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Remarks at a North Atlantic Council Summit Meeting in Bucharest April Administration of George W. Bush, 2008 / Apr. 3 473 I’m optimistic about enlargement, Mr. For nearly six decades, the NATO alliance President. I think that enlarging the NATO has been the hope of a world moving toward family of democratic nations, this value- freedom and justice and away from patterns based organization, is a plus. And I hope that of conflict and fear. During times of great tomorrow will see invitations. challenge, we have advanced our ideals. I also hope that we’ll see a positive and We’ve stood form in defending them—firm constructive meeting with the—President in defending them, and we have offered Putin and the NATO-Russia Council, with NATO’s promise to nations willing to under- the right tone and the right ambition for take the hard work and sacrifices required practical cooperation. of its members. I’m, like you, Mr. President, optimism Since the end of the cold war, NATO has about—optimistic about missile defense. I welcomed 10 liberated nations to its ranks. think the alliance will take a clear position These countries have brought new ideas, new on missile defense, recognizing the threat enthusiasm, and new vigor. NATO’s embrace and working on the answers to that recog- of these new members has made Europe nized threat. stronger, safer, and freer. These countries And last but not least, Mr. President, you have made our alliance more relevant to the mentioned another issue which readily will dangers we confront in the new century. be discussed: Membership Action Plan for In Bucharest, we’re inviting more nations Ukraine and Georgia. I think this can never to join us. I’m pleased that the alliance has be a question of ‘‘whether.’’ The ‘‘whether’’ agreed to invite Albania and Croatia to be- is not questionable. If these nations fulfill the come members of NATO. Both these nations criteria and if they want to enter—want to have demonstrated the ability and the will- enter themselves through NATO’s open ingness to provide strong and enduring con- door, I think that door should be open. So tributions to NATO. Both have undertaken that is a discussion that certainly—we cer- tainly are going to have. challenging political, economic, and defense We have a large agenda; we have a full reforms. Both have deployed their forces on agenda. It will be not only NATO’s biggest NATO missions. Albania and Croatia are summit ever, but it will also be a very inter- ready for the responsibility NATO brings, esting political summit with, I think, very and they will make outstanding members of good results. this alliance. Mr. President, once again, thank you for We regret that we were not able to reach having us. consensus today to invite Macedonia to join President Bush. Thank you, sir. the alliance. Macedonia has made difficult Secretary General de Hoop Scheffer. reforms at home. It is making major con- Thank you. tributions to NATO missions all—abroad. President Bush. Thank you. The name issue needs to be resolved quickly so that Macedonia can be welcomed into NOTE: The President spoke at 5:15 p.m. at the NATO as soon as possible. In the interim, JW Marriott Bucharest Grand Hotel. In his re- NATO needs to intensify its engagement marks, he referred to President Mikheil with Macedonio—Macedonia to make sure Saakashvili of Georgia; and President Vladimir that NATO looks forward to the day when Putin of Russia. Secretary General de Hoop Scheffer referred to President Hamid Karzai of Macedonia takes its place among the mem- Afghanistan. bers of the Atlantic alliance. Albania, Croatia, and Macedonia all know the difference between good and evil, be- Remarks at a North Atlantic Council cause they clearly remember evil’s face. Summit Meeting in Bucharest These nations do not take their freedom for April 3, 2008 granted, because they still remember life without it. These nations respect the hard President Bush. Mr. Secretary General, work of building democracy, because they President Basescu, thank you all very much. brought it to life in their countries. VerDate Aug 31 2005 21:13 Apr 07, 2008 Jkt 214250 PO 00000 Frm 00023 Fmt 1244 Sfmt 1244 E:\PRESDOCS\P13APT4.004 P13APT4 sroberts on PROD1PC76 with PRESDOCS 474 Apr. 3 / Administration of George W. Bush, 2008 The United States and all members of the after the fall of the Iron Curtain. And the alliance strongly support the aspirations of idea was to foster, to strengthen the alliance their people, and we pledge to stand with in the eastern and southeastern flank, from them as they continue to work on reform. the Baltic Sea all the way to the Black Sea Together we will continue to help build a and the Mediterranean. That is how we have Europe that is stable, strong, and free. We’ll to interpret the membership of Albania and bring more stability to a once troubled Bal- Croatia to NATO, the future membership of kan region. We will be able to demonstrate Macedonia, and eventual Georgia and the benefits that come from siding with the Ukraine membership as well. forces of freedom. But our discussion was not limited to that. NATO’s door must remain open to other We also discussed other issues of political nations in Europe that share our love for lib- and economic relationship between our erty and demonstrate a commitment to re- countries and about the U.S. investments in form and seek to strengthen their ties with our country. And I shared with President the transatlantic community. We must give Bush my ambition, my hope, and actually, other nations seeking membership a full and my dream that to see a very important indus- fair hearing. As we invite new members trial investment from the United States in today, we’re also clear that the progress of Romania, an investment with which generate enlargement will continue. common interests and would foster even The alliance has always welcomed those more our partnership. And I’m referring to willing to make the sacrifices necessary to the Ford company and of course, a common protect our nations and serves as forces for interest like this would make me feel, as a peace. And that is what’s made our alliance citizen and as a Prime Minister, much more unbreakable, and that is why NATO remains protected by our common interests. the most successful alliance in the history on behalf of human freedom. I would like to also mention another initia- Congratulations, and thank you. tive which was announced by the President Secretary General Jakob Gijsbert yesterday, which was the creation of an ‘‘Jaap’’ de Hoop Scheffer of the North At- American-Romanian foundation which will lantic Treaty Organization. Thank you set up educational programs and grants for very much, Mr. President. Romanian students. I’m talking about the seed money of $100 million, which could NOTE: The President spoke at 2:05 p.m. at the be—— Palace of Parliament. In his remarks, he referred Prime Minister Popescu-Tariceanu. to President Traian Basescu of Romania. One hundred and fifty. President Bush. One hundred and fifty. Remarks Following a Discussion Don’t short-change it. With Prime Minister Calin Popescu- Interpreter. ——$150 million, which in Tariceanu of Romania in Bucharest time will arrive at $1 billion investment, which will create—which would be an invest- April 4, 2008 ment in the future, creating the future—Ro- Interpreter. Hello; good day. Of course manian Ambassadors to United States or the our discussion was a very useful and very American Ambassadors to Romania—it pleasant one. We discussed both bilateral would be our hope. issues between Romania and the United Prime Minister Popescu-Tariceanu. States. I expressed to the—to President Bush Thank you. our gratitude for having had the trust to have President Bush. Thank you, Mr. Prime Romania organize this important NATO Minister. We just had a great—we had a summit in Bucharest. good meeting, because we’re good friends. The organization of the NATO summit in All right. Okay, I’ll just keep going. Bucharest was very symbolic. It is part of a Interpreter. I was actually told that every- much larger vision and concept, this vision body speaks English, so I should not inter- being that to strengthen and to unify Europe pret. VerDate Aug 31 2005 11:25 Apr 08, 2008 Jkt 214250 PO 00000 Frm 00024 Fmt 1244 Sfmt 1244 E:\PRESDOCS\P13APT4.004 P13APT4 sroberts on PROD1PC76 with PRESDOCS.
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