’s political crisis

Standard Note: SN05962 Last updated: 1 May 2012

Author: Jon Lunn Section International Affairs and Defence Section

In March 2009, backed by large parts of the military and in the context of street protests in the capital, , current interim President Andre Rajoelina seized power from the incumbent, , who fled into exile in . The international community viewed it as an illegal coup d’état and took steps to isolate Rajeolina and his government.

Since September 2011, a regionally-brokered agreement, signed by all the contending Malagasy parties, has been in place. Amongst other things, it provides for a one-year transition to new parliamentary and presidential elections. However, at just over the half-way point, the agreement is looking fragile and could yet collapse.

The key unresolved issue is whether ex-president Marc Ravalomanana, who has been convicted in absentia on charges of complicity in murder in connection with the shooting of protestors in 2009, should be covered by an unconditional amnesty and allowed to return to Madagascar from abroad. Ravalomanana and his supporters allege that the conviction was unjustified and politically-motivated. In April 2012 an Amnesty Law was passed which appears designed not to apply to him.

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1 Background 3

2 Events since the beginning of 2011: a way out of the crisis? 4

3 The stance of the UK Government 6

2 1 Background The current political crisis in Madagascar, which began when Andre Rajoelina successfully ousted the incumbent President, Marc Ravalomanana, in March 2009 and installed himself instead, albeit formally as a transitional leader pending elections, is in fact the latest instalment in a decade of nearly non-stop turbulence. Ravalomanana had won the 2001 presidential election but found himself engaged in a prolonged struggle to establish himself in the post after his opponent, incumbent , refused to accept defeat. At the time, the African Union (AU) suspended Madagascar’s membership and led mediation efforts to end the crisis, which only ended when Ratsiraka fled into exile in June 2002.

Over time, Ravalomanana became increasingly authoritarian and corrupt, giving clear indications that he was planning to use his powers as the incumbent to sabotage a possible challenge from Rajoelina at the next presidential elections. A popular, if young and inexperienced, , the capital, who had locked horns consistently with the President over the capital’s substantial debts and official harassment of his broadcasting station, Rajoelina organised mass street protests, some of which ended in violence, and was able to bring part of the security forces over to his side. I n what many have characterised as a pre-emptive ‘democratic coup’, Rajoelina then created a rival government, the High Transitional Authority (HAT) in January 2009. Ravalomanana eventually resigned and fled into exile in South Africa in March. At this point, Rajeolina himself became head of the HAT and announced that a new Constitution would be drawn up. Cynics claimed that his main motivation for doing this was that the existing Constitution stated that a person must be 40 before they were eligible to be president and Rajoelina, at the time, was only 34. His new government eventually announced a timetable for a transition of power, in which presidential elections were initially scheduled for October 2010.

Rajeolina’s rise without the imprimatur of an election victory, disputed or not, meant that the international community could not welcome him. Characterising what had happened as an illegal military coup, it called for a return to democracy. The AU and the Southern African Development Community suspended Madagascar’s membership.

From exile, Ravalomanana maintained that he had been forced out and remained the rightful president. WikiLeaks later reported that Ravalomanana began to recruit mercenaries with a view to attempting to overthrow Rajoelina by force soon after he went into exile. Rajoelina and his backers were also criticised for their intolerance of opposition. When Ravalomanana supporters launched protests of their own within the country, they were banned. Clashes led to deaths on the street. Investigations and trials of Ravalomanana era officials were launched. As mediation continued, led by an International Contact Group involving the UN, AU, SADC and La Francophonie, a key point of dispute became the claims of former presidents Ravalomanana, Ratsiraka and Zafy to return from exile and even possibly stand in future presidential elections. In truth, the real sticking point for Rajoelina was the return of Ravalomanana. The international community indicated that it would prefer that all the contending leading figures, including Rajeolina, should agree not to stand, so that Madagascar could make a fresh political start. In August 2009, all the negotiating parties agreed to a 15-month transition under which Rajoelina would retain his leadership position but a genuinely inclusive government of national unity would be established to oversee the transition. But the plan very quickly foundered over appointments to the government as Rajoelina reneged on his promise to promote maximum inclusiveness.

3 Rajoelina subsequently reverted to a more unilateral approach, announcing that there would be parliamentary elections in March 2010 and appointing a new Prime Minister. Although he later agreed to postpone the elections, in that month the AU imposed sanctions on him and 108 other members of the HAT for failing to implement the August 2009 agreement. The EU and the US also froze development aid. But neither introduced restrictive measures such as asset freezes or travel bans. The US also withdrew privileged access rights to its markets for Madagascar’s textile exporters.

However, Rajoelina persisted in his unilateralism, with the objective, critics claimed, of legitimating the regime over which he is presiding. In November 2010 he held a referendum on a new draft Constitution. Despite opposition calls for a boycott, a 74% vote in favour was recorded. On the day of the referendum there was an attempted coup by military officers opposed to Rajoelina, but this collapsed after three days. The International Contact Group refused to accept the legitimacy of the result on the grounds that the referendum had been held outside the internationally mediated process. Independent observers reported significant irregularities.

2 Events since the beginning of 2011: a way out of the crisis? In December, Rajoelina promulgated the new Constitution and announced the Fourth . With Rajoelina planning unilateral presidential elections during the course of 2011, further talks in January 2011, led by SADC, raised hopes that the parties might be able to strike a durable deal. SADC mediators, known as the Troika and with Mozambique and South Africa in the lead, proposed a ‘road map’, which became the basis for negotiations. Many of its elements were by now familiar: a transitional government of national unity, unconditional amnesty and right of return for the ex-presidents and subsequent internationally supervised elections.

In February 2011, Ravalomanana announced his intention to return from exile, despite the fact that he faced arrest if he did so, having been sentenced to life imprisonment in absentia in August 2010 on charges of complicity in the shooting of protestors in 2009. Under the Rajeolina-sponsored Constitution, this conviction barred him from standing for the presidency in future. The authorities prevented his first attempt to return. In March 2011, the road map was agreed by some, but not all, of the parties to the negotiations, with key opposition groups amongst those rejecting it. Rajoelina appointed a new government, albeit one with many similarities to the one it replaced. A bomb attack in the same month failed to kill Rajoelina. A leading opposition figure was arrested for his alleged involvement in the attack.

By 2011 Rajoelina’s biggest vulnerability was the economy. It was suffering badly as a result of the political crisis and the growing isolation it had brought about. According to the , donor funds had previously comprised about half of the government budget and 70% of public spending. The suspension by the US of privileged access to its markets for Madagascar’s textile exporters was also having a major impact, throwing thousands of workers out of their jobs and closing factories. However, humanitarian assistance, which remained in place, had increased to $260m in 2010, largely in response to a rising poverty and cyclones. Poverty levels were also increasing significantly, particularly in rural households, where 80% of the population lives. Madagascar’s National Institute of Statistics said that 2010 saw the second highest level of poverty since measurements began in 1993.1

1 “A poor country gets poorer”, IRIN News, 19 March 2011; “No more free schooling”, IRIN News, 19 March 2011

4 Such considerations may have been important in persuading Rajoelina and his supporters eventually to soften their stance in the SADC-brokered negotiations. However, SADC also relaxed its position in important respects, as was made clear when a deal based on the January 2011 road map, but also differing in important respects, was eventually reached on 17 September 2011.

The agreement said that an inclusive transitional government would be formed, and parliamentary and presidential elections held within 12 months of the signature of the agreement. In the interim, Andre Rajeolina would remain president. But the agreement did not – as earlier versions of the road map had done – offer Ravalomanana an unambiguous amnesty or right of return. The SADC Troika appears to have decided that these issues would be returned to further down the track. In addition, it was also agreed that the qualifying age for standing for the presidency could be reduced from 40 to 35, as provided for by the new Rajoelina-sponsored Constitution, thereby opening the way for Rajoelina to stand.

The political camps of the three former presidents all agreed to the terms of the deal, although, predictably, Ravalomanana’s camp expressed considerable reservations about it. By the end of the year, of the three men, only Ravalomanana was still in exile.

In November 2011, a new consensus Prime Minister took office, Omer Beritzky, at the head of the new inclusive transitional government. Prolonged horse-trading followed over how cabinet posts should be allocated but by the end of the month, all of the main opposition factions were on board. At the end of that month, former President Ratsiraka returned to Madagascar after nine years of exile. His return passed without incident.

In the months following the September 2011 deal, SADC continued to press for the passage of an unambiguous Amnesty Law that would cover Ravalomanana. A deadline of 29 February 2012 was set for doing so. However, Rajoelina resisted. Senior government officials continued to warn Ravalomanana that he would be arrested and imprisoned if he tried to return.

Ravalomanana announced that he would return on 22 January 2012 but in the end was unable to do so when officials in Antananarivo closed Madagascar’s airspace – the latest of two such failed attempts. His wife said that she would return in February (her third attempt) but was in turn told by officials that she too was subject to a ban by the Transport Ministry, for public safety reasons. The house of Ravalomanana’s son was raided in the same month on suspicions that he was involved in drug- and arms-trafficking. Ravolamanana’s supporters alleged that this was politically-motivated harassment. At one point, Prime Minister Beritzky (who had favoured allowing Mrs Ravolamanana to return immediately, on the grounds that she had not committed any offence that required amnesty) and other members of the government reportedly privately called for Rajoelina’s resignation over the Amnesty issue.

On 29 March the transitional government finally tabled an Amnesty Bill in parliament. Hopes were raised that the logjam might finally be overcome. However, the Bill that was eventually passed on 14 April appeared to exclude Ravalomanana from its provisions by stating anybody convicted of murder could not be covered by it. Ravalomanana’s supporters in parliament boycotted the vote in parliament.2 According to some observers, a proposed law on the status of former presidents may yet clarify Ravalomanana’s position and allow him to return. But the SADC Troika has not yet publicly expressed its view about the new Amnesty Law. The situation remains highly uncertain.

2 “Madagascar passes amnesty law, excludes ousted leader”, AFP, 14 April 2012

5 In March, another potentially explosive ingredient was added to the mix following a mini- mutiny at one military camp over salary arrears. This revived fears of another military coup. Civil society groups have also questioned the independence and impartiality of the reformed electoral commission that is due to oversee elections later this year. There has been talk of the elections taking place at the end of November, but no date has been agreed and some believe that they will have to be postponed.3

Since the September 2011 deal was agreed, the economic measures taken against Madagascar have been relaxed around the edges, but not yet entirely lifted – prompting some criticism from within humanitarian agencies.4 They are set to be lifted only once ‘constitutional order’ has been restored. This reflects awareness that these measures remain the main source of leverage over Rajoelina for the international community. The Madagascan economy grew by only 0.7% in 2011.5

During the first quarter of this year, Madagascar has been hit by two cyclones. Over 100 people were killed and 310,000 people badly affected, with a third of those in need of humanitarian aid. The European Commission announced 1 million of emergency aid in mid March.6

There was some controversy in January 2012 when the African National Congress invited President Rajeolina to attend its 100th birthday celebration. Some argued that this represented a violation of the decision by the African Union in 2009 to impose a travel ban on Rajeolina.7

3 The position of the UK Government Below is the most recent parliamentary statement on the situation in Madagascar:

HC Deb 27 February 2012 c11-12W

Ian Lucas: To ask the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs how many electoral observers from the UK will be present during the parliamentary scheduled to take place in March 2012. [96015]

Mr Bellingham: The date for parliamentary elections in Madagascar has not been formally announced.

The British Government fully support the Southern African Development Community's (SADC) mediation efforts and has welcomed the signing of the SADC roadmap in September 2011 which sets out a process towards free and fair elections. We currently have no plans to send electoral observers to Madagascar. With the wider international community, we encourage the Malagasy parties to make progress on the implementation of the roadmap so that a date for elections can be confirmed.

Ian Lucas: To ask the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs what steps his Department has taken to support the parliamentary elections in Madagascar scheduled to take place in March 2012. [96021]

3 Ibid 4 “Madagascar: donors deliver despite sanctions”, UN IRIN News, 30 November 2011 5 “Madagascan economy grows at 0.7 pc in 2011”, Xinhua News Service, 28 December 2011 6 “Madagascar: Commission launches EU 1 million emergency funding for victims of cyclones Giovanna and Irina”, European Union News, 14 March 2012 7 “Rajoelina joins festivities, despite AU ban”, Business Day, 9 January 2012

6 Mr Bellingham: The British Government fully support the Southern African Development Community's (SADC) led mediation efforts in Madagascar. We welcomed the signing of a SADC roadmap in September 2011 which sets out a process towards free and fair elections and we encourage the Malagasy parties to make progress on its implementation. In December 2011, we fully supported the gradual resumption of EU development funding to Madagascar in support of elections in line with agreed benchmarks under the framework of article 96 of the Cotonou agreement. The Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, my right hon. Friend the Member for Richmond (Yorks) (Mr Hague), announced in May 2011 that Britain intends to open an embassy and appoint an ambassador in Madagascar once the political conditions allow.

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