Madagascar's Political Crisis

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Madagascar's Political Crisis Madagascar’s political crisis Standard Note: SN05962 Last updated: 1 May 2012 Author: Jon Lunn Section International Affairs and Defence Section In March 2009, backed by large parts of the military and in the context of street protests in the capital, Antananarivo, current interim President Andre Rajoelina seized power from the incumbent, Marc Ravalomanana, who fled into exile in South Africa. The international community viewed it as an illegal coup d’état and took steps to isolate Rajeolina and his government. Since September 2011, a regionally-brokered agreement, signed by all the contending Malagasy parties, has been in place. Amongst other things, it provides for a one-year transition to new parliamentary and presidential elections. However, at just over the half-way point, the agreement is looking fragile and could yet collapse. The key unresolved issue is whether ex-president Marc Ravalomanana, who has been convicted in absentia on charges of complicity in murder in connection with the shooting of protestors in 2009, should be covered by an unconditional amnesty and allowed to return to Madagascar from abroad. Ravalomanana and his supporters allege that the conviction was unjustified and politically-motivated. In April 2012 an Amnesty Law was passed which appears designed not to apply to him. Click here for further background information about Madagascar. This information is provided to Members of Parliament in support of their parliamentary duties and is not intended to address the specific circumstances of any particular individual. It should not be relied upon as being up to date; the law or policies may have changed since it was last updated; and it should not be relied upon as legal or professional advice or as a substitute for it. A suitably qualified professional should be consulted if specific advice or information is required. This information is provided subject to our general terms and conditions which are available online or may be provided on request in hard copy. Authors are available to discuss the content of this briefing with Members and their staff, but not with the general public. Contents 1 Background 3 2 Events since the beginning of 2011: a way out of the crisis? 4 3 The stance of the UK Government 6 2 1 Background The current political crisis in Madagascar, which began when Andre Rajoelina successfully ousted the incumbent President, Marc Ravalomanana, in March 2009 and installed himself instead, albeit formally as a transitional leader pending elections, is in fact the latest instalment in a decade of nearly non-stop turbulence. Ravalomanana had won the 2001 presidential election but found himself engaged in a prolonged struggle to establish himself in the post after his opponent, incumbent Didier Ratsiraka, refused to accept defeat. At the time, the African Union (AU) suspended Madagascar’s membership and led mediation efforts to end the crisis, which only ended when Ratsiraka fled into exile in June 2002. Over time, Ravalomanana became increasingly authoritarian and corrupt, giving clear indications that he was planning to use his powers as the incumbent to sabotage a possible challenge from Rajoelina at the next presidential elections. A popular, if young and inexperienced, mayor of Antananarivo, the capital, who had locked horns consistently with the President over the capital’s substantial debts and official harassment of his broadcasting station, Rajoelina organised mass street protests, some of which ended in violence, and was able to bring part of the security forces over to his side. I n what many have characterised as a pre-emptive ‘democratic coup’, Rajoelina then created a rival government, the High Transitional Authority (HAT) in January 2009. Ravalomanana eventually resigned and fled into exile in South Africa in March. At this point, Rajeolina himself became head of the HAT and announced that a new Constitution would be drawn up. Cynics claimed that his main motivation for doing this was that the existing Constitution stated that a person must be 40 before they were eligible to be president and Rajoelina, at the time, was only 34. His new government eventually announced a timetable for a transition of power, in which presidential elections were initially scheduled for October 2010. Rajeolina’s rise without the imprimatur of an election victory, disputed or not, meant that the international community could not welcome him. Characterising what had happened as an illegal military coup, it called for a return to democracy. The AU and the Southern African Development Community suspended Madagascar’s membership. From exile, Ravalomanana maintained that he had been forced out and remained the rightful president. WikiLeaks later reported that Ravalomanana began to recruit mercenaries with a view to attempting to overthrow Rajoelina by force soon after he went into exile. Rajoelina and his backers were also criticised for their intolerance of opposition. When Ravalomanana supporters launched protests of their own within the country, they were banned. Clashes led to deaths on the street. Investigations and trials of Ravalomanana era officials were launched. As mediation continued, led by an International Contact Group involving the UN, AU, SADC and La Francophonie, a key point of dispute became the claims of former presidents Ravalomanana, Ratsiraka and Zafy to return from exile and even possibly stand in future presidential elections. In truth, the real sticking point for Rajoelina was the return of Ravalomanana. The international community indicated that it would prefer that all the contending leading figures, including Rajeolina, should agree not to stand, so that Madagascar could make a fresh political start. In August 2009, all the negotiating parties agreed to a 15-month transition under which Rajoelina would retain his leadership position but a genuinely inclusive government of national unity would be established to oversee the transition. But the plan very quickly foundered over appointments to the government as Rajoelina reneged on his promise to promote maximum inclusiveness. 3 Rajoelina subsequently reverted to a more unilateral approach, announcing that there would be parliamentary elections in March 2010 and appointing a new Prime Minister. Although he later agreed to postpone the elections, in that month the AU imposed sanctions on him and 108 other members of the HAT for failing to implement the August 2009 agreement. The EU and the US also froze development aid. But neither introduced restrictive measures such as asset freezes or travel bans. The US also withdrew privileged access rights to its markets for Madagascar’s textile exporters. However, Rajoelina persisted in his unilateralism, with the objective, critics claimed, of legitimating the regime over which he is presiding. In November 2010 he held a referendum on a new draft Constitution. Despite opposition calls for a boycott, a 74% vote in favour was recorded. On the day of the referendum there was an attempted coup by military officers opposed to Rajoelina, but this collapsed after three days. The International Contact Group refused to accept the legitimacy of the result on the grounds that the referendum had been held outside the internationally mediated process. Independent observers reported significant irregularities. 2 Events since the beginning of 2011: a way out of the crisis? In December, Rajoelina promulgated the new Constitution and announced the Fourth Malagasy Republic. With Rajoelina planning unilateral presidential elections during the course of 2011, further talks in January 2011, led by SADC, raised hopes that the parties might be able to strike a durable deal. SADC mediators, known as the Troika and with Mozambique and South Africa in the lead, proposed a ‘road map’, which became the basis for negotiations. Many of its elements were by now familiar: a transitional government of national unity, unconditional amnesty and right of return for the ex-presidents and subsequent internationally supervised elections. In February 2011, Ravalomanana announced his intention to return from exile, despite the fact that he faced arrest if he did so, having been sentenced to life imprisonment in absentia in August 2010 on charges of complicity in the shooting of protestors in 2009. Under the Rajeolina-sponsored Constitution, this conviction barred him from standing for the presidency in future. The authorities prevented his first attempt to return. In March 2011, the road map was agreed by some, but not all, of the parties to the negotiations, with key opposition groups amongst those rejecting it. Rajoelina appointed a new government, albeit one with many similarities to the one it replaced. A bomb attack in the same month failed to kill Rajoelina. A leading opposition figure was arrested for his alleged involvement in the attack. By 2011 Rajoelina’s biggest vulnerability was the economy. It was suffering badly as a result of the political crisis and the growing isolation it had brought about. According to the World Bank, donor funds had previously comprised about half of the government budget and 70% of public spending. The suspension by the US of privileged access to its markets for Madagascar’s textile exporters was also having a major impact, throwing thousands of workers out of their jobs and closing factories. However, humanitarian assistance, which remained in place, had increased to $260m in 2010, largely in response to a rising poverty and cyclones. Poverty levels were also increasing significantly, particularly in rural households, where 80% of the population lives. Madagascar’s National Institute of Statistics said that 2010 saw the second highest level of poverty since measurements began in 1993.1 1 “A poor country gets poorer”, IRIN News, 19 March 2011; “No more free schooling”, IRIN News, 19 March 2011 4 Such considerations may have been important in persuading Rajoelina and his supporters eventually to soften their stance in the SADC-brokered negotiations. However, SADC also relaxed its position in important respects, as was made clear when a deal based on the January 2011 road map, but also differing in important respects, was eventually reached on 17 September 2011.
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