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Nato's New Strategy: Stability Generation

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Nato's New Strategy: Stability Generation NATO’S NEW STRATEGY: STABILITY GENERATION Franklin D. Kramer, Hans Binnendijk, and Daniel S. Hamilton NATO’S NEW STRATEGY: STABILITY GENERATION Franklin D. Kramer, Hans Binnendijk, and Daniel S. Hamilton © 2015 The Atlantic Council of the United States. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means without permission in writing from the Atlantic Council and the Center for Transatlantic Relations, except in the case of brief quotations in news articles, critical articles, or reviews. Please direct inquiries to: Atlantic Council Center for Transatlantic Relations 1030 15th Street, NW, 12th Floor 1717 Massachusetts Ave., NW, Suite 525 Washington, DC 20005 Washington, DC 20036 United States United States ISBN: 978-1-61977-971-6 Cover photo credit (top left to bottom right): SHAPE NATO/Flickr, NATO/Flickr, US Army/WikiCommons, and US Navy/WikiCommons. This report is written and published in accordance with the Atlantic Council Policy on Intellectual Independence. The authors are solely responsible for its analysis and recommendations. The Atlantic Council and its donors do not deter- mine, nor do they necessarily endorse or advocate for, any of this report’s conclusions. September 2015 TABLE OF CONTENTS EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 1 I. UNDERSTANDING HOW TO BUILD A NATO STRATEGY 3 II. NATO’S CRITICAL CHALLENGES AND CURRENT RESPONSES 4 III. NATO’S NEW STRATEGY: STABILITY GENERATION 7 IV. CONCLUSION 16 NATO’S NEW STRATEGY Stability Generation EXECUTIVE SUMMARY This report proposes that NATO adopt a new strategy - called “stability generation,” built on the concept of ensur- gic Concept, and a new fourth pillar of resilience, which ing stability in the NATO region and reducing the threat of and cooperative security, all outlined in NATO’s Strate requirement for resilience arises because hybrid war, in the East and South. To accomplish this, NATO must add includingis crucial inthe today’s capacity globally for cyberattacks, interconnected has changedworld. The the resiliencesignificant as conflicts a core taskin and to itsaround existing NATO’s tasks adjacent of collective areas defense, crisis management, and cooperative security. New efforts are urgently needed to extend the traditional NATO must also enhance capabilities in the East against activitieslandscape directed of conflict. at territorial When war protection changes, so and must deterrence, defense. - - capacity to anticipate and resolve disruptive challenges to ingconventional countries, and and hybrid across conflicts,the Alliance in the to decreaseSouth against vulnera in - itsto incorporatecritical functions, modern and approaches to prevail againstto building direct a society’s attacks bilitiesstability and arising enhance from resilience, conflicts and particularly extremism with in neighborrespect to if necessary. cybersecurity. The strategy recognizes that, especially in a globalized The strategy of stability generation crystallizes many of world, NATO must 1) take into account the impact on sta- the efforts NATO is already undertaking, while also har- monizing and extending strategic ends, ways, and means. Western strategy by working with other institutions and The strategy can be further broken down into three correspondingbility of areas adjacent national to efforts NATO of and critical 2) be importance a part of overall to facilitate a combined multifactor approach. • - - sub-objectives: - itary capabilities for both conventional collective defense terredfirst, to or assure responded that the to threatin a fashion of significant that terminates con Accomplishing the new strategy will require sufficient mil flicts that directly impact NATO nations can be de and more effective responses; and structural changes the Alliance and its members; encompassingand hybrid conflict; cooperative increased actions agility and to aenhance strategy quicker for re- the threat or ends the conflict advantageously to • second, that the Alliance will position itself to re- silience with civil government institutions and the private spond outside the NATO area when violent means To build stability and resilience, NATO must undertake the followingsector that steps: tilt the security environment in NATO’s favor. • third, to ensure that the Alliance and its nation impact significant interests of the Alliance; and A. For Russia and the East and dissuade threats to the critical functions of al- 1. Develop a substantial collective defense by liedstates societies; have sufficient where practicable,resilient capacity assist toin preventdevelop - enhancing the current framework nation approach to focus ing resilience for partners who seek support; and on operational requirements, especially through preposi- tioning, developing reception and other logistics require- ments, and establishing an additional maritime framework theirif conflict populations. occurs, to prevail and to limit damage for the Baltic region; to the integrity of the Alliance’s nation states and 2. Permanent or consistently persistent stationing NATO MUST ADD RESIL- multiple NATO nations (some of which could be deployed IENCE AS A CORE TASK onof forces a rotational in NATO’s basis); Eastern countries, including forces from TO ITS EXISTING TASKS OF 3. Authorize the Secretary General and Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) to move forces under COLLECTIVE DEFENSE, CRI- designated circumstances where a NATO member is under SIS MANAGEMENT, AND CO- prior North Atlantic Council (NAC) approval; and OPERATIVE SECURITY. significant threat and has requested such action without that occurs,4. Encourage enhance cooperation Sweden and taking Finland into to accountjoin NATO, the which would be a major geopolitical change, and until resilientIn sum, as to part the violent,of an overall disruptive, Western or strategy,military effortsNATO’s of (EU) Mutual Defense and Solidarity Clauses, the Nordic others.objectives should be to deter, contain, respond, and remain declarationoverlaps among on solidarity, NATO’s Article the recent 5, the agreements European Union’sbetween The new strategy is built on four pillars: the traditional Sweden and Finland, and the memoranda of understanding three pillars of collective defense, crisis management, between each country and NATO. ATLANTIC COUNCIL 1 NATO’S NEW STRATEGY Stability Generation B. For the South, including the Mediterra- • in the East, which would be focused on the de- nean and Sahel, and the Levant and Iraq velopment of resilience and response to hybrid threats; 5. Substantially develop the framework nation approach, especially through developing stabilization and • in the South, which would be focused on resilience reconstruction, humanitarian, and counter-insurgency and humanitarian requirements; and capabilities, including the capacity to deal with migration; • throughout the Alliance, which would be focused 6. Provide support to Turkey as appropriate under on cyber and particularly its support to the electric Article 4 and Article 5 of the NATO treaty; 7. Expand partnerships and partner capacity, espe- D. Meetgrid key and risksfinance. facing NATO in the in- cially with Jordan, the Gulf States, and Egypt; and formation, burden sharing, technical and 8. Offer NATO membership to Montenegro if it budgetary, and multifactor strategic are- meets the required criteria, as part of a broader effort to nas by 11. Creating a better understanding of critical new Southeast. challenges by establishing an open source intelligence cen- use the open door policy to enhance stability in NATO’s C. As part of an effective resilience ap- ter with an initial focus on a) cyber threats and b) violent proach throughout the Alliance: extremism; 9. Create NATO civilian-military task forces— 12. Enhancing burden sharing by ensuring that Eu- called “NATO Resilience Support Teams”—to cooperate - with civil governmental and private institutions and enti- ing forces for the East; ropeans provide sufficient framework capabilities, includ ties on key security issues in order to establish the neces- 13. Meeting technological and budgetary risk by sary degree of resilience; expanding Alliance technological investment budgets, 10. Encourage relevant nations to establish work- including focusing on disruptive technologies; and ing group-type secretariats to coordinate defense activities 14. Ensuring an effective multifactor strategy by with overlapping civil authority and private sector key crit- coordinating any NATO operational military efforts with ical infrastructure functions, which could be called “Nation- an Alliance-wide working group focused on diplomatic, al Resilience Working Groups,” and which could coordinate with the NATO Resilience Support Team financial/economic, and informational requirements. 2 ATLANTIC COUNCIL NATO’S NEW STRATEGY Stability Generation I. UNDERSTANDING HOW TO BUILD A NATO STRATEGY Effective strategy requires an understanding of, and a relief. Through excellent diplomatic efforts on all sides, a balance among, ends, ways, and means, with an appropri- large, very expensive mission with at best limited strategic ate calculation of risk concerning each element and the agreement has held together, but it offers no model for the overall result. Other words can and have been utilized in problems facing the Alliance today. concepts or policies; and “means” are capabilities or re- sources.the definition But no of matter strategy: the “ends” terms areused, objectives; an effective “ways” strategy are THE ALLIANCE, GIVEN THE requires the combination
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