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1 (see Figure 1). the with relationship contractual of form have some not does that region in the country only the remains To date, priorities. main governmental the of one been NATO integration in 2008, independence country’s the policy. Since and defence security foreign independent its and implement develop to one last the is Kosovo countries, Balkan Western all the Of Introduction part of NATO’s programme. Peace for Partnership NATO’s of part are Herzegovina and Bosnia and whereas members, NATO are and , parties. more or two between agreement A contractual relationship refers to a signed asigned to refers relationship A contractual Kosovo’s future integration aspirations. Kosovo’s integration future for path asmoother create would which system, political its in reforming Kosovo aid could Alliance the interaction, this Through framework’. cooperation ‘enhanced the within cooperation deepening NATO consider could versa, Vice dialogue. a political establish to asking explicitly for by instance circumstances, current the under Alliance the to ties of strengthening ways create to try also should Kosovo system. democratic of its reforms necessary to commit already can Kosovo Nonetheless, repercussions. have political could change military major every where equation, military-political the of aware be to has unlikely. is NATO integration reached, is adeal and until term long in the for Kosovo challenge ultimate the is Dialogue Kosovo-Serbia The partner. future acredible as itself prepare to in order term, and medium short the in take could Kosovo that steps and military political possible delineate authors The organisations. international into integration further hampered has independence, Kosovo’s recognise not do and four NATO states member Serbia that fact The strengthened. and NATO be can Kosovo between ties how examines brief policy This How to Square the Circle? Kosovo’s NATO future 2020 DECEMBER 1 Rapprochements, such as as such Rapprochements, 2 institutions. security its complete to Kosovo for step final the be to this conceives Pristina as times, multiple agenda political the on been has transformation army. The anational into (KSF), Force Security Kosovo the forces, security 2018 its transform to in December voted Parliament Kosovo the changer, agame be would it Believing vain. programme for Peace Partnership for the application the between non-member states and NATO. and states non-member between of relationships institutional network consolidated A programme that focuses on establishing a establishing on focuses that A programme 2 in 2012, in far been have so

Kimberley Kruijver & Visar Xhambazi Policy Brief Clingendael Policy Brief

Figure 1 The Western and NATO relations

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While this decision was supported by the This policy brief analyses the various (US), NATO’s Secretary obstacles and opportunities for Kosovo to General expressed his strengthen its ties to NATO.5 The following concern and called the decision “ill-timed”.3 sections provide a brief history of NATO in The problem at the heart of it all revolves Kosovo, including the role of KFOR, and the around one central issue: the fact that after transformation of the KSF into a national Kosovo declared its independence, Serbia army.6 The subsequent part delineates and four NATO members did not recognise possible political and military steps that it.4 This enduring dispute is hampering Kosovo could take in the short and medium Kosovo’s further integration into NATO, term, in order to prepare itself as a credible or into other international forums for that future partner. Then, the authors analyse matter. A lack of normalisation with Serbia some ways in which NATO and Kosovo and the issue of non-recognisers have can strengthen ties under the current thrown up political as well as legal barriers circumstances. Finally, the policy brief ends to Kosovo’s relationship with the NATO- with conclusions and recommendations.7 led (KFOR) as well as with NATO itself, including its prospects for future membership.

The question arises whether an alternative to the current Kosovo-NATO relationship is feasible under these circumstances.

5 The research methodology is based on a mix of literature desk research and interviews conducted with experts, including researchers and (former) policy makers in the , Kosovo, the EU and NATO. Most of the interviews were held 3 NATO, Statement by the NATO Secretary General according to the Chatham House Rule, in which on the adoption of the laws on the transition of case the relevant footnotes will only broadly refer the , 14 December 2018. to the interviews. 4 Besides Serbia, five NATO (and EU) members 6 See Annex 1. for a timeline of the most important , , Romania and and events in the history of Kosovo in relation to NATO. non-NATO EU member belong to the 7 The authors are grateful to Jochem Vriesema for so-called non-recognisers of Kosovo. his valuable contributions to the research.

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KFOR: The main guarantor of (KSF). As the security environment improved, regional stability in 2009 the North (NAC) decided to redefine KFOR’s presence as a ‘deterrent presence’.10 Today, KFOR continues The Kosovo-NATO relationship began on to maintain a safe and secure environment 24 March 1999 with the launching of NATO in Kosovo11 and freedom of movement for all, Operation Allied Force, an eleven-week as stated in its original mandate.12 aerial campaign against the Federal (FR) of to halt the humanitarian The regional security relationship between catastrophe that was unfolding in Kosovo. Kosovo and Serbia still relies on a NATO The end of the war paved the way for UN presence. This argument is reinforced by Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1244 the continuing distrust of the Kosovo Serb which authorised an international civil population towards the KSF and Serbia’s and military presence in FR Yugoslavia, refusal to recognise the KSF.13 Kosovo the establishment of the United worry that the presence of the KSF in the Interim Administration in Kosovo (UNMIK) Serb populated areas can instil fear and and the deployment of KFOR.8 KFOR’s insecurity.14 Currently, KFOR is perceived original objectives were to deter renewed as the most important security mechanism hostilities, establish a secure environment in Kosovo, because it is accepted by all and ensure public safety and order, parties. Kosovo view KFOR as the demilitarise the Kosovo Liberation Army9, liberator of the country whereas the Kosovo support the international humanitarian Serbs and Serbia itself view the force as effort and coordinate with the international their main security guarantor that provides civil presence. In 2008, Kosovo unilaterally protection to the Serb community and acts declared its independence, which aggravated political tensions in the region, predominantly with Serbia. Kosovo’s declaration of independence represents a pivotal moment 10 From 2010, KFOR started to gradually reduce its in the relationship between Kosovo and force levels and adjust its concept of operations. NATO. The Alliance had to adjust to the ‘Deterrence presence’ is “a concept of operations new reality and initiated several measures whose main effort is based around small, accordingly: it started to gradually transfer regionally dispersed “liaison monitoring teams” duties such as border controls to Kosovo’s (LMTs) tasked to monitor the social, political and new security institutions. Moreover, NATO economic situation in the municipality that they are initiated capacity-building activities with responsible”. J. DeRosa, Strategic Defense Review the newly founded Kosovo Security Force of the Republic of Kosovo, GAP Policy Paper, 2013, p. 16. 11 Besides the security component, KFOR contributes, amongst other things, with community-based 8 Resolution 1244 demanded an immediate end activities including raising awareness against of violence and repression; demanded the gender-based violence, improving inter-ethnic withdrawal of Yugoslav military, and relations, helping disabled people, and assisting the paramilitary forces; encouraged all member states . More recently, during the COVID-19 and international organisations to contribute pandemic, KFOR has donated protection equipment economic reconstruction; encouraged the safe to aid local needs. return of refugees and internally displaced persons; 12 KFOR's mission is to: demanded full cooperation with the International • contribute to a safe and secure environment; Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia; • support and coordinate the international demanded the demilitarisation of the Kosovo humanitarian effort and civil presence; Liberation Army and other armed groups; decided • support the development of a stable, democratic, on an international civil and military presence multi-ethnic and peaceful Kosovo; under the UN. • support the development of the Kosovo Security OCHA Reliefweb, The development of Kosovo Force. institutions and the transition of authority from Allied Joint Force Command Napels, KFOR mission. UNMIK to local self-government – Serbia, 13 Anika Snel, ‘KFOR’s Continual Footprint’, Militaire 31 January 2003. Spectator, 27 May 2015. 9 The ethnic Albanian separatist militant group that 14 Die , ‘Thaci Vows to Ease Serb Fears About aimed for Kosovo’s independence from Serbia. Kosovo Army’, , 01 November 2017.

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as a safeguard of the Serbian-Orthodox required majority would also include two- cultural and religious sites in Kosovo.15 thirds of non-Albanian members, including As a result, any downgrading changes to the the Serb MPs. Therefore, regardless of KFOR mandate have the potential to disrupt the criticism to be expected from both the fragile balance of peace between Kosovo Serbia and international organisations, the and Serbia. Thus, unless Kosovo and Serbia proceeded with its come to terms, it is vital to the stability of plan b: enacting new legislation to create a the region that KFOR remains active as is national army (which would still be called the currently the case.16 However, for Kosovo, the KSF) and the Ministry of Defence. This led to relationship with KFOR, and thus with NATO, changes to the mission, mandate and powers seems to be a paradoxical one.17 On the one of the KSF, including territorial defence.19 hand, KFOR enforces closer cooperation The decision infuriated relations with Serbia between Kosovo and NATO, while on the and was criticised by the international other hand the very presence of KFOR limits community for being detrimental to the further steps in that relationship. Since EU-sponsored Serbia-Kosovo Dialogue to NATO is already present in Kosovo through better relations between the countries.20 KFOR, there is little incentive for the Alliance Even though the US hailed the decision to formalise relations as long as UNSCR as ‘historic’21, Jens Stoltenberg stated that 1244 remains intact and the Kosovo-Serbia “with the change of mandate, the North dispute remains an issue. Atlantic Council will now have to re-examine the level of NATO’s engagement with the Kosovo Security Force”.22 Discussions KSF transformation into a amongst Allies to this effect are however still national army ongoing and no further actions have been taken.23 Despite NATO’s political reaction, KFOR has been continuing to support the In December 2018, the government of KSF through capacity-building, education Kosovo pushed forward with the creation of and training coordination, making it the its national armed forces. NATO had made longest-lasting mission in the history of the clear that it would only support the plan if it Alliance.24 The most recent demonstration would be carried out through constitutional amendments, because in that way a double majority of the members of Parliament (MPs) would have to consent. The 19 On Kosovo Security Force, Official Gazette of the (EU) shared NATO’s view stating that “the Republic of Kosovo, No. 1, 04 January 2019. mandate of the KSF should only be changed 20 For the purpose of normalising relations between through an inclusive and gradual process Kosovo and Serbia and paving the way for EU in accordance with Kosovo ”, membership for both countries, the EU launched which was agreed upon by the parties a dialogue process in 2011. To date, Kosovo and Serbia have concluded a total of 33 agreements in involved in the , formally the . However, a considerable part thereof are Comprehensive Proposal for the Kosovo only partially implemented or not even implemented 18 Status Settlement (CSP). This would at all. Both parties have opposing views on the have been hard to accomplish since the definitive outcome of the dialogue and are still miles away from reaching a final settlement. European Parliament Think Tank, Serbia-Kosovo Relations: Confrontation or Normalisation?, 12 2019. 15 Information from interviews. 21 Fatos Bytyci, ‘Kosovo approves new army despite 16 Đorđević, Vladimir, ‘KFOR at 20: Expectations vs. Serb opposition, NATO criticism’, , Reality’, NATO at 70: Outline of the Alliance today 14 December 2018. and tomorrow, Special Edition of Panorama of 22 NATO, Statement by the NATO Secretary General Global Security Environment 2019, Strategic Policy on the adoption of the laws on the transition of Institute, p. 46. the Kosovo Security Force, 14 December 2018. 17 Information from interviews. 23 Interview with Piers Cazalet, NATO Deputy 18 European External Action Service, Statement by Spokesperson, 16 October 2020. the Spokesperson on the Kosovo Security Force, 24 The mission does not have a set end-date, since it 14 December 2018. is conditions based.

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of this trend is represented by the 2020 NATO members would even agree to the iteration of the NATO exercise called Silver participation of the KSF in anything more Sabre, which featured a prominent role than an exercise, it is nonetheless interesting performed by the KSF in both the planning to see where Kosovo stands in strict military- and execution phases.25 technical terms. One of the NATO criteria is namely that a country seeking membership NATO has now been present in Kosovo would have to demonstrate “the ability and for over 20 years. Through the widely willingness to make a military contribution held support of KFOR, the added military to NATO operations”.27 In line with the plans value is clear and crystallized. The political to transform the KSF into a regular army, dimension, which includes formalising the progressive increases of the defence budget relationship with NATO, has however proven that are proposed showcase Kosovo’s to be a challenging one for Kosovo. The commitment to seriously invest in its defence key obstacle is NATO’s neutrality approach sector (see Table 1). towards Pristina, since four of its members have not recognised Kosovo’s independence. Table 1 Kosovo defence budget28 This hurdle is too substantial, because it 2018 €52.3 million blocks any possibilities of NATO integration, € and must be overcome in due time. 2019 58.7 million 2020 €69.3 million 2021 €69.7 million planned The Political-Military Equation 2022 €74.4 million planned

It is clear that a successful outcome of the EU-facilitated Kosovo-Serbia Dialogue will Even so, significant military capabilities lessen the political and legal barriers for and capacities are still lacking. With the NATO integration. The question then arises if new mandate, the KSF aims to double its other steps can be taken in order to prepare troop strength from 2,500 active military for this essential moment. Can Kosovo work personnel and 800 reservists to 5,000 and towards becoming a credible potential 3,000 respectively.29 In absolute terms, this partner or member, by already fulfilling NATO is not of much value to NATO, the ’s criteria?26 The Serbia-Kosovo issue is the largest military alliance. Smaller countries ultimate political challenge in the long term, can however use their particular features in but what other opportunities might lie in relation to their geographic location, regional between? knowledge and specialised skills to benefit the Alliance.30 Based on the experience of Even though the political dimension the KSF in supporting the rescue efforts in significantly outweighs the military one, Albania after the earthquake in 2019, Kosovo and it remains the question whether can further develop its ‘niche’ capabilities in special missions capable of participating in international NATO and UN deployments.31 Since the KSF is trained 25 NATO, Silver Sabre – KFOR Exercise on Emergency Response Restarts, 10 October 2020. 26 Countries seeking NATO membership would have to be able to demonstrate that they have fulfilled 27 Ibid. the following requirements: 28 Information from an Interview with , • a functioning democratic political system based the Kosovo Minister of Defence, and Law On The on a market economy; Budget Appropriations Of The Republic Of Kosovo • the fair treatment of minority populations; For Year 2020, Official Gazette of the Republic of • a commitment to the peaceful resolution of Kosovo, March 2020. conflicts; 29 On Kosovo Security Force, Official Gazette of the • the ability and willingness to make a military Republic of Kosovo, No. 1, 4 January 2019, page 9. contribution to NATO operations; and 30 Brandon Burden, NATO’s Small States: Albania • a commitment to democratic civil-military as a Case Study, Naval Postgraduate School, relations and institutional structures. December 2016. NATO, Enlargement, 5 May 2020. 31 Information from interviews.

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by KFOR, there should not be significant Pristina.33 The new level of cooperation led to interoperability issues. Kosovo should enhanced communication, increased visits by however keep in mind that the process senior NATO officials and the participation of to strengthen its military capacities will KSF officials in NATO training programmes.34 probably leave several NATO Allies deeply Moreover, while it would not grant Kosovo uncomfortable, since it deviates from the access to the programmes leading up to a CSP proposal. NATO partnership or membership, the new agreement would allow Kosovo to apply for While there are still several opportunities grants for (research) projects through the for Kosovo to grow and contribute to the Public Diplomacy Division and the NATO Alliance in strict military-technical terms, the Science for Peace and Security Programme, political reality is and will remain the main as well as benefit from the Building Integrity stumbling block. It is at this point where the Programme. Whereas this was a good start current political-military equation, upheld to both more Kosovo-NATO interaction by UNSCR 1244, reaches its tipping point. and much needed reforms of Kosovo’s Every major military change that is carried democratic institutional structures, proof of out in Kosovo is watched with an eagle eye a continuation of such activities is hard to across the border. The willingness to come find. Therefore, for Pristina the ‘enhanced to a peaceful resolution of a ‘conflict’, or the interaction’ framework merely constituted a Dialogue, should be Kosovo’s first priority if tick of the political box, but it did not actually it sincerely wants to make efforts to prepare change much in bringing Kosovo closer to for future NATO integration. Stepping away the Alliance. In order to do that, Kosovo from the military opportunities: what can should undertake a proactive approach to Kosovo aim for politically in the short to deepen the cooperation possibilities within medium term? this framework.

NATO membership requirements include There are three political-institutional aspects a commitment to a functioning democratic which Kosovo should work on. First, Pristina political system and institutional structures. needs to reform its democratic system by, It is in this realm where Kosovo can amongst other things, respecting the rule demonstrate (a willingness to) progress, of law in order to meet NATO’s political without risking jeopardising the prospects standards. The NATO- relationship of the Kosovo-Serbia Dialogue. The lack of demonstrates that the Alliance demands progress between NATO and Kosovo is not progress on vital democratic issues, such only due to the Alliance, but also because of as combating corruption and judicial the inability of Kosovo’s institutions to make independence. In order to aid Ukraine headway. So far, there has only been one in implementing NATO principles and official request by the government of Kosovo standards, the Alliance uses the Annual in 2016 to strengthen ties to the Alliance: National Programme (ANP) as a tool to the introduction of ‘enhanced interaction’.32 support the transition. Through the ANP, During the deliberation of the NATO NATO Allies encourage Ukraine to push members on its response to the request, for serious reforms in order to strengthen Spain was said to be the most vocal in its democracy, the rule of law, human rights opposition to Kosovo. In 2017, the Alliance and a free market economy, as well as replied with a letter which encompassed transforming its defence and security less than the Kosovo government had hoped for. Instead of enhanced interaction through the NATO Brussels headquarters, it would be managed through KFOR and the NATO Advisory and Liaison Team (NALT) in 33 Vukašin Živković, ‘NATO perspective of Kosovo and ’, , 8 February 2019. 34 Research Institute of Development and European Affairs (RIDEA), The eventual membership of 32 NATO, Interview with Mr. John Manza, the NATO Kosovo to the Organization Deputy Assistant SG for Operation, 2017. (NATO): procedures and prospects, November 2019.

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sector.35 Pristina does not have to wait for that the KSF is a threat to Serb community such a formal process in cooperation with in Kosovo and the region’s stability. If this NATO, but can also use Ukraine as an approach would extend to KSF activities, example and work on critical democratic there also lie chances to contribute to reform issues itself. It is key that the Kosovo regional security. One such example institutions commit themselves to pursuing includes the Balkan Medical Task Force, comprehensive reforms aimed at boosting a cooperation format between Albania, good governance and the rule of law, for the Bosnia and Herzegovina, , benefit of all communities. Montenegro, Serbia and Slovenia, to enhance medical military cooperation in the region.37 Second, a well-functioning bureaucratic Especially right now, during the COVID- system is essential for Kosovo to participate 19 pandemic, this would be a practical in international organisations. At present, the suggestion for Kosovo to offer to contribute country lacks a proper qualified diplomatic in some way. corps and experts to expand its staff and facilitate discussions. The Kosovo-Serbia Dialogue drains most of Kosovo’s energy The Bumpy Road to NATO on foreign affairs and the aim to intensify relations with NATO seems to be put on the While Kosovo has multiple military and back burner. The same efforts that are put political-institutional opportunities to prepare into the development of the KSF would not itself for a future formal relationship with be wasted on other institutions such as the NATO, the question remains to what extent Ministry of Interior.36 Pristina could create a creative ways of strengthening ties to the NATO Working Group to get policymakers Alliance can be found under the current to start working on their aim to intensify circumstances. First and foremost, it is relations with the Alliance and its member fundamental that Kosovo demonstrates its states. Only then can more appropriate political willingness to enhance interaction interaction with NATO be initiated. In turn, with NATO. Even if it is not realistic in this would also contribute to Kosovo’s the short term, the Kosovo government security sector. could explicitly ask to establish a political dialogue. It would probably not immediately Kosovo could furthermore demonstrate its lead to a partnership programme, but at willingness to improve relations with its Serb least Kosovo’s intentions would be out minority, by offering Kosovo Serb personnel in the open and some form of political the opportunity to serve in the higher ranks interaction could take place. Right now, in the KSF, as happened with the police there is a missing link between the NATO force. In the long term, this could change headquarters and Pristina. Kosovo can try the attitude of the Kosovo Serb population to establish diplomatic relations by allowing towards the KSF and build more trust and its embassy in to reach out to respect within the force. At the same time, NATO headquarters as well as enhancing its the KSF must continue working closely with political relationships with NATO member NATO and welcoming their professional countries which do recognise Kosovo. assistance and training in conformity Countries such as the US, Turkey, Albania with the Alliance’s standards. This would and have already tried to break send an important message to especially the ice in the Kosovo-NATO relationship.38 Serbia that Kosovo’s security force is based By proactively seeking contact with Kosovo- on multiethnicity and professionalism, friendly nations, including also the United which could create incentives for more Kingdom, and , Kosovo engagement, as well as to dispel claims can attempt to strengthen its ties to NATO

35 NATO, Topic: Relations with Ukraine, 11 November 37 Balkan Medical Task Force, Balkan Medical Task 2020. Force History, 2016. 36 Information from interviews. 38 Information from interviews.

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members bilaterally, which in turn could b. Investing in its diplomatic corps influence the non-recognisers in the longer and establishing a NATO Working term. Group. Besides a commitment to good governance and the rule For NATO itself, engagement with Kosovo of law, it is key that the Kosovo through KFOR is still crucial to guarantee institutions pursue a well-functioning regional stability. As long as Kosovo makes bureaucratic system, since that is military adjustments, such as enhancing essential to participate in international its capabilities, this will still be subject organisations; to criticism as was the case with the c. Offering to make higher ranks in the introduction of new laws to create a national KSF available for personnel of Kosovo army. In the meantime, as a bridge towards Serb ethnicity. If this attitude would partnership programmes and the possible extend to KSF activities, there also future accession process, NATO could lie chances to contribute to regional consider deepening cooperation through security, including the Balkan Medical the ‘enhanced interaction framework’ from Task Force; their side as well. Through this interaction, d. Investing in ‘niche’ capabilities to aid the Alliance could aid Kosovo in reforming its international NATO missions, such political system and institutions. as in the area of search and rescue missions; e. Maintaining closer cooperation with Conclusions and KFOR through training programmes Recommendations and assistance and demonstrating its commitment to contribute by offering KSF troops to serve in international The complex geopolitical reality in which operations. Regardless the young state of Kosovo was born is of this, Kosovo should be aware of full of challenges that have been holding NATO members’ diverging positions it back from participating in international concerning the expansion of military organisations, such as NATO. The Kosovo- capabilities. Serbia Dialogue is the ultimate challenge 2. Kosovo should try to create ways of for Kosovo in the long term and until a deal strengthening ties to the Alliance is reached, NATO integration is unlikely. under the current circumstances. Pristina has to be aware of the military- To demonstrate its political willingness to political equation, where every major military enhance interaction with NATO, Pristina change could have political repercussions. could explicitly ask to establish a political Nonetheless this policy brief provides dialogue. This can be done by: three sets of guidelines on how to square a. Allowing the Kosovo embassy in the circle: Belgium to reach out to NATO headquarters; 1. In the meantime, Kosovo can work b. Enhancing political relationships towards becoming a credible potential with NATO member countries that NATO partner or member, by already recognise Kosovo. fulfilling necessary requirements. 3. NATO could consider deepening These include: cooperation within the ‘enhanced a. Committing to necessary reforms cooperation framework’, including the of its democratic system, including Building Integrity programme. Through strengthening its rule of law and this interaction, the Alliance could aid fighting corruption. By following the Kosovo in reforming its political system, example of the ANP process between institutions and rule of law as well as NATO and Ukraine, Kosovo can assess countering corruption. This would create which reforms are needed in order to a smoother path for Kosovo’s future meet NATO principles and standards. integration aspirations.

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Annex 1 Timeline of Kosovo-NATO relations

1999 NATO Intervention: NATO launches its air campaign against FR Yugoslavia. The war ends with the Treaty and the Yugoslav forces agreeing to withdraw. The Security Council adopts Resolution 1244 authorising the presence of the NATO-led international peacekeeping force known as the Kosovo Force (KFOR) and establishes the United Nations Interim Administration in Kosovo (UNMIK). 2004 Kosovo March Riots: led an onslaught against minority Serb, Roma and Ashkali communities, which is remembered as the largest ethnic violent incident since the end of the war. KFOR was criticised for its failure to protect. These protests were also anti-UNMIK, because people were increasingly concerned about the lack of Kosovo’s final status. 2007 Marti Ahtisaari Plan: The Ahtisaari Plan, or CSP, proposes supervised independence for Kosovo, which is immediately welcomed by Kosovo Albanians and rejected by Serbia. 2008 Kosovo’s Declaration of Independence: Kosovo declares independence and adopts its Constitution. 2010 International Court of Justice Decision on Kosovo’s declaration of independence: Declaration of independence is not in violation of either general principles of international law—which do not prohibit unilateral declarations of independence—nor of specific international law—in particular Resolution 1244—which does not define the final status process for Kosovo. 2011 EU-facilitated dialogue between Kosovo and Serbia: The start of a technical dialogue by the EU to normalise relations. 2012 Kosovo supervised independence ends: A 25- group (comprised of 23 EU member states, the US and Turkey) which has been monitoring Kosovo’s first few years of independence officially ends its role. 2013 Brussels Agreement: Kosovo and Serbia negotiate and conclude the “First Agreement of Principles Governing the Normalisation of Relations,” although not signed by either party. 2015 Stabilisation and Association Agreement: Kosovo signs its first contractual agreement with the EU. 2018 Kosovo army: Kosovo assembly passes three laws to transform its security forces into a national army. 2020 Kosovo-Serbia Economic Normalisation Deal: Kosovo and Serbia sign a pair of documents agreeing to normalise their economic ties and join the “Mini-Schengen” regional initiative. The documents are signed at the in the presence of the US President, .

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About the authors

Kimberley Kruijver is Junior Researcher at the Clingendael Security Unit. Her research concentrates on (European) security and defence issues, including the EU Common Security and Defence Policy, NATO and multilateral cooperation.

Visar Xhambazi is Policy Researcher at Democracy for Development (D4D) Institute. He specialises in US Foreign Policy, international organisations and the Western Balkans.

Supported by a grant from the Foundation Open Society Institute in cooperation with the OSIFE of the Open Society Foundations.