Madagascar Revue Du Presse Octobre 2012
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Crise Malgache
Actuelle de l’Ifri L’Afrique en questions 5 : Crise malgache Sylvain Touati Mathieu Pellerin Février 2009 1 © Ifri Crise malgache L'ampleur des violences qui frappent Madagascar ont peu surpris les observateurs. Les signes avant-coureurs de la crise sont apparus sur l'île depuis plusieurs mois dans un contexte social et politique tendu. Cette crise trouve ses racines dans un mouvement de contestation à l'encontre de la gestion du gouvernement du président Ravalomanana des questions économiques, politiques et sociales. Les parallèles avec la crise politique de 2002 sont nombreux mais restent toutefois insuffisants pour expliquer la situation actuelle. Mathieu Pellerin, journaliste et consultant, commente la crise en détaillant les fractures politiques, sociales, économiques qui tiraillent la société malgache et les rivalités personnelles qui aujourd'hui opposent le président malgache et le maire de la capitale, Antananarivo. 2 © Ifri Sylvain Touati ; Mathieu Pellerin / Crise malgache Sylvain Touati : Où en est la situation aujourd'hui à Madagascar ? Mathieu Pellerin : Andry Rajoelina1 et Marc Ravalomanana2 se sont enfin rencontrés ce samedi 21 février grâce à la médiation dirigée par le FFKM3 (Conseil des Églises chrétiennes à Madagascar). Les deux parties sont parvenues à un consensus sur des préalables à l'ouverture de négociation : arrêter toute incitation à la violence, cesser les provocations et les dénigrements médiatiques, les manifestations et troubles à l'ordre public, les poursuites et arrestations d'ordre politique. Jusqu'à maintenant, ces préalables ont été respectés, et les deux camps se sont de nouveau retrouvés le lundi 23 février. Ces préalables réunis, l'heure est aujourd'hui à l'établissement de conditions pour que les négociations puissent aboutir à une solution de sortie de crise. -
F a S T Update Madagascar Semi-Annual Risk Assessment June to November 2006
F A S T Update Madagascar Semi-annual Risk Assessment June to November 2006 T S A F © swisspeace FAST Update Madagascar | June to November 2006 | Page 2 Contents Country Stability and Cooperative International Events (relative) 3 Conflictive Government and Non-Government Events (relative) 5 Cooperative and Conflictive Domestic Events (relative) 8 Appendix: Description of indicators used 11 The FAST International Early Warning Program 12 FAST Update Subscription: www.swisspeace.org/fast/subscription_form.asp Contact FAST International: Country Expert: Phone: +41 31 330 12 19 Richard Marcus Fax: +41 31 330 12 13 mailto:[email protected] www.swisspeace.org/fast © swisspeace FAST Update Madagascar | June to November 2006 | Page 3 Country Stability and Cooperative International Events (relative) Average number of reported events per month: 127 Indicator description: see appendix Risk Assessment: • During the second half of 2006 Country Stability and Cooperative International Events in Madagascar were primarily a function of the social and political actions in the run-up to the much anticipated 3 December 2006 presidential elections. Promises for extended economic aid and long term program planning on the part of donors and other international actors slowed as the administration of President Marc Ravalomanana drew towards political action. Considering the large number of challengers to the presidency, and the volatility of the opposition, Country Stability remained notably high. The downward trend in the Country Stability index in November 2006 is a reflection primarily of a single event, and its repercussions: the weak effort by General Andrianafidisoa (Fidy) to stage a military challenge to the Ravalomanana regime. • The first half of 2006, like much of Ravalomanana’s presidency, was characterized by high levels of foreign assistance. -
Madagascar 6Mm.Indd
EISA gratefully acknowledges the generous financial support for this project from the Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation (SDC) and the EISA ELECTION OBSERVER MISSION REPORT United Kingdom’s Department for International Development (DFID) Mission D’OBseRVation electoRale DE L’eisa EISA reconnaît avec gratitude la généreuse assistance financière de la Direction du Développement et de la Coopération (DDC) et du Département britannique pour le Développement International (DFID) pour ce projet MADAGASCAR PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS Elections PREsiDentielles 3 DECEMBER 2006 Order from: [email protected] ISBN 978-1-920095-71-0 9 781920 095710 EISA ELECTION OBSERVER MISSION REPORT No 24 EISA OBSERVER MISSION REPORT i EISA ELECTION OBSERVER MISSION REPORT MADAGASCAR PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS 3 DECEMBER 2006 ii EISA OBSERVER MISSION REPORT EISA OBSERVER MISSION REPORT iii EISA ELECTION OBSERVER MISSION REPORT MADAGASCAR PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS 3 DECEMBER 2006 2007 iv EISA OBSERVER MISSION REPORT Published by EISA 14 Park Rd, Richmond Johannesburg South Africa P O Box 740 Auckland Park 2006 South Africa Tel: 27 11 482 5495 Fax: 27 11 482 6163 Email: [email protected] www.eisa.org.za ISBN: 978-1-920095-71-0 EISA 2007 All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without the prior permission of EISA. First published 2007 EISA strives for excellence in the promotion of credible elections, participatory democracy, human rights culture, and the strengthening of governance institutions for the consolidation of democracy in Africa. EISA Election Observer Mission Report, No. -
A Cosmetic End to Madagascar's Crisis?
A Cosmetic End to Madagascar’s Crisis? Africa Report N°218 | 19 May 2014 International Crisis Group Headquarters Avenue Louise 149 1050 Brussels, Belgium Tel: +32 2 502 90 38 Fax: +32 2 502 50 38 [email protected] Table of Contents Executive Summary ................................................................................................................... i Recommendations..................................................................................................................... iii I. Introduction ..................................................................................................................... 1 II. From Deadlock to Elections ............................................................................................. 3 A. Postponed Elections................................................................................................... 3 B. Proxy Battles .............................................................................................................. 4 C. A Contested but Valid Election .................................................................................. 5 III. Old Wine, New Bottles ..................................................................................................... 7 A. Political Divides, Old and New .................................................................................. 7 1. Rivalry between Rajoelina and Rajaonarimampianina ....................................... 7 2. Parliamentary battles and the nomination of a prime minister ......................... -
Legislative and Second Round of Presidential Elections in Madagascar Final Report
ELECTION REPORT ✩ Legislative and Second Round of Presidential Elections in Madagascar Final Report December 2013 The Carter Center strives to relieve suffering by advancing peace and health worldwide; it seeks to prevent and resolve conflicts, enhance freedom and democracy, and protect and promote human rights worldwide. ELECTION REPORT ✩ Legislative and Second Round of Presidential Elections in Madagascar Final Report December 2013 One Copenhill 453 Freedom Parkway Atlanta, GA 30307 (404) 420-5100 www.cartercenter.org Contents Foreword..................................... 4 Candidates, Parties, and Campaigns ......... 28 Executive Summary........................... 6 Campaign Finance ......................... 30 Key Findings and Recommendations ......... 7 Participation of Women, Minorities, and Marginalized Groups ....................... 30 The Carter Center in Madagascar ............. 11 The Media ................................ 31 Deployment of Observers for the Civil Society ............................... 32 Dec. 20 Elections .......................... 11 Election Day ................................. 34 Historical and Political Background........... 14 Opening and Polling ....................... 34 Overview ................................. 14 Voting Process ............................ 34 Single-Party Dominance and a Close Relationship With France (1960–1975) ....... 14 Postelection Developments .................. 38 Single-Party Dominance and the Transfer of Results to District Transmission Red Admiral’s Break With France ........... -
Madagascar : Le Pasteur Andriamanjato Et La Ivè République Samedi, 14 Novembre 2009 11:23 - Mis À Jour Samedi, 14 Novembre 2009 11:47
Madagascar : Le Pasteur Andriamanjato et la IVè république Samedi, 14 Novembre 2009 11:23 - Mis à jour Samedi, 14 Novembre 2009 11:47 A 80 ans (en 2010), le pasteur Andriamanjato Richard Mahitsison figure comme l’un des derniers survivants opposants à tous les régimes qui se sont succédés à Madagascar, bien avant le retour de l’Indépendance, le 26 juin 1960. En effet, un an plutôt, en 1959, il a été le second maire malgache élu pour la ville d’Antanarivo. A 29 ans, après Stanislas Rakotonirina. Pour l’histoire à toujours retenir, rappelons que le Pasteur Andrimanjato faisant partie de l'opposition à l'époque, avec son parti Akfm, le pouvoir Psd (parti social démocrate) du président Philibert Tsiranana avait sorti l'ordonnance n°60.085 du 24 août 1960, à son encontre, qui stipulait : " est désormais chargé de l'administration de la ville de Tananarive, un fonctionnaire désigné par le ministre de l'Intérieur et nommé Délégué général " . T iens tiens… Le tout premier Délégué général qui a supplanté le Maire Richard Andriamanjato se nommait Clément Raveloson. VIDEO DE L’EMISSION DU 3 NOVEMBRE 2009 SUR LA TVM 1 / 5 Madagascar : Le Pasteur Andriamanjato et la IVè république Samedi, 14 Novembre 2009 11:23 - Mis à jour Samedi, 14 Novembre 2009 11:47 Traduction de ses déclarations sur cette chaîne nationale malgache TVM, le vendredi 13 novembre 2009 « Heureusement qu’un accord a été trouvé et signé à Addis-Abeba car c’était réellement l’avenir du pays tout entier qui était en jeu. Si aucun accord n’avait été trouvé, si Andry Rajoelina n’avait pas été accepté comme président de la transition, croyez-bien que Ravalomanana aurait fait appel à des forces armées africaines, ce qui entraînera un conflit dans le pays dans le but de revenir au pouvoir. -
The Indian Ocean Newsletter
PUBLISHED IN ENGLISH AND IN FRENCH SINCE 1981 THE INDIAN OCEAN NEWSLETTER N°1273 Paris, November 14 2009 CONTENTS MOZAMBIQUE Horn of Africa Afonso Dhlakama is playing with fi re Eritrea: Louis Michel got it all Since he lost by a landslide in the general election on 28 October, Afonso Dhlakama, the leader wrong (p.6); European Union of Renamo (opposition) has been playing a dangerous game of verbal jousting. He has made a show walks on a tightrope (p.7) of being prepared to use violence to contest the election results, which he claims are stained with Djibouti: The Afar sultan’s sons fraud. Many irregularities did indeed take place, but even the most critical observers evaluate them come to visit (p.3); President IOG’s as aff ecting at most 5% or 6% of the votes. They therefore do not have a signifi cant eff ect on the family network (p.4) balance of force in the fi nal outcome. In fact, Dhlakama is making a lot of noise to try to gather the ranks of Renamo around him, as he knows he is increasingly contested within the party. East Africa Guebuza tries to reassure. Last week President Armando Guebuza took endless initiatives to Kenya: KACC investigates a prevent his election victory together with that of Frelimo (governing party) from being tarnished by minister (p.3); Administration Police post-election violence, which would have been disastrous for the international image of his country. takes to the air (p.4); Considerable interest in NBK (p.6) He is worried just as much by Dhlakama’s calls to contest the election results as he is by the risk that Dhlakama might be dramatically ousted from the Renamo leadership by an internal settling of scores Tanzania: The tradition of double allocations (p.3) within the party. -
Marc Ravalomanana Est Un « Auto-Putschiste » Selon Hyppolite Rarison Ramaroson
Marc Ravalomanana est un « auto-putschiste » selon Hyppolite Rarison Ramaroson Extrait du Madagascar-Tribune.com http://www.madagascar-tribune.com/Marc-Ravalomanana-est-un-auto,13617.html Passation de fonctions aux Affaires Étrangères Marc Ravalomanana est un « auto-putschiste » selon Hyppolite Rarison Ramaroson - Politique - Date de mise en ligne : vendredi 26 février 2010 Madagascar-Tribune.com Copyright © Madagascar-Tribune.com Page 1/3 Marc Ravalomanana est un « auto-putschiste » selon Hyppolite Rarison Ramaroson Marc Ravalomanana s'est renversé lui-même de son trône. C'est ce qu'a voulu dire le Vice amiral chef d'escadre Hyppolite Rarison Ramaroson, le plus haut gradé au sein de l'armée malagasy et nouveau vice Premier Ministre chargé des Affaires Étrangères. Ce dernier a fait cette déclaration lors de la passation de service entre lui et le vice premier ministre sortant, Ny Hasina Andriamanjato. Une passation qui s'est déroulée dans la matinée de ce jeudi 25 février 2010, au siège du vice primature à Anosy. L'utilisation de certains mots en français au cours de cette cérémonie n'était certainement pas anodine et visait à faire passer un message à l'Union Africaine et au Groupe International de Contact. Ainsi, le VPM sortant, Ny Hasina Andriamanjato, a expliqué les motifs de sa démission et dit qu'il avait démissionné « pour aider le Président Rajoelina dans sa décision de mettre en place un gouvernement d'union nationale ». Les mots qu'Hyppolite Ramaroson a quant à lui utilisé sont « Marc Ravalomanana s'est auto-putsché ». Un journaliste étranger s'est interrogé sur la signification de ce néologisme que le nouveau responsable des affaires étrangères venait d'inventer. -
Madagascar : Sortir Du Cycle De Crises
MADAGASCAR : SORTIR DU CYCLE DE CRISES Rapport Afrique N°156 – 18 mars 2010 TABLE OF CONTENTS SYNTHESE ET RECOMMANDATIONS ............................................................................. i I. INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................................. 1 II. LA CRISE DE 2009 ........................................................................................................... 2 A. COMMENT MOBILISER LA FOULE : LES ELEMENTS DECLENCHEURS ............................................... 2 B. LES VIOLENCES DE JANVIER-MARS ............................................................................................... 4 1. Manifestations et répression ........................................................................................................ 4 2. Le rôle de l’armée ........................................................................................................................ 5 3. La passation de pouvoir ............................................................................................................... 6 C. ECHECS INITIAUX DE MEDIATION ................................................................................................. 7 1. Manque de consensus et de crédibilité de l’initiative des Eglises .............................................. 7 2. Manque de coordination de la communauté internationale ........................................................ 8 D. LA HAT : UN AN AU POUVOIR ..................................................................................................... -
Madagascar's Political Crisis
Madagascar’s Political Crisis Lauren Ploch Analyst in African Affairs Nicolas Cook Specialist in African Affairs June 18, 2012 Congressional Research Service 7-5700 www.crs.gov R40448 CRS Report for Congress Prepared for Members and Committees of Congress Madagascar’s Political Crisis Summary Madagascar, an Indian Ocean island country, ranks among the world’s poorest countries, is the world’s fourth largest island and is extremely biologically diverse, with thousands of unique species of flora and fauna. It has experienced political instability since early 2009, initiated by tensions between the country’s last elected president, Marc Ravalomanana, and an opposition movement led by Andry Rajoelina, then the mayor of the capital city, Antananarivo. Mass protests in early 2009 and eventual military support for the ouster of President Ravalomanana culminated in his forced resignation from office. Rajoelina then seized power and, with other leaders, formed an interim self-declared transitional government, the High Transitional Authority (HAT, after its French acronym). Ravalomanana now lives in exile in South Africa. Periodic protests by Ravalomanana supporters after the takeover led to violent clashes with security forces. Negotiations between the parties led to the signing of an agreement in 2009 in Maputo, Mozambique to establish an inclusive, transitional government, but Rajoelina subsequently appointed a cabinet seen to be primarily composed of his own supporters. Southern African leaders and Madagascar’s opposition parties rejected the proposed government, and negotiations resumed. Two later agreements also failed to result in a unified transitional process. The unconstitutional change of power and resulting political impasse have negatively affected economic growth and development efforts and strained Madagascar’s relations with international donors. -
AC Vol 43 No 10
www.africa-confidential.com 17 May 2002 Vol 43 No 10 AFRICA CONFIDENTIAL SOUTH AFRICA I I 3 SOUTH AFRICA Mbeki’s front line President Thabo Mbeki’s rapid rise Will the real Thabo Mbeki stand up? in the ANC followed years of Ahead of a hectic six months of hosting world leaders and trying to building a circle of friends and wring trade concessions from them, Mbeki changes course supporters in his exile years. Most of them now occupy key positions This year’s workload for President Thabo Mbeki is overwhelming. He and his colleagues from Africa’s in business and the media but most big nations must oversee the transformation of the Organisation of African Unity into the African Union of all in the party hierarchy. in July when it meets in Durban. In June, he will be in Canada, as chief salesman of the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NePAD). In August, his government will host, in Johannesburg, the United SUDAN 4Nations World Summit on Sustainable Development (known as ‘Rio plus 10’, since it is ten years since the first such meeting, in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil). And in December, he will face the 50th annual The fire does not conference of his own African National Congress, whose old allies, the Congress of South African Trade Unions and the SA Communist Party, will grumble loudly about the government’s free-market economic cease policies. The US-brokered ceasefire in the Mbeki is clearing the decks. To the relief of his supporters and the surprise of his detractors, he has Nuba Mountains was meant to changed his stance on HIV/AIDS and Zimbabwe, which had seriously damaged his own and South bring relief to the Nuba people and push the government towards Africa’s standing in the world. -
AC Vol 42 No 11
www.africa-confidential.com 1 June 2001 Vol 42 No 11 AFRICA CONFIDENTIAL ANGOLA 2 ANGOLA Lev Leviev takes on De Beers Who blinks first? Government and UNITA rebels edge reluctantly towards a ceasefire De Beers announced on 24 May that it was halting its diamond and new negotiations in one of Africa’s longest-running wars business in Angola. This is a Rebel leader Jonas Savimbi has a cruel sense of timing. For 18 months, he has been calling on the triumph for Israeli-based tycoon Leviev, whose diamond interests ruling Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola to start talking again to his União Nacional para spread across Africa and Russia. a Independência Total de Angola. On 2 May, President José Eduardo dos Santos made his most conciliatory statement for a year, talking of a ‘route to peace’ and a dialogue with UNITA (AC Vol 42 No 9). Three days later, Savimbi’s fighters killed at least 80 people in Caxito, abducting 60 GHANA 3 children from a local orphanage. Many in Luanda believe both leaders are inching towards new negotiations but want to save face Ole Kufuor! and get the best negotiating position beforehand. Dos Santos is under pressure from the growing Coup rumours don’t faze President popularity of Luanda’s peace movement and needs a ceasefire if he’s to hold elections next year. John Kufuor. This week Kufuor Savimbi is feeling the pressure of sanctions, the government’s military efforts and the factionalising flew into Valencia to speak at the African Development Bank’s of his UNITA organisation.