NATO's Air War for Kosovo: a Strategic and Operational Assessment
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The research reported here was sponsored by the United States Air Force under Contract F49642-01-C-0003. Further information may be obtained from the Strategic Planning Division, Directorate of Plans, Hq USAF. Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Lambeth, Benjamin S. NATO’s air war for Kosovo : a strategic and operational assessment / Benjamin S. Lambeth. p. cm. “MR-1365.” Includes bibliographical references. ISBN 0-8330-3050-7 1. Kosovo (Serbia)—History—Civil War, 1998—Aerial operations. 2. Operation Allied Force, 1999. I. Title. DR2087.5 .L36 2001 949.7103—dc21 2001048221 RAND is a nonprofit institution that helps improve policy and decisionmaking through research and analysis. RAND® is a registered trademark. RAND’s publications do not necessarily reflect the opinions or policies of its research sponsors. Cover design by Peter Soriano © Copyright 2001 RAND All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced in any form by any electronic or mechanical means (including photocopying, recording, or information storage and retrieval) without permission in writing from RAND. Published 2001 by RAND 1700 Main Street, P.O. Box 2138, Santa Monica, CA 90407-2138 1200 South Hayes Street, Arlington, VA 22202-5050 201 North Craig Street, Suite 102, Pittsburgh, PA 15213-1516 RAND URL: http://www.rand.org/ To order RAND documents or to obtain additional information, contact Distribution Services: Telephone: (310) 451-7002; Fax: (310) 451-6915; Email: [email protected] RAND MR1365-1.1 Nis l Raska Blace l l l K Sjenica L O Prokuplje P A l Zitorada O l N Doljevac I K l S l l Brestovac l Kursumlija A Novi Pazar N D S e r b i a Bojnik l Zˇ l l Tutin Leskovac A Lebane l K Kosovska l Montenegro l Podujevo Zubin Potok Mitrovica Medvedja Berane l l l Rozajˇ l Vucitrnˇ K l O Istok l S l Srbica O l l Poljance V G O l Djurakovac O L Pec Vitomirica J l A Kosovo Pristina K Klina Glogovac l Novo M l l Poljec Kosovska l Brdo l l E Kamenica Gracanica l Plav P l T l l O Janjevo Vranje l Decani Lapusnik Lipljan l o L N . A J L H B A E N l I Malisevo l I A l l N Junik J Gnjilane A Bujanovac L A P S Bajram l Orahovac l Curri l l Djakovica l Suva Reka Urosevac l Presevo Kosovo Vitina l Kacanik l C l Prizren R A L B A N I A N A Shalqin l l Blace G Kumanovol Kukes O R l A Dragas A l I N N A L Tetovol l P Brod Skopje R l A Kamenjane S Gostivar l MACEDONIA Titov l Veles Map of Kosovo PREFACE On March 24, 1999, NATO embarked on a 78-day air war aimed at compelling the government of Yugoslavia and its elected president, Slobodan Milosevic, to halt and reverse the human rights abuses that were being committed by armed Serbs against the ethnic Albanian majority living in Yugoslavia’s Serbian province of Kosovo. That ef- fort, called Operation Allied Force, ended on June 9 after Milosevic finally acceded to NATO’s demands and a withdrawal of Serb forces from Kosovo had begun. The air war was a first of that magnitude for NATO and represented the third largest strategic application of air power by the United States since World War II, exceeded only by the Vietnam War and Operation Desert Storm in scale and intensity. With a view toward capturing the many useful insights to be ex- tracted from that experience, the U.S. Air Force chief of staff, General Michael Ryan, asked Headquarters United States Air Forces in Europe (Hq USAFE) shortly after Allied Force ended to establish a studies and analysis office (USAFE/SA) to manage all USAF- sponsored assessments of the air war. The director of that office, Brigadier General John Corley, in turn asked RAND’s Project AIR FORCE to contribute to the assessment effort across a wide spectrum of topics, ranging from individual platform and systems performance to command and control, operational support, strategy and plan- ning, and other considerations bearing on the air war’s effectiveness. This book examines the conduct and results of Operation Allied Force at the strategic and operational levels. An earlier and less de- veloped version appeared as a chapter in the author’s previous book The Transformation of American Air Power, which was published by Cornell University Press in September 2000. The research docu- v vi NATO’s Air War for Kosovo: A Strategic and Operational Assessment mented herein was carried out in Project AIR FORCE’s Strategy and Doctrine Program and was completed in August 2001. All photographs included in this study were provided by the U.S. Department of Defense. The book should be of interest to USAF officers and other members of the U.S. national security community concerned with strategy and force employment issues raised by NATO’s air war for Kosovo and with the implications of that experience for force development, air power doctrine, and concepts of operations for joint and coalition warfare. Other documents published in this series currently include the fol- lowing: MR-1279-AF, Command and Control and Battle Management: Expe- riences from the Air War over Serbia, James E. Schneider, Myron Hura, Gary McLeod (Government publication; not releasable to the general public) MR-1326-AF, Aircraft Weapon Employment in Operation Allied Force, William Stanley, Carl Rhodes, Robert Uy, Sherrill Lingel (Government publication; not releasable to the general public) MR-1351-AF, The Conflict over Kosovo: Why Milosevic Decided to Settle When He Did, Stephen Hosmer MR-1391-AF, European Contributions to Operation Allied Force: Implications for Transatlantic Cooperation, John E. Peters, Stuart Johnson, Nora Bensahel, Timothy Liston, Traci Williams DB-332-AF, Aircraft Survivability in Operation Allied Force, William Stanley, Sherrill Lingel, Carl Rhodes, Jody Jacobs, Robert Uy (Government publication; not releasable to the general public) Topics examined in series documents nearing completion include: • Supporting Expeditionary Aerospace Forces: Lessons from the Air War Over Serbia • Lessons Learned from Operation Allied Force Tanker Operations Preface vii Project AIR FORCE Project AIR FORCE, a division of RAND, is the Air Force’s federally funded research and development center (FFRDC) for studies and analysis. It provides the USAF with independent analyses of policy alternatives affecting the deployment, employment, combat readi- ness, and support of current and future air and space forces. Re- search is performed in four programs: Aerospace Force Develop- ment; Manpower, Readiness, and Training; Resource Management; and Strategy and Doctrine. CONTENTS Frontispiece: Map of Kosovo Preface ................................................................................... v Figures .................................................................................... xi Summary ................................................................................ xiii Acknowledgments ................................................................... xxv Acronyms ............................................................................... xxix Chapter One INTRODUCTION .............................................................. 1 Chapter Two PRELUDE TO COMBAT ..................................................... 5 Chapter Three THE AIR WAR UNFOLDS ................................................... 17 Initial Attacks and Their Effects .......................................... 19 The Air War Bogs Down ..................................................... 25 NATO Finally Escalates ...................................................... 38 Facing the Need for a Ground Option ................................. 43 Countdown to Capitulation ............................................... 48 The Endgame .................................................................... 56 Chapter Four WHY MILOSEVIC GAVE UP WHEN HE DID ........................ 67 Considerations in Addition to the Bombing ........................ 69 The Prospect of a Ground Invasion .................................... 72 ix x NATO’s Air War for Kosovo: A Strategic and Operational Assessment Milosevic’s Probable Decision Calculus .............................. 77 The Determining Role of the Air War .................................. 82 Chapter Five ACCOMPLISHMENTS OF THE AIR WAR ............................ 87 The Combat Debut of the B-2 ............................................ 89 UAV Employment ............................................................. 94 The Contributions of Space ............................................... 97 Chapter Six FRICTION AND OPERATIONAL PROBLEMS ...................... 101 Frustrations with the SEAD Effort ....................................... 102 The F-117 Shootdown ....................................................... 116 Problems with Flexible Targeting ....................................... 120 Stray Weapons and the Loss of Innocents ........................... 136 The Chinese Embassy Bombing ......................................... 144 Task Force Hawk ............................................................... 147 Shortcomings in Intelligence Cycle Time ............................ 158 Airspace and Traffic Flow Management .............................. 161 Deficiencies with Respect to Space ..................................... 164 Interoperability Problems .................................................. 166 The Wages of U.S. Overcommitment .................................. 170 Chapter Seven LAPSES IN STRATEGY AND IMPLEMENTATION ................ 179 Allied Miscalculations and False Hopes .............................. 182 Problems at the Coalition Level .........................................