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F a S T Update Madagascar Semi-Annual Risk Assessment June to November 2006
F A S T Update Madagascar Semi-annual Risk Assessment June to November 2006 T S A F © swisspeace FAST Update Madagascar | June to November 2006 | Page 2 Contents Country Stability and Cooperative International Events (relative) 3 Conflictive Government and Non-Government Events (relative) 5 Cooperative and Conflictive Domestic Events (relative) 8 Appendix: Description of indicators used 11 The FAST International Early Warning Program 12 FAST Update Subscription: www.swisspeace.org/fast/subscription_form.asp Contact FAST International: Country Expert: Phone: +41 31 330 12 19 Richard Marcus Fax: +41 31 330 12 13 mailto:[email protected] www.swisspeace.org/fast © swisspeace FAST Update Madagascar | June to November 2006 | Page 3 Country Stability and Cooperative International Events (relative) Average number of reported events per month: 127 Indicator description: see appendix Risk Assessment: • During the second half of 2006 Country Stability and Cooperative International Events in Madagascar were primarily a function of the social and political actions in the run-up to the much anticipated 3 December 2006 presidential elections. Promises for extended economic aid and long term program planning on the part of donors and other international actors slowed as the administration of President Marc Ravalomanana drew towards political action. Considering the large number of challengers to the presidency, and the volatility of the opposition, Country Stability remained notably high. The downward trend in the Country Stability index in November 2006 is a reflection primarily of a single event, and its repercussions: the weak effort by General Andrianafidisoa (Fidy) to stage a military challenge to the Ravalomanana regime. • The first half of 2006, like much of Ravalomanana’s presidency, was characterized by high levels of foreign assistance. -
Madagascar 6Mm.Indd
EISA gratefully acknowledges the generous financial support for this project from the Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation (SDC) and the EISA ELECTION OBSERVER MISSION REPORT United Kingdom’s Department for International Development (DFID) Mission D’OBseRVation electoRale DE L’eisa EISA reconnaît avec gratitude la généreuse assistance financière de la Direction du Développement et de la Coopération (DDC) et du Département britannique pour le Développement International (DFID) pour ce projet MADAGASCAR PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS Elections PREsiDentielles 3 DECEMBER 2006 Order from: [email protected] ISBN 978-1-920095-71-0 9 781920 095710 EISA ELECTION OBSERVER MISSION REPORT No 24 EISA OBSERVER MISSION REPORT i EISA ELECTION OBSERVER MISSION REPORT MADAGASCAR PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS 3 DECEMBER 2006 ii EISA OBSERVER MISSION REPORT EISA OBSERVER MISSION REPORT iii EISA ELECTION OBSERVER MISSION REPORT MADAGASCAR PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS 3 DECEMBER 2006 2007 iv EISA OBSERVER MISSION REPORT Published by EISA 14 Park Rd, Richmond Johannesburg South Africa P O Box 740 Auckland Park 2006 South Africa Tel: 27 11 482 5495 Fax: 27 11 482 6163 Email: [email protected] www.eisa.org.za ISBN: 978-1-920095-71-0 EISA 2007 All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without the prior permission of EISA. First published 2007 EISA strives for excellence in the promotion of credible elections, participatory democracy, human rights culture, and the strengthening of governance institutions for the consolidation of democracy in Africa. EISA Election Observer Mission Report, No. -
A Cosmetic End to Madagascar's Crisis?
A Cosmetic End to Madagascar’s Crisis? Africa Report N°218 | 19 May 2014 International Crisis Group Headquarters Avenue Louise 149 1050 Brussels, Belgium Tel: +32 2 502 90 38 Fax: +32 2 502 50 38 [email protected] Table of Contents Executive Summary ................................................................................................................... i Recommendations..................................................................................................................... iii I. Introduction ..................................................................................................................... 1 II. From Deadlock to Elections ............................................................................................. 3 A. Postponed Elections................................................................................................... 3 B. Proxy Battles .............................................................................................................. 4 C. A Contested but Valid Election .................................................................................. 5 III. Old Wine, New Bottles ..................................................................................................... 7 A. Political Divides, Old and New .................................................................................. 7 1. Rivalry between Rajoelina and Rajaonarimampianina ....................................... 7 2. Parliamentary battles and the nomination of a prime minister ......................... -
Économie Politique De Madagascar L’Énigme Et Le Paradoxe Économie Politique De Madagascar
M. Razafindrakoto F.Roubaud J.-M.Wachsberger L’énigme etleparadoxe Économie politique de Madagascar L’énigme et le paradoxe Économie politique de Madagascar IRD_Roubaud2_MEP.indd 1 28/06/2017 14:23:39 L’énigme et le paradoxe Économie politique de Madagascar Mireille RAZAFINDRAKOTO, François ROUBAUD, Jean-Michel WACHSBERGER IRD Éditions INSTITUT DE RECHERCHE POUR LE DÉVELOPPEMENT AFD AGENCE FRANÇAISE DE DÉVELOPPEMENT Collection Synthèses Marseille, 2017 IRD_Roubaud2_MEP.indd 3 28/06/2017 14:23:39 Préparation éditoriale Marie-Laure Portal (11) Mise en page et réfection des figures Desk (53) Maquette de couverture Michelle Saint-Léger Maquette intérieure Pierre Lopez Coordination fabrication Catherine Guedj Photo de couverture © IRD/Rijasolo/Riva Press – Antananarivo, Madagascar. Lors d’un concert de la Fête de l’indépendance, juin 2009. La loi du 1er juillet 1992 (code de la propriété intellectuelle, première partie) n’autorisant, aux termes des alinéas 2 et 3 de l’article L. 122-5, d’une part, que les « copies ou reproductions strictement réser- vées à l’usage du copiste et non destinées à une utilisation collective » et, d’autre part, que les analyses et les courtes citations dans le but d’exemple ou d’illustration, « toute représentation ou reproduction intégrale ou partielle faite sans le consentement de l’auteur ou de ses ayants droit ou ayants cause, est illicite » (alinéa 1er de l’article L. 122-4). Cette représentation ou reproduction, par quelque procédé que ce soit, constituerait donc une contrefaçon passible des peines prévues au titre III de la loi précitée. © IRD/AFD, 2017 ISBN : 978-2-7099-2408-5 IRD_Roubaud2_MEP.indd 4 28/06/2017 14:23:39 Sommaire Remerciements ........................................................................ -
Madagascar Revue Du Presse Octobre 2012
MADAGASCAR REVUE DU PRESSE OCTOBRE 2012 SOMMAIRE LA CRISE POLITIQUE ............................................................................................................................ 1 Mise en œuvre de la feuille de route, préparatifs électoraux, amnistie ................................................................................................ 1 Préparatifs électoraux, début officieux de la campagne d’Andry Rajoelina .................................................................................................. 1 Mise en œuvre de l’amnistie - Conseil de Réconciliation Malagasy (CRM), Commission spéciale .............................................................. 4 Opposition, retour de Marc Ravalomanana, affaire Ramaroson ........................................................................................................... 6 Affaire Ramaroson ...................................................................................................................................................................................... 8 Armée, Parlement ................................................................................................................................................................................... 10 Médiation de la SADC, COI .................................................................................................................................................................... 10 Diplomatie .............................................................................................................................................................................................. -
The South African Institute of International Affairs
THE SOUTH AFRICAN INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS Brief Report 10/91 A French possession since 1896, the island of Madagascar, the fourth largest in the world, acceded to autonomous statehood within the French Community in October 1958, as the Malagasy Republic. In May 1959 Philibert Tsiranana, leader of the Parti Social Democrate (PSD), became President. The country achieved full independence in June 1960. Universally famous for its oddities in the animal and plant kingdom - notably, the mouse lemurs, the smallest of all primates, and a dozen species of vanga shrikes - Madagascar has known conflict since its independence. Conflict between the coastal people (cotiers) and the traditional ruling group of the island, the Merina, underlies the islands recent political history. ECONOMIC DECLINE After 1967 the economy, based principally on agriculture, forestry, fishing and - more recently - mining, went into deep decline. Political opposition to the Government's alleged authoritarianism and subservience to the interests of metropolitan France, also mounted. The embattled President transferred power to the military, who initiated the "Malagasization" of industry and education, and strengthened ties with the more progressive mainland African states. The crisis deepened, following an attempted military coup in December 1974, the assassination of the new Head of State and the imposition of martial law in February 1975. In June 1975, Lt-Commander Didier Ratsiraka, a cotier (a group long-favoured by the French) and a former Minister of Foreign Affairs, became the new Head of State and Chairman of the Supreme Revolutionary Council (SRC). |an Smuts House P.O. Box 31596 University of the Witwatersrand Braamfontein Braamfontein Johannesburg 2017 South Africa Tel: 339-2021 Telex: 4-27291 SA Fax: 339-2154 In a referendum in December 1975, a new constitution won overwhelming approval from the voters. -
Legislative and Second Round of Presidential Elections in Madagascar Final Report
ELECTION REPORT ✩ Legislative and Second Round of Presidential Elections in Madagascar Final Report December 2013 The Carter Center strives to relieve suffering by advancing peace and health worldwide; it seeks to prevent and resolve conflicts, enhance freedom and democracy, and protect and promote human rights worldwide. ELECTION REPORT ✩ Legislative and Second Round of Presidential Elections in Madagascar Final Report December 2013 One Copenhill 453 Freedom Parkway Atlanta, GA 30307 (404) 420-5100 www.cartercenter.org Contents Foreword..................................... 4 Candidates, Parties, and Campaigns ......... 28 Executive Summary........................... 6 Campaign Finance ......................... 30 Key Findings and Recommendations ......... 7 Participation of Women, Minorities, and Marginalized Groups ....................... 30 The Carter Center in Madagascar ............. 11 The Media ................................ 31 Deployment of Observers for the Civil Society ............................... 32 Dec. 20 Elections .......................... 11 Election Day ................................. 34 Historical and Political Background........... 14 Opening and Polling ....................... 34 Overview ................................. 14 Voting Process ............................ 34 Single-Party Dominance and a Close Relationship With France (1960–1975) ....... 14 Postelection Developments .................. 38 Single-Party Dominance and the Transfer of Results to District Transmission Red Admiral’s Break With France ........... -
Sommet De Maputo II : Un Atout Et Trois Jokers Mardi, 25 Août 2009 02:21 - Mis À Jour Samedi, 12 Septembre 2009 07:26
Sommet de Maputo II : un atout et trois jokers Mardi, 25 Août 2009 02:21 - Mis à jour Samedi, 12 Septembre 2009 07:26 En haut : Blanche Richard et Nadine Ramaroson, en bas Manandafy Rakotonirina, Ihanta Randriamandranto et Raharinaivo Andrianatoandro Si les mouvances Zafy Albert et Didier Ratsiraka n’ont pas tellement jugé utile de recourir à de nouveaux membres (sauf Tabera Randriamanantsoa pour la mouvance Zafy), les deux principaux protagonistes de cette crise 2009, en l’occurrence Marc Ravalomanana et Andry Rajoelina, eux, ont jugé de s’entourer d’une artillerie lourde. Mais, à bien y voir, il s’agit de trois jokers pour le premier et d’un atout pour le second. Andry et Mialy Rajoelina dans le salon d'honneur de l'aéroport d'Ivato, le 24 août 2009 Concernant la mouvance Ravalomanana, notons Rapelanoro Rabenja, Ravatomanga, Rakotoarivelo Mamy, Révérend Ndriamanampy dit Satrobory, Fetison Rakoto Andrianirina, Yves Aimé Rakotoarison et Raharinaivo Andrianatoandro (porte-parole du Tim), Manandafy Rakotonirina (« Pm » nommé par téléphone par Ravalomanana) ainsi que Ihanta Randriamandranto (leader des femmes légalistes). Si le premier s’était terré quelque part, avant 1 / 6 Sommet de Maputo II : un atout et trois jokers Mardi, 25 Août 2009 02:21 - Mis à jour Samedi, 12 Septembre 2009 07:26 la signature de Maputo I, les deux derniers, eux, ont été libérés sur parole et méritent certainement un changement d’air. Quoi de mieux que celui du Mozambique ? Une mouvance ne se limite pas à une personne ou un parti. Ici, des chefs de parti membres de la mouvance Andry Rajoelina. -
Madagascar's 2009 Political Crisis
Madagascar’s 2009 Political Crisis Lauren Ploch Analyst in African Affairs October 7, 2009 Congressional Research Service 7-5700 www.crs.gov R40448 CRS Report for Congress Prepared for Members and Committees of Congress Madagascar’s 2009 Political Crisis Summary Political tensions on the Indian Ocean island of Madagascar between President Marc Ravalomanana and Andry Rajoelina, the former mayor of the capital city, escalated in early 2009, culminating in the President’s forced removal from office. In preceding weeks, over 135 people had been killed in riots and demonstrations. Under intensifying pressure from mutinous soldiers and large crowds of protestors, Ravalomanana handed power to the military on March 17, 2009. The military then transferred authority to Rajoelina, who has declared a transitional government. Rajoelina’s “inauguration” as president of the transitional authority was followed by days of protests by thousands of supporters of Ravalomanana. Several subsequent demonstrations have led to violent clashes with security forces. Negotiations in August between the parties led to the signing of an agreement in Mozambique to establish an inclusive, transitional government, but Rajoelina subsequently appointed a new government seen to be primarily composed of his own supporters. Southern African leaders and Madagascar’s opposition parties rejected the proposed government, and negotiations in Mozambique resumed. On October 6, the parties announced that they had reached agreement on posts in the new government, which will be led by Andry Rajoelina until new elections are held. Ravalomanana reportedly agreed to the arrangement on the condition that Rajoelina would not vie for the presidency in those elections. The agreement must now be implemented, and some observers question whether members of Rajoelina’s former administration will adhere to the new arrangement. -
Découvrons Tuléar À Travers Ses Rues
Découvrons Tuléar à travers ses rues Autrefois, Tuléar n’était qu’un tout petit village de pêcheurs Vezo. En 1656, sur la carte d’Etienne de Flacourt, gouverneur de la colonie française de Fort Dauphin, à l’emplacement de la ville de Tuléar, on trouve « Hivouron-Heroc ». On sait ainsi qu’au XVIIe siècle, les Vezo Voroneoke formaient déjà de petits hameaux dans les quartiers d’Ambohitsabo, et de Mahavatsy. Tuléar s’est développée dans la basse plaine du Fiherenana, non loin du Tropique du Capricorne. Le proverbe dit : « Sans le Fiherenana, il n’y aurait pas de Tuléar ». En effet, la région est semi-désertique et d’ailleurs, le fleuve est à sec pendant la saison sèche. A la fin du XVIIe siècle et surtout au XVIIIe siècle, Tuléar et la baie de Saint-Augustin vont devenir les principaux postes de traite des rois Masikoro du Fiherenana. La ville n’existe officiellement qu’en 1897, lorsque Gallieni, le gouverneur de Madagascar, ordonne le transport des services administratifs de Nosy Ve à Tuléar. Tuléar devient centre du cercle militaire français. Au moins 2000 habitants y sont recensés à cette date. Toliara devient, en 1903, la capitale de la plus grande, province de l’île puis, progressivement, son véritable pôle économique. Le premier plan d’urbanisme est mis en place en 1916. Les principales rues sont tracées. Des maisons sont construites par des Européens et des Indiens. En 1980, la ville comptait 60 000 habitants, et aujourd’hui plus de 200 000 habitants. Ainsi, elle occupe de plus en plus d’espace. -
Download File
Detailed timeline: Madagascar Rick de Satgé This timeline provides additional information to the Land Portal profile on Madagascar. Land related content is shaded in green and tagged using Landvoc metadata categories. Version 1.0 last updated 1 June 2021 Year Event Context Landvoc metadata tags 700CE Mariners from Indonesia settle in Madagascar has only had human settlement for 1300 years. Language Madagascar and culture derived from Indonesian origins although there is debate Afro Arab settlers inhabit the coasts before about how the first settlers came to the island and a precise settlement 1000 CE chronology has yet to be reliably established. 1000 CE “Slaves probably made an important part of the population of Madagascar as early as in the 10th century”. 1 1 (Regnier and Somda 2018) Year Event Context Landvoc metadata tags Madagascar has a fragmented population made up of 20 ethnic groups. The island was visited by Diaz Portuguese navigator in 1500 Figure 1: Encyclopaedia Britannica2 1600 to Portuguese navigators trade and raid Afro 1625 Arab coastal towns 1642 The French invade and establish Port Dauphin in the south-east which they maintain until 1674 1810 - 1861 Formation of the Kingdom of Madagascar In this period Andriana Merina expand their The economy of the Merina kingdom was dependent on domestic influence to control much of the island. slavery supplemented by the import of slaves from the African mainland.3 1810 Radama I rises to head what became known Radama 1 the Merina sovereign (1810-28) allied himself with the British as the Merina kingdom. governor of Mauritius. 2 (Kent 2020) 3 (Campbell 1981) Year Event Context Landvoc metadata tags 1820 British-Merina treaty of I820 in which Radama I signs the agreement with Farquhar the British governor – Radama I, the Merina sovereign, pledged to himself the owner of the largest slave run plantation in Mauritius. -
Essai D'analyse De La Crise De 2009-2011 À Mada
Université d’Antananarivo Faculté de Droit, d’Economie, de Gestion et de Sociologie Département de Sociologie LABORATOIRE III Recherche Interdisciplinaire en Politique, Gouvernance et Développement Mémoire de Maitrise ESSAI D’ANALYSE DE LA CRISE DE 2009- 2011 A MADAGASCAR Présenté par : RALAINONY Stéphane Richard Membres du jury Président : Mr ETIENNE Stefano Raherimalala, Maître de conférences Juge : Mr ANDRIAMAMPANDRY Todisoa, Maître de conférences Directeur de mémoire : Mr RASOLO André, Maître de conférences Date de soutenance : 11 Juillet 2012 Année Universitaire : 2010- 2011 1 “““ Ny olona mahay mihaino sady tsy miteny firy dia manmananganaangana hery lehibe sy afaka mamoaka hevihevi----dalinadalina »»» The person who listen carefully and who speak rarely that person build a great force and can expose an analysis ininin-in ---depthdepth Une personne qui sait écouter et qui parle rarement est une personne qui érige une grande force et capable d’exposer une analyse approfondie ... 2 Essai d’analyse de la crise de 2009-2011 à Madagascar 3 Remerciement Nous remercions les personnalités suivantes pour leurs partages d’expériences et de savoirs. Mr. Serge ZAFIMAHOVA Mr. Fetison RAKOTO ANDRIANIRINA Mr. Joseph RANDRIAMIARISOA Mr. Willy RAZAFINJATOVO Aux autres informateurs qui ont voulu gardé l’anonymat. Je tiens également à adresser ma profonde gratitude envers les membres du jury à savoir : Dr. Stefano Raherimalala ETIENNE, le président du jury Dr. Todisoa ANDRIAMAMPANDRY, le juge Dr. André RASOLO, notre directeur de mémoire Mes