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Venezuela: Overview of U.S. Sanctions

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Venezuela: Overview of U.S. Sanctions Updated April 24, 2019 Venezuela: Overview of U.S. Sanctions For more than a decade, the United States has employed Silva (former defense minister and governor of Trujillo sanctions as a policy tool in response to activities of the State), and Ramón Rodríguez Chacín (former interior Venezuelan government and Venezuelan individuals. These minister and former governor of Guárico); in 2011, Freddy have included sanctions related to terrorism, drug Alirio Bernal Rosales and Amilicar Jesus Figueroa Salazar trafficking, trafficking in persons, antidemocratic actions, (United Socialist Party of Venezuela, or PSUV, politicians), human rights violations, and corruption. Overall, the Major General Cliver Antonio Alcalá Cordones, and Treasury Department has imposed financial sanctions on Ramon Isidro Madriz Moreno (a Venezuelan intelligence 111 individuals, and the State Department has revoked the officer); in 2017, then-Vice President Tareck el Aissami; visas of hundreds of individuals. On January 28, 2019, the and in May 2018, Pedro Luis Martin (a former senior Trump Administration announced sanctions on Venezuela’s intelligence official) and two of his associates. Others state-oil company, Petróleos de Venezuela, S.A., or designated include drug trafficker Walid Makled, three dual PdVSA. Several days before the imposition of the PdVSA Lebanese-Venezuelan citizens allegedly involved in a drug sanctions, the United States recognized Juan Guaidó, the money-laundering network, and several Colombian drug head of Venezuela’s National Assembly, as the country’s traffickers with activity in Venezuela. interim president and ceased to recognize Nicolás Maduro as the president of Venezuela. Targeted Sanctions Related to Antidemocratic Actions, Human Rights Violations, and Corruption Terrorism-Related Sanctions In response to increasing repression in Venezuela, Congress Since 2006, U.S. officials have expressed concerns about enacted the Venezuela Defense of Human Rights and Civil Venezuela’s lack of cooperation on antiterrorism efforts. Society Act of 2014 (P.L. 113-278; 50 U.S.C. 1701 note) in Since then, the Secretary of State has made an annual December 2014. Among its provisions, the law requires the determination that Venezuela is not “cooperating fully with President to impose sanctions (asset blocking and visa United States anti-terrorism efforts” pursuant to Section restrictions) against those whom the President determines 40A of the Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2781). The are responsible for significant acts of violence or serious most recent determination was made in May 2018. As a human rights abuses associated with protests in February result, the United States has prohibited all U.S. commercial 2014 or, more broadly, against anyone who has directed or arms sales and retransfers to Venezuela since 2006. ordered the arrest or prosecution of a person primarily because of the person’s legitimate exercise of freedom of In 2008, the Treasury Department imposed sanctions (asset expression or assembly. In 2016, Congress extended the freezing and prohibitions on transactions) on two 2014 act through 2019 in P.L. 114-194. individuals and two travel agencies in Venezuela for providing financial support to the radical Lebanon-based In March 2015, President Obama issued E.O. 13692 to Islamic Shiite group Hezbollah. The action was taken implement P.L. 113-278, and the Treasury Department pursuant to Executive Order (E.O.) 13224, aimed at issued regulations in July 2015 (31 C.F.R. Part 591). The impeding terrorist funding. E.O. targets (for asset blocking and visa restrictions) those involved in actions or policies undermining democratic Drug Trafficking-Related Sanctions processes or institutions; those involved in acts of violence U.S. concerns about the lack of Venezuelan cooperation on or conduct constituting a serious human rights abuse; those counternarcotics efforts date back to 2005. Since then, the taking actions that prohibit, limit, or penalize the exercise President has made an annual determination, pursuant to of freedom of expression or peaceful assembly; public procedures set forth in the Foreign Relations Authorization corruption by senior Venezuelan officials; and any person Act, FY2003 (P.L. 107-228, §706; 22 U.S.C. 2291j), that determined to be a current or former leader of any entity Venezuela has failed demonstrably to adhere to its engaged in any activity described above or a current or obligations under international narcotics agreements. former official of the government of Venezuela. President Trump made the most recent determination for FY2019 in September 2018, but also waived foreign aid To date, the Treasury Department has imposed financial restrictions for programs to support democracy promotion. sanctions on 81 Venezuelans pursuant to E.O. 13692. Under the Obama Administration, the Treasury Department The Treasury Department has imposed economic sanctions froze the assets of seven Venezuelans—six members of on at least 22 individuals with connections to Venezuela Venezuela’s security forces and a prosecutor involved in and 27 companies by designating them as Specially repressing antigovernment protesters. Under the Trump Designated Narcotics Traffickers pursuant to the Foreign Administration, as the political situation in Venezuela has Narcotics Kingpin Designation Act (Kingpin Act; P.L. 106- deteriorated, the Treasury Department sanctioned an 120, Title VIII; 21 U.S.C. 1901 et seq.). additional 74 Venezuelan government and military officials Designated individuals include several current or former from May 2017 to April 2019. These officials include Venezuelan officials: in 2008, General Hugo Carvajal President Nicolás Maduro and his wife, Cecilia Flores; (former military intelligence head), General Henry Rangel Executive Vice President Delcy Rodriguez; PSUV First https://crsreports.congress.gov Venezuela: Overview of U.S. Sanctions Vice President Diosdado Cabello; eight Supreme Court Treasury sanctioned Venezuela’s Central Bank in order to members; the leaders of Venezuela’s army, national guard, cut off its access to U.S. currency and limit its ability to and national police; four state governors; and the director of conduct international financial transactions. the Central Bank of Venezuela. Additional Financial Sanctions Broader Sanctions on the Oil and Gold Sectors In addition to targeted sanctions against individuals and On November 1, 2018, President Trump issued E.O. 13850, companies, President Trump has imposed financial setting forth a framework to block the assets of, and sanctions on Venezuela through three additional E.O.s prohibit certain transactions with, any person determined by because of the government’s serious human rights abuses, the Secretary of the Treasury, in consultation with the antidemocratic actions, and responsibility for the deepening Secretary of State, to operate in the gold sector (or any humanitarian crisis. In August 2017, he issued E.O. 13808, other sector of the economy as determined in the future by which prohibits access to the U.S. financial markets by the the Secretary of the Treasury) or to be responsible for or Venezuelan government, including PdVSA, with certain complicit in transactions involving deceptive practices or exceptions to minimize the impact on the Venezuelan corruption and the Venezuelan government. Currently, six people and U.S. economic interests. The sanctions restrict individuals are sanctioned pursuant to E.O. 13850: five the Venezuelan government’s access to U.S. debt and were sanctioned in January 2019 for involvement in a equity markets. corruption scheme involving Venezuela’s currency exchange practices that generated more than $2.4 billion in In March 2018, President Trump issued E.O. 13827 to corrupt proceeds; the president of Venezuela’s state gold prohibit transactions involving the Venezuelan mining company was sanctioned in March 2019. government’s issuance of digital currency, coin, or token. The Maduro government launched a cryptocurrency known On January 28, 2019, pursuant to E.O. 13850, the Treasury as the petro in 2018 in an effort to circumvent sanctions. Department designated PdVSA as operating in the oil sector of the Venezuelan economy, and Secretary of the Treasury In May 2018, President Trump issued E.O. 13835, which Steven Mnuchin determined that the company was subject prohibits transactions related to the purchase of Venezuelan to U.S. sanctions. As a result, all property and interests in debt, including accounts receivable, and to any debt owed property of PdVSA subject to U.S. jurisdiction are blocked, to Venezuela pledged as collateral. U.S. officials assert the and U.S. persons generally are prohibited from engaging in action was intended to deny corrupt Venezuelan officials transactions with the company. the ability to improperly value and sell off public assets in return for kickbacks. At the same time, OFAC issued general licenses to allow Policy Considerations certain transactions and activities related to PdVSA and its Although Venezuelan oil exports to the United States subsidiaries, some within specified time frames or wind- already had been declining, sanctions on that trade are down periods. Transactions with two U.S.-based PdVSA requiring U.S. refineries that process Venezuelan crude oil subsidiaries, PDV Holding, Inc. (PDVH) and CITGO to find alternative sources. Some analysts are concerned Holding, Inc., originally were authorized through July 27, that the stronger sanctions on PdVSA are further 2019,
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