May 01 Issue FINAL 1 4/10/01 5:22 PM Page 226 (Black plate) “President Ratsiraka is trying to reverse the gains that have been made during Madagascar’s democratization process. Campaigning on the slogan of freedom with development, he has successfully moved the country back toward the autocracy of the Second Republic. If the highest leadership is not seeking democracy, then who is?” Madagascar: Legitimizing Autocracy RICHARD R. MARCUS adagascar is viewed as democratic by the of Malagasy are politically marginalized—muted by international community because, as the the opaque system created by aggressive political MUnited States Department of State has put actors. What is left in Madagascar is a carefully it, this island nation off the eastern coast of Africa crafted shell of electoral democracy. “completed its transition from 16 years of authori- tarian Socialist rule with the free and fair election THE RETURN TO DEMOCRACY of Albert Zafy as president in 1993.” Indeed, in con- In 1989 President Ratsiraka, Madagascar’s undis- trast to the political situation ten years ago, it would puted autocratic leader since the military took over appear that democracy has flourished: not only in 1975, faced three major problems. The economy have regular elections been held, but people also was in tatters, a debt crisis had erupted after foreign exercise their rights to free speech and assembly, donors bailed out of Ratsiraka’s experiment in practice the religion of their choice, and publish nationalization, and his patron state, the Soviet newspaper articles criticizing both the system and Union, was on the brink of collapse. Moreover, for specific politicians. the first time his opponents were publicly chal- But just what kind of democracy is taking shape lenging his legitimacy through popular protest. in Madagascar? Although the country may hold elec- By 1991 Ratsiraka had become so weak that tions and has begun to consolidate its democratic opposition leader Albert Zafy was able to lead an system, the kind of democracy it is consolidating 80,000-strong civil-servant strike in Antananarivo, obeys the rules but deviates from the essence.1 The the capital city. Malagasy economic life came to a elected presidents of the Third Republic, Albert Zafy halt. With Ratsiraka unable to end the crisis, Zafy— and Didier Ratsiraka, have manipulated the political a professor of medicine from the northern Antsir- system to suit their own ends, making democracy in anana region who had founded the National Union Madagascar a tool for the legitimization of self- of Democrats for Development (UNDD)—was able to seeking politicians through elections.2 The majority set up a shadow government with himself as prime minister and the Haute Authorité—the 16 parties in the opposition coalition known as Hery Velona (Liv- RICHARD R. MARCUS is an adjunct assistant professor of politi- cal science at Western Oregon University. ing Forces)—as parliament. The surprisingly rapid challenge posed by this parallel legislature forced President Ratsiraka to the bargaining table. On Octo- 1Political scientist Michael Bratton has defined the process of democratic consolidation as the “widespread acceptance ber 31, 1991 he signed the Panorama Convention, of rules to guarantee political participation and political under which Ratsiraka remained president, but was competition.” See Michael Bratton, “Second Elections in stripped of the majority of his powers. The Haute Africa,” Journal of Democracy, vol. 9, no. 3 (1998). Authorité effectively became the new legislature. 2Madagascar’s First Republic (1960–1972) was politically and economically liberal but marred by President Philibert Multiparty presidential elections were held Tsiranana’s close ties to France. The Second Republic February 10, 1993. Albert Zafy won a resounding (1975–1992) saw the country guided by “scientific socialism” victory with 67 percent of the vote to Ratsiraka’s 33 under a government led by Admiral Didier Ratsiraka. The Third Republic (1992–present) began with the new demo- percent. Voter turnout was a remarkably high 70 cratic constitution and the victory of President Albert Zafy. percent. Zafy was sworn in on March 27, 1993, cre- 226 May 01 Issue FINAL 1 4/10/01 5:22 PM Page 227 (Black plate) Madagascar: Legitimizing Autocracy • 227 ating Madagascar’s Third Republic. The Hery Following his victory in 1997, President Ratsir- Velona parties won a clear majority in the June 16, aka held his own constitutional referendum. Once 1993 legislative elections. Madagascar was once again the constitutional issues took a backseat as again a “democracy.” Ratsiraka promoted the idea that a “yes” vote meant development and security. The March 1998 consti- ZAFY IN POWER tutional referendum passed by a narrow margin (51 Madagascar’s Third Republic began as a parlia- percent to 49 percent), but was a significant victory mentary democracy. The prime minister, Francisque for President Ratsiraka. The constitutional revisions Ravony, was elected by the National Assembly and returned much of the state structure if not the fla- was responsible for most executive duties in domes- vor of the Second Republic. Under the new provi- tic affairs. The president maintained control of for- sions, increased autonomy and greater spending eign relations, but clashed with Prime Minister power were given to regional governments. How- Ravony over executive authority. On September 15, ever, the institutional vacuum left in Antananarivo 1995 President Zafy held a constitutional referen- has allowed President Ratsiraka to expand his polit- dum to shift the nexus of power back to the presi- ical control. Regional government remains sub- dency. Rather than focusing on the issues of servient to the national government since leaders constitutional import, however, he ran a populist owe their political fortunes to President Ratsiraka. campaign focused on economic development and Ratsiraka’s form of decentralization thus provides rooting out corruption. Voters approved the consti- few constitutional guarantees to protect regional tutional changes requested: the power of appoint- governments from encroachment by his personal- ing the prime minister was given to the president, istic network; as a result, regional governors have and the domestic authority of the president’s office little power to challenge the president’s newly was restored. Prime Minister Ravony resigned and expanded authority. Zafy named Emmanuel Rakotovahiny, the head of On May 17, 1998 parliamentary elections gave the UNDD and Zafy’s protégé, to the post. Madagas- President Ratsiraka’s Vanguard of the Malagasy Rev- car’s democracy is now one in which the president olution (AREMA) party 63 of the National Assembly’s exerts a great deal of authority not only over exec- 150 seats. This left him short of an absolute major- utive matters but also legislative concerns. ity, but independents, who tend to follow the pres- This constitutional shift was the first of many ident, took a record 32 seats, and the Torch efforts by Zafy to centralize authority in the hands (LEADER/FANILO) party, which commonly votes with of the president and create a unitary government AREMA, won 17 seats. Although AREMA won 42 per- secured to his Antananarivo power base. Zafy was cent of the seats in parliament, it only won 23 per- accused of corruption and impeached by the cent of the popular vote nationwide. This National Assembly in July 1996; the impeachment demonstrates that while electoral procedures may was ratified by the High Constitutional Court on have been largely followed, the population lines on September 5, 1996. Norbert Ratsirahonana, the which the districts are partitioned greatly favor prime minister and former president of the High President Ratsiraka’s AREMA party. Constitutional Court, became acting president until Ratsiraka’s success can be attributed at least in elections could be held in December. Albert Zafy part to low voter turnout, which analysts generally was permitted to run in those elections and the ascribe to voter apathy. While largely true, two runoff again came down to Zafy and Ratsiraka. This other factors were at work. One was bureaucratic time Ratsiraka won. bungling in the distribution of “election cards” Didier Ratsiraka took the larger share of the vote required for voters and the corrupt behavior of local for two reasons. First, Zafy had presided over an officials who erroneously told voters they had to economic downturn. Second, voters were largely ill purchase the cards at a relatively dear cost. Second, informed on substantive issues. The lack of rural voters finally realized that, with the end of informed voters meant that the debates over the mandatory voting, they would not suffer repercus- socialism of the Second Republic, the expansion of sions by failing to vote. democracy, and the platforms of the candidates themselves were immaterial; people voted for Rat- ELECTIONS DEVOID OF MEANING siraka in the 1996–1997 presidential election An important distinction can be drawn between because they thought life had been better during the quality of elections and their meaning. Where Ratsiraka’s previous tenure as president. quality is an exploration of the process, meaning is May 01 Issue FINAL 1 4/10/01 5:22 PM Page 228 (Black plate) 228 • CURRENT HISTORY • May 2001 an exploration of its outcomes. Legitimacy becomes unrelated to their platform or the measure. For a relative factor subject to the interpretation of (often example, in the September 1995 national referen- self-seeking) leaders in a poorly institutionalized sys- dum that shifted the power to appoint the prime tem. Thus, even where there is voter participation, minister from the National Assembly to the presi- some level of accountability and governance suffi- dent, the “yes” vote campaign of President Zafy cient to manage the affairs of state, it is possible to used the slogan “For Development, Peace, and hold elections that are devoid of meaning. Security.” Voters thus believed that approving the The majority of Malagasy who do vote claim that referendum question would lead to an increase in they cast ballots because the “government said to,” road rehabilitation and agricultural investment.