F A S T Update Madagascar Semi-annual Risk Assessment June to November 2006 T S A F © swisspeace FAST Update Madagascar | June to November 2006 | Page 2 Contents Country Stability and Cooperative International Events (relative) 3 Conflictive Government and Non-Government Events (relative) 5 Cooperative and Conflictive Domestic Events (relative) 8 Appendix: Description of indicators used 11 The FAST International Early Warning Program 12 FAST Update Subscription: www.swisspeace.org/fast/subscription_form.asp Contact FAST International: Country Expert: Phone: +41 31 330 12 19 Richard Marcus Fax: +41 31 330 12 13 mailto:[email protected] www.swisspeace.org/fast © swisspeace FAST Update Madagascar | June to November 2006 | Page 3 Country Stability and Cooperative International Events (relative) Average number of reported events per month: 127 Indicator description: see appendix Risk Assessment: • During the second half of 2006 Country Stability and Cooperative International Events in Madagascar were primarily a function of the social and political actions in the run-up to the much anticipated 3 December 2006 presidential elections. Promises for extended economic aid and long term program planning on the part of donors and other international actors slowed as the administration of President Marc Ravalomanana drew towards political action. Considering the large number of challengers to the presidency, and the volatility of the opposition, Country Stability remained notably high. The downward trend in the Country Stability index in November 2006 is a reflection primarily of a single event, and its repercussions: the weak effort by General Andrianafidisoa (Fidy) to stage a military challenge to the Ravalomanana regime. • The first half of 2006, like much of Ravalomanana’s presidency, was characterized by high levels of foreign assistance. The World Bank initiated its program planning for its 2007-2010 Country Assistance Strategy (CAS) even while it promised immediate support for the ailing water and electricity parastal, Jira sy Rano Malagasy (JIRAMA). The European Union, World Wildlife Fund, and French, Japanese, German, U.S., and Chinese governments also committed new aid packages or project support (see “Madagascar Semi-Annual Risk Assessment: December 2005-May 2006”). In the second half of 2006, such promises continued but were fewer. On 4 July 2006 Norway promised 247,000 €. On 12 July 2006 the Japanese government promised technical assistance to help the government of Madagascar implement the Madagascar Action Plan (MAP). On 14 July 2006 the World Bank gave an installment of US$ 40 million to fight poverty. On 24 July 2006 the African Development Bank committed 113 billion MGA (42.25 million €) to help fight poverty. Other funds came by way of elections support (from the UNDP, which managed the presidential elections funds), U.S., Switzerland, and European Union, among others. The downward slide in the International Cooperation index score is therefore reflective not of a turn away from the international community but rather a temporary slowdown in the quantity of assistance in the run up to the new elections and the preparation of new funding packages. • Calling General Fidy’s action an attempted coup is a reach. General Fidy intended to run as a presidential candidate but was barred on the grounds that he neither properly paid the 25 million MGA (9,355 €) registration fee nor had his paperwork properly witnessed. His candidacy was therefore nullified by the High Constitutional Court on 16 October 2006. This was not the first of General Fidy’s problems. In July 2006 Fidy began critizing the Ravalomanana regime. By 14 July 2006 this had © swisspeace FAST Update Madagascar | June to November 2006 | Page 4 culminated into General Fidy’s demanding forgiveness for soldiers who supported former President Didier Ratsiraka during the 2002 crisis that nearly Balkanized the country. On 10 August 2006 the Association des réservistes pacificateurs de Madagascar (AREPAM), an association of reservists who helped Fidy win control of Central Madagascar on behalf of President Ravalomanana in 2002, accused Fidy of bribery and, on 11 August 2006 General Peter Behajaina, Minister of Defense, threatened to sanction Fidy for his criticisms of the government. On 21 October 2006, General Fidy accused the president’s party, Tiako i Madagasikara (TIM) of trying to bribe him. Tensions between the onetime hero and the administration were high by the morning of 17 November 2006 when leaflets were found saying “Marc Ravalomanana is no longer president of the Republic. The army has taken power under the leadership of General Fidy.” Fidy was denied entrance to military headquarters. Though he denied spreading the leaflets, on 18 November 2006 soldiers loyal to Fidy took over the airport, clashing with other troops and leading to the death of one soldier. President Ravalomanana, returning from a trip abroad, had to divert his plane. This was, however, as far as it went. For a brief period the 100 or so soldiers supporting General Fidy held siege to the military barracks at Bani. Fidy fled and, at time of writing, is in hiding. At no point did he take control of radio stations, state house, or any other critical infrastructure. • What makes the event an impact on Country Stability is less the coup attempt itself and more the reaction. The international community roundly condemned General Fidy’s actions with statements by the US Ambassador, French Ambassador, and others. Leading Malagasy civil society organizations, such as the Malagasy Council of Christian Churches (FFKM) and the National Committee for Election Observation (CNOE) also denounced destabilizing efforts generally and Fidy specifically. However, of the 14 presidential candidates, 8 supported the spirit of General Fidy’s remarks – that the president is illegitimate – and pressed the government to eschew pursuing him. Yet, rather than demonstrating a strong voice of dissent, the impotence of their collective voices demonstrated the lack of organization within the opposition. It is this lack of organization within the opposition that has led to six months of rhetoric with quite limited social action attached. • There were other scattered events that lent to a decrease in overall security in Madagascar during the second half of 2006. Most events followed a common pattern of relatively low-grade social tensions. For instance, mob violence erupted on 9 August 2006 in Anlavory when a mob attacked policemen who were trying to remove squatters. On 21 October 2006 several hundred youth attacked police at a concert of South African reggae singer Lucky Dube. In all, however, such violence has been limited relative to the social tensions elections bring. On 15 November two grenades were thrown into the Madagascar Broadcasting System (MBS) radio station owned by President Ravalomanana. On 2 December 2006, a day before the election, a grenade was thrown into the garden of Antananarivo mayor Patrick Ramiaramanana (who works closely with President Ravalomanana). The state also exerted force on scattered occasions. Police in Toamasina threw tear gas at a crowd on 7 October 2006. Furthermore, the government launched a strong attack on the forces of General Fidy after the general fled in November. Yet, despite these limited events and a general tension the run up to the elections took place in relative calm. Madagascar had something to prove after the last presidential elections in 2001 led to crisis. In light of this it would seem the run-up to the elections is a triumph for stability and a good indicator for Madagascar’s future. © swisspeace FAST Update Madagascar | June to November 2006 | Page 5 Conflictive Non-Government and Government Events (relative) Average number of reported events per month: 127 Indicator description: see appendix Risk Assessment: • June and July 2006 continued a moderation trend in both Conflictive Government and Non-Government Events. However, the run-up to the elections brought out an expected array of opposition activities. There was a sharp increase in Conflictive Non-Government Events in November 2006. This reflected the failed military action of General Fidy and its aftermath (see “Country Stability and Cooperative International Events” above). We can expect a sharp downturn in conflict level from this single event and its aftermath in December 2006 and January 2007. The lasting consequence is the interplay of party politics, their leaders, and their social relations, in the lead up to the elections. • What is most notable in Conflictive Non-Government Events is that they are few. Indeed, the trend was calmer in the September 2006 to November 2006 period than in the majority of the two years that preceded this. This signals a lack of organization and capacity on the part of the so-called “radical” opposition as well as the moderate opposition. • In “Madagascar Semi-Annual Risk Assessment: December 2005-May 2006” we wrote that the “Three National Forces (3-FN) umbrella party, formed in late 2005 by the “radical” opposition leaders former President Prof. Zafy Albert, former National Assembly Speaker Pastor Richard Andriamanjato, and former FJKM leader Reverend Edmond Razafimahefa, support electoral reform as one would expect. Yet these calls have reverberated much further, coming from Herizo Razafimahaleo of the Leader-Fanilo party, Pierre Tsiranana, the son of Madagascar’s first president who was appointed governor of Mahajanga by President Ravalomanana, the RPSD, AKFM, the Vice