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Overview of Madagascar 2003‐2009 2003 2004

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Overview of Madagascar 2003‐2009 2003 2004 OVERVIEW OF MADAGASCAR 2003‐2009 Madagascar is the 4th largest island in the world, with a population of roughly 20.7 million. It is subject to a cyclone season that annually sees death and destruction, and around 75% of the population lives on less than $1 a day. It is generally peaceable, although presidential elections tend to see spikes in violence. There is a strong tradition of protest, and it has become a powerful tool in the political sphere, particularly with regard to presidential candidates and incumbents. Having been on the brink of civil war in 2001‐2, violence again flared in 2009 as Andry Rajoelina challenged Marc Ravalomanana’s authority, denouncing him as a tyrant. Currently, there is an interim administration with elections due next autumn (2010). 2003 2003 proved to be relatively Quiet in the aftermath of political turbulence in 2001‐2 due to disputed presidential elections, which were eventually won by Marc Ravalomanana. There were scattered opposition demonstrations countrywide, but the violence that characterised the previous two years was far less. An oil workers’ strike disrupted oil supply for a short period in October, and students rioted and protested in March‐April over poor conditions. A grenade attack in January bore the hallmarks of similar attacks that plagued the country throughout 2004. 2004 Army reservists (‘Zanadambo’) held a series of protests against President Ravalomanana due to what they considered to be inadeQuate compensation for their backing during the political crisis of 2001‐ 2. In June, 32 people were injured during clashes with the police on such a march. Previously, the marches had been peaceful by and large. A spate of grenade attacks aimed at prominent political and economic targets was a continual worry, though apparently with a desire to gain attention rather than to injure. Political leaders and enterprises linked to Ravolamanana’s Tiko empire were the main targets. However, leaders from most political affiliations were victims of attacks, leaving the actual motives unclear. Reports state that many of the grenades were left over from political violence in 2002. However, grenade attacks in Toliara, Mahajanga and Fianarantsoa left 38 injured. 2005 Grenade attacks that had occurred throughout 2004 continued during the beginning of the year, with judicial officials’ homes attacked in February. The Rally of National Forces (RFN), the Parliamentarians' Solidarity for the Defence of Democracy (SPDD) and the National Reconciliation Committee (CRN) came together to form 3FN (3 National Forces), an opposition movement which held a series of protests against Ravalomanana’s government. The leaders of the group included former president Albert Zafy (CRN), Edmond Rafimanaheja (RFN) and Richard Andriamanjato (SPDD). The year ended with the murder of a UNDP staff member, which raised Questions about the rising levels of violent crime and the need for increased security members. 2006 Grenade attacks again targeted government figures and buildings, but were less freQuent than in previous year. The opposition protested the inability of Pierrot Rajaonarivelo to return to the island to register his candidacy for the presidential elections. He faced arrest if he returned to Madagascar, where he had been convicted in absentia for misuse of funds during his tenure as Deputy Prime Minister under Didier Ratsiraka. He thus was unable to formally register his candidacy and was unable to compete in the elections. General Andrianafidisoa (General Fidy) led a futile coup attempt that had little popular support in November. Posed in reaction to his disQualification from the presidential election due to non‐ payment of a deposit, the attempt consisted of a leafleting campaign in Antananarivo and a shoot‐ out at Ivato military base, which saw the swift demise of his attempt at power‐grabbing. Elections held on 3 December saw Marc Ravalomanana returned for a second term, with roughly 55% of the vote. 2007 Ethnic violence saw a spike during 2007, as several protests and riots took on an ethnic bias. Toliara saw anti‐Merina violence in April, while students from the ‘Northern Triangle’ of Antsiranana, Mahajanga and Toamasina were targeted in Andrainjato University, in Fianarantsoa. Such occurrences prompted the opposition to deny that they were fermenting animosity between groups. In the south, a gang suspected of being responsible for robberies and attempted assaults was smashed in September. 2008 While the majority of 2008 was calm, tensions began to grow towards the end of the year as Antananarivo mayor Andry Rajoelina and President Marc Ravalomanana began to tussle over control. Rajoelina’s media outlets (Viva) were closed down in mid‐December after airing an interview with ex‐leader Didier Ratsiraka, thus beginning Rajoelina’s protests against Ravalomanana’s increasingly dictatorial tendencies. 2009 Tensions which had been fermenting since the end of 2008 finally erupted into strong anti‐ Ravalomanana sentiment, expressed by months of demonstrations, including some which turned violent. Up to 160 people died during protests, including times when the military fired indiscriminately into crowds (28 were killed on 7th February when the army was ordered to fire, leading to the eventual rescinding of support for Ravalomanana by the traditionally apolitical army). On March 17th, Ravalomanana officially handed power over to the army, who immediately handed it to Rajoelina (although constitutionally too young to actually be president). Internationally condemned as a coup, Rajoelina was unrecognised and his Transitional Authority (HAT) was unrecognised as legitimate government. Ravalomanana went into exile in South Africa. Rajoelina had little power outside Antananarivo, although traditionally the position of mayor is a strong political platform (Ravalomanana was mayor before president). Protests of the Rajoelina administration mirrored those previously aimed at Ravalomanana, though talks aimed at mediating the escalating crisis failed continually until August when eventually a power‐sharing agreement was signed by Ravalomanana and Rajoelina, allowing for an interim government and elections within 15 months. September brought the country again to the brink of political crisis as Rajoelina named an administration full of his own supporters. However, as of 7th October, there is general agreement as to the make‐up of the interim administration, with Rajoelina as acting president. .
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