Atlantic Council SOUTH ASIA CENTER ISSUEBRIEF BY YELENA BIBERMAN Reimagining Pakistan’s Militia Policy APRIL 2015 If ever a turning point seemed inevitable in Atlantic Council South Asia Center Pakistan’s militia policy, it was in the aftermath of the Peshawar school massacre in December 2014. The South Asia Center serves as the Atlantic Council’s focal point for work on greater South Asia Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) killed 152 people, as well as its relations between these countries, the 133 of them children, in the bloodiest terrorist neighboring regions, Europe, and the United States. attack in Pakistan’s history.1 The carnage sparked The US-Pakistan Program was funded by the an unprecedented national dialogue about the Carnegie Corporation of New York. costs and contradictions of the Pakistani political and military establishment’s reliance on violent Pakistan’s post-Peshawar collaboration with proxies, such as the Afghan Taliban (from which Afghanistan signals a willingness to halt the the TTP originates), for security. long-standing policy of nurturing and sending Pakistani leaders vowed to take serious measures violent proxies across the border. However, this to ensure that such a tragedy would never breakthrough makes all the more conspicuous happen again. Those measures include a military the absence of a similar arrangement with India. crackdown in the tribal areas, reinstatement of the What Sharif did not include in his to-do list for death penalty, establishment of a parallel system of “the war against terrorism till the last terrorist 4 military courts to try terrorism cases, and enlisting is eliminated” is a crackdown on the anti-India the help of the Afghan army. Pakistan’s Prime militias operating with impunity on Pakistani soil. Minister Nawaz Sharif promised that his country would no longer differentiate between “good” vowed on Pakistan’s national television to take and “bad” Taliban.2 In return, Afghanistan began revengeLashkar-e-Taiba on India leader for the Hafiz Peshawar Muhammad massacre. Saeed tracking down individuals suspected by Pakistan Lashkar-e-Taiba is a leading anti-India militant of being involved in the Peshawar attack.3 group headquartered near the Pakistani city of that killed 164 people and wounded over 300. 1 “Peshawar Attack: Schools Reopen after Taliban IndianLahore. television It carried network out the 2008 NDTV Mumbai noted that attacks not Massacre,” BBC News, January 13, 2015, http://www.bbc. a single Pakistani politician condemned Saeed’s com/news/world-asia-30773120. statements.5 2 “Pakistan’s Prime Minister Promises Day of Reckoning with Militias,” Guardian, December 17, 2014, http://www. theguardian.com/world/2014/dec/17/pakistan-prime- 4 “Pakistan School Attack: PM Sharif Vows to End minister-reckoning-militants. ‘Terrorism,’” BBC News, December 17, 2014, http://www. 3 Hamid Shalizi, Jessica Donati, and Katharine Houreld, “Five bbc.com/news/world-asia-30517904. Pakistani Men Held in Afghanistan Over School Massacre: http://www.reuters. India,” NDTV, December 17, 2014, http://www.ndtv.com/ 5 “Hafiz Saeed on TV Threatens Terror Attacks against Officials,” Reuters, January 18,. 2015, . com/article/2015/01/18/us-afghanistan-pakistan- india-news/hafiz-saeed-on-tv-threatens-terror-attacks- idUSKBN0KR0DL20150118 against-india-714518 Yelena Biberman is a Visiting Assistant Professor of Government at Skidmore College and US-Pakistan Program Exchange Fellow at the Atlantic Council’s South Asia Center. What explains the persistence of Pakistan’s ideological beliefs. differentiating approach to militias in the face 8 of the Peshawar massacre? What are the costs Author Ahmed Rashid describes Pakistan as “an of playing the good-bad militia game? What can abnormal state” for using “Islamic militants— be done to end Pakistan’s dependency on armed jihadi groups, nonstate actors—in addition to nonstate groups? diplomacy and trade to pursue its defense and foreign policies.”9 Other epithets range from Conventional wisdom regarding Pakistan’s the more generous “hard” and “warrior” to security policy emphasizes the country’s the less generous “ideological,” “rentier,” and ideological and historical idiosyncrasies. However, “failing.” Pakistan was critical to the success of in doing so, it obscures rather than illuminates the US war in Afghanistan. But specialists and the strategic logic behind states’ use of militias. insiders are now warning Washington that its The enduring security dilemma underlying the relationship with Islamabad had always been Pakistan-India relationship motivates both sides based on misunderstanding and ambiguity—or, to rely on unconventional means to achieve their as Pakistan’s former ambassador to the United policy goals. Government-backed militias are likely to remain pervasive in South Asia until the broader delusions”10—rather than shared values. At the issues of regional security are addressed. heartStates of Husain the Americans’ Haqqani put misperception it, “magnificent of their Pakistani counterparts, according to the emerging Causes conventional wisdom, is the false assumption that Pakistan’s militia policy attracted considerable Pakistan is a normal country. attention in Washington when, in 2007, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) discovered that its “staunch ally” had all along been supporting the Taliban.6 With the discovery that Osama bin Laden CONVENTIONAL WISDOM had been in hiding near the country’s equivalent REGARDING PAKISTAN’S of West Point, understanding Pakistan acquired SECURITY POLICY EMPHASIZES an unprecedented sense of urgency. American THE COUNTRY’S IDEOLOGICAL strategists felt betrayed and needed answers, AND HISTORICAL which their Pakistani counterparts were unwilling to provide. What followed was a surge in expert IDIOSYNCRASIES. HOWEVER, explanations. Most of them blamed the country’s IN DOING SO, IT OBSCURES distinctive history, culture, or ideology. RATHER THAN ILLUMINATES The leading accounts of Pakistan’s betrayal have THE STRATEGIC LOGIC BEHIND pointed to the country’s “obsession” with India, STATES’ USE OF MILITIAS. insatiable geopolitical appetite, national identity crisis, powerful and opportunistic military, and weak and corrupt civilian institutions. Historian Pakistan’s history and culture are indeed distinct, Ayesha Jalal notes that a “national paranoia” is as are those of other countries. Militia sponsorship taking hold of a country that has yet to develop and diplomatic double-dealing are global, not “historical consciousness.”7 Political scientist T.V. Paul observed that, in addition to Pakistan’s proxies is a staple of unconventional warfare, strategic circumstances (i.e., the geostrategic whichPakistan-specific, has long been practices. practiced The by use countries of nonstate curse), the country suffers from a political and ranging from Great Britain and the United States military elite that based its calculations not on prudence and pragmatism, but rather on hyper-realpolitik assumptions and deeply held The Warrior State: Pakistan in the Contemporary World (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014). 89 T.V.Ahmed Paul, Rashid, Pakistan on the Brink: The Future of 6 Carlotta Gall, The Wrong Enemy: America in Afghanistan, America, Pakistan, and Afghanistan (New York: Penguin 2001-2014 Books, 2013). p. 159. 10 Husain Haqqani, Magnificent Delusions: Pakistan, the United 7 Cited in Maleeha(Boston: Lodhi, Houghton Pakistan: Mifflin Beyond Harcourt, the ‘Crisis 2014), State’ States, and an Epic History of Misunderstanding (New York: (London: Hurst & Company, 2011), p. 11. PublicAffairs, 2013). 2 ATLANTIC COUNCIL Two girls head back to school in Peshawar, Pakistan, January 2015. Schools across Pakistan were closed after a December 16 attack on Peshawar’s Army Public School in which 152 people were killed. Photo credit: Reuters/Khuram Parvez. to Mozambique and Afghanistan. A recent study Pakistan’s unwillingness to crack down on counted 332 pro-government militias operating all terrorist groups is more a product of cold in nearly every region of the world between calculation than ideological shortsightedness. While the United States has been waging a war them under the aegis of a state institution.11 1982 and 2007, with at least 64 percent of and expand regional power. A retired senior US unconventional warfare as “activities conducted on terror, Pakistan has been fighting to maintain toThe enable US Special a resistance Operations movement Command or insurgency defines behind Pakistan’s use of Taliban militants: “Part to coerce, disrupt, or overthrow a government or ofcounterterrorism it was to keep the official situation summed in Afghanistan up the logic off- occupying power by operating through or with balance so that Pakistan could play a larger role in an underground, auxiliary, and guerrilla force in deciding what happened ultimately in that part of a denied area.”12 In other words, militias are a key the world . their [Pakistani strategists’] approach component of covert operations conducted below was not to rely on diplomacy or engagement as the surface of regular military and diplomatic the key way to resolve issues. Their approach was dealings. Solving the puzzle of Pakistan’s to operate using chaos as a principal weapon.”13 relationship with militias requires recognizing the banality, ubiquity, and strategic logic of violence outsourcing. When US officials requested that Pakistan restrain militarycross-border capacity. infiltration14 These by maneuvers militants, (i.e.,Pakistani “hiding 11 Sabine C. Carey,