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“President Ratsiraka is trying to reverse the gains that have been made during ’s democratization process. Campaigning on the slogan of freedom with development, he has successfully moved the country back toward the autocracy of the Second Republic. If the highest leadership is not seeking democracy, then who is?”

Madagascar: Legitimizing Autocracy RICHARD R. MARCUS

adagascar is viewed as democratic by the of Malagasy are politically marginalized—muted by international community because, as the the opaque system created by aggressive political MUnited States Department of State has put actors. What is left in Madagascar is a carefully it, this island nation off the eastern coast of Africa crafted shell of electoral democracy. “completed its transition from 16 years of authori- tarian Socialist rule with the free and fair election THE RETURN TO DEMOCRACY of as president in 1993.” Indeed, in con- In 1989 President Ratsiraka, Madagascar’s undis- trast to the political situation ten years ago, it would puted autocratic leader since the military took over appear that democracy has flourished: not only in 1975, faced three major problems. The economy have regular elections been held, but people also was in tatters, a debt crisis had erupted after foreign exercise their rights to free speech and assembly, donors bailed out of Ratsiraka’s experiment in practice the religion of their choice, and publish nationalization, and his patron state, the Soviet newspaper articles criticizing both the system and Union, was on the brink of collapse. Moreover, for specific politicians. the first time his opponents were publicly chal- But just what kind of democracy is taking shape lenging his legitimacy through popular protest. in Madagascar? Although the country may hold elec- By 1991 Ratsiraka had become so weak that tions and has begun to consolidate its democratic opposition leader Albert Zafy was able to lead an system, the kind of democracy it is consolidating 80,000-strong civil-servant strike in , obeys the rules but deviates from the essence.1 The the capital city. Malagasy economic life came to a elected presidents of the Third Republic, Albert Zafy halt. With Ratsiraka unable to end the crisis, Zafy— and , have manipulated the political a professor of medicine from the northern Antsir- system to suit their own ends, making democracy in anana region who had founded the National Union Madagascar a tool for the legitimization of self- of Democrats for Development (UNDD)—was able to seeking politicians through elections.2 The majority set up a shadow government with himself as prime minister and the Haute Authorité—the 16 parties in the opposition coalition known as Hery Velona (Liv- RICHARD R. MARCUS is an adjunct assistant professor of politi- cal science at Western Oregon University. ing Forces)—as parliament. The surprisingly rapid challenge posed by this parallel legislature forced President Ratsiraka to the bargaining table. On Octo- 1Political scientist Michael Bratton has defined the process of democratic consolidation as the “widespread acceptance ber 31, 1991 he signed the Panorama Convention, of rules to guarantee political participation and political under which Ratsiraka remained president, but was competition.” See Michael Bratton, “Second Elections in stripped of the majority of his powers. The Haute Africa,” Journal of Democracy, vol. 9, no. 3 (1998). Authorité effectively became the new legislature. 2Madagascar’s First Republic (1960–1972) was politically and economically liberal but marred by President Philibert Multiparty presidential elections were held Tsiranana’s close ties to . The Second Republic February 10, 1993. Albert Zafy won a resounding (1975–1992) saw the country guided by “scientific socialism” victory with 67 percent of the vote to Ratsiraka’s 33 under a government led by Admiral Didier Ratsiraka. The Third Republic (1992–present) began with the new demo- percent. Voter turnout was a remarkably high 70 cratic constitution and the victory of President Albert Zafy. percent. Zafy was sworn in on March 27, 1993, cre-

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ating Madagascar’s Third Republic. The Hery Following his victory in 1997, President Ratsir- Velona parties won a clear majority in the June 16, aka held his own constitutional referendum. Once 1993 legislative elections. Madagascar was once again the constitutional issues took a backseat as again a “democracy.” Ratsiraka promoted the idea that a “yes” vote meant development and security. The March 1998 consti- ZAFY IN POWER tutional referendum passed by a narrow margin (51 Madagascar’s Third Republic began as a parlia- percent to 49 percent), but was a significant victory mentary democracy. The prime minister, Francisque for President Ratsiraka. The constitutional revisions Ravony, was elected by the National Assembly and returned much of the state structure if not the fla- was responsible for most executive duties in domes- vor of the Second Republic. Under the new provi- tic affairs. The president maintained control of for- sions, increased autonomy and greater spending eign relations, but clashed with Prime Minister power were given to regional governments. How- Ravony over executive authority. On September 15, ever, the institutional vacuum left in Antananarivo 1995 President Zafy held a constitutional referen- has allowed President Ratsiraka to expand his polit- dum to shift the nexus of power back to the presi- ical control. Regional government remains sub- dency. Rather than focusing on the issues of servient to the national government since leaders constitutional import, however, he ran a populist owe their political fortunes to President Ratsiraka. campaign focused on economic development and Ratsiraka’s form of decentralization thus provides rooting out corruption. Voters approved the consti- few constitutional guarantees to protect regional tutional changes requested: the power of appoint- governments from encroachment by his personal- ing the prime minister was given to the president, istic network; as a result, regional governors have and the domestic authority of the president’s office little power to challenge the president’s newly was restored. Prime Minister Ravony resigned and expanded authority. Zafy named , the head of On May 17, 1998 parliamentary elections gave the UNDD and Zafy’s protégé, to the post. Madagas- President Ratsiraka’s Vanguard of the Malagasy Rev- car’s democracy is now one in which the president olution (AREMA) party 63 of the National Assembly’s exerts a great deal of authority not only over exec- 150 seats. This left him short of an absolute major- utive matters but also legislative concerns. ity, but independents, who tend to follow the pres- This constitutional shift was the first of many ident, took a record 32 seats, and the Torch efforts by Zafy to centralize authority in the hands (LEADER/FANILO) party, which commonly votes with of the president and create a unitary government AREMA, won 17 seats. Although AREMA won 42 per- secured to his Antananarivo power base. Zafy was cent of the seats in parliament, it only won 23 per- accused of corruption and impeached by the cent of the popular vote nationwide. This National Assembly in July 1996; the impeachment demonstrates that while electoral procedures may was ratified by the High Constitutional Court on have been largely followed, the population lines on September 5, 1996. , the which the districts are partitioned greatly favor prime minister and former president of the High President Ratsiraka’s AREMA party. Constitutional Court, became acting president until Ratsiraka’s success can be attributed at least in elections could be held in December. Albert Zafy part to low voter turnout, which analysts generally was permitted to run in those elections and the ascribe to voter apathy. While largely true, two runoff again came down to Zafy and Ratsiraka. This other factors were at work. One was bureaucratic time Ratsiraka won. bungling in the distribution of “election cards” Didier Ratsiraka took the larger share of the vote required for voters and the corrupt behavior of local for two reasons. First, Zafy had presided over an officials who erroneously told voters they had to economic downturn. Second, voters were largely ill purchase the cards at a relatively dear cost. Second, informed on substantive issues. The lack of rural voters finally realized that, with the end of informed voters meant that the debates over the mandatory voting, they would not suffer repercus- socialism of the Second Republic, the expansion of sions by failing to vote. democracy, and the platforms of the candidates themselves were immaterial; people voted for Rat- ELECTIONS DEVOID OF MEANING siraka in the 1996–1997 presidential election An important distinction can be drawn between because they thought life had been better during the quality of elections and their meaning. Where Ratsiraka’s previous tenure as president. quality is an exploration of the process, meaning is May 01 Issue FINAL 1 4/10/01 5:22 PM Page 228 (Black plate)

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an exploration of its outcomes. Legitimacy becomes unrelated to their platform or the measure. For a relative factor subject to the interpretation of (often example, in the September 1995 national referen- self-seeking) leaders in a poorly institutionalized sys- dum that shifted the power to appoint the prime tem. Thus, even where there is voter participation, minister from the National Assembly to the presi- some level of accountability and governance suffi- dent, the “yes” vote campaign of President Zafy cient to manage the affairs of state, it is possible to used the slogan “For Development, Peace, and hold elections that are devoid of meaning. Security.” Voters thus believed that approving the The majority of Malagasy who do vote claim that referendum question would lead to an increase in they cast ballots because the “government said to,” road rehabilitation and agricultural investment. “it is the law,” or “it is their obligation.” Participat- ing because it is a “personal right,” a “personal FAILING TO CONNECT expression,” or to “create change” is rare; whom to Rural Malagasy voters may not be well vote for is therefore of little importance. One com- informed, but they do know what they want and mon way of choosing a candidate is at random: for the challenges to obtaining it. If they are not example, selecting the most appealing ballot color instructed in the electoral process, or even encour- or the top ballot in the pile. Also common is bought aged to act on and communicate their needs to voter influence. Party representatives pass through authorities, then the meaning of the electoral pro- villages handing out gifts, such as money, footballs, cess is called into question. and foam cushions. They give a large cash gift to Malagasy want economic development. Accord- the local leader (often around $20), garnering a ing to research on political attitudes conducted by promise that he will influence other villagers to vote the author, a significant majority of people in rural for the party’s candidate. Although representatives areas believe that the government should provide of several par- for them and ties generally that the coun- pass, often the If the Malagasy’s leaders can be held accountable, try’s develop- one who gives then why do the people allow themselves to be pushed around? ment is the the most gifts national gov- wins the elec- ernment’s pri- tion. Actual “vote buying” seems less common, but mary job. Yet they believe that the government acts the author did witness an increase in this activity at primarily “to fill its own pockets.” As a result, peo- the village level in the days immediately preceding ple do not feel that participation through voting the 1998 National Assembly elections; payments includes them in the political process. Indeed, peo- seemed to average about 40 cents to 90 cents (a siz- ple often speak of the national government as able amount for many people). vazaha (foreign) and thus not an extension of their The rural voter rarely is an informed voter. The will at all. A woman interviewed in southern Mada- social cohesion so common in many parts of Africa gascar captured this sense of separation: “We are like is not found in much of Madagascar. Associational zebu [cattle]. We just go where we are told to go. If life is also very low. Thus few opportunities exist for we are told to go this way, we go this way. And when people to learn from one another and discuss the we are told to go that way, we just go that way. Like issues. Contributing to this are the problems asso- the zebu. We don’t know really what the govern- ciated with the country’s mass communication sys- ment does. We just live like zebu . . . [but] that man tems. Although, as on the rest of the African who has the stick never comes here. We just hear continent, radio remains the primary source of about him. Yes, we just hear—like pay money, just information (after discussions with friends and fam- pay money. But we have never seen that man.” ily members), Madagascar’s national station is still At the same time, most Malagasy believe that the largely state influenced. Moreover, the broadcasts government does represent them. Although people are in the official but not universally understood may not vote as a matter of personal expression, dialect of Malagasy, geared toward the historically somehow their political representative is a by-prod- dominant Merina ethnic group, which constitutes uct of their desires. a large proportion of the educated middle class and Yet if the Malagasy’s leaders can be held account- intellectual elite. In addition, a large amount of “dis- able, then why do the people allow themselves to information” is broadcast by candidates or propo- be pushed around? The answer likely can be found nents of a ballot measure making promises in the duality between the desire for strong leader- May 01 Issue FINAL 1 4/10/01 5:22 PM Page 229 (Black plate)

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ship to produce economic outcomes and the wish and the regional capitals of Fianarantsoa and Maha- for the personal freedoms that restrict government janga. Civic groups and pacts represent such diverse intrusion into private life. The desire for a better societal segments as landowners, mining concerns, quality of life takes precedence to everything else, and the tourism industry. The government has been including culture, religion, and especially politics. working with civic leaders from these groups and Malagasy would like to see the government per- international donors to learn to accommodate form, and they want their leaders to act with them. The international community has pointed to strength—but with accountability. The state, how- these efforts as an import step toward the consoli- ever, fails to act. It fails to connect, especially with dation of democracy in Madagascar. The belief is the Malagasy peasantry. People in rural areas thus that increasing the participation of the urban mid- want the government to provide development, but dle class in the governing process is the means by expect that it will not. A vote for a leader to bring which democracy will grow in the provinces. development is not seen as linked to particular pol- Madagascar’s middle class is more of a new busi- icy outcomes. ness elite comprised predominantly of well-educated As a result, there is a lack of trust in the govern- Merina. Once its interests are served (most often ment. On the rare occasion that a villager says the receiving guarantees that the investment environ- word government (fanjakana), it is generally shouted ment will be enhanced), it has little incentive to as a warning that the gendarmes are coming. People encourage civic growth in the countryside. The run to hide their cattle and grain stores so that the goals of these civics groups are too far removed from payoff for avoiding “trouble” will be less. If a dispute the rural populace to include them. Furthermore, or crime occurs in a village, people generally consult the new urban civil society, like the state, benefits a local leader. Going to court is exceedingly rare since most from a quiet, uninformed, unmobilized rural it requires a personal payment for the gendarmes tes- peasantry that does not challenge investment prac- timony and often a “contribution” to the judge if the tices, economic expansion costs, and state-spon- case is to be won. The amount of the contribution is sored urban infrastructure investments at the often a greater determinant in the outcome than any expense of rural infrastructure development. of the relevant facts. Indeed, there is significant reason to believe that the interest of these two groups will continue to CONTINUING THE PATTERN grow together: politicians can keep asserting their Malagasy politicians have found a formula that personal agendas, and civil society will continue to works well for them. Voters turn out in small num- reflect the attitude of the appeased center. With bers to elect those who have made a minuscule, political leaders having little incentive to reach out one-time contribution to the village. Villagers to the rural population, whose avenues of dissent remain too far outside the system to question it and have been closed off, government transparency and do not associate with each other enough to chal- accountability will not likely increase. This formula, lenge it. Social action is therefore rare in Madagas- while maintaining political stability, is one in which car (outside the capital), and social upheaval power-seeking leaders subvert a meaningful demo- challenging state practices rarer still. cratic process for political expediency. Politicians thus find it to their advantage to fur- ther marginalize the peasantry rather than connect LOOKING TOWARD THIRD ELECTIONS with it. When a challenge to the system does occur The constitutional referendum of March 15, 1998 in the provinces (such as in the northern provincial not only revised the constitution but also laid the capital of Antsiranana in 1996, when students took groundwork for the reelection campaign of Presi- to the streets over grant cuts), the government can dent Ratsiraka. On April 9, 1998, Ordinance 98-001 afford to ignore it since it has little chance of sway- enacted the constitutional changes approved by the ing or even influencing the status quo. referendum. It restored many of the central presi- With 80 percent of the population rural and dential prerogatives of the Second Republic, includ- unlikely to challenge the government, politicians ing the right to dissolve the National Assembly, and need only to please the urban electorate (the mili- making it more difficult to carry out impeachment. tary has remained close to the government). But an The president was also given the power to appoint increase in foreign investment and the growth of a the cabinet without parliament’s approval, and he new business class in the capital have led to the can appoint a prime minister from any party expansion of an urban civil society in Antananarivo (including a minority party or an independent). May 01 Issue FINAL 1 4/10/01 5:22 PM Page 230 (Black plate)

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Under Ordinance 98-001 the High Constitutional leadership is dominated not only by his party but Court remains comprised of nine members by his family members and close associates. There appointed for seven years. Three of the justices are was no question that this provincial powerhold named by the president, two by the National Assem- would win President Ratsiraka a significant victory bly, two by the Senate, and two are elected by the in the senatorial elections. Supreme Council of Magistrates. The president of In an outcome that distorts electoral conditions, the High Constitutional Court is appointed by the AREMA won 49 of the 60 Senate seats at large. president, who reserves the right to designate other LEADER/FANILO, which won 5 seats, joined with other justices by executive decree. opposition parties in immediately noting the dis- Perhaps most critical to the political future of crepancy between political power and the electoral Didier Ratsiraka is the election of the Senate. results. Even while it was presumed that the presi- According to the 1992 constitution, Madagascar dent would have significant influence over the sen- has a bicameral legislature. Yet a Senate was not atorial agenda, his degree of influence appears created during the birth of the Third Republic and staggering; many of the senators elected are long- was only finally elected on March 18, 2001. standing members of Ratsiraka’s coterie. With the The Senate is comprised of 90 members, with the president’s existing influence in the National president of the Senate to succeed the president of Assembly, his legislative agenda is assured even if the country in the case of incapacitation. The Sen- he chooses not to use the power of executive decree ate also can change the constitution with a two- granted him by Ordinance 98-001. More important, thirds vote. Following the 1992 constitution, 30 Ratsiraka will be able to influence the Senate to senators were appointed by the president and 60 change the constitution if he so desires. But will he were elected by provincial leaders. In all 1,720 elec- use this power to aid his flagging reelection bid? tors composed of mayors, counselors, and gover- For his entire political career, President Ratsiraka nors cast a ballot. Electors who failed to cast a ballot has sought to establish a federal system in Mada- without justification risked a fine of $77 (about 2 gascar even as he has argued that decentralization months’ pay for a civil servant). brings government closer to the people. But Ratsir- Since the majority of the Senate is elected by aka’s power base is in the coastal provinces. In a provincial governors, whom those governors are is manifestation of Madagascar’s largest political divide, critical to the composition of the Senate. Madagas- Ratsiraka has been a côtier fighting against the cen- car held its first provincial elections on December tralized power of the long-dominant Merina ethnic 3, 2000. Although this was a general election, voter group of the Antananarivo region. Federalism, Rat- turnout is estimated to have been only 10 percent siraka has found, has given him a structural guise to of registered voters. With the president so clearly in realign political power in his favor. charge, and since a provincial election had never President Ratsiraka clearly saw the 1998 referen- before been held, most Malagasy did not see this as dum as an opportunity to codify his form of feder- consequential enough to warrant the costs associ- alism in Madagascar. However, in September 2000 ated with travel expenses and the time away from the leading organization of Malagasy federalists the fields to go to the polls. came out strongly against the president’s plans for President Ratsiraka’s AREMA party won approxi- provincial autonomy. The Roman Catholic Church mately 95 percent of the provincial vote. Of the 6 and the Association of Parliamentarians for the gubernatorial elections, AREMA won all but Antana- Development of the South (APDS) also said they narivo province. A number of the president’s family were opposed. They joined a chorus of every lead- members and close associates were among the vic- ing opposition party, including the UNDD, the Move- tors, including Sophie Ranaivo, Ratsiraka’s daugh- ment for the Progress of Madagascar (MFM), and the ter, and Kolo Roland, an AREMA member of People Are Judged by the Work They Do (AVI) party, parliament and close associate of the president. The in criticizing the president’s plan. While these oppo- president also hedged his bets by running indepen- sition parties are proponents of a unitary govern- dent candidates who were members of his extended ment with firm support in the capital, the federalists family or family friends against his own AREMA party. and APDS are côtiers and have long been considered With the results of these provincial elections, supporters of the president. Added to these threats along with the changes brought about by the 1998 is a challenge from two retired generals who have constitutional referendum, the president’s power in formed an opposition group, Groupe d’Andria- the provinces is unquestionable. The provincial narivo, to back Patrick Rajaonary, a former AREMA May 01 Issue FINAL 1 4/10/01 5:22 PM Page 231 (Black plate)

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faithful, as an opposition candidate. There is also a moved the country back toward the autocracy of lack of support from the powerful National Coun- the Second Republic. If the highest leadership is not cil of Christian Churches (FFKM), and it seems seeking democracy, then who is? unlikely that President Ratsiraka can count on his The AREMA party members who are most likely to traditional support for a victory in Madagascar’s succeed Ratsiraka do not come with untarnished third elections, now scheduled for November 2001. democratic vita. The opposition leaders at the fore- With his traditional base of support in question, front, Albert Zafy and Norbert Ratsirahonana, have whether Ratsiraka can hold on to the presidency used their time in office to increase political patron- will depend on his ability to manipulate the system. age rather than reach out to the masses. The The most likely scenario is that Ratsiraka will use National Assembly has demonstrated that it prefers his power over the Senate to extend the presiden- to marginalize the rural masses to educating or tial term to seven years from the current five. serving them. The judiciary has proved that it is Although Ratsiraka is as unlikely to win a popular willing to intervene in the political process if it election in 2003 as he is in 2001, this would buy stands to benefit from it. Even the growing urban him two years to establish a line of succession. elite is finding that serving its own ends is far more Given his poor health at the age of 64, he will prob- profitable than reaching out to countryside. ably be unable to retain power longer than that The 80 percent of the population who live out- without succumbing to illness or a coup attempt. side the cities are left to their own devices to The only reason he would not alter the constitution broaden and deepen the democratic process. Yet to allow a longer term is the associated risk of sig- they are ill prepared for this job. In Madagascar no nificant international fallout or a coup attempt. viable rural middle class can catalyze such a move- Should he decide not to alter the constitution, it ment. Voting is not viewed as important, associa- seems unlikely he will step down as AREMA’s candi- tional life is weak, civic associations are nascent at date in the November 2001 election. But he will best, and even revolutionary fervor is muted. With- face an uphill battle. out the appropriate mechanisms in place at the The potential for such constitutional manipula- local level, the roam of the vociferous political tion for personal gain, while not illegal, is a clear vio- beasts is left unhindered. As a result, Madagascar’s lation of the spirit of democracy. It does nothing to third elections will likely serve to legitimize autoc- compromise the quality of democracy, but the very racy and consolidate a democracy of limited qual- possibility that it can happen devalues its meaning. ity, void of meaning. ■ There are other indications that the quality of democracy in Madagascar is in peril heading into third elections. The MFM and the UNDD boycotted the senatorial elections in March. Although these parties clearly were incensed that they had no chance of winning, the scope and nature of the president’s involvement in the provincial elections leave little doubt that the rules of the democracy are Teach with Current History failing to promote broad-based competition. There is also little doubt that Ordinance 98-001, which CURRENT HISTORY’S multimedia approach to world established these rules, would have been voted affairs is invaluable in the classroom. The intelligent down by the opposition and even the AREMA-led analysis and commentary that CURRENT HISTORY has National Assembly. The public voted for the ordi- offered teachers and students for more than 85 years nance not out of admiration for Ratsiraka’s systemic is now available in a variety of forms, including: intent, or even out of a belief in autonomous ● Specially priced print and ● Regional/country sets provinces, but because it believed Ratsiraka when electronic subscriptions ● Custom Current History he said it would bring development. for students coursepacks ● Topic-specific audiotapes ● On-line back issues BACK TOWARD AUTOCRACY ● Discounted bulk orders President Ratsiraka is trying to reverse the gains For more information on how CURRENT HISTORY that have been made during Madagascar’s democ- can be used in your classroom, please call toll-free ratization process. Campaigning on the slogan of 1-800-726-4464 (215-482-4464 outside U.S.). freedom with development, he has successfully