Early Warning Issues for August LIVINGSTONE FORMULA PEACE and SECURITY COUNCIL PROTOCOL

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Early Warning Issues for August LIVINGSTONE FORMULA PEACE and SECURITY COUNCIL PROTOCOL CONTENTS OF THIS ISSUE Early Warning Issues for August 1 Pending PSC Issues 2 Country Analysis: Guinea-Bissau 13 Country Analysis: Madagascar 3 PSC Retrospective – PSC and PSC Retrospective – PSC and ICC 5 Sanctions Committee 15 Country Analysis: Mauritania 6 Country Analysis: Niger 16 PSC Retrospective – PSC and Spotlight on the PSC 17 Unconstitutional Change 7 Peace and Security Issues in the AU Country Analysis: South Sudan 8 Strategic Plan 18 Volume 1, 31 July 2009 Country Analysis: Somalia 11 Important Forthcoming Dates 19 This report is available on the ISS website and can be viewed together with Thematic Reports on the work of the PSC at www.issafrica.org PEACE AND SECURITY COUNCIL PROTOCOL “The PSC shall encourage non-governmental organizations to participate actively in the efforts aimed at promoting peace, security and stability in Africa. When required such organizations may be invited to address the Peace and Security Council” – Article 20 of the Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the PSC of the African Union. Early Warning Issues 29 June 2009 in Sirte, Libya, at Somalia: the ministerial level, and called for for August efforts to be deployed to ensure The PSC considered a report on transparent elections. The elections Somalia and issued communiqué The scheduled Rotating Chair of were held on 18 July 2009 and the PSC/PR/COMM.2(CLXXIX) of 15 the African Union (AU) Peace AU together with other international June 2009 considered the Report of and Security Council (PSC) for partners have declared it free and the Chairperson of the Commission the month of August is Gabon. fair. However, the opposition have PSC/PR/2(CXCIV) on the In the absence of a country’s described the election as a “massive situation in Somalia. Through this representation at ambassadorial fraud” and an electoral coup d’etat. communiqué the Council decided level, an alternate member will chair The aftermath of the elections has to renew the mandate of AMISOM the Council for the month. to be monitored closely to ensure for a period of seven months Madagascar: that tensions do not escalate. beginning from 17 June 2009. The assassination of the Mogadishu South Sudan: Police Chief and the National The PSC issued communiqué PSC/ Security Minister has illustrated that PR/Comm.(CLXXXI) on 20 March the Transitional Federal Government 2009 on the situation in Madagascar The PSC communiqué PSC/PR/ (TFG) is vulnerable and the situation calling for a restoration of Comm.1(CLIX) of 24 November remains exceptionally volatile constitutional order in the country. 2008 noted “with concern the delay requiring urgent and ongoing The current Foreign Minister has in the implementation of crucial attention. suggested that elections might components of the Comprehensive be convened at the end of 2009. Peace Agreement”. The recent claim Guinea-Bissau: However, the regime is still elusive by President Salva Kiir Mayardit on a precise timetable for this that the South was ready for war process and therefore the country is an ominous early warning of the The PSC communiqué PSC/PR/ remains on a precarious footing. failure to implement the CPA and to Comm.5(CXCII) issued on 10 June make North-South unity “attractive”. 2009, vehemently condemned Mauritania: Conflict escalation in the south the assassination, on 5 June 2009, between southern groups has of Mr. Baciro Dabó, candidate in the presidential election. Also The PSC issued communiqué increased dramatically and could (PSC/MIN/COMM.(CXCVI) on further undermine the agreement. >>page 2 LIVINGSTONE FORMULA “Civil Society Organizations may provide technical support to the African Union by undertaking early warning reporting, and situation analysis which feeds information into the decision-making process of the PSC” – PSC/ PR/(CLX), 5 December 2008, Conclusions of a Retreat of the PSC on a mechanism of interaction between the Council and CSOs. PSC Report Programme, Institute for Security Studies, Addis Ababa, T: +251-11-372-11-54; F: +251-11-372-59-54; [email protected]; www.issafrica.org 1 PENDING PSC ISSUES Issues pending for the in consultation with ECOWAS, to of the AU Commission, in Council include: submit to it recommendations on accordance with the decision of immediate measures to be taken the Assembly AU/Dec.220(XII) Guinea: to ensure that optimal security adopted on 4 February 2009 conditions are created for the to present at the next Ordinary The PSC issued communiqué presidential elections in Guinea- Session of the Assembly concrete PSC/PR/COMM.(CXCVII) on Bissau. The PSC is yet to issue a recommendations to more 10 July 2009 which debated communiqué on its consideration of effectively prevent and punish the situation in the Republic of these recommendations. The PSC unconstitutional changes of Guinea. The PSC called on the also issued communiqué PSC/PR/ Government. The PSC is yet AU Commission, Member States, Comm(CLXXIV) on 3 March 2009 to issue a communiqué on this the Economic Community of West calling on the national authorities request. African States (ECOWAS) and of Guinea-Bissau, in cooperation the international community to with the AU, ECOWAS and other ICC: provide the necessary technical African institutions, to launch a full and financial assistance to investigation into the assassination The PSC issued communiqué PSC/ facilitate the holding of elections of the President and the Army Chief PR/Comm(CLXXV) on 5 March before the end of 2009. The PSC of Staff of Guinea-Bissau. The PSC is 2009 which considered the ruling is yet to issue a communiqué on yet to issue a communiqué on this of the Pre-Trial Chamber of the this request. investigation. International Criminal Court (ICC) to issue an arrest warrant against Central African Republic (CAR): Somalia: the President of Sudan, Omar Al- Bashir. The PSC appealed to the The PSC issued communiqué The PSC issued communiqué PSC/ UN Security Council to assume PSC/PR/COMM.3(CXCV) on PR/COMM.(CXC) on 22 May 2009 its responsibilities by deferring 17 June 2009 which considered which considered the situation in the process initiated by the ICC. the situation in Central African Somalia in which it requested the The PSC also requested the Republic (CAR) and requested the UN Security Council to impose Chairperson of the Commission to Chairperson of the AU Commission a no-fly zone and a blockade of urgently take all the steps required to support the implementation sea ports to prevent the entry of to dispatch a high-level delegation of the recommendations of foreign elements into Somalia. The to New York to directly engage the Inclusive Political Dialogue PSC also called for the UN Security the Security Council. The PSC is (DPI). The PSC also requested Council to impose sanctions against yet to issue a communiqué on this that AU Member States and the all those foreign actors providing meeting. international community support support to armed groups in the the preparation for elections country, including Eritrea. The PSC Committee on Sanctions: scheduled for April 2010. The PSC also requested all AU Member is yet to issue a communiqué on States that have pledged troops The PSC issued communiqué this request. to AMISOM to urgently deploy PSC/PR/COMM.3(CLXXVIII) on them. The PSC is yet to issue a 13 March 2009 which requested Guinea-Bissau: communiqué on this request. the AU Commission to submit to the Council “within a duration of The PSC issued communiqué PSC/ Unconstitutional Change two months from the date of the PR/COMM.5(CXCII) on 10 June of Government: adoption of this decision, a study 2009 which considered the report on the modalities for the function on the mission undertaken by The PSC issued communiqué PSC/ of the Committee on Sanctions”. the Council to West Africa, from PR/COMM.(CLXXXI) on 20 March The PSC is yet to issue a 24 April to 1 May 2009. The PSC 2009 on the situation in Madagascar communiqué on the consideration requested the AU Commission, and requested the Chairperson of this study. Early Warning Issues for Niger: August (continued) candidates in the presidential On 30 June 2009 the Chairperson election were also threatened. The of the AU Commission stated assassinated was Mr. Hélder situation in the country remains that the continental body was Proença, former Minister of unstable in the aftermath. “extremely concerned” about the Defence. In addition other escalating political crisis in Niger. PSC Report Programme, Institute for Security Studies, Addis Ababa, T: +251-11-372-11-54; F: +251-11-372-59-54; [email protected]; www.issafrica.org 2 The prospect for escalation of the officers who had seized one of the International efforts to engage in current situation is high. Some presidential palaces the previous mediated negotiations involving opposition groups have also day declared Andry Rajoelina, representatives of all the key actors stated that they will disrupt the former mayor of Antananarivo, have thus far not been successful. referendum. In addition, at least one “president” of Madagascar. The The parties involved are accusing rebel movement active in the north High Constitutional Court later each other of bad-faith, and the of the country has indicated its confirmed this decision and on 21 mediators are being accused of willingness to resort to violence to March 2009 he was inaugurated as lacking impartiality and neutrality. disrupt the referendum.The situation Madagascar’s president and head Recently, the Minister of Foreign therefore needs to be monitored of the Haute Autorité Transitoire Affairs Ny Hasina Andriamanjato closely. or the “high transitional authority”. announced that legislative and This was the culmination of a three- presidential elections could be month long standoff between feasibly held by the end of 2009 if COUNTRY ANALYSIS Ravalomanana and Rajoelina that the international community assisted started in December 2008.
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