oftheNon-Aligned Movement Coordinating Bureau inCaracas, Venezuela. The dual-usenature ofIran’s coop Policy Recommendations Understanding the nature of how Hezbollah oper in effect since January 2019, has focused on of theMaduro regime. Still, theregime has eroding the political and economic support he United States’ “maximumpressure” policy, - - gence points throughout the world from which Iran, follow thisstrategy. Hezbollah, andtheMaduro regime benefit.However, targeted actionswithaglobal narrative that delegiti the international community shouldcombine these the United States must engageinacounter-threat diaspora that isasmuchavictimitthetarget of Hezbollah’s illicitactivities.The following actions ence inLatin Americamust work withtheLebanese of diminishingtheterrorist group’s influence inthe mizes Hezbollah’s presence intheregion, withthegoal network approach that equallyattacks conver larger Lebanese communities in Latin America. Any strategy that aimsto diminish Hezbollah’s influ policy

recommendations 13 - - - - THE MADURO-HEZBOLLAH NEXUS: HOW IRAN-BACKED NETWORKS PROP UP THE VENEZUELAN REGIME

The United States has been helping to boost The US State Department (and Commerce 1 regional counterterrorism cooperation in recent 4 Department), in coordination with the years through hemispheric ministerial forums Department of Homeland Security International that have led to the first four Hezbollah terror Trade Office, should establish a robust public- designations in Latin America.61 Under current diplomacy campaign with Lebanese and other conditions of COVID-19, the momentum for these Arab communities throughout Latin America, forums has stalled, but the importance of the to build partnerships aimed at weeding out designations remains. The designation of Hezbollah Hezbollah’s malign influence. Such partnerships as a terrorist organization is critical to ensuring that would need to be multifaceted, with commercial each country criminalizes the act of membership or cooperation, cultural exchange, customs support of Hezbollah, so that local authorities can enforcement, and media partnerships aimed at prevent potential terrorist actions before they take anti-corruption initiatives that help legitimate place. Thus, continuing with these Hemispheric businessmen stay away from the perverse incentives Counterterrorism Ministerial Conferences will that Hezbollah or any other illicit actors could offer. help to ensure that the regional counterterrorism Many in the broader Lebanese communities in Latin coalition strengthens. America are eager to participate in efforts that help build credibility to reduce the reputational risk of The hemispheric ministerial forums were their commercial activity. 2 essential in building a broader coalition of countries in Latin America that supports these The Organization of American States could terror designations. Through a total of three forums 5 adopt a convergence task force that works on from December 2018 to January 2020, this effort identifying convergence points where Hezbollah has grown a coalition of eighteen participating and and other crime-terror networks operate in four observing nations, as well as the participation Latin America and the Caribbean. This could of the United Nations (UN), the Organization of be part of the OAS Inter-American Network on American States (OAS), the International Criminal Counterterrorism, a project created in 2019 and Police Organization (INTERPOL), and the Police aimed at strengthening cooperation to prevent and Community of the Americas (AMERIPOL). Each address terrorist threats in the Western Hemisphere. forum built on the success of the last to establish The goal of the convergence task force should be a regional consensus on the concern of the to share real-time information on the logistical Hezbollah network’s activities in Latin America, networks (persons and entities) that help both the officially declared through a joint communique.62 Maduro regime and Hezbollah. This document helped reinforce existing terror designations of Hezbollah in Latin America and The Iran and Hezbollah nexus in Venezuela, first under catalyze new countries to consider doing the same. Chávez and now with Maduro, has been underesti- mated by the international community for far too long. A primary conduit of the convergence of The findings in this report demonstrate that these 3 organized crime and international terrorism is connections exist and are mutually beneficial, allowing illicit finance. Financial-intelligence units (FIUs) are Hezbollah a safe space to conduct its global crime-ter- the nerve center of a government’s ability to collect, ror operations and providing the Maduro regime analyze, and report on suspicious activity related to with increased illicit support from the Middle East. money laundering, corruption, terror finance, and Curtailing the Maduro-Iran-Hezbollah cooperation other financial crimes. FIUs have played an outsized is a critical step in stemming illicit networks that are role in helping to shut down the illicit financial helping to sustain the Maduro regime and prolonging networks of Hezbollah and its sympathizers the Western Hemisphere’s worst humanitarian crisis. worldwide. In the absence of adequate antiterrorism legislation in Latin America, the FIUs have established many mechanisms to cooperate on regional counter-terror-finance efforts. This FIU cooperation in the Americas should be expanded to Gulf states in the Middle East—namely the (UAE), Bahrain, Kuwait, and Oman—that oversee well-known money-laundering jurisdictions widely and constantly used by Iran and Hezbollah. United Nations Security Council Resolution 2462 provides an impetus for this cooperation.

14 Author Bio

Joseph M. Humire is the executive director of the Center for a Secure Free Society (SFS)—a national security think tank based in Washington D.C.—and an Atlantic Council author. Humire specializes in analyzing trans-regional threat networks in the Western Hemisphere and provides regular subject matter expert briefings to the U.S. Defense Department and other govern- ment agencies. He has testified a half dozen times before the U.S. Congress on a variety of national security topics, including Iran and Hezbollah's presence in Latin America and is the co-author of the book Iran's Strategic Penetration of Latin America (Lexington Books, 2014). Humire has also served as an expert witness to important terrorism trials in South America, and is a regular national security commentator on major media. Prior to SFS, he served in the U.S. Marine Corps with a deployment to Iraq and the Middle East, as well as to Latin America and the Caribbean as part of a multinational training exercise.

Acknowledgements

I would like to thank the Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center of the Atlantic Council, in particular Jason Marczak, Diego Area, and Domingo Sadurní for your leadership in making this publication possible. I would also like to thank Jose Gustavo Arocha, Alberto Ray, Leonardo Coutinho, Ricardo Ferrer, Mariano Federici, Matthew Levitt, and former members of U.S. Special Operations Command for your invaluable input and expert advice. As well, I want to thank my staff, board, and supporters of the Center for a Secure Free Society (SFS) who make our research possible. Thank you to Susan Cavan, Donald Partyka, and Nikita Kataev for their editorial assistance and design.

15 THE MADURO-HEZBOLLAH NEXUS: HOW IRAN-BACKED NETWORKS PROP UP THE VENEZUELAN REGIME

Endnotes

1 “Attorney General William P. Barr Delivers Re- 15 Ibid. marks at Press Conference Announcing Crim- 16 “Treasury Targets Major Money Laundering inal Charges Against Venezuelan Officials,” Network Linked to Drug Trafficker Ayman Jou- US Department of Justice, March 26, 2020, maa and a Key Hizballah Supporter in South https://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/attor- America,” US Department of the Treasury, press ney-general-william-p-barr-delivers-remarks. release, June 27, 2012, https://www.treasury.gov/ 2 “Former Member of Venezuelan National As- press-center/press-releases/pages/tg1624.aspx. sembly Charged with Narco-Terrorism, Drug 17 “U.S. Charges Alleged Lebanese Drug Kingpin Trafficking, and Weapons Offenses,” US De- with Laundering Drug Proceeds for Mexican partment of Justice, May 27, 2020, https:// and Colombian Drug Cartels,” US Attorney’s www.justice.gov/usao-sdny/pr/former-mem- Office, Eastern District of Virginia, December 13, ber-venezuelan-national-assembly-charged. 2011, https://www.justice.gov/archive/usao/vae/ 3 Financial Nexus of Terrorism, Drug Trafficking, news/2011/12/20111213joumaanr.html; “Treasury and Organized Crime, Subcommittee of Terror- Sanctions Maritime Network Tied to Joumaa ism and Illicit Finance, US House of Representa- Criminal Organization,” US Department of Trea- tives (2018) (testimony of Joseph M. Humire), sury, press release, October 1, 2015, -center/ 4 For a detailed discussion, see Matthew Lev- press-releases/Pages/jl0196.aspx. itt, Hezbollah: The Global Footprint of Leb- 18 Celina Realuyo, “The Terror-Crime Nexus: Hez- anon’s Party of God (Washington, DC: bollah’s Global Facilitators,” Prism 5, 1, Na- Georgetown University Press, 2015). tional Defense University, 2015, https://cco. 5 Matthew Levitt, “How Trump Is Go- ndu.edu/Portals/96/Documents/prism/ ing After Hezbollah in America’s Back- prism_5-1/The_Terror_Crime_Nexus.pdf. yard,” Politico, November 30, 2017, 19 Matthew Levitt, “Hezbollah’s Criminal Net- 6 “Nisman Report (Dictamina) on Sleep- works: Useful Idiots, Henchmen, and Orga- er Cells,” AlbertoNisman.org, March 4, 2015, nized Criminal Facilitators,” National De- http://albertonisman.org/nisman-report- fense University, October 25, 2016, pdf. dictamina-on-sleeper-cells-full-text/. 20 Los Leal in the San Francisco munic- 7 Financial Nexus of Terrorism, Drug Trafficking, and ipality, along Lake Maracaibo, is considered to Organized Crime, 3. As of August 5, 2020, there be the fastest-growing criminal group in Zulia are 2,140 individuals and entities identified as State. According to several Venezuela orga- “Foreign Narcotics Kingpins” by the US Depart- nized-crime experts, Los Leal is considered a ment of Treasury Office of Foreign Assets Control “hybrid state-criminal structure” that benefits (OFAC) persuant to the Kingpin Act of 2000. from the institutional protection and support of the Maduro regime’s state security forces. 8 “DEA And European Authorities Uncover Mas- sive Hizballah Drug and Money Laundering 21 Abraham Mahshie, “Hezbollah Financing Scheme,” United States Drug Enforcement Evolves Beyond Colombia’s Muslim Communi- Administration, press release, February 1, 2016, ties,” World-Wide Religious News, December 19, 2013, https://wwrn.org/articles/41379/. 9 “Treasury Sanctions Hizballah Front Compa- nies and Facilitators in Lebanon and Iraq,” US 22 “Treasury Targets Hizballah in Venezuela,” US Department of Treasury, press release, June Department of the Treasury, press release, June 10, 2015, https://www.treasury.gov/press-cen- 18, 2008, https://www.treasury.gov/press-center/ ter/press-releases/Pages/jl0069.aspx. press-releases/pages/hp1036.aspx; “FBI Adds Lebanese Man to Seeking Information–Terrorism 10 “Treasury Targets Hizballah Financial Network List,” Federal Bureau of Investigation, press re- in Africa and the Middle East,” US Department lease, January 29, 2015, https://www.fbi.gov/con- of Treasury, February 2, 2018, https://home. tact-us/field-offices/miami/news/press-releases/. treasury.gov/news/press-releases/sm0278. 23 Iran’s Influence and Activity in Latin Ameri- 11 “Attorney General Sessions Announces New ca, Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere, Measures to Fight Transnational Organized Peace Corps, and Global Narcotics Affairs, US Crime,” US Department of Justice, press re- Senate (2012) (testimony by Ambassador Roger lease, October 15, 2018, https://www.justice.gov/ Noreiga), https://www.foreign.senate.gov/imo/ opa/pr/attorney-general-sessions-announces. media/doc/Roger_Noriega_Testimony1.pdf. 12 Michael Miklaucic and Jacqueline Brewer, eds. 24 Iran and Hezbollah in the Western Hemi- Convergence: Illicit Networks and National Se- sphere, Subcommittee on the Western curity in the Age of Globalization (Washington, Hemisphere, US House of Representatives DC: National Defense University Press, 2013), (2015) (testimony by Joseph M. Humire), 13 “Remittances Markedly Boost Lebanon’s 25 In a DOJ indictment dated May 27, 2020, by GDP,” An-Nahar, May 18, 2017, https:// the Southern District of New York against a en.annahar.com/article/586292. former member of the Venezuelan Nation- 14 Ignacio Klich and Jeffrey Lesser, “Introduc- al Assembly, a DEA special agent discussed tion: ‘Turco’ Immigrants in Latin America” in this 2009 meeting in Syria between a Hezbol- Special Issue: “Turco” Immigrants in Lat- lah operative and Tareck El Aissami and Hugo in America, The Americas 53.1 (1996), 1–14. Carvajal, on pg. 10 of U.S. v. Adel El Zebayar. According to the indictment, the DEA inves-

16 endnotes

tigation was supported by one confidential 1, 2020, https://decrypt.co/30898/us-gov-mil- witness and at least two confidential sources. lion-dollar-bounty-venezuela-crypto-chief. 26 Ibid, 16–17. 39 Ghazi Nasr al Din was designated a specially des- 27 A detailed mapping of the Nassereddine network ignated global terrorist (SDGT) by Treasury’s Of- in Venezuela has been done by the author and a fice of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) on June 18, field research team in Central and South America. 2008; Ali Mohamad Saleh was designated a SDGT Ghazi Nassereddine often travels under an alias by OFAC on June 27, 2012. However, no member and with various and in private flights. of the Rada clan has been designated or sanc- Prior to 2014, Ghazi traveled primarily to France, tioned by the US Department of Treasury to date. Germany, and Italy with a 2007 trip to Iran and 40 “US Strategy to Combat Transnational Orga- Cuba. Author interviews with Colombian police nized Crime, Addressing the Threats to National officials in December 2019 in Bogota, Colombia, Security,” White House, July 2011; Nicolás Madu- along with immigration records from Venezuela, ro, “Esto Dijo Maduro sobre Supuestos Vínculos corroborated these findings and field research. con Hezbollah,” February 8, 2019, YouTube video, 28 Author interview with Carlos Papparoni on https://www.youtube.com/watch?time_contin- February 3, 2020, in Washington, DC. Deputy ue=238&v=VgipIhoczwE&feature=emb_logo. Papparoni was appointed by Juan Guaido as a 41 Robert “J. R.” McBrien, “Financial Tools and representative in the interim Venezuelan govern- Sanctions: Following the Money and the Joumaa ment’s Office of Regional Cooperation against Web,” Journal of Complex Operations, May 24, Money Laundering and Corruption, and later as 2016, https://cco.ndu.edu/News/Article/780264/. commissioner for counterterrorism and CTOC. 42 “Colombia en la Mira de Hizbulá con el 29 “Policía Expulsó del País Ciudadano Libanés Apoyo de Venezuela,” Semana, Octo- Vinculado con Narcotráfico,” El Tiempo, Oc- ber 4, 2020, https://www.semana.com/na- tober 27, 2017, https://www.eltiempo.com/ cion/articulo/integrantes-de-hizbula. justicia/policia-expulso-del-pais-ciudadano-li- 43 “Divide and Conquer: The Growing Hez- banes-vinculado-con-narcotrafico-145546. bollah Threat to the ,” Middle East 30 “El Colombiano de Hizbulá,” Semana, July 7, 2018, Institute, October 21, 2019, https://www. https://www.semana.com/nacion/articulo/. mei.edu/publications/divide-and-con- 31 “Salman Raouf Salman, el Terrorista de Hez- quer-growing-hezbollah-threat-druze. bollah que Coordina el Narcotráfico y el 44 Dr. Majid Rafizadeh, “In First, Hezbollah Con- Lavado de Dinero en América Latina,” In- firms All Financial Support Comes from Iran,” fobae, August 1, 2018, https://www.infobae. Al Arabiya English, June 25, 2016, https://en- com/america/america-latina/2018/08/01/. glish.alarabiya.net/en/features/2016/06/25/ 32 “OFAC Recent Actions,” US Department In-first-Hezbollah-s-Nasrallah-confirms- of the Treasury Resource Center, https:// all-financial-support-comes-from-Iran. www.treasury.gov/resource-center/sanc- 45 Marisa Sullivan, “Middle East Securi- tions/OFAC-Enforcement/Pages/20190719. ty Report 19: Hezbollah in Syria,” Insti- aspx; “Salman Raouf Salman: Wanted,” US tute for the Study of War, 2014, Department of State, https://rewardsfor- 46 Colin P. Clark, “Hezbollah Is in Venezue- justice.net/english/salman_salman.html. la to Stay,” Foreign Policy, February 9, 2019, 33 Author interviews with Argentine security offi- https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/02/09/ cials on July 20, 2019, in Buenos Aires, Argentina. hezbollah-is-in-venezuela-to-stay/. 34 George Chaya, “Interpol Detecta Actividades 47 Scott Zamost, et al., “Venezuela May Have Ilícitas de Hezbollah en Colombia,” Infobae, Given Passports to People with Ties to Ter- April 7, 2018, https://www.infobae.com/america/ rorism,” CNN, February 14, 2017, https:// colombia/2018/04/07/interpol-detecta-activ- www..com/2017/02/08/; Sebastian Ro- idades-ilicitas-de-hezbollah-en-colombia/. tella, “The Terror Threat and Iran’s Inroads 35 For more on Hezbollah’s use of “black cocaine,” in Latin America,” ProPublica, July 11, 2013, see Emanuele Ottolenghi, “How Hezbollah Col- https://www.propublica.org/article/the-ter- laborates with Latin American Cartels,” The Dis- ror-threat-and-irans-inroads-in-latin-america. patch, September 22, 2020, https://thedispatch. 48 Douglas Farah and Caitlyn Yates, “Madu- com/p/how-hezbollah-collaborates-with-latin ro’s Last Stand,” IBI Consultants, May 2019, 36 Samer Akil Rada, the brother of Amer Moha- https://www.ibiconsultants.net/_pdf/madu- mad Akil Rada, operates various cryptocurrency ros-last-stand-final-publication-version.pdf. companies in Venezuela, namely in Valencia. 49 Angus Berwick, “Detained Colombian Busi- 37 “HSI Adds Venezuelan Official to Most Wanted nessman was Negotiating with Iran for Ven- List, $5M Reward Offered for Information Lead- ezuela, Lawyers Say,” Reuters, August 28, ing to His Arrest, Conviction,” US Immigration 2020, https://www.reuters.com/article/ and Customs Enforcement, press release, June us-venezuela-iran/detained-colombia-busi- 1, 2020, https://www.ice.gov/news/releases/. nessman-was-negotiating-with-iran-for-ven- ezuela-lawyers-say-idUSKBN25O1Q9. 38 Jose Antonio Lanz, “US Gov Puts $5 Million Boun- ty on Venezuela’s Head of Crypto,” Decrypt, June 50 Joseph Humire, “Iran, , and Venezuela’s Super Facilitator: Who is Alex Saab?” Center for a

17 THE MADURO-HEZBOLLAH NEXUS: HOW IRAN-BACKED NETWORKS PROP UP THE VENEZUELAN REGIME

Secure Free Society, June 30, 2020, https://www. 60 Joseph Humire and Ilan Berman, Iran’s Strate- securefreesociety.org/research/who-is-alex-saab/. gic Penetration of Latin America (Washington, 51 Patricia Laya and Ben Bartenstein, “Iran is DC: Lexington Books, 2014), chapter 7, 63–70. Hauling Gold Bars out of Venezuela’s Al- 61 President Mauricio Macri of Argentina was the most-Empty Vaults,” Bloomberg, April 30, first Latin American leader to designate Hez- 2020, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/ar- bollah as a terrorist organization via decree ticles/2020-04-30/iran-is-hauling-gold-bars- 489 on July 16, 2019; President Mario Abdo of out-of-venezuela-s-almost-empty-vaults. Paraguay followed suit on August 9, 2019 via 52 For a more specific discussion, see Joseph Hu- decree 2307. Finally, President Ivan Duque of mire, “Iran and Venezuela’s Strategic Challenge Colombia and President Juan Orlando Hernan- to Sanctions,” Hill, August 31, 2020, https://thehill. dez of also designated Hezbollah as com/opinion/international/514104-iran-and-ven- a terrorist organization on January 20, 2020 ezuelas-strategic-challenge-to-sanctions. during the Third Hemispheric Counterterrorism Ministerial Conference in Bogota, Colombia. 53 “Warrant and Complaint Seek Seizure of All Iranian Gasoil Aboard Four Tankers Headed to 62 “Joint Communique of the Third Hemispher- Venezuela Based on Connection to IRGC,” US ic Ministerial Conference to Combat Terror- Department of Justice Office of Public Affairs, ism in Bogota, Colombia,” January 20, 2019, July 2, 2020, https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/ http://www.itamaraty.gov.br/en/press-releas- warrant-and-complaint-seek-seizure-all-irani- es/21235-third-hemispheric-ministerial-confer- an-gasoil-aboard-four-tankers-headed-venezuela. ence-to-combat-terrorism-joint-communique. 54 “Largest U.S. Seizure of Iranian Fuel from Four Tankers,” US Department of Justice Office of Public Affairs, August 14, 2020, https://www. justice.gov/opa/pr/largest-us-seizure-irani- an-fuel-four-tankers#:~:text=The%20Justice%20 Department%20today%20announced,that%20 was%20bound%20for%20Venezuela. 55 The Khalil Mazjoub brothers first gained no- toriety in 2015 when they were identified as part of the company that owned the Cessna Citation 500 jet mentioned in the “Narcosobri- nos” case, a high-profile criminal case against the nephews of Maduro’s wife, Celia Flores, who are currently serving an eighteen-year sentence in New York for drug trafficking. 56 In 2017, Bolivian Senator Arturo Murillo, who is now the minister of government in Bo- livia, launched a legislative investigation on Khaled Khalil Mazjoub’s business dealings with the Evo Morales government. Then-Sen- ator Murillo stated that Khaled Mazjoub was contracted by the Bolivian state-owned oil and gas company YPFB in 2016. 57 Bolivian immigration documents are in the author’s possession. 58 “Treasury Targets Hizballah’s Enablers in Leb- anon,” US Department of Treasury, press release, September 8, 2020, https://home. treasury.gov/news/press-releases/sm1116. 59 Ian Talley and Benoit Faucon, “Irani- an Military-Owned Conglomerate Sets Up Shop in Venezuela,” Wall Street Jour- nal, July 5, 2020, https://www.wsj.com/ar- ticles/iranian-military-owned-conglomer- ate-sets-up-shop-in-venezuela-11593972015.

18 Atlantic Council Board of Directors

CHAIRMAN *Helima Croft *Judith A. Miller HONORARY DIRECTORS *John F.W. Rogers Ralph D. Crosby, Jr. Dariusz Mioduski James A. Baker, III *Ankit N. Desai *Michael J. Morell Ashton B. Carter EXECUTIVE CHAIRMAN Dario Deste *Richard Morningstar Robert M. Gates EMERITUS Paula J. Dobriansky Virginia A. Mulberger Michael G. Mullen *James L. Jones Joseph F. Dunford, Jr. Mary Claire Murphy Leon E. Panetta Thomas J. Egan, Jr. Edward J. Newberry William J. Perry CHAIRMAN EMERITUS Stuart E. Eizenstat Thomas R. Nides Colin L. Powell Thomas R. Eldridge Franco Nuschese Condoleezza Rice

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