POWERS fRUUGLES AND CONFLICT RECURRENCE: AN EXAMINATION OF

POIXI !CAL COMPETITION IN MADAGASCAR

By

Sawyer Lee Blazek

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ALL RIGHTS RESERVED POWER STRUGGLES AND CONFLICT RECURRENCE: AN EXAMINATION OF

POLITICAL COMPETITION JN MADAGASCAR

BY

SAWYER LEE BLAZEK

ABSTRACT

This study examines the extent to which political power struggles have an effect on the recunence of conflict in a state. l create a model to examine the process of a political power struggle for the legitimate control of a state to measure the impact of particular events on an actor's political support. I then conduct an inductive examination of variables in the Malagasy political environment that may contribute to the instigation and recunence of conflict. This research reviews several theories of conflict and development and proposes a theory of internal power dynamics that examines a series of sin!:,TUlar events and identifies a fom1 of cyclical conflict. Madagascar is employed as the case study. TABLE OF CONTENTS

ABSTRACT ...... i LIST OF FIGURES ...... v LIST OF TABLES ...... vi

Chapter 1. POWER STRUGGLES AND CONFLJCT RECURRENCE ...... ! 1.1 INTRODUCTION ...... I 1.2 RESEARCH QUESTION ...... 3 1.3 LITERATURE REVIEW ...... 3 1.3.1 Power...... 3 1.3 .2 Political Competition ...... 4 1.3.3 Political Power Struggles ...... 6 1.3.4 Competitive Control...... 11 1.3.5 Political Leadership ...... 12 1.3.6 Political Movement Management...... 14 1.3. 7 Resources ...... 15 1.3.8 Strategies and Tactics of Social and Political Resource Competition...... I 7 1.3.9 Conflict Entrepreneurship and Conflict Cycles ...... 20 1.4 OUTLINE ...... 22

2. RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY...... 23 2.1 INTRODUCTION ...... 23 2.2 RESEARCH OBJECTIVE ...... 23 2.3 SPECIFICATION OF THE VARIABLES ...... 24 2.3.1 Independent Variables ...... 24 2.3.2 Dependent Variables ...... 24 2.3.3 Controlled Variables ...... 25 2.4 CASE SELECTION ...... 26 2.5 CASE JUSTIFICATION ...... 27 2.5.1 The 2009 Malagasy Political Crisis ...... 28 2.5.2 Madagascar...... 39 2.6 RESEARCH DESIGN ...... 31 2.6.1 Phase One: Power Struggle Modeling ...... 31 2.6.2 Phase Two: Deductive and Inductive Examination ...... 33 2.7 DATA REQUIREMENTS AND COLLECTION ...... 35 2.7.1 Media Review ...... 35 2.7.2 Structured Open-Ended Interviews ...... 36

11 2.8 DESIGN JUSTIFICATION ...... 37 2.9 PRELIMINARY HYPOTHESIS ...... 38

3. A BRIEF HISTORY OF MALAGASY POLITICAL COMPETITION ...... 40 3.1 INTRODUCTION ...... 40 3.2 PHILIBERT TSlRANANA, 1960-1972 ...... 41 3.3 MILITARY TRANSITION 1972-1975 ...... 44 3.4 DIDIER RATSIRAKA, 1975-1992 ...... 45 3.5 ALBERT ZAFY, 1992-1996 ...... 48 3.6 DIDIER RATSIRAKA, 1996-2001 ...... 48 3.7 MARC RAVALOMANANA, 2001-2009 ...... 49 3.8 THE 2009 MALAGASY POLITICAL CRISIS ...... 52 3.8.1 The Causes ofConflict...... 52 3.8.2 November to December 2008 ...... 54 3.8.3 January, 2009 ...... 56 3.8.4 February, 2009 ...... 59 3.8.5 March, 2009 ...... 63 3.8.6 May 2009 to March 2011 ...... 67 3.9 CONCLUSION ...... 70

4. MODELING THE 2009 MALAGASY POLITICAL CRISIS ...... 72 4.1 INTRODUCTION ...... 72 4.2 HYPOTHESIS FORMULATION ...... 72 4.2.1 Preliminary Hypothesis ...... 73 4.3 MODELING THE 2009 MALAGASY POLITICAL CRISIS ...... 73 4.4 INITIAL OBSERVATIONS ...... 75 4.5 MEASUREMENT CONCERNS ...... 77 4.5.1 Margin ofError ...... 77 4.5.2 Qualitative Scoring ...... 78 4.5.3. Initial Scoring ...... 78 4.6 STRATEGIC AND TACTICAL OBSERVATJONS ...... 79 4.6.1 Action-Reaction ...... 80 4.6.2 Refom1-Rigidity ...... 81 4.6.3Inclusion-Exclusion ...... 82 4. 7 ANALYSIS OF EVENT IMP ACTS ...... 84 4. 7.1 Critical Events ...... 84 4.7.2 February 7, 2009 ...... 85 4.8 ANALYSIS OF ACTORS' ACTIONS ...... 86 4.8.1 Marc Ravalomanana ...... 86 4.8.2 Andry Rajoelina ...... 88 4.9 CONCLUSION ...... 91

111 5. EXAMINING THE MALAGASY POLITICAL ENVIRONMENT ...... 94 5.1 INTRODUCTION ...... 94 5.2 POLITICAL STRUCTURES ...... 95 5.2.1 ''Warlord Politics·· ...... 95 5.2.2 "The Men Behind the Curtains" ...... 95 5.2.3 Neopatrimonialism in Madagascar...... 97 5.3 POLITICAL NORMS ...... 102 5.3 .I Challenges to Institutional Development...... I 02 5.3.2 Political Divisiveness ...... 104 5.3.2.1 Ethnicity ...... 104 5.3.2.2 Biases in International Engagement...... 105 5.3.3 Opportunism ...... I 07 5.3.3.1 Conflict Entrepreneurship ...... I 07 5.3.3.2 111icit Trade Networks and Environmental Corruption ...... I 09 5.4 INTERNATIONAL ENGAGEMENT ...... 114 5.4.1 Economic Sanctions and the Problem of Leverage ...... 115 5.4.2 "The Principled vs. Pragmatic Approach" ...... 118 5.5 CONCLUSION ...... 122

6. CONCLUSION ...... 125 6.1 INTRODUCTION ...... 125 6.2 POWER STRUGGLES AND CONFLICT RECURRENCE ...... 125 6.2.1 Actor(s) Decide to Shift Power Distribution ...... 126 6.2.2 Destructive Political Power Struggle ...... 126 6.2.3 Conf1ict and Destabilization ...... 127 6.2.4 Power is Redistributed ...... 127 6.2.5 Reinforcement of Destructive Political Competition ...... 128 6.3 CONCLUSION AND THEORETICAL IMPLICATIONS ...... 129

APPENDICES ...... 131 A. DESCRIPTION OF QUESTIONNAIRE AND INTERVIEWS ...... 131 B. QUESTIONNAIRE (ENGLISH) ...... 132 C. QUESTIONNAIRE (FRENCH) ...... 133 D. LIST OF INTERVIEWS ...... 134

BIBLIOGRAPHY ...... I35

lV LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS

FIGURES

Figure I. Scale of Political Competition ...... 5

Figure 2. Cumulative Impact of Events During a Political Power Struggle ...... 9

Figure 3. Frequency of Coups in Fon11er European Colonies (Sub-Saharan Afi·ica) ...... 31

Figure 4. The Cycle of Political Power Struggles and Recurrence of Conflict...... 39

Fih:rure 5. Preliminary H ypothcsis of the 2009 Malagasy Political Crisis ...... 73

Fih:rure 6. Absolute Gains and Losses of Political Support During the 2009 Malagasy Political Crisis ...... 76

Figure 7. Cumulative Gains and Losses of Political Support During the 2009 Malagasy Political Crisis ...... 76

Figure 8. Cumulative Gains and Losses of Political Support During the 2009 Malagasy Political Crisis (Li and Ci Only) ...... 78

Figure 9. Cumulative Gains and Losses of Political Support During the 2009 Malagasy Political Crisis (Ravalomanana Initial Score=5) ...... 79

v LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS

TABLES

Table 1. Index of Events of the 2009 Malagasy Political Crisis ...... 74

Vl I.

POWER STRUGGLES AND CONFLICT RECURRENCE: AN EXAMJNATION OF

POLITICAL COMPETITION IN MADAGASCAR

"The aim of every revolutionary struggle in the world is the seizure and consolidation of political power." Mao Tse-tung. 1

1.1 INTRODUCTION

The linkages between security and development have increasingly become a singular field of study in recent years? The co-constitutive roles and development of rule of law, human rights, good govemance, political competition, consensus-building, and civil society have been identified as key components to stable and sustainable state development. 3 However, as is certainly now apparent, state development, particularly democratization, is a very dangerous and sensitive process that can all too often lead to

1 Quoted by Lin Piao in "Speech at Peking Rally Commemorating the 50' 11 Anniversary of the October Revolution," New China Ne1Vs Agency, November 6, 1967.

2 See, for example, Tschirgi, Nechi, MichaelS. Lund and Francesco Mancini. Security & Development: Searching for Critical Connections. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers. 2010.

3 Identified by U.S. Agency for International Development as core elements of governance development assistance and programming. See also; Snyder, .lack. From Voting to Violence. New York, NY: W.W. Norton. 2000; Reilly, Benjamin and Per Nordlund, eds. Political Parties in Conflict-Prone Societies. Tokyo: United Nations University. 2008; Lyons, Terrence. Demilitarizing Politics: Elections on the Uncertain Road to Peace. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers. 2005. 2

violent conflict and state fragility. 4 Developing states are subject to powerful and often subversive forces from inside and outside their borders.

Francis Fukuyama argues that current methods of state-building focus on strategies of decentralization in which the scope of the state's management and control is decreased as industries and sectors privatize. 5 However, this often inadvertently decreases the state's capacity, or strength. in the process, weakening institutions and state security. 6

Charles Call has also argued that capacity, legitimacy, and security gaps in weak states can cause cross-sector deficiency, inducing state weakness, even failure. 7 If the state is unable to provide the basic needs and services to its people, conflict and opposition can arise in anger and frustration, with caBs for new fom1s of leadership, management, and development. x In some cases, this triggers the necessary social movement that motivates popular parhcipation in governance and helps to reform autocratic or authoritarian regimes. However, what may seem to be a social movement may instead be a political manipulation by actors competing for political power. When actors employ destructive and destabilizing methods of political competition, states can fall victim to recutTing

4 de Zeeuw, Jeroen and Krishna Kumar, eds. Promoting Democracv in Po.\tconflict Societie5. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers. 2006. 5 I would like to note that, at least recently, this type of state-building i~ far more apparent in states that have historically experienced some degree of centrality or central authority. It should be understood that federations, decentralized states, centralized states, and states that were never centralized are all very different types of states that do not experience the same forms of development or, for that matter, decentralization.

6 Fukuyama, Francis. State-Building: Governance and World Order in the 21.\t Century. Ithaca. NY: Cornell University Press. 2004.

7 Call, Charles. "Beyond the 'failed state': Toward conceptual alternatives." European Journal of International Relations,frJrthcoming paper. 2010.

8 O'Neill, Bard. Insurgency & Terrorism: From Revolution to Apocalypse, 2nd Edition. Potomac Books: Dulles, VA. 2005. p. 82 .., .)

conflict each time actors compete. This study will examine the effects of political power struggles in Madagascar over the legitimate control of a state to examine how contentious political competition leads to recurring conflict, destabilization, and institutional weakness.

1.2 RESEARCH QUESTION

What strategies and tactics do actors employ in Madagascar during a political power struggle that causes conflict and destabilization to occur? How do pohtical power struggles affect the recurrence of conflict in the state? These questions will help students and scholars of international affairs better understand the dynamics of state development as well as how internal and external forces can influence the process.

1.3 LITERATURE REVIEW

This study draws trom literature on political power and the use of violent and non-violent action as a political technique. From the literature, l examine several concepts and place this study within the cunent literature on political competition and power struggles. 1 then establish a working definition of a political power struggle that will be employed to examine the actions of two actors competing over the legitimate control of a state. To begin, I first develop an understanding of power.

1.3.1 Power

Power IS a defining aspect of politics. Understanding the vanous power relationships and interactions has been the subject of social inquiry for centuries. In

Politics, Aristotle discussed justice, order, liberty, riches, and the distribution of political power within and among the various constitutions of city-states. He defined political 4

structures as constitutions on the basis of power distribution, establishing a matrix of governmental structures ranging from ··just"" to "perverted·· depending on the style of rule. 9

Michael Barnett and Raymond Duvall define power in international politics as

"the production, in and through social relations, of effects that shape the capacities of actors to determine their circumstances and fate." 10 Thus, power is a polymorphous concept that exists in multiple dimensions of governance and on multiple levels of political affairs.

Within states, political systems function in a similar manner. The political system itself does not possess any inherent power; rather. power is distributed among the component actors. These actors may employ this power to alter the direction of state development or may use it for self-enrichment and personal gain. In some cases, opposition may arise as actors compete for political power.

1.3.2 Political Competition

Political competition appears in a variety of fonns. In The Logic of Violence in

Civil War, Stathis Kalyvas differentiates between "peaceful" political competition and armed combat (i.e. regular politics and civil wars). 11 This is congruent with Mao Tse- tung's philosophy, when he \vrote that ·'politics is war '''ithout bloodshed while war is

9 Aristotle, Trevor J Saunders (ed.) and T. A. Sinclair (trans!.). The PolitiC!,. New York: Penguin Classics. 1981.

10 Barnett, Michael and Raymond Duvall. "Power in International Politics," International Organization, 59(1): 39-75. 2005. p. 39

11 Kalyvas, Stathis N. The Logic of Violence in Civil War. Cambridge University Press: New York. 2006. p.38 5

politics with bloodshed:· 12 Charles Tilly also notes that war and peace share mechanisms. 13 However, fanning and expressing political preferences during war involves more constraints, less consent, and higher stakes for the actors involved. 14 This divides political competition along a scale from non-violent. ··normal .. political competition to polarized, violent competition for power. In between this dichotomy is a category of "contentious politics·' that disturb nom1al political activity. 1~ This middle ground is where we find political crises, manifested in violent and non-violent actions that include terrorism, protests, social movements, insurrections and revolutions (See

Figure 1).

War r Conten!ious Politics Poht1cs .. Figure 1. Scale of Political Competition

Contentious politics are the unpredictable stalemates that stand uncertainly, waiting to either retum to political normalcy or for an otl:en catalytic event that pushes actors into violent combat. Alvin So identified that certain class struggles may alter movements, particularly political processes. 16 Mao's Cultural Revolution in 1967 that

12 Shaw, Bruno. Selections from Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung. In Sam C. Sarkes1an (ed.). Revolutionary Guerrilla Warfare, Ch1cago: Precedent Publishmg. 1975. pp. 223-224

11 Tilly, Charles. Politics of Collective Violence. Cambridge: Cambndge Umversity Press. 2003.

14 Kalyvas, Stathis N. The Logic of Violence zn Civzl War. Cambridge Umversity Pret>s: New York. 2006.p.38

15 For more infom1ation on contentious politics, see Tarrow, Sidney. PolVer in Movement: Social Movements, Collective Action and Politics. Cambridge: Cambridge Umvers1ty Press. 1994; Tilly, Charles. Contentious Performances. New York: Cambridge University Press. 2008.

16 So, Alvin Y. "Class Struggle Analysis: A Critique of Class Structure Analysis," Sociologzcal Perspectzves, 34(1): 39-59. 1991. 6

began a period of nation-wide violence and disorder has been seen by some as merely a

"question of political power" that was, at the core, a battle over the structure of power and who controlled it. 17 Consequently, these events are opportunities to b1ing about revolutionary reform and develop sustainable resolutions between actors as much as they are opportunities for conflict to escalate into violent and destructive civil war. It is in this middle ground where this study will focus its examination of political competition.

1.3.3 Political Power Struggles

Missing in the literature IS an adequate definition of what a power struggle actually is. We see the term ''power struggles·' employed nearly every day. but each time with seemingly different implications. The Persian Gulf power struggle centralizes on

1 Iran's desire to usurp the United States' influence in the oil-rich region. R The Egyptian

Revolution of 201 1 began as protests over poverty, unemployment, government corruption and autocratic governance and erupted into a power struggle between the "old guard" and a collective group of opposition forces. A power struggle in 2011 erupted in

Wisconsin between the government and union groups over the right to organize for collective bargaining. 19 These three examples (supra-national, national, and subnational respectively) also denote that ''power struggles" can occur on several levels of political

17 Bridgham, Philip. "Mao's Cultural Revolution: The Struggle to Consolidate Power," 7he Chma Quarter~v, 41:1-25. 1970; Bridgham, Philip. "Mao's Culh1ral Revolution in 1967: The Struggle to Seize Power," The China Quarterly, 34:6-37. 1968.

18 "Bahrain key toPers ian Gulf power struggle,'· United Press International. March 3, 2011. [http://www .upi.com/Top_ News/SpeciaV20 11/03/03/Bahrain-key-to-Persian-Gu If-power-struggle/UP I- 10891299173843/] (accessed March 10, 2011) 19 Taranto, James. "1l1e Means ofCoersion: The Privileged are revolting in Wisconsin,"' The Wall Street Journal, February 22,2011. 7

interaction, for a variety of reasons, and are intended to achieve oftentimes very different goals. What is needed. then, is a concise definition of what exactly a "'power struggle .. is and how it can affect a political system, particularly in weak states where power is often stiJJ higl1ly centralized under a single leader.

Graham Harrison describes a struggle as "a process, a result of mobilization provoked hy some form of resistance." 20 Both the actors involved in political power struggles and the struggles themselves can differ along lines of socioeconomic status or class. For example, an elite struggle may be associated with a struggle for spoils 21 while a struggle of the masses may be associated with the rights, liberties, or opportunities available to a group. More importantly, this definition identifies power struggles as both offensive and defensive actions. In one case, a power struggle may result from an action stimulated by an opportunity to make gains or to take revenge from disenfranchisement; in another case, it may also result from an incentive to consolidate power and prevent others from infiltrating a patronage system or current government structure. Such a process can occur between two or more individuals or groups and on varying levels of interaction and engagement. However, this definition does not identify why the power struggle occurs.

To include the focal point of the power struggle, I put forth the following definition: a political power struggle is a process by which two or more groups compete

20 Harrison, Graham. "Bringing Political Struggle Back in: African Politics, Power & Resistance," Review of African Political Economy, 89: 387-402. 2001. p. 387

21 Szeftel, Morris. "Corruption and the Spoils System in Zambia," in Clark, Michael. Corruption: Causes, Consequences and Control. Frances Pinter: London. 1983. pp. 163-189. 8

over legitimate access to or control of a set of resources. The resources that actors compete for can be any unit two or more groups desire or derive some degree of power from. For example, a struggle could be over students' rights at a university, greater fi·eedoms and privacy from the government, the leadership of a country, natural resources, or territory.

This definition creates a dynamic concept of a power struggle that allows differentiation by context, what is at stake, why it started, who is involved, the degree of violence, the degree of action, the time it takes, the modality, and the degree of legality.

Power struggles can often be invisible, hidden "behind closed doors" or legal documentation. lt is usually the ignition of the struggle and the resistant violence that we observe on the streets. The rest of the power struggle is nuanced and covert as support groups shift and economic controls are manipulated.

A power struggle is not a singular event but a process; it is a combination of a series of events, each of which may increase or decrease the influence and control of the individuals and groups involved. Each event does not occur in a vacuum; instead, events occur over a chronological timeline, continually accumulating impact of each event relative to prior events (See Figure 2). In this example, Actor A is continually negatively affected by the events of the power struggle until event 5 and 6, from which he profits; whereas Actor B is positively affected by the events of the power struggle until event 4, at which point he is negatively affected by the subsequent events, diminishing the support and control he had gained. 9

I u "'Q_ ~~Actor A E =~ActorB c 2 3 4 5 6 Q) \l'" > ll.]

~ '--''

Fvent Numbe1

Fzgure 2. Cumulative imp[/( t of E~·ents Dzmng a Political PoHer Struggle

In general, the events of a power struggle are lmked for two additional reasons. 22

First, the actors involved remain constant. On an individual level, the effects of the actors' actions cumulate as they formulate new actron hased on prior action. Second, the asset actors compete for usually remains constant. When 1t does not, it may indicate that the identified asset is part of a subcategory of the actual asset actors desire. For example, when two warring parties compete over control of City A and then switch their battle to

City B, it is not because the desired asset has switched. It is because control of the strategic territory of City B and its resources is more desirable than City A's. Thus. the p1imary asset desired is the control of strategic territory, not a particular city. This example also highlights the importance of recognizing the level of analysis undertaken.

In the case of Madagascar, the 2009 political crisis was a political power struggle over the legitimate control of the state. The series of events occurred as a result of this

22 The~e two reasons do not necessarily apply m every case However, when they do, they further strengthen the lmkages between events. 10

competition and accumulate along a linear chronological path. While the process may sometimes decline in visibility, the struggle is continuous. similar to a game of tug-of- war. Each side's strength or torce employed may decline at times, but the struggle is not over until one side wins or a resolution is a,greed upon by both sides.

The cumulative effect of the power struggle also suggests that it is a dynamic process as each new event is shaped by previous events. Similar to Stathis Kalyvas' work on the logic of violence in civil wars, observing power struggles as a dynamic process

"allows an investigation of the sequence of decisions and events that intersect...as well as the study of otherwise invisible actors who partake in this process and shape it in fundamental ways. "23

Different from genocides, total wars, and ethnic cleansings where surrendering or switching sides is not necessarily an option, 24 this study assumes that at least one actor intends to govern or rely on support groups for power rather than exterminate or deport them. This turns the situation into a process by which competing actors must calculate their actions and adopt a strategy that assumes support groups have the opportunity to shift their support and resources to competing actors.

Examining a power struggle in this way helps to identify the primary actors and determine the type of power struggle that occuned: elite, struggle of the masses, international, national, subnational, etcetera.

23 Kalyvas, Stathis N. The Logic of Violence in Civil War. New York: Cambridge University Press. 2006. p.22

24 Fein, Helen. Genocide: A Sociological Per~pective. London: Sage. 1993. 1 1

1.3.4 Competitive Control

The outcome of a power struggle rests on the actors involved and the power they control. Access to resources become critical for garnering suppoti. Kalyvas underlines control, primarily in military resources, as a decisive factor affecting the population's tendency to collaborate with a political actor during civil war. 25 David Snyder and

Charles Tilly examined fluctuations in year-to-year violence in France between 1830 and

1960 and found that violence was often a byproduct of power struggles over resources where one group laid claim to a resource and at least one other ,group could resist their claim.26

William Reno notes that political actors, specifically rulers of weak states, calculate their interests and make decisions based on strategies for maximizing power. He argues,

"rulers of the institutionally weakest states. which face the most severe threats from strongmen and the most intense pressures from outs1dcrs. are the most consistent and thorough m destroying remaming fonnal state institutions~the very tools advocates of refonn regard as the key to regime capabilities.-· 27

Missing in his examination is any discussion on leadership transitions and how power shifts from one leader to the next. Leaders do not stay in power indefinitely. In fact, since Reno's analysis in 1998, several of the case studies he employed have experienced

25 Kalyvas, Stathis N. The Logic of Violence in Civil War. New York: Cambridge University Press. 2006. p. 111

26 Snyder, David and Charles Tilly. "Hardship and Collective Violence in France. 1830 to 1960," American Sociological Review, 37(5): 520-532. 1972.

27 Reno, William. Warlord Politics and African States. Lynne Rienner: Boulder. 1998. p. 7 12

leadership transitions, but we can find no explanations for how or why these occuned or what implications they might have beyond his study of how the actors will try to maintain power.

To fill this gap, David Kilcullen puts forth the theory of competitive control:

--Jn irregular connicts (i.e con1licts in which at least one warring party is a nonstatc am1ed actor). the local armed actor that a g1ven population perceives as most able to establish a nonnative system for resilient. full-spectrum control over violence, economic activity, and human security IS most likely to prevail within that population·s residential area.''n

Though this theory derives from counterinsurgency strategy, there are striking similarities between competitive control theory and our definition of political power struggles, primarily because our definition places insurgencies and counterinsurgencies as a subcategory of power struggles floating within the reabn between war and contentious politics. This theory also bridges an important link between the underlying strategic and tactical concepts of insurgencies and counterinsurgencies and the dynamics of violent and non-violent action and social movements. As a population protests, the opposition attempts to achieve the same goals as an insurgent who seeks to gain legitimate political authority over a specified resource (e.g. territory). Thus the dynamics of the two competitions are the same: sell yourself as the ''better" candidate for control in order to gain support.

1.3.5 Political Leadership

28 Kilcullen, David J. Counterinsurgency. New York: Oxford University Press. 2010. p. 152 13

Leadership is the "process of social influence in which one person can enlist the aid and support of others in the accomplishment of a common task." 29 The use of emotions by the leader and the vision he or she can create are key components. For example, placing an assertive, charismatic leader at the forefront of a movement can oftentimes taster popular support during political movements. 30 Historical examples include Mao Tse-tung, Vlademir Lenin, Che Guevara, and Osama bin Laden. These leaders are the individuals who iterate the movement's eso- and exoteric appeals to the masses to achieve greater support. As exemplified by the Dalai Lama and Mahatma

Ghandi, violence may be a sufficient means for garnering support, but it is not necessary.

Max Weber distinguished among three types of leadership: charismatic authority, traditional authority, and rational-legal authority. 31 For Weber, authority is power accepted as legitimate by those subjected to it. In the case of these typologies, Weber argues that such authority develops in a hierarchical manner from charismatic authority, through the strength of personality and chann, to traditional authority, through tradition and customs, to legal authority, whereby a leader can exert power by virtue of the legal office they hold. Thus, for a government and opposition leader alike, charisma is a highly valuable trait, particularly at the outset of a power struggle.

29 Chemers, Martin M. An Integrative Theory of Leadership. Psychology Press: London, UK. 1997. p. I

30 O'Neill, Bard. Insurgency & Terrorism: From Revolution to Apocalypse, 2"d Edition. Potomac Books: Dulles, VA 2005. p. 98

31 Weber, Max. The Theory ofSocial and Economic Organization. New York: The Free Press. 1974. 14

The ability to articulate strong, attractive ideas, convey these ideas to others, and generate a critical mass of support, is crucial. In high anxiety situations, people often prefer to be told what to do rather than make a decision for themselves. Therefore, leaders who can be persuasive (via intimidation or eloquence), lead by example, motivate, and have a commanding presence, will be the individuals who direct and command the rest of the population. During political movements, a leader who is more effective at managing these factors and forces will be the one to successfully generates the critical mass of support.

Leadership does not drastically differ regardless of which side of a political movement a leader directs. How a leader engages his support groups is the same whether he is a government or opposition leader. Differences between a government and an opposition derive from the assets at the disposal of each group. For a president or prime minister, the institutional and legal framework of the state, however weak it may be, offers a greater authority and legitimacy against competing leaders. However, state officials also have a greater responsibility. 1f a leader abuses or does not manage resources responsibly, he can lose key support groups. Assets alone do not always detennine the outcome; they are contingent upon effective leadership and management.

1.3.6 Political Movement Management

Management is the art of bringing people together to accomplish a desired goal or objective.32 It includes planning, organizing, leading, coordinating, controlling, staffing,

32 Barrett, Richard. Vocational Business: Training, Developing and Motivating People. Nelson Thomes: Gloucester, UK. 2003. p. 5 15

and motivating. 33 The management of a political movement is the most important component in achieving a movement's goal while the choice of leadership is the most important factor in creating a movement's support.

It should be understood that leadership and management of support are not necessarily undertaken by the same individual or group. Leadership and management can be divided between those in the spotlight and those "behind the cu1iains" who manage operations outside of public view. Such a division often leads to the identification of the leader as a "puppet" who is only the face of a group, while another individual or group coordinates the actual machinery of operations.

In many cases, leaders are the individuals who attempt to instigate a reaction from their opponent. For instance, a president may try to initiate dialogue with an opposition leader while an opposition leader may try to cause the president to respond and act irrationally. In this case, the president attempts to show the population that compromise is possible, retonn can occur, and conflict can be mitigated, while the opposition attempts to show that the division between the state's leadership and the population is growing and new leadership is needed. In both instances, calculated action and reaction are key to success.

1.3.7 Resources and Political Support

The resources available to political actors can be divided into four categories: military, political, economic, and social. Military resources can refer to both anns and

33 Fayol, Henri. Administration industrielle et generate: prevoyance, organization, commandement, coordination, contra/e. Paris: Dunod. 1966. 16

combatants. Economic resources support the political and social forces that are used to define and drive a govemment or movement. Political and social forces include concepts like ideas, values, and propaganda. 34 These resources are not to be considered of equal imp01iance in every situation, though control of one resource can strengthen the importance of control of another. In weak states, an actor who controls the military can often to control the government and population. At the same time, if an opposition group contro Is sufficient economic and social resources, the military may defect from the government, depriving a government of its military resources and severely weakening its political resources. In effect, this conceptualization creates an illustration of mutually reinforcing resource control.

Because of this, an actor involved in a power struggle is highly sensitive to military, political, economic, and social pressures. For example, if a country· s political structure does not reflect the values of its society, the seeds of a new social movement, be it violent or non-violent, may exist. Such a scenario would be desirable for an opposition movement to exploit and dangerous for a government to ignore. For this study, I will focus on political and social resources but identify the importance of economic and military resources where appropriate. This scope limitation is justified by the fact that I am seeking to differentiate between social movements and elite power struggles.

3 ~ See Merom, Gil. How Democracies Lose Small Wars: State, Society, and the Failures of France in Algeria, Israel in Lebanon, and the United States in Vietnam. Cambridge University Press: New York, NY. 2003; O'Neill, Bard. Insurgency & Terrorism: From Revolution to Apocalypse, 2'Jd Edition. Potomac Books: Dulles, VA. 2005. p. 97-98; Tse-tung, Mao. On Guerrilla Warfare. Trans. Samuel B. Griffith. University of Illinois Press: Chicago, IL. 2000. pp. 12-19 17

Therefore. a greater emphasis on the particular political actors and the population's involvement in the political competitions is warranted.

1.3.8 Strategies and Tactics of Social and Political Resource Competition

Social resources can be manipulated by leaders to gain popular support through both nuanced strategies and direct action. As previously mentioned, the charismatic attractiveness of a leader is a relatively common force used by many movements, especially in the Middle East and Africa where heroic leadership is often highly valued. 35

In places where you have fewer and weaker institutionalized ways to gain legitimacy, charisma will be more salient. In addition, tenorism can be used when esoteric and exoteric appeals do not yield the expected support. 36 In either case, the goal is to obtain popular support by demonstrating the government's weaknesses in the face of opposition initiatives. However, branding an opponent as a terrorist can also be used as propaganda, painting an opponent as inhumane or extremist. For example, an insurgent group or political movement may claim that the government leader is a terrorist because of a certain course of action taken to quell an uprising and control the people. Regardless of the !abe r s accuracy, a statement like this can significantly depreciate the legitimacy of a government leader.

An actor· s capacity to provoke his opponent to overreact is also a powerful yet complex tactic that can dramatically shift support. It is a strategy that seeks to separate an

5 ' O'Neill, Bard. Jmurgency & Terrorism: From Revolution to Apocalypse, 2nd Edition. Potomac Books: Dulles, VA. 2005. p. 98

6 ' ibid., p. 79 18

opponent from potential support t,'roups. 37 However. if the compctitor·s own actions are perceived to be excessive, this strategy may not be effective. Additionally, sometimes collective punishments lead to more support of rebellion than would otherwise naturally occur. In either case, instigating oven-caction is a tactic that can be employed by either side; an opposition leader can provoke a government leader to overreact and take harsh steps to suppress a movement, or a government leader can provoke an opposition leader to make outrageous claims, or follow an ineffective policy path that delegitimizes the movement at large. For example, actions like indiscriminate or excessive violence can also be powerful tools to shift suppmi to an enemy. Individuals or groups who have lost friends, relatives, or parents can very quickly become strong supporters of a particular side of a dispute.

A competitor·s ability to demonstrate potency is also a critical factor in assessing success. For an opposition, this can include the ability to meet the needs of the people through an administrative apparatus such as a shadow government that provides services to the people like schools, health clinics 1 ~, or at the very least, hope. For a government, this can include the ability to address the people, defend the state, refonn the current institutions in place, and properly react to popular interest. While these qualities may also refer to entire groups and institutions, there is a greater degree of personalization of such concepts in weak states. As such, these actions often exemplify the individualized actions of a leader rather than the entirety of the group. One reason this occurs is because

37 ibid., p. 80

18 ibid., p. 82 19

countries with powerful patronage networks and a centralized government generally experience agt:,)}"essive competition as politicians compete over the presidency in order to mamtam. . power an d contro I. 39

Coercion on behalf of an opposition leader can be rather ineffective, particularly against a repressive incumbent. It creates a situation where the population must essentially decide between the "lesser of two evils", as both groups have negative qualities and the desire to uplift the current regime may decrease relative to the fear that the new regime or any form of change may be even more repressive. In addition, if one of the competitors is a state competing against a nonstatc actor, the nonstate actor is immediately at a disadvantage. This is because states, by definition, maintain a monopoly over the legitimate use of violence and may use this asset against a violent opponent. 40

Coercion is not used as propaganda but one party" s coercive measures could be used against it in the propaganda of the other. This method is particularly useful during social movements and by those engaged in non-violent action. For an opposition leader, this may include claiming that the current president is a dictator who represses the people or staging peaceful protests and deliberately instigating harsh government repression. For a government leader, this may include labeling the opposition as terrorists and showing the extremist methods and radicalism that an opposition group employs to achieve political change. In both cases, it is both a contest of ideas and actions.

19 Callaghy, Thomas. The State-Society Struggle: Zaire in Comparative Perspective. New York: Columbia University Press. I 984.

40 Weber, Max. The Theory ofSocial and Economic Organization. New York: TI1e Free Press. 1997. p. 154 20

1.3. 9 Conflict Entrepreneurship and Conflict Cycles

Espen Barth Eide examined ethno-politics and conflict ignition arguing that civil wars, among other forms of conflict, are not some tonn of "ancient hatred·· but instead

''the end product of deliberate, manipulative activities conducted by political actors for specific purposes."' 41 Actors find opportunity in employing destabilizing and destructive methods of political competition to acquire particular resources. However, political struggles also play a key role in the processes of political change in Sub-Saharan

Africa. 42 Consequently, socioeconomic conditions are altered by a cause-effect relationship with sociopolitical events. This is one reason why the patronage systems, or

"warlord politics", described by William Reno have been so prevalent in African political systems, as well as so destructive. 43 Reno also notes the imp01iance of individualism by arguing that political authority and command over resources derive trom the specific and personal interests of individuals, usually without regard for government institutions, rules or processes. 44 In effect, "less government has contributed not to better government but rather to warlord politics. "45

41 Eide, Espen Bart."' Conflict Entrepreneurship.: On the· A11' of Waging Civil War,'· PRIG Report,4.1997.pp.41

~ 2 Harrison, Graham. "Bringing Political Struggle Back in: African Politics, Power & Resistance," Review of African Political Economy, 28(89): 387-402. 2001.

41 Reno, William. Warlord Politics and African States. Lynne Rienner: Boulder. 1998.

44 ibid., p. IX

45 ibid., p. 1 21

With power often heavily centralized in weak states, political competition can easily become contentious as actors risk more for a greater reward. In the Ivory Coast, the power struggle between Laurent Gbagbo and Alasanne Ouattara over the 20 I 0 presidential elections put the country again on the brink of civil war and illustrates the tendency of actors to reuse destabilizing and destructive tactics and strategies during power struggles. Kalyvas· examination of violence in civil wars found that "civil wars have a sticky quality: they arc notorious for being a past that won't go away''. 46

Oftentimes, this is due to underlying political implications. 47 Without a desire to initiate proper institutional refom1, these destructive tactics and strategies will only continue to be employed as actors continue to compete for political power.

Power struggles and other political conflicts are deeply entrenched in the historical context of a country or a case. They affect the specific actors, the population, and the international community in a number of ways. The perceptions of those involved shape the normative behavior individuals and groups employ to formulate actions and decisions with regard to the conduct of politics within the country. In this way, destabilizing and destructive actions can reinforce social norms about degenerative political action just as much as they can reinforce developmental action. As actors see the benefit of destabilizing action, the normative value of such action is reinforced and reused in the future, creating cyclical phases of conflict each new time actors compete for

46 Kalyvas, Stathis N. The Logic of Violence in Civil War. Cambridge University Press: New York. 2006.p.35

47 Rohde, David. 2001. Warehouse of Death. New York Times Magazine, March 11, 1946. 22

a resource. Though these political competitions are not necessarily violent in nature, they can still have destructive social, economic and political effects.

1.5 OUTLINE

With key concepts and tenns defined and the literature examined, Chapter Two will provide a description of the methodology, and research design of the study. Chapter

Three provides a brief history ofleadership and political competition in Madagascar since independence followed by a narrative of the events of the 2009 political crisis. In Chapter

Four, I create a model to examine the events of the 2009 Malagasy political crisis, identify strategies and tactics employed by the actors involved, and assess effectiveness.

Chapter Five examines norms of political competition in Madagascar to try to understand why conflict recurs. Chapter Six concludes with a reexamination of the strength of the hypothesis and a discussion of theoretical implications. 2.

METHODOLOGY AND RESEARCH DESIGN

2.1 INTRODUCTION

Paul Collier and others have made strong cases for why conflict is ''sticky'' and underdeveloped countries can often become stuck in cycles of conflict. 1 Their arguments derive from both large-N quantitative analyses, which can often miss critical factors within particular cases, and emphasizing the economic conditions as the only causal variables. However, some variables derive from conditions that are not as easily quantifiable. In these cases, failing to properly examine these variables can inaccurately conceptualize the core problems residing within some conflicts and concepts. To better understand the underlying factors that may cause conflict recunence, I argue that a qualitative examination of power struggles and the sociopolitical structure of the case experiencing these power struggles is required.

2.2 RESEARCH OBJECTIVE

This study has drawn from literature on violent and non-violent action as a political technique to create a working definition of a political power struggle. I now

1 See Collier, Paul and Anke BoeHler. "Greed and Grievance in Civil War," Oxford Economic Papers, 50(4): 563-595. 2004; Collier, Paul Anke Hoeffler and Dominic Rohmer. "Beyond Greed and Grievance: Feasibility and Civil War." Oxford Economic Papers, 61(1): 1-27. 2009; Collier, Paul. The Bottom Billion: Why the Poorest Countries Are Failing and What Can Be Done About It. New York: Oxford University Press. 2007; and Fearon, James D. and David D Laitin. "Ethnic1ty, Insurgency, and Civil War," American Political Science Review, 97: 75-90. 2003. 23 24

employ this concept to create a model for understanding the pmiicular dynamics of a power struggle through an examination of the 2009 Malagasy political crisis. Through this examination, I will analyze the effectiveness of strategies and tactics employed by competing actors. This will be measured by examining fluctuations in the actors' political supp01i during the power struggle.

The examination then takes a heuristic approach and draws from interviews conducted in Madagascar between November 2010 and January 2011 to identify political and social norms in Madagascar. I examine how these variables influence and affect political processes and the sociopolitical structure of Madagascar to provide a lens through which we can better understand why the events of 2009 occurred and why

Madagascar experiences recurring conflict.

It is hoped that this examination will extend the scope of our understanding of the connections between conflict and development through understanding one type of conflict- and instability-inducing event that continues to plague state development.

2.3 SPECIFICATION OF VARIABLES

2.3.1 Independent Variables

Political Power Struggles. The impact of contentious political competition on the frequency of conflict in a state is a central focus of this study. As such, I will examine the strategies, tactics, and effects of political power struggles on two separate dependent variables . The type of power struggle employed is a political power struggle over the legitimate political control of a state.

2.3.2 Dependent Variables 25

Political Support. Maintaining a stable political structure is contingent upon the support of those that reside within the system. During a power struggle, an actor's success or failure is detcnnined by the degree of control and support they gain or lose. The first phase of this study will examine how the linear series of events of a political power struggle atTect the political support of competing actors.

Political Norms. Norms are deeply rooted within the historical context of a case. They are affected by the actions of actors that shape a country's political structure. In the second phase of this study, I will examine how political power struggles affect social norms in an attempt to understand why the case study experiences recurring conflict.

2.3.3 Controlled Variables

Political Actors. Each actor m a phenomenon, particularly when that actor is an individual or a pm1icular group, brings their own unique style method of engagement into the case. For this reason, 1 will hold constant the actors involved for the first phase of the study. Examining a power struggle where the actors continually change introduces variables that extend beyond the scope of this study.

During the second phase of the study, the analysis does not focus on particular actors, rather the evolution of social norms and, as such, political actors will not be a controlled variable.

Desired Resource. This study focuses on the dynamics of a power struggle rather than the strategic objectives of one. In other studies, it would be useful to examine how actors shift competition from one resource to another (e.g. from competing over control of City

A to control of City B). However, examining the strategic value of such targets is beyond 26

the scope of this study and. as such, the target resource that opponents are competing over will be held constant: the leadership and control of the country.

2.4 CASE SELECTION

For this examination, I have selected Madagascar as my case study. Madagascar will be examined in two ways. In the first phase of this study I examine the events of the political crisis between November 2008 and May 2009 and the political power struggle between President March Ravalomanana and Mayor Andry Rajoelina. I have selected these dates for several reasons. During the interview process, the first event respondents attributed to the political crisis was usually in November 2008. This coincides with media coverage of Madagascar and several others that have written about the crisis. 2 Some respondents noted that it is necessary to look back to the mayoral election of Andry

Rajoelina in 2007 to fully understand what happened. While l acknowledge that this event may have contributed to the tension between Rajoelina and the former President

Marc Ravalomanana, it did not inunediately erupt into a destabilizing opposition movement. Therefore, events prior to November 2008 are noted for their significance in the buildup to the crisis, but are not considered part of the tirneline. The same holds true for events after May 2009. While the crisis continued, country leadership changed when a coup d'etat in March 2009 occurred. Several events after the coup are included as they relate to the initial power struggle between the government and opposition but the effect

2 See, for example, Urfer, Sylvan. La Cris et le Rebond: Apres 50 ans d'independance malgache. 2"ct Edition. Antananarivo: Foi et Justice. 2010. 27

of the leadership change consequently shitted the dynamics of the power struggle. Thus, I do not include subsequent events that are not linked to the initial dual-actor competition.

In fact. the differences before and after the March 2009 coup d"etat have led some experts to divide the Malagasy political crisis into two separate crises: one comprised of the events prior to the coup and the competition between government and opposition forces; and one of the events after the coup. comprised of the new regime's crisis of legitimacy, economic collapse, and political instability. The significant difference between the two necessitates separate analyses of each. In addition, the dynamics of the second crisis do not possess the same dual-actor competition that phase one of this study seeks to examine.

In the second phase of the study I examine Madagascar's sociopolitical structure m connection with the 2009 political crisis and other destabilizing events that have occurred either before or after. This will be done through a heuristic examination of social norms to better understand how political preferences and behavior are formulated.

This examination aims to identify nonnative structures that may help to explain why

Madagascar experiences recurring conflict.

2.5 CASE JUSTIFICATION

This study's usefulness extends beyond the selected case study. The conclusions provided have implications for similar events that have recently occurred in other countries. 3 The Madagascar case offers insight into several common trends that exist in

1 Examples include the power struggle between Laurent Gbagbo and Alassane Ouattara during the disputed Ivorian presidential election of 2010, the struggle between President Kurmanbek Bakiyev and opposition groups during the 2010 Kyrgyzstani uprising, and the 2000 Ecuadorean coup d'etat that replaced 28

many developing countries. Madagascar's coup c.f etat came at a time when several other

4 countries had also recently experienced similar coups and coup attcmpts • raising fear in the international community that a resurgence of unconstitutional regime changes were sweepmg. across wea k states. 5

2.5.1 The 2009 Malagasy Political Crisis

The 2009 political crisis also provides a good example of two opposing forces competing for the legitimate control of a resource: country leadership. Both the president and opposition leader heavily relied on the use of political, military, economic, and social support throughout the power struggle. Through this competition and the resulting power transfer, several significant incidents occurred including the deaths of hundreds of

Malagasy and several foreign nationals, the resignation of the president, dissolution of parliament and the constitution, and the installation of an opposition leader and transitional regime, the expansion of several illicit trade networks, a shift in international influence in and on the country, and the creation of a damaging fault line within the diplomatic community that has hindered effective international engagement in the resolution process. From the method of competition employed by the opponents and the outcome that resulted, we can extract several interesting observations about each side's strategies and tactics.

former President Jamil Mahuad with Vice President Gustavo Noboa. Certain principles may also be useful when examining the recent string of protests and riots across the Middle East.

4 Including Guinea, Mauritania, Guinea-Bissau, Ecuador, Niger, Honduras, and Malaysia

5 "The Resurgence of Coups d'Etat in Africa," Security Council Report, Update Report No.3. April 15, 2009. 29

The recency of the event, compared to more historical cases, will help to explain current methods of contentious political competition that actors employ and identify how they may lead to conflict recurrence in a state.

2.5.2 Madagascar

Madagascar is a partially unique case in that it is an island country. 6 This removes the border sharing variable that can induce severely destabilizing effects like contlict spillover, particularly in regions populated by weak states. 7

Though decentralization has been a key element of Madagascar's institutional development, it is still a highly centralized state due to the sixteen years of revolutionary socialism maintained by the previous president, Didier Ratsiraka. x Since 2002,

Madagascar had been on an ambitious development track. However, the events of 2009 sent the country spiraling into violence, political instability, economic collapse, continued corruption, and intemational condemnation for more than two years.

After 50 years of independence, Madagascar ranks 145 out of 182 countries on the Human Development Index as two-thirds of the population still lives below the poverty line. 9 With a population of 20.1 million that is rapidly growing 10 and a primarily

6 As ofMarch 2011, there are 195 sovereign states (192 are members of the United Nations). Only 49 (25%) of these are Islands.

7 For more information on the problems of borders, see Atzili, Boaz. "When Good Fences Make Bad Neighbors: Fixed Borders, State Weakness, and International Conflict.'. International Security. 31 (3 ): 139-173. Winter 2006/07.

8 Brown, Mervyn. A History ofMadagascar. Princeton, NJ: Markus Wiener Publishers. 2002; Marcus, Richard R. and Paul Razafindrakoto. "Participation and the Poverty of Electoral Democracy in Madagascar," Aji-ica Spectrum, 38(1): 27-48. 2003. 9 "Human Development Report 2010: The Real Wealth ofNations: Pathways to Human Development," United Natzons Development Programme. 2010. 30

pastoral society, food shortages, land scarcity and deforestation plague the country while the Malagasy political structure is severely corrupt and institutions remain dangerously weak. 11 The 2009 Malagasy political crisis underlines the threats to weak governance and institutions many weak states still face.

Madagascar· s political system is also similar to many other African francophone countries as many of the underlying institutions and laws derive directly from France's legal and political structure. 12 It also shared many characteristics as the rest of

Fran<;:afrique. Figure 3 illustrates the noticeable difference of the frequency of coups d'etat in former European colonies, highlighting two trends: the historically greater frequency of coups in francophone countries; and the continued use of coups as a mechanism for regime change in Fran<;:afrique, in contrast to their decline in nearly every other country. 13

10 The population has increased by approximately 5 million every ten years from 11.3 million in 1990, to 15.3 million in 2000, to 20.1 million in 2010 and is expected to grow to 25.7 million in 2020. See UN DESA. ''World Population Prospects: The 2008 Revision." New York: Department for Economic and Social Affairs. 2009d. [http://hdrstats.undp.org/en/indicators/306.html] (accessed March 12, 2011)

11 Madagascar ranks 154 out of 178 on Transparency Internationar s Corruption Perception Index 20 10. See ''Corruption Perception Index 20 I 0," Transparency International. 2010. [available at: http://www.transparency.org/policy _research/surveys_indices/cpi/2010] (accessed March 12, 2011)

12 Brown, Mervyn. A History ofMadagascar. Princeton, NJ: Markus Wiener Publishers. 2002.

1 ' lt should be noted that the data is likely biased by the fact that there were more French and British colonies than others. This discussion is only supposed to exemplify the fact that there are similar trends of instability across Francophone countries. 31

18

16

...... 14 C';! liJ =o 12 0.. / ::; ~ ~,- Belg~an Colome<; 0 10 u ..... • ·-Bnlt<;h Colome<; ,_0 8

0

*Ongmal data can be found m Luttwak Edward N Coup d Etul 4 p, aUt uti Handboof.. Revt"ed EdJtton wtth Sawyer Blazek Cambndgc Harvard Untver'>tty Pre<,-.. fot1hcommg 2012

F1gure 3 Frequency of Coups zn former European Colomes (Sub-Saharan Afnca)

An exammat10n of pohtical power struggles m Madagascar helps to Identify the severely destabihzmg Impact that a pohtical cnsis can have on weak states. As such,

Identifymg the forces at work and the context withm which they took place IS paramount to understanding why these trends contmue to exist and may help to provide some expectations for the future of Madagascar and other countnes experiencmg similar phenomena.

2.6 RESEARCH DESIGN

2.6.1 Phase One: Power Struggle Modehng 32

During the first phase of this study, I examine the 2009 Malagasy political crisis

14 between November 2008 and May 2009 , focusing primarily on fluctuations in leadership support between the two competitors, then President Marc Ravalomanana and mayor Andry Rajoelina. This study takes a heuristic approach to identifying what factors increased or decreased a competitor's control and support.

This method utilizes an index of events during the power struggle and employs a quantifiable a scoring rubric to measure each event's etlect on a competitor· s support. I use a qualitative scoring method that grades events along an ordinal numerical scale

(O=No impact; 1=Small impact; 2=Large impact; 3=Critical impact). Scores are based on media review, interviews and other infonnation gathered. Impacts can be both positive and negative in nature depending on whether the event was beneficial or detrimental to the leader's support system. 15

This method will identify each event as an independent variable along a linear path and chronologically measure the impact of the event on the dependent variable, an actor's political support, in terms of both their absolute and cumulative values. As a result,

I will be able to observe two phenomena. First, 1 will be able to highlight key events within and among a string of similar events. Second, I will be able to measure the cumulative effect of these events on each actor's perceived support, illustrating the ebb and flow of political support as the power struggle continues. Such an examination will

14 For a justification of the selected dates, please refer to the previous section entitled "Case Selection."

15 For an illustration of this method, see Figure 2 in Chapter I. 33

help to identify and assess the effectiveness of strategies and tactics employed by the each opponent.

For the purposes of this study, I specifically focus on power struggles between individuals or groups over the legitimate control of a state. Success in such a power struggle is partially determined by the degree of legitimacy and support that is obtained, or at least removed from by the opponent.

After an examination of the modeL I will evaluate each actor's tactics and strategies to decipher how they modified their actions as the power struggle continued and what strategies proved to be the most effective. I have organized the actions of an actor during a power struggle along three ranges: no (re)action-over(re)action, reform­ rigidity, and inclusion-exclusion. Assessing when actors act, react, or choose neither will help to explain the particular outcome of the power struggle. Assessing when and why an actor reforms or maintains a position will help to identify when certain strategies are effective and when they are not. Finally, assessing when actors decide to include an opponent or the population in a policy or strategy and when they do not will help to explain when, how and why inclusion and exclusion are effective (e.g. when to allow opponents to switch sides or shift support groups) and when they arc not.

2.6.2 Phase Two: Deductive and Inductive Examination

The second phase of this analysis will consist of a deductive and inductive examination of variables that effected or were affected by the 2009 political crisis. The target variables include sociopolitical trends, factors, and norms. In order to properly identify variables, deductive and inductive examinations will be performed in phases. By 34

dividing the two examinations into separate phases, the examination will not be overburdened with both seeking new and removing old variables, but instead be able to focus all efforts on one function at a time, ensuring a minimal margin of error or oversight.

First, I will begin with a deductive logic of currently identified variables and subsequent theories that may help to explain power struggles and conflict recurrence.

There have been significant developments and exemplary historical and contemporary examinations of political power struggles, though few studies of what, exactly, they are.

Building from this wealth of literature will provide a common and conceptual framework to contribute to understanding the phenomenon and its impacts. This examination will also isolate and/or remove inappropriate or insignificant causal factors as well as establish categorizations of causal variables, effects, and nominal groupings. This phase will primarily utilize the data collected through the media analysis, literature review, and interviews to synthesize the known variables.

Second, I will conduct an inductive building-block examination to identify incorporate variables that may have been previously ignored or have recently emerged.

This type of heuristic approach will help to identify and or remove any equifinality of variables.

Criticism may fall on the claim that deductive typological examinations bias any results found because the study is based on pre-existing conceptions of the variables under study. In effect, the case studies would be exposed to a biased perspective rather than a clean slate which could arguably remove the uniqueness of any findings. However, 35

when attempting to create a theoretical framework, it is less important to extract unique and robust data and more imp01iant to show trends and commonalities that may arise across similar cases. Therefore, losing some degree of robustness by initiating with a deductive logic \viii not significantly harm the results produced for the intended purpose of the study. This docs not mean that the theoretical framework will explain everything within the case. Rather, it will provide the conceptual equipment to understand similar phenomenon across cases.

1 then employ these variables to examine whether they help to explain certain decisions, actions, and events by individuals and b'TOups in Madagascar, particularly political actors. With these examinations, 1 put forth a conceptualization of the Malagasy sociopolitical structure.

2.7 DATA REQUIREMENTS AND COLLECTION

Research for this thesis will be supported by primary source data, collected in two ways: media review and structured open-ended interviews.

2.7.1 Media Review

Newspapers, journals, and other media resources were used to provide both objective and subjective interpretations of the events of 2009, often from a first-person or eyewitness perspective. Records of such events as riots, protests, street battles, or other phenomena are invaluable to understanding both how the event actually occurred and how the event was interpreted by the media and the population. Media biases play a very big role in propagandizing and influencing people. These biases exist within Malagasy 36

1 media as wel1 " and are impmiant to identify and consider when examining political events. When media review was employed to score the significance of particular events during the 2009 political crisis, these biases were taken into consideration. To further ensure scoring was representative of the actual impacts of the events, structured open- ended interviews were also used to gather more information and cross-analyze against media repmis.

2.7.2 Structured Open-Ended Interviews

Structured open-ended interviews were conducted with politicians, military officials, lawyers, diplomats, development practitioners, ptivate business owners, and rural agriculturalists between November 2010 and January 2011. The interviews consisted of open-ended questionnaires that allowed for respondents to provide the highest degree of detail on each discussion point. The interviews focused primarily on the events of the 2009 Malagasy political crisis to highlight the underlying variables at the core of the concept political competition in Madagascar. These variables were then examined in the context of the 2009 political crisis and in the larger context of Malagasy political competition.

It should be noted that the data and analysis is not quantitative, nor was the sample stze representative of any group or the population at large. Many of the respondents do, however, hold high-level positions and their responses, as such, are assumed to be reasonably representative of particular political perceptions. For example,

16 For example, La Verite, Madagascar Television, and Midi Madagasikara are known to be pro­ HAT while !'Express and Les Nouvelles remain neutral and La Gazette is generally critical to both the HAT and the opposition. 37

when a Malagasy politician states that the Malagasy people do not consider themselves to

17 be African , this is assumed to be a broadly-held perspective of the people of

Madagascar. 18 In addition, many of the responses can be cross-analyzed against previous literature and other respondents' answers. 19 These cross-references are included as footnotes where possible.

The combination of these various types of data collection also helps to reinforce the strength and quality of the data that will be employed in this examination. By collecting data from many and various locations that are both internal and external to the case study, 1 am attempting to remove biases as well as provide the largest available library of data to be used to cross-reference and examine in an effort to best establish the primary indicators and independent variables and their effects on the dependent variable.

2.8 DESIGN JUSTIFICATION

This research aims to broaden an understanding of the dynamics of a political power struggle rather than to entirely explain the causal factors. It takes into consideration these dynamics and utilizes qualitative analysis to show how individuals within the case study interact, engage, and formulate actions in order for a researcher to

17 Interview with Malagasy Politician, December 2010.

18 Exact percentages of individuals who hold this belief are not calculated. However, for the purposes of this study, such a belief is expected to have a visible effect on political processes in the country. Further evidence to justify this assumption are provided later in the chapter and in subsequent footnotes.

19 In addition to the politician, two other Malagasy respondents, of which one is a lawyer. made the same claim. Their quotes are provided later in the chapter. See also, Brown, Mervyn. A History of Madagascar. Princeton, NJ: Markus Wiener Publishers. 2002; Marcus, Richard R. and Paul Razafindrakoto. "Participation and the Poverty of Electoral Democracy in Madagascar," Afi·ica Spectrum, 38(1): 27-48. 2003; and Marcus, Richard R. "Marc the Medici? The Failure of a New Form ofNeopatrimonial Rule in Madagascar," Political Science Quarterly, 125( 1): 111-131. 2010. 38

better understand how and why actors decide upon a particular policy and set of actions during a political power struggle.

By employing a case study of a recent event, the researcher seeks to take advantage of how "fresh" the infonnation collected in interviews is in order to gather the richest data possible before important details fade from respondents' memory. In addition. examining the dynamics of a recent phenomenon that has occuned in several different cases will prove to be a more useful resource for future examination of cunent events and similar phenomena on other cases.

2.9 PRELIMINARY HYPOTHESIS

How do political pm1·er struggles affi:'Ct the recurrence ofconflict'!

Based on the literature and a preliminary review of the case, contentious political competition appears to arise when particular political actors desire to shift power distribution in order to obtain greater benefit. This often entails extra-legal actions that

20 undermine the rule of law. If such a process is successful , it reinforces destructive and destabilizing political competition, weakens the institutional structure of a state, and likely leads to a recunence of conflict when political actors desire to shift power distribution in the future (See Figure 4).

20 It is important to note that shifting the power balance is not cost-free and is not always successful. Otherwise we would observe even more destabilization. 39

1 ActO!(~) Deude to Shllt Pmver Dlo.tllbllt!Oil

'~-----.-/

Rcmforc.ement of De<.tructJ\ e De-. tructl\ t Pohttcal Powe1 PohtKal Stmgglc Competition

Pov\et I'> Confl1ct and Red1<.tnbuted De<;tabJh7atJOn

Fzgure 4 The Cycle of Polztzcal PoVl er Struggles and Recurrence of Conflzct _)."

A BRIEF HISTORY OF MALAGASY POLITICAL COMPETITION

3.1INTRODUCTION

2009 was not the first time Madagascar has experienced a political cns1s. The events shared many dynamics with previous political power struggles in the country. In fact, nearly every president since Madagascar's independence has been removed from power "by the street", 1 or, by violence, protests and destabilization. These similarities underline the trend that Madagascar experiences: cyclical political crises that result fi·om political power struggles.

Madagascar gained full independence from France m 1960. Since then it has experienced nine successions of the chief of state:

1960-1972: Semi-presidential regime of Philibert Tsiranana 1972-1975: Military Transition led by Gabriel Ramantsoa 1975: Election and Assassination (6 days later) of Richard Ratsimandrava; Power transferred to Gilles Andriamahazo for transitional government 1975-1992: Authoritarian semi-presidential regime ofDidier Ratsiraka 1991-1993: Democratic Transition led by Albery Zafy and Guy-Willy Razanamasy 1993-1996: Parliamentary Regime of Albert Zafy 1996-2001: Didier Ratsiraka 2001-2009: Marc Ravalomanana (victor of disputed election between Ravalomanana and Ratsiraka)

1 "Madagascar: Sortir du Cycle de Crises," International Crisis Group, Rapport Afrique No. 156. March 18,2010, p.1; Randrianja, Solofo, Stephen Ellis. Madagascar-A Short History. London, 2009; Politiqueafricaine: Madagascar. December 1993.

40 41

2009-: Transitional Regime led by Andry Rajoelina and Camille YJtal 2

Only one of these successions was passive and resembled a norn1al legal process: the elec6on of Didier Ratsiraka in 1996. Every other succession was engulfed by violence, protest and destabilization. To assume that leadership succession in Madagascar will be a peaceful process ignores the fact that the country never institutionalized the concept.

Instead, political actors and opposition groups have reverted to destructive and destabilizing methods of political competition to redistribute political power.

This chapter provides a brief history of Malagasy leadership and power struggles since independence to establish a context with which we will use to examine conflict in

Madagascar.

3.2 PHILIBERT TSIRANANA, 1960-1972

Philibert Tsiranana, leader of the Social Democratic Party (PSD) and the first

President of the newly independent state, followed a policy of pragmatism and caution which brought stability to the first few years of Malagasy independence, in contrast to many other African countries of that time. Though he maintained a one-party state led and tended toward authoritarianism, with no direct external threats and relative internal harmony, Madagascar was donned the name l'ile heureuse, ''the fortunate island", for while it was ranked by the UN within the twenty poorest countries in 1960, with per

2 This list is an expanded version of a similar time line by Sylvan Urfer. See, Urfer, Sylvan. Le Doux et L 'A mer (Tantely amam-bahona): Madagascar au toumant du mil!enaire. 2"d Edition. Foi et Justice. Antananarivo. 2003. p. 244 42

capita income at $80, peasants outside the monetary economy were living comfortable lives in well-constructed houses, tending to their own rice-paddies, cattle and poultry. 3

Tsiranana's economic policies led to the removal of Madagascar from the UN's list of the world's poorest countries in 1970 as optimistic talk began of Madagascar becoming a new "take-off point". 4 However, progress had been made was unevenly spread and frustration was brewing.

With little connection to the central government, local ministers in the coastal regions began to take advantage of their positions as well as develop local, grass-roots ideologies. The lack of political opposition diminished the need to develop party centrality and discipline, breeding divisions based on regions, personalities and ethnicities. In addition, the longer Tsiranana stayed in power, the faster corruption spread. 5 Though it did not reach the central government, small-scale bribery was common in the management of cooperatives. Ultimately, however, the primary factor that led to the downfall of the regime was the perception that not much had changed since independence.

In 1971, university students began striking, demanding better living conditions and job prospects. In the south and southwest, a long drought destroyed zebu 6 herds though taxes on cattle remained the same as they had before, putting excessive economic

'Brown, Mervyn. A History of Madagascar. Princeton: Markus Wiener Publishers. 2006. p. 304 4 ibid., p. 305

5 Archer, Robert. Madagascar depuis 1972, Ia marche d'une rerolution. Paris. 1976.

6 Zebu are humped cattle originating from South Asia. 43

hardship on local communities. The increasing hardship on locals led to armed revolts against gendarmes, government buildings, and other locations. Tsiranana responded with a heavy fist, crushing the revolts, leaving nearly 1,000 dead. 7

At the same time, French influence in the government was still very strong in

Malagasy governance: French advisors still resided in nearly every ministry; the

Scctrctary-Cieneral was French: and the head of security and the President's Chief of

Staff were both French as were half the senior posts in the central administration.

This system continued well past any post-independence transition phase toward independence and was reaching into a decade of Malagasy sovereignty with no indication that the structure would soon change. Consequently, opposition groups began fonning and internal divisions in the PSD demanded greater ·'Malgachisation·· and the removal of

French influence from within the government. However, this influence was what kept some ethnic divisions at bay. Tsiranana, a Cotier ("coastal''), utilized French influence as a defense against the Merina, an ethnic group of the Central Highlands and the historical rulers of Madagascar.8 Losing this influence meant facing a powerful internal challenger to his rule. As one historian writes, ''the plateau-coastal division was thus at the heart of this major weakness of the regime, " 9 and utilizing France as a defense was one way to

7 Brown, Mervyn. A History ofMadagascar. Princeton: Markus Wiener Publishers. 2006. p. 314

8 Ihe Merina are the primary ethnic group of the Central Highlands of Madagascar and the capital, Antananarivo. They are of Austronesian descent, in contrast to many Cotiers, or coastal Malagasy, who are generally of African descent. The Merina constitute a large proportion of the educated middle-class and intellectual elite of Madagascar. Prior to colonization, the Merina Kingdom ruled most of Madagascar. Divisions between the Merina and the Co tiers have usually been at the heart of many political power struggles in Madagascar.

9 Brown, Mervyn. A History ofMadagascar. Princeton: Markus W1ener Publishers. 2006. p. 308 44

keep this division at bay. This is one reason why many within Madagascar were not yet certain that French colonial rule had ended.

While the regime held a policy of "wait-and-see'·, hoping enthusiasm for the protests would decline, this hope taded when armed forces fired on student protests in protests in May 1972, killing several. The event was a catalyst for opposition groups and though Tsiranana threatened to maintain law and order "even if it cost 100,000 deaths", the military would not fire on crowds, the French declined to provide military support.

Ultimately the continued escalation of violence, strikes, and protests led Tsiranana to transfer power to a mi)jtary regime, led by General Gabriel Ramanantsoa, who was to lead for the next five years.

3.3 MIUTARY TRANSITION, 1972-1975

General Gabriel Ramanantsoa held office with an entourage of military officers who followed a process of Malgachisation and attempted to implement a fonn of popular democracy that replaced old fonns of government-appointed local officers with a system that allowed the people to directly elect their officials at the local levels. While French influence faded. the former "establishment'' of notables and local officials as well as the bourgeois Merina in the capital, Antananarivo, began covertly formulating their opposition, dividing governmental support and weakening Ramanantsoa's position. 10

10 There are references to a group of high elites in the Merina bourgeoisie of Antananarivo known as the "Club of 48'' that held important political. military, and business positions and would often shift policies to their benefit. Brown, Mervyn. A History ofMadagascar. Princeton: Markus Wiener Publishers. 2006.p.323 45

With an economy damaged from the events of 1972 and inflation nsmg m conjunction with increased imp01i prices due to increased world oil prices in 1973, the divided govemment accomplished little. Coup plots, anned opposition, and political manipulations abounded, leading Ramanantsoa to transfer power to General Richard

Ratsimandrava on February 5, 1975. Six days later, Ratsimandrava was assassinated, transferring power again to General Gilles Andriamahazo. Martial law was proclaimed, political parties were dissolved, and a group of 18 officers in the am1ed forces, including

Ratsiraka, took power and began a trial of those accused of responsibility for the assassination. ·'While the trial monopolized attention, a struggle for power was going on inside the Military Directorate, to decide who would lead a new government once the emergency was over.., 11 At the end of the trial five months later, Ratsiraka had arrived at the dominant position among the contenders and was chosen as the new head of state by a two-thirds vote in the Directorate. He assumed power in June 1975, ending the four year political crisis.

3.4 DIDIER RATSIRAKA, 1975-1992

During his first few years in power, Ratsiraka pushed the country toward socialism, nationalized a majority of the economy, and severed ties with France. As his policies weakened the economy, many French immigrants left. Almost immediately,

Ratsiraka took on the task of economic recovery and transformation with the ambitious

Investment Program, approved in 1977, that relied on heavy foreign borrowing, contrary to the policy of self-reliance advocated in his Little Red Book.

11 Brown, Mervyn. A History ofMadagascar. Princeton: Markus Wiener Publishers. 2006. p. 328 46

However, by 1980, the economy was in ruins. Banditry grew across the country, something that hadn't happened since the beginning of the century. and child beggars began to appear in chilling numbers, something that Madagascar had never experienced before, and Ratsiraka was forced to appeal for intervention by the International Monetary

Fund (IMF). This intervention may have prevented a full-on financial crisis, but it did not hinder the economic decline. As a result, Ratsiraka opened the doors to western aid which, by 1985 reached $330 million, 50% higher than it was two years before.

For a majority of his term in power. Ratsiraka ascribed to a policy of "'non­ alignment", which in reality was little more than an anti-western pro-soviet doctrine. Jn consequence, the USSR surpassed France in providing defense equipment and military training but western aid, dominated by France. provided the bulk of external economic and technical aid.

At the same time, university enrollment had been doubling every five years since the early 70s, but with a Jack of employment opportunities, this only created a new grievance. The use of the secret police DGID (Direction Gbu!rale d 'Jnvestigation el de

Documentation) to unearth rumors of coup plots and suppress opposition further damaged Ratsiraka' s popularity. Many of the supporters of DGID were low level gangs of unemployed youth that would suppress student demonstrations and extort money through threats.

With divisions in the government and socialist parties grouped under the National

Front for the Defense of the Revolution (FNDR). Ratsiraka' s power waned. By the late

1980s, in the wake of a failing economy and demand for fundamental political change, 47

the regime eased press censorship, allowed the growth of additional political parties, and

shifted toward a more market-based economy. In less than a year, what was essentially

one-party state was transformed into a country of over 120 political pmiies. This reform

provided political parties with enough room to unite under a coalition of opposition

parties known as Hery Velona, "Active Forces·', and led by Albert Zafy, a surgeon. With

their new united strength. the opposition began demanding more from Ratsiraka's

government by holding massive strikes and demonstrations in 1991. Growing bolder,

Hery V dona announced it was setting up its own transitional regime and began

occupying deserted government offices with the help of those on strike. Press censorship

had become largely ignored and the armed forces were not taking action against the

opposition. By August, Zafy and his followers sought a complete overthrow of the

regime and organized protests outside the President's residence in Javoloha, just outside

the capital Antananarivo. The struggle between Ratsiraka and opposition groups took a

drastic shift when Ratsiraka' s troops fired on unarmed protestors outside the Presidential

Palace, killing at least 100 and wounding more. At the same time, a similar protest m

Majunga, a city to the northwest, experienced similar violent repression, killing 20.

Having made the same mistake Tsiranana had made two decades before,

Ratsiraka' s support crumbled. Though he refused to relinquish power, claiming he was

still the legally elected President, internal and external support severely collapsed as

France severed most assistance and political and military officials defected to join the

opposition. After a several month stalemate, Ratsiraka was forced to establish a

transitional regime where he held a largely ceremonial position. The new regime was 48

then giVen 18 months to fom1 a new constitutional government, conducted under the purview of the High Constitutional Court, considered the judicial arbiter of the process.

3.5 ALBERT ZAFY, 1992-1996

Presidential elections were held m 1992 and, after runoffs in 1993, Albert Zafy, leader of the Hery Velona, had defeated Ratsiraka and was sworn in on March 27, 1993.

The first peaceful and democratic transition in the history of Madagascar had emerged,

23 years after the county's independence.

While claiming democratic principles, Zafy· s regtme did not have a clear ideology. The fact that Hery Velona had been organized as a '"catch-all party" in an etlort to overthrow Ratsiraka led to many and a weak ideological standpoint. Ultimately, Zafy' s doctrine emphasized economic and political centralization. In essence, Zafy was creating the same neopatrimonial network each president before him had. By May 1996, with claims that no progress occurred and widespread accusations of corruption, Parliament conducted a vote of no confidence and Zafy was impeached, placing fonner President of the High Constitutional Court and Prime Minister Norbert Ratsirahonana in power until the next elections in November 1996.

3.6 DIDIER RATSIRAKA, 1996-2001

During 1996 elections, Ratsirahonana ran for president, taking fourth in the polls

12 (10%), behind Ratsiraka (38%), Zafy (23%), and Herizo Razafimahaleo (15%) , founder of the LEADER Fanilo party and considered the father of political ethics in Madagascar.

12 Nunley. AC. "Elections in Madagascar" in African Elections Database. 2007. [http://africanelections.tripod.com/mg.html] (accessed March 5, 2011) 49

As no single candidate acquired over 50%, a runoff election was held between Ratsiraka and ZafY with Razafimahaleo supporting the fonner and Ratsirahonana supporting the latter. Second round votes differed by 1.5% between the two candidates, with Ratsiraka the winner with 50.71% and Zafy at 49.29%. 13

By 1998, Ratsiraka had changed the constitution to strengthen the presidency once again, creating his own neopatrimonial framework, refocusing dominance on the

C6tiers through autonomous provinces, and with it, frustration, anger and resentment in the run-up to the 2001 elections.

3.7 MARC RAVALOMANANA, 2001-2009

Beginning his political career as the mayor of Antananarivo in 1999, he was credited with cleaning up the capital during his time in office. 14 The 2001 elections illustrated the ability of a Merina to achieve countrywide support Marc Ravalomanana won nearly every province aside from Didier Ratsiraka' s home province of Toamasina.

This is an interesting outcome considering Marc Ravalomanana · s political party, Tiako I

Madagasikara, ''I Love Madagascar", had been established only six months prior to the presidential elections, bringing into question how institutionalized the political party system was in Madagascar. 15 In addition, the entirety of Ravalomanana's political career comprises of his experience as mayor of Antananarivo from 1999 to 2001. In either case,

13 ibid.

14 Marcus, Richard R. "Political Change in Madagascar: Populist democracy or neopatrimonialism by another name?" Institute for Security Studies, paper 89. August, 2004. 15 Marcus, Richard R. "Political Parties in Madagascar," Party Politics, 11(4):495-512. 2005. p. 505 50

the vote count brought on an electoral crisis and for the next five months, violence and instability rang loud as both Ravalomanana and Ratsiraka claimed the victory.

Hundreds of thousands of supporters flooded the street, echoing Ravalomanana · s call for democracy in a mirror of the events that took place in 1991. Employing the same method Zafy had used, Ravalomanana claimed victory and began appointing government ministers while Ratsiraka rejected any compromises. However, Ratsiraka and his government had been forced out of the capital and into the coastal city of Tomasina, severing transport routes from the capital, 16 while sporadic violence and economic instability swept the country. To defend his position, Ravalomanana hired 2000 reservists who fought against Ratsiraka's army; the death toll is still unknown. At this point,

Ravalomanana' s acting prime minister publicly stated "We do not accept any terrat·ist act committed in our territory," while tens of thousands of unarmed Ravalomanana supporters forced Ratsiraka's ministers out oftheir offices while the military stood down, remained mostly on the sidelines, and likely prevented the conflict from escalating into a civil war. 17 By June 2002, forces loyal to Ravalomanana had taken control of all key port towns, including Toamasina and Ratsiraka had fled to France. This marked the brink of a new era of politics in Madagascar, or at least that is what most Malagasy believed. Six to

16 In one eyewitness report, security forces had gone in and systematically bombed bridges along all roads that led to Antananarivo in an effort to divide it from the rest of the country. Interview with public health volunteer. December, 2010. 17 Marcus, Richard R. and Paul Razafindrakoto. "Participation and the Poverty of Electoral Democracy in Madagascar," Afhca Spectrum, 38(1): 27-48. 2003. p. 40 51

eight percent of the population of Madagascar had become active political participants near Iy overm"gh t. 18

Ravalomanana was a Merina who had amassed a small empire of businesses and advocated for rapid and durable development as well as for a powerful counter-corruption strategy. The Malagasy people flocked to his good looks, his charisma, and the view that he was a seed of change. He had not grown rich through corruption, like so many other politicians. 19 In contrast to this standard, Ravalomanana started his career selling yogurt on the side of the road and built his own business empire. Such a shift in leadership inspired and brought hope to people that real change would come. Conversely, many previous politicians feared that reform would leave them empty handed.

During his first term, Ravalomanana improved the country's infrastructure, education and health systems. Anti-corruption efforts were well funded and achieved impressive results. Yet these improvements grew amid continued demands for better living conditions and price hikes in fuel and rice. 20 True enough, while many of the improvements did help the country at large, they were likely primarily motivated by personal interests. Infrastructure development, particularly road construction seemed to center around Ravalomanana's businesses in order to expedite delivery and cut

18 ibid., p. 42

19 During one interview, a respondent quoted a politician who said, "in the 70s, everyone was going to school to become a tax collector or customs oftlcer because that's the best way to make money: bribes." Interview with diplomat. December, 2010.

20 "MADAGASCAR: Voter apathy as election day approaches," IRJN. December I, 2006. [http://www.irinnews.org/Report.aspx?Reportld=62266] (accessed March 5, 2001) 52

transportation costs. 21 By the 2006 elections, voter apathy had set in as Malagasy did not sec the poverty reduction Ravalomanana had promised in 2001. However, official results placed Ravalomanana with 54.79% of the vote22 and he was sworn in to his second term in January 2007.

Upon entering his second term, Ravalomanana's policies became more intertwined with his business interests as he tried to dominate nearly every industry the country was engaged in whilst trying to edge everyone else out. Power continued to centralize as his policies and actions became more autocratic. Ravalomanana's true identity was as a businessman; consequently, in trying to run the country like a business, he became one of the country" s richest men and built a massive conglomerate that dominated nearly every economic sector of Madagascar. Ravalomanana had taken advantage of the malleable government institutions. Politicians, business owners, and others that did not align with Ravalomanana' s vision became marginalized and resentful and slowly organized in opposition.

3.8 THE 2009 MALAGASY POLITICAL CRISIS

3.8.1 The Causes of Conflict

There were perhaps four mistakes that Ravalomanana made that ultimately led to the 2009 political crisis. First, beginning in 2002, Ravalomanana had surrounded himself with a very capable set of ministers. However, as time went on, he tended to publicly

21 Marcus. Richard R. "Marc the Medici? The Failure of a New Form ofNeopatrimonial Rule in Madagascar," Political Science Quarterly, 125(1 ): 111-131. 20 10.

22 "Resultats de I' Election Presidentielle du 03 Decembre 2006." Haute Cour Constitutionnelle. [http://www.hcc.gov.mg/election-2006/resultat-2006.php] (accessed March 5, 2011) 53

belittle them v.hich. a very ··un-Malagasy .. thing to do. 23 In conjunction with 11 cabinet shifts during his presidency and the firing of many strong supporters led to a perception that he had become very autocratic and had strengthened opposition by marginalizing powerful individuals.

Second, his relationship with the private sector had a severely damaging impact on his reputation. His inability to separate state and personal interests and many French and Malagasy did not feel there was open competition that allowed them to move forward with the legal and regulatory developments Ravalomanana was implementing.

Third, Ravalomanana did not understand and nurture the collegial attitude of the military. Historically, the military has been able to pull Madagascar out of many political crises and have always been perceived to be the true defenders of the population.

However, Ravalomanana ultimately split his support in the military with two actions.

First he appointed Cecile Manorohanta as Minister of Defense in October 2007, which disrupted the hannony because (a) she was the first woman to be appointed to the position and (b) she had no previous military experience. Second, he began promoting colonels over generals and creating disequilibrium within the core of the military.

The fourth mistake was the personal clashes between Marc Ravalomanana and

Andry Rajoelina. Publicly, these clashes began after Rajoelina was elected as mayor of

Antananarivo. Leader of the Tanora malaGasy Vonona (TGV), ''Determined Malagasy

Youth .. , Andry Rajoelina was born into a rich family and started off as a disc jockey in clubs and bars in the country's capital, Antananarivo. Gaining prominence after

n Interview with Malagasy lawyer. December, 2010. 54

establishing his own radio station and an advertising company, he ran for mayor of

Antananarivo in 2007 and won. beating Ravalomanana·s candidate by a wide margin. As his political career took otf, he gained the nickname TGV (like the French high speed trains) for his charisma and "lightning politics.'' 24

Privately, a very personal history between Rajoelina and Ravalomanana' s daughter led to a personal clash between the two individuals that was never resolved.

Rajoelina had previously dated and had a daughter with Ravalomanana's daughter. And though Rajoelina wanted to marry Ravalomanana's daughter. Ravalomanana did not approve and prevented their marriage. The subsequent humiliation likely strengthened the hardness of Rajoelina' s opposing position. As opposition formed, Rajoelina slowly rose to a position that others united around as the crisis began.

3.8.2 November to December 2008: Opposition Organizes

On November 17, 2008, Daewoo Logistics Corporation announced that it had agreed to lease 1.3 million hectares of land in Madagascar, representing approximately 60% of the total arable land in the country, for 99 years to produce food and biofuel for export.

Though such deals have occurred in other Sub-Saharan African countries, and there was a similar deal with the Indian company Varun in Madagascar, public outcry led

Madagascar's government to quickly deny that the agreements had been made. 25 The

24 "DJ-turned-mayor a thorn for government." Independent Online. January 28, 2009. [http://www.iol.co.za/index.php?set_ id= !&click_id=84&art_id=nw20090 128183451778C872853] (accessed Aprill3, 20IO)

25 "Chronologie de ]'affaire Daewoo." Madagascar Tribune. February 2, 2009. [http://www.madagascar-tribune.com/Chronologie-de-l-affaire-Daewoo, II 023.html] (accessed April I2, 2010) 55

public also learned that the president had spent over $30 million on a private

"presidential" jet. In December, the IMF, World Bank Group, EU, and the African

Development Bank suspended disbursement of direct budget support due to budgetary misconduct. This decision was based on claims that the president was mixing personal business interests with state interest. 26 Then Viva Radio, owned by then mayor of

Antananarivo, Andry Rajoelina, aired an interview with the exiled fom1er president,

Didier Ratsiraka. In response, the president shut down the mayor's radio and television stations, causing fmiher outrage and protests. Reporters Without Borders (RSF) condemned the closing of the TV and radio stations27 while gTOwing resentment and the led to the beginning of a movement, led by Rajoelina, to upbraid the government.

The movement was comprised of marginalized internal and external businessmen, politicians, and others who believed the country was going in the wrong direction and

28 sought a change of leadership :

"Tt was all the leftovers that didn't get positions in the previous rregimes]. .. and how it was their time to step in and their time to take control ... that's what you had in the beginning ... an almost rent­ seeking, opportunistic behavior." 29

26 "Le FMI bloque le dossier Madagascar." !'Express de Madagascar. February 7, 2009. [http://www.lexpressmada.com/display.php?p=display&id=24330] (accessed April 13, 201 0); For further referencing, see the collection ofNew York Times articles cited in this paper.

27 "DJ-tumed-mayor a thom for government." Independent Online. January 28, 2009. [http://www.iol.co.za/index.php?set_id= 1&click_id=84&art_id=nw20090128183451778C872853] (accessed April 13, 2010)

28 As one author writes, many of these individuals, particularly French businessmen, "united in their demand for 'anyone but Ravalomanana', [and were] a natural ally of the president's political opponents, descendants of the Malagasy elite." See, Rakotomalala, Patrick. "Madagascar: The 2009 Crisis and Outside Interests," Al!Afi'ica.com. March 17, 2011.

29 Interview with political official. December, 2010. 56

In addition, fear had grown after others noticed Ravalomanana was organvmg elections and key seats in his favor:

··He had made sure that local elections were being run in such a way that TIM candidates had the advantage to win. He had also made a decision towards appointmg regional chiefs wh1ch .. before had been elected positions. He was stacking the deck ··lO

The opposition group was financially backed by several entities who sought to manufacture a political change. It has been rumored that the French government and

French companies heavily backed opposition actions though no hard evidence has linked this claim. 31

Reports also suggest that vanous businessmen financed opposition protests m

2009. Colonel Andriasoavina, arrested for participating in a coup attempt in November

2010, claimed that several Indian businessmen, part of the Karana ethnic group of

Madagascar, allegedly paid 1.2 billion Ariary ($6 million dollars) to finance the unrest and that he himself was paid $10,000 for his part in the operation. 32

3.8.3 January, 2009: The Beginning of Opposition and Violence

3°Confidential interview. November, 20 I 0.

31 There have been rumors that crates ofEuros were showing up in some of Madagascar· s port cities in early 2009, destined for particular individuals in Antananarivo. Additionally, all Malagasy politicians and military officials that I interviewed affirmed the connection among France, Andry Rajoelina. and the opposition movement. Confidential interviews. December 2010 to January 2011; In addition, the French multinational oil company Total S.A. has also been rumored to have heavily supported the opposition movement. See Zakin, Susan. "Why Madagascar Matters," Buffington Post, November 24, 2010. [http://www.huffingtonpost.com/susan-zakin/post~ 1327~ b ~ 788119.html] (accessed March 13, 2011)

32 Andrianasoavina, Charles. "Chronologie du coup d. etat de mars 2009,'. handwritten letter to Joachim Chissano. January 14, 20 II; '"'Indian, Pakistani businessmen paid 2009 Madagascar coup'," Sify News. January 22, 2011. [http://www.sify.com/news/indian-pakistani-businessmen-paid-2009-madagascar­ coup-news-intemational-lbwpuhgeihj.htm I] (accessed March 6, 20 II); Razafison, Rivonala. '·Soldier: J was paid $10,000 to topple Marc Ravalomanana,'' Africa Review. January 6, 2011. [http://www.africareview .com/News/-/97918011 084666/-li6unu2z/-/index.html] (accessed March 6, 2011) 57

Once a leader no longer represents the interests of his people, the seeds for a new political movement are sown. Malagasy opposition 6'foups recognized their oppmiunity and began to take advantage of the deteriorating political situation. The Daewoo deal was seen as a betrayal by their president that they could not i6:rnore, though most of the protest and opposition was centralized in the capital. 33 As Antananarivo's mayoral seat has previously been a politically defining post, exemplified by Ravalomanana's rise from mayor to president in 2002, Rajoelina took advantage of the growing tensions, tapping into the deep unrest over shrinking fi·ecdoms and high poverty, and accused the president of becoming a dictator. 34 He also began making public statements like "forei6'11 governments give money to Madagascar, and instead the money only goes to our

3 president " 'i Opposition management organized protests and directing looting and arson toward specific targets, particularly factories and stores owned by Marc Ravalomanana. 36

To say that the protests were spontaneous and the targets were random would be a mistake. As one government official described:

''TI1at was not something spontaneous. It was very well organized ... when the stores were attacked and looted was basically the same in each scenario. Pickup truck shows up, someone steps down out of the truck with bolt pliers ... [it was] a group of really looters that were

33 "Q&A Madagascar Crisis." BBC NeJVs. March 18, 2009.

34 Iloniaina, Alain and Njuwa Maina. "AU Condemns efforts to Oust Madagascar leader". Reuters UK. February 2, 2009.

35 Bearak, Barry. "Self-Proclainled President Learns a Quick Lesson." New York Times. February 2, 2009.

16 Interview with Malagasy military official. January 2011. 58

mobilized and ready to go. It was a very well organized operation. there was not very much that was spontaneous about any of it.'' 17

Opposition groups had formulated a well-defined strategy of protest, loot and arson in order to instigate a response from Ravalomanana and illustrate his instability and lack of control, and the growing frustration of his people. By January 26, the opposition had become violent The anti-government protests coupled with widespread looting and arson in Ravalomanana' s factories and stores resulted in the deaths of over I 00 people. Jll

On January 31, with a bit of hubris, Rajoelina claimed that he was in charge of the entire

Malagasy Republic:

"Since the president and the government have not taken their responsibility, I therefore proclaim that I will run all national affairs as 39 of today."

He added that he was filing with the Madagascar parliament a request for

Ravalomanana to formally resign, claiming authority under a law that seemed not to exist. 40 The President's response was to play down events by eschewing the incident as a

"political hiccup" while spending the afternoon with his ministers. 41 At this point it was apparent that the public was getting a little tired of protesting since it did not seem that large-scale change was going to occur.

37 Interviewed by author. December, 2010.

38 Bearak, Barry. "Madagascar Political Feud Continues." New York Times. February 4, 2009.

39 Bearak, Barry. "Mayor Declares a Coup in Madagascar." New York Times. February 1, 2009.

40 Bearak, Barry. "Self-Proclaimed President Learns a Quick Lesson." New York Times. February 2, 2009.

41 Bearak, Barry. "Mayor Declares a Coup in Madagascar." New York Times. February 1, 2009. 59

Meanwhile, with the international community's head now turned toward the conflict, U.S. Ambassador to Madagascar, R. Neils Marquardt, began efforts to establish dialogue between the two leaders in order to mitigate conflict, 42 though noting that "the balance seem[ ed] to be tilting in the direction of the president. "43 Ravalomanana let the protests continue without response. By the end of January the movement was losing steam and protests were getting smaller. 44 It was at this point that Ravalomanana, perhaps mistakenly, reformed his strategy. Up to this point, most protests had been centralized in a single downtown region of Antananarivo, and were essentially ignored by the government and military. Believing the movement was in its final throes, Ravalomanana decided to cut it short, telling the military to "get the protestors off the street. ''45 However, would tum out to be a disastrous strategic decision.

3.8.4 February, 2009: Ravalomanana Responds and Opposition Escalates.

On February 2, Ravalomanana fired Rajoelina on the grounds that he was no longer fulfilling his mayoral duties. 46 He claimed that "the mayor has not spent much

42 ibid.

41 Bearak, Barry. "Self-Proclaimed President Learns a Quick Lesson." New York Times. February 2, 2009.

44 "One thing that characterizes people's political outlook here is [that] they just want to go about their business ... people were getting tired of it." Interview with diplomat. November, 20 I 0.

45 Interview with diplomat. November, 2010.

46 Bearak, Barry. "Mayor Who Tried to Supplant Madagascar's President is Fired." New York Times. Februmy 5, 2009. 60

time fulfilling his real duties; he only went into the streets to excite the crowds and create trouble. "47

Recall that on January 31, Rajoelina had declared that he was ruling Madagascar, telling civil servants and school children to stay home in a show of solidarity. He soon realized that he may have overstepped his bounds and dented his credibility. Instead of backing down, Rajoelina too began reformulating his strategy. He forged new partnerships and promoted new colors of orange and blue for the "revolution". He held protests along A venue de l'lndependance and Place du 13 Mai where the Malagasy people had held their revolutionary protests for independence in the 1950s. By the first week of February, he had begun sending aides to the constitutional court with papers asking for the impeachment of Ravalomanana. Later evidence also indicates that

Rajoelina held meetings with military officials, politicians, and others where he noted that ''it was necessary to make blood flow." 48

Ramping up for the weekend, Rajoelina began organizing for Saturday protests throughout the city. By Saturday morning, February 7, several thousand protestors had congregated along A venue de l'Independance and begun marching toward the presidential palace. Upon arrival, they were met with a first round of security forces that retreated as the protestors approached. Upon reaching the palace, a second set of security forces, positioned in buildings along the street, opened fire on the unarmed crowd, killing dozens and injuring scores.

47 ibid. 48 Andrianasoavina, Charles. "Chronologie du coup d'etat de mars 2009," handwritten letter to Joachim Chissano. January 14, 2011. 61

The president was on television within the hour expressing his condolences to families, appealing for calm, and blaming Rajoelina for inciting the crowd and ordering them into peril. Rajoelina returned the favor by calling him a callous dictator who ordered soldiers to fire on helpless masses and children, stating they "were not armed ... they had only their courage. "49

These speeches, only reinforced what had already occurred. The president, regardless of whether he had given the order, would be held responsible for this incident.

"The tolerable threshold is largely passed" 50 and the same day saw the resignation of the defense minister, claiming she was unable to continue supporting what the government

1 was doing. 5 At this point, Ravalomanana's support began to falter.

Rajoelina no longer needed to rally opposition; his work was done. Instead, as had

Zafy in 1991 and Ravalomanana in 2002, Rajoelina and his group began building the new government, the High Transitional Authority (HAT), whose structure shadowed the current government's. From this point forward, his ascendency would fall into place as if a self-fulfilling prophecy.

After February 7, protests became generalized, widespread, spontaneous and more violent. In response, the international community began taking direct action. The United

Nations sent a mediator to try to begin dialogue; the African Union condemned the

49 Bearak, Barry. "More than 20 Killed in Madagascar Protest." New York Times. February 8, 2009.

50 "Trap: Carnage at Ambohitsorohitra". Madagascar-Tribune. February 9, 2009.

51 "Madagascar Defense Minister Resigns After Bloodshed." VOA News. February 9, 2009. [http://wwwl.voanews.com/english/news/a-13-2009-02-09-voal6-68797062.html] (accessed April 12, 2010) 62

violence and temporarily removed Madagascar's membership. The United States continued its neutral stance while attempting to establish dialogue between the parties.

Within Madagascar, there was a price on Ravalomanana's head. He would no longer be seen in public, nor found in his palace. He retreated to a more secluded compound in Iavoloha protected by anned forces. 52 Ravalomanana's initial stance had been firmly in the use of force based on constitutional grounds. After the events of

February 7, he gathered supporters to draw a line against the challenge to his leadership and reaffirmed his stance, stating" I am president of the republic and I intend to remain so until the end of my mandate ... Every problem in Madagascar can be resolved tlu·ough discussion; we will do every1hing to restore peace." 53 However, just as this legalistic claim did not work for Ratsiraka two decades before, it failed to work for Ravalomanana.

Two weeks later, violence and protest continued. Ravalomanana realized that he needed to change his tune and began drastically calling for dialogue between sides.

Rajoelina was not necessarily gaining support, but Ravalomanana was certainly losing it. Statements, claims, pamphlets, text messages, and every other form of communication sent across the country, denounced Ravalomanana's actions. 54 Meanwhile

Ravalomanana accused the opposition of using "terror and repression" to dislodge him. 55

His support began fluctuating dramatically. Even members of the military began

52 "J'y suisj'y reste!" Madagascar Tribune. March 16, 2009.

5 ' "I'm here to stay, Madagascar president vows." Agence-France Press. February 14, 2009.

54 Madagascer Tribune, !'Express de Madagascar, and several others maintain archives of op-eds, news articles, and independently submitted articles calling on people supporting several different groups, ideas, and paths.

55 "Q&A Madagascar Crisis." BBC News. March 18, 2009. 63

questioning their stance. He could not establish dialogue between parties, nor could he reach the people beyond his original support.

Rajoelina had successfully used the government against itself He had managed to use Ravalomanana' s response as a weapon. The damage was severe and irreversible. The

HAT gained further support and began infiltrating government ministries in an attempt to take control of daily duties. It was, by this point, only a matter of time before the opposition's support and power would reach a tipping point, and Ravalomanana would have to step down.

3.8.5 March, 2009: Mutiny, Mayhem, and a Change of Power

The final weeks of February into the first weeks of March saw massive looting and violence. Shops were shut down and major marketplaces were destroyed throughout

Antananarivo. People were unable to find or attord food. The situation was becoming desperate and Ravalomanana's inability to resolve the conflict was severely depreciating his power and legitimacy.

Meanwhile, within the military ranks, unrest was stirring due to Ravalomanana's wavering support since the February 7 shootings. During the first weekend in March, soldiers at a camp in the Antananarivo refused to suppress street demonstrations against the government. They claimed that they "were trained to protect property and citizens, not to fire at the people." 56 This took place after presidential security officers had failed to arrest Rajoelina the previous Friday, after which, Rajoelina went into hiding. Whether or not soldiers aided Rajoelina in his escape is subject to speculation as there are no

56 Bearak, Barry. "Army Mutiny Heightens Madagascar Crisis." New York Times. March 10, 2009. 64

official repm1s. It is apparent however, that as soon each time military support split or faltered, Ravalomanana · s support was irreversibly damaged.

In the ensuing days, mutineers ousted the Minister of National Defense and positioned a new Chief of General Staff of the Army as the newest addition to Rajoelina's shadow government. 57 Several days later Ravalomanana gave a speech asking the people for forgiveness for his mistakes and promising that he would take the necessary steps to find a solution to their concerns. Unfortunately for him, it was too late. Ravalomanana had lost too much support and the HAT was unwilling to engage with him. The HAT's response was simple and strategic; they would "let the people speak first and see. ,sx

By March 14, Rajoelina had emerged from hiding and given Ravalomanana a four hour deadline to step down. As the deadline passed, Ravalomanana's only response was a public statement claiming he would never step clown and the opposition was only a

"street protest which uses terror and repression to survive. "59

Rajoelina responded that "the hands of Andry Rajoelina are clean, I don't intend to kill him. I don't want to send tanks and soldiers to t h e palace." 60 To counter

Ravalomanana's initial use of force, Rajoelina had shifted to peaceful rhetoric, movements, and even clothing to disassociate from Ravalomanana · s violence and further divide support. He attended church gatherings, greeted supporters and the public in white

57 Iloniaina, Alain. "Mea Culpa de Ravalomanana." l'E\press de Madagascar. March 11, 2009.

58 ibid.

59 Bearak, Barry. "Madagascar Reaches Showdown for Control." New York Times. March 15, 2009.

60 ibid. 65

suits, waved peace signs, claimed that he would not mix religion with politics like his

61 predecessor, Ravalomanana, had done in a 2007 referendum , and exclaimed that "the people will not be intimidated. "62

On March 16, soldiers broke into the abandoned presidential palace in a show of force. Many shadow government officials followed and began taking photos of HAT leaders sitting down at tables discussing plans. These photos were quickly and publicly distributed to strengthen the apparent legitimacy of the HAT. While the previous few weeks had been relatively bloodless, the strength of the opposition and the force of the movement had never diminished. The military continued to strent,rthen its support for

Rajoehna, claiming that Ravalomanana could not resolve the crisis and they could not support his actions during the events of February 7. 63

By the end of the week, Ravalomanana had resigned from office and g1ven control over to the military, which passed power to Rajoelina. 64 Rajoehna immediately moved his government into place and claimed control of the country. His first major action was to cancel the Daewoo deal, claiming it was an act of neo-colonialism. 65 The

African Union denounced the transition as an attempted coup d'etat and

61 "Madagascan opposition leader promises not to mix religion with politics." Xinhua News. March 15,2009.

62 Debois, R. La fievre de !'or rouge saigne Ia foret malgache. Univers Maore 13: 8-15.2009.

61 "Q&A Madagascar Crisis." BBC News. March 18, 2009.

64 Bearak, Barry. "Madagascar's President Quits After Weeks of Chaos." New York Times. March 18, 2009.

65 "Africans reject Madagascar leader" BBC News. March, 19, 2009. 66

unconstitutional. 66 The South Atlican Development Bank announced it would not recognize Rajoelina's presidency, the European Union, United States, and Norway condemned the transition, and foreign aid was suspended in protest of the method by which Rajoelina had gained power. 67 With the economy severely disrupted, business was

at a standstill. With 70% of government funding coming from foreign aid and donors,

suspension was grave news for the new leader. 6x While the political movement and transition did not receive international support, Rajoelina enjoyed widespread national

support.

Interestingly, since its assumption of power, the regime has been widely accused

of corruption, Jack of regard for human rights, and mixing of state and personal financial

interests. 69 The new regime needed funding and oppot1unistic groups were already offering support both licit and illicit and reaping profits from the shift in power.

On Saturday, April 18, 2009, the Ministry of Waters and Forests closed the port of Vohemar for rosewood exports. On Sunday, a private plane flew in from Antalaha to

Antananarivo with a delegation of rosewood traders who met with several members of the HAT. By Monday, rosewood-filled trucks went on their way to Vohemar and the timber barons of the northeast had received assurance that they will be allowed to

66 ibid.

67 "Southern African Nations Refuse to Recognize Madagascar Leader" VOA News. March 19, 2009; "Africans reject Madagascar leader" BBC News. March, 19, 2009; Tighe, Paul. "Madagascar Army­ Backed Leadership Change Denounced by EU, U.S." Bloomberg. March 19,2009. "Madagascar: international community deserts Rajoelina." IRIN News. March 23, 2009.

68 "Madagascar: international community deserts Rajoelina." IRIN News. March 23,2009.

69 "Madagascar: Sortir du Cycle de Crises," Rapport Afnque No. 156, International Crisis Group. March 18,2010. 67

export. 70 In the subsequent months, an explosion of illicit timber extraction hit the market and the global demand for several precious timbers, patiicularly rosewood, ebony, and palisander skyrocketed. Shipping companies linked with furniture companies in China and the Gibson guitar company in the United States, covertly sending thousands of tons of illegal rosewood across the globe. 71 Much of this illicit trade was conducted under the complicit protection of military and government officials and with profits to the HAT regime of more than $20 million do liars. 72

3.8.6 May 2009 to March 2011: Failed Agreements, Opportunism and Instability

In the months that followed, it became obvious that the regime did not have the

Malagasy people's interests at the forefront of their plans. They had one desire: money.

The regime did not fortify its position and set out on a process of refonn. Instead it set up a Force d 'Intervention Special (Special Intervention Forces), similar to Ratsiraka' s secret police, to snuff out opposition and Ravalomanana suppotiers, continually reorganized and reshuffled political positions, and tried to strong-arm businesses by imposing new taxes and bribes in order to pay off civil servants and the military long enough to stay afloat.

Instead, a system was created where the political elites try to utilize Madagascar's poverty to their ends.

7°Chronology of events collected from confidential interview. December, 2010.

71 "Investigation into the Illegal Felling, Transport, and Export of Precious Wood in SAVA Region Madagascar," Global Witness and the Environmental investigation Agency, Inc. August 2009. pp. 15-16, 20 [http://www. eia-global.org/P DF /Report-- Madagascar--Forest--Aug09--Eng! ish. pdf]

72 Environmental corruption will be discussed again in Chapter 5. 68

This is one reason why neither the international community nor the Malagasy political community really knew who was in charge or who was behind who. Politicians did not know who they needed to be aligned with. 73 What did become apparent \Vas that

Rajoelina and his movement had been used by other opposition groups. Rajoelina had been a pawn in a well-orchestrated chess game that redistributed power among individuals with no collective ideology other than opportunism. In effect, what the transition did was bring Madagascar back to the days of Ratsiraka and Zafy and what those individuals wanted. Rather than representing a vision, the High Transitional

Authority represented a power basin, leading to a political system that was more conflictual and less capable of agreeing upon anything.

In early August 2009, through negotiations assisted by the African Union, United

Nations, Southern African Development Community, and the International Organization of the Francophonie, the major political leaders and parties of Madagascar reached achieved an agreement for a power-sharing arrangement. Ravalomanana, who would not be participating in the new power-sharing agreement, received full amnesty for any crimes he may have committed while in office, as did the previous president before him,

Didier Ratsiraka. Both Ravalomanana and Ratsiraka participated in the mediation. 74

Unfortunately, this agreement collapsed when Rajoelina announced the cabinet members of the transitional government, who happened to be his strong supporters.

71 Confidential interview. December, 2010.

74 Bearak, Barry. "Madagascar Political Rivals Agree to Power-Sharing Deal." New York Times. August 10, 2009. 69

Negotiations commenced agam m October, and led to another breach by Rajoelina in

December, when he sacked his consensus-appointed pnme minister, put m place a military colonel, and formally abandoned any power-sharing peace deal calling for parliamentary elections the following March. Rajoelina' s tendency to break each deal that political actors and the international cmmnunity came to would continue for the next two years. In fact, the one thing that stayed true throughout the entire two years that followed is that Rajoelina never made a single concession.

In March 2010, Rajoelina again backed out of his own agreement, which led to greater international backlash. With the national economy already devastated by the previous year of unrest and instability, new sanctions by the African Union did not offer a fruitful future. 75 The continued struggle for control and fears of a new coup led Rajoelina to sack military officials who had helped him claim the presidency only a year before. 76

Mismanagement and widespread corruption has done little to put Madagascar back on a development track. Instability and a lack of ambient security plagues the entire country.

Banditry has rapidly expanded around Antananarivo that often involves police complicity.

Local polite ''rent" their Kalashnikovs to individuals or groups, allowing bandits to rob cars along the main highways. 77 In Ambalavao, a southern town which famously hosts larger cattle markets, the lack of security enforcement and expansion of banditry and

75 Corbett, Christina. "Is Time Up for Madagascar's Leader, Andry Rajoelina?" BBC News, Madagascar. March 18,2010.

76 "Madagascar Armed Forces Head Refuses to Leave." The Associated Press. April 8, 2010.

77 Interview with military official. January, 20 II. 70

cattle rustling has led to the imposition of curfews and classification of Ambalavao as a

''red zone.··

The events of 2009 were not a decisive victory. Ravalomanana continues to maintain significant support in Madagascar and the conflict continues just as previous ones had. Insecurity has been widespread and severely destructive, exemplified by the several coup attempts in 201 0. In fact, Albert Zafy and Didier Ratsiraka have joined the efforts to restore constitutional order, creating four separate political powers, known as the '"4 mouvances", who each seek a piece of the new order. As becomes obvious, when a leader is kicked out of office, they do not disappear; they just wait their turn.

A coup attempt in May 2010 carried allegations that it was funded by Marc

Ravalomanana and his supporters. A coup attempt in November 2010 led to a 3-day stand-off between anned forces around the capital. 78 These events prompt serious concern and illustrate the continual recurrence of conflict and institutional destruction.

3.9 CONCLUSION

As we have seen, the history of Madagascar is replete with examples of actors employing destructive and destabilizing forms of political competition in an effort to redistribute power. The success of these methods has reinforced their use and led to the continued recurrence of conflict each time actors desire to redistribute power again. The events of 2009 are no exception. It represents a continuation of standard political action actors have employed since independence. The events of 2009 neither constitute a social uprising nor an unexpected and chaotic series of protests. Instead, they were a well-

78 "19 Arrested in Madagascar Coup Allegations." VOA News. Aprill9, 2010. 71

planned and organized process by which several individuals and groups sought to overthrow the current country leadership in order to redistribute power to their benefit, engineered in a way to make it resemble a social movement. The use of this strategy is not new but has in fact been employed multiple times by various actors. This also shows that social movements can be manipulated in a way that can lead to a recurrence of conflict and underdevelopment rather than progressive reform.

The result of these power struggles sets Madagascar on a path of recurring conflict as destructive and destabilizing methods of political competition are reinforced and reused, preventing the institutional development. This process is not expected to change until incentives shift and new norms of political competition are formulated and reinforced to replace the currently destabilizing system of political power struggles actors employ. 4.

MODELING THE 2009 MALAGASY POLITICAL CRISIS

4.1 INTRODUCTION

This chapter examines the effectiveness of strategies and tactics employed by two competing actors in a political power struggle. 1 employ the 2009 Malagasy political crisis as a case and index the series of events that occurred between November 2008 and

May 2009 as they relate to the power struggle. Each event is employed as an independent variable to measure its effect on the political support of each competing actor.

Through this examination makes several important observations. First, I identify and examine the most important events from a series of similar events to detect trends and similarities. Second, I identify effective and ineffective methods of political competition employed by each actor during the political power struggle. Third, 1 identify that the competition is not a zero-sum game but a competition of relative support. Fourth, in identifying the power struggle as a competition for relative support, I argue that it may be more effective for a competitor to remove an opponent's political support than it would be to try to expand their own. In effect, many of the most effective methods employed by competing actors are often destructive and destabilizing, leading to a recurrence of conflict each time actors compete for political power.

4.2 HYPOTHESIS FORMULATION

72 73

4.2.1 Preliminary Hypothesis

From the previous chapter, we are led to believe that the events of February 7,

2009, when the presidential t,ruard gunned down unanned protestors, were a critical moment and turning point in the crisis. However, as the crisis lasted far longer than a single day and repo1is of support waxing and waning tor each opponent throw this hypothesis into question, we will simply establish a model with which to begin a deeper analysis. Figure 5 illustrates the initial hypothesis.

Pre-Febmary 7, 2009: Febmary 7, 2009: Post-february 7, 2009: Ravalomanana maintains ____. Presidential guard ktlls ____. Ravalomanana loses sufficient support 27, injures dozens crittcal support

Figure 5. Preliminary Hypothesis of the 2009 Malagasy Political Crisis

4.3 MODELING THE 2009 MALAGASY POLJTICAL CRISIS

From the detailed nmrative, it would appear that the series of events in 2008 and

2009 generally a more nuanced but cumulative effect than previously believed. Thus, a second model must be developed to account for the added degree of complexity. As described in Chapter One, the events are indexed and scored on an ordinal numerical scale [O=No impact (Ni); 1=Small impact (Si); 2=Large impact (Li); 3=Critical impact

(Ci)]. The impact of each event can be both positive and negative in nature depending on whether the event was beneficial or detrimental to an actm' s political support. Table 1 indexes the primary events of the political crisis. This index is drawn from the researcher's literature review, media review, and expert interviews conducted between

November 2010 and January 2011. The first two score columns represent absolute scores for each particular event (RavA and RajA) while the second two score columns represent 74

the cumulative scores of each actor·s political support (RavC and RajC). These scores take into consideration the values of pnor events and add them together m a chronological and cumulative manner.

Table 1 Index of Events of the 2009 Malagasy Political Crisis No. Date Description RavA RaJA Rave RajC 1 11/17/08 Daewoo announces land lease deal -I 0 -1 -~ 2 12;]3/08 Ravalomanana closes Viva Radio in response to -2 2 -3 2 RaJoclina's interview w1th Ratsiraka 3 0 l/05/09 Ravalomanana purchases Air Force 2 -I 1 -4 3 4 01/24/09 Ra1oelina calls for general strike and protests -I I -5 4 5 01/26/09 Opposition protests, over 100 die -1 -1 -6 3 6 01/31/09 RaJoelina claims to control government I -1 -5 2 7 02/02/09 Ravalomanana fires Rajoelina as mayor I -I -4 I 8 02/04/09 Rajoelina holds rally attended by 1.500 supporters 0 I -4 2 9 02/07/09 Presidential guard fires on protestors -3 2 -7 4 10 02/09/09 Defense Minister resigns in protest -I 1 -8 5 11 02/14/09 Ravalomanana holds rally with 35,000 supporters; 1 I -7 6 Rajoelina holds rally with 10.000 supporters 12 02117/09 Rajoelina holds protest. conducts "sit-ins" near -1 1 -8 7 m mistries 13 02!20109 Opposition enters ministries, later removed by -1 1 -9 8 security forces 14 02/21/09 Ravalomanana and Rajoelina meet to resolve 1 1 -8 9 situation 15 02/25/09 Rajoelina withdraws from talks -I 1 -9 10 16 02/27/09 Protests in Fianarantsoa, 2 die -1 1 -10 11 17 02/28/09 Rajoelina leads rally saying he will continue the -1 1 -II 12 fight 18 03/05/09 Protests in Ambositra, Viva Radio is raided -1 1 -12 13 19 03/07/09 Rajoelina avoids arrest, goes into hiding -1 1 -13 14 20 03/08/09 Camp CAPS AT Military Defection -2 2 -15 16 21 03/10109 General Rasolomahandry threatens coup -] -I -16 15 22 03/11/09 CAPSATForces storm Am1y HQ and force -2 2 -18 17 resignation of General Rasolomahandry 23 03/12/09 Opposition and military take over Ministry of -2 2 -20 19 Finance and Budget 24 03/14/09 Opposition holds PM office, Rajoelina gives -2 2 -22 21 Ravalomanana 4 hours to resign 25 03/15/09 Ravalomanana offers to hold referendum on -1 1 -23 22 whether he should stay in power 26 03/16/09 Opposition forces storm Presidential Palace and -2 2 -25 24 capture Central Bank 27 03117/09 Ravalomanana gives power to military -3 3 -28 27 28 03/18/09 Army announces presidential power transferred to -3 3 -31 30 Rajoelina 75

Table 1 Continued 29 03/19/09 Rajoelina suspends chambers of parliament -2 2 -33 32 30 03/21/09 Rajoelina officially swom in before of 40,000 -3 3 -36 35 supporters 31 03/25/09 Rajoelina invites Ravalomanana's party and others 1 2 -35 37 to join in reconciliation on April 2 and 3 32 03/26/09 Rajoelina gives presidential pardon to 28 political -1 1 -36 38 pnsoners 33 03/27/09 6,000 Ravalomanana supporters gather to protest 1 -1 -35 37 34 03/28/09 15,000 to 20,000 Ravalomanana supporters protest, 1 -1 -34 36 28 injured when broken up by police 35 03/31/09 Rajoelina announces individuals who constitute -1 I -35 37 transitional cabinet 36 04/20/09 People gather to listen to Ravalomanana talk over 1 -1 -34 36 telephone, He appoints Manandafy Rakotonirina as his Prime Minister. After, protestors take to streets and are dispersed with tear gas, several die after being shot 37 04/23/09 Vehicles set on fire and massive looking in 0 -I -34 35 Antananarivo 38 04/29/09 Soldiers stonn Carlton and arrest Prime Minister -I I -35 36 Rakotonirina and other ministers 39 05/23/09 Transitional govemment and Truth and -1 1 -36 37 Reconciliation Commission agreed upon and fonned *Data provtded m th1s table denves from a quahtat1ve scormg of events based on hterature rev1ew, medta review, and expert interviews, between November 2010 and January 2011, conducted by the researcher.

4.4 INITIAL OBSERVATIONS

From this table, we can make several initial observations. First, each event did not impact each actor to the same degree. In effect, opponents do not necessarily have mirrored absolute or cumulative scores. Second, some events did not positively or negatively impact an actor. Third, several events critically impacted political support but they are relatively few in number. Fourth, the cumulative scores indicate a trend in the impact of events that tends to hold constant after the events of February 9, 2009.

Examining the data in another way, Figures 6 and 7 graph the series of events chronologically, via absolute and cumulative scores. Figure 7 illustrates that after the first 76

few events Ravalomanana was regammg support (m late January) However, these gams were Immediately reversed aftet February 7 and nearly every subsequent event mcreased

RaJoehna and decreased Ravalomanana · s po ht1cal supp01 t

4 Februar~ 7, 2009 3

t ~, ~ .Zi. $ 2 ,, f I \ ;ii ' ? if> if 't t\~f 0 ,'• l I ,, .....l Coup d'Etat "v \ t '' C: ~I 1 \ ~ \ 0 I " <; .;: .( 1!7--,f ;- \ ' ' f \' / 2 Jl ' ' 3

4 I 2 3 4 56 7 8 910111213141516171~1920212223242q6272X2930313233343536373X39 rvent Number Rdvalomanana Rdjoehna Fzgure 6 Absolute Cams and Losses ofPolztzcal Support Dw mg the 2009 Malagasy Polztzcal Crzszs 50

30

40 - I 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 II 12131415161718192021222324252627282930313233343536373839 Event Number --+-- Ravalomanana ~RaJoelma Fzgure 7 Cumulatzve Cams and Losses of Polztzcal Support Durzng the 2009 Malagasy Polztzcal Crzszs 77

4.5 MEASUREMENT CONCERNS

4.5.1 Margin of error

As this study employed a qualitative scormg system, I acknowledge that disagreement or concern may arise over the scoring of each event and whether some events were more or less important and deserve higher or lower scores. To account for this concern I cross-analyzed each event against media reports, other literature and expert interviews to ensure that the results are robust.

Though I do not expect much fluctuation to occur, I identify a margin of error between a score of 0 and 1 for particular events. While this may appear to be a large margin of error, several items must be noted. First, scoring concerns are primarily focused on events with a score of 0 or 1 (Ni and Si). All Li and Ci event scores were minimally affected by the margin of error. Second, even if particular events were rescored and a shift in political support occurred, the cumulative scoring maintains the same trend for each actor. In addition, ifNi and Si events are removed from the index, the cumulative impact still holds and reveals the same trend of gains and losses for each actor.

This is illustrated in Figure 8, where all events scoring less than 2 were removed (original event numbers are left the same for data referencing). Thus, while there may be some debate over the significance of some events, this study is not intended to qualitatively defrne the exact score or importance of each event in and of itself, but rather the combined significance of all events during the crisis to illustrate trends and identify key events. 78

30

February 7, 2009 20 t: 0 0... g- 10 (/)

ro ~ ~ Coup d'Etat 0 0 0....

~ 0 %""'=..,., u -10 ro 0... ~ ~

-20 '

-30 2 9 20 22 23 24 26 27 28 29 30 31 Event Number Rava1omanana -djj1- RaJoe1ma Figure 8. Simplzfied Cumulative Gains and Losses of Political Support During the 2009 Malagasy Polztical Crisis (Li and Ci Only)

4.5.2 Quahtative Scoring

The scoring scale(+ or-; 0 to 3) was detennined by the researcher and simplified for demonstrative purposes. Other scoring rubrics can be utilized to provide greater detai I if the data is available. Neither absolute nor cumulative scoring is expected to have 100% accuracy. Rather, they are intended to illustrate the impact of each event on each actor's political support to identify differences between the two.

4.5.3 Initial Scoring

It should be noted that the opponents' initial scores were not likely 0 at the onset of the power struggle. However, for demonstrative purposes, each actor's score was set to

0 to illustrate the cumulative impact of each event rather than their actual degree of political support. Employing an initial support score would better represent their actual degree of support. To provide an example, Figure 9 sets Ravalomanana's initial score at 5 79

and graphs each actor's cumulative scores accordingly. Notice that the lines now intersect at several events, but stJll maintam the same diverging impact trend after event 9

(February 7. 2009). Setting the initial scores based on a qualitative assessment of their actual mitial poht1cal suppmi may be a more accurate representation of the power struggle.

'iO

40

30 t 0 0.. 0.. February 7, 2009 ::::; 20 VJ cv u 10 .§ ~ 0 Coup d'Etat 0... 0 0 ~ -10 0.. ~l - -20

-lO

-40 I 2 3-15 6 7 R 9101112131415161718192021222324252627282930313233343536373839 Event Number

Ravalomanana ~Rajoelina Figure 9. Cumulative Gains and Losses ofPolitical Support During the 2009 Malagasy Political Crisis (Ravalomanana Initial Score=5)

4.6 STRATEGIC AND TACTICAL OBSERVATIONS

In a speech by former president Marc Ravalomanana, he explicitly outlined Andry

Rajoelina' s strategy to seize the government by two of these components: terrorize the population and destabilize the country. 1 By identifying these actions as deliberate and

1 Ravalomanana, Marc. "Speech of His Excellency Marc Ravalomanana," presented at SADC Er:traordznarJ Summit March 30, 2009. Swaziland. 80

manipulated, the examination of the Malagasy case shifts from an example of a social uprising or popular movement to a case of a well-organized, highly manipulated elite power struggle and highlights a key concept that helps to explain why Kalyvas describes civil wars as "sticky"- and why contlict recurs in Madagascar.

4.6.1 Action--Reaction

The analysis shows that leaders must take careful precautions along each range of actions. Taking no action can sometimes permit the opponent to manipulate social forces without consequences. However, overreacting to situations is far more detrimental to popular support maintenance. The events and analysis of the 2009 Malagasy political crisis give direct evidence to the conclusion that overreaction will lead to a critical loss of support and can affect more than just social support. That being said, a firm stance against violence has shown to be effective in polishing an image of honor and purity.

Rajoelina's response to Ravalomanana's overreactions placed him as the innocent and righteous opponent to a dictator in the eyes of the people. The use of lethal force should rarely, if ever, be used. A policy of "don't shoot first" would be an effective means to establish a defensive position, rather than one of aggression. Holding other issues constant, popular support will likely maintain a strong stance against an over-reactor, while instigating overreaction can cause lives to be lost in the process.

Finally, engaging an opponent often runs the risk of legitimizing an otherwise unsupported cause. The closing down of Viva Radio strengthened the support of the opposition. Admittedly, maintaining a ''wait-and-see" policy, with its lack of consequences, may reinforce bad behavior, as evidenced by Ravalomanana's eschewal of 81

the opposition's development in the early months of the cns1s. In response, careful analysis wi1l help to discern when and what degree of response a situation ca1ls for.

For a president, it is important to take calculated steps when responding to a political movement. Overreaction can shitt the balance of support in a single, decisive mistake. Crucial is the ability to acquire good intelligence about the opposition's strategy in order to respond to sensitive issues, avoid misdirection, and refrain from emphasis on concerns that are not relevant to their central objectives.

For an opposition leader, the key is to publicly delegitimize the leader and use strong rhetoric against the government to instigate reaction. Public responses can increase support and legitimize the movement. By instigating reactions, especia1ly overreactions, an opposition leader can exploit events to show that a leader is oppressive and has betrayed his people. In contrast, an opposition leader who overreacts can quickly lose legitimacy, as when Rajoelina overstepped his bounds and claimed that he ruled the country too early, weakening his support. To note, in many cases the opposition leader risks losing his life if he is too vocal, so this point may be case dependent.

4.6.2 Reform-Rigidity

In a contest with a fmite amount of supporters, absolute gains are less relevant. A leader must ensure that his political support is stronger and more widespread relative to his important. Because of this, it is important to continually adjust and reform policy and strategies to ensure they are continually effective vis-a-vis the leader's opponent.

For a president, it is critical to remain dynamic and reform policies as the opposition adjusts and the movement changes paths. Knowing that the opposition is 82

attempting to instigate overreaction, strategic reform 1s a useful method to moderate response relative to opposition actions.

In contrast, an opposition leader must constantly reform policies and strategies to attack and exploit the weak points of the president's policies and strategies. Hitting a wall with your fist will not be very effective but carefully removing a keystone will weaken an entire structure with minimal effort. Once weak points are found, they must be exploited as rapidly as possible. Leaders will likely realize the dangers of their current policies and quickly adjust their strategy in response.

4. 6. 3 Inclusion-Exclusion

Inclusion and exclusion likely encompass the most complex range of actions that a president and opposition leader can use. The use of this range requires excellent intelligence of your opponent in order to be able to target individuals and groups for inclusion and exclusion. Stealing support fi·om your opponent is a critical, though a difficult task. It is important to understand what the people want and to attempt to provide it to them.

For a president, concessiOns to opposition supporters can undermine the opposition's statements and legitimacy. It provides an image of a functional, participatory government which is able to reform relative to the citizen's requests. However, attention must be given to the degree of concessions offered. By providing the wrong type of concessions or including the wrong people (corrupt officials, terrorists, etc.), this action can actually damage a leader's position. The key for a president is to re-include the supporters that he may have lost or the opposition gained. 83

Exclusion can be detrimental and divisive, further creating a strong opposition movement. Individuals or groups that arc excluded will often breed resentment and can provide a strong and effective anti-governmental weapon. Though Ravalomanana called for dialogue between the two pmiies, he also used heavy force to suppress opposition protests and often shut down rally points. These actions likely crystallized the opposition's perception that Ravalomanana was the enemy and could not be dealt with peacefully, but only through force. Polarizing parties as a governmental leader can be devastating to social force management. lt will likely close access to the opposition and weaken the support a leader already possesses due to the aggressive nature of the measures.

Similarly, the opposition leader must attempt to include as many supporters in his target audience as possible while excluding the president and his government. This effectively differentiates the opposition movement from the government and those in power. By doing so, a leader divides the government from the people and establishes an image of a broken connection between the governors and the governed as well as a rally point that is outside the confines of the dysfunctional state. By avoiding dialogue and discussion with Ravalomanana, Rajoelina strongly increased the division between the two groups as the crisis ensued.

Opposition leaders must also remember that every supporter counts, and to vary as much as possible with the target support groups. Support should include political, military, and popular support. Attempts should be made to show that these groups do not support the current president or his government. As in the 2009 Malagasy cns1s, 84

Rajoelina effectively created a stronger movement by dividing the people and the government, thereby weakening its support while not always and necessarily increasing his own support. By showing that these groups do not support the leader, many will conclude that they therefore supp01i the opposition movement, regardless of the veracity of this claim. In effect, the opposition strengthens and increases its power and support.

Overall, the central strategy is not necessarily to gain support for yourself, but to ensure that your opponent loses support.

4. 7 ANALYSIS OF EVENT IMP ACTS

4. 7.1 Critical Events

From this examination, we can identify several of the most important events that likely determined the outcome of the 2009 Malagasy political crisis. The events prior to the coup focused more on Rajoelina attempting to take legitimate control of the government while Ravalomanana defended it, whereas after the coup, the roles were reversed. Therefore, their actions also reversed as they switched from offense to defense

(Rajoelina), and vice versa (Ravalomanana).

As we can derive from Table 1, five of the seven large impact and critical impact events involved military engagement, underlining the importance of military support during a political power struggle. 2 In addition, a majority of the events (27 of 39) had a small impact on the actual political support, while the majority of large impact and critical impact events are groups around the time of the coup. These observations have

2 Several diplomats, politicians and military officials made the same remark. In particular, once Ravalomanana had lost the support of the military, it was just a matter of time. Interviews conducted by researcher, November 2010 to January 2011. 85

two implications: (a) that beyond the few critical events, the power struggle was rather nuanced and involved many small maneuvers to diminish or usurp the opponent's support;

(b) that once power changed hands, Rajoelina took large steps to immediately crystallize his legitimacy as the new president. An alternative implication to (b) is that the office of the Presidency still conferred some form of legitimacy by itself, which would also explain the significant impact of his attempts to bolster his position.

4.7.2 February 7, 2009

This analysis supports the hypothesis that the events of February 7, 2009 were the definitive shifting point of the political power struggle. February 7 had a huge impact on each actor's political support and initiated a linear pattern of losses for Ravalomanana and gains for Rajoelina that did not significantly fluctuate until after the coup. As

Kalyvas notes, "political actors hold symmetrical intentions to extenninate each other's

'civilian basis'". 3 In other words, a key goal of each competitor is to remove the opponent's support. The events of February 7 did exactly that as such protest arose over

Ravalomanana' s actions, there was little to do but join the fight against him.

This model has also identified that February 7 was not the only event that had a large impact prior to the coup. The closure of Viva Radio, military defections, and subsequent attacks on Ministries, Ministers and the Presidential Palace had a very determinative effect on the political support for each actor. In the public's eye, seeing an oppressive President take such harsh action against the people's lives, freedom of speech,

3 Kalyvas, Stathis N. The Logic of Violence in Civil War. Cambridge University Press: New York. 2006.p.31 86

and ability to protest, and then seeing that the military no longer supported the regime catalyzed the growing belief that Ravalomanana was no longer and should no longer be allowed to act as President of the Republic while strenf,rthening the belief that Rajoelina and his movement were a legitimate and preferable alternative. At the same time,

Rajoelina and the opposition's occupation of government buildings was an effective method to strengthen political support and legitimize their movement while simultaneously weakening Ravalomanana's power and control. This strategy was similar to that employed by Albert Zafy' s movement in 1991 against Didier Ratsiraka. as we observed in Chapter 3.

4.8 ANALYSIS OF ACTORS' ACTIONS

4.8.1 Marc Ravalomanana

Several observations can be made about the actions of Marc Ravalomanana during the political power struggle. First, although Africa admittedly expenences widespread and varying degrees of corruption, there is always a tipping point. For the

Malagasy, this occurred when the Daewoo deal, set to lease 60% of Madagascar's arable land for 99 years, was unearthed. The Malagasy, who share a deep, traditional connection with their land, saw this action as a violation of loyalty to the people, and took action against his misuse of office and power.

Further, Ravalomanana did not react well to the creation of an oppositional political movement. Instead of quelling an uprising, he instigated the need to support one.

By targeting Viva Radio, Ravalomuanana put Rajoelina in a perfect position to step into the opposition's leadership role. He was young, charismatic, a vocal supporter of greater 87

freedoms through his radio station, and, perhaps most important, was directly affected by the harsh hand of Ravalomanana. Shutting down the opposition radio and television stations only increased domestic and international protest. Ravalomanana encouraged the opposition movement by demonstrating his oppressive tendencies through the violent suppression of any and all opposition. Yet the harsher he was, the more he lost support, and the stronger opposition grew. As we observed, most significant damage dealt to his support was a result of his overreaction and use of lethal force against unarmed citizens on February 7, 2009. This overreaction against Malagasy citizens ostensibly exercising their right to protest strengthened the opposition's suppmi, damaged his own image, triggered divisiveness within the military, garnered international criticism, and appears to be the catalyzing event that ultimately led to his removal from the presidency.

Ravalomanana should have known better than to use such force against the population. As Chapter 3 showed, both Philibert Tsiranana and Didier Ratsiraka had made the same mistake in 1972 and 1991 respectively by firing on peaceful demonstrators. By not taking more measured steps and more careful precautions,

Ravalomanana severely weakened his political support and the opposition movement directly profited. By the time that he realized his mistake and began seeking inclusive dialogue between sides, it was already too late.

Additionally, Ravalomanana maintained the nearly same rigid exclusive strategy throughout most of the power struggle. Shutting down the opposition's media sources and using force did not serve him well. The same "wait-and-see'· strategy that Tsiranana had employed in 1972 may have worked had he not decided to begin violently 88

suppressing protests shortely thereafter. Even after seeing the negative impact of his strategy, he did not rcfonn it; he only became more oppressive. By sticking to the same strategy until it was too late, Ravalomanana was not able to dynamically cater to changing interests and fluctuations of political support as they continually shifted throughout the several months of the power struggle.

Finally, Ravalomanana only offered to include the opposition and the neutrals beyond his own supporters after he had lost significant political support and started fearing complete loss of control of the country. ln the beginning, he shrugged off the opposition as a "political hiccup," allowing it to gain significant political support. Had he paid lip service to the complaints, implemented a strategy of inclusion, aggressively pursued dialogue between sides earlier, or attempted to steal support from Rajoelina rather than validating the reasons for Rajoelina's popular support, the events may have played out differently. Ravalomanana could have also attempted to directly exclude

Rajoelina from the movement earlier by placing him in jail before divisions existed within the military. When the president did finally attempt to arrest Rajoelina months into the breakdown of the government, Rajoelina easily escaped, likely with the support of the sedi6ous military that had turned away from Ravalomanana's violence.

In sum, overreaction and a rigid strategy of exclusion of both opposition leaders and opposition supporters led to the dual effects of weakening support for the president and increasing support for the opposition.

4.8.2 Andry Rajoelina 89

In contrast, Andry Rajoelina's actions proved to be very effective. The political and social environment was already seething with presidential opposition, which set the foundation for Rajoelina and an opposition to form around and gather rapid support. By airing an interview with the former exiled president, Didier Ratsiraka, Rajoelina anticipated that he would trigger a strong, critical reaction from the current president.

When his strategy proved conect, he utilized the resulting suppression of both himself and the media as a representation of Ravalomanana's abuse of power. He fanned the anger and resentment with harsh labels like "dictator", "terrorist", and by claiming that foreign aid vvas being diverted to support the president's lavish lifestyle, which further ignited the population. Thinking he had gained sufficient support, Rajoelina claimed that he was running the country after the early violent protests in January. This claim, however, did not achieve the expected result of elevating him to the presidency and forcing Ravalomanana out, and he experienced a brief crisis of legitimacy, slowing his political movement's growing power.

Unlike Ravalomanana, Rajoelina and the opposition were flexible enough to quickly reform their strategy, and attacked the president through legal channels by filing impeachment papers while continuing to call for more protests and strikes. Expecting the president to respond harshly, Rajoelina only had to wait until the president went too far with his suppressiOn. Fortunately for him, Ravalomanana's violent overreaction on

February 7, shooting unarmed protestors, occurred only a week after Rajoelina's unsupported claim to power. Rajoelina and the opposition's credibility and support were restored immediately and the opposition movement was stronger than ever. This grave 90

mistake by the president also weakened his support among the military, which Rajoelina exploited to the fullest extent by paying off military forces to defect and join their movement.

Finally, Rajoelina utilized both inclusion and exclusion to his advantage. He reinforced the support he had already gained, while also calling to Ravalomanana's supporters and the military to transfer their allegiance to his movement. His manipulation of Ravalomanana to instigate government repression also brought him international support, which further weakened the president's political support. When the president finally made overtures of dialogue, his invitations were wholeheartedly rejected by

Rajoelina, who claimed that the president only had his personal business interests in mind and Rajoelina would not negotiate. By excluding the president from dialogue with the movement and distancing himself from the malfunctioning government, Rajoelina did not allow his movement to be tainted by or drawn into the problems the government was experiencing (even those he was causing for the government). By keeping the movement

"pure", he maintained popular support and strong separation from the regime, which helped to weaken its foundation.

Preexisting political instability, strategic reform, opponent antagonization, public and military inclusion, and government exclusion provided the opposition leader with high levels of political support and success in achieving the opposition's goals. A key consideration is that it was not only Rajoelina's strategy but the effects of his strategy that played a part; in particular, the errors and missteps of his opponent. It is important to remember that an opponent's errors are a crucial part of an effective strategy and one of 91

the key reasons why strategic reform IS necessary m order to properly exploit the predicted responses.

4.8 CONCLUSION

As the analysis has indicated, qualitative modeling of the 2009 Malagasy political crisis supports the hypothesis that the events of February 7, 2009 were one of, if not the most, critical events in definitively shifting political support away t1-om Ravalomanana and toward Rajoelina. This has several implications. First, a singular critical event, in this case a mistake by one actor, can pennanently damage the political suppmi of an actor for the remainder of a power struggle. Second, as noted previously, ce1iain individuals and groups have the option to shift their support and resources between competing actors. In effect, a loss to one competitor may be a gain to another. Therefore, political power struggles are not a zero-sum game but a competition for relative support and it may be more e±Tective to remove an opponent's support than to expand your own.

Analysis of the 2009 Malagasy political crisis also illustrated that measured and moderated action, continual reform, and selective inclusion and exclusion are critical components to an effective strategy to win a political power struggle over legitimate control of a state. A cyclical process of strategic assessment should then be employed to ensure continued dynamism of the method of engagement: cause, action, reaction, lesson/output, cause. 4

4 Kilcullen, David. The Accidental Guerrilla: Fighting Small Wars in the Midst ofa Big One. Oxford University Press: New York, NY. 2009. 92

A president has the far more difficult task of defending the government since it is nearly impossible to directly attack a political movement However, the president also has the state· s institutions at his disposaL Where inclusion is possible, it should always be preferred. However, while gaining support is necessary for the development of a political movement, it is not sufficient. The opposition leader's most important goal is to cause the president to respond. By maintaining a dynamic strategy and exploiting weaknesses, the opposition leader can effectively instigate oveneaction and rally anti-govemmental protests under a common cause.

Exclusion and isolation only breeds resentment, but overreaction or no action can exacerbate conflict. Rigid policy and strategies will quickly become anachronistic to an organic movement or strategy. Therefore, actors must maintain an adaptive and evolutionary method of engagement and response relative to the environment and opponent they face. It is crucial to remember that the most important action may not necessarily be to expand your own political support, but to ensure that your opponent continues to lose theirs. Relative gains are the key to a war of ideas.

Perhaps of most importance to this study is the fact that many of the methods employed by both actors were destabilizing and by no means new. Creating shadow govemments, occupying govemment buildings, instigating military defections, and firing on protestors have all been historically employed in previous political struggles in

Madagascar. Thus, the examination of each actor's methods of political competition during the 2009 political power struggle alludes to trends that extend beyond the events of 2009. The most effective methods tend to be the most destructive and destabilizing, as 93

well as the most commonly employed. The reuse of these strategies and tactics indicates that their effectiveness reinforces their continued employment. Due to this trend and their divisive and destabilizing nature, the country is swept into violent conflict each time actors employ these methods and compete for political power. 5.

EXAMINING THE MALAGASY POLITICAL ENVIRONMENT

5.1 INTRODUCTION

Having examined the political power struggle during the 2009 Malagasy political crisis, this chapter turns to the nonns and structure of the Malagasy political system. ln the previous chapter, I identified specific forms of political competition between two actors in a single power struggle that led to violence, conflict, and destabilization. This chapter explores the political environment to understand why actors employ these methods and why they succeed.

Utilizing eyewitness reports, expert interviews, and other resources, 1 identify variables that impact political behaviors and competition. I conclude that the political structure of Madagascar is not currently calibrated for long-term development but fixated on elite opportunism and short-term exploitation, often supported or influenced by external actors. Actors reinforce destabilizing political norms of behavior, instigating contentious political competition between political actors and leading them to prioritize short-term benefits, capitalize on short-term gains, and ignore development and reformation of the state structure that would prevent the future recurrence political crises.

The political structure of Madagascar encourages this cycle of destructive politics, although such behaviors are also influenced and employed by international actors.

94 95

5.2 POLITICAL STRUCTURES

In this section, I identify those aspects of Madagascar's political structure that I posit help to explain the recurrence of destructive and conflict-inducing political competition: patronage networks and political party personalization.

5.2.1 ''Warlord Politics''

William Reno put forth a convincing argument that political authority derives from ''the decisions of specific individuals who act to serve their private interests. largely without regard for formal government instih1tions, rules, or processes." 1 While his case studies were Liberia, Sierra Leone, the Democratic Republic of Congo and Nigeria, the central argument is still relevant to the case of Madagascar. Among Madagascar· s rulers, particularly Ratsiraka, Ravalomanana, and Rajoelina, there is documented evidence that they mixed state and personal interests and authoritarian tendencies often based on near delusional feelings of omnipotence. 2 In several instances, this abuse of political power triggered opposition protests and conflict.

5.2.2 "The Men Behind the Curtains"

''We have a class of politicians, but then we have behind the scenes the so called faction powers who finance different things. You will never see them."'

1 Reno, William. Warlord Politics and African States. Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers. 1998. p. IX

2 During an interview, one political official noted that Rajoelina had said during a meeting that "he thinks he's almost sent by god ... he has convinced himself that he is doing the lord's work and that he is on some divine mission." Interviewed by author. November, 2010.

3 Interview with political official. December, 2010. 96

What Reno's examination does not mention IS the network of advisors and financiers that leaders rely on, that is, the leaders' patronage system. These individuals can significantly impact a leader's maintenance or loss of power. Reno focuses on how leaders make decisions to maintain their power, not the causes of transition. Strategic maintenance of power is only one side to the coin. The other, of course, is identification of strategic failures that cause loss of power and even loss of position. One of the primary reasons Ravalomanana lost power in 2009 was the defection of the military who saw an opportunity to gain from restructuring their power relationships. Chapter 4 showed how these individuals and groups formed behind Rajoelina at the advent of the crisis.

In Madagascar, these support networks are comprised of military, political, and private industry elites along with many international supporters and financiers,

4 particularly from France and China . It is difficult to pinpoint many of these groups as their support can shift between leaders rapidly depending on the changes distribution of power and profit which is why one political official noted that everything, even loyalty, was for sale. 5

One reason loyalties change is the personalization of political parties and their evolution as neopatrimonial networks in Madagascar. Such a system encourages those individuals working behind leaders to become opportunistic, shifting sides whenever it is deemed personally beneficial and undermining the development of political ideologies,

4 In particular, French and Chinese fmancing and connections will be discussed in 5.3.3.2 Illicit Trade Networks and Environmental Corruption and 5.4 International Engagement.

5 Interviewed by author. November, 2010. 97

aggregations of social interest, and the fonnulation of mass support for the current leaders.

For example, Norbert Ratsirahonana, fonner Prime Minister of Albert Zafy and acting

President of Madgascar after his impeachment, has held high level positions in every regime since the 1990s. Within two weeks after the coup in 2009, Ratsirahonana had become one of the 44 members of the ruling body of the HAT regime. As one political official explained:

.. I put it in a picture like a train. You have just one train here. And the ones involved in politics, the only thing they want is to be the driver. Every three, four, five, SL'< years, you have a crisis, the driver gets kicked out. But he·s not starting a parallel train. He is immediately tlying to jump on the last car that comes again after a couple years. What you see here, who is involved, if s always the same. If you look at the names that were here in the Second, the Third Republic, they come up again. They shift from one position to another.-'6

In effect, rather than a fonnation of political parties and easily identifiable political elites, you have pm1icular leaders who aggregate interests and benefits through a personal network. As the Chapter 3 identified, the four most recent presidents continued to struggle over political power for more than two years after the 2009 crisis. Though exiled, these leaders still maintained significant support and strong personal networks in the country, continually seeking new and competing distributions of power and profit.

In consequence, the weak institutional structure of the political system, the opportunistic and manipulative tendencies of leaders, and the shifting tendencies of leaders' support networks leave Madagascar prone to experiencing a cyclical recurrence of conflict and destabilization each time a political competition redistributes power.

5.2.3 Neopatrimonialism in Madagascar

6 Interviewed by author. December, 201 0. 98

"In neopatrinomial regimes. the chief executive maintains authority through personal patronage, rather than through ideology and laws. As with classic patrimonialism, the right to rule is ascribed to a person rather than an office. In contemporary neopatrimonialism, relationships of loyalty and dependence pervade a fom1al political and administrative system and leaders occupy bureaucratic offices less to perf01m public service than to acquire personal wealth and status.-'7

PoWical parties and political support groups in Madagascar were historically created by elites vying for power. While the first political parties were creaded during the interwar period, most parties emerged in Madagascar after World War II as a mechanism to govern the country after the end of colonial rule. Unfortunately, authoritarianism distorted the concept of political parties, establishing a ''personalization of party politics.'·8 Such a structure runs counter to the more liberal democratic formation of a political party: one that centralizes on a particular ideology enumerated in a written platfonn as a set of goals the party seeks to accomplish. Elite authoritarianism as a method of governance and regime organization is not unique to Madagascar. Similar forms of authoritarian rule under the auspices of "free and fair" multi-party elections occur across the globe in countries like the Ivory Coast, Nigeria, Russia, Uzbekistan and

Venezuela.

In Madagascar, political parties have served less as instruments of democracy and more as tools of neopatrimonial rule. 9 Richard Marcus' analysis of political parties in

Madagascar identified Didier Ratsiraka's Vanguard of the Malagasy Revolution

7 Bratton, Michael and Nicolas Van de Walle. "Neopatrimonial Regimes and Political Transitions in Africa," World Politics, 46(4): 453-489. July, 1994. p. 458

8 ibid., p. 496

9 Marcus, Richard and Adrien Ratsimbaharison. "Political Parties in Madagascar: Neopatrimonial Tools or Democratic Instruments?" Party Politics, 11(4): 495-512. July 2005. 99

(AREMA) as little more than an ehte-clientelistic party, intemally organized along particularistic factions; Zafy Albert's I le1y Velona party was an electoralist catch-all party with little ideology and the primary goal of aggregating social interests to win elections and govem; Marc Ravalomanana" s Tiako i Madigasikara (TIM) party was an elite-personalistic party. 10 What these parties all shared is a neopatrimonial leadership that was used to sustain them.

As Marcus highlights, ·'these differences reflect the combined influence of

Madagascar· s historical development and the underlying pattern of social cleavages, ethnicity, in particular, on the range of conflicting political interests that successive neopatrimonial leaders have tried to accommodate.,. Any party development that has occurred. particularly after 1992's reintroduction of true multi-party politics, has been hindered by the influence elite-based neopatrimonial networks.

Research on Madagascar has indicated that where electoral democracy focuses on processes of exclusion, the results must produce an indisputable outcome or else the democratization process will be put in jeopardy. 11 As the previous chapters have exemplified, methods of exclusion abound in Malagasy political competition, which helps to explain much of the often violent contestation between political leaders during

10 ibid., p. 497

11 Marcus, Richard R and Pau I Razafindrakoto. "Partie ipat ion and the poverty of electoral democracy in Madagascar," Afrika Spectrum, 38(1): 27-48. 2003. 100

elections in Madagascar: political transitions from neopatrimonial regm1es originate m soc1a. I protest. 12

We must then ask the question: did neopatrimonialism end when the president was overthrown and a nnv transition to "democratic'' rule was implemented in 2009?

Much of the evidence suggests that the neopatrimonial roots remained intact and some indicates that they may have grown stronger. 13 As the discussion in Chapters 3 and 4 also indicate, the events of 2009 do not characterize the large-scale social movement it may have resembled on the ground, but rather a competing network vying for a redistribution of political power. As one political official noted:

"We don't have any debates. We don·t have any programs ... Now, you should probably ask the candidates, 'what are you doing for my daughter? Do I give you my vote or not?· Bnt here if s not that case. The case is different. TI1ey look for the messiah ... Rajoelina is the new Messiah." 14

Political leaders fight to be the "Big Man" in the country in order to use these patrimonial networks to maintain power and control. 15 Thus, it is still the personal relationships rather than the office, ideology, or law that defines power and until such a systetn is uprooted there can be no true social probrress, 110 genuine econotnic improvement, and no relief for the impoverished majority.

12 Bratton, Michael and Nicolas Van de Walle. "Neopatrimonial Regimes and Political Transitions in Africa," World Politics, 46(4): 453-489. July, 1994. p. 460

13 Marcus, Richard R. "Marc the Medici? TI1e Failure of a New Fom1 ofNeopatrimonial Rule in Madagascar," Political Science Quarterly, 125(1 ): 111-131. 2010.

14 Interviewed by author. December, 2010.

15 Callaghy, TI10mas. The State-Society Struggle: Zaire in Comparative Perspective. New York: Columbia University Press. 1984. I 0 1

Since this style of governance and political affiliation is often so exclusive and polarizing, opponents and opposition groups will go beyond standard political procedures in order to ensure victory, often resulting in violent extra-legal power struggles and a reinforcement of political norms that emphasize destructive political competition and instability.

Leaders prefer to build their personal networks instead of state institutions because they are more profitable. There is a reluctance to invest in institution-building as such institutions risk putting their power in check. Thus, deliberate effmis are often made to weaken institutions and strengthen personal networks. This behavior also instigates significant interest-shifting and reorganization of leaders' support structures. creating a very fluid and fragile political structure. Much of 2009 and 2010 were characterized by continual institutional reorganization by those in office through the daily passage of new laws, often with little debate, intended for the direct and immediate benefit (primarily their private investments) of the office holders. As such, the institutional structure changed on a nearly daily basis. Such behavior implies that political actors arc working together far less than one would might assume which means that (a) the regime is hollow and lacks trust and (b) they recognize this and are consequently trying to profit as much as they can at each moment, since they expect at any time the restructuring or overthrow that will sever their sources of power and profit. Such an attitude underlines the desire to capitalize on short-term gains whenever and wherever possible. Thus, divisions within elites, society, and others foment self-serving opportunism and destabilization that focuses on accruing short-term benefits. 102

5.3 POLITICAL NORMS IN MALAGASY POLITICS

5.3.1 Challenges to Institutional Development

Social nonns are the rules and standards of a group that guide or constrain their values, beliefs, attitudes and behaviors. They are the foundation of politics and social organization. In rural Madagascar, such unwritten rules have been effective means to manage protected areas. In Ve1ondriake, a community-managed protected area m southwestern Madagascar, local customs and social norms (known as dina) were legalized to reduce conflict with national laws regarding resource use, effectively decentralizing governance of natural resources to local levels, generating greater compliance with legal regulations, and supporting institutional development. 16 However, institutionalization of a nonn usually needs to develop from a local level rather than be imposed from a national, regional, or international level, in order to foment compliance.

Top-down institutionalization of social norms can conflict with pre-existing local norms, creating legal contradictions and institutional inetTiciency, as well as removing powerful local mechanisms for developing social cohesion. 17 Similar observations were made in

Madagascar where dina were imposed by external agencies or when they were not aligned with community aspirations. The result was poor compliance with the rules and a

16 Gildas, Andriamalala and Charlie J. Gardner. "L'utilisation du dina comme outil de gouvemance des ressources naturelles: le<;ons tires de Velondriake, sud-ouest de Madagascar,'· Tropical Conservation Science, 3(4): 447-472. 2010.

17 Blazek, Sawyer. "Legal Flexibility: A Comparative Study of African & Southeast Asian Regional Norm Legalization," Presented at the Annual Whitehead Colloquium. New Jersey: Seton Hall University. April, 2010. 103

breakdown of hierarchical enforcement procedures. 18 Such a breakdown of procedures, particularly at a national level, can have a severely destabilizing effect on a state.

In addition to nonn compliance, norm reinforcement can be progressive or severely destabilizing depending on the norm. In the United Nations, increasing reference has been made to the issue area of "women, peace and security'', reflecting norms that are gradually becoming institutionalized in the organization. 19 At the other end of the spectrum, actors may take deliberate steps to ignite conflict in order to forge new power relationships and gain from them. 20 In observing the effectiveness and benefit of such actions, actors may decide to employ similar techniques in the future, reinforcing nonnative ideas of the benefit of destabilizing and manipulative activities.

Political norms are a subset of social nom1s that guide or constrain the values, beliefs, attitudes and behaviors of political actors. In general, such nonns are aggregated behaviors from millions of individuals meaning a single individual is usually not able to influence or change the nonn. In fact, political norms are quite malleable as they often represent the behaviors of a far smaller community of individuals. This leaves them sensitive to the impact of particular events and individuals. In Madagascar, years of poor governance and elite opportunism have generated many destructive po1i6ca1 nonns. Two of these norms, political divisiveness and political and economic opportunism, will be

18 Gildas, Andriamalala and Charlie J. Gardner. "L'utilisation du dina comme outil de gouvemance des ressources naturelles: levons tires de Velondriake, sud-ouest de Madagascar," Tropical Conservation Science, 3(4): 447-472. 2010

19 Tryggestad, Torunn L. "The UN Peacebuilding Commission and Gender: A Case ofNorm Reinforcement," International Peacekeeping, 17(2): 159-171. 2010.

20 Eide, Espen Bart. "'Conflict Entrepreneurship': On the' Art' of Waging Civil War," PRIG Report, 4. 1997. pp. 44 104

discussed in detail. These examples are meant to illustrate the potential destructive impact of particular political norms.

5.3.2 Political Divisiveness

5.3.2.1 Ethnicity

"In a poor country like Madagascar, the first power IS money, but the second power m Madagascar IS ethnical ... " 21

Racism and classism are still very prevalent in Madagascar. In most cases, one would expect this to tangentially influence politics and social interaction. However, ethnic divisions, particularly the divide the Merina and the Cotiers, are exploited to repress one while benefit the other. Depending on which leader or patronage network is in power, the group that benefits can vary. For example, if a Merina president is in power,

Cotiers are usually excluded from holding governmental positions; if a Co tier is in power, the Merina are usually excluded these positions. In this way, poilitical leaders and their patronage networks use these divisions to control the population by fragmenting opposition in a way that makes it easier to maintain oneself in power. For example, in

Chapter 3 I discussed Tsiranana's strategic reliance on France to ensure that the Merina population would not usurp his regime's control. In a more recent example, one leadership advisor indicated in an interview that Marc Ravalomanana was heavily criticized for only working with people of the Merina or Betsileo ethnic groups, both

21 Interview with Malagasy politician. December, 2010. 105

groups from the Central Highlands, and excluding the C6tiers. 22 These two examples highlight how leadership can be divisive for personal power and profit

In many cases, ethnic divisions run parallel to socioeconomic divisions. Historical access to education has been disparate between the Merina groups living in the Central

Highlands, who have had greater access to education, while the coastal communities of the C6tiers have had less. Thus, the Merina-Cotiers ethnical division also becomes a socioeconomic division.

Another Malagasy politician highlighted political divisiveness by noting "the ethnic problem m Madagascar 1s a false problem. We use it as a problem." 23 The tendency of political actors to utilize these divisions extends back to the first post­ independence leader, President Philibert Tsiranana, who was fond of saying that

Madagascar was the only true Afro-Asian country. 24 This divisiveness is one reason why ethnic lines and ethnic tensions, particularly the division between the Merina and C6tiers, are always brought up in political speeches and debates around election time.

5.3.2.2 Biases in International Engagement

These divisions and preferences do not stop at the territorial borders of

Madagascar but also extend both toward international engagement and from external actors that engage the Malagasy. For example, external assistance and internally-based conflict resolution has been severely disrupted by racism in Madagascar. When

22 Interview with Malagasy politician. December, 2010.

23 Interviewed by author. December, 2010.

24 Brown, Mervyn. A History ofMadagascar. Princeton: Markus Wiener Publishers. 2006. p. 303 106

chscussmg mtematlonal mvolvement m the 2009 pohtlcal cnsis, several Malagasy

1 cspondents noted that Afncans could not help them and the Southem Afncan

Development Commumty (SADC) would not be effective, pnmanly because It IS Afncan and they are not

A tnLan can't <>olve the problems by Atncans We are not Afncan<> at 75 all ~o [the)] can't do [1t] 1t's not effective at all "

6 Jt hds to be \r\hrte to1ergners It can't be Afncan foreigners ,,?

Ethmc diVISions have also mtegrated mto the calculatiOns of extemal actors m sevei al ways First, as one diplomat explamed, engagement m Madagascar must factor m racism because of the degree that It will Impact the effectiveness of the engagement"

'It'<> been trustratmg tor SADC, 1t's been fmstratmg tor the AfiJcan Un 1011, dnd for the UN, part1cu larly the UN because 1t' s not an A fncan orgamzatwn The Malaga<>y are really qmte racist Certamly the Merma are, and the notwn that a bunch of Afncam gomg there to help them ~OI1 out the1r problem<; I'> almo~t mconceivable to them Yes they are pohtically pm1 of Atnca but pa11 of Ch1ssano 's problem 1s that he s Atncan 17

Second, some extemal mterventwn may actually employ the same diVISIVe techmques that Malagasy political actors do. This ts certainly true h1stoncally in the case of French engagement w1th prevwus leaders. Yet as one Malagasy pohticmn descnbed, such calculations may contmue to mfluence pohcy formulation:

"The F1ench government doesn't hke that a Merma [Ravalomanana] IS there F1rst, for someone who IS to be pres1dent, France doesn't hke that the) ate a Menna, second they don't hke that they are powerful m

25 Interview with Malagasy busmessman December, 2010

26 Interview With Malagasy lawyer January, 2011

27 Interview with pohtlcal official December, 2010 107

business: third. they don ·1 like those who got a degree in an Anglo­ Saxon country; folll1h, they dord like that they are protestant."28

These divisive techniques allow groups to better control the population. However, they also have a severe impact on intemational engagement, create dangerous new fault lines among ethnic groups, further fragmenting an already weak societal structure, and can lead to polarizing violence and contlict. ln such conditions, any form of inclusive conflict resolution or governance processes is far more difficult to accomplish.

5.3.3 Opportunism

The weak, centralized and unstable nature of the political system leads actors to focus on acquiring short-term benefits and gains rather than collectively working toward long-tenn development This mentality can easily lead to destructive behavior and further institutional erosion as individuals and groups defy the rule of law and engage in extra- legal activities for power and profit.

5.3.3.1 Conflict Entrepreneurship in Madagascar

How do actors compete for political power? As recent trials have also identified, conflict is often a business, heavily integrated into political processes. Colonel

Andriasoavina, arrested for participating in the November 2010 coup attempt in

Madagascar, claimed that several Indian businessmen, part of the Karana ethnic group of

Madagascar, paid 1.2 billion Ariary ($6 million dollars) to finance the unrest that lead to the March 2009 coup and that he himself was paid $10,000 for his part in the operation. 29

28 Interview with Malagasy politician. December, 2010. 29 Andrianasoavina, Charles. "Chronologie du coup d'etat de mars 2009," handwritten letter to Joachim Chissano. January 14, 2011; '"Indian, Pakistani businessmen paid 2009 Madagascar coup'," Si.fy 108

This is to say that the actions and events of 2009 were by no means unorganized, unexpected, or impulsive. Instead, they were a heavily calculated and organized series of events focused on a specific goal from the beginning: to shift power relationships for the benefit of those who had been previously marginalized by the Ravalomanana regime.

The fmancing of the 2009 political crisis also underlines the degree to which the private sector is a powerful tool in reshaping malleable political institutions. 30 Some argue that the private sector· s "'institutional manipulation can serve to improve their democratic character in the long run."' 31 Theoretically, this may be so. But realistically, and as the above example illustrates, such institutional manipulation can be far more self- centered and destructive than developmental.

Such actions exemplify the attitude that it is easy to pay otT groups to destabilize and overthrow a government in order to reestablish a beneficial situation for oneself.

Some individuals likely instigated or joined the opposition once they recognized the potential personal oppmiunity it would create. One example of such a group is the timber barons in the northeast of Madagascar. Their connections to the HAT regime will be examined in the next section.

News. January 22, 20 I I; Razafison, Rivonala. "Soldier: I was paid $I 0.000 to topple Marc Ravalomanana," Africa Review. January 6, 2011.

10 Richard Marcus examined this phenomenon by analyzing former President Marc Ravalomanana's management and expansion of his company, TIKO, while he was president, which placed the company at the forefront of nearly every market in Madagascar, enriching himself and establishing powerful lines of patronage. See, Marcus, Richard R. "Marc the Medici? The Failure of a New Form of Neopatrimonial Rule in Madagascar,'· Political Science Quarterly, 125(1): 111-131. 2010.

11 ibid., p. 131 109

With a history of neopatrimonialism and as evidenced by the behavior and actions of political actors during Madagascar's frequent political power struggles, prevailing norms of conflict entrepreneurship and opportunism usurp any potential for institutional development. Instead, they strengthen and reinforce patronage systems as pmiicipants find benefit and opportunity in utilizing destabilization and extra-legal means to reorganize political structures.

In effect this normative construct of politics that emphasizes destabilization and conflict to achieve political and economic benefit is reinforced as actors benefit from employing it, leading countries to experience recmTing conflict as each oppmiunity for unilateral gain and political restructuring presents itself.

5.3.3.2 Illicit Trade Networks and Environmental Corruption

Political and economic oppmiunism is further reinforced by the development of illicit trade networks, particularly as rule of law erodes during times of instability. As the international community established their policy of non-recognition of the new regime after the coup in 2009, the HAT knew they needed to find financing. One of these sources that proved to be one of the most economically viable was from the illicit timber trade and environmental corruption.

Though illegal resource extraction did occur before the 2009 political crisis, after coup d'etat, the amount of illegal logging in Madagascar increased significantly, resulting in more than 52,000 tons of illegally-cut precious woods by the end of 2009.32 This illicit

32 Randriamalala, Hery and Zhou Liu. "Rosewood of Madagascar: Between democracy and conservation," Madagascar Conservation & Development, 5(1): 11-22. June, 2010. p. 11 110

export industry reached unprecedented levels, with over $100 million wo1ih of precious woods illegally logged and shipped out of Madagascar within nine months after the coup.

At one point, nearly $500,000 of illegal rosewood was exported daily. This translates to the clearing of 17,000 hectares of pristine, primary forest in less than a year, much of which was located within UNESCO protected sites and national parks.

This illegal resource extraction also subverts the local economies by establishing powerful networks of unfair trade. Chinese companies, who purchased the majority of the precious timber, earn 25 times as much as the Malagasy traders, and 357 times as much

as the villagers who worked in the forest. As the exploitation continues and even increases, the region experiences an increased risk of criminahzation, as members of the

Chinese mafia become further established in the country. By December 2010, 98% of the

illegally harvested rosewood was being exported to China (primarily for furniture) while

2% went to the US and Europe (primarily for musical instruments); simultaneously,

timber barons and Chinese companies forged stronger relationships and opportunity to become involved in the lucrative business increased. 33 However, these business relationships and deals do not take into consideration any form of sustainability. They are

also conducted in a very opportunistic manner. As one source noted:

''We've had the Chinese buyers speak ... quite openly, talking about how they know this wood is going to be gone in a few years and that very clearly their job is to get it while they can. They sometimes spoke quite wistfully about the impact of what they were doing but it really did not occur to them, it was not part of a consideration that that should in any way affect their buying behavior. .. It is the momentary glut of the resource and the flow of money ... "34

33 Confidential interview. December, 2010.

14 Confidential interview. December, 2010. I II

Madagascar has a long history of regimes allowing for "exceptions'· to legislative laws in times of economic and political trouble that is due, in pari, to the country's oligopolistic market structures and its connections with a small network of political elites.

Fraud is perpetrated by a syndicate of expmiers working closely with government administrators who profit by imposing taxes and engaging in money laundering. There are significant allegations that these syndicates actively support the HAT regime. In fact, one major timber baron, Roger Thu Nam, boasts his both pre- and post-coup links and financing of the federal government. 35 Another Chinese trader boasted about his personal relationship he had with Rajoelina, both when he was mayor and after the coup when he became president. 36 This trader also noted how he worked with government officials to ensure a smooth business operation:

'· [111e Chinese trader] talked about running a casino in Madagascar and inviting government officials to train them how to do business in wood, particularly as a response to the extant laws ... He spoke about how specific deals of his can finance the government for three months ... He was quite proud of the direct impact that he, as a trader had, on the government in Madagascar and in particular the current form of it headed by Rajoelina.'·> 7

The regulatory failures, fraud, and embezzlement are easily identified in a number of government documents and communiques that reflect the political influence of local timber exporters. A 2009 Environmental Investigation Agency/Global Witness

35 Confidential interview. December, 2010.

16 · Confidential interview. December, 2010.

37 Confidential interview. December, 2010. 112

investigative report on the "'Tllegal Felling, Transport and Export of Precious Wood in

Sava Region of Madagascar'' cites one such exception to forest protection laws. Service

Note 923-05, which authorized timber exportation on the basis of "economic reasons ... and following the grievances arising from the forest operators and exporters," as well as

"to appease the socio-eco-political situation which prevails in the Region". 3x

Preferential treatment can also be found in the banking industry. In an August

2009 communique39 regarding rosewood and vanilla from the Secretary General for the

Ministry of Finance and Budget, the President of the Association of Professional Banks pleaded for a relaxation of financial restrictions that froze assets of particular resource exploiters, which were allegedly being used to launder money through the financial institutions. Claiming that it was '·hurting those working in the vanilla industry," this request was later honored, reauthorizing these exporters to freely launder money with minimal consequences. Much of the bank loans intended for financing the vanilla industry were instead embezzled to fmance the rosewood trade. 40 This exploitation likely lined government officials' pockets that were involved.

In September 2009, another exception, Inter-Ministerial Order No. 38244/2009, increased the number of individuals and companies authorized to export precious timber

38 "Investigation into the Illegal Felling, Transport, and Expmi of Precious Wood in SA VA Region Madagascar," Global Witne1·s and the Environmental Investigation Agency, Inc. August 2009. pp. 15-16, 20

39 Letter No. 32 MFB/SG from the Secretary General of the Ministry of Finance and Budget to the President of the Association of Professional Banks re: Bank bans and freezes of the bank accounts of the exporters of rosewood. Received April30, 2010. Original French version: "Lettre No. 32 MFBISG du Secretariat General du Ministre de5 Finance et du Budget a Monsieur /e President de !'Association Professionnelle de5 Banques. Objet: Interdiction bancaire et cloture des comptes bancaires des exportmrs de bois de rose". 40 Randriamalala, Hery and Zhou Liu. "Rosewood of Madagascar: Between democracy and conservation," Madaga5car Conservation & Development, 5(1): 11-22. June, 2010. p. 21 113

from 13 to 23 for the period of September to December 2009, established a compul<;ory

payment of $36,000 per contamer pnor to export, and encouraged the creation of new

companies to export timber ill the Sava region as well as in the capital, Antanananvo. 41

In effect, this order established a loophole to extract revenue for the HAT regime

by mcreasing the number of compames mvolved m resource extraction and by requmng a

substantial ''fine" for each exported container. To lessen the financial burden f01 the

Malagasy exporters. this "fine" was typically paid by the Chmesc buyers. In the Sava

region of Madagascar, exports from the c1ty ofVohemar alone amounted to $15.3 milhon

in revenue for the State, the largest single beneficiary. 42 At a tune when the HAT was

facmg severe economic sanctions and a severance of foreign md, the Illicit trade of timber

provided a very profitable alternative, offsetting the economic impact of the sanctions,

allowing the regime to stay ill power.

The escalation of rosewood extraction by government decree in 1992, 2006, and

2009-2010 also mdicates that restrictions on the trade of rosewood are frequently relaxed

JUSt prior to important elections and during difficult fillancial tnnes m Madagascar. 43 As

others have indicated. "this predictable, regular pattern strongly suggests that the sale of

41 0 CCPTF-Groupe Gouvemance, Octobre 2009, 4na!yse de I (J/ I ere mtellnllmfelte! 'V 3R2./-t, "Inve-,tJgatJOn mto the Illegal Fellmg, T1 an sport, and Export ofPrec1ous Wood m SAVA Reg1on Madaga,car," G!obct! Wlfness and the Environmental Invest1gatwn Agency, Inc August 2009 pp 1v, 9, 32, Randnamalala, Hery and Zhou Lm "Rosewood of Madagascar Between democracy and con,ervat1on," Madagascar Conservatwn & Development, 5(1) 11-22 June, 2010 p 14, 'ee also full report, Randnamalala, Hery and Zhou Lm. "Bo1s de ro'e de Madagascar Entre demoaat1e et protectiOn de Ia nature" March 1, 2010 pp 13, 23, 29, 31,48 42 Randnamalala, Hery and Zhou Lm "Rosewood of Madaga,car Between democracy and conservatiOn," Madagascar Conservatwn & Development, 5(1) 11-22 June, 2010 p 11, see al~o full report, Randnamalala, Hery and Zhou Lm "Bo1s de rose de Madagascar Entre democrat1e et protectwn de Ia nature" March 1, 2010 p 3

43 Randnamalala, Hery and Zhou LIU "Rosewood of Madagascar Between democracy and conservatiOn," Madagascar Conservatwn & Development, 5(1) 11-22 June, 2010 114

rosewood is being used to finance Madagascar's 'democracy'". 44 This underlines serious concerns about the legitimacy of any upcoming elections, as well as the institutional strength and stability of the country.

Even the gendarmerie, given the task of combating the expanding illegal rosewood logging industry, have allegedly become involved in securing safe passage of the precious woods from the forest to the harbors. With authority and enforcement easily corruptib Je and with no accountability, groups of political elites are reaping huge profits and expanding the strength and influence of illicit power structures and trade networks with no repercussions, often under the protection of and for the benefit of those in the government.

5.4 INTERNATIONAL ENGAGEMENT

Madagascar is not isolated from the rest of the world. Many external actors who have interests and investments in Madagascar present the opportunity to provide great benefit to both the country and the international community. However, the examination of illicit trade highlights the fact that destructive opportunism abounds in international engagement as well. This destructive and even illegal behavior tends to occur among non-state actors who could be reprimanded through proper legal processes. But when states engage in these operations, it can contradict and undermine efforts aimed at institutional development. As one recent report indicated, Madagascar is a very geostrategic country between Asia and Africa in the Indian Ocean, particularly for

44 Ibid., p. 18 115

France. 45 This is due to the fact that Madagascar is incredibly rich in minerals and at the center of several other French island territories, which is likely one of the reason why

France·s 8 111 largest embassy is located in the capital. 46 In this section I discuss other problems that can arise from international engagement. In particular, I discuss the use of sanctions on a post-coup regime and the different approaches employed by the diplomatic community.

5.4.1 Economic Sanctions and the Problem of Leverage

The international community was engaged with both the government and the opposition in Madagascar every step of the way during the 2009 crisis, both before and after the coup. In fact, prior to the escalation of the crisis in 2008, the diplomatic corps was doing everything it could to limit Ravalomanana' s self-serving actions, though with little success. By the fall 2008, he was no longer listening to any requests from the United

States, France, the IMF, the World Bank, or essentially anyone other than his cadre of supporters.

During the events of 2009, both Ravalomanana and Rajoelina approached embassies for assistance and support. In fact, prior to Ravalomanana' s transfer of power,

Rajoelina had asked several embassies what their response would be if there were to be a coup.47 For the most part and as post-coup official responses indicate, their policies were

45 Rakotomalala, Patrick. "Les implicates de Ia crise malgache de 2009: enjeux geopolitiques et geostrategiques;· Madagoravox.wordpress.com, March II, 20 II. [http://madagoravox. wordpress.com/20 II /03/ lilies-implic ites-de-la -crise-malgache-de-2009-geopolitique­ geostrategie-et-diplomatie-trancaise/] (accessed March 28, 20II)

46 Behind the U.S., U.K., Germany, Spain, Italy, Morocco, and Senegal. See, ibid. 47 Confidential interview. December, 20IO. 116

decidedly against supporting a regune that took power by a coup or any other unconstitutional means. However, actual post-coup international engagement in

Madagascar has highlighted that this was not a uniform policy among all external actors.

In March 2009, the African Union suspended Madagascar's membership and imposed economic sanctions on Rajoelina and 108 other senior government officials while Norway, the United States, the European Union and several other states imposed their own economic sanctions and severed most fmms of financial assistance. 48 It soon became apparent that the sanctions did little to curb the policies and actions of the new regune.

In a study of international sanctions imposed between 1945 and 2000, Gary

Hutbauer et al. found that sanctions failed to have a substantial impact on the policies of the target country in two-thirds of the cases. 49 "Success'· was measured in both the amount of economic damage that occurred in the target country and the degree to which the country's national decision-makers maintained the same policies in light of the sanctions. Essentially, if sanctions do not possess enough leverage, they fail. For example, economic sanctions imposed by the U.S. and others in 1994 failed to significantly impact the policies of the post-coup government in the Gambia, where President Yahya Jammeh

48 In most cases, this meant that all non-humanitarian assistance would be stopped. However, some fmancial assistance continued in the form of disaster relief, particularly assistance to Southern Madagascar during the famine in 2010.

49 Hufbauer, Gary Clyde, Jeffrey J. Schott, Kimberly Ann Elliott and Barbara Oegg. Economic Sanctions Reconsidered, 3'd Edition. Washington, D.C.: Peterson Institute for International Economics. 2008. 117

continues to maintain power in an uncompetitive democracy, regardless of demands for refonn from the intemational community. 50

In Madagascar, a similar failure occuned for several reasons. First, former

President Marc Ravalomanana had built up a surplus of money in the treasury, allowing the HAT regime, once it had taken power, to rely on these savings until they drained.

Second, several resource extraction agreements have provided the regime with extra funding to pay off military and other civil servants, particularly a deal with the Chinese company WISCO (Wuhan Iron and Steel Corporation) which the Ministry of Energy and

Mines granted the rights to exploit the iron fields of Soalala in May 20 I 0. This agreement provided the HAT regime with $100 million US dollars, payable directly to the office of the president. In addition, the primary reason why illicit timber extraction expanded was because of international engagement. In terms of illicit trade, illicit rosewood and ebony extraction and animal trafficking significantly increased immediately after the 2009 coup.

Much of the profits went to timber barons in the northeast but there are also significant connections to the HAT regime. It is estimated that the regime received an estimated

$15.3 million US dollars from shipments out of just one port city. 51

The interests in this business extended beyond the buyers and sellers. French companies, in particular the shipping company Delmas, were responsible for shipping

50 Blazek, Sawyer. ''An Uncertain Policy for Africa: Measuring the Effects and Effectiveness of Economic Sanctions on Post-Coup Governments," Presented at the Annual Whitehead Colloquium. New Jersey: Seton Hall University. April, 2011. 51 Randriamalala, Hery and Zhou Liu. "Rosewood of Madagascar: Between democracy and conservation," Madagascar Conservation & Development, 5(1): 11-22. June, 2010. p. I 1; see also full report, Randriamalala, Hery and Zhou Liu. "Bois de rose de Madagascar: Entre democratie et protection de Ia nature." March 1, 2010. p. 3 118

timber to China. 52 These operations were financed by several international banks and their subsidiaries, particularly BFV -Societe Generale, a Malagasy subsidiary of the

French bank Societe Generale, and Bank of Africa, a subsidiary of the Bank of Africa

Group. 53 There was also significant lobbying by the Chinese government and companies

on the Malagasy government and rumors of lobbying from the French government to

allow the shipping, based on pressure from Delmas. 54

In sum, the leverage needed to force a change of policies on the HAT regime did

not exist due to several licit and illicit operations. Unfortunately, the HAT's policies of

t,'l·abbing as much as they can for their immediate gratification is counterproductive to

long-tenn growth and development. It is, however, consistent with Malagasy political and

economic experience which teaches that one should grab now while in power, as the

opportunity most likely won't last long. Without sufficient leverage, the regime had little

incentive to curb their policies. Instead, with the support of external engagement, they

managed to maintain their position and reap rewards.

5.4.2 ''The Principled vs. Pragmatic Approach''

On the diplomatic side, the fact that embassies have not been speaking with one

voice, or have not been perceived to be doing so, has further delayed a resolution to the

crisis. Due to differing state interests, dual approaches to the resolution of the crisis were

52 "Investigation Into the Global Trade in Malagasy Precious Woods: Rosewood, Ebony and Pallisander:' Global Witness and the Environmental Investigation Agency (US). October, 2010. p. 14

51 "Investigation into the Illegal Felling, Transport, and Export of Precious Wood in SAVA Region Madagascar," Global Witness and the Environmental Investigation Agency, Inc. August, 2009. p. 28 54 Confidential interview. December, 2010. 119

created. The principled approach, primarily supported by the United States, South Africa, and SADC, emphasized establishing precedent by not recognizing a coup regime and attempted to push all parties in a pluralistic manner to create a consensual path forward.

The pragmatic approach, primarily supported by France, was more accommodating to the post-coup regime and emphasized working with what was in place to schedule elections to put a new democratically elected regime in place.

One reason for the different approaches is likely the degree of engagement of

each actor. For those that employed the principled approach, the crisis was an opportunity to set precedent. The United States' policy largely reflected U.S. President Obama's

speech in Ghana in 2009. 55 In short, it stipulated that regimes that play by democratic rules will have international support; those that do not, particularly regimes that come to

power by unconstitutional regime changes, will be isolated. Madagascar's coup d'etat

came at a time when several other countries had also recently experienced similar coups

56 and coup attempts , raising fear in the international community that a resurgence of

unconstitutional regime changes was sweeping across weak states. 57 This policy was an

opportunity to set precedent and prevent a dangerous new trend from expanding across

weak states.

55 "Remarks by the President to the Ghanaian Parliament,'' The White House, Office ofthe Press Secretary. Accra, Ghana. July 11, 2009.

56 Including Guinea, Mauritania, Guinea-Bissau, Ecuador, Niger, Honduras, and Malaysia

57 "The Resurgence of Coups d'Etat in Africa," Security Council Report, Update Report No.3. April 15, 2009. 120

However, isolating a weak regtme m such a way can also encourage further destabilization and violent conflict. For France, this would have been a very dangerous policy. No other external actor has the same interest in Madagascar as the French. Not

only does France have a long history with Madagascar stemming from its fanner

colonization, but it still maintains a strong economic interest in the country. Aside from

the previous investments and connections to the illicit timber trade, many French

companies, like S.A. Total are heavily invested in Madagascar's resource industries. In

addition over 25,000 French citizens live in Madagascar. In the event of widespread

violent conflict, the impact on French business would be severe and the logistics of trying

to evacuate or at least provide safety to so many individuals would be nearly impossible.

Pursuing a policy that may further destabilize the country was not an option.

Unfortunately, the dual approaches in the diplomatic community caused several

problems. First, the divisions in the diplomatic community rendered their mediation

process useless. As one diplomat noted:

"As far as this community cannot come up with a common approach, they cannot mediate. And the HAT knows that. ''58

Second, at the outset of the crisis in 2009, the French were far more willing ''to

give Andry [Rajoelina] a wink and a nod." 59 As the above quote identifies, the HAT was

well-informed about the dynamics of external engagement in conflict resolution, and the

signals the French government sent even before Rajoelina took power were ones that

58 Interviewed by author. December, 2010.

59 Interview with political official. December, 2010. 121

likely encouraged him to continue on a unilateral track and to ignore the power-sharing

concessions that the rest of the international community wanted. Third, the larger problem began after the coup occurred and once the HAT regime had positioned itself.

Almost immediately, it was obvious the regime was only seeking to enrich itself while in

power. The expected support from the French likely created a moral hazard as the HAT

regime believed it could expect the support of France even if the situation worsened.60

Unfortunately, this encouraged many within the regime to become self-interested and

opportunistic.

In post-coup Madagascar, the education system, health system, and nearly every

other institution eroded, leaving those outside of Antananarivo to fend for themselves and

to only rely on those around them. By December 2010, a severe famine in the south left

720,000 facing starvation. 61 When asked what they were going to do to help, the HAT

simply responded, ''If you don't want our people to die, you save them."62 The regime

rejected responsibility for the livelihood-and even the lives-of its own people. A

system had been institutionalized in Madagascar whereby when things got too bad, the

country reasonably expected external assistance, depreciating the entire concept of a

sovereign state and a representative government.

60 The theory of a moral hazard that accompanies international engagement is well documented in the works of other scholars. See, for example, Moyo, Dambisa. Dead Aid: Why Aid is Not Working and How There is a Better Way for Africa. New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux. 2009.

61 Theunissen, Garth. "Southern Madagascar Drought Leaves 720,000 Facing Starvation, AFP Reports," Bloomberg, December II, 2010. [http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2010-12-II/southern­ madagascar-drought -leaves- 720-000-facing -starvation -afp-reports.html] (accessed March 6, 20 II)

62 Respondent quoting government official. Interview with Political official, December 2010. 122

Diverging approaches weakened the international community·s role in the resolution process. Different interests, unilateral abrreements and concessions emboldened an opportunistic regime to continue to pillage the country. Instead of helping to resolve the crisis, international engagement involved both participating in and reinforcing opportunistic and self-interested behavior, leading to further economic degradation and political instability.

5.5 CONCLUSION

''Indicative of the neopatrimonial underpinnings of Madagascar political parties, and of the resulting absence of an institutionalized party system, is the rapid rise and fall of parties with the political fortunes of their Ieaders." 61

Bratton and Van de Walle enumerate two common characteristics of political transitions from neopatrimonal regimes: first, neopatrimonial elites fracture over access to patronage, which explains the buildup of opposition against Ravalomanana as he continually excluded more and more business and political elites over time; second, m neopatrimonial regimes, political transitions are struggles to establish legal rules, or, m other words, to rewrite the rules in a manner that is more beneficial to the new regime which explains why legal and constitutional frameworks are rewritten each time a new regime takes power. 64 When a leader is in power, they develop their own institutional framework to maintain order. For Tsiranana, this involved a network of French and

C6tiers to prevent the Merina from fanning an opposition. For Ratsiraka, this involved

63 Marcus, Richard and Adrien Ratsimbaharison. "Political Parties in Madagascar: Neopatrimonial Tools or Democratic Instruments?" Party Politics, I 1(4): 495-512. July 2005. p. 504

64 Bratton, Michael and Nicolas Van de Walle. "Neopatrimonial Regimes and Political Transitions in Africa," World Politics, 46(4): 453-489. July, 1994. pp. 462-464; 466-468 123

the military and C6tiers. For Ravalomanana, this involved a network of Merina, organized through his private investments and companies. 65 For Rajoelina, this involved the marginalized politicians and Karana businessmen, among others. The actors involved beyond the leader are hard to identify as they continually shift. This is another reason why political parties become personalized into nearly entirely focusing on the individual in charge.

In essence, personal networks were developed and replaced strong institutions.

While this is effective in stabilizing a country and providing order, those under the leader remain loyal while they receive the benefit of the group while others are marginalized. As such a system can generally only provide profit to a select amount of individuals; some groups need to be marginalized in order to maintain power. Further, when the a leader chooses or is no longer able to provide a profitable system for those invested, the leader's support structure falter and reorganize to establish a new leader who can better distribute power and profit among his supporters.

Instead of fomenting institutional development, a system of opportunism IS created that incentivizes the use of divisiveness and conflict instigation to acquire short­ term benefits before power relationships are again restructured to benefit those that had previously been marginalized.

Madagascar· s neopatrimonial networks are effectively highly developed institutional systems. However, since they are dependent on singular individuals or a few select individuals, they are inherently unstable. In effect, you don't have political parties.

65 l11is group was even unofficially known as the ''Tiko Boys", named after his conglomerate, Tiko. 124

You have people, individuals, who by chance become president. However, when they work against the system that has become institutionalized, they are kicked out by the rest.

As long as these individuals can keep the patronage networks running, they can avert power struggles. But once they can no longer keep the patrimonial networks running, they lose power and the power struggles begin, conflict and destabilization begin and power is redistributed, stmiing the entire process over again.

The utilization of some forms of destabilizing political competition have created destructive political norms. Social divisions like ethnicity have played into the hands of leaders and elites that utilize them and other destabilizing forces to compete over power.

The repeated use of these methods has reinforced their value and created degenerative nom1s of political competition, attracting others to engage and not only support the process but also to see to its continued use in the future, leading to institutional deficiency, opportunism in the forms of conflict entrepreneurship and illicit trade. These observations provide a grim picture for the institutional development of Madagascar and affirm the expectation of continued conflict in the future, each time actors decide to compete for political power. 6.

CONCLUSION

6.1 INTRODUCTION

The 2009 Malagasy political crisis is characterized by a variety of internal and external interests and influences that encouraged contentious political competition over the distribution of political power. At the core of the struggles are the destructive and destabilizing forms of political competition employed by political actors and opposition groups for over 50 years that have fed the cycle of instability and resultant developmental setbacks.

The external actors engaged in Madagascar are not free from blame. Many have int1uenced particular events or supported specific sides rather than remain neutral during these events, whether for economic gain, political advantage, or out of sociopolitical justification. However, at the foundation of political competition in Madagascar are the values, beliefs and behaviors of actors and the structure than has been established by the years of political upheaval since independence from France.

6.2 POWER STRUGGLES AND CONFLICT RECURRENCE

Close examination of Malagasy political competition strongly supports my initial hypothesis. The 2009 Malagasy political crisis and the political environment of

Madagascar have underlined several trends common in systems of weak governance. I

125 126

now return to my initial hypothesis and trace the process of events through Madagascar's political competition.

6.2.1 Actor(s) Decide to Shift Power Distribution

I began this study by hypothesizing that contentious political competition arises when particular actors desire to shift power distribution in order to obtain greater benefit.

The previous chapters have illustrated that this trend has continued since Madagascar's independence. When actors or groups become marginalized, they unite to overthrow the current political leadership or, when possible, the entire political system "by the street" in order to redistribute power. In some cases, this would be characterized as a civil war or a social revolution and progressive developmental reform would be enacted, reducing the probability of future conflict. However, as the political power struggles in Madagascar highlight, this is not always the case.

The events of 2009 do not constitute a disorganized or chaotic series of events.

They have been shown to be a well-organized and calculated series of operations aimed at overthrowing a regime that had marginalized particular political and business elites.

While the opposition movement may have resembled a social movement during the political struggle, their actions once they assumed power exemplify the opportunistic and self-interested desires that did not speak to the interests or needs of the population.

6.2.2 Destructive Political Power Struggle

During the power struggle, the actors typically engage in destructive violent or non-violent power competition. The history of Malagasy political competition is replete with examples of actors employing destructive and destabilizing forms of political 127

competition in order to redistribute power. The struggle is not a zero-sum game. Instead, individuals and groups have the option to shift their support and resources between competing actors. In effect the struggle becomes a process of competitive control whereby actors attempt to both expand their own political suppmi bases while

simultaneously removing their opponent's political support.

Modeling the events of 2009 underlines the fact that measured and moderated

action, continual strategic refonn, and manipulative techniques of inclusion and exclusion

are the most effective methods to employ during a political power struggle. In Madagscar, the leader's choices for exclusion and oppressive overreaction bred resentment, polarized

interests and exacerbated conflict.

6.2.3 Conf1ict and Destabilization

These power competitions have a tendency to be destructive and destabilizing.

Significantly, many of the most effective strategies and tactics employed by actors were

also the most destructive and destabilizing, leading to widespread violence, protest,

destabilization and institutional destruction. The effects of repeated power struggles since

independence have left a cumulatively degenerative impact on the political, economic,

and social development of Madagascar. The events of 2009 were no different. A several month power struggle led to a political crisis that sent the country into political instability

and economic collapse which has now lasted for more than two years.

6.2.4 Power is Redistributed

When a power struggle is successful, a new leader takes control and redistributes

power among a new network of actors based on their interests and participation. The 128

history of Madagascar shows that among those who go into politics, none or virtually

none enter the arena because of an altruistic vision. They choose politics as a means to make money. Being in politics, especially leading a country, can provide actors the

opportunity to acquire a Jot of money. And in a country such as Madagascar, that opportunity extends not for the benefit of the general public, but for the benefit of the

leaders· support structure. their friends and family.

6.2.5 Reinforcement of Destructive Political Competition

The success of even one power struggle can validate the effectiveness of its

strategy and can incentivize the use of similar strategies and tactics in the future. When the powers-that-want-to-be study the strategies and tactics of the powers-that-be, both the

strategies that got them into power and the ones making them wealthy, they seek to

identify which strategies and tactics are the most effective. When damaging and destructive strategies enable one to assume power, they will be used by those that follow,

seeking to ovetihrow the current regime and have their own opportunity to set the rules

and make the money.

The use of these destructive strategies and tactics is not new to Madagascar or political competition in general. They have, in fact, been employed numerous times by both the opposition and governments across the globe. The effectiveness of these methods and the success that they bring reinforces their continued use in future power

struggles, linking the series of events together into a destructive cyclical process of

conflict recurrence and instability. This repeating cycle, with its divisive and 129

destabilizing nature, draws the country into cycles of violent conflict and destructive uncertainty with each political crisis.

6.3 CONCLUSION AND THEORETICAL IMPLICATIONS

Edward Luttwak argues that civil wars and other conflicts can actually initiate sustainable peace so long as the conflict continues until a decisive victory by one side. 1 If the preconditions for a lasting settlement are never achieved, the conflict is likely to arise again a few years later. For a country like Madagascar, political power struggles largely involve the same actors continually trying to maintain or regain power. Didier Ratsiraka,

Albert Zafy, Marc Ravalomanana, and Andry Rajoelina continue to struggle for political power while their support networks shift as benefits ebb and flow.

The normative political structure of Madagascar describes a system plagued by self-interested elites undermining democratic processes through the methodical use of divisiveness and destabilization to grab power. This behavior reinforces opportunism and self-interest to the point that conflict entrepreneurship and illicit trade networks have arisen to capitalize on weak governance. In other words, the Malagasy political structure is characterized by an aggregation of sociopolitical divisions and destructive political norms that are exploited for short-term gain, creating a cyclical process of instability as power is continually redistributed among various patronage networks.

In this way, Madagascar exemplifies a fragmented society in which large-scale political participation does not provide a needed check on self-interested political actors.

1 Luttwak, Edward N. "Give War a Chance," Foreign Affairs, 78(4): 36-44. July/August 1999. See also Hironaka, Ann. Neverending Wars: The International Community, Weak States, and the Perpetuation of Civil War. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 2005. 130

The current regime restructures the political environment so as to restrict or preclude opposition. In effect, the winner takes all. The current winner will last until the actors on

the outside devise a method to move to the inside, to become the winners, to take the

power, the control, the money. When Ravalomanana and his regime became too greedy,

and their greed became too public, there was no parliament, judiciary system, or other regulated governmental or political arena for opposition b,>roups to respond or protest. As

a result, they took to the streets. We can expect to see the same contentious political

competition to continue so long as Madagascar· s regimes continue to act out of economic

self-interest, instead of genuine concern for their country. APPENDIX A.

DESCRIPTION OF QUESTIONNAIRE AND INTERVIEWS

The open-ended questionnaire was developed from currently employed conflict

assessment frameworks and adapted to specifically examine power struggles and power

relationships in the case study. At some points, subsequent questions were asked to

maximize clarity of the questions and robustness of the responses.

Interviews were conducted in Madagascar and the United States between

November 2010 and January 2011. To note, many ofthe subjects agreed to interviews on the basis of confidentiality. In order to protect the identity of the interviewee, respondents' identities are kept anonymous and the interviews are neither dated nor placed in chronological order. In addition, when direct quotes are used in the text, "confidential interview" is used as a citation at the request of the interviewee due to the sensitivity of the discussion.

131 APPENDIX B.

QUESTIONNAIRE (ENGLISH)

1. How would you describe the situation in Madagascar since January 2009? (e.g. the primary causes ofthe situation, who is involved, why they are involved, etc.)

2. Can you provide a brief description of yourself, your profession, and how the situation has affected you, your family, or your work?

3. Are there competitions or struggles for political power between groups or elites?

a. Can you describe these power struggles? (e.g. who is involved, how do they treat each other, etc.)

b. Who is in control of the government? How effectively and impartially are they governing or maintaining control?

4. How have these power struggles affected the legitimacy and effectiveness of the government and its institutions? (e.g. the justice system, the security system, etc.)

5. Could you describe any difference between what is happening in Antananarivo and other regions in Madagascar?

6. Who in the international community is involved, how are they involved, and what effect has this had on the situation and you, your family, or your work?

7. How have these problems caused divisions in society and created violence and conflict between individuals or groups?

8. What factors have made the situation better or worse? (e.g. prevented conflict, caused conflict, etc.)

9. What can be done to resolve the situation?

10. What will happen if the situation is not resolved?

11. What do you think is going to happen in Madagascar?

12. Do you have any other comments?

132 APPENDIX C.

QUESTIONNAIRE (FRENCH)

1. Pouvez-vous donner une description de la situation politique a Madagascar depuis Janvier 2009? (les causes du conflit, qui participe et pourquoi, etc.)

2. Pouvez-vous vous presenter, votre profession, et comment la situation vous affecte, votre famille, et votre travail?

3. Y-a-t-il une lutte pour le pouvoir politique entre des groups ou des elites?

a. Pouviez-vous decrire cette lutte pour le pouvoir? (qui participe, quelles sont les relations entre les different parties, etc.)

b. Qui est-ce qui controle le gouvemement? Sont-ils efficace, impartial?

4. Comment est-ce que ces luttes pour le pouvoir ont affecte la legitimite et efficacite du gouvemement et ses institutions? (le systeme judiciaire, le systeme securitaire, etc.)

5. Est-ce qu'il y a des differences entre la situation a Antananarivo et dans les autres regions?

6. Comment est-ce que la communaute intemationale engager dans la situation au Madagascar, et comment est-ce que cela a change pour vous, votre famille, et votre travail?

7. Est-ce que ces problemes ont fait des divisions dans la societe et fait du violence entre des individuals ou des groups?

8. Qu'est-ce qui a ameliore ou aggrave la situation?

9. Qu'est-ce qu'on peut faire pour ameliorer la situation

10. Qu'est-ce qui vase passer la situation ne s'ameliore pas?

II. Qu' est -ce que vous pensez se passer au Madagascar dans le future?

12. Avez-vous d'autres commentaires?

133 APPENDIX D.

LIST OF INTERVIEWS

Number Interviewee's Description

1. Business owner 2. Businessman 3. Businessman 4. Businessman 5. Diplomat 6. Diplomat 7. Diplomat 8. Diplomat 9. Diplomat 10. Diplomat 11. Farmer 12. Military Official 13. Law Student 14. Lawyer 15. Lawyer 16. NGO Worker 17. NGO Worker 18. NGO Worker 19. NGO Worker 20. Political Official 21. Political Official 22. Political Official 23. Political Official 24. Public Health Volunteer 25. Public Policy Expert

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