West Africa Observer SWAC/OECD, N°2, April - June 2009 > www.westafricaclub.org
• Impact of the crisis: a mixed picture • The free movement of persons, 30 years later • Challenges for food security and the cotton sector • The army - a key political player, The Constitution under pressure West Africa Observer - SWAC/OECD, N°2 – April - june 2009
The Sahel and West Africa Club
The OECD has considerably deepened its relationship with Africa. The Its specificity lies in its approach, which combines direct field-involvement OECD’s policy dialogue is also developing at a regional level, in particular with analyses of West African realities. Together with regional institutions, through the work of the Sahel and West Africa Club (SWAC) which plays governments, business and civil society organisations, the SWAC a bridging role as an interface between West African actors and OECD promotes the regional dimension of development, supports the formulation member countries. Administratively attached to the OECD, the SWAC is and implementation of joint or intergovernmental policies and thereby led by a Secretariat based in Paris, which is supported by a network of contributes to mobilising and strengthening West African capacities. partners and experts from West Africa and OECD countries.
2 West Africa Observer - SWAC/OECD, N°2 – April - june 2009
Contents
Summary 4 Impact of the crisis: a mixed picture 5
• Economic outlook 5 • Regional policy reponses 6 • International policy reponses 6 The free movement of persons, 30 years later 8
• The 1979 Protocol and its application 8 • Obstacles and administrative harassment 9 • Regional infrastructure projects 10 Challenges for food security and the cotton sector 11
• High food prices 11 • A Charter for food crises prevention and management 12 • No relief for the West African cotton sector 13 The army - a key political player ; the Constitution under pressure 14
• Speedy election in Mauritania 14 • Political violence and elections in Guinea-Bissau 14 • A difficult transition in Guinea 15 • Niger’s Constitution under pressure 15
3 About the West Africa Observer
Summary The West Africa Observer
espite the crisis, the economic outlook for West Africa is better his quarterly review analyses West African news on major than expected. Not surprisingly, the oil exporting countries are the political, economic and social trends from a regional point Dhardest hit. The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) Tof view. It summarizes and puts into perspective important presents a highly contrasted assessment as to West Africa’s capacity to events and developments. Topics are chosen according co-ordinate its monetary policies and the Central Banks actions while the to the concerns of those with whom the SWAC team works: private West African banking system is rapidly integrating. However, the leaders of West African regional or government organisations, West African Economic and Monetary Union (UEMOA) was able to react development partners, NGOs, local actors and researchers, relatively successfully within its zone. The G20 pledged more resources civil society, etc. Our work draws on many existing information to the main financial institutions such as the African Development Bank sources. We believe: “The more information is available, the (AfDB), the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and the World Bank Group. more it needs to be synthesised”. The West Africa Observer is The Gleneagles commitments were also reconfirmed. An interim Economic intended to become a tool that provides easy and quick access Partnership Agreement (EPA) between West Africa and the European to key information on the region. Union will likely be signed in October 2009. Only addressing areas of Please send your comments to: [email protected] consensus, it will focus on trade in goods and equitable development in order to compensate for the imbalances linked to the opening up of the market. As it is the 30th anniversary of the freedom of movement within the ECOWAS zone, the West Africa Observer is focusing on the application of this founding principle. All ECOWAS member states have eliminated visas and entry permits for community citizens, and many of the countries now provide a travel certificate or a community passport. Yet there is still much to be done to reduce administrative harassment, and the number of control posts along cross-border corridors. The food situation is still worrying throughout the region. Despite record production (17% increase compared with 2007/2008 for the entire region; 30% in Sahel countries), food prices remain high. Price pressures are exacerbated by poor rainfall previsions; national public security stocks are not at optimal level. With regard to cotton, the global economic crisis combined with another fall in the dollar versus the euro (thus the CFA F) raises the bar. Some countries are taking short-term measures to save their “white gold” (subsidising inputs, State settlement of debts, sale price guarantees) and plan to undertake structural reforms over the long-term. Finally, the political and social scene continues to be instable. The political transition processes in Mauritania, Guinea-Bissau and Guinea progressed at a different pace. Political dialogue and mediation accelerated preparations for elections in Mauritania at lightning speed. Guinea-Bissau was finally able to hold elections without incident, after a series of political assassinations. In Guinea, as electoral preparations seem to be off track, tensions are rising between the military junta and the “Forces vives”. The army in these three countries is a key political player. In Niger, despite the Constitutional Court’s decision, President Mamadou Tandja will hold a referendum on 4 August 2009 which could pave the way to a third presidential term. ECOWAS played an important role by dispatching a mission of five Army Chiefs-of-Staff to Guinea-Bissau and a high-level delegation to Niger, led by the former Nigerian President Abusalami Abubakar.
Normand Lauzon, SWAC Director 4 Impact of the crisis: a mixed picture Economic outlook
he African Development Bank (AfDB) Annual meetings, held in Dakar on 13 and 14 May 2009, released new growth prospects for the TAfrican continent. According to the “African Economic Outlook (2009)”, economic growth in Sub-Saharan Africa is expected to be 2.4% in 2009 and 4.7% in 2010. In West Africa, real GDP growth is expected to slow to 4.2% in 2009, from 5.4% in 2008, before partially rebounding to 4.6% in 2010. However, it is a mixed picture with some countries maintaining, or even increasing their growth rate. Among the hardest hit African economies are oil exporting countries which have felt the effects of the crisis quicker and more acutely. In 2009, Nigeria is set to lose two growth points and its Federal State budget as well as its current account balance will be in deficit. Foreign exchange reserves dropped from US$ 53 to 43 billion between December 2008 and July 2009. The Central Bank of Nigeria declared a relaxing of its monetary policy (again cutting its federal funds rate from 8% to 6%) to provide increased liquidity while securing stability of the exchange rate. Volatile oil prices hinder the planning and implementation of economic policies over the medium-term. Ghana is faring well due to the good performance of the cocoa sector and, more generally, increases in agricultural production. In 2009, private consumption should support growth which will be able to rely on first oil exports as of 2010. After good performances in 2007 and 2008, the economy of Cape Verde is expected to significantly slow in 2009 as a result of a potential decrease in remittances and a drop in tourism. Post- conflict recovery in Liberia and Sierra Leone is likely to continue. The situation also varies in UEMOA countries. Burkina Faso and Mali are benefitting from good harvests, and Mali from the high price of gold in particular, while Niger is profiting from the high price of uranium. Senegal has suffered a poor agricultural campaign and a fall in phosphate and fertilizer production. The suspension of the Falémé mine project (ArcelorMittal of US$ 2.2 billion) is casting a shadow over Senegal’s medium- and long-term growth prospects. The improved political situation in Côte d’Ivoire, the biggest economy in UEMOA, has helped maintain growth prospects of 3.8% in 2009. This contributes also to the economic performance of other UEMOA member countries, tightly linked to the Côte d’Ivoire.
Learn more
• African Economic Outlook (2009): http://www.africaneconomicoutlook.org • Measuring the Pulse of Africa in Times of Crisis, OECD Policy Brief, May 2009 • Regional Economic Outlook: Sub-Saharan Africa, IMF, April 2009, http://www.imf.org
5 Impact of the crisis: a mixed picture
Regional policy responses At the same time, the 9th Summit of the Heads of State of the West African Monetary Zone (WAMZ) announced the postponement of the creation of the common West African Central Bank from January 2010 to June 2014. uring a regional seminar held in Cotonou on 11 and According to Nigerian President Umaru Musa Yar’Adua who chaired the 12 June 2009, the ECOWAS Commission and its Consultative session, “the global economic and financial crisis has put constraints on DCommittee presented a highly contrasted assessment of the regional member states’ ability to meet the convergence criteria individually and responses to the crisis: no co-ordinated response by central banks collectively.” A new Action Plan was adopted in order to assist preparation and a lack of co-ordination regarding monetary policies, while in the countries concerned (the Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Nigeria and the private West African banking system is rapidly integrating. A Sierra Leone) to agree on common convergence criteria and establish regional strategic monitoring committee will be responsible for the legal instruments of the WAMZ. analysing the sectoral implications of the financial crisis and report to the next Conference of ECOWAS Heads of State. However, it Learn more was underscored during the seminar that UEMOA was able to react • Press Release of the Ordinary Meeting of the Union Council of relatively successfully within its zone. Ministers, UEMOA, 26 June 2009 • Final Communiqué of the Authority of ECOWAS Heads of State In the first quarter, the situation of the UEMOA banking system was deemed and Government, 22 June 2009 • Strategy for addressing the financial crisis in ECOWAS, by relatively good as the region’s foreign exchange reserves were sufficient the ECOWAS Commission and the Consultative Committee, (West Africa Observer, No. 1, January – March 2009). The 21 March 2009 June 2009 assessment by the Central Bank of West African States (BCEAO) confirms this analysis and notes the mitigation of inflationary pressure. However, the UEMOA Council of Ministers meeting on 26 June 2009 called for vigilance with regard to potential price increases of energy products as International policy well as uncertainties related to climate conditions during the 2009/2010 responses agricultural campaign. Ministers also approved the creation of national committees responsible for implementing the recommendations of the UEMOA’s financial sector assessment programme. A series of directives At the G20 Summit, it was agreed to allocate more financing were adopted with a view to harmonising the management of public to the main financial institutions [the African Development LBank Group (AfDB), the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the finances to facilitate multilateral monitoring. World Bank Group]. The G8 leaders also reaffirmed the Gleneagles Financing the real economy is also still a major concern. On 11 June 2009, commitments to increase Official Development Aid (ODA) to Africa the BCEAO announced another cut to its federal funds rate (from 4.75% from US$ 42 billion in 2008 to US$ 66 billion in 2010. to 4.25%) and the coefficient of obligatory reserves applicable to banks. The aim is to increase the volume of loans and reduce their costs. The Participants at the annual AfDB meetings endorsed a joint Action Plan to BCEAO’s governor, Mr. Philippe-Henri Dacoury-Tabley, stressed the support Africa’s financial systems and lending to the private sector (US$ need for banks within the region to reflect the Central Bank’s action to its 15 billion over the next 2 or 3 years). An Emergency Liquidity Facility clients, notably with regard to interest rates. Investments in agriculture, (ELF) of US$ 1.5 billion is being set up. It will provide financial support energy and infrastructure continue to be UEMOA priorities. to eligible states and to non sovereign activities (businesses). The AfDB is also launching a Trade Finance Initiative. The first phase, approved in The 36th Conference of ECOWAS Heads of State and Government, March 2009, introduces a US$ 500 million trade line of credit to support held in Abuja on 22 June 2009 underscored “the need to deepen the trade financing by African Banks and US$ 500 million for the Global Trade regional integration process” in order to counter the impacts of “crises” Liquidity Programme (GTLP) in the second phase. and provide increased opportunities for regional growth. In fact, the ECOWAS Commission believes it is essential to address the financial, fuel The G20 and the International Monetary and Financial Committee decided and food crisis (“three F’s”) simultaneously. Heads of State encouraged to triple the IMF’s concessional loans to low-income countries over the ECOWAS Commission “to continue with its efforts to establish a the next three years. Africa’s share based on current IMF quotas is regional strategy and pursue the reforms that have been undertaken to estimated at US$ 15.6 billion. Africa could also receive US$ 3 billion put in place macroeconomic convergence instruments and speed up the of the US$ 6 billion additional concessional lending. IMF financing establishment of a single monetary zone within the ECOWAS area”. should become more flexible, in particular with regard to the concessional lending facilities.
6 Impact of the crisis: a mixed picture
The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) An interim Economic Partnership will triple its loans to provide US$ 100 billion over the next three years frontloading International Development Association (IDA 15) Agreement (EPA) by October 2009 disbursements (US$ 42 billion over 3 years of which US$ 21 billion will be allocated to Sub-Saharan Africa). The World Bank also recommends ollowing meetings in June in Cotonou and in Brussels, the developed countries pledge the equivalent of 0.7% of their stimulus European Union and West Africa (ECOWAS plus Mauritania) Fdecided to sign a less ambitious EPA in October 2009. This packages to a global vulnerability fund to help development countries interim which cannot afford bailouts and deficits. would be an agreement on areas of consensus, mainly trade in goods (including the 5th tariff band of 35% to better Learn more protect the regional market) and the “EPA Development
• The Crisis and Africa: Monitoring the Global Policy Response, Programme” (EPADP or its French acronym PAPED). Among prepared by the Africa Partnership Forum (APF) Support Unit, others, the PAPED (about US$ 9.5 billion over 5 years) shall OECD, 10 June 2009 http://www.africapartnershipforum.org help countries of the region compensate for imbalances linked • African Development Bank Group Response to the Economic to the opening up of the market instituted by the EPA, notably Impact of the Financial Crisis, March 2009, http://www.afdb.org • Update on the EPA negotiations, by Melissa Julian its net fiscal impact. The October agreement should also set http://ictsd.net/news/eclairage out the road map for negotiating a more comprehensive EPA. • Information-sharing Gateway on ACP-EU trade http://www.acp-eu-trade.org These negotiations, due to begin in January 2010, will have no deadline as was the case in the past. They will focus on services as West Africa is wary to open up calls for tender to European businesses (see also the SWAC interview with Mr. Mamadou Cissokho, ROPPA).
Photo: Stopover on the Lake Volta (Ghana)
7 The free movement of persons, 30 years later The 1979 Protocol and its application
reedom of movement is one of the founding principles of the 1975 treaty establishing ECOWAS. The 1979 Protocol on Free Movement Fof Persons, the Right of Residence and Establishment sets out its implementation. Over time, several supplementary protocols, an ECOWAS Code of Citizenship (1982), the creation of an ECOWAS travel certificate (1985), a residence card (1990) and a community passport (2000) help implement this founding principle. What progress has been made? All ECOWAS member states have eliminated visas and entry permits for community citizens. Only a national identity card or a passport is needed to move about within the ECOWAS area. Six member countries have already introduced the community passport and seven countries use the travel certificate. This much less expensive certificate is easier to obtain and thus more frequently used than a passport. West African nationals simply need an identity card when crossing the border. “The ECOWAS Protocol […] has implicitly conferred a particular status on West African nationals […]. This “adjusted” application of legal provisions is a response to the nature of migratory exchanges that are behind the history of the region.”1 There is certainly a high level of intra-regional mobility. Approximately 3% of West Africans live in a country in which they do not have nationality. Within the EU, it is about 0.5%.
1 Nelly Robin: ECOWAS, an Area of Free Movement and First Border Post for the Schengen Area, “Regional Challenges of West African Migration: African and European Perspectives”, West African Studies, OECD/SWAC, 2009 est Africa is making notable progress with regard to free movement, in comparison with other African regions, as was confirmed in the WFollow-up Report on the Implementation of Recommendations from the 3rd Conferences of African Ministers in charge of Integration, published in Intra-regional trade is greatly tied May by the African Union Commission. The Report’s conclusions indicate to human mobility that the member countries of the East African Community and ECOWAS are much further ahead (with the community passport) than the Common ccording to the general perception set out in the 2009 Report Market for East and Southern Africa (COMESA) and the Economic of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development Community of Central African States (ECCAS) in which the free movement A(UNCTAD), there is relatively little trade between African countries protocols are only at the ratification stage; and even more so than the (approximately 9.5% in West Africa). But the report also emphasises Community of the Sahel-Saharan States (CEN-SAD), the Southern African the rarely highlighted fact that taken individually, intra-continental Development Community (SADC) and the InterGovernmental Authority on trade accounts for more than 25% of many countries’ exports. Trade Development (IGAD) in East Africa who are still seeking consensus on within the ECOWAS zone accounts for 57% of Togo’s exports, 37% this issue. of Senegal’s exports, 31% of Burkina Faso, 25% of Cape Verde, 24% of Côte d’Ivoire and the Gambia, etc. The tremendous volume of oil exports relegates Nigeria’s exports within West Africa to 5%. Learn more However, West Africa’s demographic and economic giant also trades • Protocol on Free Movement of Persons, the Right of Residence massive volumes (although difficult to quantify) of manufactured and Establishment, adopted by ECOWAS on 28 May 1979 in Dakar and agricultural products within the ECOWAS region. Official trade • Follow-up Report on the Implementation from the statistics do not necessarily reflect real trade volumes as 90% of the 3rd Conferences of African Ministers in charge of Integration West African population is living off the informal sector (family farms (COMAI III), African Union Commission, May 2009 • Economic Development in Africa: Strengthening Regional and the urban economy). Economic Integration for Africa’s Development, UNCTAD, 2009
8 The free movement of persons, 30 years later Obstacles and Results for 1 January – 31 March 2009 administrative harassment
evertheless, the Observatory of Abnormal Practices – an initiative of the West Africa Trade Hub and UEMOA, supported by USAID – Nasserts that numerous control posts, administrative harassment and the extortion of funds continue to hinder free movement within the ECOWAS zone. Each quarter, the Observatory publishes a report on the three corridors of Tema-Ouagadougou, Bamako-Ouagadougou and Lomé- Ouagadougou. The 2009 first quarter assessment showed that the rate of “harassment” had not decreased considerably. Illegal payments vary from 1 667 CFA F in Togo to 7 784 CFA F in Mali over 100 km. The amount of time lost can be 5 minutes for 100 km in Togo to 30 minutes in Mali. Resolving this problem is not easy, as it involves security issues (banditry is recurrent in some sections of these corridors), social issues (purchasing power and working conditions of ECOWAS member countries’ security he Conference of ECOWAS Heads of State and government meeting forces vary greatly) and economic issues (the least costly and quickest on 22 June again, “called on Member States to ensure the effective Tapplication of the ECOWAS Protocols on the Free Movement of Persons transport routes are preferred by truck drivers). and Right of Residence and to put an end to all forms of harassment Learn more along corridors and borders.” The ECOWAS Commission also relies on • 7th Report of the Observatory of Abnormal Practices on Inter- the press to stimulate debate to raise awareness among civil society. state Corridors, Results for 1 January - 31 March 2009, West During a workshop bringing together some 100 journalists (Abidjan, Africa Trade Hub, UEMOA and USAID 24 and 25 June), the Commission suggested creating a media network to encourage integration and lower the barriers hindering free movement within ECOWAS borders. The Director of the ECOWAS Commission’s Free Movement of Persons Department, Mr. NFaly Sanoh, stressed the lack of awareness of community laws. The first step to applying a law is to inform the beneficiaries. Photo: Trucks at the Paga border check point (Burkina Faso-Ghana)
9 The free movement of persons, 30 years later
The dry port of Dosso in Niger awaiting the Parakou Regional railway
infrastructure projects n 21 May 2009, Niger’s President Mamadou Tandja, alongside his Beninois counterpart, Thomas Boni Yayi, broke ground on the t their summit, ECOWAS Heads of State and government announced ODosso dry port with a view to extending the Cotonou-Parakou railway the creation of a fund for the development and financing of the (Benin-Niger Joint Railway and Transport Organisation - OCBN) up to Atransport and energy sectors. This fund (modalities are currently being the Nigerien town. This long-planned project still lacks the technical and explored) shall be financed through revenue generated by the region’s financial means even though both countries are committed to contribute main export products. regularly into a fund. Areva’s participation is still in discussion.
A transport corridor between West and Central Africa The Senegal River with 900 navigable kilometres
The US$ 455 million project focuses on the Lagos-Enugu-Abakiliki he Senegal River Basin Organisation (Organisation de mise en valeur (Nigeria) - Mamfé-Mutengene-Bamenda (Cameroon) corridor covering du fleuve Sénégal - OMVS) announced plans to begin sea-marking 450km. This project will entail the paving and maintenance of the road, the Ta channel in August/September 2009 so as to facilitate navigation building of two bridges and investment in socio-economic infrastructure. for medium-sized boats along the 900km that separates Saint-Louis Two-thirds of the financing will come from the AfDB as well as the World (Senegal) and Amdibédi (close to Kayes, Mali). Ports will be built in both Bank in Nigeria and the Japanese International Co-operation Agency towns as well as nine stopover ports along the route. (JICA) in Cameroon. ECOWAS, the Economic and Monetary Community of Central African States (CEMAC) and the two states concerned will also provide assistance. This project was finalised at the beginning of April, just after the official settlement of the border between the two countries on the Bakassi peninsula.
10 Challenges for food security and the cotton sector High food prices
lobal food commodity prices have dropped sharply since the est Africa is following the global trend. Continued high food beginning of 2008 after having reached an all-time high in 2007. Yet, prices were confirmed at the meeting of the Regional Monitoring Gthey are still far superior to price levels prior to the 2007 crisis (Figure 1). WMechanism on Food and Nutritional Security held in Dakar in June, Plunging prices have stabilised over the last few months. Record rice despite record production (17% increase compared with 2007/2008 in production (666 million tonnes, an increase of 2.3%) has led to a 30% West Africa; 30% in Sahel countries). drop in prices although still not at the 2007 price level. Cereals are all The FEWS NET monthly newsletter asserts that between April and June, following a similar trend (Figure 2). the price of imported rice remained higher than the 2004/2008 average of Figure 1: Food product price index all the markets surveyed. The same goes for corn, which is a basic food product in coastal countries and a substitution for millet and sorghum in source: FAO (index 100 = 2002 – 2004 average) Sahel countries where it is also used in animal feed. The prices of sorghum and millet, mainly consumed in the Sahelian and Sudano-Sahelian zones, are also above average. In June 2009, the price of millet in Mali (Mopti), Niger (Niamey) and Burkina Faso (Djibo) were respectively 11%, 14% and 21% higher than in June 2008. On the other hand, the price of yams, also a basic food product on the coast and a substitution in the Sahel, fell below the 2004/2008 average (except on the Lagos market). Although current market supply is relatively good, producer’s as well as national public security stocks are not at optimum level. Worrying rainfall forecasts are exacerbating price pressures. Rainfall Figure 2: Cereal price index is expected to be insufficient in some Sahelian zones (the Gambia, source: FAO southwest and central Mali, southwest of Mauritania, Senegal) leading to an early start of transhumance in pastoral zones. There could even be a lack of rain in high-rainfall areas such as Benin, north of Côte d’Ivoire, Ghana, north and west Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Nigeria and Togo. Floods could also occur in the southern part of the Gulf of Guinea countries. Against this background, several West African countries are maintaining their agricultural production support programmes.
11 Challenges for food security and the cotton sector
A Charter for Food Crises Prevention and Management
n the 1980s, the “Club du Sahel” (renamed in 2001 the Sahel and West Africa Club - SWAC) and the Permanent Inter-state Committee Ifor Drought Control in the Sahel (CILSS) carried out an analysis and consultation process which led to the establishment of the “Food Aid Charter” (1990), adopted by CILSS member countries and the main food aid donors. This code of good conduct aims to co-ordinate donors’ actions by delivering aid in a timely and an appropriate manner to the “real” beneficiaries in Sahelian countries while avoiding the adverse effects it may cause on local production and the market. As a precursor to the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness (2005), it also inspired the Food Aid Convention (London, 1999). Today, food crises are more intricate taking on more diverse forms than in the past. The regional population has doubled since the beginning of the 1980s becoming increasingly urbanised (from 25% to almost 50%). Trade has created great interdependencies on the regional market. While in the past, food security mainly relied on the ability to produce one’s own food, access to food today is mostly determined by income. The global market has a strong impact on local prices which can remain high even if local production is plentiful. The institutional framework has also changed. Decentralisation paved the way for local actors to make their voices heard. Farmers are actively taking part in food aid programmes and international negotiations, supported by their associations and much more powerful NGOs. Regional organisations (CILSS, ECOWAS, UEMOA, etc.) are major players. New actors (Brazil, China, India, etc.), non-signatories of the Charter, are also joining this new food security landscape. The Food Aid Charter therefore needs to be revised. Since 2007, the CILSS and the SWAC are leading another consultation process involving all concerned food security actors to respond to this new situation. A draft version of the revised Charter was produced and validated by an international Steering Committee (June 2009). It goes beyond the original text evolving from co-ordinated food aid management to a food crisis prevention and management tool (mutual responsibility). It also opens up to regional organisations and non-state actors, and expands its geographic coverage from the Sahel to all of West Africa.
Learn more
• Food Aid Charter (1990) • Draft revised Charter for Food Crises Prevention and Management (June 2009), http://www.oecd.org/swac/rural • New Contexts and Food Security Issues in the Sahel and West Africa (French), SWAC/D(2008)3, February 2008 • West Africa, monthly bulletin of cereal prices, June 2009, FEWS NET, USAID
12 Challenges for food security and the cotton sector
No relief for the West African irmly opposed to the cultivation of GMOs, the Swiss NGO, Helvetas, in partnership with local associations, is implementing an agreement cotton sector Fbetween Brittany (France) and cotton growers in Burkina Faso and Mali. This agreement provides, with UEMOA support, 740 000 euros over ince the mid-1990s, structural problems have affected the West three years (2008-2010) to launch organic cotton production. Currently African cotton industry with a drop in international prices punctuated accounting for 0.2% of global production, organic cotton is sold at Sby a few soaring speculative hikes, an increase in the cost of inputs and 350 CFA F, more than twice as much as regular cotton (160 CFA F). fluctuations in the CFA F/US$ exchange rate. The global economic crisis (provoking a sharp decrease in demand) combined with another fall in On 11 April 2009, Brazil announced that it would provide US$ 7 billion in the dollar versus the euro (thus the CFA F) raises the bar. Burkina Faso non-reimbursable aid to the cotton sectors in Benin, Burkina Faso, Chad surpassed Mali as the first cotton-producing country of the region. On and Mali. In 2003, these four countries launched the C4 initiative to defend 6 May, the Burkinabe’s Council of Ministers announced a support plan for the interests of African cotton producers in WTO negotiations. the cotton sector. Seven billion CFA F (10.6 million euros) will be provided to subsidise inputs and to support producers’ purchasing price. Four Cotton production in West and Central Africa billion CFA F (6.1 million euros) will help balance out producer groups’ debts. In the long term, the cotton sector as well as the Burkinabe textile fibre company SOFITEX will undergo significant reforms. SOFITEX has opted to reduce cotton grain production costs and increase yields by introducing genetically modified organisms (GMOs).
Learn more
• The World Cotton Market: Main Challenges (French), International Cotton Advisory Committee, July 2009 http://www.icac.org • Cotton, Market information in the commodity area http://www.unctad.org/infocomm/anglais/cotton/market.htm • Cotton news: between the financial crisis and protectionism, what hope for the cotton sector ? Information note n° 82, IDEAS Centre Geneva, 12 March 2009 (French)
West African cotton basins
13 the army - a key political player ; the Constitution under pressure
Speedy election Political violence and in Mauritania elections in Guinea-Bissau
ollowing lengthy negotiations, the Dakar agreement, facilitated by ollowing the assassinations of President Nino Vieira and the Army the Senegalese government and the International Contact Group on Chief-of-Staff Tagme Na Waie last March, violence again erupted Fthe situation in Mauritania (African Union, Arab League, European Union, Fon the political scene. On the night from 4 to 5 June, the military was International Organisation of the Francophonie and the United Nations) was accused of its involvement in the assassinations of Baciro Dabo, Minister signed on 4 June 2009 in Nouakchott. It sets the date of the presidential of Territorial Administration and a presidential candidate, as well as election to 18 July (initially scheduled for 6 June), re-opens candidate Hélder Proença, a deputy in the African Party for the Independence of registration (officially closed in April), establishes an interim government Guinea and Cape Verde (PAIGC) and former Minister of Defence. The and transforms the High Council of State (HCS - the junta in power since government accused these two political figures, close allies of Nino Vieira, the military coup on 6 August 2008) into a Security and Defence Council of attempting a coup d’état. The ECOWAS Commission and the African under the National Union transitional government’s authority. It also Union are setting-up an International Commission of Inquiry to investigate foresees the symbolic resignation of the deposed president. these assassinations. Implementing this agreement immediately encountered difficulties. In Furthermore, in order to prevent resurging tensions, ECOWAS paid the army particular, there was disagreement on the composition of the National three months of back salary and contributed to the budget and logistical Union’s transitional government which was finally appointed on arrangements of the 28 June elections (see box below). Other measures 27 June; the unseated President Sidi Ould Cheikh Abdallahi refused to should be undertaken soon. The donor round table on the restructuring officially step down prior to the dissolution of the HCS. On 24 June, the and modernisation of the security and defence sector, organised in Praia Constitutional Court nullified a HCS order precipitating the closing of on 20 April, was a first step. Following elections, ECOWAS intends to candidate registration. The Independent National Electoral Commission organise an international donor conference on Guinea-Bissau. The United (INEC) was only established on 1 July making it impossible to mobilise all Nations Peacebuilding Support Office in Guinea-Bissau (UNOGBIS) the international observers on such short notice. will be replaced as of 1 January 2010 by the United Nations Integrated Peacebuilding Office in Guinea-Bissau (Resolution 1876/2009). This office On 18 July, General Mohamed Ould Abdelaziz was elected in the first will provide support to the Peacebuilding Commission (PBC), in particular round with 52.47% of the votes. His election was confirmed a few days in capacity-building of national institutions (police, justice, etc.), as well as later by the Constitutional Court before which the opposition had submitted in reconciliation and mediation activities. a petition to nullify elections. According to the last United Nations report on the political developments in Guinea-Bissau, “there was a high risk of a constitutional crisis”. The Amnesty for rebels constitution provides for a 60-day term of office of an interim President before elections are held. As President Vieira was assassinated at the in the Niger Delta beginning of March, elections should have been held at the beginning of May at the latest. In order to prevent a constitutional crisis, interim n 24 June 2009, Nigeria’s President Umaru Musa Yar’ Adua President Raimundo Pereira achieved consensus with parliamentarians, offered amnesty to all Niger Delta rebel organisations political parties and members of civil society to set the length of his Oand militants who lay down their arms by 6 October 2009. mandate. UNOGBIS sees this as an encouraging sign to build a new Immediately responding to this announcement, the Movement national consensus based on political dialogue which is needed to resolve for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND) attacked an oil the critical challenges facing the country. pipeline. Nevertheless, there is progress towards peace. Some rebel groups seem to seek firmer guarantees as compensation for laying down arms. A peaceful first round of presidential elections
n 28 June, none of the eleven candidates on the list obtained majority. Leading candidates were Malam OBacai Sanha of the PAIGC (39.6% of the votes) and Kumba Learn more Yala of the Party for Social Renovation (29.4%). The second • Report of the Secretary-General on developments in Guinea- round of voting on 26 July should decide between the two. Bissau and on the activities of the United Nations Peacebuilding Support Office in that country, 10 June 2009 14 the army - a key political player ; the Constitution under pressure
A difficult transition A drop in drug trafficking in Guinea ccording to the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) Report on “Transnational Trafficking and the Rule uring the second quarter, relations between Captain Moussa Dadis Aof Law in West Africa: a Threat Assessment”, drug-trafficking , in Camara’s National Council for Democracy and Development (CNDD) particular cocaine, is decreasing for the first time in five years. In Dand the “Forces Vives” began to chill around the scheduled timetable addition to Europe’s decline in demand, Mr. Antonio Mazzitelli, of the presidential election. While the head of the ruling junta stressed UNODC’s West Africa Director, explains this drop by the the need to pursue his fight against corruption and drug-trafficking, the changes in political regimes (along with different strategies to spokesperson of the “Forces Vives”, Mr. Jean-Marie Doré, expressed his combat drug-trafficking) in Guinea and Guinea-Bissau as well concerns over the delay in electoral preparations and the lack of financing as measures undertaken by Ghana. to set up an Independent National Electoral Commission.
ECOWAS Heads of State and government were concerned by the lack of Learn more progress in the implementation of the agreed chronogram for the restoration of constitutional order (see ECOWAS Press Release No. 066/2009). With • “Transnational Trafficking and the Rule of Law in West Africa: A Threat Assessment”, UNODC, 7 July 2009 the junta banning several political meetings, ECOWAS requested the CNDD to respect its commitments, authorise all political party activity and organise legislative and presidential elections in 2009. The International Contact Group on Guinea (OCG) will open in Conakry in July to facilitate Niger’s constitution dialogue between the CNDD and other stakeholders to assure elections at the end of 2009. under pressure
The social climate is still tense. Guinean Unions are protesting against the On 5 May, Niger’s President Mamadou Tandja announced his intention to 30% rise in fuel prices and are calling for salary increases, notably for civil submit a referendum modifying the constitution to abolish the presidential servants in the national education system. In mid-June, violence erupted term limitation. The President thus intends to try to serve a third term in in Conakry and in several large towns between protesting youth and order to “finish the large-scale projects underway”. On 8 May, twenty- military/policy forces, following a well-supported general strike. Following three deputies referred the matter to the Constitutional Court which then these clashes baccalaureate exams were cancelled by the junta. ruled against it on 25 May. The next day, President Tandja dissolved the National Assembly. One month later, on 25 June, the Constitutional Court rendered a negative decision for the second time and one of the major A constitutional reform to establish presidential parties (the Democratic and Social Convention) withdrew the vice presidency in Senegal its eight government ministers from the presidential administration. On 29 June, the President dismissed the seven judges of the Constitutional n Senegal’s 49th anniversary of independence Court and suspended the Court’s powers of arbitration concerning politics (4 April 2009), President Abdoulaye Wade announced his and elections. The same day, he enforced Article 53 of the Constitution, Ointention to establish the post of vice-president. Unlike Niger, authorising the president to exert special powers and govern by decree. the Supreme Court declared itself incompetent to decide on the The final Press Release of the Conference of ECOWAS Heads of State and opposition’s appeal. Following a majority vote by the National government of 22 June stressed their concerns and noted the Nigerien Assembly, the Senate approved the constitutional change on Prime Minister’s reassurances that “all political stakeholders will continue 19 May. The vice president is named by the president for a term to operate with the ambit of respect for the constitutional legality”. The not exceeding the president’s mandate in consultations with the ECOWAS Supplementary Protocol on Democracy and Good Governance, president of the Senate and the National Assembly. ratified by Niger, prohibits any non-consensual change to the constitution within six months prior to elections. Niger is expected to hold three elections in 2009 under very tense political circumstances that include the constitutional referendum of 4 August, legislative elections set for 20 August and presidential elections to be held by the end of December. President Tandja’s term officially ends at the end of this year.
15 West Africa Observer - Contact: [email protected] Sahel and West Africa Club/OECD Postal Address: 2 rue André Pascal, 75775 Paris Cedex 16 - France Office: Le Seine Saint-Germain, 12 bd des Iles, Building B , 92130 Issy-les-Moulineaux - France Phone: +33 (0)1 45 24 89 87 - Fax: +33 (0)1 45 24 90 31 E-mail: [email protected] / www.westafricaclub.org