sign in sign up
<<
Home , Kosovo Force, Martti Ahtisaari

2009_CIC_3.qxd:Peacekeeping_FM_qxd.qxd 1/16/09 4:57 PM Page 73

3.6

Kosovo

In December 2007, international talks on and Serbian authorities but the process remains ’s future ended in failure. On 17 Febru- incomplete. ary 2008, the province’s government declared independence from , of which it had been nominally part while under UN adminis- Background tration since 1999. A number of states—includ- In Resolution 1244 of 1999, the Security Coun- ing , , Great Britain, and the cil mandated UNMIK and NATO’s Kosovo —have recognized Kosovo, but Force (KFOR) to prepare the ground for a “po- the majority of the international community litical settlement.” It did not define parameters have not. In October, Serbia persuaded the UN for this settlement. Nor (unusually but not General Assembly to refer the issue to the In- uniquely) did it require a periodic renewal of the ternational Court of Justice. Staunch Russian mandate. Neither the supporters nor opponents opposition to independence precluded any de- of Kosovo’s independence have reopened dis- cisions in the UN Security Council. cussions of Resolution 1244. Both sides know This meant a year of confusion and con- flicting signals for the international presence in Kosovo. The UN and NATO were faced by sig- nificant challenges in ethnically Serb after the declaration of independence. But the major dilemma has been the existence of competing legal and political bases for oper- ations emerging from international and local dynamics. The UN has had to manage its role in Kosovo in the face of these contradictions, and Kosovo has been one of Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon’s priorities through 2008. In June 2008, he declared that he no longer believed the UN’s role viable in its current form, and acted in his role as the UN’s Chief Administra- tive Officer to “reconfigure” the UN Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK). In reality, this has trans- lated into substantial downsizing of staff and trying to find a modus vivendi with the other international organizations involved. By late 2008, there had been more progress toward this than might have been predicted, with an EU peace operation being accepted by both Kosovar

73 2009_CIC_3.qxd:Peacekeeping_FM_qxd.qxd 1/16/09 4:57 PM Page 74

74 • MISSION REVIEWS

3.6.1 Cost-Benefit Analysis of

In 2008, a team of researchers led by Paul impact negatively on broader develop- reduces the risk of violence from nearly 40 Collier, working under the Copenhagen mental interventions by the international percent to 7 percent. Consensus project, published a report pro- community. An even more cost-efficient method of viding a comprehensive cost-benefit analy- The report explored a range of military intervention is the use of over-the-horizon sis of international military interventions intervention mechanisms used by the inter- security guarantees, which are character- in postconflict societies and the abilities national community, with a primary focus ized by maintenance of only small contin- of these interventions to reduce the risk of on the curtailment of domestic military gents of personnel in-theater, with more ro- conflict recurrence. The report found that spending, the use of peacekeeping forces, bust forces available to be rapidly deployed. UN peacekeeping operations are highly and the provision of over-the-horizon secu- Interventions modeled on Britain’s ten-year cost-effective, as they reduce the possibili- rity guarantees. The authors concluded that security safeguard for Sierra Leone, pro- ties of relapse to conflict and coup attempts these methods have had positive impacts on vide for diminished operational costs with and all their negative consequences. the security situation where they were em- positive impacts on the security situation. While interstate war has declined ployed, but are not a panacea and need to be The report concluded that the bene- since the end of the Cold War, the inci- applied on a case-by-case basis. fits of postconflict aid are maximized dence of conflict—particularly civil wars The authors found that UN peacekeep- when packaged with the instruments de- in low-income countries—has remained ing has proven to be extremely cost-effec- scribed above. To ensure optimal effect, relatively constant. Further, the threat tive, especially when the investment in a these efforts require significant coordina- posed by the recurrence of conflict or coup mission is weighed against the alternative tion among institutional actors, a role that attempts in postconflict societies remains impacts of relapse to conflict and its conse- the authors see as a perfect fit for the UN’s high. The average direct cost of a civil war quences. The study concluded that spend- Peacebuilding Commission. can be upward of $250 billion. This does ing $850 million on a peacekeeping opera- not include the humanitarian costs, which tion annually over the course of ten years

Source: Paul Collier, Lisa Chauvet, and Haavard Hegre, “The Security Challenge in Conflict-Prone Countries,” Copenhagen Consensus 2008 Challenge Paper, http://www.copenhagenconsensus.com/files/filer/cc08/papers/0%20challenge%20papers/cp_conflicts_-_collier.pdf.

UN Interim Administration in Kosovo (UNMIK) that the other could muster at least one Security Council veto on alterations to the mandate. • Authorization and 10 June 1999 (UNSC Res. 1244) The resolution has thus remained in force, Start Date (note: paragraph 19 of the resolution and UNMIK and KFOR continued to operate states that international civil and security presences are established for an initial throughout the year, as they had previously. period of twelve months, to continue Their role has been complicated by early ele- thereafter unless the Security Council ments of an alternative international presence decides otherwise) under the political auspices of the European • SRSG Lamberto Zannier () Union. The EU sent planners to Kosovo in • Chief Military Major-General Raul Cunha () 2006, on the assumption that it would receive Liaison Officer full international recognition and so achieve a • Police Commissioner Richard Monk () smooth transfer from UN administration. In • Budget $198.0 million (1 July 2008–30 June 2009) early 2007, UN envoy Martti Ahtisaari pub- • Strength as of Military Observers: 26 lished a plan envisaging an EU rule of law and 31 October 2008 Police: 1,871 police mission and a (European) International International Civilian Staff: 381 Civilian Representative (ICR) to provide polit- Local Civilian Staff: 1,719 Un Volunteers: 108 ical advice in an independent Kosovo. For detailed mission information see p. 305 The foresaw the redefinition of KFOR as an “international military presence” 2009_CIC_3.qxd:Peacekeeping_FM_qxd.qxd 1/16/09 4:57 PM Page 75

KOSOVO • 75

(IMP), still under NATO command and provid- ing direct security, but also training a new NATO Kosovo Force (KFOR) . It also proposed an au- tonomous mission under the Organization for • Authorization and 10 June 1999 (UNSC Res. 1244) Security and Cooperation in (OSCE)— Start Date the OSCE Mission in Kosovo (OMIK)—to • Force Commander Lieutenant-General Giuseppe Emilio Gay monitor legal and rights issues, most obviously (Italy) to safeguard Kosovo’s Serb minority (about 5 • Budget $44.1 million percent of the population). The EU and OSCE (October 2007–September 2008) had previously operated in Kosovo under the • Strength as of Troops: 14,759 authority of UNMIK, the former dealing with 30 September 2008 economic issues and the latter dealing with human rights and institution building. While the Ahtisaari plan called for UNMIK’s dissolu- tion, it nonetheless allowed for a degree of con- tinuity in the international presence. OSCE Mission in Kosovo (OMIK)

• Authorization and 1 July 1999 (PC.DEC/305) Start Date Key Developments • Head of Mission Ambassador Tim Guldimann () Legal • Budget $46.0 million In the context of Kosovo’s unilateral declara- (October 2007–September 2008) tion of independence in February 2008, how- • Strength as of Civilian Staff: 177 ever, the Ahtisaari proposals have effectively 30 September 2008 offered an alternative basis for peace opera- tions to Resolution 1244. The Ahtisaari plan had no status in international law, but the bulk of its provisions were included in Kosovo’s themselves “status neutral,” implying that they constitution, ratified on 9 April. Following ear- could fulfill their duties without reference to lier EU planning assumptions, endorsed by the political claims of domestic actors. The Ahtisaari, that a transition from the UN would OSCE adopted this term in late 2007, prior to take four months, the Kosovar authorities de- the annual meeting of the OSCE Ministerial clared the constitution in force on 15 June. Council, while the UN did so in the days imme- All elements of the international commu- diately prior to independence. nity have had to navigate between what some By contrast, the International Civilian Rep- officials call the “two legal universes” of Res- resentative, Pieter Fieth, and his staff operate olution 1244 and the new constitution. The one solely on the consent of the Kosovar govern- exception to this was the EU pillar within ment. Fieth had been chosen for the post in 2007, UNMIK, which had dealt with economic mat- but did not arrive until after Kosovo’s independ- ters, whose work was already believed done in ence declaration. There was considerable public 2007. The closed its eco- speculation about the relationship between the nomic operations within UNMIK after the in- ICR and the UN’s Special Representative of the dependence declaration, with only limited con- Secretary-General (SRSG), then Joachim sultation from the UN. Rücker. While Fieth was initially thought to be The UN and OSCE, both requiring Russian taking a highly assertive stance, he adopted a (and in the OSCE’s case, Serbian) approval for more measured approach as the year progressed. their continued activities, continue to act on The existence of “two legal universes” the basis of Resolution 1244. Both declared posed particular problems for NATO and the 2009_CIC_3.qxd:Peacekeeping_FM_qxd.qxd 1/16/09 4:57 PM Page 76

76 • MISSION REVIEWS

still far from operational by the middle of the EU Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo (EULEX Kosovo) year, the EU and UN explored whether EULEX could be a “status neutral” actor, fulfilling the law and order aspects of Resolution 1244. • Authorization and 4 February 2008 (EU Council Joint Action There were serious complications as Start Date 2008/124/CSFP) • Head of Mission Yves de Kermabon (France) EULEX’s claim to status neutrality sat uneasily • Budget $133.6 million with its earlier purpose: fostering a Kosovar (February 2008–January 2009) state. Resolution 1244 explicitly states that the • Strength as of Police: 118 SRSG is the ultimate authority in Kosovo, but 30 September 2008 International Civilian Staff: 95 EU members did not want their personnel under a UN line of command answering directly to New York. Nonrecognizing states, concerned by the status of their personnel, wanted EULEX EU Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo (EULEX staff to enjoy the rights and immunities granted Kosovo). The overlapping membership of both to UN staff—as they could not accept any such organizations split over whether to recognize rights offered by the Kosovar government. But Kosovo. While only a few European states they did not want the UN to be able to revoke have not recognized Kosovo’s independence, these immunities. dissenters including (the fifth biggest Discussions of these problems progressed troop contributor to KFOR in early 2008) and slowly in the third quarter of 2008. By Septem- have complicated consensus-based ber, a working group of UNMIK and EULEX decisionmaking in Brussels. Even among rec- officials had been formed to address them. ognizing states, there have been divisions over However, officials doubted that a resolution how boldly to proceed. could be found unless the Serbian government For NATO, the question was whether its were to drop objections to EULEX taking re- presence should continue as KFOR, recognized sponsibilities from the UN. in Resolution 1244, or take on the expanded This reflected the extent to which maintain- remit envisaged by Ahtisaari for the IMP. ing a presence in Serb areas of Kosovo was es- While NATO’s immediate concern in the first sential to the international community’s credi- quarter of 2008 was security in north Kosovo, bility. In late November 2008, authorities from its French field commanders insisted that they both Kosovo and Serbia reluctantly agreed to a continue to act as KFOR. But the North Atlantic plan that would let EULEX officially begin its Council decided in June to mandate KFOR to operation. The compromise stipulated that the train a Kosovo Security Force, apparently to EU will take over the day-to-day administrative some surprise within the mission. While nonrec- activities, but UNMIK would retain overall au- ognizing states indicated that they would not par- thority. That they did so resulted from both an ticipate, planning was under way by fall 2008. improving security situation and compromises The role of EULEX was even more prob- by international officials. lematic because the mission was designed to operate closely with Kosovo’s new constitu- Security tional order, including not only police but also Kosovo was calm in the run-up to the February judges and prosecutors, as well as a border se- declaration of independence. There were fewer curity element. While it began to deploy in late incidents of political violence in the fall and February 2008, originally aiming to be opera- early winter of 2007 than in comparable seasons tional by the time Kosovo’s constitution came in earlier years. Nonetheless, almost all inter- into force, its lack of a clear legal basis and op- national officials assumed that the indepen- erational challenges led to speculation in Brus- dence announcement would stimulate intereth- sels that it might be dissolved. With the mission nic clashes. 2009_CIC_3.qxd:Peacekeeping_FM_qxd.qxd 1/16/09 4:57 PM Page 77

KOSOVO • 77

These had two possible centers of gravity. UNMIK and KFOR officials agreed that One was the enclaves scattered throughout UNMIK police should retake the courthouse, Kosovo that are home to about half its Serb pop- with KFOR in reserve. They seem not to have ulations. The other was north Kosovo, which consulted closely with French KFOR officers houses the other half and is contiguous with Ser- in the area or with the UNMIK office in Mitro- bia proper. The most likely flashpoint was Mitro- vica, possibly for fear of leaks. The decision vica, a town on the border of the north and site may have been motivated by reports of further of many past skirmishes. Serb provocations looming the following week. KFOR made a number of well-publicized The initial operation took place on 17 March troop rotations into north Kosovo while spon- 2008, and the courthouse was soon secured— soring an advertising campaign throughout the the Serb occupiers were briefly taken to Pris- province, underlining its friendly role. Its com- tina, although later released without charge. This manders stated that it would be ready for any was a particularly inflammatory gesture given eventuality, after NATO held an exercise in the that on 17 March 2004, KFOR and UNMIK Adriatic in 2007 to show its will. had failed to handle large-scale anti-Serb riot- In the event, Albanian violence against ing throughout Kosovo. A mob soon formed in Serb enclaves failed to materialize. This almost Mitrovica, although it was well armed enough certainly reflected efforts by the Kosovar au- to suggest premeditation. thorities to urge restraint, but opinion polls sug- In the violence that followed, a Ukrainian gested that there was little desire for violence in UNMIK policeman was mortally wounded and the Albanian community. UNMIK officials the French KFOR troops sent to relieve the found that the Serb enclaves exhibited a high courthouse sustained eighty casualties. The ad sense of personal security. hoc nature of the operation was highlighted by By contrast, the situation in north Kosovo the fact that UNMIK and KFOR did not have a deteriorated rapidly after independence was de- joint medical evacuation plan, and staff at a clared. Mobs destroyed customs checkpoints KFOR field hospital initially refused to admit between Kosovo and Serbia proper, and demon- police casualties, including Ukrainian police- strations in Kosovo won global press attention. men, while treating the French. It is probable that this violence was coordinated The head of UNMIK’s Mitrovica office of- by Serbian security services, also implicated in fered to resign in an e-mail on the “defeat,” an attack on the US embassy in Belgrade. which was soon reproduced in the Serbian By mid-March 2008, however, UNMIK press. His resignation was not accepted. SRSG and KFOR appeared close to losing control of Joachim Rücker (who was away during the op- the north completely. The Serbs made symbolic eration) and his deputy Larry Rosin (who had moves to affirm their authority there, such as been in charge) also tendered their resignations. reclaiming control of the railway in that region. Their resignations were accepted. Nonetheless, The international community’s response was there were no major acts of violence in north complicated by long-standing disagreements Kosovo thereafter, and there was a cooling of over how to treat the Serbs inhabiting the re- rhetoric from Belgrade. The episode may have gion between UNMIK’s headquarters in Pris- deterred all involved from further use of force. tina and its Mitrovica office. The closure of the courthouse impacted The situation escalated on 13 March when heavily on the Kosovo Serbs, as it was not re- Mitrovica’s courthouse was occupied by about opened and the day-to-day administration of fifty Serbs, apparently court staff from Yu- justice in the north effectively halted. Many goslav times. What followed is still open to dis- Serb-ethnicity had stopped work pute; a detailed UN report has not been circu- upon the declaration of independence (also a lated even to the Security Council. It appears problem in the enclaves), and while some pa- that over the weekend of 15–16 March, senior trols continued in the region, cases could not be 2009_CIC_3.qxd:Peacekeeping_FM_qxd.qxd 1/16/09 4:57 PM Page 78

78 • MISSION REVIEWS

Kosovo. Belgrade appears to have reined in the security services in north Kosovo, and moved to strip more radical figures in the area of vari- ous vested interests. Growing rumors that it might even agree to allow EU personnel to pa- trol Serb areas led to a wave of protests in the enclaves in October. October also saw a success for UNMIK, which was finally able to reopen the Mitrovica courthouse for urgent cases after extensive ne- gotiations with Belgrade on the issue. These were part of a wider program of talks designed by UNMIK to engage Serbia on practical mat- ters in the area, circumventing political diffi- culties. The talks took place in parallel with much broader negotiations between the EU and Serbia (also relatively detached from the EU REUTERS/Marko Djurica presence in Kosovo), and might have had less UN and NATO peacekeeping vehicles burn during clashes with Serb protesters in Mitrovica, Kosovo, 17 March 2008. chance in isolation. Nonetheless, many UN officials assumed through much of 2008 that they would have to taken for trial. While KFOR mounted a number continue to lead in relations with the Serbs in- of exercises there, the Kosovar authorities side Kosovo. Plans were drawn up for a resid- opened customs posts between the north and ual police presence of about 500 UN officers in Kosovo proper. the north after EULEX deployed. But these This legal limbo did not lead to chaos, per- were complicated by continuing questions over haps because of the influence of plainclothes EULEX’s deployment, arising not only from Serbian police and security officers, but organ- high-level tensions in the Security Council but ized criminals such as fuel racketeers bene- also from administrative hiccups. fited. UNMIK worked quietly to ensure that funds earmarked for the north were transferred. The Long Transition By the end of 2008, the estimated 6,000 Alba- The questions about EULEX’s base in interna- nians who live in the north had gone unmo- tional law overshadowed many planning as- lested, and had even enjoyed increased freedom sumptions about its arrival. Although the EU of movement—suggesting a gradual acceptance wished to distinguish itself from UNMIK— of the new reality by the Serbs. choosing to reemploy only a small number of The decisive factor in shaping events in UN international staff—it wanted to take over north Kosovo, however, was probably the elec- the mission’s headquarters, vehicles, and items tions held in Serbia proper in May 2008. Ini- such as computers. In taking on rule of law du- tially, these caused UNMIK embarrassment, as ties, it also needed to learn about existing cases it decided to permit polling in Serb areas, con- and challenges from the UN. travening Resolution 1244. But the elections With no Security Council mandate for the resulted, after prolonged coalition negotiations, EU, however, the extent to which the UN could in the formation of a liberal government more cooperate was unclear. In line with Ban Ki- deeply committed to working with the Euro- moon’s decision to reconfigure the mission, pean Union and the United States than had been UNMIK found ways to work with the EU, but its predecessor. The new government appointed personal relations were frequently poor. There a moderate from Mitrovica as its minister for was a feeling that EU staff saw their predecessors 2009_CIC_3.qxd:Peacekeeping_FM_qxd.qxd 1/16/09 4:57 PM Page 79

KOSOVO • 79

as jaded, while UNMIK saw their successors as operate under UNMIK authority provided some naive. clarity as to the EU’s role, the operation will Particular problems emerged around the only reach full strength by spring 2009. The transfer of property and vehicles and over ICR’s role remained troubled by the continued Kosovo’s courts. In the legal sector, tensions existence of the UN SRSG, although Joachim arose around the transfer of cases—including Rücker’s replacement, Lamberto Zannieri, ap- war crimes cases—from UN to EU supervision. pears to have reduced tensions. While UN judges and prosecutors had played The OSCE’s role also remains uncertain. In executive roles in the Kosovar system since early 2008, Serbia was positive about the 1999, their EU successors were meant to be ad- OSCE’s presence, presumably seeing it as an visers only. While waiting to take on this more advocate in Kosovo. But Belgrade has grown limited role, the European lawyers requested to more critical, perhaps because the organization see active files, leading to concerns on the UN has done little to slow the gradual emergence of side about breaching client confidentiality. a functioning Kosovar state. The OSCE also Issues such as this soured some UNMIK managed to irritate the Kosovar government by staff against its political leadership, which they releasing a detailed and highly critical report on saw as too ready to compromise with EULEX. governance and rule of law in the six months Consultation in the mission seems to have suf- after the independence declaration. Nonethe- fered. But all involved understood that the mis- less, its officials have also been quietly helpful, sion leadership was ultimately responsible for carrying messages between the Kosovo Serbs redefining the mission in a way that would sat- and other elements of the international system isfy Resolution 1244 while having little or no where direct contact has not been possible. operational identity (with the possible excep- KFOR perhaps has the most straightfor- tion of the north). In September 2008, an 80 ward future in the province, although it remains percent staff cut was announced, and senior of- to be seen whether it will transform into an IMP. ficials envisaged the emergence of an essen- After the peak of violence in March 2008, the tially political mission, rather than a peace- mission appears more confident in the security keeping one, in the medium term. situation: as of November 2008, it had 14,579 The responsibilities of this mission are troops in place, down from 16,000 the previous likely to include activities far removed from year. But the current lull in north Serbia is not blue helmets. One area in which UNMIK has al- guaranteed to last, especially if radical Serbs ready played a facilitating role is in regional and choose to defy the Belgrade moderates. international forums in which Kosovo cannot win recognition due to Serbian opposition (this includes regional stability and development ini- Conclusion tiatives). UNMIK officials now attend to “repre- While not as envisioned in the Ahtisaari plan, sent” Kosovo, but bring Kosovar representatives the transition from UN to EU day-to-day ad- in their team—allowing Kosovo to act more like ministration has taken place, and the main chal- a state despite its recognition difficulties. lenge in the coming year will be bringing the In the meantime, EULEX and the ICR’s staff EU operations up to their full capacity. But continued putting their missions together. While many in Kosovo believe that the imperfections EULEX still had fewer than 300 personnel by the of this transition had one lasting political effect fourth quarter of 2008, it appeared to be suffering in 2008: the Kosovar government enjoyed a internal tensions resulting from differences be- great deal of freedom. Kosovo has moved more tween the operational cultures of its police, rapidly to real statehood than it might have in judicial, and border security elements. While the case of a smoother transition. the compromise agreement to allow EULEX to