1 Implementation of Environmental Sanitation

Home , Sustainable sanitation

IMPLEMENTATION OF ENVIRONMENTAL SANITATION POLICIES: Assessing the Role of Local Actors in Ghana

A thesis submitted to the University of Manchester for the degree of

Doctor of Philosophy (PhD) in the Faculty of Humanities

2018

Franklin Yayra Adorsu-Djentuh

Global Development Institute (GDI)

School of Environment, Education and Development 1

TABLE OF CONTENTS

LIST OF TABLES ...... 9 LIST OF FIGURES ...... 9 LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS ...... 10 ABSTRACT ...... 12 DECLARATION ...... 13 COPYRIGHT STATEMENT ...... 14 ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ...... 15 DEDICATION ...... 17 CHAPTER ONE ...... 18 GENERAL INTRODUCTION ...... 18 1.0 Introduction ...... 18 1.1 Background and Research Problem...... 20 1.2 Environmental Sanitation as a ‘Wicked Problem’ ...... 23 1.3 Environmental Sanitation Policies [ESP] ...... 25 1.4 Role of Local Actors in ESP Implementation ...... 26 1.5 Relationships between Local Actors in ESP Implementation ...... 27 1.6 Research Aim, Objectives and Questions ...... 29 1.7 Scope and Theoretical Disposition of Thesis ...... 29 1.8 Originality and Relevance of the Thesis ...... 30 1.9 Structure of Thesis ...... 31 1.10 Conclusion ...... 33 CHAPTER TWO ...... 34 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK FOR ENVIRONMENTAL SANITATION POLICY IMPLEMENTATION ...... 34 2.0 Introduction ...... 34 2.1 Background to Environmental Sanitation ...... 35 2.1.1 Environmental Sanitation: Definition and Scope ...... 35 2.1.2 Environmental Sanitation: A Global Challenge ...... 36 2.1.3 Africa ...... 38 2.1.4 Ghana ...... 39 2.1.5 Global Institutional Framework for Managing Environmental Sanitation ...... 41 2.2 Public Policy Implementations ...... 43 2

2.2.1 Implementation Research: State of the Field ...... 43 2.2.2 Conceptualizing Policy Implementation ...... 43 2.2.3 Approaches to Policy Implementation Theories ...... 45 2.2.4 Top-Down Policy Implementation ...... 46 2.2.5 Bottom-Up Policy Implementation ...... 46 2.2.6 Synthesis of both Approaches...... 48 2.2.7 Policy Implementation Challenges in Developing Countries ...... 48 2.3 Public Management Theories for ESP Implementation ...... 50 2.3.1 The Changing Nature of Public Administration ...... 50 2.3.2 New Public Management [NPM] Reforms ...... 51 2.3.3 NPM Attempt at Solving Policy Implementation Problems ...... 52 2.3.4 Public Private Partnership as NPM Principle ...... 53 2.3.5 Public-Private-Partnerships: Relational Perspectives ...... 54 2.3.6 Decentralization as NPM Principle...... 55 2.3.7 Decentralization: Relational Perspective ...... 56 2.3.8 Participation ...... 58 2.3.9 Community/Public Participation and Actors’ Relations ...... 59 2.4 Integrated Public Management ...... 60 2.4.1 A New Paradigm for Public Management: Emerging Approach ...... 60 2.4.2 Governance ...... 62 2.4.3 New Public Governance ...... 62 2.4.4 Relational Governance ...... 63 2.5 Conceptual Framework ...... 64 2.5.1 Inter-Organizational Networks and Collaborative Relationships ...... 64 2.5.2 New Institutional Economics Theory [NIE] ...... 67 2.5.3 Transaction Costs Economics [TCE] Theory ...... 69 2.5.4 Behavioural Assumption of TCE: Bounded Rationality vs Bounded Reliability71 2.5.5 Social Capital Theory ...... 73 2.5.6 Types of Social Capital and Benefits ...... 74 2.5.7 Negative Social Capital ...... 75 2.6 The Relevance and Justification of New Institutional Economics and Social Capital ...... 77 2.7 Chapter Summary and Links to Research Questions ...... 78 2.8 Conclusion ...... 80 3

CHAPTER THREE ...... 81 CONTEXTUAL OVERVIEW OF THE RESEARCH SETTING ...... 81 3.0 Introduction ...... 81 3.1 Country Profile: Ghana...... 81 3.2 Study Areas ...... 86 3.2.1 Accra Metropolitan Assembly ...... 87 3.2.2 La-Nkwantanang - Madina Municipal Assembly ...... 88 3.2.3 Ashaiman Municipal Assembly ...... 88 3.3 An Overview of Environmental Sanitation in Ghana ...... 90 3.4 Environmental Sanitation Support Programs in Ghana...... 91 3.4.1 National Sanitation Day Program [NSDP] ...... 91 3.4.2 Community-Led Total Sanitation [CLTS] ...... 92 3.4.3 School Health Education Program [SHEP] ...... 93 3.4.4 National Youth Employment Program – Youth in Waste and Sanitation Module ...... 94 3.4.5 National Community Water and Sanitation Program [NCWSP]...... 95 3.4.6 Expanded Sanitary Inspections, Compliance Management and Enforcement [ESICOME] ...... 96 3.5 Policy Framework for Environmental Sanitation in Ghana ...... 98 3.5.1 National Development Policy Frameworks ...... 98 3.5.2 Ghana Shared Growth and Development Agenda GSGDA II (2014-2017)...... 99 3.5.3 Decentralization Policy of Ghana ...... 100 3.5.4 National Environmental Sanitation Policy of Ghana [NESP] ...... 100 3.5.5 National Environmental Sanitation Strategy and Action Plan [NESSAP] ...... 102 3.5.6 Other Guidelines and Standards for Environmental Sanitation ...... 104 3.6 Legal and Regulatory Framework for Environmental Sanitation in Ghana ...... 104 3.6.1 Local Government Act, 1993 (Act 462) ...... 104 3.6.2 Environmental Sanitation By-Laws ...... 105 3.6.3 Criminal Code of Ghana, 1960 (Act 29)...... 105 3.6.4 Other Legal Provisions ...... 106 3.7 Institutional Arrangement for Environmental Sanitation Management in Ghana.... 107 3.8 Ghana’s Decentralization History in Perspective ...... 109 3.9 The Local Government System and Structure in Ghana ...... 111 3.10 Decentralization and Public Services Delivery in Ghana...... 115

3.11 Public Private Partnerships [PPP] and Environmental Sanitation in Ghana ...... 117 3.12 Community/Public Participation in Ghana ...... 119 3.13 Basis for Actor Relations in ESP Implementation in Ghana ...... 120 3.13.1 Legislative Relations...... 120 3.13.2 Contractual Relations ...... 120 3.13.3 Customer/Client Relations ...... 121 3.13.4 Social Relations ...... 122 3.14 Conclusion ...... 122 CHAPTER FOUR ...... 124 METHODOLOGY AND RESEARCH DESIGN ...... 124 4.0 Introduction ...... 124 4.1 Philosophical Assumption of the Research ...... 124 4.2 Approaches to Social Science Research ...... 125 4.2.1 Ontology ...... 125 4.2.2 Epistemology ...... 126 4.2.3 Axiology ...... 127 4.2.4 Methodology ...... 127 4.3 The Research Approach ...... 128 4.3.1 Qualitative Research Approach ...... 129 4.4 Case Study Research Strategy ...... 130 4.5 Sampling of Case Study Organizations ...... 131 4.6 The Fieldwork ...... 133 4.7 Sample Inclusion and Eligibility Criteria ...... 133 4.8 Sampling Methods ...... 134 4.9 Sampling of Respondents ...... 135 4.10 Data Collection ...... 137 4.10.1 Semi-Structured Interviews ...... 137 4.10.2 Focus Group Discussions [FGDs] ...... 137 4.10.3 Documentary Reviews ...... 138 4.10.4 Participant Observation...... 139 4.11 Interview Transcription ...... 139 4.12 Data analysis ...... 140 4.13 Quality Assurance and Rigor ...... 141

4.14 Ethical Considerations ...... 142 4.14.1 Informed Consent and Voluntary Participation ...... 143 4.14.2 Confidentiality and Anonymity ...... 144 4.14.3 Language ...... 144 4.15 Conclusion ...... 144 CHAPTER FIVE ...... 146 RELATIONS AND LINKS BETWEEN ACTORS IN ESP IMPLEMENTATION ...... 146 5.0 Introduction ...... 146 5.1 Role of Actors: Relations and Links ...... 146 5.2 Working Together in PPPs at the Local level ...... 151 5.2.1 Relations between MMDAs and Private Sector Service Providers ...... 152 5.2.2 MMDAs and NGOs/CBOs Relations ...... 154 5.2.3 Relations between the Community and Private Service Providers...... 156 5.2.4 The Informal Private Sector Fitting into the Actor Constellations ...... 159 5.3 Collaboration within the Decentralized Space ...... 160 5.3.1 MMDAs and the Community Relations ...... 161 5.3.2 Relations between MMDAs and Allied Institutions ...... 163 5.3.3 The Mediating Role of Assembly and Unit Committee Members ...... 165 5.4 Participation at the Local Level ...... 169 5.4.1 Community Engagement Programs ...... 169 5.5 Conclusion ...... 171 CHAPTER SIX ...... 172 ISSUES AFFECTING ACTORS’ RELATIONS IN ESP IMPLEMENTATION ...... 172 6.0 Introduction ...... 172 6.1 Critical Issues Affecting Actors’ Relations ...... 172 6.2 Institutional Issues ...... 173 6.2.1 Non-Inclusive Institutional Arrangements...... 173 6.2.2 Undermining Lower- Level Institutional Structures ...... 175 6.3 Political Issues ...... 176 6.3.1 Local Capture by Assembly Men/Women ...... 176 6.3.2 Political Interference – ‘Order from Above Syndrome’ ...... 178 6.3.3 Party Foot-soldier Conundrum ...... 180 6.4 Economic Issues ...... 181

6.4.1 The Polluter Can’t Pay ...... 181 6.4.2 Resource Availability ...... 183 6.5 Socio- Cultural Issues ...... 184 6.5.1 Cosmopolitanism and Nomadism ...... 185 6.5.2 Moribund Traditional Leadership and Value Systems ...... 186 6.5.3 Community Ownership ...... 187 6.6 Conclusion ...... 189 CHAPTER SEVEN ...... 190 ASSESSING THE IMPACT OF ACTOR RELATIONS ON ENVIRONMENTAL SANITATION ...... 190 7.0 Introduction ...... 190 7.1 Environmental Sanitation Policy Focus and Objectives ...... 190 7.2 Environmental Sanitation Education ...... 191 7.2.1 Synergies for Effective Education ...... 192 7.2.2 Participation in Programs and Decision-Making ...... 194 7.3 Enforcement Management ...... 195 7.3.1 Accountability and Service Quality ...... 196 7.3.2 Joint Taskforce for Watchdog Role ...... 197 7.4 Sustainable Financing and Cost Recovery ...... 198 7.4.1 Tariff Collection ...... 199 7.4.2 Tariff Information Dissemination ...... 200 7.5 Monitoring and Evaluation ...... 201 7.5.1 Local Information Exchange ...... 202 7.6 Conclusion ...... 203 CHAPTER EIGHT ...... 204 INTERPRETATION AND DISCUSSION OF FINDINGS ...... 204 8.0 Introduction ...... 204 8.1 Assessing Actors’ Relation in ESP Implementation ...... 204 8.1.1 Commitment in ESP Actors’ Relations in Ghana ...... 207 8.1.2 Trust in ESP Actors’ Relations in Ghana ...... 208 8.1.3 Communication in ESP Actors’ Relations in Ghana ...... 210 8.1.4 Coordination in ESP Actors’ Relations in Ghana ...... 211 8.2 Issues Affecting Actors’ Relations: A New Institutional Economics View...... 214 8.2.1 Actors’ Relations and Transaction Cost Benefits ...... 214 7

8.2.2 Bounded Rationality or Reliability? ...... 216 8.3 Issues Affecting Actors’ Relations: Social Capital View...... 223 8.3.1 Low Social Capital Accumulation for ESP Implementation ...... 223 8.3.2 Negative Effects of Social Capital on ESP Implementation ...... 226 8.4 Impact of Actors’ Relations on Achieving Sanitation Goals ...... 229 8.4.1 Positive Impacts ...... 230 8.4.2 Negative Impacts ...... 231 8.5 Establishing Linkages between Research Outcomes ...... 233 8.6 Conclusion ...... 233 CHAPTER NINE ...... 235 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS ...... 235 9.0 Introduction ...... 235 9.1 Summary of the Study ...... 236 9.2 Contribution of Thesis to Knowledge [Theoretical Implications] ...... 238 9.2.1 Bringing To the Fore Local Actor Relations in ESP Implementation ...... 238 9.2.2 Novel Classification of Issues Affecting Actor Relations...... 239 9.2.3 Bringing out Relational Perspectives within the Public Management Theories239 9.2.4 The Application of the NIE and SC as Theoretical Lens to Study Relations .... 239 9.2.5 New Insight into the Impact of Actor Relations on ESP Implementation ...... 240 9.3 Context Specific Policy and Management Recommendations [Policy Implications] ...... 240 9.3.1 Review of the Environmental Sanitation Policy of Ghana ...... 241 9.3.2 Inclusive Contract Negotiations...... 241 9.3.3 Periodic Review of PPP Contracts, Franchise and Concessions ...... 242 9.3.4 Sanitation Authority and Levy ...... 242 9.3.5 Community Sanitation Watchdog Committee ...... 243 9.3.6 Empowering Traditional Leadership ...... 243 9.4 Implications for Further Research ...... 244 9.5 Limitations of the Research ...... 245 9.6 Chapter Conclusion ...... 245 9.7 Concluding Remarks ...... 246 REFERENCES ...... 247

LIST OF TABLES Table 1: Distribution of MMDAs and 2010 Population Census ...... 112 Table 2: Quality standards for qualitative studies ...... 130 Table 3: Organisation and Interviewee Sample Distribution before fieldwork ...... 132 Table 4: Outline of Sample Distribution of Respondents during Fieldwork ...... 136 Table 5: Summary of Research Findings 1 ...... 213 Table 6: Classification of Issues Affecting Actors’ Relation ...... 219 Table 7: Summary of Research Findings 2 ...... 229 Table 8: Summary of Research Finding 3 ...... 232

LIST OF FIGURES Figure 1: Relationship between Local Actors in ESP Implementation...... 28 Figure 2: Associated aspects of sanitation ...... 36 Figure 3: Proportion of the population using improved sanitation facilities in 2015 ...... 37 Figure 4: Conceptual Framework ...... 76 Figure 5: Map of Ghana showing the Ten Administrative Regions ...... 86 Figure 6: Map of Ghana and GAMA Showing the three Metropolitan Areas ...... 89 Figure 7: Organizational Collaboration between Agencies for Delivering Aspect of Environmental Sanitation Services ...... 108 Figure 8: Structure of the Local Government System in Ghana ...... 113

Total Word Count = 79,777

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

AMA Accra Metropolitan Assembly ADB African Development Bank CBO Community Based Organisations CWSA Community Water and Sanitation Agency CWSD Community Water and Sanitation Division CCWL City and Country Waste Limited CONIWAS Coalition of NGOs in Water and Sanitation CLTS Community Led Total Sanitation Program DA Districts Assembly DCE District Chief Executive DUR Department of Urban Roads DESSAP District Environmental Sanitation Strategy and Action Plan DP Decentralization Policy DEHO District Environmental Health Officers DPCO District Public Cleansing Officers ESP Environmental Sanitation Policies EHO Environmental Health Officers EHMD Environmental Health and Management Departments EPA Environmental Protection Agency ESICOME Expanded Sanitary Inspections, Compliance Management and Enforcement EHSD Environmental Health and Sanitation Department GWSC Ghana Water and Sewerage Corporation GWCL Ghana Water Company Limited GYEEDA Ghana Youth Employment and Entrepreneurship Development Agency GSGDA Ghana Shared Growth and Development Agenda GDP Gross Domestic Product GSS Ghana Statistical Service GAMA Greater Accra Metropolitan Area GDHS Ghana Demographic and Health Survey HSD Hydrological Services Department ICT Information and Communications Technology IMF International Monetary Fund IOR Inter-Organisational Relations JMP Joint Monitoring Program LG Local Government LGWU Local Government Workers Union of Ghana MOWAC Ministry of Women and Children MP Members of Parliament MSW Municipal Solid Waste MINT Materials in Transit

MDG Millennium Development Goals MTDPF Medium Term Development Policy Framework MMDAs Metropolitan, Municipal and District Assemblies MOH Ministry of Health MOE Ministry of Education MOST Ministry of Science and Technology MWRWH Ministry of Water Resources, Works and Housing MLGRD Ministry of Local Government and Rural Development NIE New Institutional Economics NGO Non-Governmental Organizations NSDP National Sanitation Day Program NESPoCC National Environmental Sanitation Policy Coordinating Council NESSAP National Environmental Sanitation Policy Strategy Plan NYEP National Youth Employment Program NESP National Environmental Sanitation Policy NEPAD New Partnership for Africa’s Development NPM New Public Management NPG New Public Governance OECD Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development PAM Public Administration and Management PA Public Administration PCO Public Cleansing Officers PHC Population and Housing Census PPP Public Private Partnership RCC Regional Coordinating Council REHSD Regional Environmental Health and Sanitation Directorates RSMS Rural Sanitation Model and Strategy SHEP School Health Education Program SDG Sustainable Development Goals SESIP Sector Environment Strategic Investment Plan SADA Savannah Accelerated Development Authority SC Social Capital SAP Structural Adjustment Program TCPD Town and Country Planning Department UN United Nations UNICEF United Nations Children’s Fund NCED UN Conference on Environment and Development WASH Water, Sanitation and Hygiene WMD Waste Management Departments WHO World Health Organisation WSP World Bank Water and Sanitation Program WM Waste Management WCED World Commission on Environment and Development

ABSTRACT

The implementation of Environmental Sanitation Policies [ESP] to achieve sanitation goals has been a daunting task for many developing countries. Many research outcomes identified implementation challenges ranging from institutional bottlenecks, finance, and technology to regulation and law enforcement. However, research on actor’s relations and how these relations influence the implementation of the ESP at the local level can be described as scanty but emerging. Though public management theories like Public-Private- Partnerships [PPP], decentralization and participation are thought to be effective management tools for public policy implementation; little attention has been given to the relations of actors within the process of their application in ESP implementation. This research argues that actors are the fulcrum around which all the factors that affect implementation evolve; therefore their relations and interactions exerts a significant influence on policy output and outcome. Drawing on empirical examination in three local government areas in the Greater Accra region of Ghana, this study investigated the kind of relation that exists between actors in the implementation of ESP at the local level, the issues affecting actors’ relations and how these relations influence policy outcomes. The study adopts a qualitative research methodology to investigate the phenomena. The study was conducted adopting semi-structured interviews and focus group discussions; documentary reviews; and participant observations as the key data collection Instruments to document actors’ relations, issues affecting actors’ relations and the impact of relations on ESP implementation at the local level. A purposive sampling technic was employed to sample local level actors from wide range of actors who are directly involved in the implementation of the Environmental Sanitation Policy of Ghana. The study establishes that the relations between actors at the local level are largely chaotic and uncoordinated. It further identified issues affecting actor’s relations under four themes namely Institutional, Economic, Political and Socio-culture. These issues largely defined the kind of relations that exist between actors at the local level. The findings of the study conclude that actor relations play a central role in ESP Implementing in Ghana. The study contributes to theory by unearthing critical but less researched area of actors’ relations in public management theories and also to practice of policy implementation by identifying critical contextual factors that impedes public policy implementation in developing countries.

DECLARATION

I declare that no portion of the work referred to in the thesis has been submitted in support of an application for another degree or qualification of this or any other university or other institute of learning.

Franklin Yayra Adorsu-Djentuh

September, 2018

COPYRIGHT STATEMENT i. The author of this thesis (including any appendices and/or schedules to this thesis) owns certain copyright or related rights in it (the “Copyright”) and s/he has given The University of Manchester certain rights to use such Copyright, including for administrative purposes. ii. Copies of this thesis, either in full or in extracts and whether in hard or electronic copy, may be made only in accordance with the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988 (as amended) and regulations issued under it or, where appropriate, in accordance with licensing agreements which the University has from time to time. This page must form part of any such copies made. iii. The ownership of certain Copyright, patents, designs, trademarks and other intellectual property (the “Intellectual Property”) and any reproductions of copyright works in the thesis, for example graphs and tables (“Reproductions”), which may be described in this thesis, may not be owned by the author and may be owned by third parties. Such Intellectual Property and Reproductions cannot and must not be made available for use without the prior written permission of the owner(s) of the relevant Intellectual Property and/or Reproductions. iv. Further information on the conditions under which disclosure, publication and commercialisation of this thesis, the Copyright and any Intellectual Property and/or Reproductions described in it may take place is available in the University IP Policy (see http://documents.manchester.ac.uk/DocuInfo.aspx?DocID=24420), in any relevant Thesis restriction declarations deposited in the University Library, The University Library’s regulations (see http://www.library.manchester.ac.uk/about/regulations/) and in The University’s policy on Presentation of Theses

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

To God be the glory for great things he has done. I am most grateful to the Almighty Father and our Saviour and Lord Jesus Christ for fulfilling his word in my life. “So shall my word be that goeth forth out of my mouth: it shall not return unto me void, but it shall accomplish that which I please, and it shall prosper in the thing whereto I sent it” Isaiah 55:11

I wish to thank my supervisors, Dr. Farhad Hossain and Dr. Chris Rees most sincerely for the support, guidance and mentoring, which have spurred me on to achieving this great fist, and to Prof. Justice Nyigma Bawole, I am most grateful for your kindness, love and correction throughout the period.

I wish to thank my fathers in the Lord for the mentoring and spiritual guidance which has played a major part of my success. Apostle Stephen Kojo Boamah of Crystal Word Chapel Accra, when all odds were against me, you stood by me and fought the battle with me. Bishop Edmund Akyea-Mensah of Command Prayer Center Manchester, you were my spiritual covering throughout this journey. Prophet Prince Atsu Manasseh of Watered Garden Ministries Accra, your mentoring from afar brought me this far. You taught me to be diligent with everything I do, your sermons kept me going. Apostle Joshua Selman Nimmak of Eternity Nertwork International Zaria Nigeria, though I am yet to meet you in person but your Koinonia messages has transformed my life in many ways. You charged me to go out there and conquer cosmos, by the grace of God I am conquering cosmos sir! Finally to Dr. Abel Damina of Power City International Uyo Nigeria, you re-introduced Jesus Christ to me in a spectacular way and the power of that knowledge has equipped me to do exploit. Thank you all mighty men of valour for your great contribution to my life.

My very sincere thanks go to the Ghana Education Trust Fund (Getfund) for sponsoring my PhD studies. Special thanks to Mr Paul Krampa and Mr. Stephen Baffoe for facilitating this scholarship. God bless you all

Special thanks go to my colleagues and friends in Accra, Ghana and Manchester, UK. Dr. Ishmael Ayanoore, Dr. Anthony Kumasy, Dr. Ibrahim Mohammed, Dr. Edward

Ampratwum, Dr. Issifu Amadu Abdullai, Dr. Daniel Otoo, Dr. Peter Agamile, Dr. Nathaniel Tetteh Djangma, Dr. Irene Okhade, Dr. Kevwe Pela, Dr. Ning Kang, Dr. Raqueeb Abu Salia Nantamba, Dr. Bridget Kabbah, Dr. Asie Yousefnejad, Hakeem Akparibo, Dzidzor Francis Kyekye, Mawuli Akusah, Vivian Gyemfi, Francisca Selikem Asalu, Mrs. Joyce Akyea-Mensah, Rev. Claudia and Isaac Wilberforce, Richard Aducoffie, Ivy Zomelo, Millicent Duah, Kevin Devanny, Derick Adjakwaku, Cornelius Kumi, Albert Kojo Kyekye, Emil Meddy, Godwin Ahiase, Shaibu Awudu, Avissey Godsway, Obed Obeng Akomea, Raymond Dzantor, Akrasi Richard, Begah Kofi Divine, Eric Armah Quaye, Worlanyo Agbalekpor, Ivy Adjakwaku, Kofi Lawson, Llyod Tanyo Hevi, Godwin Amla, Atsu Klugah, Worgbah Richmond, Thomas Amedzo, Cynthia Dzotsi, Nelly Ocansey, Sefemor Aza, Gifty Ketemepi, Akorfa Wuttor, Paul and Miriam Afeeva, George Attabuatsi, Cynthia Mawulawoe Kodowu, Lola Asiseh Ashitey, Arnold Dabi, JJ Attianah, Charles MacCarthy Agabanu, Jean-Louis Siaby, Adzah Edwin, Amexo Divine, Edem Torsah (Torgbui Ahorgo), Anita Daniels, Selorm Kpade, Juliet Korkordi, Japhet Lolo, all members of Command Prayer Centre, Manchester and Crystal Word Chapel, Ghana and all those who I couldn’t mention, thanks for their support.

My most sincere thanks go to my family Terrence Edem Ayiku, Judith Senam Abbah, Godwin Ayiku, Anthony Djentuh, David Mawuena Djentuh Esq., Veronica Akpaba Djentuh, Delali and Reiss Quartey, Jonathan Kafui Djentuh, Robert Adorsu, Dr. Divine Akwensivie, Victor Akwensive, Sitsofe Akwensivie Seyram Djentuh, Michael Setsoafia Djentuh, Gloria Djentuh, Evans Mawuli Djentuh, Iris Quartey, Emefa Djentuh, Venunye Djentuh, Kekeli Djentuh, Ema Djentuh, Emilia Djentuh, Joseph Djentuh, Ameyaw Safo Kantanka who together contributed to my upkeep and education in one way or the other. For all others, including institutions and individuals who participated in this study, I am very grateful for your love and support. I thank you all for keeping my hope alive.

DEDICATION

I dedicate this thesis to:

1. My grandparents Joseph Sai-Kofi Djentuh and Emma Amba Krampah-Djentuh of Blessed Memory, who gave me the right foundation in life on which I have built upon. “If the foundations be destroyed, what can the righteous do?” Psalm 11:3

2. My mother Caroline Peace Abra Djentuh, a single mother who singlehandedly financed my entire education.

3. My lovely wife Victoria Efua Clarke-Djentuh who gave me all the support I needed to accomplish this task.

CHAPTER ONE

GENERAL INTRODUCTION

1.0 Introduction

Environmental sanitation is a major developmental issue that confronts many societies around the globe. Increasing waste generation rates due to population growth, changing lifestyles of people, development and consumption of products with materials that are less biodegradable have led to diverse environmental challenges in various cities of the world (Asase et al., 2009). Environmental sanitation is among the top drivers of human development as it affects quality of life and health. The state of the environment requires governmental actions and policy interventions to improve human health, promote environmental quality, and to support economic productivity and physical wellbeing of the society. Environmental Sanitation Policies (ESP) are essential in promoting and creating that enabling atmosphere that will support and boost increased access to sanitation services (Elledge et al., 2002). However, the implementation of ESPs to cause changes in the sanitary condition of the environment at any given location may work as planned, but the likelihood that application is hindered, delayed or even prevented during the process is a reality that cannot be gainsaid (Bressers, 2004a). Achieving sanitation goals may depend on several factors ranging from socio-economic development of the country, resource availability, sustainable financing, and the capacity of the sanitation sector. Kumar et al. (2011) also posit that indigenous and cultural factors, the political environment, type of legislation that governs the sector and its enforcement, and appropriate technology are equally important in achieving sanitation goals.

Ghana is one of few African countries that can boast of a well-defined Environmental Sanitation Policy (ESP), with a well laid out strategy and action plan for implementation, yet exemplifies one of Africa’s worst sanitation records. see (UNICEF, 2015b). This rather paradoxical quagmire of Ghana’s sanitation situation is linked to different elements and variables within the policy implementation process. Empirical research discloses implementation as one significant impediment to change (Bressers, 2004b; Hill and Hupe, 2002a; Palumbo and Calista, 1990; Pressman and Wildavsky, 1973; Owens, 2008). Many

18 obstacles to effective policy outcomes can be traced to implementation failure, rather than in the policy design errors that concern most policy analysts (Dinica and Bressers, 2003). The implementation process of the ESP in Ghana undoubtedly has its fair share of implementation challenges. Although Government of Ghana acknowledged environmental sanitation as crucial to the nation’s development, there seems to be an apparent lack of clear and coherent strategy and the will to implement the stated vision for environmental sanitation (GVCTF and Foundation, 2012)

A number of evaluations of Ghana’s sanitation policy and governance have been conducted (Ayee and Crook, 2003; King et al., 2001; Salifu, 2005; Saywell and Hunt, 1999; Thrift, 2007; Oduro-Kwarteng, 2011; Obirih-Opareh and Post, 2002). These were assessments to identify the causes of the deteriorating sanitation conditions in Ghana and to recommend appropriate solutions to ameliorate the situation. Extant literature revealed such key areas as participation, technology adoption, Public Private Partnerships (PPP), financing, decentralisation, law enforcement etc. as having received some considerable amount of attention in this enterprise. However, research on actors’ relations and how these relations influence the implementation of the ESP at the local level can be described as scanty but emerging. Before any real change can take place regarding sanitation on the ground, there must be some level of cooperation and collaboration between the actors at the local level. A successful policy outcome will require a highly interactive and cooperative mechanisms; local empowerment, partnership between public and private decision makers, NGOs and traditional authorities etc. (Bressers, 2004a). This research argues that actors are the fulcrum around which all the factors that affect implementation evolve and therefore their relations and interactions exert significant influence on policy output and outcome. Although local participations have been promoted variously by international organisations at all levels, it is imperative to examine the mode of such involvements to understand the ways through which sanitation agencies engage the community to implement sanitation policies (Manase et al., 2004). Ultimately, the collective actions of individuals, groups and community members are important to bring about the desired changes in finding solutions to waste management and sanitation related problems (Babanawo, 2006).

The research examines the implementation structure of Ghana’s ESP with a number of public management theories such as the Public-Private-Partnerships, Decentralisation, and Participation focusing on their relational perspectives with the aim to expose gaps in

19 literature. The New Institutional Economics (NIE) and Social Capital are used as the theoretical lenses to analyse the outcome of the study. This is in attempt to explore how institutions (formal and informal) shape actors interactions in the policy implementation process, thereby contributing to literature. The main aim therefore of this research is to understand how actors relate at the local level, the issues affecting their relationships and the impact of such relations on the overall objectives of the ESP in Ghana.

1.1 Background and Research Problem

Improved sanitation is an essential component of development (Asare and Frimpong, 2013). The lack of sanitation endured by at least 2.6 billion people, almost half of the world’s population from the beginning of the 21st century, is a hidden international scandal (Black and Fawcett, 2010). According to the Human Development Report 2016, almost half of the people in developing countries lack access to basic sanitation services (Jahan, 2017). Sanitation and waste management are the major challenge confronting many developing countries undergoing rapid urbanization. (Briscoe, 1996; Potter and Lloyd- Evans, 2014; Chaplin, 1999; Songsore, 2003). Extant literature reveals that sanitation has been a matter of concern to the human race for a very long time (Rosen, 1994) yet the current sanitation situation in the developing world remains at unappreciable levels despite past and present campaigns and efforts (Black and Fawcett, 2010).

Environmental sanitation is a major developmental issue on the agenda of Governments and development agencies worldwide. It is also one of the identifiable sectors that keeps receiving attention from researchers, NGOs and international organisations such as the UN and the World Bank. At the UN Summit on Sustainable Development, held in New York in 2015, world leaders adopted the post-2015 development agenda to halve the proportion of the global population lacking adequate sanitation by 2030. To meet this ambitious target, the United Nations believes that coordinated action is required, not just from governments, but also from various actors and players in the sanitation sector. The need for collaboration and partnerships between communities and sanitation agencies of all kinds does not need further emphasis (Manase et al., 2004).

While Ghana ranks higher on development indicators than most countries in sub-Saharan Africa, much needs to be done to improve Environmental Sanitation. Effective delivery of environmental sanitation services remains one of the major intractable challenges facing Metropolitan, Municipal and District Assemblies (MMDAs) in Ghana (Salifu, 2005; ESP, 2010). With the surge in urban population and changing lifestyles, the sanitation problems of Ghana have, over the years, worsened even after the promulgation of a revised Environmental Sanitation Policy. A Joint World Health Organisation (WHO) and United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) sanitation report puts Ghana at the seventh position among the world’s worst performing country in global sanitation ranking. See (UNICEF, 2015b). According to the epidemiological surveillance reports, 55,784 cases of cholera was recorded in Ghana between 1998 and 2013 with 1,095 fatalities (case fatality rate of 2%) (UNICEF, 2015a). In 2014 Ghana recorded the worst cholera outbreak in 30 years. At the end of the year (outbreak period of week 52), a total of 28,975 cases with 243 deaths (CFR of 0.8%) were reported from 130 out of the 216 districts in all the 10 regions of the country. A spill over into 2015 recorded a cumulative total of 591 cases with 5 deaths, a case fatality rate (CFR) of 0.8% were reported after the first quarter of the year (WHO, 2015b).

The cost of inadequacies within the sanitation sector for society is enormous (Watkins, 2006; Cheng et al., 2012; Yardley, 2010; Fewtrell et al., 2005; Prüss-Üstün et al., 2008). Besides its effects on human health, the wider economic impacts of poor sanitation have been variously acknowledged (Bartram and Cairncross, 2010; Bos et al., 2005). According to the World Bank Water and Sanitation Program (WSP) report, poor sanitation costs 18 African countries a colossal sum of USD 5.5 billion per year in economic terms. The report in 2012 estimated that Ghana loses GHS420 million 1 annually equivalent to US$290 million due to poor sanitation. This suggests that each Ghanaian loses US$12 per year or 1.6% of the national GDP to poor sanitation (WSP, 2012).

Aside from the negative effects of sanitation related illness and the economic cost implications, poor sanitation in Ghana often results in other environmental disasters like flooding and destruction of properties. In 2015, Ghana experienced one of its worst human disasters in decades from floods in the city of Accra as a result of the improper planning of settlement and choked drains together with other human factors. This led to an explosion at a fuel station leaving over 150 Ghanaians dead and over 200 others sustaining various

1 The Ghanaian Cedi was exchanged at GHS1 to £3.095 in 2012 approximating the cost in to £13.6million. 21 degree of injury on the night of June 3rd. According to the commission of enquiry that investigated the incident, poor sanitation, among other factors, resulted in the flooding that led to the disaster.

The aforementioned statistics are indicative of the poor environmental sanitation record of Ghana and its devastating effects on the lives of her citizens. These constitute evidences enough to back the argument that the ESP of Ghana, a documented plan laid down to address such challenges has not been effective in doing so. Although the ESP puts forth key policy instruments that are thought to be effective, they can only influence implementation outcomes positively through the character of the actors involved. The ESP of Ghana sets out responsibilities for the various actors, from individual actors through community organizations to Metropolitan, Municipal, District Assemblies (MMDAs), state agencies, educational institutions and the private sector (Salifu, 2005), with appropriate laws and sanctions. But the implementation of the policy directives is not fully followed (Awortwi, 2004) leaving the policy implementation process in a rather weak and fragmented state.

Ghana’s poor sanitation record has prompted a number of studies (Ayee and Crook, 2003; Awortwi, 2004; Owusu, 2010; Salifu et al., 2005; Saywell and Hunt, 1999; King et al., 2001; Obirih-Opareh and Post, 2002; Oduro-Kwarteng, 2011; Oteng-Ababio, 2010; Mansour and Esseku, 2017). According to extant literature, the dysfunctional environmental sanitation system in Ghana can be linked to lack of proper participatory framework for PPPs, inadequate financing of the sector, lack of infrastructural capacity and appropriate technology in managing sanitation, lack of political will to deal with sanitation etc. However, research on actor relations and how they influence ESP implementation has received very little attention in this endeavour. A few studies such as Osumanu et al. (2010) Crook and Ayee (2006), King et al. (2001), Kessey (1995) have touched briefly on actor relations, but their research focus were limited in their scope in various ways. These studies failed to identify a clear cut relationship pattern among actors, issues affecting actor relations and the overall impact of relations on ESP outcomes. In an attempt to fill this gap in literature, this study seeks to build on a similar study conducted by Manase et al. (2004) in three African countries Zambia, Zimbabwe and South Africa which identified links between sanitations agencies and urban poor communities and the key issues and challenges affecting their relationships. This is an attempt to replicate this study in the

Ghanaian context and to expand the frontier of the study of relations within the ES literature in the global south.

The sanitation challenge is reckoned to have a critical social and institutional dimension that requires attention from the research community (Manase et al., 2004). To understand the lack of progress in sanitation, research needs to move beyond the structural dimension to a deeper level to understanding both formal and informal relationships that exist between actors, the context within which these relationships exist and how these relations affect the policy implementation process.

This thesis argues that despite the enormous benefits that NPM theory such as PPP, decentralization and community/public participation offer in actualising the policy intent of the ESP, uncoordinated relationships and lack of social and institutional cohesion between local actors remains a serious threat to the effective implementation of ESP at the local level. The study further posits that, notwithstanding the structural constrains that were early on alluded to in literature, actors’ relations and collaboration in ESP implementation offers another dimension of opportunity in achieving sanitation goals. In this regard, the research examines the implementation structure of the ESP and evaluates the characteristics of actors to ascertain how these actors relate, the issues affecting their relations and how their relationships impact sanitation outcomes. This will help reveal some implementation barriers and solutions to bring some clarity in addressing issues of sanitation management in Ghana.

1.2 Environmental Sanitation as a ‘Wicked Problem’

Environmental sanitation and waste management is increasingly becoming a ‘wicked problem’ to solve. Many environmental sanitation problems fit the criteria of ‘wicked problems’ because they are in many ways entangled in the community’s political, cultural, social, and economic structure (Kreuter et al., 2004). In post-independent Ghana, environmental sanitation seemed a straight forward issue. Simple legislation and by-laws were effective enough to deal with the problem. However, as the economy of Ghana grew, with population explosion and expansion in human settlements, the existing legislations to

23 control environmental sanitation has signally failed. The sanitation challenge also seems to have defied new policy measures and management tools adopted to solve it.

The term ‘wicked problem’ is usually used to describe adverse and difficult social and environmental situations that overwhelm existing and observed procedures and persist even after the application of best-known methods (Ludwig, 2001; Ritchey, 2005; Rittel and Webber, 1973). Unlike ‘tame problems’ where problems can be resolved with conventional methods due to their straightforward nature and the ability to define the cause-and-effect relationship of such problems, “wicked problems” usually defy technical solutions, foster inherent conflict among numerous stakeholders, persist indefinitely and are characterized by a high degree of uncertainty among other challenges (Rittel and Webber, 1973). The term “wicked” as coined by Rittel et al is not to suggest problems as ethically awful or in any way reflective of character, moral tenets, values and ethics of the society in which a problem persists. Rather, the term is used to describe a problem that is illusive and somewhat difficult to define. According to Ramalingam (2013), Wicked problems require solutions generated by collaboration across organizations and specialisms rather than through technical fixes developed and delivered to public agencies in a linear manner. Networks of public, private and non-profit organizations have been identified as critical to the development of government capacity to address complex problems and achieve collective goals (Eggers and Goldsmith, 2004). Collaborative networks between public managers, the private sector, citizens and not-for-profit actors become critical vehicles for addressing wicked problems, serving as alternatives to hierarchical and fragmented systems in public policy formulation and delivery (Keast et al., 2004; Weber and Khademian, 2008; Bingham et al., 2005). Again, Weber and Khademian (2008, p.341) argued that no single government agency will have the capacity to define and design solutions to wicked problems and so “the need to share, understand and integrate diverse understandings of the wicked problem is paramount”.

This thesis, however, seeks to shift focus from structural and technical fixes to examine human relations within the collaborative process of ESP implementation, identifying the potentials of actors’ collaborative relations and how they can be harnessed to solve the ‘wicked problem’ dilemma of environmental sanitation in Ghana.

1.3 Environmental Sanitation Policies [ESP]

Environmental Sanitation Policy [ESP] is the principal document to guide the delivery of sanitation services as a whole, from development of guidelines to implementation and enforcement of necessary legislations (Quansah, 2010). According to Elledge (2003) policies set priorities and often allocate resources for their implementation. Public policies are mainly implemented through four types of policy instruments: laws and regulations, economic measures, information and education programmes, assignment of rights and responsibilities for providing services. A coherent national policy on environmental sanitation is critical for raising the sanitation profile of a country and for improving access to safe and hygienic sanitation facilities (Ekane and Gill, 2013). Elledge (2003) further noted that Environmental Sanitation Policies have often been unclear, contradictory or non-existent in most developing countries. With few exceptions, national level sanitation policy frameworks within which national, state and municipal government agencies and the private and non-profit sectors operate have not been adequate. A growing body of practitioners and policymakers has come to recognise this as a key constraint to improving sanitation coverage and programme quality (Elledge, 2003).

Non-existence of ESP can constrain management as well as the coverage and the improvement of sanitation in the developing countries (Seppälä, 2002; Elledge, 2003; Cotton et al., 2002; WELL., 1998; Tayler and Scott, 2005). This implies that policy could serve as an empowerment tool to stop or enhance sanitation practice. Several views have been expressed on how to get the ESPs drawn and implemented (Elledge et al., 2002; Cotton et al., 2002; Tayler et al., 2005). Nevertheless, there is still no consensus as to how to get ESP drafted and implemented in the low-income countries, thus leaving room for poor and fragmented policies for implementation or even complete lack of it in some countries (Tayler and Scott, 2005). Many countries in the developing world, especially Africa, either lack sanitation policy entirely or have an unclear and often contradictory policy (Elledge, 2003; Seppälä, 2002). In some instances, there is an expressed lack of knowledge and understanding among policymakers about technical issues and the importance of sanitation (Lenton et al., 2005). Effective policy can be the mechanism to stimulate the delivery of programmes that address sanitation needs both nationally and locally. Guidance on how to develop and implement effective ESP is a key knowledge gap in many developing countries (Cotton et al., 2002).

South Africa is one of the few countries in Africa with quite a comprehensive ESP in Africa (DWAFT, 2002) followed by countries like Ghana and Uganda. However, formulating a good ESP does not necessarily translate into better sanitary conditions, as were the case in Ghana. These must be accompanied with a good implementation strategy and the right conditions to achieve policy goals. According to Samanta and Van Wijk (1998), policies should encourage technologies and practices that match users’ own frames of reference in order for them to be effective. It is further argued that for environmental sanitation policies and reform implementation to be successful, political will and facilitation, technical, economic, environmental and social considerations must be taken into account (Seppälä, 2002). Actors’ role and their critical importance in policy implementation literature have been emphasized variously. Taking the debate further on what works in the implementation of environmental sanitation policies in developing countries, the role of actors and their collaborative relationships in this enterprise is scrutinized further. The environmental sanitation policy of Ghana [NESP, 2010] is used as the point of reference to investigate this phenomenon.

1.4 Role of Local Actors in ESP Implementation

Actors are involved at various stages of the policy making process. Nakamura and Smallwood (1980)’s implementation model classified three groups of actor typologies within the policy process: formulators, implementers and evaluators, all of whom are linked to each other in terms of delegation, discretion, bureaucracy, technocracy and bargaining. The roles of implementers are very crucial in actualising policy intentions. Van Meter and Van Horn (1975) argue that goal consensus must be achieved among actors if policy is to be carried out successfully. Theoretically, the concept of ‘policy actor’ refers to all individuals or legal entities that are directly or indirectly concerned with a policy, from its initiation to its sustainability. For analytical purposes this broad category of actors are broken into public actors (Government officials, policy elites, and bureaucrats), private actors (NGOs, CBOs, and Private Sanitation Agencies), Community members and households as the target population. The term ‘local actors’ refers to various individuals and groups of stakeholders at the municipal level, assigned with various roles by the ESP. The local actor taxonomy is used to distinguish them from national and international actors

26 who have equally important roles to play in the implementation of the ESP. The study posits that, the roles of an actor can only be carried out effectively based on relationship with other actors within the implementation process. This study therefore seeks to analyse the relationships that exist between these actors in performing their roles and how power and responsibility is distributed between them.

1.5 Relationships between Local Actors in ESP Implementation

In Ghana, the implementation of environmental sanitation policies involves collaborative relationship among various actors at the local level. A wide range of actors and groups are concerned with the management of waste and sanitation within their communities. These actors include government regulators, private service providers, end users and intermediaries such as NGOs/CBOs who have various roles to play in the implementation of government policies regarding environmental sanitation. The relationships between these actors are very important in achieving the sanitation goals set by the ESP and other international sanitation targets e.g. SDGs. The ESP of Ghana has identified the importance of these actors and has assigned them with various roles. The diagram below illustrates the potential relations and links between local actors. These relations may either be direct or indirect depending on institutional arrangements and the outcomes could either be weak or strong based on channels of communication and interaction.

Figure 1: Relationship between Local Actors in ESP Implementation

SANITATION AGENCIES

Local Government Authorities, Allied Agencies, NGOs, Private Waste Collectors

Chiefs, Community CBOS Heads, Opinion Leaders

INDIVIDUALS, HOUSEHOLDS AND COMMUNITIES

Strong Relationships

Weak Relationships

Source: Manase et al. (2004)

1.6 Research Aim, Objectives and Questions

This research is principally aimed at investigating how actors relate and how they influence the implementation process of the ESP in Ghana. The research seeks to determine the role of institutions in shaping actors’ interactions within ESP implementation and the kind of relations that exist. The empirical inquiry is aimed at providing a more suitable guideline for policy makers, governments and practitioners of implementation on the way forward in tackling future implementation challenges in the area of environmental sanitation. Based on the research aim outlined above, the study intends to achieve the following objectives.

1. To examine the kind of relations and links that exist between actors in ESP implementation 2. To identify the issues affecting actors’ relations in the environmental sanitation sub-sector. 3. To assess the impacts of actors’ relations on environmental sanitation.

To achieve the above aim and objectives the following questions will guide the research.

1. What kinds of relations and links exist between actors in of ESP Implementation? 2. What are the issues affecting actors’ relations in ESP implementation? 3. How do actor relations impact on environmental sanitation?

1.7 Scope and Theoretical Disposition of Thesis

The study focuses mainly on actors’ relations in the implementation of the ESP in Ghana. The scope of the study is categorised along the theoretical and empirical lines. Theoretically the study covers Environmental Sanitation [ES] and policy implementation literature. It then expounds on the New Public Management [NPM] theory, utilising some of its core principles such as Public Private Partnerships [PPP], Decentralisation and Participation with dominant focus on their relational perspectives. It also examined the New Public Governance [NPG] and Relational Governance literature as emerging approach in public management, where the study of relations is situated. Finally, the scope covered the theories of inter-organisational networks and collaborative relationships, using

29 the New Institutional Economics [NIE] and Social Capital [SC] theories as the theoretical lenses to explain the relations of actors. The study also examined a number of sanitation related literature and policies within the Ghanaian context, to gain an insight in to the management structures and the processes in implementing environmental sanitation policies in Ghana.

Empirically the scope of study coveres environmental sanitation in Ghana, using the ESP of Ghana as the basis for the study. The ESP is a cross-sectorial policy involving wide range of actors with different levels of responsibilities. The actors can be classified into two broad categories, i.e. the implementers (State and Non-State actors) and the targets (Individual Citizens, Community and local businesses, and Sanitation workers). The main implementer agency is the Ministry of Local Government and Rural Development [MLGRD]. They implement the ESP with assistance from other allied sector organisations like the Ministry of Health [MOH], the Ministry of Education [MOE] and the Ministry of Science and Technology [MOST], the Ministry of Water Resources, Works and Housing [MWRWH] and other allied organisations. The implementation of the ESP is however a decentralised function of the Metropolitan, Municipal and District Assemblies [MMDA’s] at the local level so the scope is limited to some selected MMDA’s in Ghana. The scope also covered the non-state implementers like the non-governmental organisations [NGOs], and community based organisations [CBOs] who are assigned various responsibilities in the ESP. The target here refers to the individual citizens, communities and commercial and industrial entities.

1.8 Originality and Relevance of the Thesis

Actors’ relations within the area of environmental sanitation in Ghana is largely under- researched. Mostly, the study on actors’ role in environmental sanitation are limited to issues of performance and service quality e.g (Oduro-Kwarteng, 2011) leaving out very core areas like relationships which forms part of the driving forces behind performance and service quality. This study illuminates the kinds of relations that exist between the actors in the implementation of ESPs. Also, the research brings some understanding to how actors influence implementation through their interactions and relationships. Although literature on policy frameworks, implementation strategies and urban governance in sanitation

30 management is large and growing, detailed analysis of actor relations which impact the overall policy outcome needs to be conducted. This research seeks to bring some clarity to implementation challenges of the ESP in Ghana. It aims to identify the key issues regarding actors’ role at the local level that need to be addressed in order to bring about more effective and sustainable ways of implementing ESP in Ghana. This thesis should also help engage government and those with a wider policy interest in the sanitation sector to reflect on the approaches based on partnership between local actors in implementing national policies at the local level. Further, the thesis provides grounds for future research in the area of actor’s relation in ESP Implementation.

1.9 Structure of Thesis

The thesis is organized into nine (9) chapters:

Chapter one (1) is the introductory chapter. This consists of the background to the study and statement of the problem. It identified the type of actors, their roles and the kind of relations to be studied. The aims and objectives of the study, research questions and significance of the study were stated. The scope and limitations of the study, as well as the contribution of the study to general knowledge and the outline of the study all constitute part of chapter one.

Chapter two (2) consists of an extensive review of literature on the components of environmental sanitation and development approaches to environmental sanitation. It explores relevant public management theories like New Public Management [NPM], Public Private Partnerships [PPP], Decentralisation, Participation, New Public Governance [NPG], and Relational Governance [RG] theories applicable for ESP implementation. The chapter also presents the conceptual framework of the study. The New Institutional Economics [NIE] and Social Capital [SC] were used as the analytical lens to study the relationships between actors. These theories and their relevance were explored in detail in the chapter.

Chapter three (3) presents a contextual overview of the research setting. It provides background to both the political and developmental context of Ghana. It presents an overview of the local government and decentralisation system within which the ESP is

31 implemented. It also discusses the ESP and all other policy statements and interventions made from the past to the present to ensure proper sanitation in Ghana.

Chapter four (4) presents the methodology and the philosophical foundation of the study. The study adopts a social constructivist and interpretive ontology. The orientation is that knowledge does not exist independently of the social set-ups and what is known is socially constructed. The study does not believe in the positivist orientation of objectivity. For this research, knowledge is hardly value-free and what is knowledge is contingent upon the interpretation of subjects. This chapter also presents the method of data collection and analysis. Adopting a qualitative case-study approach, this study used in-depth interviews, documentary review and focus group and informal discussions as the key data collection instruments.

Chapter Five (5) presents the results of the data collected from the public that answers the first research question “What kinds of relations and links exist between actors’ in ESP Implementation?” The chapter presents an assessment of the relations to determine the kind of relationship and links that exist and how they influence the implementation process. This examination was conducted to fill the gaps identified in literature.

Chapter Six (6) Presents the results of the data collected from the public that answers the second research question “What are the key issues affecting actors’ relations in ESP implementation?” the chapter also presents an assessment of the factors affecting actors relations and the impact of these factors on the policy implementation process. This examination was conducted to fill the gaps identified in literature.

Chapter Seven (7) Presents the results of the data collected from the public that answers the third research question “How do actor relations impact on environmental sanitation?” the chapter presents an assessment of the implication of actors’ relations on environmental sanitation policy implementation in Ghana.

Chapter Eight (8) presents the discussions and interpretation of the research findings and results.

Chapter Nine (9) provides a summary of the study and draws a conclusion. This chapter also states the possible theoretical and policy implications of actor relations with recommendations for further research, limitation of the study and conclusions.

1.10 Conclusion

This chapter began with an introduction to the thesis with discussions on environmental sanitation issues pointing out the area of focus. The chapter discussed the research problem bringing to light some statistics on the sanitation records of the research context to provide a clear picture of the challenges the study aim to address. The chapter identified the group of actors to be studied and their role in the ESP implementation. It then went on to outline the research aim, objectives and questions to be answered. Three (3) research questions which sought to explore actors’ relations; to identify issues affecting actors’ relations and the impact of actor’s relations on policy implementation were stated. The chapter demarcates the scope of study by stating the theoretical scope and the empirical scope of study. The theoretical scope examines literature and theories of policy implementation and public management theories whiles the empirical scope covers a specific geography of Ghana and the actors in the ESP implementation at the local level. The relevance and the originality of the study, the limitations of the research and how the thesis will be organised were outlined and stated in the chapter. The following chapter presents a review of relevant literature in the area under study to serve as a link between this study and previous studies and provide a basis for contribution to knowledge.

CHAPTER TWO

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK FOR ENVIRONMENTAL SANITATION POLICY IMPLEMENTATION

2.0 Introduction

This chapter critically reviews the literature and conceptual framework outlining the theoretical foundation for the research. The chapter reviews the literature with the aim to identify gaps and defines the zones for the contribution of this study to the existing literature. In other words, the aim is to map out what is not fully discussed in the literature to provide a basis for this study (Locke and Golden-Biddle, 1997; Boote and Beile, 2005). This chapter is divided into five different sections.

The first section focuses on the background to environmental sanitation [ES]. It defined the subject matter of ES of which this study will largely dwell. It also assessed the global challenges of environmental sanitation and the institutional framework for managing them. The second section discussed public policy implementation theories which formed the broader theme for this study. It assesses the field of implementation research so far, explaining the background to policy implementation, the various approaches to policy implementation with a highlight on policy implementation problems in developing countries. The third section reviews public management literature and their application in the field of ES management. It focused on three NPM principles of PPP, decentralisation and community/public participation, reviewing the theoretical debate on their application in public service delivery and their relational perspectives. The fourth section reviews literature on integrated public management theories highlighting emerging public management approaches such as Governance, New Public Governance [NPG] and Relational Governance [RG] where this study is situated. The fifth section explained the conceptual framework of the study. The theories for analysis are discussed in detail in this chapter. It reviewed literature on inter-organisational networks and collaborative relationships focusing on institutional perspective in studying actors’ relations using the New Institutional economics [NIE] and Social Capital [SC] as the theoretical lens for the study. This section gave an overview of NIE with a particular focus on its core conceptual

34 theory such as the transaction cost. The social capital theory is also reviewed as the second theoretical lens.

The concluding part of the chapter states the relevance and choice of the NIE and SC as the conceptual lens for the study, it then went on to connect the research questions with the literature reviewed. A final conclusion of the chapter is then drawn, bringing the chapter to an end.

2.1 Background to Environmental Sanitation

2.1.1 Environmental Sanitation: Definition and Scope

In its wide meaning, ‘environmental sanitation’ refers to all activities that influence the physical environment and the related human health; it typically includes faeces management, solid waste, drainage, and vector control (DFID and WELL., 1998). The word sanitation also refers to the maintenance of hygienic conditions, through services such as garbage collection and wastewater disposal (WHO, 2015a). There are varied definitions of sanitation depending on the focus and context it is defined. Sanitation could mean different things to different people. UN-Habitat (2003) defined ‘adequate sanitation’ as convenient and affordable system that eliminates contact with human excreta and other wastewater in the home and neighbourhood. The World Health Organization (WHO) defined “improved sanitation” as a situation where human waste is hygienically separated from human contact through the access to personal sanitation facilities (WHO, 2008), According to Elledge (2003) sanitation refers mainly to the facilities and hygiene principles and practices relate to the safe collection, reuse and/or disposal of human excreta and domestic wastewater. In other studies, sanitation dwells mainly on the provision of safe drinking water for domestic use. In general, the visible challenges to sanitation lie foremost with its definition and also with the decision regarding the most important aspects of it as ‘sanitation’ is considered as a ‘big idea’(WHO, 2008) which covers inter alia all that is framed in figure 2

Figure 2: Associated aspects of sanitation

� Safe collection, storage, treatment and disposal/re-use/recycling of human excreta (faeces and urine);

� Management/re-use/recycling of solid wastes (rubbish); �Drainage and disposal/re-use/recycling of household wastewater (often referred to as sullage or grey water); � Drainage of storm water;

�Treatment and disposal/re-use/recycling of sewage effluent;

� Collection and management of industrial waste products; and

� Management of hazardous wastes (including hospital wastes, and chemical / radioactive and other dangerous substances).

Source: WHO, (2008)

The scope of sanitation is wide and complex, it encompasses a wide range of activities to promote health, wellbeing and clean physical and natural environment. The scope of sanitation in the ESP of Ghana comprises a number of components, but the focus on sanitation has been limited only to address the collection and sanitary disposal of liquid and solid wastes in this thesis. Therefore, this study defines sanitation as the collection, disposal and management of waste. Though the relationship of actors which is the focus of this study will be limited to the sphere of Waste Management [WM], it is hoped that, the outcome of the study can be applied in all other context within the sanitation cluster and related activities.

2.1.2 Environmental Sanitation: A Global Challenge

In recent times, sanitation has received international attention as a human right; providing services to the poor is a major contemporary concern and it is widely understood that sanitation is a prerequisite for human dignity (Singh, 2005), and ensuring good health and economic benefits. Despite the efforts made by governments, NGOs and international bodies to halve the percentage of people without access to improved sanitation through the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) and now the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), majority of the world’s population still lacks access to basic sanitation. The global MDG target of 77 per cent has therefore been missed by nine percentage points with almost 700 million people without proper sanitation (UNICEF, 2015b).

Several sanitation interventions over the years have failed to deliver improve sanitation especially to the poor in developing countries. Maintaining quality sanitation standards and sustainable management of waste has been a major challenge for local authorities in many parts of the world. In the global south, the situation is further exacerbated by rapid population growth and urbanization which is evident in the numerous environmental problems, like contamination of water, open defecation, indiscriminate dumping of waste and chocked drains leading to sanitation related diseases such as cholera, diarrhoea and malaria. In 47 countries, areas or territories, less than half the population uses improved sanitation in 2015 (UNICEF, 2015b).

Figure 3: Proportion of the population using improved sanitation facilities in 2015

■ 91–100% ■ 76–90% ■ 50–75% ■ <50% ■ INSUFFICIENT DATA OR NOT APPLICABLE

Source: UNICEF 2015

After the expiration of MDG targets in 2015, it is estimated that 2.4 billion people globally still use unimproved sanitation facilities (UNICEF, 2015b). A WHO report in 2008 estimates that at least 10% of global illness is as a result of poor sanitation. Global estimates of 1.5 million children die annually as a result (UNICEF, 2006). Open defecation 37 is still prevalent globally with nearly 1.2 billion people engaged in this practice by choice or lack of facilities (ibid). The World Health Organization (WHO) estimates that poor sanitary conditions and practices cause 85-90% of diarrhoeal diseases in developing countries (Prüss-Üstün et al., 2004), contributing to the deaths of some 842,000 people in low and middle income countries each year with children under five bearing the greatest burden (WHO, 2016). Another study by Boschi-Pinto and Velebit (2008) underscored the point that aside pneumonia, diarrhoea and diarrhoea-related diseases are the most frequent causes of death among children under five (5) years of age worldwide. In addition, 1.5 billion people suffer from soil-transmitted helminth infections2, which are perpetuated by unsanitary faecal disposal. These examples highlight the huge impact of the lack of sanitation, coupled with lack of access to clean water on public health in developing countries. These public health impacts, in turn, impede economic and social development and perpetuate the cycle of poverty. Sustainable sanitation is a key requirement to promote economic activity and education within a community, because lack of proper sanitation may obviously result in poor health leading to lost working hours and school absenteeism (UNU-INWEH, 2010). According to UN estimates, achieving MDG goals in sanitation would have promoted the health of workers who absent themselves from work due to sanitation related illness adding 3.2 annual working days worldwide (Hutton and Haller, 2004). The introduction of the SDGs however, indicate a renewed commitment to continue the fight against poor sanitation after the world failed to meet the 2015 MDG deadline of at least halving the percentage of people without access to sanitation.

2.1.3 Africa

While most developed countries have achieved universal access at the end of 2015 MDG targets, sanitation coverage varies widely in developing countries (UNICEF, 2015b). However, North Africa is among the developing regions to meet the MDG target in 2015 with Sub-Sahara Africa [SSA] lagging behind. The lowest progress was recorded in Sub- Sahara Africa after Oceania with the improved sanitation coverage of 30% representing 6% point increase from 1990 to 2015 (UNICEF, 2015b). MDG report in 2012 indicates that

2 World Health Organization (2018) Soil-transmitted helminth infections [Online] Available from: http://www.who.int/news-room/fact-sheets/detail/soil-transmitted-helminth-infections. [Accessed March 13, 2018] 38 out of the 69 countries that were not on track to achieve the MDG target in sanitation, 36 of these countries were from SSA recording the lowest coverage in the world. In Sub- Sahara Africa, an estimate of 585 million people lack access to proper sanitation and sanitation services (JMP, 2010). Sanitation coverage in 35 countries is less than 50% (JMP, 2010). While sanitation coverage increased from 28% in 1990 to 31% in 2008, the number of people without access to latrines and toilets in Sub-Saharan Africa has increased by 194 million in the same time period (JMP, 2010).

Open defecation is still very prevalent, despite past and present efforts to reduce the practice. 23% of the population in SSA practice open defecation in 2015 (W.H.O and UNICEF, 2015). According to WHO and UNICEF report in 2017, one billion of the world population practice open defecation and 82% of this population are in 10 countries, among them were 5 African countries. Waste management in urban centres in most African cities are taking monstrous dimensions with “Garbage Mountains” a common sight in most city centres. Rapid urbanization has led to the growth of slums posing huge challenge to city authorities to manage. In 2012, a UN-Habitat report estimated that 863 million urban residents in developing world live in slum conditions. Slum dwellers normally receive little attention from city authorities in the provision of sanitation services due to their informal structures, congestion and illegal status. These groups are somewhat marginalised in designing sanitation approach and strategies within the cities. There is however the need for a more elaborate and holistic approach in environmental sanitation management to include these marginalised groups to improve the sanitation situation in African cities. City authorities need to establish links and relationships among the various informal groups within the so call illegal settlements to work for better management of sanitation conditions in the cities.

2.1.4 Ghana

Ghana’s progress in achieving Environmental Sanitation goals (e.g. ESP, MDGs, and SDGs) is mixed. The water sector of Ghana recorded a remarkable improvement in terms of meeting the MDG water target (UNICEF, 2015b). Whilst the percentage of people with access to improved sanitation recorded a marginal improvement (NDPC, 2014), most sanitation targets including the MDG in sanitation have been missed with wide margins

(UNICEF, 2015b). According to WHO data in 2015, only 15% of Ghana’s population have access to improved sanitation, with a national rate of open defecation among urban and rural population at 19% and 34% respectively. It is estimated that every fifth Ghanaian or 5 million people defecate in the open. The JMP report 2015 described the challenge to access improved sanitation in Ghana as “starker”. The report also ranked Ghana among the worst performing countries as the seventh worst on the sanitation index globally only ahead of Sierra Leone 13 per cent; Chad, Madagascar and Togo, 12 per cent; Niger, 11 per cent; and South Sudan, 7 per cent coverage (UNICEF, 2015b).

Waste disposal constitutes one of the major environmental sanitation challenges to city authorities in Ghana. Thousands of tonnes of solid waste are generated daily, most of which are dumped at disposal sites, some ending up in drains exacerbating other environmental threats such as flooding (EuroupeAid, 2012). People in most communities use primary drains and water bodies as a waste receptacle3. The increasing solid waste generation and management problems are being driven by the increasing urban population and urban sprawling of new suburbs. The problem is compounded by low capacity of the MMDAs and the private sector to collect the total waste generated daily.

In Ghana, poor hygiene results in frequent outbreaks of sanitation related sickness such as cholera, diarrhoea and malaria accounting for the death of over 7,500 children annually (UNICEF, 2015). This situation is most alarming since improved sanitation is essential for health and well-being as well as healthy economic development (Sijbesma et al., 2008; Bartram et al., 2005). ES in Ghana is a conundrum yet to be grasped by state and local authorities. In summary, the pressures and drivers of inappropriate waste management arise from inappropriate waste handling practices, increasing volumes of waste generation due to population pressures, lack of financial commitment and weak enforcement of sanitation by-laws, rules and regulation (EuroupeAid, 2012).

3 Ghanaweb.com (2017) Ghana is not making significant progress in sanitation-Robert Coleman [Online]. Available at: https://www.ghanaweb.com/GhanaHomePage/economy/Ghana-is-not-making-significant- progress-in-sanitation-Robert-Coleman-521671. [Accessed June 14, 2017] 40

2.1.5 Global Institutional Framework for Managing Environmental Sanitation

Global efforts to solve the earths increasing environmental problem found a common voice in the twilight of the 20th century. The institutionalization of Environmental problems started taking shape in the 1972 when the United Nations (UN) convened its first environmental conference on Human Environment in Stockholm which is known as “The Stockholm Conference”. The aim of the conference was to establish an international framework that should promote environmental problems and sustainably in a more coordinated way (Baylis et al., 2017). The fall out of the conference was a declaration containing principles, Action Plan and recommendations spanning six broad areas (Human settlements, natural resource management, pollution, educational and social aspect of the environment, development of the environment and international organizations) and resolution on various institutional and financial arrangements (Baylis et al., 2017). Stockholm marked the beginning for an international framework for environmental law and policy.

Decades after the first global conference on the environment, challenges confronting the environment persist in worst dimensions. The UN in its determination to strengthen the institutions that safeguard the environment established a special commission on the environment known as World Commission on Environment and Development (WCED) which later became “The Brundtland Commission” in 1987. The commission’s main aim was to identify, raise awareness and suggest solutions to problems of environmental sustainability in any part of the world at any point in time. The Brundtland Commission report “Our Common Future” within which the theme of Sustainable Development was established (Muneer, 2016) forms a strong basis for managing environmental challenges including sanitation. Five years after the Brundtland Commission’s report, the world reconvened in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil at the behest of the UN to hold the UN Conference on Environment and Development – UNCED also known as Earth Summit. The 1992 Earth Summit sought to create an institutional framework through conventions in which the world can be rallied for action on the environment. At the end of the summit, policy documents such as the Rio Declaration on Environment and Development and Agenda 214 were produced. These documents were to be adopted by individual nations for

4 A wide-ranging blueprint for action to achieve sustainable development worldwide. 41 implementation, however not much progress was made in achieving the policy principles (Muneer, 2016).

Following the Millennium Summit of the United Nations in 2000, the UN adopted the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) to be achieved by all member state by 2015. Eight goals were set in all to achieve progress in different sectors of the world. Goal 7 was to ensure environmental sustainability; under which sub-section C sought to halve the proportion of the population without sustainable access to safe drinking water and basic sanitation by 2015. The MDG became a popular global target that formed the core of domestic environmental sanitation policies in most member countries. This target was reviewed in 2015 when progress was assessed. Subsequent global summits like the Rio+10 (United Nations Conference on Sustainable Development) in Johannesburg and Rio+20 in Rio de Janeiro in 2002 and 2012 respectively were all in an attempt to solidify the institutional framework for solving environmental challenges. The Rio+20 conferences stimulated a process to develop a new set of Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) to carry on the momentum generated by the MDGs5. After wide consultations with Civil Society Organizations (CSOs), NGOs, Corporate institutions, interested parties and the general public, the SGDs were introduced in 2015. Goal 6 of the SDG which dwells on ensuring sustainable management of water and sanitation for all, continued from where the MGD 7 ended.

This depicts the global attempts at solving environmental challenges through policy intervention at various times. Though some targets were achieved in various countries of the world, the majority of the world’s population especially in the global south still lack proper sanitation. To understand the failures in achieving sanitations goals in the global south, this thesis investigates actor’s role in the implementation process of the ESP in Ghana.

5 SDGF, (2015) From MDGs to SDGs [Online]. Available at: http://www.sdgfund.org/mdgs-sdgs [Accessed Sept. 6, 2017] 42

2.2 Public Policy Implementations

2.2.1 Implementation Research: State of the Field

Research on implementation studies is wide and broad; nevertheless this research area keeps growing because mankind is faced with new challenges of implementation daily. Despite several decades of research on public policy implementation we know surprisingly little, not only about cumulative research results, but also about several other key aspects of this research field (Saetren, 2005). Implementation studies are said to be superfluous with dwindling interest in this research field. However, some implementation scholars who believe this field is much alive disagree. According to (Bressers, 2004b), attention to implementation in policy analysis is far from superfluous in modern governance. Academics are increasingly revisiting the field of implementation e.g. (Hill and Hupe, 2002b), and are stating that it might be out of fashion, but still very much alive and relevant (Saetren, 2005) or even that it bridges the missing link between policy and governance models (Robichau and Lynn Jr, 2009). This research analyses policy implementation in Ghana, using the ESP to identify the impact of actor relations on the effectiveness of public policies.

2.2.2 Conceptualizing Policy Implementation

Until the early 1970s, little attention was given to implementation as an activity, simply because it was not considered to be problematic in a policy sense (Hargrove, 1975; Sabatier, 1986). However, as research started to show that policy goals were not being met as a result of poor implementation, and not poor policy, this began to change (Derthick, 1972; Pressman and Wildavsky, 1973; Bardach, 1977; Sabatier, 1986; Hill, 2005). Policy implementation has been defined differently by various scholars. Pressman and Wildavsky (1973) define implementation in terms of a relationship to policy as laid down in official documents (Pressman and Wildavsky, 1984, p. xxi,xxiii) According to them, policy implementation may be viewed as a process of interaction between the setting of goals and actions geared to achieve them. “Policy implementation encompasses those actions by public and private individuals (or groups) that are directed at the achievement of objectives

43 set forth in prior policy decisions” (Van Meter and Van Horn, 1975, p. 447). More concisely, O'Toole remark that; “policy implementation refers to the connection between the expression of governmental intention and actual result” (O'Toole, 1995, p. 43). Mazmanian and Sabatier (1983, p.20-21) Explicitly define implementation from the perspective of accomplishing a task:

“Implementation is the carrying out of a basic policy decision, usually incorporated in a statute but which can also take the form of important executive orders or court decisions. Ideally, that decision identifies the problem(s) to be addressed, stipulates the objective(s) to be pursued, and in a variety of ways, ‘structures’ the implementation process. The process normally runs through a number of stages beginning with passage of the basic statute, followed by the policy outputs (decisions) of the implementing agencies, the compliance of target groups with those decisions, the actual impacts—both intended and unintended— of those outputs, the perceived impacts of agency decisions, and finally, important revisions (or attempted revisions) in the basic statute”.

Policy implementation consists of a series of decisions and activities directed towards putting policy into action (Hill and Hupe, 2002b:140). Palumbo and Calista (1990, p. xiv) describe implementation as “a series of interactions and interpretations between the outputs of policy formation and the effects of organizational and inter-organizational impacts, between the latter and street-level bureaucratic behaviours, and between the latter and target group behaviours”. Palumbo and Calista (1990, p. xii) warn that it is a mistake to assume “policies will be effective” once implementation is “taken care of”. Inadequate implementation is one important issue, while understanding may be another. It is difficult to say which factors or conditions facilitate successful implementation since so much depends on the political, economic and social context (Cerna, 2013). For instance, local factors (e.g. size, institutional complexity) matter for policy responses (McLaughlin, 1987). In this vein, Payne (2008) argues that only looking for general solutions and not acknowledging the particular context can lead to incoherent implementation efforts. Therefore, no ‘one-size–fits-all’ policy exists.

Bunker (1972) expresses the view that implementation is simply the massing of ‘assent’ of those actors involved. Bardach (1977, p. 41) Explained that this involves a range of behaviour, that is, from quiet approval to active commitment:

“Whether policies, plans, decisions or programmes are to be implemented, the essential question is: How are ideas translated into effective collective action? For benefits consistent with the concept or design to be realized, those charged with carrying out the policy, and those to be affected by it, must yield some degree of assent. The requirement varies from passive but tolerant acquiescence on the part of some to scrupulous, informed and intense commitment for others who take responsibility for the guidance and execution of the plan”.

Policy implementation is generally carried out by the bureaucracy but progressively, administrative agencies are expected to implement policy in a network of governance, which includes other groups (John, 1998, p. 204). Policy implementation therefore involves various actors, organisations, procedures, and techniques, coming together to put policy into effect to achieve the policy goals (Lester and Stewart, 2000, pp. 104-105) Successful implementation implies that ‘agencies comply with the directives of the statues, agencies are held accountable for reaching specific indicators of success, goals of the statute are achieved, local goals are achieved or there is an improvement in the political climate around the programme’ (Ingram and Schneider, 1990). Local capacity and will matter for policy success; adequate resources and clear goals are important too (McLaughlin, 1987). In addition, the implementation process is characterised by a ‘multi- staged, developmental character’ (McLaughlin, 1987, p. 176).

2.2.3 Approaches to Policy Implementation Theories

Over the past forty years different schools of thought have emerged within the academic literature surrounding how best to implement policy, in particular, the complexity of implementation and the “top-down/bottom-up” methodological debate (Hill and Hupe, 2009, p. 44). This debate includes consideration of how policy makers formulate policy, and how best to implement policy given the complexity of engaging a wide range of actors, logistics, and cultural barriers and constraints in order to achieve policy objectives. These themes form the core of implementation literature.

2.2.4 Top-Down Policy Implementation

“Top-down” approaches, also called “rational control models”, see implementation as a logical sequence or chain of activities (Pressman and Wildavsky, 1973). Pressman and Wildavsky (1973) conceptualization of implementation set the tone for a wave of rational (top-down) models. These models, according to Parsons (1995), are concerned with finding solutions to the question of perfect implementation. As such, in order to prescribe advice, they identify general patterns of behaviour across policy areas (Matland, 1995). The models have much in common with Weber's ideal type of bureaucracy. Hence, they assume the presence of authoritative, centrally located personalities, whose issuances cascade down the hierarchy (Santa, 2010). To them, policies would see the light of day, as long as goals are clearly spelt out, control mechanisms are in place, and communication distortions between the principal and the agent are minimized (Sabatier, 1986). Donald Van Meter and Carl Van Horn (1975) were the first to develop a "top-down" model. To them, the type of policy to be effected, the attributes of key agencies involved, the disposition of the implementing official and the general environment are important variables in determining performance. If there is consensus among the key players and the amount of change required is minimal, policy implementation is likely to succeed. The main criticism of the top-down view is its neglect of the influence that actors within the process have on the effectiveness of implementation. That top-down view disregards the ideologies, values, beliefs and motivations of implementers (Dunsire 1990 in Pülzl et al., 2007). In response, the “bottom-up” literature focuses on human interaction among actors involved in the implementation process and those affected by the policy.

2.2.5 Bottom-Up Policy Implementation

Because of dissatisfaction and various criticisms of the top-downers, alternative conceptualizations have been proposed by implementation scholars. A diametrically opposed idea is to consider local officials responsible for policy implementation as the primary actors, rather than those at the top. The bottom-up approach rejected the idea that the central level defines policies and that implementers need to stick to these objectives neatly; rather they suggested that discretion at the stage of policy delivery was beneficial.

Studies in the bottom-up paradigm have emphasised the role of street level bureaucrats, and the importance of minimising disconnections between social problem and designed policies (Sinclair, 2001). It was argued that by beginning the analysis with these street level bureaucrats and analysing their personal circumstances and the societal structure that govern their behaviour, a better understanding of policy implementation can be obtained (DeLeon and DeLeon, 2002).

Street level bureaucrats are more equipped with local knowledge and clients’ preferences and needs since they are in direct contact with the public. According to the bottom-up approach, implementers should be considered in behavioural terms rather than as elements in lines of command (Elmore, 1979). Lipsky’s (1980) work on street-level bureaucrats is the classic example of the bottom-up approach. He argues that bureaucrats in charge of delivering services possess a great deal of discretion in their actions and behaviour, giving them a degree of power to amend or even change policies. Barrett and Fudge (1981) build on this idea and argue that actors operating a policy inevitably interpret it and modify it, hence making decisions and, therefore, policy during the implementation stage. For the bottom-up approach, effective implementation is therefore determined mainly by the knowledge and experience of people in the frontline of service delivery (Parsons, 1995, p. 470)

The bottom-up perspective was criticised on several grounds. It is assumed that this perspective does not provide satisfactory solutions to the problems of public policy, as its rejection of the authority of policymakers is questionable in the light of standard democratic theory. Policy control should be exercised by actors whose power derives from their accountability to sovereign voters through their elected representatives. The authority of local service deliverers does not derive from this power base (Matland, 1995, p150). It has also been demonstrated that people with very little education and poor social background are less likely to benefit from social services compared to more educated and wealthier people. This is the case even when these social services are targeted primarily at the former category. Hence, creaming is done not only by street-level bureaucrats, but also by the self-selection of the target groups themselves (Winter, 1990, p32).

2.2.6 Synthesis of both Approaches

Both the top-down and bottom-up have come under various criticisms. They both failed to develop an implementation theory that is accepted by all. Because of that implementation literature has increasingly focused on combining bottom-up and top-down approaches in implementation research in order to benefit from the strengths of both approaches and enable different levels to interact regularly (Elmore, 1985; Goggin et al., 1990; Matland, 1995; Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith, 1999; O'Toole, 2000). The third generation of implementation studies encompasses “hybrid theories” that bring together elements of both top-down and bottom-up literature in search of a more comprehensive approach to the subject (Parsons, 1995). This development was engineered by eminent policy scholars like Wildavsky, Sabatier and Elmore, who modified their initial top-down or bottom-up perspectives. For example, (Elmore, 1995 in Parsons, 1995) developed the concept of “forward mapping” to complement his previous “backward mapping” analysis, where he suggests, first taking into consideration the dynamics of implementers and target groups and then moving up to policy-makers. Wildavsky and Majone (1979) Heclo (1974) Bennett and Howlett (1992) Jenkins-Smith and Sabatier (1993) all modified their understanding of implementation to learning or evolutionary process, where actors take their experience of feedback into the process and adapt it to deliver better results (Fischer, 2003; Parsons, 1995). Others equated their models with the various phases of the policy cycle. It was suggested that the "top down" approach is suitable in the planning stages but the "bottom up" perspective is more potent in later stages (Dunsire, 1978). The top- down/bottom-up debate was eventually overcome when policy scholars acknowledged the value of different theories and frameworks in bringing different perspectives to understanding the implementation process rather than validating one approach over another (Elmore, 1979; Hill and Hupe, 2002b; Wayne, 1995).

2.2.7 Policy Implementation Challenges in Developing Countries

Policy implementation has been a major problem for developing countries though developed countries are not spared in this web. The process of translating policy into outcomes, practice or specific programs has long been recognized by policy makers,

48 governments, practitioners and researchers as fraught with difficulties, hitherto affecting the intended outcomes or leading to policy failures (GIMPA, 2016). According to Edwards (1980) critical factors like communication, resources, dispositions or attitudes, and bureaucratic structure are needed in any policy implementation process to make it succeed. Therefore, regardless of the development context of the implementation, policies are bound to fail when these factors are missing (Makinde, 2005). Case studies in three developing countries (Ghana, Malawi and Botswana) on health policy implementation indicates that the major contributing factors creating gaps during policy implementation include; collaboration, discretionary power, resources, governance and service user experiences (GIMPA, 2016).

Extant literature identifies political stability which may be absent in most developing countries, as a hindering factor to effective policy implementation (Lane and Ersson, 2004). According to Lane and Ersson (2004) political elites in the developing nations often express their willingness to conduct policies, which would improve the living conditions of their populations. However, the policy ambition becomes dissipated due to the profound political instability that prevails in many developing countries. They further asserted that political instability takes many expressions, but the most debilitating among them is corruption, because corruption is common, regular and encompassing. Abdulai and Hulme (2015) argues that developing countries are often prone to policy failures due to the allocation of limited public resources on the basis of patron-client relations rather than according to rational bureaucratic norms. In their article “policy implementation in poor countries” Lane and Ersson (2004) noted that the problems connected with public policy implementation in developing countries are intertwined with basic economic and political conditions.

Makinde (2005) maintains that aside the challenge of resource constrains, lack of effective communication, poor approach to policy implementation among other factors, politicization of policy implementation has been one the major bottleneck to effective policy implementation in developing countries. He points out some of the major political challenges as ego dimension of politicians; where policy directions are changed or completely abandoned when there is a change in political power. The winning of elections is however held as more important than the sustainability of policies and the attainment of their core goals (Makinde, 2005). Also, most target groups are left out of the policy formulation and implementation process making the process less client-oriented, and out of

49 touch with the local people making ownership of the policy a difficult one (Makinde, 2005).

2.3 Public Management Theories for ESP Implementation

2.3.1 The Changing Nature of Public Administration

Public administration is described as the study of “change that seeks to contribute not only to the understanding of government in our time, but also to practical solutions of social problems” (Raadschelders, 2008, p. 3). Public administration is mainly concerned with the dominance of the ‘rule of law’; a focus on administering set rules and guidelines; a central role for the bureaucracy in policy making and implementation; the ‘politics – administration’ split within public organizations; a commitment to incremental budgeting; and the hegemony of the professional in the service delivery system (Osborne, 2006) as it dominant features. In his 1886 essay, “The Study of Administration” Woodrow Wilson draws a distinction between administration and politics. Wilson identified that there existed a dichotomy between the science of management and the tradition of politics. The dichotomy concerns the relationship between the professional administrators who are the implementers of policy and the political leaders who establish the public policy (Eagle, 2005). Public administration theory is based on rational theory – with bureaucrats seeking to maximize utility/satisfaction and principal-agent theory – wherein the best agencies are selected to provide services, which are then closely monitored to ensure the delivery achieves the desired results/outcomes (Sindane, 2004).

In recent decades, public organizations have been profoundly transformed, justified by the need to evolve and adapt to the social, economic and political contexts of our post- industrial society (Iacovino et al., 2015). Public Administration thus has gone through metamorphosis to adapt to the changing need of society. Olsen (2008) opined that, the pluralistic nature of society gives rise to different sets of criterial to measure success; therefore to understand how public organisations function, we must go beyond the idea of a single organisational principle and look at them as composite organisations. Public Administration has been widely criticized for being inefficient and ineffective, overly bureaucratic, poor orientation towards customer satisfaction and service delivery. Since the

50 late 1970s, the majority of countries have carried out reforms to modernize and improve the efficiency of their public sector. The most widespread and successful paradigm is the New Public Management (NPM), formulated by Christopher Hood in 1991. Hood (1991) in his seminal article on the ‘New Public Management’ (NPM) illuminated the concept of managerialism as applicable to Public administration. He outlined some of the key elements of the practice of the NPM that included an attention to the lessons from private sector management, a focus upon entrepreneurial leadership for public service organizations, an emphasis upon input and output control, the dis-aggregation of public services to their most basic units and a focus upon the control of their (unit) costs and the growth of the use of markets and competition as key allocative mechanism for the resources for delivering public services (Osborne, 2010).

2.3.2 New Public Management [NPM] Reforms

The new public management [NPM] is a set of reforms meant to shift the public sector management from bureaucratic to post-bureaucratic organizational arrangements (Hood, 1991). Public sector reform has been a common experience across the world despite its different forms and foci (Pollitt and Bouckaert, 2004; O'Flynn, 2007). At the end of the 20th century, a post-bureaucratic paradigm of public management was firmly embedded in many countries reflecting the outcome of the suite of reforms intended to enact a break from the traditional model of public administration underpinned by Weber’s (1946) bureaucracy, Wilson’s (1887) policy-administration divide, and Taylor’s (1911) scientific management model of work organisation (O'Flynn, 2007). The need for change to make public administration more effective, efficient and economical (Richards and Smith, 2002) resulted in the introduction of the concept of NPM.

NPM was a reaction to perceived weaknesses of the traditional bureaucratic paradigm of public administration (Stoker, 2006; O'Flynn, 2007), and it encompassed a ‘critique of monopolistic forms of service provision and an argument for a wider range of service providers and a more market-oriented approach to management’(Stoker, 2006; O'Flynn, 2007). Essentially NPM is a set of broadly similar administrative doctrines which dominated the bureaucratic reform agenda in many of the OECD group of countries from the late 1970s (Aucoin, 1990; Hood, 1991; Pollitt, 1990); for others, it is a body of

51 managerial thought (Ferlie, 1996), or an ideological thought system based on ideas generated in the private sector and imported into the public sector (Hood, 1991).

The impact of NPM on policy implementation and basic service delivery has generated a lot of debates which point to the fact that little has been achieved so far. In spite of the high praise accorded NPM reforms, critics maintain that the process has produced some unpleasant consequences and therefore could not be considered a panacea for the problems of the African public sector (Larbi, 2006). Since one of the cardinal principles of NPM is performance and accountability which emphasizes outputs and outcomes instead of inputs, then it is assumed that the introduction of NPM in the Ghanaian public administration, should improve public services like sanitation. The next section discusses the impact of NPM on policy implementation.

2.3.3 NPM Attempt at Solving Policy Implementation Problems

The NPM reform programme is aimed at solving the implementation problems diagnosed by the classical implementation theories (Ansell et al., 2017). The process of implementing public policy has changed since the advent of NPM, especially in domestic areas such as development polices like sanitation. Implementation in many cases involves a collaborative effort of public, private and non-profit organizations in a complex web that minimizes the use of direct service delivery methods by public or governmental entities (Rabe et al., 1989; Kettl, 1993; Salamon and Lund, 1989; Blair, 2000). These collaborations and partnerships not only altered the basic structure of and approach to implementation; they created new and complicated delivery mechanisms consisting of inter-sectoral networks often managed by public administrators (Blair, 2000).

While the specific mechanisms of the NPM approach often seems to be only briefly discussed by researchers and commentators, a review of the literature reveals that practitioners of NPM appear to employ a wide-range of administrative processes that blend public and private resources and processes in the implementation of public policy, including public-private cooperative arrangements and networks, strategic planning and management techniques, outsourcing and privatization of public services, and non-profit service delivery organizations (Nagel, 1997; Peters and Pierre, 1998; Blair, 2000).

Although contracting-out public service delivery to the private sector and not-for profit providers in various sectors of public administration is prevalent, policy implementation is still patchy with mixed results due to regulatory capacity constraints and more importantly lack of collaboration and network among various actors (Batley and Mcloughlin, 2009). NPM’s focus on actors and their relations within such collaborative process is minimal making it difficult to identify relational challenges that have the potential of stalling the process. The ensuing sections will discuss the NPM principles of Public Private Partnership, decentralization, community/public participation and their relational perspectives in public policy implementation.

2.3.4 Public Private Partnership as NPM Principle

Public Private Partnership is one of the cardinal principles employed by NPM that emphasises on partnership between government and the private sector for efficient delivery of public goods and services. While each partnership is a function of its particular historical, social, political and economic contexts, several events during the 1990s and 2000s spurred the emergence of PPPs for development at the global and national levels (Morard, 2012). The 1990s saw the establishment of PPPs as a key public-policy tool at the national level across the world (Osborne, 2000). More precisely, policy makers increasingly considered them as cost-efficient mechanism for policy implementation and for developing better integrated social communities (Osborne, 2000). However, also at the global level, international organisations such as the United Nations (UN) started to strongly advocate closer cooperation between states and other sectors in order to achieve more sustainable development (Scott, 2007).

PPP over the years continued to receive approval from different quarters with nations and organisations affirming their trust in the principle. The forum for the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) explicitly called for multi-stakeholder partnership to define and implement poverty-reduction policies (Andonova, 2006). Public-Private-Partnerships, it is believed will ensure that government maintains some control while reaping the ideals of private sector management practices (Bovaird and Tizard, 2009). Heymans and Schur (1999, p. 608) defined PPPs as “a contractual relationship between the government and a private sector operator to share and divide responsibilities and risks in delivering a service

53 or developing infrastructure”. The concept of PPP is to draw on the rich managerial expertise of the private sector which is perceived to be lacking in public bureaucracies. Hitherto, public agencies often ‘minded their business’, concentrating on accomplishing their targets while ignoring others who pursued their businesses as well (Bovaird and Tizard, 2009). However, this trend has changed and government agencies are increasingly turning to the other actors for service provision (Klijn, 2008).

The reasons may include the increasing demand for public services coupled with an increased demand for effectiveness in the delivery of these services (Weihe, 2008) which has thrown up the challenge for public sector agencies to strike relations with other stakeholders to push the agenda for development. The extension of the market mechanisms of the New Public Management (NPM) to private sector involvement in waste collection services is still an emerging issue, especially in developing countries (Oduro-Kwarteng, 2011). The next section discusses the relational perspective of PPP.

2.3.5 Public-Private-Partnerships: Relational Perspectives

PPP has different forms, types and definitions depending on the focus; however, the definition that closely aligns to stakeholders’ involvement in PPP projects was shared by Klijn and Teisman (2003, p. 137) who describe PPPs as a “cooperation between public and private actors with a durable character in which actors develop mutual products and/ or services and in which risks, costs and benefits are shared”. Public-private collaborations are largely designed, managed, and ran by professionals from both sectors, yet the role of individuals and how they may influence processes and actions has been largely ignored in extant studies (Schillebeeckx et al., 2016). Also, the literature focuses on contractual relationships between the private sector and their partners in government, overlooking other actors in the service delivery framework. (De Bettignies and Ross, 2009; Savas and Savas, 2000; Hodge and Greve, 2005; Nederhand and Klijn, 2016; Ahmed and Ali, 2006).

According to Kolzow (1994), PPP is far more than occasional meetings between the city council and local business organisations; - rather, partnerships are shared commitments to pursue common goals. Again, partnership must go beyond the bilateral relations between the public and the private sector to include active public participation and interaction with

54 the wider actor network. The argument for wider stakeholder involvement in PPP contracts is that it eliminates the top-down decision making process that is likely to create poor policy problem definition and solutions (Fischer, 2003). The inclusion of wider network of actors in the PPP process, especially the one like environmental sanitation that is considered as a wicked problem, will benefit from valuable perspectives on the problem; local knowledge and information, rich ideas and more credible solutions that would otherwise not have been present. This may also improve the democratic quality of the process (Nederhand and Klijn, 2016). Building trust relationships with actors within the project environment further consolidates the process and reduces the risk of failure. Warsen and Koppenjan (2017) in explaining PPP performances and what makes good PPP projects works came to the conclusion that, the quality of relationship between actors produces better PPP outcomes than the quality of the contract itself. The fact that PPPs are part of a larger network where various stakeholders are involved is often neglected in PPP literature (Skelcher, 2005). Also, research on PPPs in environmental sanitation has largely centred on contractual issues with little focus on operational issues like institutional and social relations (Oduro-Kwarteng, 2011; Awortwi, 2004; Ayee and Crook, 2003). For this purpose, the study advances the debate to include such grey areas like actor relations within the PPP discourse, thereby filling the existing gaps in literature.

2.3.6 Decentralization as NPM Principle

Decentralization is defined by World Bank (2014), as the transfer of authority and responsibilities for public functions, from central governments to regional governments or quasi-independent government organizations and/or the private sector for greater efficiency. The literature is unanimous about the importance of decentralization (van Dijk, 2007). This is because decentralization affects every policy decision from maintaining macroeconomic stability to the effectiveness and efficiency of the delivery of basic services (Seddon and Litwack, 1999). Decentralisation is a term used globally as a key theme to promote public services, and political and economic development (Heywood, 2002). Decentralisation has been introduced to achieve outcomes that include enhanced popular participation and improved economic and social interactions.

It is often suggested that bureaucrats at local government can deliver better services to the people and that administrative functions and responsibilities can be performed more

55 effectively at the local level (Heywood, 2002). The argument that decentralization improves resource allocation, accountability, and cost recovery relies heavily on the assumption that subnational governments are equipped with better information than the central government about the needs and preferences of the local population (Azfar et al., 1999). Through the instrumentality of the International Monetary Fund and the Wold Bank’s structural adjustment programs, the neoliberal orthodoxy was spread throughout the world (Harvey, 2005). The provision of public services was decentralized in different ways and degrees across the Global South (Krol, 2015). The widely held belief was that decentralization and commodification of public services would reduce the fiscal burden of deeply indebted states by allocating resources more efficiently to regional and local needs (Crawford and Hartmann, 2008). Neoliberal thinkers have seen decentralisation as a means of moving power away from ineffective, over bloated, and often corrupt central states who are responsible for market failures to sub-national governments where the transaction costs are lower and public service delivery can be better targeted (Manor, 1999; Bardhan, 2002). Also, decentralisation provides the platform for greater participation at the local level.

Despite its array of supporters drawn from international, national and sub-national front, it is widely acknowledged, even among its body of proponents, that decentralization is not a panacea which will address all the ills of the highly centralized, hierarchical public sector bureaucracies (Rees and Hossain, 2013). The debate over whether the introduction of decentralisation in developing nations enhanced the delivery of basic social services such as sanitation over the years is much alive in both literature and in public discourse. The role of actors and their relations in the decentralisation process will be examined in the next section.

2.3.7 Decentralization: Relational Perspective

Proponents of decentralization argue that decentralisation brings governance closer to the people than any other level of government, leads to greater participation of local actors and might be able to identify the needs and preferences of communities better (Faguet, 2011; Robinson, 2007; Heywood, 2002). Many governments across the developing world are engaged in ambitious efforts to devolve power and resources to local bodies which are

56 increasingly assuming responsibility for managing the delivery of sanitation, health, education and other essential services to poor people (Robinson, 2007).

Decentralisation is also said to lead to improvement in the efficiency and appropriateness of public services, better governance, and an empowered local citizenry who get to actively participate in the development process by articulating local priorities better and ensuring that programmes are appropriate to local needs. Nevertheless, public service delivery in developing countries remains poor despite this ambitious effort at decentralization. Hossain and Helao (2008) noted that despite the rhetoric about participation and local autonomy, most central governments in developing countries have been protective of their powers. Judging from the poor results from public service delivery in most developing countries, it is quite clear that benefits of decentralization may not be automatically harnessed without a trigger. According to OECD (1999), partner relationships between authorities and local actors involved in economic and social development are required to complete the process successfully and improve local governance. The inefficiencies and lack of effectiveness in public service delivery within decentralized arrangement has been investigated at various fronts. However, contrary to much of the current empirical research on public sector decentralization reforms, it dwells little on relations between various actors in decentralized decision making, linkages for cooperation between actors at different levels of decision making and the role of communication in shaping such linkages (Andersson, 2004). Smoke (2003) identified the lack of coordination between governance actors at different levels of authority as ‘‘one of the greatest deficiencies in most decentralization efforts’’ (p.13). How actors relate in provision of public services like environmental sanitation has much impact on overall service delivery. The realization that cooperative arrangements and relationships between complementary governance actors are essential, but are not likely to emerge automatically, raises the question as to what set of conditions are associated with successful cooperation between actors within the decentralised space (Andersson, 2004). According to recent study by Bawole and Hossain (2015), the relations between local government and non-state actors like NGOs in the implementation of poverty reduction programmes are varied, complex, and multidimensional. This study takes a step further to investigate actors’ relations within the decentralised space to reveal their impact on public service delivery in the provision of environmental sanitation services.

2.3.8 Participation

A simple definition adopted from Stoker (1997) defines participation as members of the public taking part in any of the processes of formulation, passage and implementation of public policies. Wenger (1999) defines participation as the process of taking part and also to the relations with others that reflect this process. He further added that this entails both action and connection. To achieve participation, there must be a relationship among a group of people with the aim of achieving a particular objective. There can be relationship among a group of people but if these relationships are not directed towards achieving a common goal, then participation cannot be said to exist. Public participation is based on the presumptions that those who are affected by a decision are entitled to be involved in decision-making process (André and Enserink, 2006). Public participation is therefore considered as a process by which an organization consults with stakeholders, i.e. interested or affected individuals, organizations and government entities before making a decision.

Public participation is, by principle, promoting two-way communication and collaborative problem solving with the goal of achieving better and more acceptable decisions (ibid). A participatory decision-making process brings together people with a diverse set of interests in an open, authentic discussion of possible solutions in order to arrive at a mutually beneficial solution (Hajer and Wagenaar, 2003). In practice there are many levels of participation from attending meetings, providing information to surveys, or taking an active role in debates and decision-making (McConville, 2010). Participation is often linked to discussions of empowerment and ownership, since taking part in society is often seen as having a voice. Arnstein (1969) noted that citizen participation is a categorical term for power, although she also recognizes that there are varying degrees of participation, and hence of power. Thus, power is an intrinsic part of participation, as the degree to which a person participates in a process affects how much control that person has over what happens. Among the various reasons adduced in literature for participation, Rittel and Webber (1973) assert that, participation promotes civil society building and creating an adaptive, self-organizing polity capable of addressing wicked problems in an informed and effective way. While these reasons are used to justify and argue for the benefits of participation by development partners, experts and the academia, there is however very little evidence that supports these claims. There is also an increasing disillusionment among project and programme managers who feel let down when these claims are not

58 realised (Reed, 2008). The following sub-sections further explore the role of actors in community participation.

2.3.9 Community/Public Participation and Actors’ Relations

The call for greater public participation in public policy implementation is rife. Environmental sanitation has been one such area where international organizations, civil society organisations, policy documents, academic documents and publications have strongly advocated for public involvement in formulation and implementation of policies. Community participation proves to be a key factor underpinning the sustainable delivery of social services, globally (Manase et al., 2004). Participation as a concept became popular as a result of is increased advocacy by development agents both locally and internationally to end of the top-down strategies to development action, in favour of greater inclusion of the subjects of the development programs. The sanitation sector in general has embraced the principle that households and communities are central role-players in planning and provision of sanitation services (DWAFT, 2001).

Literature within the sanitation discourse indicates that involvement of community in designing, implementing and management of sanitation projects helps to sustain sanitation coverage for urban poor communities (Manase et al., 2004). It is also clear that there is broad consensus that community involvement will provide an effective answer for the provision of basic sanitation at the local level (Supply and COUNCIL, 2001). The Dublin principles advise that stakeholder involvement is essential to the sustainability of services and the Demand Responsive Approach (DRA) principles also advocate that management should be focused at the lowest appropriate level (Wright and Mundial, 1997). Current development approaches that are recommended in the sanitation sector recognise the needs of the community and the vulnerable poor, and the importance of their participation in decision-making and the implementation of development policies (Manase et al., 2004).

However, participatory approaches if not practiced well can create mistrust between the implementing organisation and the local people. This may undermine future attempt for local engagement and any subsequent proposals for involvement are likely to be greeted

59 with cynicism and suspicion 6. Some scholars believe the concept of participation has become a window dressing of a sort. It is argued that participation has been implemented in most community projects just to fulfil all righteousness without the desired impact. According to Addae-Boahene (2007), there are several factors which impact the nature and quality of community participation in service delivery. These he outlined as participation style, relationship, information sharing and interaction. Relationships are important in achieving effective participation. Lack of cordiality among actors can negatively impact community projects/programs. Therefore ensuring positive relationship with all stakeholders during project planning and implementation is very crucial (Mansuri and Rao, 2004). This thesis therefore seeks to examine actors’ relations in participation and how it affects the implementation of ESP at the local level in Ghana.

2.4 Integrated Public Management

2.4.1 A New Paradigm for Public Management: Emerging Approach

Traditional theories and Public Administration came under increasing fire and severe criticism from academics (Ostrom and Ostrom, 1971; Dunleavy, 1985) and from the political elite (Mischra, 1984). Osborne and Gaebler (1993) criticised Public administration for being inefficient and ineffective in allocating public resources. Chandler (1991) describes PA as a discipline entering in to a terminal decline, while Rhodes (1997) asserts that it has become a ‘bystander’ to the practice of Public Administration and Management [PAM]. These criticisms and increasing discontent about PA among scholars of the field and political elites inter alia culminated in to a new paradigm called the New Public Management (NPM). The NPM asserted the superiority of private-sector managerial techniques over those of PA and with the assumption that the application of such techniques to public services would automatically lead to improvements in the efficiency and effectiveness of these services (Thatcher, 1995). However, the debate regarding the impact of the NPM paradigm upon PAM, and indeed about whether it is a paradigm at all (Gow and Dufour, 2000), has become more contested (Osborne, 2006). Soon, the NPM

6 Involve.org.uk (2005). People and Participation. [Online]. Available at: http://www.involve.org.uk/wp- content/uploads/2011/03/People-and-Participation.pdf [Accessed: June 29, 2017] 60 also came on the chopping board and has been criticized for several reasons: most critically for its intra-governmental focus in an increasingly plural world and for its adherence to the application of outdated private sector techniques to PAM, and in the face of evidence about their inapplicability (Metcalfe and Richards, 1991) while Hood and Jackson (1991) concluded that the NPM was a ‘disaster waiting to happen’.

The criticism of both PA and NPM paradigms has gradually developed in to a theoretical approach to Public Administration and Management [PAM] that advocates for a more integrated system of governance that moves beyond the sterile dichotomy of administration and management. This has led to some transformations in PA in recent years. Goodsell (2006) in synthesizing the various ways PA is viewed by different observers within the practice of PAM noted that, the official hierarchies of government have become less important as some public responsibilities have been devolved to local jurisdictions on one hand and to international bodies on the other. He further opined that, the new institution taking over governance is the self-organizing networks. This he opined are loose collections of private, public, and voluntary organizations that have common policy interests, exchange specialized information, and negotiate shared purposes. As Kettl (2002) rightly puts it, public policies are now massively implemented by business corporations and non-profit organizations, blurring the distinctions between public and private. At the extreme, these developments eschew intentional public action in favour of spontaneous outcomes of complex interaction generated by multiple societal forces (Kooiman, 2003). The movement in Public Management towards Integrated Public Governance and the anticipated increase in the delivery of government services by private and third sector organizations point to the need for collaborative community engagement (Kernaghan, 2009).

In the face of the conceptual and practical challenges encountered with the NPM approaches to policy implementations and delivery of public services, a number of theorists have developed fresh conceptualizations of public management that depart from earlier schema (Robinson, 2015) emphasizing governance approach to public management. These emerging approaches with emphasis on citizen’s role, networks, collaborative and relationships are discussed in the ensuing sections.

2.4.2 Governance

Governance refers to the role of citizens in the policy process and how groups within a society organize to make and implement decisions on matters of great concern (Brinkerhoff, 1999). Kickert (1993) and (Rhodes, 1997) define governance as the machinery of ‘self-organizing inter-organizational networks’ that function both with and without government to provide public services. The emphasis on governance stresses the role of citizens, both individually and organized in various forms of association, in the policy process; from issue identification, to formation, implementation, feedback and evaluation of results. In other words, governance refers to the interactions and partnerships among a range of actors – central and local governments, the private sector, NGOs, and community organisations – for decision-making (Yousif and Scott, 2007).

2.4.3 New Public Governance

The New Public Governance (NPG) approach as proposed by Osborn (2006, 2010) deviates from the two earlier traditions of PA and NPM. NPG calls for an approach that is grounded on citizenship and public interest rather than aggregation of individual interests determined by elected officials and market mechanism (Bourgon, 2007). The NPG places citizens rather than government at the core of it activities. Osborne (2010) argues that public service delivery has become complex in recent times and difficult to understand either by the policy and administrative focus of public administration or by the intra- organizational and managerial focus of public management. He noted that while these imperatives continue to be important, they are now subsumed within a pluralist environment where the delivery of public services requires the negotiation of complex inter-organizational relationships and multi-actor policymaking processes. Public Governance; however, looks beyond the internal processes in policy making and implementation to include entities outside like the community, social networks, civil societies, economic and private actors within the policy area which makes the approach more integrated. Most importantly, it focuses on relationships of various actors and how these relationships are managed for effective co-production of public services. The NPG approach emphasizes inter-organizational relationships and the governance of processes, in

62 which trust, relational capital and relational contracts serve as the core governance mechanisms, rather than organizational form and function (Osborne, 2006).

2.4.4 Relational Governance

Relational governance refers to “interfirm exchanges which include significant relationship-specific assets, combined with a high level of inter-organizational trust”, and “is embodied in both the structure and the process of an inter-organizational relationship” (Zaheer and Venkatraman, 1995: p. 374). Thus, relational governance represents the management of inter-organizational activities with relational mechanisms (Gundlach et al., 1995; Heide, 1994). In the organizational context, Heide (1994) makes a distinction between three forms of inter-organizational governance: market (contract-based), unilateral (authority-based), and bilateral (relationship-based), which rely on price mechanisms, bureaucratic structures, and socialization processes, respectively, to manage inter- organizational activities. Olander et al. (2010) note that relational contracting has been used to describe mechanisms that utilize non-legal sanctions that result in decreased opportunism along with improved effectiveness. Poppo and Zenger (2002) explain that relational governance basically hinges on trust, cooperation or cooperative spirit, open communication and sharing of information, and dependence.

Relational governance stresses social interactions and joint efforts to develop and maintain long-term bilateral relationships, which primarily bases on mutual trust and commitment. From the governance perspective, the core of relational governance is to develop trust and commitment through social interactions of channel partners, reflected in joint actions such as joint planning and joint problem solving (Bensaou and Venkatraman, 1995; Heide and Miner, 1992). Compared with traditional control mechanisms (authority or contract), relational governance is more effective in reducing transaction costs and coordinating inter-organizational activities (Frazier, 2009; Claro et al., 2003). Relational governance highlights a new approach response to the challenges of NPM in public policy implementation and service delivery.

2.5 Conceptual Framework

2.5.1 Inter-Organizational Networks and Collaborative Relationships

There are many definitions of inter-organizational networks in the literature; at the foundation of virtually all lies the concept of networks consisting of the structure of relationships between actors (individuals and organizations), the nature of the links between actors, and the meaning of those relationships (Popp et al., 2014). “In very broad terms, networks are defined by the enduring exchange relations established between organizations, individuals, and groups” (Weber and Khademian, 2008, p. 334). Though the term Inter-Organizational network may not be used in some other context, the term partnerships, strategic alliances, inter-organizational relationships, coalitions, cooperative arrangements, or collaborative agreements / alliance are often used to describe inter- organizational networks (Provan et al., 2007, p. 480). Inter-organizational networks can be viewed as a way to address complex social and environmental problems by taking advantage of a broader set of resources and increased capacity. (Hoberecht et al., 2011; Keast et al., 2004; Bryson et al., 2006; Gilchrist, 2006) Often these inter-organizational networks will also be inter-sectoral, in that many of society’s most difficult public challenges require collaboration amongst government, business, non-profits, communities and/or the public as a whole (Bryson et al., 2006; Conteh, 2013).

Collaboration entails joint execution of some tasks as a team and integrating the efforts of all parties to facilitate and maintain focus and synergy (Mothae and Sindane, 2008). As O'Flynn (2009) rightly state, Collaboration, it seems, is ‘King’ in a turbulent world where governments do not have all the answers to complex challenges, and where there is some impetus to move beyond both bureaucracy and markets. A relatively straightforward definition provided by Himmelman (2002, p. 3) states that collaboration is ‘a process in which organisations exchange information, alter activities, share resources, and enhance each other’s capacity for mutual benefit and a common purpose by sharing risks, responsibilities, and rewards’. Lack of cooperation and collaboration between multiple actors involved in the implementation of public policies, has been identified as a prohibiting factor to effective public policy implementation (Muhammad, 2014).

At the heart of every collaborative process are interpersonal relations among the various actors. Effective, enabling and conducive relationships are requisite to collaboration of multiple actors in public policy implementation (Muhammad, 2014). Getha-Taylor (2008, p. 112) Identified relationship building as one of the competencies required for collaborative behaviour. Grobler et al. (2006, p. 302) Add that people relations skills represent the ability to communicate with others to establish strong interpersonal relations and to build cooperative, satisfying relationships necessary for implementers to foster common understanding and collective effort towards the accomplishment of policy objectives, thus good public governance. For these relations to succeed and to yield the expected benefits of collaboration there are certain vital elements that must be present. Among these are commitment, trust, communication and coordination.

Commitment

Many studies of collaborative relationships have concluded that commitment forms a critical component to relationship success (Plewa and Quester, 2006; Pesämaa and Franklin Hair Jr, 2007; Hoegl and Gemuenden, 2001; Casey, 2008; Rampersad et al., 2010). Morgan and Hunt (1994) who defined commitment as "an exchange partner believing that an ongoing relationship with another is so important as to warrant maximum efforts at maintaining it; that is, the committed party believes the relationship endures indefinitely," and commitment is central to all of the relational exchanges between the firm and its various partners. According to Das and Kumar (2009, p. 37), commitment is “the obligation or pledge to carry out some action or policy or to give support to some policy or person” or “the state of being obligated or bound”, whether through intellectual conviction or emotional ties. Pesämaa and Franklin Hair Jr (2007) state that it is based on the loyalty of an actor to another actor in a social unit, which leads to the formation of a relationship and requires an enduring desire and recognition of the importance of the relationship if it is to be maintained. Thus, for successful collaboration, it is essential for these relationships to comprise highly committed parties (Aas et al., 2005; Devine et al., 2011; Ramayah et al., 2011; Pesämaa and Franklin Hair Jr, 2007). Commitment entails sacrifice on the part of partners to commit resources, time and abide by specific terms governing the relationship.

Trust

Trust is described as the facilitating factor that makes cooperation possible between actors, and higher levels of trust are believed to lead to increasing network effectiveness (Popp et al., 2014). Trust decreases the transaction costs of collective action in collaboration, thus enhancing the likelihood of positive collaborative outcomes (Chen, 2008). Trusting relationships are often depicted as the essence of collaboration (Lee et al., 2012). Trust can comprise interpersonal behaviour, confidence in organizational competence and expected performance, and a common bond and sense of goodwill (Chen and Graddy, 2010). Many researchers realize that collaborations begin with varying degrees of trust but emphasize that trust building is an ongoing requirement for successful collaborations (Emerson et al., 2012; Nolte and Boenigk, 2011; Walker and Hills, 2012). Collaboration partners build trust by sharing resources such as information and demonstrating competency, good intentions, and follow-through; conversely, failing to follow through or serving one’s own or one’s organization’s interests over the collaboration undermines trust (Chen, 2010).

Communication

Communication is the glue that binds various elements, coordinates activities, allows people to work together and produce results (Grobler et al., 2006, p. 302). Schoonraad and Radebe (2007, p. 121) state that poor communication skills result in a poor understanding of specific needs, the nature and extent of backlogs and poor liaison. It is through communication whereby implementers establish a common ground and understanding, disseminate relevant information about the policy and implementers involved and create an opportunity to learn from each other (Muhammad, 2014). Kirchmajer and Patterson (2004, p. 3) asserted that it is impossible to have relationships without communication, because communication is the human activity that links people together and creates relationships. In particular, effective collaboration between participants requires extensive communication for brainstorming, for the sharing of project-related information and performance feedback, for reducing perceived risks and for improving credibility (Abosag et al., 2006; Graci, 2013; Devine et al., 2011).

Coordination

Coordination in a network context is defined as ”the organising of functions and flow that is activities and relationships, within a network to increase the effectiveness of the activity cycle” (Lundgren, 1992, p. 157). Inter-organizational coordination can be defined as a process in which two or more organizations design and implement plans and policies in order to achieve common goals (Kojoori, 2011). It has also been defined as the process by which partners in an inter-organizational relationship seek to work together in a joint effort (Medina-Muñoz and Garcı́a-Falcón, 2000). By doing so, duplicating and overlapping activities are avoided, agreed roles and responsibilities are coordinated with others, conflicts are settled quickly, and constructive discussions are facilitated(Thomson et al., 2008; Thomson et al., 2007). Kojoori (2011) argues that coordination between organizations emphasizes cooperation and assistance with respect to the codification and/or management of plans in order to achieve common goals and purposes. Meanwhile, a lack of appropriate coordination can lead to ineffective communication channels and non-value- adding activities, resulting in a decrease in performance and an increase in coordination costs (Kim, 2001).

2.5.2 New Institutional Economics Theory [NIE]

This thesis adopts the New Institutional Economic approach as a theoretical lens to study the interactions of actors and the kind of relationship that exist between them, issues affecting such relationships and the impact of these relations on environmental sanitation. Oliver Williamson coined the phrase the “New Institutional Economics” (Coase, 2000) but it is commonly known that the New Institutional Economics emerged with Coase’s 1937 article “The Nature of the Firm”. This article and his other famous essay “The Problem of Social Cost” (1960) started what many, including North (2000), considered to be a revolution in economics. NIE considers that the cost of transacting determined by institutions and institutional arrangements is the key to economic performance. It argued that the institutions of a country such as its legal, political, and social systems – determine its economic performance, and it is this, according to Coase (2000), that gives the new institutional economics its importance for economists. Khan (2010) explains that the contribution of the new institutional economics (NIE) was to highlight that, institutions

67 mattered because rules were essential to make social interaction possible. He further added that the facilitating role of institutions was often described in terms of transaction costs, the argument being that in the absence of rules, the costs of organizing particular types of interaction may be so high that coordination and cooperation may be precluded. NIE assumes that economic processes are embedded within social and political process. Unlike the “old” institutional economics, the NIE does not reject the neo-classical economic theory in its entirety but disagrees on some basic assumptions of their thoughts. Whiles neo-classical economics assumes unbounded rationality, positing that there is a complete or near complete of information which allows agents to act in a rational manner, NIE takes a relatively different view that information is inadequate and rationality is bounded by time and information. North (1993:1) noted that…

“We have incomplete information and limited mental capacity by which to process information….. in such a world ideas and ideologies play a major role in choices and transaction result in imperfect market”

NIE has criticized neoclassical economics for failing to appreciate the extent to which formal and informal institutions shape and constrain available opportunities, and for not recognizing that people make decisions with limited information through mental constructs that can be faulty (North, 1990, p. 3-10). NIE seeks to explain how formal and informal institutions can mitigate transaction costs by reducing uncertainty. This they posit will establish a more stable structure that will facilitate interactions, thus enhancing efficiency. According to Klein (1998), to organize the various strands of the NIE, it is useful to begin with Davis and North’s (1971) distinction between the ‘institutional environment’ and ‘institutional arrangements’. The former refers to the background constraints, or ‘rules of the game’, that guide individuals’ behaviour. These can be both formal, explicit rules (constitutions, laws, property rights) and informal, often implicit rules (social conventions, norms). While these background rules are the product of - and can be explained in terms of - the goals, beliefs and choices of individual actors, the social result (the rule itself) is typically not known or ‘designed’ by anyone. Institutional arrangements, by contrast, are specific guidelines - what Williamson (1985a) calls ‘governance structures’ - designed by trading partners to mediate particular economic relationships. Business firms, long-term contracts, public bureaucracies, non-profit organizations and other contractual agreements are examples of institutional arrangements (ibid). 68

The purpose of the NIE is both to explain the determinants of institutions and their evolution over time, and to evaluate their impact on economic performance, efficiency, and distribution (Nabli and Nugent, 1989). The theory aspires to explain why and how institutions emerge, function and evolve (Williamson, 2008; Joskow, 2008). In addition, NIE seeks to expand the static conventional economic theory into a dynamic one by including the dimension of time and creating modest hypotheses about economic change to enhance the utility of social theory to address human problems (North, 2005). Simultaneously, the theory is concerned with explaining how to improve economic performance, and hence welfare, by comprehending human incentives, preferences, perceptions, beliefs and learning (North, 2004). The theoretical core of NIE starts from the premise that because transaction costs are positive, information is costly and incomplete, and contracts and property rights are imperfectly defined and enforced. Under such circumstances, the institutional framework is a crucial determinant of economic performance (Ménard and Shirley, 2014). Thus, organisations act in the middle of a complex web of written and unwritten contracts and norms that create the incentive structure for strategic choices (Lamberg et al., 2002).

In their recent review Ménard and Shirley (2014) state that NIE has three key concepts – transaction costs, property rights, and contracts – which became known as the ‘golden triangle of NIE. They agree these three are not the only concepts developed by new institutionalists over the years, but they encapsulate the central core of NIE and make its paradigm so distinctive. In view of this, this thesis adopts the transaction cost concept to explain inter-organizational networks and relations in ESP implementation to establish the role of relations in mediating cost of organising and implementing ESP.

2.5.3 Transaction Costs Economics [TCE] Theory

The definition of transaction cost has been a contentious among scholars over the years. Ménard and Shirley (2014) in their recent review explained that the concept originate in Coase’s 1937 paper ‘The Nature of the Firm,’ when he asked, why are there firms? Why doesn’t all exchange take place in the market? His answer was that there are costs to transacting in the market: a would-be trader must find someone with whom to trade, get information on price and quality, strike a bargain, draw up a contract, and monitor and

69 enforce the contract. However, this may not constitute a definition enough to explain the concept. Scholars over the years questioned Coase’s reasoning over the concept and further criticised his position as a mere description of the term with no definitional meaning to it. There is however an on-going debate in literature on the definition and the meaning of transaction costs (Hodgson, 2014; Allen, 2015; Usher, 1998; Halpin, 2007; Fischer, 1977; Klaes, 2000b; Klaes, 2000a).

Williamson (1985a, p. 1) defines a transaction as occurring ‘when a good or service is transferred across a technologically separable interface’. According to Hodgson (2014) this suggests that transaction costs emerge through the physical transfer of goods or services. He went on to contrast this position with Commons (1924, 1934) and criticised Williamson for omitting some vital elements like agreed, legal, contractual obligations or transfers of legal rights. Allen (2015) in a simple definition stated that: ‘transaction costs are the costs of establishing and maintaining economic property rights’. This has come to add to the growing literature on the definition of the term, but this definitional controversy may rage on for years to come. This controversy however, does not necessarily take anything away from the concept. It only goes a long way to strengthen its conceptual and theoretical basis. This thesis defines transaction cost as the cost associated with formulating policies (formal), instituting values, norms or cultures (Informal) and implementing or enforcing them. Policies (formal), cultures, values and norms (informal) are made to govern a set of activities and behaviours in society. This study tends to align more with Matthews (1986)’s definition that put it succinctly as the costs of arranging a ‘contract’ ex ante and monitoring and enforcing it ex post.

Institutions are put in place to bring about order and stability. Whether policies, cultures, norms and values are formulated, instituted, implemented and enforced or not, there is a cost associated with them. In the absence of institutions the cost of organising society is high, but effective institutions both formal and informal lower such costs. This position is supported by Ménard and Shirley (2005)’s assertion that, “to reduce risk and transaction costs humans create institutions, writing and enforcing constitutions, laws, contracts and regulations so-called formal institutions and structuring and inculcating norms of conduct, beliefs and habits of thought and behaviour or informal institutions.” Indeed, transaction cost as a result of Institutions determines the kind of interactions and relationships that may exist between actors within a particular institutional arrangement.

2.5.4 Behavioural Assumption of TCE: Bounded Rationality vs Bounded Reliability

(i) Bounded Rationality

Williamson (1981) introduced within TCE two behavioural assumptions to introduce some aspects of human behaviour into the economic discussion of organisations. These behavioural assumptions postulate that human agents are subject to bounded rationality and that at least some agents are given to opportunism (Weber and Meyer, 2010). Bounded rationality refers to economic actors’ behaviour that is “intendedly rational, but only limitedly so” (Simon and Behavior, 1961, p. xxiv). In other words, human actors have a limited capacity to process information, address complexity, and make optimal choices. In the presence of bounded rationality, all contracts are necessarily incomplete. In Williamson’s view, human agents who populate firms and markets also have an inherent proclivity toward opportunism, which manifests itself in “calculated efforts to mislead, distort, disguise, obfuscate or otherwise confuse”(Williamson, 1985b). Williamson (1981) defined Opportunism as “self-interest seeking with guile”. He opined that governance structures should therefore be designed so as to economize on bounded rationality and safeguard against economic actors’ potential opportunistic behaviour.

These assumptions and their definitions however, have been the subject of heated debate in literature over the years. The concept of opportunism in particular has been the subject of controversy among scholars (Conner and Prahalad, 1996; Ghoshal, 2005; Hodgson, 2004; Ghoshal and Moran, 1996). It has been criticised for having a narrow conceptual focus and one lacking ample empirical support and its inaccurate portrayal of human nature (Tsang, 2006). Chandler and Salsbury (2000) argue that, opportunism cannot fully describe the behaviour of economic actors. He further asserted that the problem with relying on opportunism as a predictive indicator of firm behaviour is that, it is vulnerable to commitment breakdowns due to the presence of behaviours that are motivated by forces other than opportunism. Scholars, until recently, rejected and ignored the assumption instead of addressing its deficiencies (see Conner and Prahalad, 1996; Ghoshal and Moran, 1996). However a more recent study by Verbeke and Greidanus (2009) revived the concept of bounded reliability as a way to advance TCE-based thinking.

(ii) Bounded Reliability

Bounded reliability can be defined as an imperfect effort to make good on open-ended commitments, either because of opportunism or because of two other reasons that is benevolent preference reversal and identity-based discordance (Verbeke and Kano, 2010). First, benevolent preference reversal, which often occurs in a systemic fashion, with the same individuals engaging in repeated, dysfunctional preference reversals (thereby suggesting that the challenge at hand encompasses more than a mere information problem), but without guile playing a significant role. Second, identity-based discordance, which means that in spite of individuals’ stated or assumed commitments, they maintain contradictory behaviour in line with their personal identity or with past, prevailing practices they identify with (ibid). Verbeke and Greidanus (2009) contend that, bounded reliability extends the assumption of opportunism by including the many situations where parties may fail to deliver on commitments while not intentionally engaging in self-interest seeking with guile. Bounded reliability reflects the often observed reality of failed commitments caused by a variety of factors including but not limited to intentional deceit (Verbeke and Greidanus, 2009; Verbeke and Kano, 2010). According to Verbeke and Greidanus (2009), benevolent preference reversal associated with reprioritization or with scaling back on over-commitment are such expressions of bounded reliability. They explained the psychological dimension of over-commitment as a behavioural phenomenon of impulsivity and self-assessment bias. Over-commitment can also be attributed to the planning fallacy, whereby planners rely on best-case scenarios when making a commitment ex-ante (ibid). Having conceptualized the critical drivers of failed commitments captured by the bounded reliability concept, Verbeke and Greidanus (2009) identify a large number of mechanisms for economizing on the three facets of bounded reliability. In practical terms, these mechanisms they enumerated to include realistic goal setting; regular reviews of targets, cultivation of informal connections among actors, development of clear guidelines, joint strategic planning by participating parties, frequent budgetary reviews, and imposition of limits on the size and scope of new activities. Though this concept is emerging, it is yet to have a firm foothold in TCE discourse. This study argues that contextual and environmental factors other than opportunism accounts for and affects actor relations in economic transaction. Building on the framework of (Verbeke and Kano, 2010) rational reliability with the empirical study of actor’s relations,

72 this thesis expands the frontier of the concept by exploring other behavioural and environmental factors that affect TC in ESP implementation.

2.5.5 Social Capital Theory

Social capital as a theory has been invoked in numerous studies and used extensively in various fields to explain different social phenomenon. Economists, sociologists and political scientists try to define the concept of social capital from their different perspectives, sometimes culminating in confusing and conflicting definitions (Svendsen and Svendsen, 2009). Putnam (1993, p. 167) defines social capital as “features of social organizations, such as trust, norms, and networks, that can improve the efficiency of society by facilitating coordinated actions” Putnam (2000, p. 19) again asserted that social capital can be seen as “…connections among individuals – social networks and the norms of reciprocity and trustworthiness that arise from them. Putnam treated social capital as an amalgam of social norms, particularly trust (Coleman, 1990; Fukuyama, 1995), social networks (Foley and Edwards, 1999) , outcomes (Coleman, 1990) and productivity (Ostrom, 1990).

Generally speaking, the main proposition of social capital theory is that social relations are a valuable resource for individuals and groups of individuals to achieve certain benefits that would be impossible to obtain on their own, or would only be possible with an extra cost (Zuleta Ferrari, 2012). As Nahapiet (2009), maintained, Social capital can be applied across different levels of analysis: from an individual person to a group, organization, community, region or even nation. Social capital can also be taken as the accumulation of various types of social, psychological, cultural, cognitive, institutional and related assets that increase the likelihood of mutually beneficial and cooperative actions. Social capital has different shades and plays a double-sided role in the development and wellbeing of society. On one side, it represents a fertile ground for nurturing trust and shared values, which reduce monitoring costs and facilitate transactions. At the other side, networks can work in the opposite direction as well: members of the group may use their ties as a means for the pursuit of narrow interests, and organizations may lobby against the interest of other groups (Zuleta Ferrari, 2012).

2.5.6 Types of Social Capital and Benefits

Social capital generates positive externalities for members, these externalities are achieved through shared trust, norms, and values and their consequent effects on expectations and behaviour and finally, these arise from informal forms of organizations based on social networks and associations (Durlauf and Fafchamps, 2004). Putnam (2000) identified two types of social capital, (bonding and bridging social capital). Bonding social capital is derived from relationships between similar persons with respect to socio-demographic and socio-economic characteristics (Putnam, 2000; Gittell and Vidal, 1998) and occurs among homogeneous populations. Examples of bonding social capital are ethnic fraternal organizations, church-based women’s reading groups. Bridging social capital on the other hand, is derived from dissimilar or heterogeneous persons at the same level of hierarchy (Putnam, 2000; Gittell and Vidal, 1998). Examples of bridging social capital are civil rights movements; youth service groups and ecumenical religious organizations. Putnam (2000, p. 23) argues that bonding social capital is good for ‘getting by’ and bridging social capital is essential for ‘getting ahead’.

Channels of social capital refer to a stream of benefits through which it affects development. These channels according to (Grootaert and Van Bastelaer, 2002) are information sharing, collective action, and decision-making, including reduction of opportunistic behaviour. Empirical studies have shown that social capital in terms of rational economic explanation is a transaction cost saving device. Where markets do not function and government coordination does not work, private collaboration offers a high cooperation rent (ibid) and offers competitive advantage to a firm or individual (Styhre, 2008) through increase of the availability of information. Participation in local networks and attitudes of mutual trust reduce opportunistic behaviour by community members. It is noteworthy however, that in settings where certain behaviour is expected from individuals for the benefit of the group, social pressures and exclusion can induce these individuals to provide expected behaviour even when it is in conflict with a formal role (Grootaert and Van Bastelaer, 2002; Ocheje, 2001; Kugonza, 2010).

2.5.7 Negative Social Capital

The second main school has grown mainly out of the work of Bourdieu (2011, p. 51) who defines social capital as “the aggregate of the actual or potential resources which are linked to possession of a durable network of more or less institutionalised relationships of mutual acquaintance and recognition”. The focus of this conceptualisation is that social capital is a private resource at the disposal of the individuals to spend and to utilise to better their own situations. This argument points to the assumption that individuals use their social relations primarily for personal gain although the benefits may still be available to others. However, it is assumed that those who own the social capital, control access to the social structure. As Leana III and Van Buren (1999) observe, owners of social capital are the primary beneficiaries and others who have access are the secondary beneficiaries. This implies that right connections may allow certain persons (primary beneficiaries) to obtain favour in any form and able to bypass regulations binding on others (Portes, 2000).

Individual social capital in such instances consists of one‘s ability to undermine collective social capital –defined as civic spirit grounded on impartial application of the laws (Portes, 2000). In sociology, for example, (McLean, 2007), citing Putnam (2000), argues that bonding SC has the potential to exclude people who do not belong to particular social entities. Arneil (2006) notes similarly the role played by bridging SC in enabling dominant groups to protect their self-interests, while Andrist (2008) highlights the deleterious consequences of SC in general in accentuating restrictions on women and diminishing their autonomy (see also Ganapati, 2013).

According to Gabbay and Leenders (1999), when a social structure impedes and restricts action, it becomes a social liability; in addition, negative ties in the prevailing social structure can limit opportunities. They, thus caution that overinvestment in SC can result in negative returns. Although (Putnam, 1993)Putnam (1993) originally envisaged that bonding social capital among these closely knit social groups as having beneficial externalities, others have identified negative externalities of even extreme cases such as mafia‘ shadowy groups or interahamwe of Rwanda who committed genocide (Grootaert and Van Bastelaer, 2002)

Figure 4: Conceptual Framework

Source: Authors’ Construct, 2018

2.6 The Relevance and Justification of New Institutional Economics and Social Capital

The combination of NIE and SC helps explain both formal and informal relations among actors at different levels and their implications for ESP implementation. For instance, part of the NPM ideas are rooted in the NIE theory which was built on the principles of public choice, transactions cost theory and principal-agent theory. The gradual shift in PAM studies from NPM to a more integrated public management approach focuses on governance and social networks. However, conceptualising people’s interaction in terms of social capital together with institutions as a constraining factor on human behaviour to analyse relations, best project the principles of markets and governance.

Another justification for using the combination of NIE and SC is that, despite the recognition by some NIE scholars that informal institutions play a crucial role in defining societal rules (Greif, 1997; Ensminger, 1997; Denzau and North, 1994), the application of NIE to the study of micro-level issues relevant to policy implementation like inter- organizational relations has largely focused on formal institutions. Though the NIE recognises the importance of social capital in it analysis of institutions, it was however criticised as crudely functionalist because the existence of an economic institution is often explained merely by the functions it performs for the economic system. Granovetter (1985) argues that, the NIE, failed to recognize the importance of concrete personal relationships and networks of relationships – what he calls “embeddedness” – in generating trust, in establishing expectations, and in creating and enforcing norms. The main idea of embeddedness may be seen as an attempt to introduce into the analysis of economic systems, social organizations, and social relationships, not merely as a structure that springs into place to fulfil an economic function, but as a structure with history and continuity that give it an independent effect on the functioning of economic systems (de Arruda and Rok, 2015). Conceptualising NIE and SC will provide the basis to explain how social relations are developed and maintained through formal and informal institutions and how they affect policy goals.

Also the ESP of Ghana which is the subject of this study, represents institutions that govern the sanitation sub-sector, therefore an institutional analysis together with study of

77 actors’ relations which are well explained by social capital, is deemed the best combination to explore this subject area.

Finally, the justification for the use of NIE and SC in this research is that studies in public sector policy implementation using the amalgamation of the duo are limited. Also, not many of studies have investigated the relations between actors in policy implementation using these theories combined. Using NIE and SC in this area to explain actors’ relations will further boost understanding and their applicability in development policy research.

2.7 Gaps in Literature and Links to Research Questions

After an extensive review of literature, it is evident that the subject matter of environmental sanitation is well covered on various fronts including actors’ roles. However, literature on actors’ relations in respect to the kind of relations existing between them, seems limited (Ayee and Crook, 2003; Awortwi and Helmsing, 2007; Awortwi, 2003; Obirih-Opareh and Post, 2002; Oduro-Kwarteng, 2011; Owusu and Afutu-Kotey, 2010; King et al., 2001; Salifu et al., 2005). Literature extensively discussed the impact of PPP, decentralisation and participation on sanitation service delivery where the role of various actors under this umbrella were assessed, but discussions did not go further to examine how these actors relate in the policy implementation process. The actor constellations must be studied as a whole to identify the kind of relationships that exist and to determine how these relationships affect policy implementation and consequently sanitation service delivery. The interaction of these actors and the effect of their relations on policy outcomes cannot be contradicted. Their relationships are vital in achieving goal consensus for effective policy implementation. As evident in the review, literature explores very little on actors’ relations in the application of public management theories such as PPP, Decentralization and Participation. This palpable limitation in literature gave rise to the first research question of this study - What kinds of relations and links exist between actors in ESP implementation?

Actors’ relations are largely shaped by certain contextual factors which ultimately determine relationship outcomes. Williamson (1981) in his TCE model states that actors in economic transactions are opportunistic in nature describing them as “self-interest seeking

78 with guile”. Actors’ opportunistic behaviours have been explained by bounded rationality in literature time and again. However, emerging studies contradict this umbrella term of self-seeking attributes of actors in economic relations to include other factors as captured by the bounded reliability concept (Verbeke and Greidanus, 2009; Verbeke and Kano, 2010). This concept has been used mostly to explain actors’ behaviour in multi-national enterprises so far. However, the concept is yet to be tested in public policy management and implementation. Also, limited account exists in the NIE literature in advancing this concept. Expanding on this to bring some empirical meaning to the concept, this thesis applies the bounded reliability concept within the NIE theory together with social capital to explain the contextual issues effecting actors’ relations. Employing the concept of Social capital, in understanding transaction costs, recognises those features of social organisations that facilitate coordination and cooperation for mutual benefit, including horizontal associations such as networks, norms, and social trust (Putnam, 1995). This study identified this gap and therefore will help advance new arguments in both NIE and SC theories as applied to public management and policy implementations studies through the second research question - What are the issues affecting such relations among actors in ESP implementation?

Finally, the effect of the institutions on economic performance has been well espoused; the NIE literature discussed the ramifications of human behaviours on transaction cost. Literature emphasises on the importance of the role relationships plays in any implementation process. However, literature is limited on detailed analysis on the various ways these relationships can either facilitate or inhibit implementations. According to implementation literature, it is difficult to pinpoint which factors or conditions facilitate or inhibit implementation since so much depends on the institutional, political, economic and socio-cultural context of the implementation (Cerna, 2013). Therefore, the argument advanced by NIE that economic efficiency will be achieved once institutions are efficient and are well enforced can be problematic. Limitation in literature on the impact of actors’ relationships, in particular, have on the ultimate policy goal necessitated the third research question - How do actor relations impact on environmental sanitation?

2.8 Conclusion

This chapter delved into theories and literature to lay the basis and foundation for the research. It sought to bring the various debates in literature to a point of confluence in order to expose the limitations and inherent shortfall to provide the platform for a major contribution. The chapter first defines and highlights the different context of environmental sanitation. It reviewed implementation literature, bringing to bare the various approaches to policy implementation in the view of identifying the best approach for ESP implementation. The implementations of ESPs as any other public policies are influenced by various public management theories. The review carefully examined the NPM principles of PPP, Decentralisation and Participation which forms the bedrock for ESP implementations in most countries of the world. The review suggests that the PPP, decentralisation and participation as concept to promote policy implementation has worked to some extent, but their full benefits could not be realised due to some lapses in their operationalisation. The review brought out the debates and various views on how best these principles can be harnessed for a successful policy implementation. In other to provide some basis to analyse actors’ relations, literature identified integrated public management principle like governance which is at the heart of actors’ relationships. The chapter also discusses the theoretical framework, beginning with inter-organizational network and collaborative relationships, using the NIE and SC as the theoretical lenses for studying the relations. It dwells on NIE principles of transaction cost, to do the analysis. The chapter delved a bit further into the relevance of social capital in institutional analyses. The relevance of the NIE to the study was stated with the concluding part connecting the literature reviewed to the research question to expose the gaps in literature.

CHAPTER THREE

CONTEXTUAL OVERVIEW OF THE RESEARCH SETTING

3.0 Introduction

This chapter presents the political, economic and developmental context of Ghana, providing backgrounds of Ghana’s current development. It presents the state of Ghana’s environmental sanitation, environmental sanitation programs in Ghana and an overview of the regulatory and institutional framework and strategies that are designed to tackle environmental sanitation. It discusses the national development policy, the decentralisation concept for managing sanitation, the national environmental sanitation policy and the National Environmental Sanitation Strategy and Action Plan. It also discusses the various provisions in the policy regarding the role of actors and how they work together to implement these policies. The chapter presents the structure and practice of local government system in Ghana. The chapter draws to a close by discussing the basis for possible relations between actors at the local level in the implementation of ESP in Ghana.

3.1 Country Profile: Ghana

Geography The Republic of Ghana is a country located in West Africa. It is bordered by Côte d'Ivoire (Ivory Coast) to the west, Burkina Faso to the north, Togo to the east, and the Gulf of Guinea to the south. The coastline covers a distance of 550km, from Aflao (South- East) to Elubo (South-West). The total area of the country is about 238,539 square kilometres (NESSAP, 2010). Ghana is a lowland country except for a range of highlands on the eastern border. The highest elevation is Mt. Afadjato, 884 metres above sea level, found in the Akuapem-Togo ranges, west of the Volta River. Ghana can be divided into three ecological zones: the low, sandy coastal plains, with several rivers and streams; the middle and western parts of the country, characterised by a heavy canopy of semi deciduous rainforests, with many streams and rivers; and a northern savannah, which is drained by the

Black and White Volta Rivers. The Volta Lake, created by the hydroelectric dam in the east, is one of the largest artificial lakes in the world (GDHS, 2014).

Climate Ghana has a tropical climate with temperatures and rainfall patterns that vary according to distance from the coast and elevation. The average annual temperature is about 26ºC (79ºF). There are two distinct rainy seasons in the southern and middle parts of the country, from April to June and September to November. The North is, however, characterised by one rainfall season that begins in May, peaks in August, and lasts until September. Annual rainfall ranges from about 1,015 millimetres (40 inches) in the North to about 2,030 millimetres (80 inches) in the Southwest. The harmattan, a dry dusty desert wind, blows from the northeast and covers much of the country between December and March, lowering the humidity and visibility, and also creates very warm days and cool nights in the North. In the South, the effects of the harmattan are felt mainly in January. (GDHS, 2014)

Politics Formerly known as the Gold Coast, Ghana achieved political independence from the United Kingdom in 1957, making it the first sub-Saharan African nation to wean itself from colonial rule. Ghana became a republic in the British Commonwealth of Nations on 1 July 1960. The country was renamed Ghana by it first President Dr Kwame Nkrumah at independence to reflect it African identity. The name Ghana was adopted from the ancient Ghana Empire which covered mostly the western coast of Africa. Ghana is a stable democracy but with a chequered political history. After several military interventions from 1966 when the first president Dr. Kwame Nkrumah was overthrown, to the second and third republic in 1972 and1981 respectively, Ghana finally maintained a long period of political stability from 1992 when it returned to constitutional rule. Ghana is now referred to as a beacon of democracy in Africa with 26 years’ record spanning seven successful presidential and parliamentary elections. Ghana operates a multi-party democracy with an executive president who is elected for a term of four years with a maximum of two terms. There is a parliament elected every four years, an independent judiciary, and a vibrant media. Ghana is a member of the South Atlantic Peace and Cooperation Zone, the Commonwealth of Nations, the Economic Community of West African States, the African

Union, African, Caribbean, and Pacific Group of States, the United Nations and an associate Member of La Francophonie.

Economy Ghana is a developing country recently classified as lower middle income country (World Bank, 2013). The structure of the Ghanaian economy has seen minimal changes over the past two decades. The agriculture sector, previously the largest contributor to the Ghanaian economy, has been overtaken by the service and industry sectors. By 2014, the service sector was the fastest growing sector of the economy, contributing 52 percent of the gross domestic product (GDP), followed by the industry sector, at 27 percent, and the agriculture sector, at 22 percent. In 2014, the service sector recorded its highest growth, of 6 percent, followed by the agricultural sector with 5 percent growth, and the industry sector with 1 percent growth (GSS, 2015). Overall, the 2014 real annual GDP grew by 4 percent compared with 7 percent growth recorded in 2013 (GSS, 2015). However, agriculture remains the major socioeconomic activity in Ghana employing 45% of employed labour force. This percentage is higher for the rural population as 69.4 in rural Ghana are employed in agriculture (GSS, 2013) which yields about 40 per cent of the gross domestic product, and about 40 per cent of foreign currencies acquired through exports. Ghana is largely an agrarian economy but is dominated by few cash crops and peasant farming that is heavily dependent on nature (Namara et al., 2011). 41 percent of the active population provide services, with a high proportion of the employed population of Ghana working in the informal sector, the majority being self-employed (GSS, 2014). The leading export commodities of Ghana are cocoa, gold, and timber. Recently, the economy has diversified to the export of non-traditional commodities such as pineapples, bananas, yam, and cashew nuts (GDHS, 2014). The tourism industry contributes substantially to the country's economy, as a key driver of economic growth. The tourism industry is currently the third largest foreign exchange earner after merchandise exports and remittances from abroad and has become one of the most important and fastest growing sectors of the Ghanaian economy (BOG 2007). Ghana discovered oil in commercial quantity in 2007 and in 2011 began producing commercial quantities of crude oil and natural gas from the Jubilee Oil Field. Petroleum activities have become a critical source of government revenue. At US$444.12 million in 2011, petroleum revenue

83 constituted 5.9 percent of Ghana’s domestic revenue, rising to 6.6 percent in 2012, 9.5 percent in 2013 and further to 13.5 percent in 2014.

Natural Resources Ghana is endowed with abundant natural wealth, including vast agricultural, mining and human resources. Ghana is currently the second largest producer of cocoa in the world behind Ivory Coast and the second-largest gold producer in Africa. Ghana also produces such minerals as diamond, bauxite and manganese. New exports such as wood products, textiles, jewellery, pineapples, tuna fish and cotton are rapidly diversifying Ghana's agricultural export profile. The country has over 13.6 million hectares of arable land suitable for crops or livestock, and a potential annual production of 655,000 metric tons of fisheries products. It is also the home to Lake Volta, the largest artificial lake in the world by surface area.

Population Ghanaians live in more than 47,800 towns and villages (Hens and Boon, 1999). The 2010 Population and Housing Census (PHC) of Ghana indicated that the total population of Ghana as at September, 2010 was around 24.6 million. The 2010 data shows an increase of 30.4 percent over the previous decade’s figure of 18.9 million making the annual population growth rate of 2.5 percent. The current population is expected to double in 28 years. The population of Ghana at the time of undertaking this research was estimated at 28.3 million. The Ghanaian population is made up of several ethnic groups, with the Akans constituting the largest group (48 percent), followed by the Mole-Dagbani (17 percent), Ewe (14 percent), Ga-Dangme (7 percent), and others (GSS, 2013).

Urbanisation There has been a surge in urban population of Ghana over the years resulting in expansion in urban settlements. This rapid urbanisation can be attributed to Ghana’s economic growth in recent years. According to a World Bank report, the urban population in Ghana has grown over 3.5 times in the last 30+ years. It is estimated currently that over 53% of the total population live in urban areas (World Bank, 2016). Ghana’s ‘urban transformation’ has been huge, with a 3.5 - times increase in urban population between 1984 and 2014 (World Bank, 2016). The Government of Ghana has indicated that should the current rate of urbanisation, which is above 4% remains constant in to the future, urban population will 84 rise to 72% by 2035 (Government of Ghana, 2015). The rising level of urbanization in Ghana has mainly been attributed to demographic factors of rural-urban migration and natural population increase within the urban areas (Songsore, 2003).

Education Educational attainment in Ghana is somehow low. According to the Ghana Statistical Service (GSS), 23.4 percent of the population aged three years and older has never been to school. The proportion currently attending school and those who have attended school before are 39.5 percent and 37.1 percent respectively. The proportion of the population which has never attended school in the rural area (33.1%) is more than two times that of the urban area (14.2%). There is also a marked difference between males (9.1%) and females (14.3%) who have never attended school (GPHC, 2010). Overall, Ghana’s population aged 15 years and over who can read and write reached 71.5%, compared to 61.7% in 2007. The gross enrolment ratio (GER) for children in the age group 4-5years increased from 97.3% during the 2009/10 academic year to about 99.4% during the 2011/12 academic year (GSGDA 11 2014-2017).

Figure 5: Map of Ghana showing the Ten Administrative Regions

Source: Mapcruzin.com, (1996) Download Free Ghana Maps. [Online]. Available at: http://www.mapcruzin.com/free-ghana-maps.htm [Accessed April 6, 2016]

3.2 Study Areas

Three administrative local government areas consisting of three case studies were covered in this study. The three MMDAs featured in this study were selected from the Greater Accra regions of Ghana. These were selected for the empirical investigation of actor

86 relations in the ESP implementation at the local level. Sanitation and waste management literature suggests that five cities in Ghana namely Accra, Tema, Kumasi, Sekondi- Takoradi and Tamale account for 19% of the total population and their residents generate an estimated 3,200 tonnes of solid waste per day (NESSAP, 2010). These parts particularly constitute the worst sanitation areas of the country. Though other cities are equally plagued with various sanitation challenges but their intensity cannot be compared to the former. Per the sanitation characteristic above, the study chooses Accra due to the proportion of waste generation and severity of sanitation challenge. The choice of Accra also came about due to geographical and environmental factors like urbanisation, population, economic, politics and socio-culture which may depict a better picture of the implementation process the of ESP. Three MMDs namely Accra Metropolitan Assembly, La Nkwantanang Madina and Ashiaman Municipal Assembly were selected for the study. The following section presents the profiles of the three cities detailing their physical, human, economic, socio-cultural and environmental conditions.

3.2.1 Accra Metropolitan Assembly

Accra is the capital city and largest urban centre in Ghana. Accra is divided into 16 administrative units. The Accra Metropolitan Assembly (AMA) is one of the 16 MMDAs located in the Greater Accra region of Ghana. The metropolitan assembly is made up of 10 sub-metros. The AMA covers the central business district of Accra where most commercial activities take place. The AMA is also the seat of government where all government ministries and offices are located. The Accra Metropolitan Area has an estimated population of 4.5 million residents. The city generates between 2,000 and 2,500 tonnes of municipal solid waste (MSW) a day. Apart from residential population of the metropolis, the AMA estimated the influx of about one million people from all part of the country including foreigners from neighbouring countries to the city centre for socio- economic activities on daily basis. Accra is the most developed city in Ghana since independence. High level of job creation, services and infrastructural development like roads and transport networks, government offices and accommodation, schools, health centres and recreational facilities etc. made it an epic centre of attraction. Since becoming

87 the capital city, Accra has grown rapidly to engulf many surrounding rural settlements which now nest within the city as ‘urban villages’(Songsore, 2003).

3.2.2 La-Nkwantanang - Madina Municipal Assembly

The La Nkwantanang-Madina Municipality is located in the Greater Accra Region. It is one of the 16 Metropolitan, Municipal and District Assemblies in the region and was created in 2012 as part of the newly created Assemblies aimed at deepening decentralization and bringing development to the door step of citizens. La Nkwantanang Madina Municipal was established by Legislative Instrument (L.I.) 2131 and inaugurated in June 2012. It was carved out of the Ga East Municipality. The La Nkwantanang - Madina Municipality is located at the northern part of the Greater Accra Region. La Nkwantanang Madina Municipality is generally urban (84 percent) (GPHC, 2010). The main economic activities in the La Nkwantanang Madina Municipality are commerce, agriculture, services and manufacturing. Trading is one of the main economic activities in the Municipality with the Madina market as the main trading centre. The Municipality is linked by road to other parts of Accra and the rest of the country. Commercial transportation by vehicles, taxis and others provide employment for drivers and mechanics. There are a number of business associations in the Municipality, which include market women’s associations, drivers associations, farmer groups, dressmakers and beauticians associations.

3.2.3 Ashaiman Municipal Assembly

Ashaiman Municipal Assembly covers a total land area of about forty-five (45) square kilometres with a population size of 190,721 according to the 2010 Population and Housing Census. It was carved out of the then Tema Municipality, now Tema Metropolitan Authority, as one of the newly created Districts in 2008 by LI 1889 and Local Government Act of 1993 (Act 462). Ashaiman Municipality is located about 4km to the North of Tema and about 30km from Accra, the capital of Ghana. Its proximity to Tema and Accra makes it easy for community members to have access to high level social facilities and

88 infrastructure such as good roads, water, hospitals and electricity. It also serves as a dormitory town for workers in most industries in the Tema Township. The construction of Tema harbour and the railway line in the 1950s, contributed to the migration of people to the area in search of jobs and for relatively less expensive accommodation as compared to Accra and Tema. Ashaiman is a cosmopolitan area which comprises large numbers of ethnic groups. Ashaiman is a sprawling “urban settlement”, parts of which exhibit characteristics of a slum. This pertains especially around the core business arena of the community. The 2010 population and housing census estimates that 91.6% of the economically active population (between 15 and 65 years) in the municipality are employed and the rest 8.4% are unemployed. Ashaiman has two main markets; the central market and the Nii Annang Adjor market. The markets in the Municipality have all kinds of commodities for sale.

Figure 6: Map of Ghana and GAMA Showing the three Metropolitan Areas

Source: Martin Oteng-Ababio, 2010

3.3 An Overview of Environmental Sanitation in Ghana

Ghana is bedevilled with sanitation and waste management problems that extend from the state to the local government. Apart from inadequate sanitation facilities in various households and communities; “refuse mountains”, chocked drains and wastewater are a common site on the street in both urban and rural areas of the country. The impact of poor environmental sanitation in Ghana is evidently present in all cities

and communities. One is often greeted with foul-smelling excreta-laden and choked gutters, stagnant pools of water and flooding during rains and the attendant prevalence of sanitation related sicknesses like malaria, cholera, diarrhoea and typhoid (NESSAP, 2010). Poor disposal of refuse both in communities and its management at final disposal sites is another challenge faced by all MMDAs. Crude, open dumping is the practice in almost all communities except for some few elite communities. Implementing improved site management procedures is therefore, often only in reaction to public outcry and threat of closure of operations by nearby communities(NESSAP, 2010). Rapid urbanisation and Population pressure in most Ghanaian cities and other urban centres have escalated the problem of sanitation (Boadi and Kuitunen, 2003).

Most densely populated urban areas, market centres and urban slums face the biggest challenge of managing the growing waste volumes that are generated daily. The baseline environmental sanitation survey in 2007/2008 indicates that, close to 76% of households in Ghana depend on improper waste collection and disposal methods, with only less than 5% using house to house collection services (ESP, 2010). Literature also reveals that, rapid economic growth and increase in living standards results in the high demand for goods and services which eventually translate to an increase in per capita waste generation (Amoah and Kosoe, 2014; Narayana, 2009). The Waste Management Departments (WMDs) and Environmental Health Department (EHD) under the MMDAs are responsible for waste collection in partnership with the private sector and public education and enforcement of sanitation by-laws. However, these departments are confronted with a myriad of challenges that hamper their delivery as expected. The difficulties in providing the required level of service that is proportionate to the increasing demand for good sanitation service is typically attributed to institutional, technical and financial constraints at the various levels of governance: national and local levels, as well as the private sector (Amoah and Kosoe,

2014; Oteng-Ababio et al., 2013; UN-HABITAT, 2010). In recent past, waste management services from MMDAs and their private sector partners in Ghana have consistently failed to keep pace with the amount of waste generated in towns and cities (Amoah and Kosoe, 2014).

3.4 Environmental Sanitation Support Programs in Ghana

Environmental Sanitation problems in Ghana have assumed a wide proportion, dimension and scope in recent times, of which international regulatory framework and standards, and national policy directive alone may not suffice in arresting. Aside these guidelines, the government of Ghana have over the years introduced sanitation related programs that specifically target various aspects of sanitation. Some of these programs are the National Sanitation Day Program [NSDP], Community Led Total Sanitation Program [CLTS], School Health Education Program [SHEP], National Youth Employment Program – Youth in Waste and Sanitation model [NYEP – YWS] and the Expanded Sanitary Inspections, Compliance Management and Enforcement [ESICOME]. These programs are managed by actors in sanitation from the national to the local level. These programs though have been successful to some extent in their individual rights, have not produced the desired results as expected. These programs are discussed in detail below.

3.4.1 National Sanitation Day Program [NSDP]

The National Sanitation Day Program [NSDP] is a voluntary clean-up exercise instituted by the Ministry of Local Government and Rural Development in Ghana. This was introduced in an attempt to rekindle the lost communal spirit that existed among Ghanaians in the past in dealing with challenges that confront communities like environmental sanitation. Government of Ghana in 2014 introduced the National Sanitation Day Program [NSDP] to encourage cleanliness in public place and homes by citizens. First Saturday of every month has been earmarked as National Sanitation Day in Ghana. To make this program sustainable, the MLGRD decided to back the program with law. NSD bill is currently under consideration in parliament. The bill if approved will give legal backing to

91 the NSD program allowing it to prosecute individuals who refuse to take part in the program. This practice however is not new to the continent of Africa as countries like Cameroun, Nigeria, Liberia and Sierra Leone introduced such programs in the past to curb ES challenges (Monney, 2016).

This initiative was hailed as monumental step towards addressing the perennial flood situation in Accra during the raining season (GFSR, 2015). It is envisaged that chocked drains which are the major cause of floods in the city will be cleared during NSD to allow for proper flow during storms. The local government workers union of Ghana (LGWU) has described the institution of the sanitation day program as a national duty call and admonishes all and workers and citizens to participate and support the program 7 . Nevertheless, this program received much criticism for various reasons. The programme which was initiated at the backdrop of a severe cholera outbreak in 2014 was criticised as a knee-jerk response rather than a pragmatic approach to the enormous environmental challenges that beset the nation over the years (Monney, 2016). Though the program on its initial introduction received massive support from citizens in all parts of the country, the communal spirit, patriotism and the enthusiasm that greeted it is waning at a very fast pace.

3.4.2 Community-Led Total Sanitation [CLTS]

Community-Led Total Sanitation [CLTS] is an ES program widely recognised as a revolutionary participatory approach to rural sanitation in many parts of the world. This approach was first adopted and implemented in Bangladesh, and later spread to many parts of the world. CLTS is an approach in which people in rural communities are encouraged to plan and execute their own sanitation facilities and programs. The people are not taught or instructed on what they must do, rather their own initiative and action through the facilitation of a small team that helps to trigger these actions (Magala and Roberts, 2009).

CLTS in its classical form is implemented by a small team of facilitators who do the pre- triggering. This process involves community profiling of sanitation; triggering which involves assisting communities to realise their sanitation practices and the post-triggering

7 Ghana.gov.gh (2014). Ghanaians should see sanitation day as national duty – LGWU [Online]. Available at: http://www.ghana.gov.gh/index.php/news/features/128-the-victory-at-akwatia-that-dented-ghanas-image., [Accessed May 16, 2017] 92 activities which involves assisting communities in solving sanitation problems (Magala and Roberts, 2009). Unlike the supply driven approach adopted previously, which was proven ineffective, the CLTS approach is less prescriptive in it approach, rather it employs tools of empowerment and motivation to get community members to take their own initiative with a collective action (NESSAP, 2010). According to Kar (2005), the facilitators may be government, NGO or project staff, or Natural leaders from their communities. The CLTS is a revolutionary tool to change and reverse personal behaviours, attitudes and mind-sets of communities to embrace a new approach to sanitation.

CLTS has been piloted in Ghana since 2007 by a number of agencies within the sanitation sub-sector in Ghana. The concept of (CLTS) has been acknowledged by the ESP of Ghana as the preferred approach to scale-up rural sanitation and hygiene in Ghana (CLTS-Ghana- Report, 2017). The overall objective of this program is to reduce sanitation related illness, improve knowledge and skills in handling sanitation in rural areas and to enhance sanitation services throughout the country. Though this program has recorded a number of successes since it was first implemented, the implementation challenges besetting the program are numerous. Challenges such as inadequate supervision and post-triggering follow up by district assemblies, lack of funds or political will, resistance to change within the sector has been the bane of the success of the CLTS in Ghana (Bibby and Dotse, 2011).

3.4.3 School Health Education Program [SHEP]

The School Health Environmental Program [SHEP] was established in 1992 as follow-up actions on Ghana's commitment to the Jomtien World Declaration on Education for All and her ratification of the United Nations Convention of the Rights for the Child. The SHEP is a unit under the Ghana Education Service and it is responsible for Health Promotion in schools up to Pre-tertiary level in Ghana. The programme was initially established under the joint mandate of the Ministry of Education and Health, but now expanded to include the Environmental Health Department [EHD] under the Ministry of Local Government and Rural Development. The EHD which was originally under the Ministry of Health was transferred to the MLGRD in 1995 by a Presidential Directive to ensure compliance with the decentralization process which gave the environmental health and sanitation responsibilities to the local assemblies (Magala and Roberts, 2009). The

93 mandate of the overseeing ministries is to provide health Education and technical support to schools in achieving health and sanitation goals.

SHEP envisaged equipping and imbedding in the school population, health consciousness in order for them to act as change agent in their homes and communities. The goal of SHEP is to ensure a safe, hygienic school environment that encourages children’s participation and success in education (CRS/Ghana, 2009). SHEP interventions consist of four main themes, namely: skills-based health education, disease prevention and control, nutrition control and education and safe and healthy school environment. The basic structure for implementing the SHEP programme consists of National Office, 10 Regional Offices, at all districts and School-Based Health Coordinators and community-level School Health Committees which bring together stakeholders at the school/community level to give direction to the programme’s implementation in each school (NESSAP, 2010, p. 39).

Until 2014, the SHEP was without any policy document for it implementation. This resulted in fragmented and duplicated efforts by stakeholders in their dealings. For the effective implementation and actualisation of the SHEP in schools, there must be an effective collaboration between the various stakeholders within the sector. However, the case has not been so over the years. The programme has not received the needed attention from policy makers and implemented. The programme is not effective in most schools, owing to budgetary constraints and other factors that compromise it objectives.

3.4.4 National Youth Employment Program – Youth in Waste and Sanitation Module

The National Youth Employment Programme [NYEP] now Ghana Youth Employment and Entrepreneurship Development Agency [GYEEDA] was initiated by the government of Ghana in 2006 and restructured in 2012 to curb the high incidence of unemployment among the youth of the country which is perceived to be a potential threat to National Security. The primary goal of this program is to empower the youth to contribute meaningfully to the socio economic and sustainable development of the nation. This program provides employment to youth between the ages of 18 and 35 years. The programme was initially sponsored solely by the Government of Ghana and later supported by the World Bank.

The NYEP/GYEEDA is a broad-based program with cross-sectorial responsibility. The program is implemented by different ministries, agencies, MMDAs, Community groups, as well as NGOs and the private sector institutions (Wodon, 2012). Under the NYEP/GYEEDA are different modules initiated from different sectors of the economy. Among these are Agriculture, Security, Health, ICT, Trade and vocation, Water and Sanitation among others. Sanitation being a critical developmental issue, received attention in this endeavour. Most of these modules are contracted out to the private sector and NGOs. For instance, the Youth in Waste and Sanitation Module is run in partnership with the largest private waste management company in Ghana, Zoomlion Limited.

According to Murray and Forstater (2013) the introduction of Youth in Waste and Sanitation module led to the improvement in the sanitation situation in major cities like Accra and Kumasi. However, the program has been criticised variously for poor management since its inception. Contractual issues, non-payment of contract fees by government, low wages to sanitation workers and financial malfeasance have dogged the program over the years. A ministerial fact finding team that investigated the program in 2013 reveals that lack of transparency has allowed the scheme to be milked by unscrupulous agents both in and outside the public sector and has served as a tool for political patronage (Korboe, 2014). Though the focus of the module was to curb the increasing sanitation challenge in Ghana, the overall programme focus was more of reducing employment than achieving improved sanitation. Hence no targets and parameters for measurement were put in place to measure success in sanitation within the program.

3.4.5 National Community Water and Sanitation Program [NCWSP]

The NCWSP was launched in 1994 to promote of hygiene behaviour as a basic requirement for all projects. Hitherto, hygiene promotion is carried out by Environmental Health Assistants (EHAs) with facilitation support offered by Extension Support Staff of the Community Water and Sanitation Agency (CWSA). The purpose of the NCWSP was to establish an organization that would focus on rural water and sanitation provision which had lagged behind over the years as the existing system was centralized. Subsequently, the Community Water and Sanitation Division (CWSD) was carved out of the then Ghana

Water and Sewerage Corporation (GWSC) now Ghana Water Company Limited (GWCL) and transformed into the Community Water and Sanitation Agency (CWSA) by an Act of Parliament, Act 564 in December 1998 with the mandate to facilitate the provision of safe drinking water and related sanitation services to Rural Communities and Small Towns in Ghana. The Second Community Water and Sanitation Program was initiated in 2000 with support of a World Bank IDA credit of US$21.9 million, aiming at increasing access and supporting effective and sustained use of improved community water supply and sanitation services in villages and small towns through a demand-driven approach. It built on lessons learned from the first Community Water and Sanitation Program which had been carried out from 1994 to 2000. A large-scale decentralization approach in the planning, implementation, and management of water supply and sanitation in Ghana was one of the main characteristics of the second program (World and Bank, 2006).

In theory, the Ministry of Local Government and Rural Development (MLGRD) has institutional responsibilities for ES whiles water supply is handled by the Ministry of Water Resources Works and Housing (MWRWH), but since water and sanitation go hand in hand MWRWH is involved in facilitating sanitation provision in rural areas and small towns, through its Community Water Supply and Sanitation Agency (CWSA) (WEDC, 2005). The NCWSP however has it main focus in water provision and dwells less on sanitation. In 2017, these two overlapping functions were merged in to one with the creation of the Water and Sanitation Ministry.

3.4.6 Expanded Sanitary Inspections, Compliance Management and Enforcement [ESICOME]

The ESICOME programme was initiated in 1999 in an attempt to revisit the previously effective colonial and post-independence sanitary inspection and enforcement of bye-laws in Ghana. In 2009/10, it was revived, and the new scope seeks to reinforce public health education methods that were adopted from the late 1970’s, which was failing to improve environmental sanitation behaviour with the necessary sanctions for non-compliance of bye-laws. The ESICOME Programme guidelines which are implemented by the MMDA’s, routinely looks at 4 broad areas namely: effective environmental health inspections

(Sanitary Inspections), dissemination of sanitary information (Hygiene Education), pests/vector control and law enforcement.

The programme is designed for district-based implementation with facilitation by Regional Environmental Health and Sanitation Directorates [REHSDs]. Environmental Health Officers [EHO] provide both education and enforcement. However, the capacity of these officers in many MMDAs is inadequate and has resulted in nostalgic recall of the old “tankass” or “samasama”8 era, and many officers have no means of transportation and can therefore not effectively inspect their districts. The MLGRD has responded by recently deploying “sanitation guards” as part of the Sanitation Module under the National Youth Employment Programme (NYEP). Sanitation Guards assist the environmental health officers in the inspection of the following types of premises: private households, health care centres, industrial areas, hospitality facilities, markets and schools. Other activities they carry out include hygiene education and promotion in communities, lorry parks, markets and schools, and supervision and monitoring of sanitation services and dissemination of sanitary information to community members.

The sanitation guards are paid by a publicly financed project, managed by Zoomlion Ghana Ltd9. From the late 1970’s, rapid population growth and spread of urban towns as well as the decline in government’s ability to provide the necessary logistics that sustained source prevention of diseases and vigorous premises inspections and enforcement by environmental health officers gradually led to the breakdown of enforcement management. The ESICOME guidelines need to be updated, and the concept needs to be re-energized. As it is, many EHOs would not even know the concept any more, but it is still a highly needed service by MMDAs.

8 Local parlance for sanitation taskforce and enforcement regime that existed before year 2000 9 Single largest private waste management company in Ghana 97

3.5 Policy Framework for Environmental Sanitation in Ghana

3.5.1 National Development Policy Frameworks

Under the Fourth Republican constitution, the president is enjoined by Article 36 clause 5 of the constitution to within 2 years after assuming office present to parliament a coordinated program of economic and social development. The 1992 Constitution also provides a long-term national development vision for the country through the Directive Principles of State Policy which require that:

“…every Government must pursue policies that would ultimately lead to the “establishment of a just and free society”, where every Ghanaian would have the opportunity to live long, productive, and meaningful life”

Within the context of these constitutional requirements, successive governments from 1992 introduced and implemented various medium-term plans through the National Development Planning Commission. It began with Vision 2020 (1996-2000), then followed by The Ghana Poverty Reduction Strategy (GPRS) (2003-2005), GPRS II (2006- 2009), Ghana Shared Growth and Development Agenda (GSGDA) I (2010-2013) and GSGDA II (2014-2017). The various medium-term development plans highlight the fact that adequate sanitation facilities are vital to a clean environment and to the prevention of many infectious diseases such as cholera, diarrhoea and dysentery. Example the GPRS II objectives relating to Environmental Sanitation was to accelerate the provision of adequate sanitation and to improve environmental sanitation, which are linked to a clear set of policy measures (Magala and Roberts, 2009). The medium-term development plan being implemented by government at the time of this research is the Ghana Shared Growth and Development Agenda GSGDA II (2014-2017). The GoG development agenda is driven by the GSGDA II which is in itself informed by the commitments to the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), New Partnership for Africa Development (NEPAD) and above all by the underlying obligations set out in the Constitution of the Republic of Ghana.

3.5.2 Ghana Shared Growth and Development Agenda GSGDA II (2014-2017).

The Ghana Shared Growth and Development Agenda (GSGDA) II, 2014-2017, is the fifth in the series of medium-term national development policy frameworks prepared over the past two decades. GSGDA II which drives government development agenda acknowledges the fact that adequate sanitation is essential to human development. Government’s policy objective over the medium-term in this focal area is aimed at promoting effective waste management and reducing noise pollution. GSGDA II intended to achieve this through the education of the public on the effects of improper waste disposal, strengthening regulatory environment to provide sufficient deterrent for sanitation and pollution offences and increasing investment in infrastructure for waste management through Public-Private Partnerships (PPPs).

The GSGDA II policy interventions to be implemented in the medium term aimed at ensuring that water and sanitation programs adopted sector-wide approach in its delivery; ensuring the development and implementation of health and hygiene education as a component of all water and sanitation programmes; and improving sector institutional capacity. Other strategies included the operationalising the Polluter Pays Principle; promoting the construction and use of improved sanitation facilities by households and institutions; expanding disability-friendly sanitation facilities; scaling up the Community Led Total Sanitation (CLTS); Rural Sanitation Model and Strategy (RSMS) for the promotion of household sanitation in urban and rural communities; reviewing, gazetting and enforcing MMDAs bye-laws on sanitation; strengthening existing regional and district inter-agency committees to ensure sector sustainability of WASH services; strengthening PPPs in waste management; reviewing and implementing the Sanitation and Water for All Ghana Compact; and facilitating the establishment of a National Sanitation Authority as an autonomous agency with independent source of funding (NDPC, 2014). The GSGDA II like previous medium-term plans is yet to achieve a significant success in it sanitation objectives.

3.5.3 Decentralization Policy of Ghana

Decentralization Policy [DP] of Ghana seeks to establish a decentralised administration and governance through the transfer of power and authority from central government to the local levels to encourage people’s participation in local governance and development. This policy forms the basis of the local government system currently practiced in Ghana. The decentralization policy of Ghana provides a framework for environmental sanitation planning and management in Ghana. The DP stressed the importance of environmental sanitation and waste management as one of the responsibilities of LGs in municipal services delivery. As part of measures to promote it policy objectives, the DP mandates DAs to develop and implement local programs of sustainable public education for attitudinal or behavioural issues to improve environmental sanitation at the local level. LGs are expected by DP directive as part of their Social agenda, to undertake social development where water and sanitation infrastructural development is a fundamental requirement for the well-being of underserved groups. The DP in its situational analysis suggested that environmental sanitation and waste management functions of DAs has become more prominent or urgent, therefore the need to foster capacity for information and knowledge management in this area is paramount. The DP also acknowledges as part of it development plans, sector specific policies and guiding documents like The National Environmental Sanitation Policy [NESP] and the National Environmental Sanitation Policy Strategy Plan [NESSAP] which are considered relevant to accelerating decentralization.

3.5.4 National Environmental Sanitation Policy of Ghana [NESP]

The Environmental Sanitation policy of Ghana was first promulgated in 1999 and later revised in 2010. The NSEP was revised to take into consideration the changing context of the national and international development priorities and to cover a wider scope to meet current development objectives and aspirations of the sector (ESP, 2010). The NESP serves as the principal document that guides the delivery of sanitation services in Ghana. It developed guidelines to implementation and enforcement of legislations governing ES and also serves as a basis for the development of all other sanitation related guidelines and by- laws. The revised policy encourages relevant research to meet the challenges associated

100 with managing waste, supports building effective partnership both at international and local levels. The goal of the revised Environmental sanitation policy is to develop a clear and nationally accepted framework for environmental sanitation as an essential social service and a major determinant for improving health status and standard of living of the Ghana populace (ESP, 2010).

The Ministry of Local Government and Rural Development [MLGRD] is the lead sector agency and has the institutional responsibility for the formulation and the implementation the ESP including management and regulation of ES related activities by the local government bodies. Under the MLGRD is the Environmental Health Sanitation Department [EHSD] which is mandated to provide guidance to MLGRD on ES, sector planning, policy and legislation. The EHSD developed key strategic plans such as Sector Environment Strategic Investment Plan [SESIP], the National Environmental Sanitation Strategy and Action Plan (NESSAP) and District Environmental Sanitation Strategy and Action Plan (DESSAP) which formed the basis for the implementation and monitoring of sanitation activities at the local level (Magala and Roberts, 2009). In order to provide a clearer strategic framework for achieving the overall policy goals, the revised policy identified seven focal areas which also constitute challenges of the sector that needed to be addressed. These are (i) capacity development, (ii) Information, education and communication (iii) Legislation and regulation (iv) Level of service (v) Sustainable financing and cost recovery, (vi) Research and development and (vii) Monitoring and evaluation (ESP, 2010).

The NESP also set out the role of the National Environmental Sanitation Policy Coordinating Council [NESPoCC] which serves as the sector coordinating council responsible for coordinating and implementation of the NESP and other national strategies. The NESPoCC includes representatives from relevant Government agencies10, NGOs and private sector groups (ESP, 2010). The policy - sets out responsibilities for the various stakeholders necessary for it implementation, right from individuals through NGOs and community-based organizations to Metropolitan, Municipal and District Assemblies [MMDAs], and other allied institutions like the Environmental Protection Agency [EPA], Ministries of Environment Science and Technology, Health and Education, educational

10 MLGRD, EHSD (Secretariat), Metropolitan, Municipal and District Assembly representatives, MEST, EPA, CSIR, MWRWH, Hydrological Services Department, GWCL, CWSA, Ministry of Roads and Transport, DUR, Ministry of Education, Ministry of Health, Ministry of Women and Children, Ministry of Information, MoFEP, Ghana Statistical Service, Ghana National Development Planning Commission. 101 institutions and the private sector. In accordance with Ghana’s overall commitment to decentralization, as echoed by the Constitution and various enabling acts, the NESP assigned - different roles to government departments and agencies whiles the direct responsibility for waste management, public health management, environmental monitoring, planning and monitoring are given to the MMDAs.

The MMDAs are required to develop their own M/DESSAP and sanitation by-laws, which of course must take root from the NESP and the NESSAP to govern their MMDAs. The revised policy identifies many challenges and constraints in environmental sanitation which the previous policy did not address. It therefore proposed some salient recommendations and strategic action plans which are necessary to materialise the goal of the policy to achieve improved sanitation. While all the key elements usually listed as ingredients of a good policy framework are present in the revised ESP, it couldn’t achieve its strategic objectives due to poor implementation and its attendant challenges.

3.5.5 National Environmental Sanitation Strategy and Action Plan [NESSAP]

The NESSAP is a response to the need to refocus attention on environmental sanitation in Ghana and provide clear strategies and action plans that will guide implementation of the ESP by MMDAs. It is a logical follow-up to the revision of the Environmental Sanitation Policy (1999) within the new framework of national planning that requires comprehensive sector policies and strategic plans and investment costs. The NESSAP is a first attempt at translating the measures of the objectives of the Revised ESP (2010) into strategies and planned activities. The NESSAP was developed in phases through a highly participatory process. The framework for the NESSAP evolved from reviews of relevant national and international level processes as well as consultations with a wide range of stakeholders at district, regional and national levels.

The ESP (2010) defines the implementation roles of key stakeholders. The NESSAP is to guide all sector actors – ministries, departments and agencies [MMDAs], private sector, development partners, NGOs, traditional authorities and the media – to achieve incremental improvements over the long-term planning horizon, 2008 – 2025. The NESSAP presents as much information as was reported by the MMDAs on the state of the

102 environmental sanitation infrastructure and services. It also defines resources required and implementation packages covering all the components of environmental sanitation. An accompanying Strategic Environmental Sanitation Investment Plan [SESIP] provides further details of funding requirements and the framework for allocating estimated funding-gaps for projected improvements by 2015. The policy has been structured into three implementation Time-frames; short term 2010-2015, mid -term 2016 – 2020, as well as long term 2021 – 2025. The NESSAP adopted the “top-down” and “bottom-up” policy implementation approaches. The strategic action plan is focused at the districts as the primary service delivery units. In accordance with Ghana’s decentralised system of governance and implementation management, national policies take effect at district level. Therefore, strategies, plans, programmes and projects to meet policy objectives are based on and derived from the aspirations of district level actors. Each district has been supported to develop a District Environmental Sanitation Strategic Action plan [DESSAP]. The DESSAP is flexible and the districts can amend it without informing the national counterparts.

The framework of the NESSAP is hinged on the principle of Materials in Transit [MINT] i.e waste is not treated as waste per say but as a reusable material that can be used to generate energy, income and organic fertilizer.The NESSAP framework seeks to achieve the policy goals in three levels. At the first level, it seeks to raise awareness for change in sanitation-behaviour and attitudes towards all wastes encompassing advocacy at the highest political levels, effectively implementing policies, and enhancing environmental sanitation education and enforcement management. The Second level is to pursue a phased programme for incremental improvements in all aspects of environmental sanitation services targeting the reduction of wastes for final disposal. And the third level is to ensure effective coordination of, and collaboration among, sector stakeholders for country-wide adoption of policies, plans and programmes.

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3.5.6 Other Guidelines and Standards for Environmental Sanitation

Aside the national level policies discussed above, there are other subsidiary guidelines and standards that have been developed by the MLGRD in collaboration with other sector ministries that are concerned with environmental sanitation. The following guidelines and standards are also in place to for environmental sanitation and waste management:

 National Environmental Quality Guidelines (1998)  Ghana Landfill Guidelines (2002)  Handbook for the preparation of District Level Environmental Sanitation Strategies and Action Plans (DESSAPs).  Manual for the preparation of district waste management plans in Ghana (2002)  Guidelines for the management of healthcare and veterinary waste in Ghana (2002)

3.6 Legal and Regulatory Framework for Environmental Sanitation in Ghana

3.6.1 Local Government Act, 1993 (Act 462)

The local government act was enacted in 1993 after coming into force the 1992 constitution of Ghana. The act takes it source from the constitution which is the supreme laws of the land. The Local Government Act defines the legal roles and functions of local District Assemblies and their officers in providing and promoting environmental sanitation at the local levels. The local government act gives powers to DAs over their jurisdiction to execute development projects and enforce laws of the land. DAs are established as the planning authority for its area of jurisdiction.

Among the many areas DAs have powers for planning and regulation is environmental sanitation and abatement of environmental nuisance. The act gives DAs the power to charge fees for environmental sanitation service or facility provided by the assembly or for a license or permits issued by or on behalf of the assembly and prosecute in the event of default. The act also mandates the sanitary inspector under the Infectious Diseases Act, 1908 to enforce the by-laws relating to public health made by the DA. Environmental health officers of DAs have the right of entry for inspection of premises and any wilful

104 obstruction of officers from executing their duties of office by any person, commits an offence under the local government act and is liable on conviction to a fine or a term of imprisonment not exceeding one month or to both the fine and the imprisonment.

DAs are empowered by the act to constitute a district assembly tender board which shall advise the assembly on the award of contracts in the district including PPP contracts in sanitation. The act also empowers DAs to make by-laws for the purpose of a function conferred on it by an act or any other enactment. All environmental sanitation by-laws take their source from the local government act of Ghana.

3.6.2 Environmental Sanitation By-Laws

The Local Government Act 1993 (Act 462) conferred on MMDAs the powers to promulgate by- laws to govern and regulate environmental sanitation, waste management, cleansing and abatement of nuisance within their jurisdiction. By-laws as promulgated and gazetted become a legal instrument for regulating environmental sanitation sector within the local assemblies and are enforceable at the law court. By-laws must take their root from and be in agreement with the local government act, the constitution of the republic and other legal codes of the state. Sanitation by-laws are the primary legal tools available at the local level for regulating and enforcing compliance. For instance, the Accra Metropolitan Assembly AMA [Solid and Liquid Waste Management] bylaws 1995, specify the exclusive responsibility of the AMA, its agents, or registered contractors for the management of solid and liquid waste in its area of jurisdiction, and outline the responsibilities of households, industries, and offices regarding bylaw violations and sanctions.

3.6.3 Criminal Code of Ghana, 1960 (Act 29)

The criminal code on public nuisance was the only national legislative instrument on environmental sanitation prior to coming in force the 1992 Constitution and the Local Government Act. The criminal code particularly sought to address indiscriminate disposal of waste at public places and prosecution of offenders. The Criminal Code of Ghana, 1960 (Act 29) provides that: 105

“Whoever places or permits to be placed, any refuse, or rubbish, or any offensive or otherwise unwholesome matter, on any street, yard, enclosure, or open space, except at such places as may be set apart by the local authority or health officer for that purpose commits a punishable offence”.

The law seeks to ensure that residents take responsibility for the streets in front of them as well as their premises (Oduro-Kwarteng, 2011). The criminal codes together with other legislations constitute the legal and regulatory framework for maintaining clean environment.

3.6.4 Other Legal Provisions

The other relevant legal provision that governs the environmental sanitation sector in Ghana includes:  Public Health Act 2012 (Act 851)  Procurement Act and Assembly Tender Board regulation,  Environmental Protection Agency Act, 1994 (Act 490)  Environmental Assessment Regulations, 1999 (LI 1652)  National Building Regulations, 1996 (LI 1630)  Town and Country Planning Ordinances, 1944 (Cap 84)  Vaccination Ordinance Cap 76  Food and Drugs Law 305b (1992)  Mortuaries and Funeral Facilities Act, 1998 (Act 563)  Water Resources Commission Act, 1996 (Act 522)  Pesticides Control and Management Act, 1996 (Act 528)

These legal frameworks have provisions for environmental sanitation and waste management and therefore require the effort of the public sector institutions to implement and enforce the laws for effective sanitation management (Oduro-Kwarteng, 2011). For example, the National Building Regulations, 1996 (LI 1630) stipulates that a building for residential, commercial, industrial, civic or cultural use shall have a facility for refuse disposal. It further states as a requirement, that each dwelling unit shall have a standardised dustbin or other receptacle approved by the Assembly in which all refuse generated shall

106 be stored temporarily. It touched on drainage and waste water treatment among other sanitation regulations required for every building in Ghana.

3.7 Institutional Arrangement for Environmental Sanitation Management in Ghana

The Ministry of Local Government and Rural Development [MLGRD] and the MMDAs are key sector institutions concerned with the formulation and implementation of the Environmental Sanitation Policy in Ghana. The MLGRD is responsible for the supervision of MMDAs in their implementation of the policy at the local level. The Environmental Health and Sanitation Directorate [EHSD], under the MLGRD is responsible for sector coordination and facilitation of MMDAs in implementing national level programmes on environmental sanitation. At the regional level, the Regional Environmental Health and Sanitation Directorate [REHSDs] provides facilitation support to Environmental Health and Management Departments [EHMDs, provided for by policy] at district level (NESSAP, 2010). The Waste Management Departments [WMD] of the MMDAs have the responsibility for solid waste management. Waste management is a decentralised function of the Local Governments, which began after the decentralisation reforms in 1988. The WMD is responsible for the liquid and solid waste collection and disposal, public cleansing, education of the public on waste management and supervision of activities of private contractors engaged by the Assemblies. The sub-metro cleansing or sanitation officers are responsible for solid waste collection monitoring. The health inspectors of Environmental Health Department [EHD] are expected to regulate and monitor the quality of service delivery and sanitary conditions, and sanction possible offenders (Oduro-Kwarteng, 2011).

Allied sector institutions involved in the implementation of the ESP of Ghana are the Environmental Protection Agency [EPA], the Ministry of Health [MoH], Ministry of Education [MoE], Ministry of Water Resources, Works and Housing [MWRWH], Ministry of Women and Children [MOWAC], Town and Country Planning Department [TCPD], Ghana Statistical Services [GSS], Hydrological Services Department [HSD], Community Water and Sanitation Agency [CWSA], Ghana Water Company Limited [GWCL], Department of Urban Roads [DUR], and the Department of Feeder Roads [DFR]. All allied institutions have their roles spelt out by the NESP, 2010.

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Figure 7: Organizational Collaboration between Agencies for Delivering Aspect of Environmental Sanitation Services

Source: National Environmental Sanitation Strategy and Action Plan (NESSAP) 2010 – 2015

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3.8 Ghana’s Decentralization History in Perspective

Attempts at decentralization predate colonial independence in 1957 when colonial authorities introduced the “indirect rule” system of governance as a way of legitimising their rule and reducing conflicts by ruling through traditional authorities called Chiefs. According to Capistrano and Colfer (2005), the introduction of decentralization in Gold Coast in the 1870’s by the British colonial authorities provided the basis for traditional authorities to carry out some local government function including judicial and legislative functions and management of some resources. The local government administration basically revolved around chiefs and some few loyal locals without any properly defined structure. Literature suggests that the introduction of the indirect rule concept was not just another government policy rather it emerged as a strategy to effectively manage large colonies (Crook, 1986).

After the Second World War, a number of commissions were appointed to make recommendations for a more effective local government system (Warren and Blunt, 1983). Following the 1948 disturbances in the major cities in Ghana, due to lack of local representation in governance and poor quality of life, and an attempt to address the inadequacies identified by the Coussey Committee in 1949, the first Local Government Ordinance was commissioned in 1951 (Stiftung, 2010). Within five years of its implementation, the Coussey Committee report was to be reviewed again in 1956 by the Greenwood Committee to strengthen; the structure of Local Government, revenue control systems, expenditure control measures, taxation and Local Government financing among others. However, the recommendations of the Greenwood Committee were short lived.

After political independence in 1957, successive governments and regimes in Ghana have continued with the decentralization process because they regarded it as a necessary condition for not only the socio-economic development of the country, but also as a way of achieving their political objectives such as the recentralization of power and legitimacy (Ayee, 2004). Literature reveals that, efforts by the post-independence regimes resulted in recentralisation (Crawford, 2004; Kyiu, 2010; Ayee, 2008). The Convention People Party (CPP) led by Dr. Kwame Nkrumah, enacted the Local government 1961, (Act 54) as part of the 1960 constitution in the bid to institutionalise decentralisation. Nevertheless, this attempt suffered certain pitfalls. Whereas the colonial authorities used the chieftancy

109 institution as a rallying point to introduce decentralisation, the post independent administration led by Nkrumah ignored these pre-existing locally revered community institutions. These institutions were side-lined because they were perceived by the Nkrumah administration as a menace to national governance (Hoffman and Metzroth, 2010). Also, some chiefs were also perceived as political opponents hence the attempt to eliminate them from governance to reduce their influence.

After the fall of the First Republic in 1966 the Siriboe Committee (appointed in 1967) proposed a three-tier system of regional councils, district councils, and area, town and local councils, with the district councils as the main administrative units. The Siriboe Report and that of the Mills-Oddoye Commission of 1967 are the main bases for the 1971 Local Government (Local Administration) Act 359. This Act was later amended in 1974 to create four-tier system of regional councils, district councils, local, area, urban and municipal councils, and town/village development committees. However, the major attempt at real decentralization begun in 1988 with the promulgation of Provisional National Defence Council (PNDC) Law 207, this was later replaced by an Act of parliament in1993 with the Local Government Act (Act 462). The current Local Government act of Ghana derives its powers from the chapter 20 of the 1992 Constitution. Also, there are other legislative provisions put in place to facilitate the effective implementation and actualization of the policy. These includes the National Development Planning Commission Act, 1994 (Act 479), Civil Service Law, 1993 (PNDC Law 327), National Development Planning System Act, 1994 (Act 480), Local Government (Urban, Zonal and Town Councils and Unit Committees) (Establishment) Instrument of 1994, LI 1589; and the District Assemblies Common Fund Act 1993 (Act 445).

For the purpose of this thesis, decentralization refers to the transfer of authority and power for public planning, management and administration from central government to lower levels of government, or from national to sub-national levels (Crawford, 2004; Rondinelli et al., 1983; Ribot, 2001; Saltman et al., 2007). Ayee (2008) defined decentralization in the Ghanaian context as the “transfer of significant authority, responsibility for service and fiscal and human resources to local government units for the development of their areas and reduction of poverty and also involving legal and administrative measures to transfer authority, resources, accountability and rules from central government to local entities” Ghana’s decentralization policy combines elements of political, administrative, decentralized planning and fiscal decentralization. The decentralisation policy of Ghana

110 devolves power, functions and responsibility as well as human and financial resources from the central government to the district level and also establishes major areas of relationship between the local and central government (Stiftung, 2010)The policy specifically seeks to promote popular participation in the decision-making process and responsive governance at the local level (Ayee, 2008; Yankson, 2000). The new decentralization policy document by the Ministry of Local Government and Rural Development (MLGRD; 2010) specifically identifies popular participation and accountability as one of the 10 priority action areas in its action plan to achieve overall decentralization (Adams and Taabazuing, 2015). The idea of grassroots participation in local systems of governance was given further expression by Article 35 section 6 (d) of the 1992 constitution which states that:

“Make democracy a reality by decentralizing the administrative and financial machinery of government to the regions and districts and by affording all possible opportunities to the people to participate in decision - making at every level in national life and in government”

In all, the central theme of the decentralization policy is to promote participatory development at the local level. However, participation in action has either been a lip service and a cosmetic exercise to fulfil both policy and donor requirements. Despite the best intentions of legislators and policy makers, however, it is evident that the majority of local assemblies have, thus far, failed to give effect to the principles of participation at the grassroots (Tapscott, 2007).

3.9 The Local Government System and Structure in Ghana

Local governments undoubtedly are pivots for development at the grassroots. In Ghana, local government play very important roles in administration and development at the local areas (Stiftung, 2010). The 1992 Constitution of the Republic of Ghana provides for “Decentralisation and Local Government” that creates a framework for citizens’ participation in decision-making and local governance (Stiftung, 2010). Ghana is a unitary state divided into 10 administrative regions. Each region has an administrative unit called Regional Coordinating Council, [RCC] headed by a Regional Minister as its chairperson.

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Reginal ministers are appointed by the President as the political head of the regions. To facilitate a holistic approach to the decentralisation process, various structures have been created at the sub-national level with the Regional Coordinating Council [RCC] as a coordinating body (Stiftung, 2010).

Ghana’s decentralisation process as enshrined in the Constitution created District Assemblies [DAs] as the principal units of local governance in Ghana. The Local Government Act (Act 462) of 1993 designates the DAs as the highest political, legislating, budgeting and planning authority at the local level. The RCCs have oversight responsibilities to coordinate and harmonize the program of the District Assemblies within their jurisdiction. Depending on the population and size of an area, the availability of social infrastructure and other settlement characteristics, local government areas are classified into to three types, namely Metropolitan, Municipal and District Assemblies. A Metropolitan Assembly is a Local Government unit or area with a district population of over 250,000; A Municipal Assembly is a one town assembly with a district population between 95,000, and 250,000; A District Assembly is a group settlement with a minimum district population of 75,000 and a maximum of 95,000. At the time of this research, Ghana had 216 district assemblies which comprised 6 Metropolitan Assemblies, 49 Municipal Assemblies and 161 District Assemblies.

Table 1: Distribution of MMDAs and 2010 Population Census Region Number of assemblies Population Metropolitan Municipal District (census 2010) Western 1 2 19 2,376,021 Central 1 6 13 2,201,863 Greater Accra 2 9 5 4,010,054 Volta 5 20 2,118,252 Eastern 8 18 2,633,154 Ashanti 1 7 22 4,780,380 Brong Ahafo 8 19 2,310,983 Northern 1 1 24 2,479,461 Upper East 2 11 1,046,545 Upper West 1 10 702,110 Total (Ghana) 6 49 161 24,658,823 Source: Deductions from Ghanadistricts.com and Ghana statistical service website

The PNDC Law 207 initially created a three tier sub-national governance structures. This was subsequently refined by the 1992 Constitution and Local Government Act, 462 of 1993. These structures operate at the regional, district and sub-district levels. The current

112 local government system in Ghana is made up of a RCC and a four-tier Metropolitan and three-tier Municipal and District Assemblies. Due to the large population size of metropolitan assemblies, a sub-metropolitan council is created as an intermediary between the assembly and the council hence the four-tier structure of metropolitan assemblies. However, except for the sub-metro structures and population differences, the internal political structures of the all the district assemblies are the same (Buabeng, 2010).

The sub-governance structures begin at the grassroots with the Unit Committees (UC) for every community or settlement with a population of about 500 – 1000 in rural areas, and of 1500 people for urban areas. Depending on the population size, this is followed by Urban Councils, where the population is over 15,000 people or the Zonal/Town/Area Council where the population is between 5000 and 15,000 (Adams and Taabazuing, 2015).

Figure 8: Structure of the Local Government System in Ghana

The Regional Co-ordinating Council

Metropolitan Municipal District

Sub-Metropolitan District Council

Town Councils Zonal Councils Urban/Town/Area Councils

Unit Committees

Source: Introduction to Ghana’s Local Government System, ILGS, 2008

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RCCs are established in all 10 regions of Ghana. Though this body represents the first-tier and the highest level of Local Governance in Ghana their function remains administrative and coordinating rather than political or policy-making one. The District Assemblies remain the highest political, legislative and deliberative body at the local level. The RCC consists of the Regional Minister (the chairperson), his deputies, the Presiding Member of each District Assembly (DA) unless otherwise stated and the Chief Executive of each district in the region, as well as two chiefs from the regional house of chiefs and the regional heads of decentralised departments, who have no voting rights (Local Government Act 462 of 1993).

According to the Local Government Act 462 of 1993, a DA is headed by a Chief Executive appointed by the President and approved by two-thirds of the total membership of the Assembly, Two-thirds of the members representing 70% are directly elected by universal adult suffrage on a non-partisan basis, The Members of Parliament (MPs) representing constituencies within the district, Not less than 30% of the members appointed by the President in consultation with traditional authorities and interest groups in the district.

Below the DA is sub-district structures called Sub-Metro Councils, Urban or Town or Zonal or Area Councils and Unit Committees. The Sub-Metros which are directly under the Metropolitan Assemblies are subsidiaries put in place to make the Metropolitan Assemblies manageable due to their large size and population. Sub-Metro Councils are divided into electoral areas, consist of not less than 25 and not more than 30 members, made up of all elected members of the Assembly in that Sub-Metropolitan District and as such other persons resident in the Sub-Metropolitan District appointed by the President (Stiftung, 2010).

Urban/Town/Zonal/Area Councils are the local sub-divisions where local government is further decentralised to the people. Urban Councils consist of not less than 25 and not more than 30 members made up of not more than 8 persons elected from among the members of the relevant DA, not more than 12 representatives from the Unit Committee in the area of authority of the Urban Council and not more than 10 persons ordinarily resident in the urban area. The Zonal Council consists of not less than 15 and not more than 20 members made up of not more than 5 persons elected from among the members of the relevant Municipal Assembly, not more than 10 representatives from the Unit Committees and not more than 5 persons ordinarily resident in the zone. The Town and Area Councils consist

114 of not less than 15 and not more than 20 members and they are made up of not more than 5 persons elected from among the members of the relevant Assembly, not more than 10 representatives from the Unit Committees and not more than 5 persons ordinarily resident in the town or area (Zanu, 1996).

Unit Committees are the least and the smallest unit of the local government structure. They are a consultative body and serve as a link between the people and the DA since they are the closest to the people. Membership of the unit committee is by election during the district assembly elections which are non-partisan in nature. The UC serve as a point of mobilisation in the communities. In theory, the Unit Committees provide structured mechanisms of representation, participation and accountability from village levels upwards (Zanu, 1996). Whereas all other members of the DA operate on budget and are remunerated by the central government through the Office of the Head of the Civil Service, Unit Committee members are not remunerated neither do they have any budget of their own in performing their duties. The Unit Committee consists of not more than 15 persons made up of 10 elected persons ordinarily resident in the unit and not more than 5 other persons’ resident in the unit and nominated by the District Chief Executive, acting on behalf of the President.

3.10 Decentralization and Public Services Delivery in Ghana

The primary aim of the decentralisation policy of Ghana was to devolve power and authority from the central government to the local unit to bring governance closer to the grassroots. Decentralization as adduced in literature has different forms and types in classification. Decentralisation is mostly discussed in literature in the form of political, administrative, spatial and market decentralization (Oduro-Kwarteng, 2011). According to Cohen et al. (1999), different combinations of the forms of decentralization result in types of decentralization. Three types of decentralization derived from the forms stated are mainly in practice. These are deconcentration, delegation and devolution (Rondinelli et al., 1983). Deconcentration of power and authority take place within the central government circles, where responsibility and roles are reassigned among various department and units. This type does not usually involve transfer of power to the local government. Delegation involves the transfer of authority for decision making and administration of central

115 government functions to a (semi-) autonomous organisations that are not under the direct control of the government (or not wholly controlled by government) but ultimately accountable to it (van Dijk, 2007). Devolution on the other hand transfers authority for decision making, finance and management from central government to quasi-autonomous local government units.

All three types of Decentralization are practised in Ghana. However, the commonest types in practice are devolution and delegation. The devolution of political and administrative power and responsibility from central government to the district assemblies is done to equip local authorities to champion development and public service delivery at the local level. Most public services in Ghana are decentralized functions of the local government authorities. Examples of devolved services in Ghana include construction and maintenance of feeder roads, delivery of relief and sanitation services, and development planning (Akramov and Asante, 2009). The Environmental Sanitation Policy of Ghana (2010) emphasises the role of local governments in planning and managing sanitation services. Local governments are given the mandate to make decision, regulate service delivery by the private sector and to enforce rules governing the sector (Oduro-Kwarteng, 2011). Their powers in public services delivery includes legislative (adopting bylaws), fiscal (revenue raising and expenditure allocation), and administrative discretionary power (Akramov and Asante, 2009). Delegated public services in Ghana are those that are delegated to local authorities or agencies by the central government ministry or agency. In this case, the local assembly only act as agents of central government without significant discretionary power in these services. Services and programs are implemented at the local levels, but are regulated from the central delegator agencies. Some examples of delegated public services in Ghana include health, education, agriculture, water provision etc. Decentralization of public services in Ghana is expected to improve public service delivery and to make assessable government services to the grassroots.

According to Oduro-Kwarteng (2011) decentralisation indeed brought major institutional changes such as making the district assemblies the pivot and focal point of planning and development. However that the administration of the LGs in Ghana are weak since the central government continues to exercise tremendous authority and make spending decisions in a highly centralised and deconcentrated fashion (Oduro-Kwarteng, 2011). Obirih-Opareh et al. (2004) noted that the decentralization effort in Ghana to strengthening the MMDAs and creating Sub-Metropolitan Assemblies within the Metropolitan

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Assemblies has not paid off. The reasons adduced for this non-performance includes the non-ability of central government to perform its obligation of resource transfer to the lower tier in order for them to perform their responsibilities and the fact that departments such as the waste management department (WMD) lacks financial autonomy and continues to depend on the highly politicized allocative policies of the local authorities. Despite the various challenges faced by LGs in service delivery, effective collaborative efforts among actors in implementing national policies at the local level may enhance service delivery to a large extent. However, how these actors contribute to make the decentralization process more effective are least discussed in literature.

3.11 Public Private Partnerships [PPP] and Environmental Sanitation in Ghana

Public Private Partnerships in the sanitation sector in Ghana had begun in the two main cities of Ghana namely Accra and Kumasi and later spread to other cities (Ayee and Crook, 2003). Private sector involvement in the environmental sanitation and waste management services were not prevalent in other local government assemblies until recently (ibid). Prior to the introduction of decentralization reforms in 1988, the provision and management of sanitation services were solely managed by the central parastatals and city authorities. These functions were later decentralized to the Local Government assemblies. However, due to weak capacity and resource constraints in providing adequate sanitation services by the LGs, market mechanisms were introduced in 1990. Government of Ghana after opening up to the market laid the necessary foundation by formulating policies and legal frameworks, ensuring reforms, financing mechanisms, incentives and institutional support to support private sector participation in the provision of public infrastructure and services (Government of Ghana, 2013). The major instruments used to engage the private sector in the area of service provision includes outsourcing (contracting out), franchising, public- private, partnerships (PPPs) and concessions (Blöndal, 2005).

The LGs of Accra, Tema and Kumasi first embraced the PPP idea and subsequently started contracting out and franchising of sanitation services to the private sector (Oduro- Kwarteng, 2011). The Waste Management Department (WMD) in Accra privatized 80 percent of waste management (Boadi and Kuitunen, 2003) with less involvement of the assembly with only 20% of management. Public-Private Partnerships (PPPs) have been

117 implemented by both local and central governments in Ghana in the provision of otherwise traditional public services including sanitation in recent years (Asare and Frimpong, 2013).There has been active private sector involvement in the environmental sanitation sector in Ghana over the year. These PPP agreements are signed by LG authorities with private waste management companies under supervision of the Ministry of Local Government and Rural Development (MLGRD). The ministry regulates and controls market entry and exit procedures, measure and assess the capacities of companies operating in the waste market, the service standards, and determines user charges (Oduro- Kwarteng, 2011). LGs are given the mandates to outsource waste management functions to the private sector through competitive bidding in accordance with the National Procurement Act (2003). LGs also exercise their supervisory mandate in monitoring service quality and powers to sanction any non-compliance according to the regulations and terms of the contract.

The sanitation sub-sector has witnessed various forms of partnerships over the years. In July 1999, the national government contracted City and Country Waste Limited (CCWL), a Canadian-Ghanaian joint venture partnership, to provide sanitation services in the AMA (Post et al., 2003). Waste management companies like Teriwhite, Amanie Farm and Waste, and Nambok were in partnership with the Ga East Municipal Assembly to provide sanitation services. The Partnership with Zoomlion Ghana Ltd the largest waste management company in Ghana is part of a range of partnerships on various fronts that started with the Government of Ghana in 2006. Another sector for private partnership is NGOs in water and sanitation (WASH). Before the coalition of NGOs in water and sanitation (CONIWAS) was created in 2001, the sanitation sector had various partnerships in both local and international NGOs in this area. CONIWAS was formed to give NGOs one voice for advocacy and lobbying. Ghana’s Public-Private Partnership for Hand- washing with Soap (PPP-HwS) is part of a wider global initiative campaign aimed at addressing the problem of diarrhea diseases and acute respiratory infections by promoting the practice of handwashing with soap among mothers and caregivers of children under five years and school children of age 6-15 years (NESSAP, 2010). The above reviews indicate the dominance of PPP in the sanitation sector in Ghana. However, it is argued that Ghana, like other developing countries, lacks capacity to regulate, monitor and manage partnerships and contracts to actualize policy intents (see, Post et al., 2003).

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3.12 Community/Public Participation in Ghana

Community participation concept is embedded in most Ghanaian cultures. Many communities believe in participation and for that matter, projects of common interest are communally executed (Bonye et al., 2013). A typical example is the “dudor” and “fidodo” system among Ewes, “nnoboa” among the Ashanti and “Kotaar” among the Dagaaba. In Ghana, the government and non-governmental organizations have always facilitated communities to participate in local governance and social project management either through the community representatives or the entire community members (Kendie and Guri, 2007). Community involvement in environmental sanitation projects is vital, since bad sanitation has direct consequences on the community. Community participation in the planning and design of environmental sanitation projects has not been pronounced in the colonial past. Increasingly, donor partners and international NGOs have pushed for community involvement in the design of sanitation facilities by national and local governments.

Ghana adopted among other participatory methods of managing rural sanitation, the Community Led Total Sanitation (CLTS) approach to help rural communities to do their own appraisal and analysis, come to their own conclusions, and take their own action on sanitation projects (Magala and Roberts, 2009). The introduction of decentralization was a tool to get community members involved in governance and decision making. Though decentralization measures have brought about an increased level of participation in local decision-making and in local development initiatives, yet this level remains relatively low (Crawford, 2004). However, Ayee (2000, p. 34) believes that the “opportunities for participation are moderate but growing”

The ESP of Ghana identified the important role community participation plays in the implementation of the policy. It however stressed the importance of community participation in actualizing the ESP. One of the central themes in the implementation of the ESP in NESSAP is the Community Participation and Public Awareness Program. This program focuses mainly on behavioral change communication and social marketing issues to meet the awareness raising theme of the framework for environmental sanitation. Bonye et al. (2013); however, argues that, whether the community will be effective in initiating and participating in such programs depends on the community dynamics and the culturally

119 arranged leadership. They further opined that for participation to be effective, participatory initiatives must include sharing of power between the community and decision-makers.

3.13 Basis for Actor Relations in ESP Implementation in Ghana

To understand the kind of relations that exist between actors at the local level, it is imperative to review the context within which possible relations may develop. The provision of public service by the local government is done in collaboration with other actors within a certain framework where various relations may develop. This section will discuss some of the basis for a relationship.

3.13.1 Legislative Relations

Relations between actors who co-implement the ESP exist within the legislative power that governs the sanitation sub-sector in Ghana. According to the 1992 republican constitution of Ghana, article 245 and the Local Government Act 462 (1993), District Assemblies have been empowered to exercise political and administrative authority in the district and to provide guidance, give direction to, and supervise the other administrative authorities in the district. To this end, LGs have been given powers, roles and responsibilities to oversee the overall development and wellbeing of the local assemblies. The relationships that may exist between the LG, the local communities, service providers and other entities that work with the local assemblies are regulated by the constitution of the state, LG acts, civil service act, LG by-laws and any enactment by the state or the LG. Legislative relations therefore exist as a result of professional and legal requirements where compliance is enforced and breaches are met with punitive actions.

3.13.2 Contractual Relations

Contracts are agreements between two or more parties that are binding and enforceable by law. Contractual relations develop out of legal agreements between parties where

120 performance and consideration are required. Though public service provisions are core responsibility of local assemblies, these are done in collaboration with the private sector in Public-Private-Partnership agreements. The LGs are required to outsource part of the services they provide in sanitation to private enterprises, NGOs and CBOs. This arrangement brings the LG and other entities together in a contractual relation to provide services. Public Procurement Act 663 which replaced the District Tender Board Regulations, 1995 (L.I. 1606) serves as the legal framework for contractual relations between the LGs and private service providers in the provision of sanitation services at the local level. Most PPPs in environmental sanitation are expressed in contracts, franchise agreements or concessions. Out of these contractual agreements arise principal-agent relationships. Agency relation is an arrangement in which one entity legally appoints another to act on its behalf. Contracting-out public service by LGs to private entities produces a fiduciary relationship between the two which is bonded by trust and confidence. The agent must serve the interest of the principal and must not have any conflict of interest in the performance of their duties. Contracts therefore form the basis for the actors in sanitation service provision to relate.

3.13.3 Customer/Client Relations

Due to the weakness in the public administration system to effectively provide public service to citizens, market conditions were introduced where the public service space was liberalized for private participation. According the NESP, eighty percent (80%) of waste management and sanitation related duties shall be provided by the private sector in a PPP arrangement. This then create an avenue for the private service provider and citizens who in this context, are their clients to relate. This relation is akin to those at the market place between the seller and the buyer. However due to the non-excludability nature of public goods and public interest concerns, this relation cannot entirely be controlled by the market. This relation is coordinated by the local government as the principal and partners in service provision. The relationship between the service provider and their clients (the citizens and the community) has some ramification for environmental sanitation in Ghana.

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3.13.4 Social Relations

Social relations maybe termed as interactions between two or more people, groups, or organizations11. Social relations develop out of communal co-existence among groups of people or organizations. In order to get people to work together within a community, they must first agree on social grounds to collaborate in carrying out such an assignment. For LGs, NGOs, CBOs and other private organization to engage their target population in implementing national programs, they must first develop relations with their audience. An attempt to implement policies without first courting the attention of community members and beneficiaries may not see the light of day. Social relations are crucial in development policy practice. They form the basis on which networks can be built to penetrate the fabric of societies where policies at targeted. Social relations exist out of norms, customs or values. In integrated public management, social relations are imperative for public policy implementation at the local level. Social factors thus form the basis for which actors relate in implementing ESP at the local level.

3.14 Conclusion

This chapter presents the background to the research context. It discussed the state and current development of Ghana and a brief overview of the research area in Accra. It presents a general overview of sanitation situation of Ghana and some environmental sanitation support programs such as the National Sanitation Day Program [NSDP], Community Led Total Sanitation [CLTS], School Health and Education Program [SHEP], National Youth Employment Program [NYEP] – Sanitation Module, National Community Water and Sanitation Program [NCWSP] and Expanded Sanitation Inspection, Compliance Management and Enforcement Program [ESICOME] currently being implemented in Ghana. It establishes that Ghana has various programs in place to effectively tackle the problem of environmental sanitation, but most of these programs failed to make the desired impact. The chapter presents the policy and regulatory framework for environmental sanitation in Ghana and also Ghana’s decentralization and local government structure. It

11 Alleydog.com (2016). Social Relations [Online]. Available at: www.alleydog.com/glossary/definition.php?term=Social%20Relations. [Accessed August 15, 2016] 122 portrays adequate policy and regulatory framework with effective policy instruments to tackle environmental sanitation in Ghana but implementation has not been successful.

The chapter further discussed the decentralization of public services in Ghana, Public- Private Partnerships in Ghana and in the environmental sanitation sub-sector. Decentralization of public service over two decades of adopting the concept did not pay off in sanitation service provision though there has been an improvement on centralised services which it replaced. However, Ghana made good progress in establishing a policy framework for PPP and passing into law the PPP act to concretize PPP operations in Ghana. It also looked at community participation in implementing policies at the local level and how far it has impacted development in Ghana so far. The final section discussed some of the basis for actors’ relation in ESP implementation at the local level. It looked at some established foundations for which actor may come together to interact and establish some relations.

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CHAPTER FOUR

METHODOLOGY AND RESEARCH DESIGN

4.0 Introduction

This chapter presents the research philosophy, paradigm, design and methods that were used in conducting the study. The chapter clarifies the researchers’ philosophical, ontological and epistemological viewpoints. Again, the chapter discusses the methodology of the research, clarifying the meaning and differences between quantitative and qualitative research methods and the reason for the choice of the qualitative method. The chapter further states the choice of the research design and the strategies it adopts in answering the research questions. Furthermore, the details of field work carried out in Ghana are highlighted to provide insights into the data collection process and the challenges encountered. The chapter also explains how data was analysed to generate research findings as well as ethical concerns that guided the study. A conclusion to the chapter was drawn in a summary.

4.1 Philosophical Assumptions of the Research

There are different views and perspectives in conducting a study. According to Burrell and Morgan (1979) there are philosophical considerations and positions that underwrite different approaches to social science research. The difference in philosophical approaches to research and the outcome of a research is particularly influenced by philosophical paradigm of the researcher. What may be considered by one researcher as a factual reality may be seen by another as a social construction. One’s philosophical beliefs affect one’s choice of ‘legitimate questions’ as well as one’s choice of research methods” (Ladd, 2008). According to Creswell et al. (2007), researchers should begin their inquiry process with philosophical assumptions about the nature of reality (ontology), how they know what is known (epistemology), the inclusion of their values (axiology), the nature in which their research emerges (methodology), and their writing structures (rhetorical).

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4.2 Approaches to Social Science Research

Social science research has two broad diametrically opposing perspectives in its study. These perspectives are classified as Subjectivist and Objectivist approaches. Subjectivism perceives that social phenomena are created from perceptions and consequent actions of those social actors concerned with their existence. On the contrary Objectivism “portrays the position that social entities exist in reality external to social actors concerned with their existence” (Saunders et al., 2009). Social scientists approach their subject via explicit or implicit assumptions about the nature of the social world and the way in which it may be investigated (Burrell and Morgan, 1979). In their work “Sociological Paradigms and Organisational Analysis” Burrell and Morgan (1979) argue that it is convenient to conceptualise social science in terms of four sets of assumptions related to ontology, epistemology, human nature and methodology. This research will largely depend on the actions and perceptions of social actors to answer the research questions. The research will therefore adopt the subjectivist approach to analyse the social phenomenon of actor relations and their influence on policy implementation.

4.2.1 Ontology

Ontology is concerned with the nature of reality and what there is to know about the world (Ritchie et al., 2013). Identification of ontology at the start of the research process is critically important as it determines the choice of the research design. Social science has been shaped by two overarching ontological positions in relation to realism and idealism. Realism is based on the idea that there is an external reality which exist independently of people’s beliefs about or understanding of it (Ritchie et al., 2013). The individual is seen as being born into and living within a social world, which has a reality of its own. It is not something which the individual creates, it exists “out there:” ontologically, it is prior to the existence and consciousness of any single human being (Burrell and Morgan, 1979). Idealism/Normalism on the other hand, asserts that reality is fundamentally mind- dependent: it is only knowable through the human mind and through socially constructed meanings, and no reality exists independently of these (Ritchie et al., 2013). Since the phenomenon under investigation is socially constructed and mind dependent, it is

125 appropriate to adopt the Idealist/Normalist ontology for the study. The research questions can best be answered through the observation of social phenomenon, the social actors and individuals involved.

4.2.2 Epistemology

Epistemology is concerned with ways of knowing and learning about the world and focuses on issues such as how we can learn about reality and what forms the basis of our knowledge (Ritchie et al., 2013). Epistemological assumptions decide what is to count as acceptable truth by specifying the criteria and process of assessing truth claims (Chua, 1986).

According to Burrell and Morgan (1979), these are assumptions about the grounds of knowledge about how one might begin to understand the world and communicate this as knowledge to fellow human beings. Two major epistemological orientations have dominated debate in the social sciences: positivism and constructionism. Positivists posit that the social world exists externally, and that its properties should be measured through objective methods, rather than being inferred subjectively through sensation, reflection or intuition (Easterby-Smith et al., 2012). Positivist researchers stand as neutral observers, using scientific techniques that allow them to get beyond human biases so that they can make contact with “reality” and document “facts” (Wicks and Freeman, 1998, p. 125). Constructivist/Anti-Positivist in contrast, argues that while positivism may be an appropriate epistemology for the natural world, it is inadequate for the understanding of the human world. For the study of humans as social beings it is necessary to adopt a non- positivist orientation to investigation (Berkeley, 2004).

The constructivist contends that the world of lived reality and situation specific meanings that constitute the general object of investigation is thought to be constructed by social actors. That is, particular actors, in particular places, at particular times, fashion meaning out of events and phenomena through prolonged, complex, process of social interaction involving history, language and action (Schwandt, 1994). In trying to ascertain the true nature of relations that exist between the actors and their influence on policy implementation, the researcher’s role in producing the knowledge cannot be gainsaid. The

126 researcher’s active role and influence are necessary in answering the research questions. Therefore, the study will adopt the Constructivist/Anti-Positivist approach in conducting the research.

4.2.3 Axiology

All researchers bring on board their personal values and biases in to their study, while quantitative researchers try to reduce these values and biases through statistical extrapolations, a qualitative researcher acknowledges and discloses such values in a study rather than overlooking them (Creswell and Poth, 2017). Axiology is concerned with assessment of the role of the researcher’s own value on all stages of the research process (Li, 2016; Ponterotto, 2005). Positivists and post positivists maintain that one’s values, hope, aspirations and feelings have no place in scientific research, therefore researchers should remain emotionally detached from investigative enquiry. Whereas constructivists – interpretivists uphold the views that, the researcher’s values and life experiences cannot be divorced from the research process therefore the researcher should acknowledge and describe his or her values but not to eliminate them (Ponterotto, 2005). Ponterotto (2005) further argues that the epistemology underlying a constructivist position requires close, prolonged interpersonal contact with the participants in order to facilitate their construction and expression of the “lived experience” being studied. Therefore, it is a fallacy to even think that one could eliminate value biases in such an interdependent researcher-participant interaction.

4.2.4 Methodology

Depending on the researcher’s orientation, the philosophical assumptions have direct implications for the choice of methodology. Research methodology flows from one’s position on ontology, epistemology and axiology. Methodology refers to ways of obtaining, organising and analysing data (Polit and Hungler, 2004b). Carter and Little (2007) hold the view that knowledge is created from data analysis, therefore methods must be appropriate.

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Within the methodological strand is the ideographic-nomothetic methodological dichotomy propounded by Burrell and Morgan (1979). Ideographic debates contend that by understanding their subjects, social researchers are able to understand the world (Burrell and Morgan, 1979). The key is “looking for the uniqueness in individual cases” (Åsberg et al., 2011, p. 410) and getting to understand “nature and characteristics” of the subject (Burrell and Morgan, 1979) through qualitative techniques. The qualitative methods include broad data collection tools like interviews and data analysis procedures such as data categorisation that generates non-numerical data. The nomothetic approach relies upon quantitative techniques preferring to adopt systematic natural science approaches (Burrell and Morgan, 1979).

The quantitative methods involve data collection tools like questionnaires and establish data analysis procedures such as statistics and graphs that produce numerical data. Both the qualitative and quantitative elements can be combined as a pluralist methodology, normally referred to as mixed methods. Bryman and Bell (2015) argue that studies should include divergent methods to improve the study’s robustness. Due to the researcher’s ontological, epistemological and axiological stand, the ideographic methodological thread of qualitative case studies is best suited to understand the phenomenon under study via the key data collection methods like interviews, documentary reviews, focus group discussions etc.

4.3 The Research Approach

There are different approaches to conducting a research. The three dominant approaches can be classified as qualitative, quantitative and the synthesis of the two called the Mixed Method. The researcher used the qualitative method for this study. This is because the nature of the study involved detailed investigation of contextual conditions which required physical engagement and interaction with participants.

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4.3.1 Qualitative Research Approach

The researcher considered qualitative methods to be the most appropriate for exploring and understanding processes and for considering people’s perceptions and beliefs. This approach offers an insight into human action, behaviours, interaction, and how people perceive the world. The strength of qualitative research is its ability to provide complex textual descriptions of how people experience a given research issue. It provides information about the “human” side of an issue that is, the often contradictory behaviours, beliefs, opinions, emotions, and relationships of individuals (Mack et al., 2005). Qualitative methods are also effective in identifying intangible factors, such as social norms, socioeconomic status, gender roles, ethnicity, and religion, whose role in the research issue may not be readily apparent (Mack et al., 2005). The qualitative method has the advantage of proving findings that have quality of “undeniability” (Miles et al., 1994).

Nevertheless, there are varied criticisms of this method mostly by quantitative analysts who insist on the positivist approach as the best method in studying the world. In criticising the qualitative approach, the positivist uses the quantitative standards such as validity, reliability, precision, and generalisability to question the soundness of the qualitative approach. But this researcher; however, asserts that these quantitative standards may not be that relevant to qualitative studies, since their philosophies and perspective of the world are contrastingly different. However, in other to make room to address the concerns raised about the standard of the qualitative approach, qualitative researchers have gone ahead to propose a corresponding but different set of standards which satisfactorily dealt with the criticism of standards. Ulin et al. (2005) synthesise the work of several qualitative studies specialists and find four main quality standards: credibility, dependability, confirmability, and transferability. Each of these standards is comparable or equivalent to accepted quantitative studies standards, but suitable to the purposes and nature of qualitative studies.

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Table 2: Quality standards for qualitative studies

Credibility (Validity) Refers to confidence in the truth of findings; it assumes an accurate understanding of the context. Findings are consistent with what they explain; they are grounded and substantiated by narrative data and interviewees may verify its accuracy. Dependability Means that the research process is consistent and pays careful (Reliability) attention to rules and conventions. It sets parallels across data sources and research questions are clear and logically connected to the research design and aims. Confirmability Means to confirm that the data reflects as accurate as possible the (Objectivity) interviewee’s perspectives and experiences. The researcher has to maintain a distinction between personal values and those of interviewees. The researcher needs to reflect on her/his own personal values and document the role played in the research process, including biases, assumptions and reactions. Transferability Refers to whether conclusions are transferable to other contexts. (Generalisability) Conceptual or theoretical generalisation rather than statistical generalisation is what matters. There is no need to be representative of a wider population.

Notes: Words in parenthesis are the equivalent to quantitative studies standards

Source: Ulin, P. R., E. T. Robinson, et al. (2005). Qualitative methods in public health a field guide for applied research. San Francisco, CA.

4.4 Case Study Research Strategy

The qualitative researcher today faces a wide range of options for conducting qualitative research (Creswell et al., 2007). Among the several quantitative designs available to the researcher includes case study, ethnography, phenomenology, grounded theory, biographical, historical, participatory and clinical strategies (Denzin and Lincoln, 1995; Creswell and Creswell, 2017). In order to investigate actors’ relations, their level of cop-

130 operation and influence on implementation of ESP more deeply, a case study research was undertaken. A multiple case study was considered appropriate for this particular research because a case study research is considered appropriate if the study investigates “how” and “why” questions; when the phenomenon under investigation is not under the direct influence of the researcher; and when a real-life context is the subject of investigation (Yin, 2009) .

Yin (2003) cited in Creswell et al. (2007) states that “You would use the case study method because you deliberately wanted to cover contextual conditions believing that they might be highly pertinent to your phenomenon of study” (p. 13). The case study design was appropriate because of its promises of understanding the reasons for people’s actions and attitudes, data is collected in their natural setting and the demeanour of the participants could even be interpreted to enhance study findings. Due to timeframe for the research and limited resources available for the research, it will be impracticable to study all the all 216 Metropolitan, Municipal and District assemblies in all 10 regions of Ghana. Therefore, cases representative of the population will be selected. The case studies purposively selected for the study are Accra Metropolitan Assembly, Lan-Nkwantanang Madina Municipal Assembly and Ashaiman Municipal Assembly in the Greater Accra region of Ghana. They were selected due to the level of environmental sanitation challenge in these areas.

4.5 Sampling of Case Study Organizations

The selection of the case study organisations was done purposively according to the purposive sampling method in qualitative research. The Greater Accra Metropolitan Area [GAMA] was selected for the study because GAMA constitutes the largest problem area in environmental sanitation in Ghana (ESP, 2010). Also, some contributing factors to environmental sanitation problems such as, economic growth, urbanization and population are best depicted in GAMA than any other area in Ghana. Since environmental sanitation is a decentralised function of the local government authorities, three (3) MMDAs were chosen in GAMA. These three were settled on due to their peculiar sanitation profiles12,

12 Refer to Chapter 4 for the profile of Accra Metropolitan Assembly, La-Nkwantanang Madina Municipal Assembly and the Ashaiman Municipal Assembly. 131 which makes them the most desirably for the study. Other actor organisations operating within the jurisdiction of selected MMDAS and individual households were earmarked for the study. Officers from the EHD of the MMDAs, SHEP coordination unit of GES, Public health directorate of GHS, officers of EPA, Chief Executives and field officers of NGOs, CBOs, and Private Enterprise in partnership with the MMDAs were purposively sampled for the study. These officers were selected based on their roles in the implementation of the policy at the local level. In all 72 participants were sampled to take part in the study. The sample distribution before fieldwork began is depicted in the table below.

Table 3: Organisation and Interviewee Sample Distribution before fieldwork

Organizations Number of Interviewees Total Sampled Sampled Organizations

MMDAs 3 3 9

Allied Sector 3 3 9 Institutions

NGOs 3 3 9

CBOs 3 3 9

Private Enterprise 3 3 9

Community 3 3 12 Leaders

Individual 3 5 15 Households

Total 72

Source: Authors’ Construct 2018

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4.6 The Fieldwork

The research context was in Ghana; therefore, the fieldwork took place in Accra, Ghana within a four (4) month period from January to April 2017. The fieldwork was preceded by the necessary approvals and ethical clearance from the University of Manchester for the study to be conducted in Ghana. Also, approval was sought from the three (3) MMDAs selected, Ghana Health Service, Ghana Education Service, Environmental Protection Agency and all the private enterprises involved before the study was conducted. These organisations were pre-selected based on their roles and peculiar conditions in regards to environmental sanitation in Ghana before moving into the field. The research began by distribution of letters to individual organisations listed for my study. After some follow ups, the clearance was given to begin my interviews. Because all my case study organisations were all in Accra, the researcher shuffled between them randomly depending on whichever case study organisation was ready for me for an interview. Participants were made to read the PIS [Participant Information Sheet] and were satisfied before interviews were conducted. The identity of the case study organisations and individuals involved were well concealed through the use of pseudonyms for ethical reasons. Though the study could not achieve the full target for scheduled interview, majority was achieved.

4.7 Sample Inclusion and Eligibility Criteria

The sample is chosen from the study population that is commonly referred to as the ‘target population or accessible population’ (Polit and Hungler, 2004a, p. 290; Burns and Grove, 2010, p. 233). There are five (5) categories of organisations involved in the study. The primary inclusion criterion for the organisations was that they must be operating in case study areas which is the three MMDAs and should be directly involved in the implementation of the environmental policy within these areas. For individuals, they must be part of the organisations selected. Also, community leaders and household must be found within the three MMDAS. With the MMDAs, only officers working at the EHSD were qualified to be included since they have direct responsibilities of environmental sanitation in the district. District Environmental Health Officers [DEHOs], District Public Cleansing Officers [DPCOs] and Sanitation Field Officers were included from the EHD

133 with the case study MMDAs. SHEP coordinators from GES and Community Health Officers from the public health department of GHS were also included due to the specific roles in regards to environmental sanitation in their districts. For NGOs, CBOs and Private Enterprises, directors and field officers qualified for inclusion. At the community level identified community leaders, chiefs and households within the case study area were included for the study.

4.8 Sampling Methods

The study used the purposive sampling method to select the participants for the study. Purposive sampling “refers to strategies in which the researcher exercises judgment about who will provide the best perspective on the phenomenon of interest, and then intentionally invites those specific perspectives into the study” (Abrams, 2010:538). Purposive sampling basically has to do with the selection of participants who are specifically relevant to the purpose of the research. The objective of purposive sampling is to sample cases/participants in a strategic way, so that those sampled are relevant to the research questions that are being posed (Bryman, 2015). According to Neuman (2005) purposive sampling is best suited for case study research in order to select cases that are particularly informative. The criterion used by the researcher for the inclusion of units of analysis is local level actors in environmental sanitation policy in Ghana. The exclusion criteria are the national and international actors in environmental sanitation policy implementation. The sampling of respondent at the MMDAs, allied sector institutions, NGOs, CBOs, private enterprises , Community leaders and households was all based on their direct role in sanitation within the communities in which the studies took place. Purposive samples, however, cannot be considered to be statistically representative of the total population (Saunders et al., 2009). This study being a qualitative research did not seek to achieve representativeness. But rather selected informants that are better situated to provide key insight and understandings into the research questions (Abrams, 2010). However, the study also adopted the simple random sampling procedure to decide on individuals and households that should take part of the study. This probability sampling design mainly used in quantitative study was used in a very limited scale as a sampling method in this study.

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4.9 Sampling of Respondents

The sampling regime for the study was prepared based on actors identified in the NESP that are concerned with the implementation at the local level. In all, five categories of organisations were sampled and replicated in the three (3) study areas (MMDAs). Another category of two (2) respondents, that is community leaders and households were also sampled. In all seventy-two (72) interviews including individuals (formal and informal) and focus groups were scheduled before the fieldwork. Heads of departments [HoDs] and field officers working in the communities were sampled for interviews. Community leaders like assemblymen and women, landlords, youth leaders, market queens and religious leaders were sampled for the interview. Individuals and households were randomly sampled as well. Most of the organisations scheduled to be part of the sample, indeed took part except for some challenges with GHS in securing ethical approval for the interviews. Highly bureaucratic procedures and prolonged period for approval delayed the process. At the time a partial approval was given, subject to some correction before a full approval will be given, the time stipulated for the research was almost up. However, the researcher was able to secure some informal interviews with some public health officers in the communities where the study was conducted. Though an official position on the issues were not secured, some field experience from their work in the community was very relevant to the research.

Some NGOs and CBOs sampled for interviews were also very difficult to reach. Though they did not turn down the request for an interview, the directors in charge of these organisations were rather evasive in their dealings with the researcher. Their actions became clear in an interview with one of the respondents who closely work with such NGOs and CBOs when it was revealed that these NGO/CBOs engage in research activities as well and they often see other researchers in their area as competitors. It also came to light that these NGOs/CBOs are aware such researches receive funding so, unless a researcher is ready to pay them some money on the side, they may not be willing to help. However, these claims were neither verified nor confirmed to draw a conclusion for the reasons for the actions of the directors of these NGOs/CBOs.

Some group of respondents who were not originally included in the sample schedule were encountered on the field. Their perspectives as it were, became relevant when it emerged

135 that they work closely with sanitation agencies to implement policies at the local level but were not captured in the policy. These are trade unions like fishermen association, traditional caterers association, corn millers association and informal waste pickers union. The heads of these groups were sampled, and the entire groups were also sampled for focus group discussions. These increased the sample size to ninety (90) from the initial seventy- two (72) due to the changes on the field (Teddlie and Yu, 2007; Abrams, 2010). At the end of the study sixty-five (65) respondents were interviewed out of the ninety (90) scheduled, achieving 72.2% of the targeted interviews. This is how the sample distribution table looks after the fieldwork.

Table 4: Outline of Sample Distribution of Respondents during Fieldwork

Organizations Number of Interviewees Total Sampled Sampled Organizations MMDAs 3 3 9

Allied Sector 3 3 9 Institutions

NGOs 3 3 9

CBOs 3 3 9

Private Enterprise 3 3 9

Community 3 4 12 Leaders

Trade Unions 4 4 16

Informal waste 1 2 2 pickers

Individual 3 5 15 Households

Total 90

Source: Authors’ Construct, 2018

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4.10 Data Collection

To enable the collection of qualitative data, different data gathering methods were used. In- depth interviews, documentary reviews, informal discussions and focus group discussions were used as the key data instruments for gathering data. This method helped to understand a research problem more completely (Creswell, 2002).

4.10.1 Semi-Structured Interviews

Interviews are techniques designed to elicit a rich illustration of the participant’s perspective on the research topic (Mack et al., 2005). Interviews are essential tools in qualitative research (Myers and Newman, 2007) therefore the study adopted this as one of its instruments for data collection. Semi-structured in-depth qualitative interviews were used by the researcher to engage participants. This was done by asking questions from an interview guide. The researcher listened attentively to participants’ responses, and asked follow-up questions and probes based on those responses (Mack et al., 2005). Most interviews conducted on the field were on one-on-one basis. Where there was a language barrier, the services of an interpreter were solicited. However, there were three (3) instances where the opinions of knowledgeable colleagues other than the main interviewees in a particular areas were sought making the interview a group one. Where references were needed as to the right person to interview, the researcher’s contact person initiated the move for interviews to take place. There were no safety concerns with the one- on-one interviews so a third party’s presence was not needed. According to (Mack et al., 2005) when safety is an issue for the interviewer, the presence of two interviewers is appropriate.

4.10.2 Focus Group Discussions [FGDs]

Focus group discussions were used to obtain knowledge, perspectives and attitudes of people on issues, and to seek explanations for behaviours in a way that would be less easily

137 accessible in responses to direct questions, as in one-to-one interviews (Krueger, 2014; Kitzinger, 1995). According to Mack et al. (2005) focus group discussions are appropriate for identifying group norms, eliciting opinions about group norms discovering variety within a population. Krueger (2014) noted that focus groups are not just getting a group of people to talk rather, it a special type of group in terms of purpose, composition, size and procedure. The study adopted FGD to gather information on the field. Six focus groups with at least ten (10) in each group were planned prior to visiting the field. However, difficulties in getting the numbers made the researcher to revise the number in a group to six (6) on the field. At the end of the study, four (4) focus group were interviewed against the six (6) group target. Out of these four, only one group fell short of the original plan of at least ten people in a group. Some problems encountered in the FGDs are that some powerful opinions in the group put others on silence mode. The researcher tried to seek the views of people who were identified to be silent on issues but they referred to the earlier opinions of the “powerful voices” in the group to buttress their point, which did not bring new opinion on board.

4.10.3 Documentary Reviews

Document analysis is a form of qualitative research in which documents are reviewed and interpreted by the researcher to give voice and meaning around a research area (Bowen, 2009). Document analysis is an important data collection tool which forms an invaluable part of most schemes of triangulation (Triad_3, 2016). According to Bowen (2009), the purpose of triangulating is to provide a confluence of evidence that breeds credibility. Aside interviews, documents within the environmental sanitation sector in Ghana served as data for the study. The National Environmental Sanitation Policy (2010) [NESP] of Ghana which formed the basis for the study was printed out from the internet and used for the study. Another Important document which is the NESSAP, DESSAP and the by-laws of all the MMDAs involved were reviewed. Other important policy documents relating to environmental sanitation in Ghana were printed out of the internet and reviewed for the study. Some NGOs also provided documents relating to their work, deemed important to the study. In addition, the websites of the MMDAs and all the organizations involved were accessed to gather information for the study.

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4.10.4 Participant Observation

Participant observation enables the researchers to learn about the activities of the people and organizations under study in their natural setting through observing and participating in those activities. This afforded the researcher the opportunity of gathering data at first hand without a second party filtering or embellishing facts. According to (Marshall and Rossman, 2014) observation can be defined as "the systematic description of events, behaviors, and artifacts in the social setting chosen for study" (p.79). Observations enable the researcher to describe existing situations using the five senses, providing a "written photograph" of the situation under study (Erlandson, 1993). This research tool was integral to collecting data on the field. The researcher participated in a number of environmental sanitation activities in the communities involved. The researcher also attended some meetings between the EHD officers of the MMDAs and community groups, trade unions and groups of informal waste pickers at various times. Within these programs and meetings certain key relation patterns between these actors were identified and documented.

4.11 Interview Transcription

Transcription is the transference of a recorded speech with its particular set of rules to the written word with a different set of rules (Kvale, 1996). In order to manage and organise data effectively, it is imperative to transform spoken language into a written language since only written language can be copied, examined, evaluated and quoted (Lapadat, 2000; Mero-Jaffe, 2011) Researchers apply two main methods of transcription: naturalized transcription and denaturalized transcription (Davidson, 2009; Mero-Jaffe, 2011). Natural transcription is a detailed and less filtered transcription. It focuses on the details of the discourse capturing every word verbatim, including breaks in speech, laughter, mumbling, involuntary sounds, gestures, etc. De-natural transcription, accurately describes the discourse, but limits dealing with the description of accent or involuntary sounds and other sounds that are non-related to the interview (Mero-Jaffe, 2011). In order to achieve rigor and to ensure the credibility of data, the researcher decided to combine the strength of the two methods. The researcher listened and re-listened to the recorded interviews in order to become familiar with the data and draw meaning out of them (Lapadat, 2000).

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Transcription was first done in a naturalised form and then reorganised in a de-natural form in a question and answer format.

4.12 Data analysis

Data collected on the field through the informal discussions and focus group discussions and interview transcripts were analysed using a thematic analysis approach, which is consistent with an interpretivist epistemology (Onwuegbuzie and Leech, 2005). Thematic analysis is a form of analysis that uses coding to focus on the central themes and ideas raised in a text (Bryman, 2012; Neuman, 2011; Veal, 2006). It is a common approach to analysing qualitative data, particularly sourced from interviews or conversations and differs from other approaches such as grounded theory in its focus on identifying patterns, and overarching or common themes in the data (Bryman, 2004).

Data from the field were audio recorded by a recorder and later transferred onto the researcher’s personal laptop for storage and easy classification. The researcher first listened and re-listened to the recorded interviews to get familiarised with the data. This was done to gain an overview of the depth and richness of the data and to conceptualize and identify thematic framework for the data (Ritchie and Spencer, 2002). The recorded data was then transcribed by the researcher with the help of a research assistant. Research assistant was made to sign a confidentiality form that estopped him from disclosing any information related to the data to a third party. The transcription was not left solely in the hands of the research assistant as the researcher transcribed some data that were identified to be sensitive and also needed some inferences during transcription. The researcher after transcription identified themes, concepts and emerging issues from the data which were used to draw a thematic framework to analyse the data. The thematic framework was drawn based on the relevance of data to the research question, and emerging trends from data (Ritchie and Spencer, 2002). Ryan and Bernard (2003, p. 88) have argued that “themes can be derived from different sources, notably from raw data (inductive approach) or from the researcher’s prior theoretical understanding of the subject under investigation (priori approach)”. The former refers to themes that originate from data with an empirical basis while the latter involves professional definitions found in literature reviews or from

140 local, common-sense constructs and from researcher’s values, theoretical orientations, and personal experiences. Strauss and Corbin (1990) described this as ‘theoretical sensitivity’.

In this study, the generation of themes had two main origins, the first category of themes emanates from the existing literature on ESP implementation used in the study. These were broken into three parts namely Public-Private –Partnerships, Decentralization and Participation, whilst the second category of themes was directly drawn from interview data. The data transcripts were assigned three different codes Q1, Q2, Q3 according to the three research questions in the study. This was done to match interview responses to their specific research questions for which they were solicited. Another set of codes were developed under wider established codes. These sub-codes were built around themes developed. Charmaz et al. (1983, p. 186) describing codes comments: ‘Codes . . . serve as shorthand devices to label, separate, compile, and organize data’. Coding was used to translate raw data into a useable form with clear meanings. After coding, themes were created using data labels and descriptors that are linked to the study’s objectives in order to answer research questions. These were further analysed, interpreted and presented in the form of headings and sub headings in the empirical chapters.

This process was done manually, after the researcher found the computer aided analysis software NVivo too structured and limited in doing a detailed analysis in regard to the kind of data being processed and the outcome expected. These limitations were echoed by Welsh (2002) when he noted that NVivo is less useful simply because of the type of searching it is capable of doing and its inability in addressing issues of validity and reliability in the thematic ideas that emerge during the data analysis process.

4.13 Quality Assurance and Rigor

Rigorous research is supposed to meet a set of good practical criteria (Bryman, 2004, p. 24). In general, qualitative researchers are mostly concerned with two quality issues, namely the validity and reliability of the research. Qualitative researchers have maintained that validity is “another word for truth” (Silverman, 2010, p. 275). According to Hammersley (1990), validity means the extent to which an account accurately represents the social phenomena to which it refers (p.57). This means that research findings should

141 reflect what is happening in the field as accurately as possible. To ensure qualitative research meets quality standards, several elements have been proposed including: a) worthy topic, b) rich rigor, c) sincerity, d) credibility, e) resonance, f) significant contribution, g) ethics, and h) meaningful coherence (Tracy, 2010, p. 839).

Using Tracy (2010) Eight “Big-Tent” Criteria for Excellent Qualitative Research, this research topic demonstrated high degree of worthiness within the context of the research area, Ghana. ES is one pervasive and hard to solve challenge facing Ghana at the moment (Salifu, 2005; ESP, 2010; W.H.O and UNICEF, 2015), therefore this topic is timely, relevant, significant and interesting. Rigor of the research was ensured and demonstrated through the use of relevant literature and theoretical lens, in-depth field research spanning four months on the field. Sample size of the data was adequate with data analysed using thematic approach within qualitative research. The sincerity of the research was ensured through the clarity of methodological choice and disclosing the challenges encountered on the field.

The credibility of the research was also tested through multiple sources of data, providing excerpts of interview and triangulation of data. The research also resonates with other developing nations facing similar ES challenges as Ghana with the quality of transferability. The research contributes significantly to theory and practice as strongly demonstrated in Chapter 9 of this thesis. The research addressed all ethical issues that had implication for the quality of the research output through various ethical clearances with the University of Manchester and the study organisations. Finally, the research delivered on its stated objective and has demonstrated strong connection between theory and practice using the appropriate methodologies. Though other parameters and frameworks exist for measuring the quality and rigor of a research, this research satisfies Tracy (2010) framework for quality research.

4.14 Ethical Considerations

Ethics are guidelines or sets of principles for good professional practice, which serve to advice and steer researchers as they conduct their work (Bloor and Wood, 2006). Ethics in research refers to what is or is not legitimate to do, or what moral research procedure

142 involves. According to Bloor and Wood (2006), the responsibilities to research participants include informed consent, protection of identity and the principle of no harm. The researcher was guided by ethical issues bothering on informed consent, voluntary participation, anonymity and confidentiality as well as language. The research was conducted according to the ethical regulations of the University of Manchester. Clearance was obtained from the ethics committee of the university before proceeding to the field to collect data. Ethical clearance from organisations involved was sought before proceeding with the research.

4.14.1 Informed Consent and Voluntary Participation

Informed consent refers to the voluntary agreement to participate in a study based upon full and open information (Christians, 2000). Providing detailed information about the purpose of the study and what will happen to the person if they participate, allows participants to make a careful and informed choice about whether or not they want to take part (Goodwin, 2006). In conducting this research, particular care was taken to ensure that participants willingly volunteered to participate. Permission was first sought from the participating organisations through official letters, providing every detail of the research objectives and questions to be asked. After organisational approval, individual workers were explained to into details what the research entails. They were made to read, understand the Participant Information Sheet (PIS) and upon agreement to take part in the research, a consent form was given to them to sign. It was explained to the respondents; however, that the consent form did not bind them in anyway so if they wished to withdraw from the research at any point in time; they were at liberty to do so. Care was taken to ensure that none of the respondents was pressured in anyway whatsoever to participate. Individuals who did not show enthusiasm and were not very sure were left alone to ensure no one was coerced when they actually did not want to participate in the study.

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4.14.2 Confidentiality and Anonymity

The principle of confidentiality encompasses the expectation that information disclosed during a research relationship will not be shared with unauthorised parties without the participant’s consent (Jones et al., 2013). In research, that involves in-depth interviews that may reveal sensitive information, the assurance of confidentiality is paramount to protecting participant’s privacy and engendering trust (Patton, 2002). The researcher ensured that information collected from participants was kept in an encrypted folder on the researcher personal computer that is not shard with anyone; also, data collected was not disclosed to third parties. All information given by participants in the course of the research was treated with utmost confidentiality. Anonymity ensures that if and when information is shared or published, it will contain no identifiable personal information about participants (Jones et al., 2013). None of participants’ identity, place of work or office was disclosed in this research. Special codes were used in place of names and organisations.

4.14.3 Language

Language management is an important part of research ethics. Instances where interviews were conducted in a language other the English which is the official language adopted for the research, language interpreters were employed. The researcher conducted three (3) interviews in local languages involving two different local languages spoken in Ghana. The researcher could understand one of the languages used, whiles a community leader volunteered to interpret the questions and answer section during the interviews. Care was taken so that the original meaning of the language was not lost during interpretation; hence a second opinion was sought during transcription of the tapes.

4.15 Conclusion

This chapter presented the philosophical foundation and the methodology employed in doing the research. The study adopts a subjectivist approach to studying a social

144 phenomenon of actor’s relations. The qualitative method and multiple case study was adopted as a means of conducting the research. The subject of relations can be considered as a social phenomenon; therefore, they were conceived socially and contextually. The chapter argued the suitability of approaches adopted for the research, considering the inter- subjective nature of the issues affecting relations between actors. It presents the methodology, stating the key instruments adopted as semi-structured interviews, documentary reviews, observations and mini focus group discussions for data collection. The chapter draws to a close with assurance of quality, also addressing ethical concerns of the research. The essence of this chapter is to provide the philosophical and methodological basis for the research.

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CHAPTER FIVE

RELATIONS AND LINKS BETWEEN ACTORS IN ESP IMPLEMENTATION

5.0 Introduction

“When your mother has a new husband, you also have a new father. Neither your mother nor your new father owes you any explanation. That is where we find ourselves when a new service provider is engaged”

The sentiment in this quotation captures the kind of relations between some actors at the local level. This chapter addresses the first research question that seeks to establish the kind of relations and links between actors in the implementation of ESP at the local level. The chapter first establishes that various actors at the local level play different complementary roles in implementing the EPS, by presenting evidence of their engagements. The chapter then presents the results and findings of the kind of relations and links that exist among actors using the three thematic areas covered in the literature review namely, Public Private Partnerships, Decentralisation and Participation. Reflection on actor’s relations reveals a mixture of relationships. The chapter then draw its conclusion after the presentation of the results from the field.

5.1 Role of Actors: Relations and Links

Environmental Sanitation Policies [ESP] are targeted at ensuring healthy environments. The implementation of such policies draws on the strength of actors within the policy environment to actualise policy intent. In Ghana the NESP acknowledged the important role of actors in this process thereby assigning to them roles and responsibilities that are required to improve environmental sanitation. Though there are several actors that include individuals and organisations when it comes to the environment, this thesis identified seven (7) categories of local actors that must collaborate to implement the NESP at the local level. These include the municipal government, allied sector institutions, formal and informal private sector enterprises, NGOs, CBOs, individuals and community leaders.

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These actors have obligations towards each other in ensuring a clean environment. This section looks at some evidence of relations and links between these various actors.

The MMDAs through the Environmental Health Department [EHD] are at the forefront in the implementation of the NESP at the local level. Though other departments within the MMDAS like planning, community development and works play certain auxiliary roles in partnering the EHD to promote environmental sanitation; this thesis focuses attention on the EHD as the lead implementers of the policy at the local level. The prescribed functions of the MMDAs in ensuring adequate sanitation at the local level are: Waste management, Public health management, Environmental monitoring, Provision of works related to Environmental Sanitation facilities and planning and Monitoring and public relations. District Environmental Health Officers [DEHOs] superintend over environmental health at the local level. They conduct environmental sanitation education, supervise contracts, and ensure compliance and enforcement of environmental regulations within their localities among other duties, whiles District Public Cleansing Officers [DPCOs] ensures the cleanliness of public places like thoroughfares, lorry parks, markets, drains, street beaches and river banks etc. By virtue of their position as the chief implementers of the policy, they have interface with the community and all other organisations and stakeholders working in their jurisdiction. A DEHO confirmed this when his opinion was sought on their interface with other actors within their jurisdiction of work.

We do premises inspections of hospitality, residential, industrial and all residents’ even hospitals in our sub-metro. We do three things in every premise we visit. The first is to help educate the people on situation we find on the ground. Secondly is to give a statutory notice on any nuisances that we have found and make sure such nuisances are abated. Thirdly, we go back for re-inspection to make sure some of those nuisances are averted; if not then we enforce the by-laws by prosecuting the people in the law court. These are the work we do in all the areas in this sub-metro. We also work with the community to ensure clean environment. We liaise with sanitation service providers to ensure that services are provided in the communities. Our officers are always on the ground to ensure compliance of the sanitation by-laws of the assembly. CBOs and NGOs in the community often invite us to attend their programs, so we work with different group of people. [Fieldwork Data: Interview transcript from AKSM]. This evidence of relations and links between the MMDAs and other actors in environmental sanitation at the local level was backed by PCO who operates from the same department as follows:

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Our work brings us together with the community leaders, assemblymen and the private service providers because we don't work alone. They help us perform our duties and we also help them perform theirs. So, there is that working relations between us. [Fieldwork Data: Interview transcript from AKSM] These relations can be classified under the legislative relations framework which is prescribed by the laws of the land. Local Government Act 1993 (462) gave the local assemblies the powers to provide service and to enforce regulations at the local level. Also, the Infectious Diseases Act, 1908 enjoins environmental health officers to enforce public health by-laws by the District Assembly with the right of entry into premises for inspection. This relation is controlled by the state through the laws governing the sector. Also, some social relations can be identified from the evidence above between the MMDAs and other actors like, NGOs, CBOs, community leaders and assembly men/women working together.

Allied sector institutions collaborate with the principal sector institution to implement the ESP. Some allied sector institutions like the public health directorate of Ghana Health Service [GHS], the SHEP coordination unit of Ghana Education Service [GES] and Build Environment department of the Environmental Protection Agency [EPA] were identified in this thesis. Although allied sector institutions named in the NESP transcend these named here, these are sampled out due to their local involvement. The NESP captures the collaborative role of an allied sector institution with the MMDAs as follows:

“Within the Environmental Health and Management Department, an Environmental Protection and Standards Enforcement Division shall, in collaboration with the EPA, be responsible for monitoring and enforcing environmental standards and regulations set by the EPA and other national regulatory agencies, and for organised and continuous public education on safeguarding the environment. This includes responsibility for monitoring the environmental impact of Assemblies’ own waste management activities” (NESP, 2010, p.25)

To ascertain if this collaborative relation as stated by the NESP actually exists on the ground, the question was posed to an officer of an allied institution and the relation was confirmed as follows:

“In drafting and implementing of environmental policies, the local government don't just act on their own. They call for a stakeholder consultation by involving all the stakeholders they think should be involved. They usually invite reps from the MEST 13 in terms of policy. In sanitation aspect, you know

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sanitation and health moves together so they would invite a rep from the Ministry of Health, EPA are involved in terms of some quality parameters that they have to meet. They also invite reps from an NGO and the private operators as well”. [Fieldwork Data: Interview transcript from EPBE]. This also falls into the category of legislative relations that is controlled by policy as discussed in preceding paragraphs. The Ghana health service act, Ghana education service act, EPA act all provide functions and roles to their officers in ensuring environmental sanitation in the local assemblies. The ESP sets the agenda for collaboration between the MMDAs and other allied institutions within the decentralised space for policy implementation. This obviously creates some official working relations between these agencies as stipulated by law.

Private sector enterprises are engaged by the district assemblies to provide sanitation services to the community on its behalf under franchise arrangement, concessions or through contracting. They work with the assembly and the community and other stakeholder organisations in the communities to provide services. Their engagement is as a result of policy directive of the NESP which states that:

“The bulk of environmental sanitation services shall be provided by the private sector, including NGOs and community-based organisations under the supervision of the Public Sector, especially the Metropolitan, Municipal and District Assemblies”. (NESP, 2010, p.26) The private sector currently provides 80 percent of all environmental sanitation services in Ghana. Their involvement is visible throughout the nation, with Zoomlion Ghana Ltd being the single biggest waste management company in this venture. Their relations with the local government are that of principal agent relations. The private service providers also relate to the community they serve as their clients, thereby creating customer service relations within the established framework of relationships.

NGOs in environmental sanitation are voluntary organisations that have identified environmental needs in the community and have decided to help solve them through advocacy, service provision and education. Their nature makes them mediators between the local government authorities, service providers and the community. CBOs are community organisations that normally serve as the voice of the community to officialdom. CBOs also engage in service provision, advocacy and education. The NESP captured their functions below:

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“Community-based organisations [CBOs] and NGOs shall assist communities in community mobilisation; Assist the District Assemblies, Town Councils, Unit Committees and communities in the planning, funding and development of community sanitation infrastructure for the safe disposal of wastes and the prevention of soil, water and air pollution”. (NESP, 2010, p.23) Evidence from the field suggests that NGOs and CBOs do perform the roles prescribed by the NESP to promote environmental sanitation in their communities. All the NGOs and CBOs confirmed their relationships and interface with both the local assemblies and the communities they operate. They also engage other actors operating in the sector in their day to day activities. As stated by a CBO director:

We are based in the community and we work closely with the local assembly, we together engage the community in various programs. We also work with the service providers sometimes when we need to bring a sanitation problem in the community to their attention. [Fieldwork Data: Interview transcript from UFCG]. In support of the above, an NGO director confirmed some of their engagements with the local assemblies in their operations. He explained below:

Before we began our operations in this community we had to first apply to the district assembly for license and permit to operate. That is the law so no NGO just starts operating without permission. And most of our programs in the community are sanctioned by the assembly. [Fieldwork Data: Interview transcript from ACNG]. Both legislative and social relations exist here; the NGOs and CBOs are regulated by the assemblies in their operations in their communities of operations. They also for the purpose of advancing their cause engage the local assemblies, private service providers and the community on social grounds to perform their roles.

Community heads and opinion leaders are the landlords in the communities. They are in a place of authority and they superintend over all matters affecting the community. The core of environmental sanitation lies in the bosom of individuals and community members. Individuals and community members have the responsibility collectively to maintain a clean environment. To achieve this, they work with all other actors involved to ensure good environmental standards. Their roles as stated in the NESP put them at the centre of activity when it comes to environmental sanitation. These roles are summarised as:

Cleansing within and in the immediate environs of the property they occupy, including access ways and the drains and roads abutting the

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property; hygienically disposing of all wastes they generate in public areas by use of an authorised public toilet or solid waste container as appropriate; participating in all communal environmental sanitation exercises organised by the community or its representatives. (NESP, 2010, p.22). This group is the target of the policy and they are at the receiving end of the consequences of both the success and the failure of the policy. All other actors’ attention is on them and they relate to them on different grounds. All evidence above indicates that legislative, contractual, customer and social relations exist between the community and the rest of the actors.

Due to the various roles played by actors in implementing policy, interaction among them is inevitable. Various collaborative evidences suggest that all the actors at the local level are aware of each other and have had an interface at one time or the other in their roles as actors. This empirical chapter will establish in the ensuing sections with evidence the kind of relations and links that have developed among these actors in the implementation of the ESP in Ghana.

5.2 Working Together in PPPs at the Local level

Since the introduction of neo-liberal theories and market mechanisms in the provision of public services, state officials and bureaucrats ceased to be the sole providers of waste management and sanitation services at the local level. Sanitation and waste management services are co-produced by the state, the private entrepreneur, NGOs, CBOs and citizens as a network in a PPP agreement. PPP brought about changes in the role of the district assemblies from being a direct provider to becoming both part-providers14 and regulators. This however brought about a new way of working by municipal authorities in providing public service (Crook and Ayee, 2006). To understand how they collaborate in the co- production of environmental sanitation services, the various sub-sections below reveal the kind of relationships and links that exist between these actors based on the empirical data from the field.

14 MMDA by law retains 20% sanitation service provision and outsources 80% on contract and franchise to the private sector. 151

5.2.1 Relations between MMDAs and Private Sector Service Providers

MMDA- Private Enterprise relations emanate from the legislations provided by the NESP (2010), which stipulates that, all environmental sanitation services: waste management, cleansing and sanitation should be provided either on a full cost-recovery basis by private service providers under public contracts. This partnership also brings about contractual relations backed by Public Procurement Act 663 and the courts of the land. The MMDA’s oversight responsibility to ensure that the contract terms are carried out also results in a principal-agent relationship. With this, the MMDA’s frequent interaction with the private service provider is important to monitor and assess performance. Section 5.1 above provides evidence of such subsisting relations between the MMDA and the various sanitation service providers. To establish the extent of these relations, the question was posed to various DEHO’s at the sub-metro and zonal councils where local actors works together, if they have PPP arrangements at their zones and the kind of relations that exist between them and the service providers on the grounds. It was revealed that contractual relations exist at management level where contracts are awarded. However, relations between service providers and DEHO’s/DPCOs at the sub-metro and zonal council are rather minimal and sometimes non-existent. A DEHO confirmed knowledge of the service provider’s presence in their zone and has this to say about their relations:

Yes, we are aware of their presence, first it was XXL Ltd. Their services were not good. It was bad and now I learnt KKL waste Ltd is taking over soon but interestingly, we who have the responsibility to assist these people in their work are not involved in the agreement process so as at now we don't even know the terms of the agreement. And when you call them for meetings to have one on one interaction with them to help them to address the problem on the ground, they blatantly disregard our invitations because during their entry point, they have not seen you so why now involve you. This is a big challenge we had during XXL Ltd.’s time and things were horrible and you could not understand that a contractor coming in does not have the necessary logistics to do the job, but such a person is awarded the contract. These are some of the issues you can't talk so much about because we are limited in our involvement in the contract stage. [Fieldwork Data: Interview transcript from AKSM]. When further probed if these private service providers fall under their purview for monitoring and supervision purposes as provided by policy and the law and if so, what they have done in their powers to get them on the table? He had this to add:

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They fall exactly under our supervision. Even the new contractor that i am talking about they were here. I and my sub-metro director have to put pressure on the manager to come one afternoon just to say "hi" and he promised coming back on a certain date for as to have a meeting. As at now he has not come back but they are working in the community already. [Fieldwork Data: Interview transcript from ASKSM]. This position was partly confirmed by other DEHO’s and field officers in different zonal councils. A zonal council EHO confirmed as follows:

Like i said, here is an office under the headquarters (Assembly) so majority of the things, 70-80% of the things are done at the headquarters and maybe your boss would call and say, “so so and so” would be working here. How they penetrate the system, everything is at the headquarters. We don't go into that; all we know is that, they have come so we must work with them. [Fieldwork Data: Interview transcript from LMMA]. This response is very instructive; this sounds more like a centralised bureaucracy within a decentralised system. Officers who have direct responsibility to enforce policy standards and monitor service contracts with the private service provider are side-lined.

The question was then posed to them about their line of actions to get this situation corrected, to enhance a smooth operation at the sub metro? A DEHO stated as follows:

There is nothing i can do for now because i am limited to where it is now. We have complained to the authorities who assigned these people because we needed to help them register the various premises and households in our locality here for them to service them but that is not done as at now. As for complaints, we have complained to whoever is ready to listen and they have listened. The other time we had a meeting with the co-ordinating director, he promised that he is going to work on this so they can really come down to us at the sub-metro level for as to put up a plan to handle this. [Fieldwork Data: Interview transcript from AKSM]. Almost all the DEHO’s interviewed confirmed that they have very minimal contacts with the private service providers on the ground. These frail and superficial working relations they assert are affecting smooth implementation of the ESP on the ground. This shows a certain lack of direction within the district assembly chain of command.

To confirm the state of these relations and to ensure triangulation, the concerns expressed by the DEHO’s in the various sub-metros and zonal councils were confirmed with the private operators working in these areas. Responses from these service providers though did not explicitly corroborate the DEHO’s positions; it however confirmed a patchy and haphazard relation between them. A service provider has this to say:

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Yes, we don't have formal meetings with the sub-metro and zonal council officers but we work with them on the ground. Our officers on the fields are in touch with them. We honour their invitation to attend community meetings and we are introduced to the community in such meetings. In matters of contract and agreements, we deal with the management of the district assemblies and we channel every grievance to them. [Fieldwork Data: Interview transcript from ZLAM]. This response is in tune with most of the answers provided by the service providers. Views expressed by the two main implementing parties depict a superficial working relation between them, though not hostile. The cause of such relations is mainly due to poor coordination, lack of communication and a certain level of centralization of authority and power at the management level in the district assemblies. Authority and power is not cascaded to the lower tier of the decentralized units. Information flow from the top to the down is stifled leaving Junior EHOs who have the ultimate responsibility of supervising the PPP contracts on the ground in a weak position. The study therefore concludes that proper decentralization is not in full effect bringing about weak relations among actors in the implementation of the ESP.

5.2.2 MMDAs and NGOs/CBOs Relations

Though NGOs and CBOs are mainly into to advocacy and education within the communities, they also provide services that falls under the PPP arrangements. MMDA – NGOs/CBOs relations in service provisions are akin to that of MMDA - Private Enterprise since they perform similar roles. The NESP entrusted the responsibility of community mobilization and assisting the district assemblies and communities to plan, fund and help develop community sanitation infrastructure. However, very few local NGOs and CBOs have the capacity to invest in sanitation infrastructure. They mainly engage in sensitization programs and some minimal level of service provision. NESP also entreats MMDAs to establish an active cooperation with NGO/CBOs working in the environmental sanitation sub-sector and to develop partnership between their programs and those of the MMDAs for mutual benefits. To ascertain how these relations play out, discussions with MMDAs and NGO/CBO in the selected case study areas reveal a complex mixture of relations characterised by cordiality, rivalry and suspicion. It was observed that some NGOs and CBOs gained recognition and looked upon favourably by the district assemblies based on

154 their financial muscles and their proximity to the community. Some others are regarded as entrepreneurs in business for profits and treated as such. The partnership between NGOs/CBOs and the assembly in some indigenous communities are fantastic. They both understand they cannot succeed without each other. A director of a CBO in advocacy and education confirmed that the assembly support for their programs and their interactions and working relations has been good so far:

We collaborate with the waste management department of the assembly for our programs. They came here during our forum training and sessions that we have with community members and they bring in a resource person to talk about sanitation and health issues so one of them came from that department to talk. They come when we invite them. [Fieldwork Data: Interview transcript from AKCO]. The MMDAs also acknowledge the important role of NGOs/CBOs in carrying out their sanitation duties in the communities and have indicated their readiness to support NGOs/CBOs to succeed. The MMDAs also receive some kind of assistance and sponsorship form the NGOs in their communities to undertake community education and other duties. This position is affirmed by a number of officers from the MMDAs who work with NGOs/CBOs.

Our working relationship has been good so far, we collaborate with them in community projects. Those that are registered with the assembly, we do not have any problem with them so far and I don't think they have any problem with us either. We are always ready to work with to promote the wellbeing of our communities. We also engage them and most at times they always come based on their activities they have for the year but for us we always go to them when we needed to do a program and sponsorship to enhance the program. The posters you are seeing here are some of the posters we've gotten from some of these NGO's which help us in our educational activity [Fieldwork Data: Interview transcript from AKNO] There seems to be active relations subsisting between the assembly and NGOs/CBOs within the communities. However, some NGOs/CBOs believe the presence of the local authorities at their programs alone is not enough. They contend that the enthusiasm from the side of the district assembly to work together to achieve sanitation goals is not assured. They also accused the MMDAs and EHO for treating NGOs/CBOs invitations as services rendered which must be compensated due to the suspicion of NGO/CBO’s profiteering agenda. NGO director lamented:

With the MMDAs it’s very frustrating sometimes. It’s like they are expecting something from you. When you invite an officer from the

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assembly to come and address a meeting with the community and to educate them about issues on the environment, they expect you to cater for them, their food, drink and transportation. They don’t see the opportunity provided by the NGO to reach out to the communities to implement the EPS. It’s rather like they are doing you a favour by honouring that invitation. I will say that they have always honoured our invitation but it’s subject to providing them the logistics. [Fieldwork Data: Interview transcript from GYEM]. When these concerns were carried across to the MMDAs for their comments, a SHEP Coordinator believes there is nothing wrong with NGO/CBO assisting their officers in any way to carry out their duties. He accused NGOs/CBOs for operating for personal gains. He however denied their officers engage in any of such rent-seeking behaviours.

Sometimes when we grant them permission to work in our schools, and communities an officer needs to accompany them and take them round, and they need to take care of the transportation and movement of these officers. Mind you, some of these NGOs use our schools for their personal gains. Why should I suffer for something somebody is going to benefit from? When I say somebody I mean the NGO. If you take me out of my office and I don’t have a means of transportation and you pay my transport, I do not see anything wrong with that. But I can assure you none of our officers demand transportation and refreshment from any NGO [Fieldwork Data: Interview transcript from SCUA].

Though certain level of cordiality has been achieved in working together, there seems to be lack of unity of purpose and trust between some of the NGOs/CBOs and the MMDAs in promoting environmental sanitation agenda at the local level.

5.2.3 Relations between the Community and Private Service Providers

Community members, business, households and individuals are the major policy targets and are also the service users in PPP arrangements. Hitherto, the local government authorities related solely to the community in matters of environmental sanitation. With the introduction of a private service provider, a new kind of relationship developed between the three (3) groups in working together. Section 5.2.1 looked at how the relations between the MMDAs and the private service providers looked like on the ground. Whereas the local government dealt with the community as citizens and treated their services as public goods, the private sector service provider is in business with a profit motive and the community is

156 nothing short of a client or customer as in any business transaction. However, the complexities involved in the provision of this kind of service (public service) and relating to this category of clients (citizens) can never be same as in any business dealing.

The goal of such partnership is twofold: to achieve policy targets of clean environment and to recover cost for the private investor. There is therefore the need for a cautious balance in how these groups work together. Setting of user fees are done by the MMDAs, the service provider and the community representatives called Assembly men and women. User fees are usually charged based on economic status of the areas of operation. The preamble of likely relations that may exist between the two in literature is a customer/client relation. But beyond customer/client relations, what does the study reveal on the ground? Investigations reveal a mixture of cordial, hostile and uncooperative relations that threaten success of the partnership. The study points to smooth and cordial customer relations between service providers and service users within certain income brackets usually referred to as “middle class” while there is often disagreement between service providers and service users in the lower income bracket who dwell mostly in slums. A service provider remarked:

Our operations in high income communities are smooth; they don't give us much problem. We sign contracts with them and they go by the terms of the contract. They pay for services rendered them and we also make sure we collect their garbage on time. But the case is not the same in the low income communities. They won’t pay for their garbage even if you supply them dust bins for free they will use it to store water in their rooms. Some of them go to the extent of assaulting our officers when they go to demand for fees. It is terrible in these communities. [Fieldwork Data: Interview transcript from JVAM]. The above shows that service provision to different population groups mean different things. Whereas the high-income group can relate with service providers purely on seller- buyer contract terms without much dispute, the low income group needs more than that even if services are provided without charge. A rhetorical question put up by a community leader states:

Sometimes they come to work in the community without anybody introducing them to us. When you are entering somebodies house, you have to knock. They enter without knocking so if they have problem with the people how do they expect us to help them solve it? [Fieldwork Data: Interview transcript from AKFA].

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This clearly suggests that, engaging low income communities is beyond just service provision and customer relations. It is a web of social system that must be craftily permeated. This then raises the question of “context of application” when it comes to the implementation of PPP projects. [Emphasis mine]

A community member lamented lack of service provision in their community by the service providers though their area was assigned to a contractor on franchise.

There is no contractor working in our community although we are supposed to be served, so we rely on these local waste collectors who come with trucks. Some people just dump their waste in the community indiscriminately because we don't have any regular service provision. [Fieldwork Data: Interview transcript from AK LD]. Investigations into this complain reveals that services providers usually shun communities that are difficult to reach by vehicles due to inaccessible routes where both vehicles and tricycles for carting waste cannot reach. Also, they often boycott communities that are notorious for assaulting their officers when they go there for fees or try to prevent members from dumping due to non-payment when they are carting waste. They also complained about certain unfair behaviours against their officers that are discriminatory due to the stigma of handling waste. An operation officer in waste management company lamented below:

Some of these places are difficult to reach, moreover they don't like paying. So, the best we can do in those places is to put a community container for the pay as you dump. We have people assaulting our officers on many occasions in certain communities. There was a time when some macho men decided to dump in our vehicle without paying, when our officers protested they were assaulted them. There were also instances where we were treated with scorn because we are waste collectors. I experienced this myself when I opened someone’s gate and the house owner started raining insults on me for using my filthy hands to touch his gate. We are not saying because of this we won’t work but we react in some extreme situations. People need a lot of education on waste. [Fieldwork Data: Interview transcript from JVAM]

Most people in low income communities believe it is the duty of the assembly to clean their community since they pay levies to the assembly, hence their unwillingness to pay. The evidence above suggests that community-service provider relations among certain population groups are complex and difficult. This obviously hampers service provision in these areas.

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5.2.4 The Informal Private Sector Fitting into the Actor Constellations

The existence and the role of the informal sector in waste management cannot be gainsaid. Though, governments, policy makers and bureaucrats often sidestep them in policy formulation and implementation. There seems to be a surge in the activities of the informal sector in recent times as the sanitation and waste management problems of Ghana escalates. This group of informal waste pickers known in local parlance as “Kayaborla” operates in all urban centers across the country. Though the ESP of Ghana was elaborate on private sector partnership for sanitation management in Ghana, the policy limits its scope of definition of the private sector to the formal sector only. Because they are not included in the actor group by policy, their activities are considered illegal by various municipal authorities. Kayaborlas are often hounded and harried by environmental officers and the private sector service providers within whose jurisdiction they operate. The investigation revealed a hostile and abusive relation on one hand and some isolated informal partnership at the other. An environmental officer described them as nuisance who rather compound the sanitation situation rather than helping it. He stated as follows:

These guys are our main problem in this area, they go for rubbish from households for a fee and they come and dumb them by the roadside. Some of them package the rubbish like luggage and leave it at the lorry packs in broad day light, only for us to find out later that such well package luggage are actually rubbish. We arrest them when we get them. [Fieldwork Data: Interview transcript from AMAD] Obviously, these are miscreants who abuse the system for their gains. An environmental officer suggested that some of these people are drug users who engage in this refuse distribution business to survive. However, there are some responsible groups of refuse collectors who are genuinely helping the sanitation situation. They serve many remote communities that are not accessible by the municipal authorities and the private waste contractors due to unmemorable routes. Such communities are happy with the services of the kayabola because they are well served. A community member lamented the poor service by the private contractor maintaining that they prefer the services of kayabola than the private contractors.

The Kayabola is more helpful than the private contractor because they are more regular and their fees are low. They come every day for the rubbish but the contractor only comes once a week and even that, their charges are high. [Fieldwork Data: Interview transcript from AMHH]

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The community tends to relate well with the informal sector because their needs are met regularly by this group. Some environmental officers agreed they are functional in the waste management process. In a place like Ashiaman, the informal waste pickers have an association and they are in working relationship with the EHD and the private contractor. They pay a fee to the assembly to dump their refuse at the assembly’s dumpsite and they hold meetings to negotiate these fees, but they are not officially recognized group and there is no legislation that controls their activities. In a focus group discussion with the waste pickers associations, they indicated that they are willing to partner the assembly and the private contractor. A group member recounts:

We are usually invited by the assembly for meetings and we always honour these meeting to discuss about anything going wrong with our operations. Even Zoomlion came to register us with the promise that they will provide us tricycles but we have not heard anything from them. We are law abiding citizens working for our daily bread so we are ready to cooperate with the assembly and Zoomlion. [Fieldwork Data: Interview transcript from ASKB] These informal partnerships only exist only in Ashiaman because the EHD sees the need to allow them to operate due to the volatile nature of the community. However, apart from getting them to pay their levies and comply with certain regulations, the assembly is not ready to engage them as stakeholder group when it comes to planning and decision making in sanitation. The waste pickers association indicated that they want a formal recognition from the assembly to streamline their activities in order to put wayward waste pickers who dump by the roadside in check.

5.3 Collaboration within the Decentralized Space

Most public services have been decentralized to the lower level to achieve outcomes that include easy access to public service by citizens, timely, effective and efficient service delivery, popular participation at the local level and improved economic and social interactions. Centralized bureaucracy and top-down approach to implementing government policies gave way for a more liberal approach to development. The decentralized space allows for active interaction, participation and collaboration among local actors for the implementation of government policies. Among the social and public services decentralized in Ghana is environmental sanitation. The NESP is implemented at the local

160 level by a group of local actors whose collaboration is vital in achieving implementation success. To understand the roles of these actors and how they relate to each other in their collaborative effort, this section presents findings from the study.

5.3.1 MMDAs and the Community Relations

The MMDA as the principal implementing agency of the NESP has direct responsibility towards the community who are the main target of the policy. The implementation arrangement of the NESP has the community and the individual at the center of its action plan since the individual is the main agent of pollution in the society. The individual and the community are bound by legislative provisions to comply with sanitation by-laws and regulations to keep the environment clean. The NESP spells out community and individual responsibilities and community programmes to help the community achieve clean environment. Citizens who fail to comply with the provision are sanctioned to ensure compliance. The MMDAs are also responsible for the provision of sanitation services like collection and sanitary disposal of wastes, cleansing of thoroughfares, markets and other public spaces and other roles as stated in section 5.1 above. Since majority of these services are outsourced on contract and franchise basis in a PPP arrangements, the MMDAs has the obligation to monitor and ensure the communities are well served. Due to the enforcement and education role of the MMDAs, the ideal relation that is expected between them and the community is that of legislative and social relations. However, the study points out to fragmented relations that are defined by political, economic and socio- cultural factors that formed the basis of discussion in the next chapter. The relation between the two on the ground can best be described as marriage of convenience. They need each other to promote sanitation but their relations are mostly unstable. The EHSD of the MMDAs are engaged in the communities in various ways to educate and enforce sanitation by-laws. A DEHO described some of their engagements as follows:

We do public announcements, and education. Almost every quarter we used to have these community durbars basically some of these things are done on a focal group basis like we needed to. We just did some for public toilet operators in the community. We are partnering a company to introduce to them a vector control paint which will enhance their work to rig the transmission route of vectors to the public. We just had one with

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them and it went on well so it's basically on focal group basis. [Fieldwork Data: Interview transcript from ASKD]

These education programs are ongoing but not on regular basis. In some other communities, the EHSD only engages the community on emergency basis when there is a disease outbreak or when there is a donor funded program. Almost all the EHSD interviewed confirmed that their engagement with the community is at its peak when the above conditions exist. A DEHO stated as follows:

Yes, we engage in public education but not on a frequent basis, for instance when there is an issue to be dealt with, if it is cholera or any outbreak of disease then we move in. Apart from that we have field officers on the ground that target house-holds who don't have toilet at home to educate them on the need to have toilet at home. Currently there is a program by UNICEF to educate them on the need to have their own toilet that is also going on currently. As and when it is necessary we do that. [Fieldwork Data: Interview transcript from AKDH] The MMDAs have the backing of the state to enforce laws and implement programs, most of the EHO in the case study areas find some of the communities they work with as difficult and uncooperative. A DEHO described the community he currently works as a difficult terrain, therefore DEHO turnovers in the community is high due to bitter relationships that normally develop between the officers and the community. This he described as follows:

For some time now there is no district environmental health officer who stayed here for more than one year but I am here for 3 years going to the 4th year. This is because of the peoples' behavior. Many people would not be able to contend with the way the people go about their things. Most of the officers who come and go either opt out themselves or the people agitate against them because of their stand concerning certain issues pertaining in the area. [Fieldwork Data: Interview transcript from AKDH]

When asked how he managed to survive in such a difficult terrain, he stated that aside the use of his powers to enforce laws and to prosecute, he believes that going beyond the formal rules and engaging the community informally helps to understand them better.

You need to build personal relationships and accept the people as they are first. That's the only way you can be able to understand them. If you do not accept them as they are. You cannot be able to reason with them and find amicable solutions to their problem. [Fieldwork Data: Interview transcript from AKDH]

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Community members and some opinion leaders are not happy with the way and manner sanitation matters are handled by the MMDAs. They complained about poor service delivery and non-enforcement of sanitation by-laws in the communities. They also claim complains to the EHSD on sanitation issues in the community are not promptly attended to. This sentiment came up strongly in most focus group discussions in the communities.

The MMDAs are not swift in performing their duties in the community. When we report issues to our assembly man to be taken to the assembly, it takes time before we see some action from them; sometimes they don't come at all. The same way if you report a sanitation offender in the community, they either act or leave the offender off the hook or sometimes they don't act at all. [Fieldwork Data: Interview transcript from FGAK]

Some community members also accused the MMDAs for charging fees and levies without putting them to use in cleaning their communities. However, most response to these allegations from the MMDAs always point to logistical constraint, low level of manpower and political interference in their duties. Relation between the MMDAs and the community according to the study is checked and loose, though there have been some close collaborations, impact on sanitation is minimal.

5.3.2 Relations between MMDAs and Allied Institutions

The EHD of the district assembly collaborate with other decentralized departments under the district assembly like the town and country planning department, district health department, district education office, the EPA and other agencies connected to environmental sanitation to implement the ESP at the local level. Each of these agencies have their roles spelt out in the ESP. Though most of these departments fall under the MMDAs but operate from different sector ministries; a delegated form of decentralization. These departments and agencies are co-implementers of the policy. Among some of the challenges of the environmental sanitation sector the ESP seeks to address is weak sector collaboration. There is the need for strong collaboration to ensure effective policy implementation. Though the ESP identified 22 sectors as allied institutions responsible for the environmental sanitation sector from the national to the local level, the study sampled four departments that work closely with the EHSD at the local level. Strong sector collaboration is expected to boost implementation success. Findings of the study though

163 points to somewhat strong partnerships between these collaborating agencies on the ground however, these relations are rather ad-hoc in nature. These relations mostly develop in crisis situations and loosen up when crises are over, leaving a hiatus in the implementation process. Almost all allied institutions together with the EHD interviewed agreed they work closely together but this is only in response to crises situations. An environmental officer narrates how the 2014 cholera outbreak in Ghana united them to deal with the situation.

About the 2014 incident, we had the biggest cholera outbreak of which large numbers of people were affected with a number of casualties. We were able to bring the situation under control at a point in time because we were able to bring these actors together. We all came together to be able to do that, and that was the first time I could see these our opinion leaders, chiefs, NADMO officers, district environmental officers, Ghana health services, fire services and a whole of these institutions coming together, sitting on one table, discussing how they will all help to rectify the issue starting from the schools level. Education directors and all those who matters came together and formed part of the district cholera control committee that has helped in a very good way in handling this thing. [Fieldwork Data: Interview transcript from AKDH] The unity of purpose and collaboration displayed in working together to solve the crises described above was very strong. Due to the strength displayed through strong collaborative relationship among actors, the crisis was brought under control at the earliest possible time. An EPA official also pointed out to a cordial and strong collaboration from other agencies.

For us, because we have regional offices and some district offices, if we want to work with the schools for instance in a particular community, we start from GES so that we would go to the district office and indicate that we want to have a program with this school on this date. There are two things that happen, either they communicate with the school on our behalf or they give us the permission to go to the school so we go to the school. If we want to engage a particular community on an issue, most of the time, the issues come to us through the communities themselves or through the NGO's so if it comes through an NGO, then together we would prepare the grounds and meet the community members or they do the mobilization and we go and address the issues. [Fieldwork Data: Interview transcript from EPBE] Strong collaboration and relationship between the EPA, GES, NGOs and the community are evident on the ground. They all seem to provide the space for collaboration on issues of environmental sanitation. This position was reiterated by a SHEP coordinator in one of the MMDAs.

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The SHEP coordinating unit works with some NGOs who come to the schools to do sanitation programs that has to do with education. We also collaborate with environmental health department of the district assembly. Private sanitation companies work in our schools under the supervision of the metropolitan assembly; however, we don’t have any direct relationship with them. We work with Ghana Health Service; currently we are having a joint program where they will be distributing mosquito nets in our schools. So, they have instructed us to gather data for them in our schools to help them in their program. We collaborate with assemblymen too. Whenever we are undertaking any project in a community and we are faced with any challenge we call on them to solve the situation for us and they are helpful. Normally when there are environmental sanitation issues, the assembly invites us to deliberate the issues on the ground. At times teams are formed to work on the challenge at hand. That is where the collaboration comes in. [Fieldwork Data: Interview transcript from AMSH]

The above perfectly sums up a rather fruitful, cordial and strong relationship between some of these collaborative partners in implementing the ESP. However, these relations are not continuous. They mostly emerge to deal with emergencies and crisis situations and after that coil back. These partnerships come into existence after a party solicits for the help of the other to undertake a project. The District Environmental Sub-Committee provides the platform for these actors to meet and review cases and complains from the public on environmental sanitation issues, however the strength of this committee is only felt when there is a crisis. Instead of the sector institutions being proactive in preventing environmental pollution, they are rather reactionary in their approach; implementing the ESP on piecemeal basis due to the absence of continuous relations.

5.3.3 The Mediating Role of Assembly and Unit Committee Members

With the decentralization arrangements in Ghana, the local government system has been democratized to include local participation in the governance of the various local government areas. Representation on the general assembly of the local government, which is the decision making body of the assembly includes the peoples representatives. These representatives are voted for in local elections, according to electoral area demarcations on non-partisan basis. They are usually referred to us “assemblymen” and “assemblywomen”. The assembly men and women serve as the official mouth piece of the people on the local

165 government decision making board, playing various mediating roles between the assembly and the communities in all matters. The major issue affecting the case study communities is environmental sanitation and this has been the main preoccupation of most assembly men and women. They play the role of community leaders and serve as political heads of the communities who work in the interest of the community. The assembly men and women work with unit committees which are the least decentralized structures within the local government system. The unit committees are a consultative body that plays a mediating role between the people and the local government. The membership of this committee is by election at the district assembly elections. Both the assembly men and women and the unit committee serve as a point of mobilization within the community for effective participation. They usually liaise with other actors to implement the ESP within their communities. Since they are mediating between the people and the local government, their relations with both parties and all other parties involved in the implementation of the ESP are crucial. This empirical study reveals a subsisting relation that is cordial but polarized and laced with certain level of mistrust. Nevertheless, all actors find the role of assembly men and women and the unit committees very helpful and have often used them to get to the people in implementing sanitation programs. An environmental officer of one of the MMDAs explains how they use the assemblymen and women as a channel to get to the people:

As for these sanitation duties we don't directly relate with the community members. If we have any problem, we meet their representatives who are the assembly men, they in turn relay information to them. The assemblymen usually call our attention to situations in their communities, and then we will move in to help solve it. Sometimes we organize community interface program with the help of the assemblymen with various department in the assembly in attendance. Town hall meetings are where we meet them directly. If they have any problem with sanitation then they ask and we will explain things to them. [Fieldwork Data: Interview transcript from ASDH] This view is shared by most EHO and other actors interviewed; their mediating role and performance on the ground cannot be gainsaid. The assembly men admit they work with different actors within the communities without much problem; however, there is some level of mistrust between the assemblymen and some NGO/CBO in some of the communities. An assemblyman complained about NGO/CBO operations in his community.

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The NGO in the community provides dust-bins to households and charges them GHS 5 monthly for collections. We realized they are making profit so we approached them about this and they said their motive is not profit but to generate employment for people in the community and use the fees to remunerate them. But we have realized that, that is not true because they have other businesses they do. So, we will be calling them at the sub-metro level to sit down and talk about their objectives. Example there is this UN habitat fund that the NGO manages and CBOs in the community can apply for that funds up to GHS10,000 when they have a good proposal and when they use money for their project, they can keep the remainder. But we have seen that, they are not telling us the truth so we shall call them to look into this at sub-metro level. Once there is a change of government, we have to re-visit their activities and operations. [Fieldwork Data: Interview transcript from AMAK]

It can be gathered from the above complain that the assemblyman is not clear about the operations of the NGO/CBO so there is suspicion about the motives of the NGO/CBO. Though they work together, the trust to sustain a lasting relationship is absent.

The relations between the assembly men and women with the private service providers exist. These relations are mostly created by the assembly men and women themselves for the purpose of their work. However, these relations are one sided because most private service providers do not take interest in these relationships. The communication between them most at times is about complains from the assembly men and women about a situation in their communities that required action. Assembly man states it as follows:

Nobody introduces these private contractors to us, they just come from the assembly to work in the community. But we do contact them ourselves in our own interest because if anything goes wrong in the community we are the first point of call so we need to have information and provide such to the people. Usually, we only deal with their field supervisors and we call them anytime there is a problem. Sometimes they come to solve them, sometimes they don't come. When they are proving stubborn we report them to the district assembly but we don't see any results from that. But Zoomlion is doing well. When we call on them for clean-up exercise they always come to support us with logistics. [Fieldwork Data: Interview transcript from AMAK] These relations are cordial but not fully functional as it is supposed to be. The private service providers do not take these relationships serious.

Although the district assembly elections are conducted on non-partisan basis as stipulated by the 1992 constitution, the contest in recent times has taken an overtly partisan

167 dimension where contestants solicit for votes based on their partisan affiliations. This has polarized most communities between the two major political parties in Ghana, the NDC and the NPP. Cooperation from the losing candidates and their supporters with the winner becomes problematic. From a focus group discussion with a group of fishermen in one of the communities, they accused the assembly man for not making appearance in their community ever since he won the elections, let alone to solve their problems. But the assembly man rebuts the allegation as follows:

It is not true. Even yesterday there was a dead body at the shore, they called me to complain to me so I also called the police to report and together with the police we went to remove the body to deposit at the morgue. Maybe there are some people who are not in support of me, when you meet such people, they will say bad things about me, but when you meet people who support me they will also say good things about me. [Fieldwork Data: Interview transcript from AMAK] The assembly man further lamented about uncooperative behaviours from some of the community members when it comes to sanitation duties.

Sometimes you find people not assisting because the person making the call is from party A and they are from party B so they won’t get involved. Everything in this community is politics. They will even go to the extent of littering the areas you have cleaned. [Fieldwork Data: Interview transcript from AMAK] These accusations and counter accusations between sections of the community and the assembly men and women run through all the communities studied. The findings proved that assembly men and women are willing work closely with the EHD, the service provider, NGOs/CBOs/FBOs and all other actors to mobilize the community for sanitation programs. Their political success depends mainly on how well they organize sanitation. They proved to be the agents of transformation within the communities, who are eager to get the local authorities to discharge their sanitation duties within areas where action is lacking. However local government support and community support for them is not strong, due to several factors chief among them is resource constraints and politics. Unit committee members form some sort of cabinet to support the assembly persons in their role, but their loyalty as well is divided if their political opinion differs. Some unit committee members complain of lack of incentives to work due to the voluntary nature of their work. The effect of politics on their relationships is thoroughly discussed in the following chapter.

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5.4 Participation at the Local Level

Community Participation forms a major strategy for implementing any developmental plans and policies. Both bottom-up policy implementation advocates and international development organizations continue to project the importance of community participation in achieving developmental goals. Local inclusion in decision making and community project planning bring about community ownership and project/program sustainability. The NEP and the NESSAP employed community participation and public awareness program as one of its implementation strategies to achieve sanitation goals. Participation creates awareness and interaction among the locals who are the beneficiary and policy targets. However, the level of participation from the locals and their relations with policy implementers will determine the level of influence they exert in the process. This section presents finding on local actors’ relations based on participatory framework for ESP in Ghana.

5.4.1 Community Engagement Programs

Community engagement programs are part of the strategies to promote clean environment in communities across the country. Most community engagement programs take the form of behavourial change communication and public campaigns, social marketing and communal labour. Key among such programs currently running in Ghana is the National Sanitation Day Program, the Community Led Total Sanitation, the School Health Education Program, Community Water and Sanitation Program etc. Also, the various district assemblies and Ghana Health Service design their own educational and sensitization programs to engage communities on issues of environmental health and sanitation. The investigation of actor’s relations within these community engagement programs reveals good but weak relations from some of the communities due to various reasons. Interest in the national sanitation day program which was supposed to bring all actors together for monthly clean-up exercises is almost weaning with community members showing little or no interest. According to a key informant within one of the MMDAs, the decline in the program is largely due to political and economic reasons. He explained:

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Most of the youth in the community used to participate in the program, but some of them expect to be paid since they are jobless. They feel the assembly is paid to do the job so they are likely not to work without incentives. Some political groups also organize in their party colours to participate in the program so people who are opposed to their party are likely not to participate. [Fieldwork Data: Interview transcript from KIAK]

Though the NESP made this program compulsory, with the various district assembly by- laws backing communal labour with punitive measures for non-compliance, this seems not to be enforced. An assembly man added that some political opponents in the community will deliberately refuse to get in involved with such community programs because they wish to see them fail so that they can make political capital out of it. He lamented:

Some of them will close their shops and sit down and watch while others do the job. Most of these boys who help us clean the community; I have to give them something small from my own pocket. [Fieldwork Data: Interview transcript from AMAK] This creates some sort of adversarial relations between the factions on the political divide when it comes to participation in community work. The above also depicts low level of participation in most clean-up exercises. However, other sensitization and educational programs by NGOs/CBOs, Ghana Health Service and the district assemblies received some fair level of patronage from the community. An NGO director noted that, community members are willing to participate in their sensitization programs anytime they call on them. He explained as follows:

We get the cooperation of the community anytime we call for meetings to educate and sensitize them on the environment. Sometimes we get the chiefs to attend our meetings, their presence alone attaches some level of importance to our work. [Fieldwork Data: Interview transcript from AMNO] This position was reinforced by an EHO, concerning community mobilization for education and sensitization. He reiterates that mobilizing community members through chiefs and opinion leaders for participation in education and sensitization programs has been encouraging especially in very poor communities, but added that communities with middle class workers are often difficult to organize due to their busy working schedules. Most community members and groups interviewed corroborate these existing relations between them and the policy implementing agencies. The popular view that was echoed in a focus group discussion summarized as follows by an opinion leader:

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The assembly, NGOs and the community health nurses have engaged us in several community programs; we have good relations with them. We receive them any time they call on us, and we also make sure we mobilize the community for the programs. We are happy they engage us in what they do; we are also ready to support them. [Fieldwork Data: Interview transcript from FAAK] The above statement points out to a cordial and functional relationship between the community and the various policy implementing agencies. The findings point to a mixture of good relations on one hand and a weak relation on the other depending on the situation and who is involved. The relations among the actors within the participatory framework have some consequences for policy implementation and achieving sanitation goals. These policy implications form the basis for discussion in chapter seven.

5.5 Conclusion

The chapter presented the finding of the research that answers the first research question. The chapter began by a discussion on role of actors, their relations and links, presenting evidence of their roles from the policy point of view [NEPS] triangulating it with actors’ interface and their interaction on the field. This discussion concluded on the point that indeed there are existing relations and links among the various actors in the policy implementation process. Actors have links and they relate to each other in one way or the other as prescribed by the NESP and its organogram. This paved the way to investigate the kind of relations that exist. The sections that ensued then discussed the kinds of relations along the lines of the major themes identified in literature. Relations between actors involve within the PPP and Decentralization strands of literature were then presented. Within the PPP thread, relations were discussed among the MMDAs, the private service providers, the NGOs/CBOs and the community. This saw an emergence of different kinds of relations and how they play out in the implementation of the NESP. The second and third sections went on to discuss the relations among actors within the decentralised space and in local participation respectively, distilling different kinds of relations that characterized the implementation process. A summary conclusion that reflects on actors relations was made in the last sub-section.

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CHAPTER SIX

ISSUES AFFECTING ACTORS’ RELATIONS IN ESP IMPLEMENTATION

6.0 Introduction

This chapter presents the findings of the study that answers the second research question “What are the issues affecting the actors relations in ESP implementation?” The previous chapter identified the kind of relations that exist between local actors in the implementation of the ESP. These relations take various shapes and types that can well be explained and understood by the issues that affect their emergence. The chapter identifies such issues under various topics such as institutional, political, economic and socio- cultural. The chapter then breaks the discussion into specific issues under the various themes. Institutional context points to non-inclusive institutional arrangements and undermining lower- level institutional structures as major issues shaping actors relations. Under political issues, factors such as local capture by assembly men/women, political interference – ‘order from above syndrome’ and party foot-soldier conundrum was identified. Under economic issues factors such as the polluter can’t pay and resource availability came to the fore and lastly socio-cultural issues explore how cosmopolitanism and nomadism, moribund traditional leadership and value systems and lack of community ownership affect actors’ relations

6.1 Critical Issues Affecting Actors’ Relations

Actor’s relations as discussed in the previous chapter revealed a complex mixture of relationships between various groups of actors at the local level. These relations we contend do not arise out of vacuum but are triggered by certain issues within the policy environment. These issues shape the relations identified in the previous chapter. To better understand why actors relate the way they do, we will proceed to discuss such critical factors as the context of their relations. Using the contextual approach, we identified issues under thematic areas such as institutions, politics, economics, social and culture. The study

172 found out that, institutional factors shape the way certain relations develop. Others can be well explained by political issues within the implementation environment. Politics is a crucial factor in every implementation arrangement and its effects on overall policy outcome cannot be underplayed. Also, the economic, social and cultural factors all combined are elements and environmental variables that predict how society responds to any policy implementation process. The subsections below discuss in detail some of these issues and how they shape the relations that exist.

6.2 Institutional Issues

Institutional issues affecting actor’s relations in ESP implementation are concerned with the arrangement of organisational structures and how responsibilities, powers and authority are allocated to execute policy plan. Issues of coordination, methods and procedures in implementation are made clear by the institutional arrangements of the sector. This arrangement can affect how various actor groups relate in the implementation process. In identifying institutional issues affecting actor’s relation, certain inadequacies and shortfalls were discovered in the institutional arrangement in the NESP. Some Informal institutions crucial to waste management were ignored; also, power and authority of the lower level decentralised units were sidestepped by the higher-level units. The sections below discuss in detail such issues.

6.2.1 Non-Inclusive Institutional Arrangements

The institutional arrangement at the local level acknowledged various actors and partner agencies that must collaborate to implement the NESP. However, an important component of the private sector which includes the non-formal private sector is excluded in the arrangement. Despite various research recommendations for government and policy makers to give attention to this group (see, Alemu, 2017; Samson, 2015; Oteng-Ababio et al., 2017) they were still sidestepped in policy arrangements. The informal private sector however remains a functional component of the actor constellation and their activities contribute to the overall impact (positive and negative) on sanitation and waste

173 management. Though they are part of the system, their activities are deemed illegal so where cooperation is needed to achieve success, such opportunities are lost. A focus group discussion with informal waste pickers reveals that some of the workers are students who migrate from the northern part of the country to the south in search of greener pasture during vacation to pay their school fees. They seemed to be a well-organized group, but the authorities sometimes brand them as criminals and riffraff because they don't have a place in the official arrangement. A participant in the focus group discussion argued:

We are law abiding citizens who are ready to work; we are ready to be registered to work with the assembly. Currently we have an association; the association is supposed to pay some dues to help fix our trucks and buy t-shirts and write our names on them so that if persons don't wear the t- shirt, then they are not from our organization. That is where we can interrogate such persons and if they want to work in our area, they would have to register with us. If something happens whiles they are under our watch, we can respond to it. [Fieldwork Data: Interview transcript from AMKB]. The EHD indicates that the activities of some of the informal waste pickers are a source of concern because waste collected by them ends up on the street. But gleaning from the willingness of the waste pickers association to work with the assembly, some partnership can arise to streamline their activities. But the official mandate to work with the informal group does not exist hence hostile relations persist.

Another group that is alienated in the institutional arrangement is the traditional authorities. Though the community is recognized in the arrangement, the informal structures within the communities headed by the traditional authorities have not been officially recognized. The traditional authority serves as powerful figure of influence in the communities and their formal incorporation in the institutional arrangements with some state powers can help in effective mobilizations for community programs and enforcement management. Though the chiefs wild some level of power in their communities, their powers cannot be enforced under rule of law. The relations between the implementing agencies, NGOs/CBOs, private service providers and the traditional authorities are usually cordial however; these relations have little impact on policy implementation due to their extent of involvement. The amalgamation of formal and informal institutions into the institutional arrangement will strengthen the relationship between the two for effective collaboration.

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6.2.2 Undermining Lower- Level Institutional Structures

The institutional arrangement at the metropolitan, municipal and district assembly level allocates various duties and responsibilities to sub-divisional structures such as the sub- metro, zonal, urban and town councils. Authority is decentralized to lower level structure to supervise the performance of contractors and franchisees. But the reality on the ground points to the fact that, higher level institutional structures within the assemblies deals with the contractors and franchisees with little or no regard to the functions, responsibility and authority of the structures below. The sub-divisional structures are not adequately involved in the engagement process of contractors and franchisees; hence they are less empowered to supervise and enforce the contract terms. A DEHO lamented:

We are not involved in the process of engaging them and when they come to work in our area, nobody introduces them to us. If you are lucky your boss will call you to inform you that they are coming your area. Because of this they hardly take orders from us, even inviting them for a meeting is a problem. When you report them to the top no action is really taken [Fieldwork Data: Interview transcript from MMEH]. This attitude from the top has rendered the sub-divisional structures powerless in performing their duties. This then creates a frail relationship between the sub-metro, zonal, urban and town councils and the contractor on the ground, making supervision and monitoring less effective. Another officer at the EHD made a similar remark about how the lower level structures are excluded in PPP contract negotiation, making them ineffective in handling the service providers:

We are not privy to the contracts so when you even call the service provider and question why are they are not doing this and that, they wouldn't even respond to you. Supposing the officers in charge of the community, say the DCO or the EHOs are part of the agreement stage, and he the contractor is aware of our core mandate, If i call you would you refuse to come? You would even come; you don't need to be called because you know that this is what you are supposed to do. [Fieldwork Data: Interview transcript from AKCD]. Opening up the PPP negotiation to include both senior and junior officers who have roles to play in the overall PPP arrangement will ensure greater accountability and service quality in the implementation process. This is however not the case, leaving the process hanging without proper supervision and monitoring.

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6.3 Political Issues

Public policies emanate from within a political structure therefore the political disposition of the environment of implementation has an influence on policy outcomes. Actors’ relations are influenced in various ways by their political environment. The role of party politics within the decentralised space, factionalism and patron-client ties affect actors’ behaviour and how they relate with each other. To understand the drivers of such relations among policy actors, political factors affecting their relations must be examined. The sub- section discusses some political issues affecting actor relations. Among these are local capture by assembly men/women, political interference and party foot soldier conundrum.

6.3.1 Local Capture by Assembly Men/Women

The mediating role of the assembly members between the communities and the local government is crucial in sustaining relationships and channels of communication within the decentralized space. Though the assemblymen/women serve as a liaison between the EHD and the community to implement the ESP, there is some level of mistrust based on some perceived notion of capture for personal and political gain by the assemblymen/women. Most assemblymen/women also complained about how they use their own resources to organize clean-ups in their communities because the assemblies are not forthcoming with resources that will enable them perform their duties. An assemblyman laments:

We are left to use our own money to organize clean-up exercises, because the assembly won’t yield to our demands and the people won’t understand it is coming from the assembly. Since you promised them during the campaign, you just have to use your own money to do the job. [Fieldwork Data: Interview transcript from AMAM] An environmental officer of one of the assemblies explained that, excessive politicking and personal gain are the motivation of some assemblymen. He laments as follows:

Their job is to mobilize the people to work in the communities. Initially in the 90s people knew that assemblyman work is sacrificial, now people are aware that they take sitting allowance and are given motor bikes so the community members are aware that their position is a lucrative one.

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Before now assemblymen organized communal clean ups and put in claims for their expenses, but now they make so many demands, they want a mobilization allowance, and all sorts of allowances. Because of all these, assembly member contest has become very keen, people putting up billboards and now they politicize the contest but it wasn't like that in the past. So, people are beginning to know that there is money in there so if you go and mobilize anyone to come and work, they want their share before they cooperate. Formerly the assembly member position was not political so they were able to get the community to cooperate with them but now it has become political so people are divided along partisan lines and opponents are not willing to cooperate with the assembly member for community work. These are all challenges on the ground. [Fieldwork Data: Interview transcript from AMDH]

An assemblyman debunks this assertion claiming that their demands are in no way connected to personal gains but purely for the work. He stated that people within the community will not cooperate with them to clean up the community if there are no incentives for them. He attributes the attitude of the people to certain practices of the EHD and the PCD during clean-up exercises. He narrated as follows:

After national sanitation day exercise, you will see the DEHOs sharing allowances to their officers on the ground in the full glare of the public. This gives the idea to the people that the exercise is a paid job, so they were used for free. Because of that they will also not work next time if you don't pay them. They have caused it not us. [Fieldwork Data: Interview transcript from AKAM] These two actors traded accusation and counter accusation as to whose action is responsible for the problem at hand. A focus group discussion with the unit committees that works with the assemblymen/women reveals that, members of the committees are divided along party lines, so benefits from the assembly are derived based on political loyalty to the assemblyman/woman. A committee member stated as follows:

We are not paid as committee members so the only benefit we get is when our boss the assemblyman, gets something from the top then, he will share among us the NPP supporters. As for the other two people they are NDC so they don't support our boss so they are not part of the sharing. They also work with the “kinka assemblyman” who is NDC. [Fieldwork Data: Interview transcript from AKCM] It is instructive to note that, a unit committee member of one electoral area can breakaway to go and work in another electoral area because of partisan politics and benefits. The level of clientelism and capture by local politicians (Assemblymen/women and unit committee

177 members) has affected the way the various components of the district assembly system are designed to function. This consequently affects the functional relations that are needed to achieve cooperation to promote sanitation at the local level.

6.3.2 Political Interference – ‘Order from Above Syndrome’

The relation between the EHSD and the community can be described as a loose interaction. There are no strong relations where legislation and regulations are concerned. Though the EHSD wilds the power to enforce sanitation laws, they are unable to exercise these functions effectively due to the weak legislative relationship that exists between them, the community and the private service provider. These relations developed out of issues surrounding their engagement. The EHSD believes that excessive political interference leaves them in a weak position. In narrating how political interference has affected their relations with the community and the private service provider, an EHO lamented below:

If we arrest offenders or issue them summons to come to court, they run to their MPs, Assembly members or one big politician to come and plead for them. Your boss will call to ask you to drop the case. You can’t disobey because when you try it, they will victimize you. These things don't help matters because they are the cause of sanitation problems we have here. [Fieldwork Data: Interview transcript from MMEO] Almost all EHOs interviewed have admitted political obstruction to their work as enforcement officers at one point in time. Another EHO added:

They are no longer afraid of the law because they know they have a way out Fieldwork Data: Interview transcript from MMEO] This phenomenon makes it difficult for sanitary inspectors to enforce the law to the later. EHO indicates that though not all enforcement procedures have been tempered with, but the frequency of such interference breaks their resolve to pursue cases of sanitation offence. This normally happens due to the competitive nature of elections in Ghana and politician’s determination to hold on to power at all cost by pleasing their patrons at the expense of the law. A DEHO explained one of such situations as follows:

When you organize national sanitation day program you will see only few people working others will not mind. Although the assembly men go round informing people with the assembly information van, with the instruction and warning for community members not to open their shops during the

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exercise for business or face prosecution. You will find out that people will not open their shops but will still not participate in the exercise. This is all because the laws are not enforced. Sometimes the assembly men will tell you not to bring city guards to their area during the exercise because they want to protect their political space. They don't want to incur the wrath of their electorates. So, the assemblymen don’t help the situation themselves, instead of giving out defaulters and perpetrators for prosecution, they rather shield them. [Fieldwork Data: Interview transcript from AKDH] These interferences are not limited to law enforcement, but also in the award of sanitation and waste management contracts. The award of contract is supposed to be done through a competitive bidding process with a procurement regime; however, the process has been hijacked by politicians, dictating who should receive the award. One of the heads of department in charge of such process admitted bellow:

Politics comes in when maybe they ask you to give the work to A or B to do it but then that is the process of giving the work to somebody. But when it comes to the actual work, irrespective of where you are coming from, i would make sure you do the work. That one I don't compromise and they all know. No matter where you come from, fine, but when it comes to the work, you will do it. [Fieldwork Data: Interview transcript from MHWD] The officer admitted political manipulation but dwells on the point that, getting the job done is the most important thing and he makes sure the work is done. Though other responses may not be directly related to the jurisdiction of this particular officer, but the verdict on performance of such contractors on the ground contradicts his claims that these contractors are supervised to do the work according to the contract terms. A respondent decried the poor performance of some waste management contractors:

These contractors don't have the capacity to perform; they have less equipment and men on the field. You don't give a job to somebody like that but because of politics and their personal interest such people get the job ahead of the competent ones. [Fieldwork Data: Interview transcript from AMDH] Evidence from the field suggests that there is lack of supervision by the assembly due to the politics involved. The officers equipped with the supervisory function at the urban and zonal council are often bypassed in the process, leaving the contractor unaccountable to the field officers. Therefore, that strong legislative relationship needed to ensure effective supervision for performance is absent, due to such political issues.

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6.3.3 Party Foot-soldier Conundrum

The party foot-soldier phenomenon developed out of the political system in Ghana after the inception of the fourth republic. This is a situation where political parties encourage grassroots activism to galvanise local support for their political parties. Political parties rely on these activists, “foot soldiers” and “macho-men” to patrol polling stations during voting and registration periods, attend rallies and mobilise voters (Bob-Milliar, 2012). Anytime there is change of government, party foot-soldiers of the new government take over the running of most sanitation facilities like public toilets and dumpsites. This somehow truncates any PPP arrangement between the MMDAs and the private service providers. Service providers who are suspected to be affiliates of the former regime are violently dismissed. Such hostile takeovers create uncertainty and chaos between the MMDAs, the private service provider and the community, leaving sanitation situations unattended to. A DEHO recounted one of such situation as follows:

Zoomlion operates a temporal dumpsite here in Ashaiman, when there was the recent change of government; the foot-soldiers came to cease the site and started collecting money. They didn't know it is a temporal site that is evacuated to the landfill site so they allowed everyone to dump there. if you send police there, their political bosses will come and say they want to settle the issue themselves. Now, there is a crisis there, the place is overflowing and it is opposite a school. They have started burning the refuse and the school children are inhaling toxic smoke every day, there are complains of sickness and what have you. Now the assembly need GHS 80,000 to evacuate that refuse. The TV cameras and the news crew have been here several times to cover the story. It is terrible my brother! [Fieldwork Data: Interview transcript from AMDH] This chaos distorts every laid down procedures and arrangement within the PPP process. Some of the private waste management companies who are mostly the victim of these acts lamented how the break down in law and order during those periods affects their operations. Some environmental officers interviewed also narrated how they get threatened by some foot-soldiers when they try to enforce sanitation laws that affect them. He narrated an incident below:

Whenever there is a change of government, you get this people who call themselves party foot-soldiers giving us all sorts of problems when we go about our duties. You will hear them threatening that they will cause us to lose our jobs, even a labourer who works under me once threatened me that he will cause me to lose my job because his party has come to power. I know they speak out of ignorance, but they make our work difficult with 180

this kind of attitude on the field. [Fieldwork Data: Interview transcript from AKDC] Though things get to normalise after the new government settles in office, any functioning relationship between the active stakeholders in the area is distorted leaving the implementation arrangement in disarray.

6.4 Economic Issues

Issues affecting actors’ relations in the implementation of ESP within the economic context have to do with the economic environment of implementation. The level of economic development, the economic status of the target group, resource availably all predicts the level of success of policy implementation. Waste generation and demand for sanitation services are heavily linked to level of economic development. The sub-sections below identify two economic issues that affects the way actors relates within the process of ESP implementation in Ghana. The ability and willingness to pay for sanitation services defines how the service user and the service provider relate. Also availability of resources may determine how actors within the process of implementation relate with each other.

6.4.1 The Polluter Can’t Pay

One of the major constraints of the sanitation sector in Ghana is the low level of funding of the sector and the non-economic tariffs charged for sanitation services. To remedy this, the polluter pays principle, and the principle of cost recovery formed part of the broad policy principle of the NESP as a measure for the effective delivery of environmental sanitation. However, due to economic reasons, and the environmental consequences of excludability in private service provision, sanitation services are heavily subsidized by the district assemblies. In spite of this, the polluter in most urban areas in Ghana still can’t pay for sanitation services. The hostile and uncooperative relations between service providers, the MMDAs and some service users are the result of the service user’s inability to pay for services provided. Due to some of these hostilities, some service providers’ server their

181 relationship with some of the communities they use to serve. An operation officer of a waste management company explained the situation as follows:

Some of the community members are not ready to pay for services, though we reduced our charges very low due to their economic conditions, they still complain of the fees. But I tell you, what we charge cannot even break us even. We are running at a loss, but because we want to help so, we continue to serve them at a low cost but we won’t serve those who assault our officers who go to demand for fees. [Fieldwork Data: Interview transcript from AKJV] Some members of the community indicate that they are not engaged in any meaningful employment so they cannot afford the kind of charges imposed on them. A community member added below:

The company come to collect GH 20 every month, what work are we doing to be paying that much? That is why we prefer to use “kayabola”, just GHS 2 they will come for your “borla15”. When we don't have money, we keep the “borla” till we get the money. [Fieldwork Data: Interview transcript from AMCM]

A DEHO lamented how the system of cost recovery has not been effective due to unrealistic charges negotiated by the assemblymen/women. He stated that such low fees do not help the situation because the fees charged do not meet the operational cost of the private service provider.

In Ashiaman, when you come here they say they don't have money, but they make a lot of money here. The assemblymen who come from the community always say “my people are poor, my people are poor” so where there must be realistic fee for the contractors to work, they approve very low user fees to benefit their people during fee fixing and negotiations and once you do that the contractor cannot operate and make any gains. For instance, a contractor said that for him to do the work effectively he will need to charge GHS 50 a month. Because he needs to pay wages, buy fuel and spare parts and do maintenance. This low fee does not make the contractors work effectively. The fees were first pegged at GHS 10 then it went to GHS12 then to GHS 15 now this year households are paying GHS 20 a month. The contractor wanted to pull out because of this unrealistic fee. The contractor ends up paying about GHS 18 per ton of waste at the landfill, so this doesn’t give room for the contractor to make profit and improve on their services. So, their inefficiencies become excusable because of the polluter not paying the required fees for polluting. So, what the private contractors do is that they zone the areas according their economic status, where they charge high fees among the high income

15 Borla is a local parlance for refuse 182

group and low in the low incomes areas. So for instance the low income areas pay GHS 20 and the high, GHS 70 so that, when the average is struck it will be 45-45 to balance it, but in Ashaiman the assembly has decided that both the rich and the poor should pay a flat fee. And I, for once, believe this is unfair to the contractor. [Fieldwork Data: Interview transcript from AMDH] The assembly identified this challenge and has provided a central container in poor communities for “pay as you dump” services at a low fee, but some still cannot afford this service, so they rather dump in the drains and on the street at night. On the other hand, relations with middle income communities are cordial despite realistic and economic charges imposed on them. Economic status and the ability to pay thus becomes the determinant of relationships and how actors relate within these circles. Economic issues play a major factor in determining the kind of relationship that develops between the MMDAs the service providers and the community which in turn has an effect on policy implementation.

6.4.2 Resource Availability

Inadequacy of resource has been the bane for policy implementation in most developing countries. This is sometimes due to bad economy which can be attributed to many factors like corruption and political instability or in other cases, diversion of resources meant for a program implementation (Lane and Ersson, 2004). Resources (financial and human) play an important role in policy implementation, since turning intentions into reality requires resources to be put in to action. The kind of relations that develops between actors within the ESP implementation process is partly defined by the level of resource availability. Most passive and loose relations identified are as a result of lack of resources. Community members usually complain of the non-responsive nature of EHSD and the private service providers when called upon to attend to situations.

Whenever we have a sanitation situation that needs the environmental sanitation officer’s attention, we invite them and they sometimes come and inspect it but they won’t do anything about it. Usually it is about people dumping at an open space, creating a mountain of refuse. Some of this situation is left unattended to for a long time, causing bad smell and sickness. [Fieldwork Data: Interview transcript from AKCM].

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An assembly man also complained about how he frantically tried to get the attention of the assembly and other top government officials to desilt a drain that usually causes flood in his electoral area to no avail.

That drain in the “London market” is in my electoral area, anytime it rains that place gets flooded because of the rubbish that is packed in there. I called on the assembly to help me with equipment and some money to organize the boys to desilt it but they couldn't help. Even during the campaign the chief of staff came to the area to promise that the drain will be constructed but when he left we didn't hear anything from him again. So, I have to use my own money to pay the boys to do the work since I am the assemblyman of the area everybody sees it as my resposibility [Fieldwork Data: Interview transcript from AKAM]. When some DEHO’s were contacted on some of these complains, they admitted the claim but blamed it on lack of resources:

Yes, it is true we are unable to do anything about some of these situations because it involves money and getting approval from the assembly to undertake such exercises can be challenging. Sometimes we are overwhelmed by the demands because we don't have staffs on the ground. We do our best to get the private contractor to help in such situations. [Fieldwork Data: Interview transcript from AKDH] The resource factor affects how actors collaborate to implement policies because the implementing agencies, most of the time, are unable to perform their duties due to non- availability of the resources required to perform. Other actor groups may then find them as uncooperative in pursuing the common agenda.

6.5 Socio- Cultural Issues

The social and cultural milieu of any policy implementation is likely to influence policy outcomes in many ways; therefore, their effects must be carefully examined and considered when implementing any given policy. Policy implementing agencies must first take into consideration the population, social demographic characteristic, cultural practices, norms and value systems to design tailor-made programs to suite the appropriate target audience. Socio-cultural factors may affect how various actors relate in project implementation. The study identified three of such factors that shape the relations of actors in ESP implementation in Ghana. The characteristics of cosmopolitan population, nomadic

184 activities, traditional leadership and value systems and community ownership of common pool resources were identified and discussed in detail in the sub-sections below.

6.5.1 Cosmopolitanism and Nomadism

As population increases, coupled with economic expansion and globalization effects, people move from one place to another for various reasons. Most urban towns are becoming cosmopolitan in nature. People from different cultures and physical locations are converging to create a new kind of society. Also, the phenomenon of nomadism where people are always in transit for various economic reasons all affects the socio-cultural context of any policy implementation. Most of the case study areas are cosmopolitan in nature with nomadic activities prevalent. In trying to study the influence of social and cultural factors on actors’ behavior and how they relate in policy implementation, it has become clear that cosmopolitanism and nomadism play a key role. The relations between the MMDAs, NGOs, service providers and the community in most urban communities are largely driven by negative cosmopolitan and nomadic effects. A DEHO described the nature of his area of operation and how it has become difficult to relate with the community in certain matters due to its demographic strata. He noted bellow:

That is a serious one; so many tribes are living in this community and not only Ghanaians, the whole of West Africa. You will see all sorts of human beings here that is why when you come here in the night people are not sleeping there is still commercial activities. People from different countries are here and they pretend they don't understand the English language so when you are questioning them they will just be looking at your face like an animal, they presume, you should understand that they don't know what you are saying meanwhile they have committed an offence. If you give them a summon notice they will just be looking at you as if they don't know what is going on. Some of these people live in temporary shelter so the next day you can’t locate them where you found them previously. If we were dealing with only Ghanaians it could have been better. So, the cosmopolitan nature of the areas seriously affects sanitation. Some of these people they don't understand anything so if you don't know how to deal with them, they will form gangs and attack you, before the police intervene they would have hurt you. Even immigration cannot do anything about them. Not in Ashiaman. Ashaiman can partly be considered as a slum, you go to a compound and there are about 40 household with wooden structures. So, the socio-culture setup makes it difficult to control the sanitation situation in this area. [Fieldwork Data: Interview transcript from AMDH] 185

This view permeates all the case study areas of the study. In a focus group discussion, most community members blamed the activities of nomads and non-indigenes for the worsening sanitation situation in their communities. A focus group member stated:

We “Ga-Dangmes”16 are not dirty people, we have always maintained clean environment. People who travel from other places to come and live here commit such sanitation offences and they blame it on all of us. [Fieldwork Data: Interview transcript from AKFG] The situation described above makes it difficult for proper communication and coordination which are essential components in any relationship. This socio-cultural factor is linked to planning and immigration which ought to be in place to maintain societal order and security before any meaningful relationship between implementing agencies and target groups can be cultivated.

6.5.2 Moribund Traditional Leadership and Value Systems

Before the advent of colonization and formal institutions, the indigenous people had their own governance system and informal institution that maintains order and security in the society. Traditional rulers called chiefs and kings superintend societal governance with strict enforcement of value systems. These value systems were deemed important for societal development hence they run as a complementary governance structure to the formal democratic system of governance. Sanitation norms and values were highly upheld in the traditional system, communal labour for community clean up exercises and sanctions for sanitation offences were very effective. However, as the democratic system of governance and rule of law strengthens, the power and authority of traditional rulers dissipate. There seems to be little allegiance to the traditional system, the traditional norms and values are becoming weak and moribund. An informant blames the worsening sanitation on weak traditional systems. He lamented below:

The chiefs used to be very powerful and they commanded respect among the people, so when they decreed, everyone obeyed, but now people are no longer afraid of any chief. Due to modernization, there is nothing like punishment from chiefs. Now, people can disrespect chiefs without any consequence so there is no more organized structure in the traditional

16 The Greater Accra Region is the home of the Ga-Dangme ethnic group where this study was conducted. 186

system to deal with such issues as sanitation. [Fieldwork Data: Interview transcript from AKCM] Another respondent blamed the decline in the traditional system on the rise in chieftaincy disputes across the region. This, he contends, is the bane of the once vibrant traditional set up. He stated below:

Most of the towns are without chiefs and some are with disputed chiefs who cannot perform their traditional duties because the faction against them will not take orders from such a disputed chief. So sanitation control from the traditional system is virtually non-existent in such areas [Fieldwork Data: Interview transcript from AKCM] A DEHO remarked that, the traditional system still works in favour of sanitation but mostly in rural areas where the ethnic identity of the community is not diluted by migration.

I have worked in a rural area where the chiefs still command respect among the people. Whenever there is a program in the town like funerals where visitors will be coming in, the chief will send the “gongon beater”17 to send message to the locals to come out for a community labour to clean the streets and a warning to those with animals to keep their animals from straying during the period. And people obey these orders but in the city everything is mixed and nobody is accountable to anybody within the traditional system [Fieldwork Data: Interview transcript from AMDH] The traditional system which is supposed to be the mainstay for coordination and mobilization to support policy implementation within the society is gradually becoming non-functional. This affects how the implementing agencies relate with the community in the implementation process.

6.5.3 Community Ownership

Social behaviour and lack of community ownership of a common pool resource like the environment was identified as one of the issues affecting actors’ relations in ESP implementation. Community members are supposed to serve as a watchdog over the environment to prevent abuse of environmental protocols. In some communities, elected management group or taskforce are put in place to monitor common pool resources. It is also the civic responsibility for a community member to report environmental offences to the law enforcement authorities, but most of these elements are missing in almost all the

17 A gongon beater is the traditional town crier who make public announcements in the streets 187 case study areas. There is community apathy towards reporting sanitation offences. This is mainly due to the socio-cultural set-up of most communities in Ghana. Due to the communal system of living, people may not want to offend their family members and neighbours by confronting them to stop littering the environment or reporting them to the authorities. The few that are willing to do so normally demand strict anonymity from the law enforcement agencies to shield them from any backlash from families and neighbours. A community member expresses her fear in reporting such offences:

People rush to dump refuse in the drains when it is about to rain so that the rain can take it away. When you complain they will ask you if the gutter is your sleeping place. When they get to know you are behind their arrest, you will become their enemy and they will attack you and reign insults on you, so sometimes you see it, but you have to pretend you have not seen. [Fieldwork Data: Interview transcript from AKCM] Another member in a focus group discussion lamented the culture of silence among community members when it comes to reporting sanitation offences.

As soon as they know you have reported anybody, you have become the “Judas” 18 in the community, anytime the sanitation officers make an arrest, you are suspected to be the traitor. Only few people within the community are bold to openly report because those people don't fear anybody. [Fieldwork Data: Interview transcript from AKCM] We have discovered that even the assembly men and women who are the local representatives of the people, the ones in authority to ensure enforcement together with the environmental sanitation officers are sometimes caught in this web. Most assemblymen will shy away from reporting sanitation offences. They even intervene for the release of offenders when arrested not only for political reasons but socio-cultural reasons as well. People in these low income areas often interdepend on each other for help so in order not to fall out with a community member who they derive some sort of benefit from, it is in their parochial interest to overlook such offences. This affects how the community relates with other group of actors to ensure effective policy implementation.

18 A biblical parlance for traitor 188

6.6 Conclusion

The chapter identified the issues that shape actors’ relations in ESP implementation in Ghana. It began with a brief introduction of the chapter and an assessment of the issues affecting actor’s relations. The chapter identified various issues under four thematic areas such as institutions, politics, economic and socio-culture. The institutional context points to non-inclusive institution arrangements and issues that undermine lower level institutional structures at the local government. The political context identified issues such as local capture by assemblymen/women, political interference and party foot-soldier conundrum. The economic context reveals issues such as economic status- polluter can’t pay and resource availability as economic factors driving actor’s relationships. The socio-cultural context concluded it with factors such as cosmopolitanism and nomadism, moribund traditional leadership and value systems and lack of community ownership. It is therefore imperative to note that the kinds of relations that develop between actors are shape by various issues within the policy environment.

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CHAPTER SEVEN

ASSESSING THE IMPACT OF ACTOR RELATIONS ON ENVIRONMENTAL SANITATION

7.0 Introduction

The previous chapter discussed issues affecting actor relations in the ESP implementation in Ghana. It identified a range of issues emanating from institutional, political, economic and socio-cultural environment within which the EPS was implemented. These issues are the drivers of the relations that exist between various actors on the ground. This chapter explores the impact of actor relations on the environmental sanitation, using the ESP objectives in Ghana as the focus of the discussions. The chapter answers the third research question “How do actor relations impact on environmental sanitation?” Since the ESP of Ghana is the focus of the investigation, the chapter reviews some policy focus and objectives of the NESP to understand the impact of actor relations on the achievement of these goals. Four (4) main areas namely: Environmental Sanitation Education, Enforcement Management, Sustainable financing and cost recovery and Monitoring and Evaluation where collaboration and local action are needed to achieve policy goals were given attention. The chapter discusses the successes, failures and potentials of these relations on the ESP objectives listed above.

7.1 Environmental Sanitation Policy Focus and Objectives

To assess the impact of actor relations on the sanitation goals, focus is given to some objectives of the ESP of Ghana in this study. The revised NESP (2010) identifies the challenges and constraints of the environmental sanitation sector of which objectives, action plans and measures were drawn to mitigate. The policy focus and objectives are the rallying points for actors to actualise policy intent. The NESP identified seven (7) areas of which the policy action revolves. These are:

(i) Capacity Development

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(ii) Information Education and Communication (iii) Legislation and Regulation (iv) Sustainable financing and cost recovery (v) Levels of Service (vi) Research and Development (vii) Monitoring and Evaluation However, the study touches on four (4) policy objective areas where local actions are concentrated. These are Information Education and Communication, Legislation and Regulation, Sustainable financing and cost recovery and Monitoring and Evaluation. The assessment excluded Capacity Development, Levels of Service and Research Development. The justification for their exclusion stems from the fact that their nature and action required to achieve them reflects more of national level engagement with minimal local level involvement. Since the study is focused on local partnerships and collaboration, it is appropriate to concentrate only on objectives that satisfy this end. The sub-section below discusses the impact of actor relation on the selected objectives.

7.2 Environmental Sanitation Education

The ESP identified information dissemination, education and communication as a major challenge that needs policy attention to improve sanitation. Attitudinal and behavioural change is essential in achieving sanitation goals. The policy admits that the provision of sanitary facilities and infrastructure alone is not enough to turn sanitation situation around unless users of the facility are well informed about its use and its effective management. The policy also asserts that education with proper explanations must complement regulation to be effective in achieving progress in sanitation. The NESSAP which is the implementation plan document of the NESP proposed a two prong approach in operationalizing this objective. The first involves vigorous environmental sanitation education with public participation and building of partnerships among key stakeholders to change the behaviour of the population towards all types of waste. The second involves enforcement and sanctioning procedures that effectively deter miscreants (NESSAP, 2010). Thus, the ESP assigned the responsibility of information and education to the district assemblies to develop local level programs in conjunction with allied sector institutions,

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NGOs, CBOs, churches, social groups etc. to educate and raise awareness about the importance of environmental sanitation. The aim of the NESP in this area is to enhance knowledge, attitudes and practice of individuals, households and communities as partners in improving sanitation (NESSAP, 2010). This sub-section however presents the findings on the impact of relations on implementing education and awareness programs at the local level.

7.2.1 Synergies for Effective Education

Achieving effective education to shape sanitation behaviours hinges on the combination of actors resources and their collaboration to sustain strong educational base. Environmental sanitation education and campaigns must be vigorous and persistent to create the needed awareness that will translate into good hygiene practices among the communities. The structure of society is such a way that action of a single actor will not be enough to achieve effective educational campaign. Also, the challenge of resource availability identified in chapter 6 can be overcome by pulling resources (financial, physical and human) together by different actors engaged in the same venture. Therefore collaboration through active relationships provides the opportunity in achieving this end. Field investigation reveals that the EHSD and the assembly men and women leverage on their relations with NGOs/CBOs and the private service provider to pull resources together for education campaigns. An assembly man states:

Due to the close relations I have with the “Zoomlion” manager for our area, anytime we have town hall meetings, we invite them to come and educate our people on good hygiene practices. They have educational materials so we don't need to spend money on those things. We also collaborate with the community health nurses in sanitation education. The women in the community have clinic days where education is conducted, so we do such programs together. [Fieldwork Data: Interview transcript from AKAM] This collaboration eliminates the problem of resource scarcity; also, it provides the platform for the service provider to meet the community thereby improving relations with the community. Similarly, the district assembly has collaborated with various NGOs/CBOs, Religious, Faith Based Organizations [FBO] and allied sector agencies to

192 engage in educational campaigns. A DEHO indicates that, they have always collaborated with NGOs/COBs to engage in environmental sanitation education. He stated below:

We have always collaborated with NGOs, they bring us on board their programs and we always collaborate with them. We are currently conducting a household education on one house one toilet project supported by UNICEF. The idea is that households will be subsidized up to 50% to build toilets, so we are preceding this initiative with education. [Fieldwork Data: Interview transcript from AMDH] Such collaborations have helped to execute this sanitation goal without much struggle due to the benefit of human and financial resources from both sides. Though cordial relations exist between some actors in the policy implementation process, empirical evidence shows that, some implementing agencies have not taken full advantage of the resources of other actors to achieve this goal. An NGO director lamented how his overtures to the district assembly to collaborate to promote hygiene education were ignored for a long time:

Though we are a young NGO and we do not have the funds to execute our programs as intended, but we have been in the business for 2-3 years now and it is now that we are getting some exposure. I am even surprised that the EHSD officer recommended us to you. Because for three years now I have been to the assembly and proposed my ideas to them and did everything possible to get recognition and funds from them but I have been turn down but I keep on pushing. As we speak now our main focus is to target the bus terminals in our country. You will realize that the sanitation situations in our bus terminals are terrible, so as a result we developed some educational materials that we use for our education in the buses. [Fieldwork Data: Interview transcript from AMND] Though these NGOs do not have the needed funds to conduct an elaborate education campaign, they have the ideas and human resources that the district assembly can benefit from. The district assembly could bring them on board in their educational campaigns; provide them with the platform to expand their educational programs. In this instance however, the district assembly appears to value the relationship between them and the so called big and rich NGOs than poor NGOs who want some collaboration to achieve same sanitation goals. The district assembly, due to their indiscretion, lost the opportunity to bring others on board to intensify their educational campaign.

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7.2.2 Participation in Programs and Decision-Making

Sanitation education is not meant for information dissemination only, but also a way to get the people to understand the core functions of the sector, understand the importance of their involvement and to secure their commitment in the broader participation in policy formulation and implementation network. Getting people to be more involved and committed to a cause will take more than just a normal routine role to some tight knitted relationships. Effective education and continuous community engagement creates certain fluid relations among actors to effectively deliberate on their common challenges. Actor’s relations provide the opportunity to deepen participations in decision making and to improve their commitments to sanitation goals, which obviously have some ramifications for sanitation management. Evidence from the field proves a mixture of high and low participation in educational programs depending on the kind of relations that exit among actors. An environmental sanitation officer stated:

It's not been easy to get the people to participate but it's good so far because when the national sanitation day exercise started, i did a lot of collaboration work with the NGO's, we had a lot of people coming out. The first-second exercise was successful but after that, we have not had any of those sensitization programs because there is no money. But because of our relations with the NGO's, they provide the resources and i would mobilize the people in the community, they help us purchase the PA system, then we can go round by fueling the vans so that the announcements go on in the community that everybody should come out and be part of the national day exercise and mostly we do it a week before the exercise. When we do it that way, you see the people participating, particularly, because of the good relations that exist between us and the community but if you don't go out there to announce, they would not even participate. [Fieldwork Data: Interview transcript from AKCD] Essentially, the EHSD is able to achieve greater participation by overcoming the resource challenge through their close relations with NGOs within their community and also get the people to participate based on the timely education and goodwill that exist between them and then community. On the other hand, certain relations among these actors tend to inhibit participation in sanitation programs and decision making. As recounted by an Assembly man, his relations with certain part of the community is strained due to partisan politics, He lamented as follows:

When I organize clean-up exercises in the community, some will deliberately refuse to come and will go ahead to sabotaging our efforts by

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littering after the exercise, all because they see me as part of the ruling government, they are mostly the supporters of my opponent so they will do what will make me look bad before the community. Things would have been far better if I get all these people to cooperate with me. [Fieldwork Data: Interview transcript from AKAM] Adversarial relations clouded by politics proved to be detrimental to community participation in environmental sanitation programs. As opined by the assembly man, greater cooperation without such political rivalry will greatly improve sanitation condition of the community through participation. This shows that the role of actors’ relation is crucial in environmental sanitation education through community participation.

7.3 Enforcement Management

Aside public education programs and creating public awareness targeted at attitudinal and behavioural change, sanitary inspection and law enforcement has been identified as a critical tool to effect this change. Legislation and regulation must compliment education to establish a strong implementation regime. The NESP identified weak enforcement and none-compliance with laid down rules and regulation governing the sector as a major challenge. The policy therefore seeks to re-enforce and strengthen the legal regime and its enforcement and to equip the agencies involve in enforcement and compliance to sanitation by-laws. The focus of this objective is to provide a conducive environment that enables all stakeholders (service providers, households, institutions, industrial and commercial entities etc) to exercise their rights and responsibilities, within a responsive refereeing regimen (NESSAP, 2010). The environmental sanitation sector comprises of different groups of actors with responsibilities therefore their activities must be regulated within a certain legal framework. Appropriate laws and legislations from the national to the local levels are in place to deter people from polluting the environment. In order to effectively enforce sanitation by-laws at the local level, joint action from different stakeholders are required. The district assembly and the EPA as the principal regulators and enforcers of the law need the collaboration of the individuals, community leaders, the judiciary and sometimes the police to ensure an effective enforcement and compliance regime. The section presents the findings of the impact of relations on achieving this objective.

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7.3.1 Accountability and Service Quality

Effective enforcement management will culminate into a certain level of sanity in environmental sanitation management in Ghana. The environmental sanitation department of the MMDAs plays the lead role in the enforcement of sanitation by-laws, but to achieve an effective enforcement regime, there must be collaboration between different actors at the local level. Adequate enforcement will greatly impact service quality and bring about accountability both on the part of the service providers, service users and the community at large. A critical look at the relations between these actors points to their level of collaboration and how this has impacted enforcement management so far. Actors believe that improved relations between them will lead to greater accountability and improved service delivery. EHO stated as follows:

The sanitation situation will improve if others cooperate with us and stop sabotaging our work. The people you are supposed to work with are sometimes the same people who will undermine your efforts. Some service providers are not accountable for their actions because they have their own arrangement with the top that excludes us, so even if you report them, nothing happens. So, if you see things not going on well on the ground, these are some of the reasons. [Fieldwork Data: Interview transcript from AKEH]. This shows that upward and downward relations within the MMDAs vis-a-vis service providers have implications for accountability and service quality. For accountability and service delivery to improve, relations between the actors within the process needed to be improved first. An assembly man indicates that, sanitation situations are at their best in the community whenever offenders are prosecuted and fined. He narrated how some gains were made with collaboration with different actors on this front.

We teamed up with the EHSD at the assembly and the police to form a joint taskforce to arrest offenders. We prosecute them and get them fine swiftly, when they come back they are likely not to engage in indiscriminate dumping, also word gets to the community about the prosecutions and everyone is alert not to find themselves at the wrong side of the law. [Fieldwork Data: Interview transcript from AMAM]. Here, members of the public are held accountable of their actions through a joint collaborative relationship between different actors to ensure improvement in sanitary conditions of the community. Relations between these actors play a central role in pulling together their strength to carry out the objective of enforcement management.

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7.3.2 Joint Taskforce for Watchdog Role

Enforcement management can be effective if all actors join in the fight against lawlessness and disregard for environmental regulations by the people. The main enforcement bodies, the EHSD and the EPA are quite limited in their capacities in terms of personnel and logistics to effectively combat the menace of environmental pollution in Ghana. Hence the need for greater collaboration with the wider network of actors within the sanitation sector. To achieve this, the lead agencies need to build close relations with other actors where a task force comprising all stakeholders and actors are involved to play a watchdog role over the environments. Field investigations revealed the role actor’s relations have played in this regard and the potential of strengthening enforcement management through relations. A DEHO explained that their collaborations with the police, the assembly members and the community were effective in curbing lawlessness and pollution of the environment. He states:

We have a good rapport with the police, so whenever we require their assistance to conduct an operation, they don’t hesitate to provide us with the men. Together with the assembly men, and some community leaders, we formed a taskforce that monitors the activities of people who deliberately drop rubbish on the road in the night. It will shock you that well-to-do people put rubbish at the back of their boots and drop them at night by the roadside and drive off. The taskforce patrol at night and we have made few arrest. [Fieldwork Data: Interview transcript from MMDH] Close collaborative relations with these actors gave a boost to enforcement management. Continuous relations leading to collaborative effort in this regard may end street pollution at night possibly thereby improving the sanitation situation in the community. However, these taskforces are not common in most communities due to loose relations among actors. Most of these actors have different motivations; leading to some fragmentation in enforcement management. An environmental sanitation officer lamented how the assembly men want to protect offenders from prosecution for their political gains. Also, some community members serving on the taskforce are motivated by financial gains and not really in to achieve environmental cleanliness, so, they sometimes abuse their office by either taking bribe from offenders or resign from the taskforce when there are no financial incentives. He states as follows:

Some assembly men are fond of shielding their people. By law, people who refuse to participate in sanitation day activities are to be prosecuted. So

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we send a taskforce around to ensure that everyone participates but, you will start receiving messages from assembly members that, we shouldn’t send the taskforce to their area, they don’t want their people to be harassed and all this is because of politics. They want to look good before the people for political advantage. Those community people on the taskforce too want to make their position as a paid job, so with time when there is nothing coming, they exit the taskforce. [Fieldwork Data: Interview transcript from AKEH] This probably may be the case due to lack of deep understanding on why there is the need for a taskforce and how their objectives may inure to the greater good of the community. An assembly man corroborated this claim when he states that he prefers to solve the issues first with people and warn them on the first hand before allowing the taskforce to deal with them on the second or the their counts. He states:

When our people are arrested, they come and call us to go and plead for them. Because they are our people we help them out for the first time, but we warn them not to engage in such activities anymore so that when they do it again and they are arrested they can’t blame us for not helping them. [Fieldwork Data: Interview transcript from AKAM] For an effective taskforce to be instituted, the actors involved must deepen their relationships with a consultative forum on finding solutions to their common problem. There must be certain levels of unanimity among actors on their focus and commitment to ensure an effective enforcement management within their communities.

7.4 Sustainable Financing and Cost Recovery

Sustainable financing and cost recovery is an area that is crucial in sustaining the environmental sanitation sub-sector. Due to the financial challenges faced by district assemblies in managing sanitation, private sector investment was encouraged in a PPP arrangement where private capital is leveraged on to finance the sector. A number of private companies are engaged, creating fair competition within the sector. Consistency, reliability and affordability in service provision are fundamental in achieving sanitation goals. It is therefore important that services are provided on regular basis and at affordable prices in order not to exclude users in the low income bracket. For this to happen, there must be a sustainable financing regime and full cost recovery where possible. However, it is understandable that service users in low income bracket may not be in the position to

198 pay for commercial prices, therefore the need for differential tariffs and cross-subsidization where appropriate. In order to maintain a balance between cost recovery and provision of essential public service, the NESSAP proposed the establishment of participatory procedures by MMDAs for setting tariffs involving private sector operators and user- groups. The policy also requires that information on the cost of service to be borne by users must be made available to users. The NESP tasked the district assembly to develop strategy and financing plan to rake in revenue to make for the shortfall. Some of the avenues for revenue mobilization are polluter pay principle, fees and levies on producers and importers of none-degradable materials like plastic etc. The study presents the findings on the impact of relations on the implementation of the cost recovery regime.

7.4.1 Tariff Collection

To achieve an effective cost recovery regime for a sustainable financing of sanitation services, sanitation service providers must first secure the commitment of service users for the regular payment of service charges. Though services provided are supposed to be paid for, and non-payment can result in withdrawal of service and retrieval of debt through legal means, the complexity of the society and other factors within the environment of operation does not make it simple as it may seem. Service providers deal with different class of clients with varied economic, socio-cultural and political background, so tact is required to handle people from different backgrounds. This is where healthy community – service provider relations plays a role in achieving this aim. Also, the poor address system and unplanned settlements make house to house service delivery and cost recovery difficult, however the MMDAs are equipped with data that can help map out different locations within a settlement for proper service delivery. Also, assembly men, unit committee members and CBOs working in the communities are equipped with local information that may help service providers in having easy access to the community, so relations among them has impact on achieving this end. Evidence on the ground suggests that loose relation between the EHSD and some service providers has negative implications for sustainable financing and cost recovery. A DEHO stated in an interview as follows:

When they win the contract to work in the community, they are supposed to come to us so that we sit down and fashion out how best we can work together, but they won’t come. We are supposed to help them with 199

household numbering, we have started with Zoomlion, but the rest won’t come. If people refuse to pay, we are supposed to issue them summons and send them to court but because some of them don't regard us, they have their own challenges with the people. [Fieldwork Data: Interview transcript from AKDH]. A check with some of the service providers confirms that the cost recovery process in some of the communities were challenging due to the poor addressing system and non- payment of tariffs. The team that goes for refuse collection is different for the team that collects user fees, so a well laid out address system will be the smoothest way of carrying out this process. Service providers believe the district assembly should be helping with this, but they could not vouch for close relations with the EHSD within the communities. A service provider narrates as follows:

Yes, the introduction process takes quite a long time and it's not that smooth in every case, normally, the assembly after awarding you with a franchise or a contract, if it's a service period for that, they would introduce the contractors to the assembly, sometimes they invite the contractors to their assembly meetings and in the meetings, you have the chief, the CBO and all those people there. So that is the platform but it's not every time that you get every stakeholder attending that kind of meeting. [Fieldwork Data: Interview transcript from AKSP]. This indicates that some sort of formal process of introduction at a larger platform within the district takes place but that is not the case in all the situations. So, connection between the local level officers and the service providers do not exist in some cases, making it difficult to collaborate in the cost recovery process.

7.4.2 Tariff Information Dissemination

Tariff setting for refuse collection is done in a consultative meeting between the service provider, the assembly and the community representatives who are mostly the assembly members of the communities. These negotiations are done is such a way that tariffs are fair to be both the service providers and the community. Tariff information is supposed to be communicated to the community by the assemblymen/women as their representatives in the negotiation. The service providers must also communicate the agreed tariffs to their clients. The service providers usually do that through the sharing of a tariff guide to households and radio communication. A service provider put it as follows:

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We have an association which is Environmental Service Providers Association and through them they use the radio and other media to talk about the pricing. We also distribute leaflets, and also the assembly communicates through their assembly men, who then would communicate to the households or the community association the prices. [Fieldwork Data: Interview transcript from AKSP] However, poor communities with low literacy levels are not able to read from such leaflets and most of them may not be privy to the radio announcements being referred to by the service provider, so it behooves on their local representatives, that is the assemblymen to get these information across, but reaction to prices on the ground does not indicate in any way that proper education was done on tariffs. A service provider lamented their bad experience with clients due to tariffs:

Sometimes when you get to a place some of the clients are not prepared to even listen to what you are saying because they feel maybe you have increased the prices, then it's a problem. Some are not even willing to cooperate with us. This affects our operation, sometimes we are not able to break even [Fieldwork Data: Interview transcript from AKSP] Though the assembly men and women interviewed claim they communicate tariffs to the community members in town hall meetings, not all members are likely to attend such meetings. This points to one fact, there is no collaboration for harmonious dissemination of tariff information by the assemblymen and women and the service providers, hence the challenge in tariff collection. There are no links between the two actors here when it comes to tariff information dissemination.

7.5 Monitoring and Evaluation

To assess the progress in environmental sanitation and the policy implementation process, there must be effective monitoring and evaluation system in place. This monitoring and evaluation system should be able to measure progress against targets and recommend remedial actions to redirect policy focus where progress is lacking. ESP, 2010 identified a weak and non-formalised monitoring and evaluation system within the sanitation sub- sector which it seeks to strengthen. The NESP incorporated monitoring and evaluation as a key focal area to improve environmental sanitation (NESSAP, 2010). To achieve effective monitoring and evaluation, collaborative relationship with various sanitation agencies and local level actors are required to track progress. Though this objective is not so pronounced 201 as compared to the others due to low level attention from sanitation agencies, actors with close collaborative relations are likely to come out with a strong M&E system. The study presents the impact of such relationships on M&E in the environmental sanitation sub- sector.

7.5.1 Local Information Exchange

Currently the existing M&E platform for sanitation by MMDAs and sector agencies is weak, with little or no structures in place to track progress of key policy interventions. This is mainly due to financial constraints and lack of research personnel and professionals. However, M&E information is needed by the sector governing council to make policy decisions and to redirect focus where action is lacking within the policy implementation process. NGOs in sanitation at the local level, nonetheless have M&E systems (mostly donor requirement for funding) as part of their programs. These NGOs undertake research activities with the assistance of the EHD and other actors within the communities which they operate. This they do through relationships they built with the various actor groups who are in a position to aid their cause. Other sanitation agencies also engage in bits and pieces of M&E activities on specific donor funded programs that have M&E requirements. In effect, scattered M&E activities within the sector are prevalent but no solid M&E system for national policy evaluation. An NGO director indicated as follows:

Through our close relations and collaborations with the MMDAs and other actors, we have been able to develop an effective M&E system for our projects. Most of the organizations we work with are friendly and are willing to help with information. [Fieldwork Data: Interview transcript from AKND] The MMDAs and sanitation agencies in their attempt to conduct M&E, despite financial constraints, can take advantage of these relations and share in information that were gathered by NGO and other agencies. This however is not the case in the MMDAs studied. The study proves that relations provide a huge avenue and opportunity for MMDAs and sanitation agencies to pool together information for effective M&E system. Actor relations if harnessed may have significant impact on M&E.

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7.6 Conclusion

This chapter assessed the impact of actor relations on ES objectives and related sanitation goals. It identified impacts of relations on four ES objectives in Ghana namely: Environmental sanitation education, enforcement management, sustainable financing and cost recovery and monitoring and evaluation. Under environmental sanitation education, synergies for effective education and participatory decision making were identified as impact factor of actor relations in achieving this objective. In the area of enforcement management, actor relations have impacted accountability and service quality and joint taskforce for watchdog role. The level of actor relations has either positive or negative impacts on achieving enforcement in sanitation. The objective of sustainable financing and cost recovery may either be achieved or not based on actor relations. Critical areas like tariff collection and tariff information dissemination were identified as crucial to cost recovery. Relations were needed to ease some of the difficulties in recovering cost. Finally, relations were identified as a factor impacting on monitoring and evaluation in the area of local information exchange. To effectively achieve environmental sanitation goals, impact of actor relations in areas identified is essential and must be given attention. A conclusion was drawn to the chapter with a summary of the various impact factors identified.

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CHAPTER EIGHT

INTERPRETATION AND DISCUSSION OF FINDINGS

8.0 Introduction

The previous chapter discussed the impact of actor’s relations on environmental sanitation, using the focus and objectives of Ghana’s ESP as a yardstick to establish impacts. This chapter seeks to discuss the findings from the three research questions as illustrated in the empirical chapters in 5, 6 and 7 above. In this chapter, a connection between the findings and existing literature is established. Also, the findings of the study are interpreted using the theoretical lens of the study NIE and Social Capital in bid to contribute to theory. This chapter is segmented into four parts with the first three discussing the findings of the research questions respectively. The first section assesses actor’s relations, discussing into details the kind of relations that exist. The relations are then assessed through four ingredients of collaborative relationships, which are commitment, trust, communication and coordination to establish the state of relations that currently exist between actors in Ghana. The second section examines the issues affecting actor’s relations through the theoretical lens of New Institutional Economics and Social Capital. The third section discusses the impact of relations on environmental sanitation in Ghana with the final section establishing a nexus between the three research findings bringing the chapter to a close.

8.1 Assessing Actors’ Relation in ESP Implementation

The findings presented reveal a mosaic of relationships that exist between different actors at various levels. The first research question “What kinds of relations and links exist between actors in the process of ESP Implementation?” was answered through the empirical evidences gathered from Greater Accra Metropolitan Area [GAMA]. Based on the guiding literature of the study, actor’s relations were analysed based on the concept of Public- Private-Partnerships, Decentralization and Participation which are the main theories and framework that underpin EPS implementation in Ghana. Relations were analysed among

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PPP actors [MMDA, Private Service Provider, NGO/CBO the Community and Informal private sector] with four important permutations that is (i) MMDAs and the Private Service Providers, (ii) MMDAs and NGOs/CBOs (iii) The community and the Private Service Providers and (iv) Informal Private sector and their relations with the community and MMDAs. Analysis reveals different trends of relationships that characterized the implementation process at the local level. Within the decentralized arrangement, relations between actors [MMDAs, Allied sector institutions, the community, the Assembly men/women and unit committee members] are also assessed. Then under participation, evaluation of relations among actors in community engagement programs was conducted.

Relations between actors, their collaboration and communication are recognised as an avenue to enhance the policy implementation process (Bressers, 2004b). However, these relations are largely understudied within public management theories for policy implementation (Schillebeeckx et al., 2016; De Bettignies and Ross, 2009; Andersson, 2004). This study sought to bring out the nature of relations within the network of actors in the implementation of ESP and how these relations affect the policy implementation process. The findings reveal a mixture of relations existing between different actors at various levels. The kind of relations identified among actors within the PPP arrangement can be described as superficial. This is mainly due to the weak link between the sub-metro/zonal/urban and town/area councils and the private service providers as a result of centralization of authority at the management level within the MMDAs. Lack of information flow and non- involvement in decision making of Junior EHO and PCO who are mandated by policy to supervise the PPP contracts on the field were identified as the underlining factors. This however alienates the supervisors of the PPP contract from partaking in the contract negotiations and rightfully exercising their authority on the ground. This defeats the core principle of PPP to achieve cooperation between the public and the private sector to deliver public services (Heymans and Schur, 1999; Ahmed and Ali, 2004; Bovaird and Tizard, 2009). Also, the relations between the MMDAs and NGOs/CBOs on the ground reveal a certain cordiality that is laced with rivalry and suspicion based on some perceived notion of profiteering agenda by NGOs/CBOs. In turn, NGOs/CBOs also accused the MMDAs of rent-seeking behaviours that are not in the interest of partnership building towards a common goal. This confirms an earlier study on dyad relations between local government and NGO by Bawole (2013). Some interesting assortment of cordiality at one level and hostile and uncooperative relations at another exist between the Community and Private

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Service Providers on the ground. This relation emerges as a result of socio-economic strata of the society and the community’s ability to pay for sanitation services. Whiles the middle class within the high income areas have an arrangement with service providers to cart their waste weekly without much disagreement, the low income areas that are unable to afford sanitation service, and service providers are mostly at each other’s throat concerning service charges. Weak enforcement capacity of the MMDAs, and their inability to promptly intervene in such conflict, fester these hostile relationships. This ultimately affects cost recovery and service provision by the private service providers. It was also observed that Private Service Providers tend to relate with the communities as mere customers rather than partners in development. This makes it difficult for them to cooperate effectively. The informal private sector can be considered as the neglected group that makes a lot of impact on sanitation management in Ghana. Though they are not included in the actor constellation by policymakers, their relations with other actors have a ramification for sanitation. The study reveals a hostile and abusive relation on one hand and some pockets of informal partnerships between them and some MMDAs. This is due to the consistency of policy discrimination against the informal sector and policy ill-adaptation to local conditions (Huober, 2010).

Within the decentralization strand of the analysis, the relations between the MMDAs and the Community can best be described as a marriage of convenience. The MMDAs have the direct responsibility as a government actor towards its citizen in providing social services, but the local government’s weak capacity in law enforcement, finance, logistics and required manpower continue to make them ineffective service providers. Attitudinal problems and non-compliance with sanitation by-laws from the community also frustrate the agenda of the MMDAs. MMDAs and Allied Institutions appear to have strong partnerships between them on the ground. However, these relations are rather ad-hoc in nature making their collaboration a disjointed one. Each one of them seems to be minding their own business until there is crises situation before they start acting together to curb situations arising. Usually, media reports are awash with collaborative efforts with various stakeholders to curb outbreak of diseases19. Although they have a common platform which is the sanitation sub- committee of the district assembly, the sub-committees efforts produce very little results due

19 Ghanaweb (2015). Gov't puts in measures to contain cholera outbreak [Online] Available at : https://www.ghanaweb.com/GhanaHomePage/health/Gov-t-puts-in-measures-to-contain-cholera-outbreak- 363755, [Accessed June, 06 2018] 206 to financial constraints (Zakiya and Uwejamomere, 2016). The mediating role of assembly and unit committee members reveals subsisting relations that can be labelled as cordial but polarized. Politicization of their roles leaves them to grapple with uncooperative behaviours from community members who do not share similar political views with them. According to Manase et al. (2004), political interference continues to defeat the concept of decentralization at the local level. Finally, the level of participation and actors relations within the participatory framework point to a mixture of warm and adversarial relations among actors in different community engagement programs. The community is willing to cooperate and participate depending on who is involved (Political background) and what they can benefit (personal gain) from the exercise. It is instructive to note that relations between various actors on the ground are bedevilled with one challenge or the other, leaving a weak partnership and collaboration among actors for the implementation of the EPS.

According to Sawyer (2007, p. 43-55) when people are engaged in collaborative endeavours, interpersonal conversation is critical because it leads to flow, a state of heightened consciousness and flow leads to creativity. However the overall assessment of relations among actors can be best described as chaotic making it difficult to achieve that flow. It is observed that much of the challenges facing the smooth implementation of ESP in Ghana are embedded in actors’ relations within the collaboration process. Weak relations and links among actors proved to be a major implementation barrier to achieving sanitation goals in Ghana. The study therefore concludes that, to achieve progress in ES, attention must be given to actors relations, putting structures in place to facilitate strong and quality relations because they exert significant influence on policy outcomes. The next section analyses these relations using the four critical elements of collaborative relations namely, Commitment, Trust, Communication and Coordination.

8.1.1 Commitment in ESP Actors’ Relations in Ghana

For effective collaboration to take place among actors in the implementation of the ESP there must be some level of commitment in their relationship. Gleaning from the data analyzed on various relationships between actors in chapter 5, commitment as a vital component of any successful relation is conspicuously missing among ESP actors. This

207 resulted in weak collaboration among actors in the policy implementation Process. A respondent noted:

We are supposed to be working hand in hand with the private contractor in the community but we hardly meet to plan on how the work should proceed. Some hardly honour our invitations for meetings. When we have an issue in the community that requires their attention, we call them. They respond sometimes, but some other times, you need to follow up several times before they respond. [Fieldwork Data: Interview transcript from AKDH]. The above response shows that one party is not committed to the working relationship between the two parties. These sentiments run through most of the interviews with various actors at the local level. In addition to the above, another respondent from CBO stated below:

We petitioned the assembly about a non-performing waste contractor in our community with copies served all interested parties, but they won’t respond unless we keep following up with it. If you don’t persist, they can frustrate you and you might not get results [Fieldwork Data: Interview transcript from AKCD]. Though this seems to be the dominant sentiment between various actors, some levels of commitment in working relationship, however, exist between the assembly and some allied institution at the local level. Most EHSD officers interviewed indicate the readiness of some allied institutions like to EPA and GHS to assist anytime their help is sought to deal with some situations. Overall, commitment in actors’ relations is poor leading to weak relationships and ineffective collaboration in ESP implementation. These finding are consistent with Plewa and Quester (2006), Pesämaa and Franklin Hair Jr (2007), Rampersad et al. (2010) Casey (2008) Hoegl and Gemuenden (2001) who in their study identified commitment as a critical component for effective relationship and collaboration.

8.1.2 Trust in ESP Actors’ Relations in Ghana

Trust is a prerequisite for any endearing relationship; therefore, the absence of trust leaves relationship at a weak state. Data analyzed among ESP actors at the local level using the measuring rod of trust, failed the litmus test for healthy relationship. There are hardly trust relationships between various actors making their collaborative efforts a mirage. Actors

208 who are supposed to work together to promote environmental sanitation are somewhat suspicious of each other for one reason or the other. Though there are some levels of cordiality between actors, they are weary in their dealings with each other (Bawole, 2013). Some NGOs accuse the MMDAs of rent seeking because of the notion that NGOs are donor funded and are in business so they must also benefit from the donor cash. A SHEP Coordinator who works with some NGOs in sanitation made a counter accusation about the exploitative nature of some NGOs. He remarked:

Before they undertake any programs in our schools we need to visit the schools and put things in place for them, not once, not twice, but sometimes three times, and I don’t think NGOs do their programs without getting any profit. It is not possible! It is as if they use us to catapult themselves to where ever they want to be. So, it is only fair that if you are engaging our services, and you have to provide us with transport, I do not see why that should be a problem. [Fieldwork Data: Interview transcript from AMSC]. Clearly, there is a huge trust gap in the relationship between some NGOs and MMDAs in the performance of their duties. This kind of accusation and counter accusation is a common pattern identified in most of the relations assessed among ESP actors at the local level. A similar sort of accusation worth noting is between MMDAs and allied institutions. A local government official lamented as follows:

Sometime ago we were doing district mapping for an HIV program, and I had to go to all the health facilities in the Accra metro. Because we can’t just enter these facilities without permission, we wrote to the Ghana Health Service to grant us access. So, they called us upon the receipt of our letter to discuss the guidelines. But someone somewhere thinks what we are going to do involve money, so they decided to frustrate us by tossing us to go and come another day anytime we check on it expecting us to pay something through the back door. So, I got fed up and made it known to them that, this is a government work and there is nothing in it for me so they better cooperate and stop the unnecessary bureaucracy. [Fieldwork Data: Interview transcript from AMSC]. These and many other similar sentiments were echoed by various actors on the issue of trust. Overall there is deep level of mistrust among actors making their relations a weak one. This however leads to weak collaboration among them in the implementation of the ESP. This is consistent with Pesämaa and Franklin Hair Jr (2007) Rampersad et al. (2010) and Emerson et al. (2012) who found varying degree of trust as the building block for effective collaborative relationships.

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8.1.3 Communication in ESP Actors’ Relations in Ghana

Communication is the live wire of any active relationship; therefore for a relationship to subsist then there must be constant flow of communication. Data analyzed in chapter 5, points to some fair amount of communication and information flow. Though not at its optimal, but actors have constantly and consistently engaged in information exchange in their relations. Nevertheless, there are some communication gaps between some actors and information flow is stifled in some instances. Some MMDAs see the need to engage the informal private sector in some form of dialogue though they are not recognized under the policy. Community engagement programs organized by NGOs/CBOs in conjunction with the MMDAs are quite prevalent in most of the communities studied. Town hall meetings for information dissemination are frequent occurrences but attendance is low. Between MMDAs and Allied institutions, communication fairly exists though this picks up mostly in crisis situations. Averagely there is a fair level of communication among various actors. However, communication and information flow is a scarce commodity in some quarters within the actor constellation. This is mainly within the MMDAs and between the private service providers within the PPP arrangement. Communication and information flow between the environmental health departments and their lower tier i.e. [sub-metro/Urban/ Zonal councils] of the district assemblies is poor. Similarly, communication between the sub-metro/Urban/ Zonal councils who have the responsibility to monitor, supervise and enforce contracts terms with the private service providers is relatively poor as well. An ESD officer lamented:

We only get memos from our bosses informing us about their presence in our zone, but as to how their engaged, what agreements were reached and their obligations under the contract terms we don’t know. [Fieldwork Data: Interview transcript from MMEH]. This communication gap obviously leaves the officers at the lower level unarmed in pursuant of their mandate under the PPP arrangement. This in turn creates another communication gap between them and the service providers. In some cases, no official introduction were made between the service provider and the officers at the lower levels. Most DEHO’s complained about the uncooperative behavior of some service providers when they try to establish communication between them. One DEHO remarked:

When you call them for a meeting, they will promise to come but they won’t turn up. They don’t see our importance in this PPP arrangement 210

because we are not involved in any negotiation with them. [Fieldwork Data: Interview transcript from AKDH]. Unfortunately, however, the PPP arrangements constitute the most important aspect of implementation process of the ESP. So, lack of communication here is likely to hurt the success of the process. Overall communication among actors is fairly good promoting some level of collaboration but for the MMDA, Private Service provider relations. These findings resonate with earlier studies by Abosag et al. (2006), Graci (2013), Devine et al. (2011) who found that relationships could not function without communication so for collaboration to be effective, strong relationship therefore must be undergirded with strong communication.

8.1.4 Coordination in ESP Actors’ Relations in Ghana

Actor organisations as different components with complementary mandates to implement public policy need coordination to synchronize their activities towards the attainment of a common goal. Data analysed in Chapter 5 depicts poor coordination among actors in ESP implementation leading to poor collaboration. Due to poor coordination, actors often act in parallel to each other with scattered results which obviously leads to minimal impact on environmental sanitation goals. Though various platforms like environmental sanitation sub-committee and other platforms created by NGOs were in place, their aim of coordinating the sector players were not functional due to funding issues (Zakiya and Uwejamomere, 2016). Allied institutions mandated to help the ministry of local government and rural development and the MMDAs execute the environmental sanitation implementation plan have all been busy minding their business until there is a crisis situation that demand their immediate attention. An environmental health officer remarked:

The issue of coordination is difficult due to lack of resources to execute the policy. If there are no funds and logistics to work, what then are you coordinating? Essentially people are relaxed because there is not much to do since the resources are not there. [Fieldwork Data: Interview transcript from AMEP]. Poor sector coordination is one area the ESP has identified as challenges the policy seeks to address. However, much has not been done in this area to properly coordinate the sector. The overall coordination among actors is poor, leading to goal incongruence. Sanitation

211 goals therefore cannot be achieved if every actor should continue to act in isolation without coming together to build synergies. This result lends credence to Kim (2001) who posits that lack of appropriate coordination lead to ineffective communication channels and non- value adding activities resulting in decrease performance.

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Table 5: Summary of Research Findings 1

Research Question Summary of Key findings

What kinds of relations and Working Together in PPPs at the Local level links exist between actors in the process of ESP  Relations between MMDAs and Private Sector Service Providers Implementation? are Superficial.  MMDAs and NGOs/CBOs Relations are cordial but laced with rivalry and suspicion  Relations between the Community and Private Service Providers are a mixture of cordiality and hostility  The relation of the informal private sector fitting into the actor constellations is largely hostile and abusive with a bit of informal partnerships here and there. Collaboration within the Decentralized Space

 MMDAs and Community Relations can be described as a marriage of convenience.  Relations between MMDAs and Allied Institutions appear to be a strong partnership but rather ad-hoc in nature making their collaboration a disjointed one.  The Mediating Role of Assembly and Unit Committee Members can be labelled as cordial but polarized. Level of Participation and Relations

Relation between actors in community engagement programs points to a mixture of warm and adversarial relations

Relationship - Success Factors  Commitment Poor commitment in actors’ relations leading to weak relationships and ineffective collaboration in ESP implementation.  Trust There is deep level of mistrust among actors making their relations a weak one. This however leads to weak collaboration among them in the implementation of the ESP.  Communication Communication among various actors is fairly good promoting some level of collaboration but for the MMDA and Private Service provider relations.  Coordination The overall coordination among actors is poor, leading to goal incongruence.

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8.2 Issues Affecting Actors’ Relations: A New Institutional Economics View

The second research question addressed the issues affecting actor’s relations in the implementation of ESP in Ghana. Several issues came to the fore under the categories of institutional, political, economic and socio-cultural environment of the ESP implementation. These issues are discussed in this section with the lens of NIE theory. We apply certain aspects of the NIE framework mainly transaction cost [TC] theory to explain part of the issues affecting actor relations in ESP implementation in Ghana.

8.2.1 Actors’ Relations and Transaction Cost Benefits

Transaction cost economics offers some relevant insight into analysis of inter- organizational relations and can be useful in environmental sanitation research as a unit of analysis for performance measurement. In the context for coordination and collaboration for ESP implementation, the role of transaction costs and institutions are vital in explaining government service production decision and how they are influenced by actor relations. Economic exchanges are usually organized within the context of a particular governance structure, defined by Williamson (1986, p. 155) as ‘the institutional setting within which the execution of transactions is completed’. Two forms of governance structure are usually identified: the market within which exchange is made possible by the use of contracts and hierarchy within which exchange is made possible by the use of authority (Hindmoor, 1998).

Due to cost effectiveness, efficiency gains, manpower and technological considerations, governments at all levels have increasingly turned from operating as direct service providers that produce services internally (hierarchy) to rely on a host of external actors (market) to produce traditional public service and functions (Kettl, 1993; Kettl, 2011; Brown and Potoski, 2003). These bring government and the private sector together in a win-win contractual relations where the contracting government wins by receiving higher quality service at a lower cost than it would have obtained through internal production and vendors win by receiving revenue greater than their production costs (Brown et al., 2007). The engagement of an agent (Private Service Provider) to work on behalf a principal (Government) with contractual terms needs some level of careful consideration from the

214 principal to achieve their stated objectives. Since the two parties ultimate interest of entering into a contractual agreement may differ, there must be enough measures to safeguard the relationship to ensure performance. According to Williamson (1997) since the parties to a transaction cannot fully predict all possible future scenario, they cannot fully specify contracts. Williamson (1997) further opined that under the condition of uncertainty, contracting organizations must be vigilant or run the risk that the vendor may behave opportunistically and take advantage of the contracting organization. In Ghana, bureaucratic hierarchy in a form of decentralized governance system is used together with the private sector/NGOs/CBOs in a joint-contracting, franchise and concessions to co- produce public services. Government seeks to break responsibility and authority in the provision of public services like ES into smaller units to make governance effective and aid local participation.

From the findings of the study, the potency of the two main governance structures within TCE i.e. market via contracts and hierarchical form of governance through authority were relatively weak in organizing ESP implementation resulting in higher transaction cost. It was observed that ex-post contractual safeguard measures were virtually nonexistent and the use of authority by MMDAs and EHOs was minimal due to the complex nature of government machinery and other contextual environmental factors identified in Chapter 6. For example, lack of cooperation between higher and lower level institutional actors’ due to poor coordination and information flow, and the attempts ostensibly to undermine lower lever institutional structures leaves the PPP contracts with weak ex-post safeguard. This obviously increases transaction cost in implementing the ESP because contract terms are usually not met. Though governments are still purposive organizations that seek to reduce risks associated with uncertainty, Rainey (1991) opined that governments tend to have more ambiguous goals, complex environment and internal constraints that complicate the application of transaction cost to public organizations in explaining government service production decision (Rainey, 1991 in Brown and Potoski, 2003).

Since both markets and hierarchies are unable to provide sufficient safeguards to implement the ESP, networks and relational forms of governance offer an alternative governance structure (Frances et al., 1991; Thorelli, 1986; Powell, 1990). Hindmoor (1998) argued that relations among network of policy actors are able to generate trust that does not depend on the presence of formal and exogenous safeguards. In assessing the impact of actor relations on environmental sanitation in Chapter 7 it was observed that

215 certain complex environmental factors that impeded the implementation process were mitigated in areas where collaboration was effective with strong actor relations. Thus, building trust relations is vital in opening up the implementation process for knowledge and information sharing among actors. It was also observed from the findings that trust relation establishes a system of responsibility, obligation and expectation among actors for smooth implementation. These relations may automatically eliminate ex-ante and ex-post cost thereby reducing transaction cost for implementing ESP. According to Stump and Heide (1996), in organizing these inter-organizational relations, control mechanisms must be deployed in a relationship to manage a partner’s potential opportunism. The failures of market and hierarchy to lower transaction cost are often attributed to factors such as contract uncertainty, asset specificity, information asymmetry, bounded rationality and actor opportunistic behaviours (Williamson, 1997). However emerging evidence from the study discovered a host of other factors that extend beyond and somewhat contradict the claims of bounded rationality and opportunism. The following section analyses the point of departure from bounded rationality and opportunism as the only TC factor constraining ESP implementation.

8.2.2 Bounded Rationality or Reliability?

Issues surrounding the relations between service providers and the MMDAs suggest that government actors do very little to safeguard the contractual relations, ensure performance and keep transaction cost low. Findings from the three (3) case studies indicates that there are different institutional structures within MMDAs from the highest level to the least decentralized unit that needed to collaborate to safeguard the terms of contracts with the private sector. However, these various components do not work effectively together to ensure contract terms are met. The contracting partner, in this case, the MMDAs sometimes renege on their duty to enforce contract terms, with service provision left unmonitored, making little or no use of the transaction cost benefits that underscores the external production or outsourcing of public goods and services. A DEHO indicated how lax the system is due to weak relations making it difficult for effective monitoring of contracts. He stated below:

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The system is complex, though we are supposed to monitor the performance of the contractors on the ground, our relations with both the contractor and the head office is not that strong because the system generally doesn’t make room for you to work. There is hardly some punitive action taken against non- performing contractors. The best they do is to change them after their contract expires, but you will be surprised the ones they will engage after are even worse. [Fieldwork Data: Interview transcript from AKDH] According to Williamson (1981), it is easy to measure services that have more readily identifiable performance measures that accurately represent service quantity and quality. In the case of ES contracts, the advantage of low asset specificity with indicators such as regularity and timely collection of refuse from households and public places and the level of environmental cleanliness are enough measurable indicators for contract performance. But lack of effective monitoring ultimately gives room for opportunistic behaviours: where contractors are left to make choices based upon motives of self-interest which may be incongruous with the contract terms and the goal of government in achieving clean environment. However, evidence from the study regarding poor performance of the agent point to some factors beyond opportunism. The waste management contractors in this case may not have taken advantage of the system by being self-seeking and guile contrary to Williamson (1981). The study reveals that most contractors were willing to work to ensure environmental cleanliness, but the system has failed them.

Our aim as a company is beyond profit making. Our vision is beyond money. As much as we want to make profit to pay for our cost of operation, we also want to see Ghana clean, we are here as partners in development not just for the money. If we don’t achieve our main of clean Ghana and we make money, it will be obvious to everyone because this problem is beyond just making money. Our main challenge with the system is non-enforcement of sanitation bye laws, limited landfill sites, non-payment of funds and certain political maneuverings that affect our operations, yet we still go ahead and provide service just to sustain the system. Because we know if we should pull out there will be disaster. [Fieldwork Data: Interview transcript from ZLAM] These claims were verified from various sources on the commitment of the service provider beyond profit and it was collaborated by a DEHO as follows:

Some of the waste management contractors are always ready to step in to help, especially the big ones, even when we are unable mobilize funds for them to work. Without their timely intervention the situation could have been worse. [Fieldwork Data: Interview transcript from DHAM] Clearly there is some common purpose agenda here, where the private service provider and government seem to have a common objective of ensuring a clean environment in the

217 country. However, weak institutions and lack of enforcement coupled with various contextual factors as alluded above, and discussed in chapter 6 are responsible for their low level performance other than opportunism. Although Williamson does not regard every agent as opportunistic, he largely attributes contract non-compliance to opportunism (Hodgson, 2004). Wright (1988, p. 599) argues that “in order to try to understand what actually happens in the policy process we have to try to identify those norms of behaviour which influence and determine policy”. Though some of these companies hardly break- even, they still carry on with their contracts. This however accounts for their sub-optimal performance, turning the anticipated win-win situation for both parties to a lose-lose one. This confirms Chandler and Salsbury (2000) argument that opportunism cannot fully describe the behaviour of economic actors. The private service provider in the case study areas and other actors seek some cooperation with the contracting authorities in government to carry out their obligations which are sometimes non-existent. Though there are institutions (both formal and informal) and institutional arrangements in place, the pillar of enforcement that holds these institutions to achieve their potency is relatively weak. This satisfies Hogson (2006: p6) claim that: “Institutions matter when they are enforced in order to serve their function as a device to reduce uncertainty in interaction and facilitate coordination of human action” where institutional safeguards are not in place to monitor contracts, network relations among actors provide an alternative form of governance structure to achieve policy goals at zero coast. Hodgson (2004) concludes that the excessive explanatory concentration on opportunism may mislead institutional analysis and management practices. An envelope concept of bounded reliability (BRel) proposed by Verbeke and Greidanus (2009) is found to be more encompassing in explaining the reasons for failed commitments. This is done without invalidating the concept of bounded rationality and opportunism. This thesis built on this assumption to analyse in broader terms factors that are responsible for failed human commitment which includes but are not limited to opportunism. This study contends that relational challenges that affect ESP implementation in Ghana do not only reflect scarcity of mind of actors (Bounded Rationality), but more importantly scarcity of commitment to promise (Bounded Reliability). The Table below classified issues affecting actor’s relations and their behavioural assumption which have direct implication for transaction cost and the effective organization of ES services in Ghana.

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Table 6: Classification of Issues Affecting Actors’ Relation

Issues Affecting Actors Relations Summary of Issues Resulting in Relational Gaps TCE Behavioral Assumptions

Institutional Issues

Non-Inclusive Institutional Arrangements The ESP of Ghana alienate very important group of actors (Traditional The antecedent of traditional authorities to effectively heads and Informal private sector) from the institutional arrangement collaborate to implement ESP has been fairly creating a relationship gaps between policy implementers and policy demonstrated. Also the activities and the impact of the targets. informal private sector have been widely acknowledged but they are both bounded by the institutional arrangement of the ESP.

Undermining Lower-Level Institutional Disregard to lower-level structures and lack of information flow from The reliability of the sub-divisional structures to Structures senior management of MMDAs creates relational gap between the supervise and monitor PPP contracts are bounded by private service provider and junior management at the local level where lack of information flow and non-involvement in PPP

supervision and monitoring takes place contract negotiations.

Political Issues

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Local Capture by Assembly Men/Women Though the assemblymen/women serves as a liaison between the EHD Assembly men/women are unable to make good their and the community to implement the ESP, there is some level of mistrust open-ended commitments to organize the community based on some perceived notion of capture for personal and political gain for effective ESP implementation due to lack of by the assemblymen/women. resources at one hand and political interest at the other which leads to opportunism.

Political Interference – Order from Above The excessive political interference in enforcement management leaves Interference is for political advantage leading to Syndrome the EHSD in a weak position. opportunism.

Party Foot-soldier Conundrum Anytime there is change of government, grassroots supporters of the new Political maneuvering to seek rent from state property government called “foot-soldiers” takes over the running most sanitation opportunistically. facilities like public toilets and dumpsites. This somehow truncates any PPP arrangement between the MMDAs and the private service providers. Such hostile takeovers create uncertainty and chaos between the MMDAs, the private service provider and the community leaving relational gaps.

Economic Issues

The Polluter Can’t Pay Due to economic reasons, and the environmental consequences of Actors ability to pay for sanitation services is bounded excludability in private service provision, sanitation services are by actor’s economic power however weak mechanism subsidized by the MMDAs. In spite of this the polluter in most poor to enforce polluter pay policy result in actor’s urban areas in Ghana still can’t pay for sanitation services. This creates opportunistic behaviours. hostile and uncooperative relations between service providers, the

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MMDAs and some service users.

Resource Availability The implementing agencies most of the time are unable to perform their Ex-ante commitment on the part of ESP implementers duties due to non-availability of the resource required to function. This fail to materialize in the face of resource constraint

affects how actors relations in collaborating to implement the ESP. without the intention to deceive or guile.

Socio-Cultural Issues

Cosmopolitanism and Nomadism The relations between the MMDAs, NGOs, service providers and the Social factors strike a barrier between ex-ante community in most urban communities are largely driven by negative commitment to policy objectives and implementation. cosmopolitan and nomadic effects. It is difficult to build stable relations Actors are bounded so in their efforts. where people move in and out without a permanent of residential status.

Moribund Traditional Leadership and As the democratic system of governance and rule of law take center The policy targets opportunistically take advantage of Value Systems stage, the power and authority of traditional rulers’ dissipates. There the weak institutional set-up, where there are no seems to be little allegiance to the traditional system, the traditional informal safeguards like values and norms to disregard norms and values are becoming weak in organizing and building network policy directive and by-laws. relations in communities.

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Community Ownership There is community apathy towards reporting sanitation offences. This is Actors behave opportunistically to protect family and mainly due to the socio-cultural set-up of most communities in Ghana. social interest. Due to the communal system of living, people may not want to offend their family members and neighbours by confronting them to stop littering the environment or reporting them to the authorities. This leaves a relational gap between the enforcement agencies and the community in dealing with sanitation offences.

Source: Author Construct, 2018

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8.3 Issues Affecting Actors’ Relations: Social Capital View

Social capital analysis of public policy implementation has direct implication for transaction cost. There is a common linkage between institutions and social capital, where some scholars refer to informal institutions as social capital. Social capital is also considered a key principle in NIE literature. The concept of social capital falls within North’s definition of institution (Knowles, 2005, p. 7). Though there are similarities, their roles in analyzing public policy may differ. Where institutions fail due to non-enforcement or lack of proper institutional structures, social capital can be harnessed to manage public policy transactions to deliver an effective implementation. Societies with high social capital are able to overcome policy problems through social networking and adherence to informal institutional codes like norms and values. Where social capital is less, more of government control and authority is needed to organize policy implementation process. Actors relations forms the basis of social capital produced during implementation of ESP. Relationship patterns among actors identified in chapter 5 points to relatively weak relations and where there are strong relations, they produce a mixture of positive and negative social capital. Issues affecting actor’s relations within ES implementation in Ghana can explain in two social capital dimensions: low social capital accumulation and negative social capital.

8.3.1 Low Social Capital Accumulation for ESP Implementation

Prior to the introduction of formal rules and policy guidelines, informal institutions (norms, values and culture) and social networks was the bedrock on which society was organized and maintained order. However, the study points to the dwindling level of social capital in both high and low-income communities which hitherto was organized on strong social network and relational basis, thus confirming (Putnam, 2000). This is due to a host of factors that were explored in chapter 6 on the question of issues affecting actors’ relations in ESP implementation. The source of this dwindling social capital in the sanitation sub- sector first emanates from the institutional arrangement of the NESP, 2010 of Ghana as the study revealed. The non-inclusive nature of the institutional arrangements within the sub- sector affects actor relations. The ESP lacks inclusiveness of some informal actors who

223 have influence on ES within the community. The finding identified two of such groups as informal private sector players known in local parlance as “kayaborla” and Chiefs, Kings and Queen mothers who are the traditional rulers within the communities.

The informal private sector known as “kayaborla” has been a major player in the sanitation sub-sector for years, even before neo-liberal policy of PPP was introduced to organize the system. Despite the contracting out of municipal waste management to waste management companies, this group still plays a major part in waste collection in most deprived communities, where the waste management company’s efforts are limited due to poor access to communities and the unwillingness / inability of some poor communities to pay economics rates charged by waste contractors. This makes the services of “Kayaborla” indispensable in the current scheme of affairs. This however calls for their involvement within the institutional arrangement in order to leverage on their strength to organize sanitation in most efficient manner. Though government and policy makers are aware of their activities, they have been left out of the wider policy arrangement, despite various calls for their integration into the formal institutional arrangements (Samson, 2015; Alemu, 2017; Oteng-Ababio et al., 2017).

Also, the traditional system being the citadel of informal institutions and governed by traditional heads have some leverage, and are deemed effective in organizing their communities as literature and historical account reveals (Panyin, 2010; Knierzinger, 2011) Though the community heads (chiefs, kings and queen mothers) were mentioned in the ESP, no direct inferences were made to them and specific roles assigned (see NESSAP, 2010). They are also not incorporated into the institutional arrangements in the NESP. This lack of proper recognition within policy affects network building and the utilization of informal institutional networks to achieve policy goals. ESP attention is mostly focused and directed at government bureaucrats, NGOs/CBOs and other implementing agencies whose capacity in exercising control and authority in organizing the sector is rather low. Local and indigenous solutions which could aid the process of policy implementation were palpably ignored within the institutional framework. Though evidence shows that EHOs seek local solutions in the implementation process, this however, has not been legitimized and institutionalized to reap its full benefits. Khan Mohmand (2016) argues that the inclusion of informal institutions in formal governance can make a difference to service delivery by encouraging greater citizen participation in decision making around services, and ensuring that public service delivery meets the specific needs of different populations.

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These two informal groups provide an informal framework (social capital) to organize information sharing, coordination of activities and collective decision making (Grootaert, 1998) to effectively implement ESP in their community. Bardhan (1995) has argued that what makes informal networks (social capital) work is peer monitoring, a common set of norms and local-level sanctions. However, local solutions which have high social capital values are being left at the back burner in favour of neo-liberal polices with less or no context specific considerations (see, Samson, 2015; Harvey, 2003). The neo-liberal policy failures in developing countries like Ghana are mainly due to the inability of government and bureaucrats to tailor policies to suite local conditions to take advantage of the social capital inherent to achieve policy goals. For example, some of the economic issues affecting relations between the private service provider and some of the communities they operate in regard to cost recovery as discussed in Chapter 6 brought out the issue of “context of application” in the PPP projects. While the direct approach method of service provider- client relations as prescribed in private sector business model worked in high income communities, it signally failed in low income indigenous traditional communities. This confirms Manase et al. (2004) analysis which suggest that appropriate cost recovery strategies need to be developed to take account of different parts of the urban population living at various economic levels.

Other factors accounting for the low social capital accumulation is cosmopolitanism, nomadism and moribund traditional leadership and value systems. Due to rapid development, population growth, urbanization and globalization, more cities in Ghana are becoming cosmopolitan in nature. Mobility of people and goods across boarders are quite prevalent, changing the outlook of most indigenous communities and their way of organizing society. Nomadic activities weaken community ties and are making it difficult to build social networks and to enforce traditional value systems within cosmopolitan societies (see, Putnam, 2000). Cost of transaction in such communities is very high with low social capital accumulation. Local community members and individuals interviewed in almost all the case study communities consistently blamed their poor state of sanitation on the activities of nomads and immigrants who do not conform to their community norms, standards and values. According to Putnam (2000) nomads or frequent movers have weaker community ties, so too many communities with higher residential turnovers like cosmopolitan areas are less well integrated. This undermines community engagement and community based social capital accumulation for effective organization in society. This

225 mostly accounts for the high rate of indiscipline in society and the management of ES in such communities. Rapid urbanization and rural-urban migration largely account for this phenomenon in Ghana. According to the World Bank (2016), Ghana’s ‘urban transformation’ has been huge, with some 3.5 times increase in urban population between 1984 and 2014. The Government of Ghana has indicated that should the current rate of urbanization, which is above 4% remains constant in to the future, urban population will rise to 72% by 2035 (Government of Ghana, 2015).

Also, formal institutions and the rule of law made little room for traditional authorities in governance; rendering them moribund. The chieftaincy institution was ripped of their judicial powers to enforce value systems and to exact appropriate punishment since the advent of bureaucracy and rule of law that came with colonialism and later independent nation states. The 1992 constitution of Ghana states that the statutory functions of paramount chiefs is to advise the government on chieftaincy issues, to create a standardized customary law and to eliminate “customs and usages that are outmoded or socially harmful” (Article 272). Additionally, they act as ‘caretakers’ of the land (see Republic of Ghana 1992, Articles 36 (8) and 267 (1)). Perhaps with the exception of their role as facilitators of development, all the other roles that are currently assigned to them are non-statutory (Knierzinger, 2011). Until the traditional court system is re-instated with quasi- judicial powers to adjudicate civil matters, their role in policy implementation at the local level will continue to remain a mirage. This strengthens Bonye et al. (2013)’s claim that for participation to be effective, participatory initiatives must include sharing of power between the community and decision-makers.

8.3.2 Negative Effects of Social Capital on ESP Implementation

Social Capital as discussed in literature can result in negative consequences for the effective organization of the society (Arneil, 2006; Andrist, 2008; Grootaert and Van Bastelaer, 2002; McLean, 2007; Portes, 2000; Putnam, 2000). Social capital, where utilized well generates benefits for the implementation of ESP; however, some social and political groupings within the communities in the case study areas exist to provide protection to their members against punishment for breaching established laws and regulations within the sanitation sub-sector. The study found out that, one of the major

226 issues militating against actors’ relations and collaboration in the implementation of the ESP is political and social networks existing within the community. Most communities are organized along political lines and are sharply divided between the two major political parties in Ghana; the NDC and the NPP. The grassroots support base of these two political parties is mostly referred to as “foot-soldiers”(see, Bob-Milliar, 2012). The foot-soldier conundrum as discussed in chapter 6 revealed certain patterns of negative behaviours among political activists towards sanitation management. Also, most sanitation offenders who have ties with political parties in their communities tend to receive respite from punishment as a form of reward for their loyalty to their political masters. An “order from above” seems mightier than the law in most of these circumstances (see, Diamond, 2008; Joseph, 1987). An EHO recounted how political interference has rendered them ineffective as enforcement officers in the communities.

We are helpless sometimes when it comes to enforcing the laws, everyone belongs to one political party or the other and when they fall foul of the law you get their political masters knocking on your doors to let them off the hook. They politicians are powerful so when you joke with them, they will just frustrate your life. [Fieldwork Data: Interview transcript from MMEO] Similarly, Crook and Ayee (2006) noted in an earlier study how enforcement by EHOs are met with intervention from politicians, chiefs and opinion leaders, putting pressure on them to release sanitation offenders without prosecution. Again, it was identified from the study that “political” social capital precludes waste management contractors who are not politically aligned (located within the ruling coalition) from wining PPP contracts regardless of their competences. Also, because of contractor’s affiliation and goodwill from their political parties, they are also protected from suffering any consequences from non-performance or breach of contract. This confirms findings of Crook and Ayee (2006) which states that the change in power relations within the public service bureaucracy since the introduction of PPP has decrease the powers of public officials and increase that of contractors and politicians who form a nexus of patronage relations which is difficult for officials to challenge. Diamond (2008) concludes that in most African democracies, a contract is granted not on the basis who can deliver the best services for the lowest price, but rather who will pay the biggest bribe. Evidence so far overwhelmingly points to the political network and groupings as a source of negative social capital militating against the implementation of the ESP in Ghana.

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Aside political networks, the social-cultural set up of most Ghanaian communities is that of communal living and the extended family where every member of the society is connected in one way or the other (Hofstede, 2011). This shapes relations among actors and somehow impact negatively on sanitation management. Sanitation offended are mostly shielded by the community from prosecution (Crook and Ayee, 2006), and for the fear of being looked upon as a traitors, most people shy away from reporting offenders who are either their relatives, neighbours or a member of a group (social or religious organization) of which they belong. This in-group protection generates negative social capital that makes it difficult to effectively implement ESP. This socio-cultural phenomenon feeds into the patrimonial system of rule and power relations in society. Pitcher et al. (2009) described patrimonialism as a system where both social and political relationships are mediated and maintained by personal connection between leaders and subjects or patrons and clients. According Van Gool and Beekers (2012) to Patrimonialism emanates from traditional moral economies of patron-client relationships where individuals provided livelihood or political protection to the less resourceful in exchange for loyalty or labour. Under patrimonialism, informal and personal rule takes precedence over formal rule (Joseph, 1987; Diamond, 2008). Pitcher et al. (2009) recounted some features of patrimonialism as flouting of rational-legal authority in favour of highly personalistic rule and reliance on patron-client ties and networks for professional and political advancement or support. Patrimonialism thrives on social capital thus making it difficult for formal rules and policies to find expression in solving society’s nagging problems like environmental sanitation in Ghana.

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Table 7: Summary of Research Findings 2

Research Question Summary of Key findings

What are the key issues affecting the relations Institutional Issues among actors in the  Non-inclusive Institutional Arrangements implementation of ESP?  Undermining Lower level Institutional Structures Political Issues

 Local Capture by Assembly Men/Women  Political Interference – Order from Above

 Party Foot-soldier Conundrum

Economic Issues

 The Polluter Can’t Pay  Resource Availability Socio-Cultural Issues

 Cosmopolitanism and Nomadism  Moribund Traditional Leadership and Value Systems  Community Ownership Theoretical Lens for Evaluation

New Institutional Economics

 Actors Relations and Transaction Cost Benefits  Bounded Reliability of Actors

Social Capital Theory

 Low social capital accumulation  Negative social capital.

Author Construct, 2018

8.4 Impact of Actors’ Relations on Achieving Sanitation Goals

Assessing the role of actor’s relations in achieving environmental sanitation objectives in Ghana revealed the impacts (positive and negative) and the opportunities that exist to improve ES through relationships. Actor’s close collaboration as illustrated in chapter 7 displayed some potential to achieve greater result in the implementation ESP. However, such relations were in little manifestations on the field. Though some relations were harnessed to achieve the ESP objectives in some areas, the impact on sanitation situation in

229 the case study communities did not see significant improvement due to the inconsistent nature of such relations. Some relations also proved to be detrimental to the promotion of ESP objectives thereby exacerbating the insanitary conditions of some of the case study communities. These impacts both positive and negative are discussed in the section below.

8.4.1 Positive Impacts

The impact of actor’s relations on achieving ES goals in Ghana has been positive in many ways. Data analysed reveal that, Public agencies, NGOs, CBOs and community groups network to exchange information. According to Agranoff (2007) this enhance one another’s capabilities to smooth services interaction and to solve policy/program problems. ES education saw a boost in communities where NGOs/CBOS, Service providers and the ESHD collaborated to embark on joint educational programs. Field results indicate that where resources (financial, material and human) seemed to be lacking in one organization, the other provided to overcome resource challenge in promoting ES education. This kind of collaboration, if intensified and sustained for a long period of time, should boost the chance of greater success in achieving ES objective in education. Joint effort and collaboration between actors at the local level to implement the ES objective in enforcement management produced positive impact on ES in communities where these relations exist. Data analyzed proved that gains were made in communities where actors collaborated to ensure that sanitation by-laws were enforced. Unfortunately, most of these partnerships emerged on periodic basis so the positive impacts were not sustainable and long lasting. The strength in such collaborations among actors if maintained and institutionalized, should see the challenge of enforcement management overcome. Monitoring and Evaluation systems within the sector are weak due to lack of resources by the MMDAs to conduct field research to measure performance against targets. However, M&E activities are prevalent in the sub-sector by different organizations e.g. (NGOs, CBOs, IGOs etc.) and individuals for different purposes. Some level of collaboration, therefore, goes into such exercises either to fulfil donor requirement or for research publications. Such collaborations among actors in M&E produce some positive impact on sanitation by revealing the state of the sector to prompt remedial actions where policy is failing. As a result networks like these need to be treated seriously in public management

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(Agranoff, 2012). The MMDAs must not only depend on their own resources only to conduct M&E but benefit from the platform of other actors through close collaborative relationships.

8.4.2 Negative Impacts

Some relations between actors tend to negatively impact ES in some communities. These relations mostly developed along political lines. This kind of relations typically exists between community members and assembly men and women. Within Ghana’s competitive democratic system, most communities are sharply divided along political lines. So, any attempt by community leaders to create relations based on political affiliation will mean creating “political enemies” and also giving room for impunity. Field results show some level of adversarial and patron-client relations within the communities due to politics. This impacted negatively on participation and law enforcement in most communities. Also, lack of communication in the vertical relations within the MMDAs impacted negatively on monitoring and evaluation. Upwards and downwards communication among the various institutional structures in most MMDAs are poor. Results from the field point to the fact that, little collaborative relationship exists between the ESHD/WMD and the sub- metro/urban/zonal councils in the engagement process of private service providers and also very little information flows from top to down regarding the PPP arrangements with the private service provider. This creates little or no power relations between the principal and the agent making enforcement difficult. Where reports on non-performance of the agents are sent to the top hierarchy, such reports were in most of the cases not acted upon according to officers at the sub-metro/urban/zonal councils. This weak relation has negative impact in ensuring accountability and service quality. In order to establish a strong cost recovery regime within the ES sector, actor’s relations is important in achieving this objective. Weak collaboration among the players within the PPP arrangement impacted negatively on cost recovery within the sector, mostly in low income communities. Field investigations revealed that tariff information dissemination is poorly done in a disjointed manner leading to some resistance from some communities. Non- payment of tariff and the inability to enforce tariff payment is as a result of the parallel operation between the ESHD officers, the assembly men/women and the service provider

231 in most communities. This leads to loses of revenue to service providers and also accounting for their low-level performance and reluctance to provide services in such communities leading to worsening sanitation situations.

Table 8: Summary of Research Finding 3

Research Question Summary of Key findings

What Impacts do actors Positive Impacts relations have on  Boost in ES education in communities where NGOs/CBOS, environmental sanitation? Service providers and the ESHD collaborated to embark on joint educational programs.

 Joint efforts and strong collaborative relations between actors at the local level strengthened enforcement management.

 Collaborations among actors in M&E produce positive impact on sanitation by revealing the state of the sector to prompt remedial actions where policy is failing. Negative Impacts

 Adversarial and patron-client relations among some actors due to politics negatively impacted on participation and law enforcement in most communities leading poor sanitations situations in such communities.

 Lack of communications among the various institutional structures within most MMDAs led to little or no collaborative relations between the ESHD/WMD and the sub-metro/urban/zonal councils. This negatively impacted M&E, accountability and service quality.

 Tariff information dissemination is poorly done in a disjointed manner leading to some resistance from some communities. Non-payments of tariff and the inability to enforce tariff payment regulations is also as a result of the parallel operation between the ESHD officers, the assembly men/women and the service provider in some communities leading to negative impact on the implementing the cost recovery regime.

Author Construct, 2018

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8.5 Establishing Linkages between Research Outcomes

The kind of relations and links between actors, the issues affecting such relations and how the overall actor relations impacts on ES management in Ghana are linked to each other in a linear sequence. Relations identified in the study point to a mixture of both positive and negative, healthy and unhealthy, and good and poor relations among actors at various levels. Negative, unhealthy and poor relations as gleaned from the interpretation of the first research question was as a result of host of factors that sums up to failed human commitment and actor opportunism. Relations identified in question one is influenced by myriad of contextual factors within the study environment. The second question classified these factors within the environment of the study under institutional, political, economic and socio-cultural issues. Under these, different issues affecting actor relations like Non- inclusive institutional arrangements, undermining lower-level institutional structures, local capture by assembly men/women, political interference – ‘order from above syndrome’, party foot-soldier conundrum, the polluter can’t pay, resource availability, cosmopolitanism and nomadism, moribund traditional leadership and value systems, and community ownership were distilled. These issues are largely responsible for the kind of relations identified in the question one. These translate into how ES is organized by local actors at the various MMDAs. These relations turned to have both positive and negative impact on environmental sanitation depending on the kind of relations as identified in the first question.

8.6 Conclusion

The chapter provides discussion on findings from the three empirical chapters 5, 6 and 7 connecting findings to literature to establish its theoretical relevance. The chapter discussed the kind of relations and links that exist between actors in the implementation of ESP in Ghana. Discussions reveal different strands of relations which are largely chaotic and uncoordinated. Actor’s relations in ESP implementation in Ghana failed the test of “positive collaborative relations” when measured against the determining factors of a successful relationships (Trust, Commitment, Communication and Coordination) provided in literature. The chapter also discussed the issues affecting actor’s relations in the implementation of ESP in Ghana within the theoretical framework of NIE and SC. It

233 identified myriad of issues under four categories namely institutions, politics, economic and socio-culture. Issues were first assessed through the theoretical lens of TCE behavioural assumptions of bounded reliability (BRel) which proved the reasons for failed human commitment beyond opportunism. Then SC analysis of issues identified low social capital accumulation and negative social capital as determining factors of actor relations. The chapter concluded by discussing the impact of actor’s relations on ESP objectives. Impacts were classified between positive and negative impacts. Where there were strong relations, ESP objectives were partly achieved and where relations were weak, unhealthy and negative, ES objectives were impacted negatively. The next chapter formed the concluding chapter of the thesis; it provides the summary of the entire thesis.

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CHAPTER NINE

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

9.0 Introduction

This study investigated the relations between the various actors within ESP implementation at the local level, using three case study areas in Accra to reveal the kind of relations that exist, the issues currently affecting such relations and the impact and effects of actor relations on the ESP objectives and environmental sanitation as a whole. Three research questions guided the study. The questions were tailored to identify and fill existing gaps in literature. Dwelling on three key public management theories for ESP implementation, i.e. public-private –partnerships, decentralization and participation, weaknesses in literature were identified in regarding actors relations within these strands. Studies on the application of these strategies in public service provision were somewhat silent on actor’s relations and their effects on public services such as ES.

The first research question identified a mixture of strong and weak relations existing between actors working together to implement the ESP. it also reveals the absence of some critical success factors like commitment, trust, communication and coordination that are needed to sustain a healthy working relations among actors. The second research question uncovered issues that affect actors relations within the ESP implementation process. These issues were classified under various categories to reflect their nature. Firstly, under institutional issues where two major issues were identified: Non-inclusive institutional arrangements and undermining lower-level institutional structures. Secondly, under political issues where three issues were identified: Local capture by assembly men/women, Political interference – order from above syndrome and Party foot-soldiers conundrum. Thirdly, under economic conditions with issues like: The polluter can’t pay and resource availability. Fourthly, socio-cultural issues like Cosmopolitanism and Nomadism, Moribund traditional leadership and value system and Community ownership emerged. The third research question assessed the impact of actor relations on ES objectives in Ghana revealing positive and negative impacts of such relations on ES. This chapter presents the summary of the study and key findings and stating the contribution of this

235 study to knowledge. The chapter also presents the policy recommendations and suggestions for future research. The chapter then draws to a close with chapter conclusion.

9.1 Summary of the Study

This section summarises all the nine chapters that were organised to adequately respond to the research question of the thesis from introduction to conclusion.

Chapter one introduces the thesis, setting out with the general introduction and background, stating the problem statement of the thesis. The chapter introduces the research context and scope of ES defining various actors to be studied. The research objective and questions were stated with the theoretical disposition of the thesis, originality and relevance of the thesis, limitation of the thesis and a summary of chapter disposition all outlined.

Chapter two reviewed literature that guided the study with a theoretical framework starting with an introduction to environmental sanitation from a broader global context to Africa and then narrowed to Ghana. Relevant policy implementation literature was assessed including public management theories like New Public Management [NPM], utilising some of its core principles like PPP, decentralisation and participation to analyse policy implementation and assessing their impact on ESP implementation. It also examined some emerging public management theories (Post-NPM) like Governance, New Public Governance [NPG] and Relational Governance [RG] theories situating the study of relation within the broader governance theories with collaborative governance as its central theme. The aim was to reveal gaps in literature in connection with actor relations in their application in organising public service provision like ES services. The second scope which was the conceptual literature covered the theories of inter-organisational relations (IOR) focusing on networks and collaborative relationships. The combination of New Institutional Economics and Social Capital theories were utilised as the main theoretical lens for the study and to explain relations of actors within ESP implementation.

Chapter three presented a contextual overview of the research setting. It provided background to both the political and developmental context of Ghana. It provides an overview of the local government and decentralisation system within which the ESP is implemented. It provided an overview of ES related programs in Ghana like the National

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Sanitation Day Program [NSDP], Community Led Total Sanitation Program [CLTS], School Health Education Program [SHEP], National Youth Employment Program – Youth in Waste and Sanitation model [NYEP – YWS] and the Expanded Sanitary Inspections, Compliance Management and Enforcement [ESICOME]. The chapter also discussed the policy and legal framework for ES in Ghana, reviewing contextual literature in PPP, Decentralization and Participation in ES in Ghana. The chapter closed by establishing the basis for actor relations within the ES sub-sector in Ghana.

Chapter four outlined the methodology and the philosophical foundation of the study. The study adopted a social constructivist and interpretive ontology. The orientation is that knowledge does not exist independently of the social set-ups and what is known is socially constructed. The study does not believe in the positivist orientation of objectivity. For this research, knowledge is hardly value-free and what is knowledge is contingent upon the interpretation of subjects. The relations between actors were conceived socially, adopting social and contextual meanings. Adopting a qualitative case-study approach, the study used in-depth interviews, documentary review, focus group and informal discussions as the key data collection instruments. Data analysis was done by first transcribing the interviews and focus discussion tapes. Themes were established based upon literature reviewed and emergent trends from the data gathered.

Chapter five presented results to the first research question that seeks to establish the relations and links between actors in ESP implementation in Ghana. This was in response to gaps identified in literature in connection with studies in the area. Research focused on many areas like technology, finance, regulation and enforcement etc. in providing solutions to ES with little attention to actor’s relations. The chapter identified various kinds of relations among actors at the local level, giving a clear picture of pertinent implementation challenges on the ground.

Chapter six presented the findings on issues affecting actor’s relations in ESP implementation which was the focus of the second research question. The chapter identified issues affecting relations classified under four categories, namely institutional, political, economic and socio-cultural factors. Issues like Non-inclusive Institutional Arrangements and undermining lower-level institutional structures were identified under institutional categories. Political issues identified were Local capture by assembly men/women, Political interference – ‘order from above syndrome’ and Party foot-soldiers

237 conundrum. Then economic issues revealed the polluter can’t pay and resource availability. Lastly, socio-cultural issues point to Cosmopolitanism and Nomadism, Moribund traditional leadership and value system and Community ownership which all affect how actors relate to ESP. This chapter is guided by the new institutional economics and social capital theories.

Chapter seven assessed the impact of actor’s relations on ESP implementation. The chapter zeroed in on the objectives of ESP of Ghana, using actor’s relation to assess their outcomes. Both positive and negative impacts were identified. This reveals the importance of actor’s relations on ESP implementation and their overall impact on ES in Ghana.

Chapter eight presented the discussion and interpretations of the findings in chapter 5, 6 and 7 using the theoretical lens of NIE and SC to synchronise theory and practice in connection with actor’s relation in public policy implementation.

Chapter nine provided summary of the study stating contribution to knowledge and context specific policy and management recommendations. The chapter draws to a close bringing the study to an end

9.2 Contribution of Thesis to Knowledge [Theoretical Implications]

9.2.1 Bringing To the Fore Local Actor Relations in ESP Implementation

Hitherto, studies on local actors’ relations in public policy implementation like that of ES has not been given much attention within public management and policy implementation literature. Most inter-organisational studies also concentrate on formal institutions in their study of relations. This study brings to the fore, a blend of formal and informal relations among actors within any given implementation process. It reveals formal and interpersonal relations at the local level and how these relations affect policy output and outcomes.

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9.2.2 Novel Classification of Issues Affecting Actor Relations.

A new addition to literature emanating from this study is the classification of local factors that determine actors’ behaviour in any given implementation process and how they affect policy implementation. Ten (10) issues were identified under four (4) different classifications i.e. institutional, political, economic and socio-cultural factors bringing out unique contextual issues that drive and shape actors’ relations and behaviour in policy implementation process. These issues and their classifications will inform bureaucrats, policy makers and implementing agencies on the likely issues that drive actor’s relations in public policy implementation and their impact on policy outcomes.

9.2.3 Bringing out Relational Perspectives within the Public Management Theories

Narrowing on public management theories like public private partnership, decentralization and local participation, the study reveals low energy in literature on the actors and their relations within the application of these theories. How actors collaborate to make PPP, decentralization and local participation a success within a developing nation context was at the backburner until this study. This study throws light on the importance of relations in achieving success in public management theory application. The study redirects focus to the importance of actor relations within the public management discourse and how they impact on policy outcomes.

9.2.4 The Application of the NIE and SC as Theoretical Lens to Study Relations

The study applied the NIE and SC in the study of relation among local level actors in ESP implementation in Ghana. Though the combination of the two theories has been applied in the study of different areas in literature, its application within ES in a developing country context for that matter Ghana has not surfaced so far in literature. Their application in this study and the insight it provided in expanding the frontiers of the respective theories in public administration discourse is unique. The study provided a fine blend between formal and informal institutions using NIE and SC to understand the role of actors in ES policy

239 implementation in developing countries. It also queried the TCE concept of bounded rationality and opportunism, challenging its narrow scope to further advance the bounded reliability argument that somewhat exonerates actor’s perceived tag of “self-seeking and guile” intentions in economic transaction to include other behavioural factors other than opportunism which literature barely accounts for.

9.2.5 New Insight into the Impact of Actor Relations on ESP Implementation

Literature supports the argument that, actor’s relations has impact on policy implementation and policy outcomes. However, detailed studies that outline such impacts have not been the focus of policy researchers over the years. This study systematically identified relation trends and their direct impact on ES objectives in Ghana. The study identified positive and negative impacts of actor’s relations. It concludes that certain relations pose challenges to ES implementation on one hand and opportunity on the other. This discovery buttresses the importance of actor relations in the policy implementation process. This is novel within the ES literature in Ghana since the analyses in previous studies on implementation challenges did not make a direct link between actor relations and poor sanitation in Ghana.

9.3 Context Specific Policy and Management Recommendations [Policy Implications]

The discussion within the framework of actor relations and their impact on ES in Ghana gave rise to many issues that are worth bringing to the attention of authorities and policy maker in the area of ES in Ghana. These recommendations, the researcher believes if critically assessed and implemented would help solve some of the challenges within the ES in Ghana.

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9.3.1 Review of the Environmental Sanitation Policy of Ghana

Studying the role of actors and the impact of their relations on ES in Ghana revealed certain weaknesses within the NESP (2010). The NESP 1999 was reviewed to meet the current challenges of ES that the old did not take cognisant of. However, the current policy lacks depth in certain areas chief among them is the institutional arrangement and the role of actors. The current institutional arrangement is overly concentrated on formal institutions with casual mention of informal institutions. Two major informal institutions critical to the success of the sector, but have been omitted in the institutional arrangement are the informal private sector “Kayaborla” and traditional leaders [Chiefs, kings and Queens]. This makes the current policy non-inclusive and skewed towards formal institutions. The study revealed that these two institutions are functional in the implementation of the NESP and their relations with other actors are crucial to the outcome of NESP objectives. The activities of the informal private sector can be well regulated, and their excesses checked if they are formally recognised and provisions made for them under the policy. The policy should be reviewed to incorporate these actors in the institutional arrangement with clear roles and responsibilities assigned.

9.3.2 Inclusive Contract Negotiations

A major issue emanating from the study is the poor and non-existent relations between the district assembly sub-divisional officers like the sub-metro/zonal/ urban councils and the waste management contractors working in their jurisdiction. This is due to some information gap created within the PPP process as a result of their non-inclusion in contract negotiations and the awarding process. One of the duties assigned to the district assembly sub-divisions under the NESP is to supervise the performance of contractors and franchisees that operate within the sub-districts. Though the process of engaging a contractor includes their input at certain stages of the process, they are left out of the contract negotiation and awarding stage where the contractor or franchisees recognises these officers as their principal to whom they are accountable to. Another challenge within the process is that, senior managers who negotiate and award these contracts do not properly brief their junior officers who are responsible for monitoring the contract terms.

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In other cases the contractors are not introduced to the officers at the sub-divisions creating a gap between the two. To avoid this relational challenge, and in order to get the two to work together effectively, it is recommended that sub-divisional officers should be made part of the interview, negotiation and awarding process of contracts that will be assigned to their sub-division.

9.3.3 Periodic Review of PPP Contracts, Franchise and Concessions

PPP contracts, franchise and concessions agreements should be reviewed to include periodic assessments at short interval subject to continuation and abrogation of contracts. The study reveals poor performance on the part of most contractors and franchisees working in various communities; however, they are not subjected to proper checks because their contracts are only reviewed and action taken at the end of their term. This puts some burden on the community for the entire contract duration without room for accountability. Most contractors and franchisees do not cooperate with the community, sub-metro, zonal and urban council officers they work with. This is as a result of their direct dealings with top management leaving these lower rank officers in a helpless state in ensuring accountability through monitoring. The researcher is of the opinion that if a review committee is set up, using the report of the lower level officers who monitor performance in the communities to decide the fate of a contractor or a franchisee, some level of urgency and seriousness in how the two relate and work together will emerge.

9.3.4 Sanitation Authority and Levy

To solve the problem of finance and political interference and manipulation of sanitation issues in Ghana, plans to set up an autonomous National Sanitation Authority [NSA] should be put into immediate action by the sector ministry. Also, a bi-partisan parliamentary committee should be set up to come out with a sanitation levy that should be charged on corporate bodies and certain non-environmentally friendly goods and commodities to generate funds to tackle the sanitation problem. Emphasis were laid on autonomy of the proposed NSA and the bi-partisanship of the committee that should

242 propose the levy because, the study revealed how intertwined the challenge of sanitation is with politics of the day. An authority that does not answer to the executive can be trusted to implement ESP devoid of politics and without fear or favour. Also, any new form of tax introduced to finance the ES sector, will definitely be resisted by citizens because this will increase cost of living, and opposition parties will also chance upon it, milking it for political advantage. So, a bi-partisan approach must be adopted in setting up the sanitation fund. [Emphasis mine]

9.3.5 Community Sanitation Watchdog Committee

The study revealed that, the complexity with the implementation of ESP in certain communities is due to the relational gap between the implementing agencies and the policy targets. In certain communities nobody within the community is responsible for checking sanitations offenders. Therefore, the absence of EHSD officials means environmental lawlessness. Most community members are unwilling to report sanitation offences and the few who take the bold step to report are targeted and greeted with aggression from offenders. This study recommends the setting up of community sanitation watchdog committees with some state powers to serve as an intermediary body creating relations between the local assembly and the community. The researcher believes this will greatly enhance enforcement management. Empirical evidence proved such committees do not last because they are neither remunerated nor backed by the powers of the state. This makes them ad hoc, folding up within a short space of time after their formation. Government should consider institutionalising community sanitation watchdog committees making them jointly responsible together with the local assemblies for sanitation in their communities.

9.3.6 Empowering Traditional Leadership

Traditional leadership used to be the mainstay of Ghanaian communities before the advent of colonization and the establishment of a formal system of governance. Issues of sanitation were handled in the best possible ways because traditional authorities wielded

243 powers to decree and punish sanitation offenders. However, increasing modernisation, nation state system of governance and rule of law have dwindled the fortunes of traditional leadership in Ghana. Traditional authorities are still pivotal in ensuring improved sanitation in most indigenous Ghanaian communities. However, they have been rendered powerless and impotent in the current scheme of affairs due to their inability to exact their authority and mete out punishment to sanitation offenders. This reduces the power relations between the traditional heads and their subjects making it difficult to enforce community values and norms. The researcher recommends that a sanitation bill setting up sanitation authority should include special power of the state invested in traditional authority to prosecute and fine offenders in their communities. In exercising such quasi-judicial powers, political interference and manipulations will be minimal making enforcement management firmer and effective.

9.4 Implications for Further Research

This study serves as a catalyst for more enquiries into actor relations in ESP implementation to build on the findings of this research. Whiles this study brings to the fore the issues of actors relation in policy implementation and their relevance in curbing poor ES issues in Ghana, there is the need for this study to be replicated in other developing country context to deepen knowledge in this area of study. Also, the study adopted a purely qualitative method to analyse actor relations and their impact on ES objective, there is therefore the need for a quantitative study to measure this impact in the future to broaden further an understanding of the relations of actors in the ES discourse. Although public management theories recognize the relevance of actors in implementing public policies, studies into their relation and how they collaborate to achieve policy outcome is still superficial. There is the need for a proper scrutiny of the relations that develop between actors and how these relations affect the process of implementation.

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9.5 Limitations of the Research

Theoretically, this study benefited from a large availability of related research and academic literature from various contexts; however, environmental sanitation and actors’ role represent a rather large area for any one particular study to comprehensively cover in its entirety. Hence this study was limited to the particular context of Ghana and further narrowed to three selected local government areas i.e. Accra Metropolitan Assembly [AMA], La-Nkwantanang Madina Municipal Assembly [LANMA] and Ashaiman Municipal Assembly [ASHMA] in the Greater Accra Region of Ghana. It is a measured attempt to focus on the areas that are of immediate relevance where the challenges of environmental sanitation are pervasive. Again, the scope of sanitation in the ESP of Ghana comprises a number of components. This includes collection and sanitary disposal of wastes, including solid wastes, liquid wastes, excreta, industrial wastes, health-care and other hazardous wastes. It also covers storm water drainage; cleansing of thoroughfares, markets and other public spaces; control of pests and vectors of disease; food hygiene; environmental sanitation education; inspection and enforcement of sanitary regulations; disposal of the dead; control of rearing and straying of animals; monitoring the observance of environmental standards (ESP, 2010). But the scope of environmental sanitation in this research has been limited to address the issues of collection and sanitary disposal of solid wastes due to time and financial constraints which is also another limiting factor to this research.

9.6 Chapter Conclusion

This chapter provided a summary of the thesis starting with an overview of each of the chapters. A summary of the research findings and the contribution to knowledge of this thesis were outlined. The chapter also presents context specific recommendations and the implications of the study for future research.

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9.7 Concluding Remarks

This study set out to investigate the relations existing between actors in the implementation of ESP at the local level in Ghana. Though some dyad relations have been studied in policy implementation in Ghana, the area of sanitation barely received same attention. Multi actor policy implementation leaves a lot of complexities that requires some critical analysis. Network relations between actors in the sanitation sector the researcher opined offers some opportunities and also pose some challenges to achieving policy objectives. In view of this, the study explores this problem area to establish the veracity of this claim and to generate interest in the study of actor relations in ESP implementation. After three (3) years of painstaking research in to actor relations in three case study areas in Accra Ghana, the results reveal relations among actors that can be best described as uncoordinated and chaotic. These relations the study observed are influenced by contextual factors that shaped actor behaviour. The study also established a direct impact of actor relations on sanitation objectives that also translate in to the prevailing poor sanitation situation in Ghana. It is therefore concluded that to achieve progress in ES, attention must be given to actors relations because they exert significant influence on policy outcomes.

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