The Future of Civil Protection in North Kosovo

THE FUTURE OF CIVIL PROTECTION IN NORTH KOSOVO

Belgrade Centre for Security Policy The Future of Civil Protection in North Kosovo

Belgrade and Prishtina 2015 Publishers: Belgrade Centre for Security Policy Djure Jaksica, 6 11000 Belgrade Phone and Fax: +381 11 328 7226; 328 7334 Email: [email protected] Web: www.bezbednost.org and Kosovar Center for Security Studies Sylejman Vokshi, Block B, Entrance 2 10000 Prishtina Phone and Fax: +381 38 221 420 Email: [email protected] Web: www.qkss.org

Authors: Isidora Stakić and Maja Bjeloš [Belgrade Centre for Security Policy)

Editor: Florian Qehaja [Kosovar Center for Security Studies)

Research Assistant: Sofije Kryeziu [Kosovar Center for Security Studies) ISBN 978-86-6237-055-6

Proofreading: CIP - Каталогизација у публикацији - Народна Matthew White библиотека Србије, Београд

Design and layout: 355.58(497.115) Marko Marinković STAKIĆ, Isidora, 1983- The Future of Civil Protection in North Kosovo / [authors Isidora Stakić and Maja Bjeloš]. - Belgrade : Belgrade Centre for Security Policy ; Belgrade and Prishtina, 2015 Prishtina : Kosovar Center for Security Studies, 2015 Copyright © 2015 BCSP and KCSS (Belgrade : Unagraf). - 24 str. ; 30 cm

All rights reserved. No part of this Tiraž 300. - About authors: str. 24. - Napomene i bibli- publication may be reproduced, stored in a ografske reference retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form uz tekst. - Bibliografija: str. 20-23. or by any means, electronic, mechanical, ISBN 978-86-6237-055-6 photocopying, recording or otherwise, 1. Bjeloš, Maja, 1984- [аутор] without the prior written permission of the a) Цивилна заштита - Косово publishers. COBISS.SR-ID 214775308

This publication was produced in the framework of the project ‘Security Research Forum: Belgrade- PrishtinaTirana’ supported by the Government of the Kingdom of Norway. Research was supported by the Balkans Trust for Democracy’s Professional Work Exchange Program for Enhanced Policy Dialogue, with the support of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office of the United Kingdom. The views and analysis contained in this publication are those of the authors and do not necessarily represent the views of the Norwegian and UK governments or any of their affiliated organizations. CONTENTS

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS ...... 5

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ...... 6

RECOMMENDATIONS ...... 6

INTRODUCTION ...... 7

COMPARISON OF LEGAL POSITION OF CP IN SERBIA AND KOSOVO ...... 9

CIVIL PROTECTION UNITS IN NORTH KOSOVO ...... 10

CONFLICTING PERCEPTIONS OF CIVIL PROTECTION ...... 13

THE AGREEMENT ON INTEGRATION OF CP INTO KOSOVO’S INSTITUTIONS . . . 16

CONCLUSION ...... 20

BIBLIOGRAPHY ...... 21

ANNEX 1 . INTERVIEWS ...... 23 LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

APPK Employment Promotion Agency of Kosovo

CP Civil Protection

EMA Emergency Management Agency

EU European Union

EULEX European Union Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo

KFOR Kosovo Force

KP Kosovo Police

KSF Kosovo Security Force

MoI Ministry of Interior

RCB Radiological, chemical and biological

UNMIK United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo

UXO Unexploded ordnance 6

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY on Civil Protection reached on 26 March 2015 in the EU mediated dialogue between Prish- This paper presents an independent analysis tinë/Prishtina and Belgrade, CP units in North of the current state of the Civil Protection (CP) Kosovo are currently supported and financed units in the four municipalities which consti- by the Serbian government. tute North Kosovo, and suggests possible solutions for their future. This project has The CP Agreement provides for the integra- been developed jointly by two think tanks: tion of 483 CP personnel into Kosovo’s insti- the Belgrade Centre for Security Policy and tutions as well as providing for 50 positions the Kosovar Centre for Security Studies in to be paid for from contingency funds. It is Prishtinë/Prishtina.1 Civil Protection units in in line with the Kosovo government’s plan North Kosovo operate outside Kosovo’s legal for CP integration that it is envisaged that CP framework, despite the fact that the Brussels units will be integrated into Kosovo’s central Agreement implicitly envisages the dissolu- level institutions, and that their personnel tion of all parallel Serbian security structures will be dispersed among a number of govern- existing in Kosovo. While the Serbian com- mental bodies and agencies. However, the munity in North Kosovo sees CP as a civilian agreement also implies that 218 CP person- structure with the sole purpose of providing nel will remain jobless and without income. assistance to civilians in emergency situa- A number of challenges will need to be ad- tions, the Kosovo government, as well as the dressed in regards to the integration plan, international institutions which operate in including the inability of Kosovo’s institutions Kosovo, perceive CP as an illegal paramilitary to absorb entire CP units, the unwillingness structure that must be dissolved. of CP personnel to become part of Kosovo’s structures and the need to provide alterna- During their field research, carried out in tive sources of income for those who will re- February and March 2015, the authors found main jobless. Despite the fact that the official there to be 751 personnel of CP units, among plan for the integration of North Kosovo’s CP whom are a number of persons who lack the units has now been published,2 it remains security background necessary for protection largely unknown to the general public and CP and rescue tasks, while some personnel are staff, which might present additional- chal former military officers. Although the official lenges during its implementation. mandate of CP units in North Kosovo is to assist the civilian population in emergency situations, these units frequently perform other RECOMMENDATIONS tasks, such as road maintenance, bridge repairs, securing buildings, etc. Apart from the CP units, there is only one firefighting unit General recommendations: in North Kosovo, which operates as part of the Kosovo Emergency Management Agency • In order to increase the transparency of (EMA) and is composed of approximately 30 the process, both governments should firefighters. There are some indications that provide citizens with accurate and objec- individual members of CP units have occa- tive information on the specific stages of sionally been involved in political protests, the implementation process. as well as the suspicion that some of them • In order to enable substantial and mean- have been involved in political violence and ingful integration of CP units into Kos- organised crime. According to the Agreement ovo’s institutional system, both govern-

1 Names of cities and municipalities are written in accordance with the Kosovo Government’s ’Guidebook on the Implementarion of the Law on the use of languages’ 2 Agreement on Civil Protection, available at: (available at: http://www.komisioneri-ks.org/repository/ http://www.kryeministri-ks.net/repository/docs/Agree- docs/Udhezues_Eng_web.pdf). ment_on_CP_-_initialed_by_Kosovo_260315.pdf 7

ments must refrain from inflammatory municipalities should create an emer- and nationalist rhetoric. gency management body at either the departmental or sectoral level, and each Recommendations for Serbia: should possess a firefighting unit. • The Kosovo government, in cooperation • The Serbian government must stop fi- with the four North Kosovo municipali- nancing and supporting CP units, as per ties, should develop a re-employment Article 19 of the agreement reached on plan that can facilitate the transition to 26 March 2015. civilian life of those police officers and • The Serbian government should make le- CP personnel who are not integrated. It gal adjustments to allow CP structures to is important to ensure that CP personnel be dismantled and should adopt special who do not benefit from employment in government regulations for the retire- public institutions are provided with al- ment of CP staff which are not discrimi- ternatives in the private sector, in order natory in terms of limiting freedom of to obtain meaningful employment and movement, pension inheritance or other a regular income. In this context, provi- criteria for retirement (such as age, years sion by the Kosovo government of train- of service etc.). ing and loans for developing start-ups for • The Serbian government, as well as the small businesses, in cooperation with the North Kosovo municipalities, should co- business sector and especially interna- operate in criminal investigation of those tional donors, would be highly relevant CP personnel who are accused of crimes. for those who are not integrated into Ko- Prosecution of criminals is in the inter- sovo’s institutions. est of both the Serbian and Albanian communities. INTRODUCTION Recommendations for Kosovo: The current and future role of the CP units • Prior to the integration of CP units, a in the four North Kosovo municipalities is the thorough assessment of the profiles of subject of numerous controversies due to CP personnel should be conducted, in- the high sensitivity of the political situation cluding their educational background and in North Kosovo, as well as due to the lack skills, and additional training should be of transparency in the normalisation process provided where needed. between Prishtina and Belgrade. While Kos- • As Kosovo’s current budget does not ovo Serbs living south of the Ibar have been cover the cost of CP integration and the gradually integrated into Kosovo’s structures, wider engagement of the EMA in North the four northern Kosovo municipalities with Kosovo, the government should con- a Serb majority (North Mitrovica/Mitrovicë, duct a revision of the budget and provide Zvečan/Zveçan, Leposavić/Leposaviq and sustainable financing for emergency re- Zubin Potok/Zubin Potoku) until recently response units, aside from currently avail- mained legally and politically separate from able funds. the rest of Kosovo. The EU-mediated dia- • EMA units in North Kosovo (firefighting logue between Belgrade and Prishtinë/Prish- and rescue units) must be significantly tina which began in March 2011 has been strengthened, since one unit consist- primarily focused on North Kosovo and has ing of approximately 30 personnel is not aimed to find modalities for its integration sufficient to cover CP operations in the into Kosovo’s structures. whole of North Kosovo. • The largest proportion of CP personnel The agreement reached between the prime should be integrated into the Emergency ministers of Kosovo and Serbia on 19 April Management Agency. Each of the four 2013 in Brussels (the Brussels Agreement) 8

remained vague in regard to the integration able documents and literature and to explain of CP units into Kosovo’s security institutions. the existing mandate of CP and its future Unlike the reference to the dissolution of the prospects. Serbian Ministry of Interior’s police structures (Art. 7), there is no explicit reference to CP in This research is primarily based on data ob- the agreement, although it calls for the dis- tained through interviews which took place solution of all parallel security structures in between 9 February and 27 March 2015. North Kosovo. The role and function of CP is Researchers conducted 26 face-to-face in- subject to different interpretations and- po terviews with key stakeholders in Kosovo, litical narratives in Prishtinë/Prishtina, North including representatives of the Kosovo gov- Mitrovica/Mitrovicë and Belgrade. The man- ernment and the North Kosovo municipali- date of CP units is to provide assistance to ties, a senior CP officer and staff of interna- the civilian population in emergency situa- tional institutions and organisations operat- tions. In North Kosovo, however, CP remains ing in Kosovo, civil society organisations and one of the mechanisms which still operate the media. A list of interviewees can be found outside Kosovo’s legal framework and which at the end of this publication, while due to are not part of or subordinated to Kosovo’s the sensitivity of the topic and for the sake of civilian emergency system. Nevertheless, it their safety anonymity was provided to a few is expected that CP units will soon be trans- interviewees (the senior CP officer and- lo formed and gradually integrated into Ko- cal journalists). Additional evidence was col- sovo’s institutions in accordance with the lected through requests sent to the Serbian agreement reached on 26 March 2015, fol- Ministry of Interior (MoI) and the Government lowing the example of former Serbian police of Serbia’s Office for Kosovo and Metohija in structures which were integrated into the Ko- line with the Law on Freedom of Information. sovo Police (KP). While the MoI provided detailed answers to all the questions related to the functioning of This paper, therefore, aims to offer an analy- CP in general and in North Kosovo in particu- sis of the legal status, mandate and structure lar on 27 February 2015, the Office for - Kos of CP units in Serbia, as well as their unique ovo and Metohija replied only partially to the development in the four North Kosovo mu- questionnaire. Our research also included a nicipalities since 1999. This is contrasted review of political and legal documents, of- with legal and institutional developments in ficial reports compiled by international and Kosovo, in order to understand the potential local organisations and articles in the media. challenges of integrating CP units. Moreo- The major limitations of this approach in- ver, this research analyses the different per- clude the short time available for fieldwork, ceptions of the use of CP in Belgrade, North which lasted about a month, and the reluc- Mitrovica/Mitrovicë and Prishtinë/Prishtina tance of certain stakeholders relevant to the and how these perceptions might affect topic of CP to agree to be interviewed (e.g. the implementation of the recently reached representatives of the Prishtinë/Prishtina ne- agreement on integration of CP personnel gotiation team). into Kosovo’s institutions, as well as the risks of not providing alternative employment op- This research was possible due to a partner- portunities for those CP personnel who will ship between BCSP and KCSS that enabled not be integrated into Kosovo’s institutions. access to key stakeholders in Prishtinë/Prish- tina, North Mitrovica/Mitrovicë and Belgrade. As such, this research is an attempt to pro- It was conducted under the auspices of the vide an additional source of information, Security Research Forum Belgrade-Prishtina- prepared in a non-partisan manner by two Tirana, a regional three-year initiative sup- independent think-tanks from Belgrade and ported by the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Prishtinë/Prishtina. Our aim in carrying out Affairs aimed at enhancing dialogue on secu- this research is to fill the void in the avail- rity matters between academics, civil society 9

and the media on Serbian-Albanian relations. the national and district levels by the Minis- The fieldwork was conducted in late February try of Interior’s Sector for Emergency Man- and the first half of March 2015, as part of the agement, or by enterprises and other legal Balkan Trust for Democracy’s Professional persons that constitute a potential source of Work Exchange Program for Enhanced Policy threat of the wide territory according to the Dialogue. This programme is supported by Risk Assessment (Ibid.: Art 99). Specialised CP the United Kingdom Foreign and Common- units are composed of two types of person- wealth Office. nel: full-time employees and active reserves (MoI, 2013)3 and include fire protection units, water and underwater rescue units, units for COMPARISON OF LEGAL rescue in inaccessible terrains, first aid units, POSITION OF CP IN SERBIA AND unexploded ordnance (UXO) detection and KOSOVO destruction units, radiological, chemical and biological (RCB) protection units, units for Under the legal system of the Socialist Fed- protection and rescue from ruins, observation eral Republic of Yugoslavia, the function of units, alerting units, telecommunication units CP was part of the so-called ’total people’s and care and accommodation units (Law on defence and social self-protection’, a defence Emergency Situations, 2009: Art. 102). and military doctrine of former Yugoslavia which was grounded in the concepts of the In Kosovo’s legal system, civil defence is kept people’s army and socialist self-manage- separate from protection and rescue. While ment. This provided for every municipality the former is the responsibility of the KSF and self-contained entity to have specialised (previously the Kosovo Protection Corps), the staff responsible for individual and commu- latter is allocated to the Emergency Man- nity protection and rescue in case of disaster agement Agency (EMA), which operates as a or emergency (Wall et al., 2008: 7). After the part of the Ministry of Interior. In this system, breakup of Yugoslavia, this system was aban- emergency management is primarily the re- doned, and until 2009 CP was poorly regulat- sponsibility of the EMA, and more specifically ed, under the overlapping and competing ju- of the firefighting and rescue units that oper- risdictions of the Ministry of Defence and the ate on a local level but are directly subordi- Ministry of Interior (Milosavljević, 2010: 11). nated to the EMA. There are indications that With the adoption of the Law on Emergency Kosovo’s firefighting and rescue system will Situations on 29 December 2009, the func- soon be decentralised through amendments tion of CP was allocated to the jurisdiction of to the Law on Firefighting and Rescue which the Ministry of Interior, which contributed to will place firefighting and rescue units under the demilitarisation of CP. the direct control of municipalities (Fushtica, 24 February 2015; Demiri, 25 February 2015). According to the 2009 Serbian Law on Emer- The KSF is second-line responder in emergency Situations, the basic operational units gency situations – it reacts to large-scale of the protection and rescue system are CP emergencies or when invited by local author- units. They are divided into two distinct cate- ities to provide assistance (Law on the Kos- gories: general purpose units and specialised ovo Security Force, 2008: Art. 10). By com- units (Law on Emergency Situations, 2009: paring the protection and rescue systems of Art. 98). The law provides for general purpose Serbia and Kosovo, we may observe that the units to be established by local authorities, EMA is the counterpart to the Serbian Sector enterprises and other legal persons as pro- for Emergency Management, while Kosovo’s visional formations composed of volunteers, citizens and employees, for the purpose of carrying out simple tasks related to protec- 3 According to the 2013 Bylaw on Service in the Active tion and rescue (Ibid.: Art. 99). Specialised Reserve of the Specialised Units of Civil Protection, the units, on the other hand, are established at number of active reservists must not exceed 25 per cent of the total number specialised civil protection officers. 10

firefighting and rescue units conceptually Zveçan, Leposavić/Leposaviq and Zubin Po- correspond to Serbia’s specialised CP units. tok/Zubin Potoku are not subordinated to the Moreover, the Serbian Army and the KSF both Serbian MoI, in contravention of the stipula- have secondary responsibility in emergency tions of the Serbian Law on Emergency Situ- situations. ations for specialised units. According to the political representatives of the North Kosovo municipalities, these CP units remain under CIVIL PROTECTION UNITS IN municipal responsibility (Janković, 4 March NORTH KOSOVO 2015; Hodžić, 4 March 2015; Vulović, 12 March 2015). According to a senior CP officer interviewed on 5 March 2015, CP units in the North Ko- sovo municipalities were created in their Size and membership present form on 1 May 2006, during the government of Serbian PM Vojislav Koštunica. After they were established in 2006, CP units These units were created without consulta- in North Kosovo had around 500 full-time tion with the United Nations Interim Adminis- personnel, most of whom had some military tration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK), which was background and were trained for protection the primary governing actor in Kosovo in line and rescue tasks (senior CP officer, 2015). To with United Nations Security Council Reso- date, their number has increased to 751, after lution 1244. The units were established by new personnel were hired on three occasions and subordinated to the four North Kosovo – in 2008, 2013 and 2014 (Ibid). According to municipalities. At that time, CP in Serbia was North Mitrovica/Mitrovicë officials and senior regulated by the 1994 Law on Defence. This CP officers, the CP personnel employed since law stipulated that CP units could be formed 2008 have not passed basic military training, by state institutions, enterprises and other nor have they been trained for protection and legal persons, and did not differentiate -be rescue tasks. Many interviewees indicated tween specialised and general purpose units. that at least some were hired thanks to their Furthermore, Serbia’s 2002 Law on Local membership of the ruling political parties and Self-Governance, which was in force at the outside of normal procedures (Dimitrijević, 19 time, put municipalities in charge of organis- February 2015; Nešović, 4 March 2015; Krstić, ing protection from natural and other disas- 5 March 2015). According to a senior CP offic- ters, and of establishing bodies and services er (5 March 2015), a number of recruits later according to their needs. However, the 2009 attended firefighting and mountain rescue Law on Emergency Situations transferred CP training in Belgrade, however, they were not to the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Interior awarded formal certificates. and explicitly handed the Ministry of Interior’s Sector for Emergency Management respon- It is important to point out that there are also sibility for the formation and oversight of the CP units outside North Kosovo, geographi- specialised units, while municipalities were cally dispersed across several municipalities given a mandate to form general purpose south of the river Ibar. However, the person- units. The characteristics of the CP units in nel of these units were not discussed in the the North Kosovo municipalities corresponds Brussels negotiations, and consequently to those of specialised units – they are com- they will not be included in the integration posed of full-time employees who are ex- process. According to a CP officers estimate, pected to be organised, equipped and trained there are around 210 CP personnel south of to carry out complex tasks related to protec- the Ibar, located in Štrpce/Shtërpcë, Cen- tion and rescue. The Serbian Ministry of Inte- tral Kosovo (e.g. Lipjan/Lipljan, Gračanica/ rior’s (MoI) response to the BCSP Question- Graçanica etc.), Kamenicë/Kamenica, Shillo- naire (27 February 2015) states that the CP vë/Šilovo and Gjilan/Gnjilane. units in North Mitrovica/Mitrovicë, Zvečan/ 11

Some interviewees indicated that former northern municipalities, CP units are con- members of the ‘Bridgewatchers’ group tinuously engaged in observation and alert, are currently employed in CP units (Bjelica, firefighting, search and rescue operations, 2015; Dimitrijević, 2015; Bimbashi, 2015). The clearing snowdrifts during winter and other ‘Bridgewatchers’ group was founded after the activities that fall under the concept of CP. Kosovo war, and consisted of young men who During the floods in Serbia and Bosnia in May considered the group to be a security struc- 2014, CP personnel from North Kosovo par- ture with three functions: to prevent Albani- ticipated in protection and rescue operations ans from entering North Mitrovica/Mitrovicë, in several places in Serbia (e.g. Šabac and to gather information on KFOR and UNMIK Obrenovac). According to Stevan Pavićević, and to gather information on Albanians living a CP coordinator from North Kosovo, they in North Mitrovica/Mitrovicë (OSCE, 2003: 12). were invited by Serbian prime minister Ale- As a result of UNMIK’s limited capacities to ksandar Vučić, the MoI’s Sector for Emergen- take over law enforcement in North Kosovo, cy Situations and the government’s Office for the ‘Bridgewatchers’ performed some police Kosovo and Metohija (Tanjug, 16 May 2014). functions (e.g. arresting people) alongside Outside of emergency situations, CP units the Serbian police (Ibid.). However, later on sometimes perform community services they were perceived as also being involved which are generally not the responsibility of in criminal activities such as racketeering, CP, such as road maintenance, clearing the intimidation of local people who cooper- Ibar riverbed, bridge repairs, securing build- ated with UNMIK, smuggling, prostitution, ings, etc. (Hodžić, 4 March 2015; Janković, 4 etc. (ICG, 2002: 3). According to the OSCE March 2015; Vulović, 12 March 2015). Apart report, until 2003 the ‘Bridgewatchers’ were from the CP units, there is only one firefight- financed by the Serbian Ministry of Health ing unit in North Kosovo, which operates as a through the budget of the hospital in North part of the EMA and is composed of approxi- Mitrovica/Mitrovicë, after which date financ- mately 30 firefighters (Hodžić, 4 March 2015; ing from the Serbian government apparently Janković, 4 March 2015). According to officials stopped, while the International Crisis Group from the northern municipalities, CP cooper- (ICG) Report indicates that the ‘Bridgewatch- ates with this unit in emergency situations ers’ were financed by the Serbian Ministry of such as fires. There is an overlap between Interior and Security Service, in violation of the legal mandate of the CP units established United Nations Security Council Resolution in 2006 and that of the firefighting and res- 1244. Further research would be needed to cue unit which is part of Kosovos structures, verify the validity of the claim that CP units although as previously pointed out CP units absorbed the ‘Bridgewatchers’, meaning that are sometimes engaged in tasks which do the organisation continued to exist under a not fall under their legal mandate. However, different name (and with some new mem- given the size of the four North Kosovo mu- bership), as there are conflicting claims by nicipalities, with an area of around 1200 km², other interviewees who assert that CP was the EMA firefighting unit is not sufficient to not the successor of ‘Bridgewatchers’, i.e. provide adequate protection for the civilian that there is no continuity between the two population. For example, according to the es- organisations. timates of the northern municipalities, there were around 300 fires in North Kosovo in 2014 (Janković, 4 March 2015). Thus, CP units Mandate and activities provide public services which are currently not provided by Kosovo’s central institutions. CP units have a mandate to provide assistance to the civilian population of the North However, there are indications that CP units Kosovo municipalities in case of natural dis- are not only involved in civilian tasks, but also asters and other emergency situations. Ac- perform alternative security services, and cording to the political representatives of the thus are a political factor in North Kosovo, 12

with pronounced symbolic leverage. In 2011, equipment, including rescue boats, obser- after the Kosovo Police special unit (ROSU) vation and alert equipment, radio transmit- attempted to take control of the northern ters etc. (senior CP officer, 2015). According border crossings, CP personnel were involved to some interviewees from the northern mu- in setting up roadblocks and took part in vio- nicipalities, the equipment of CP units was lent clashes with the Kosovo Police and KFOR significantly strengthened and their visibility (Bimbashi, 27 February 2015; see also: Akter, increased during the mandate of Aleksandar 2013). They are seen by the Kosovo authori- Vulin as director of the Office for Kosovo. ties and the international community as the Among the equipment they were provided foot soldiers of political protests in the north with were uniforms bearing the internation- and perpetrators of political violence, not only al civil protection sign and three ‘Lada Niva’ against political opponents, but also against off-road vehicles per municipality (12 in total). Kosovo Albanians and international organi- Promotional billboards for CP units were also sations. One interviewee also alleged that put up in North Mitrovica/Mitrovicë. Since some CP personnel are connected to organ- Serbian government spending is not trans- ised crime and involved in criminal activities parent, it is very difficult to follow the flow of such as smuggling (Bimbashi, 27 February money from central government to the local 2015) and that there is evidence against them level. Thus, it is unclear how much money the in Kosovo Prosecutor’s Office (Dimitrijević, 11 four municipalities have received from Serbia February 2015; Bimbashi, 27 February 2015). for equipping CP units, increasing their vis- Despite plenty of speculation, no CP employ- ibility and paying their salaries. ee has so far been prosecuted. According to our interview with Fisnik Rexhepi (10 March One of the most controversial aspects of the 2015), with the integration of former Serbian CP units in North Kosovo is connected to al- police officers into the Kosovo Police in line legations that they are armed formations. with the Brussels Agreement, CP took over According to our interview with Fisnik Rex- some police functions in the northern mu- hepi (10 March 2015), Kosovo government of- nicipalities (e.g. patrolling), something which ficials claim that they have presented the EU is unacceptable for the Kosovo authorities. mediators in Brussels with evidence that the There are also suspicions that CP is involved CP units are armed and equipped as a para- in intelligence work. military formation and thus that they represent a security threat and a threat to Kos- ovo’s constitutional order (Rexhepi, 10 March Financing and equipment 2015). Kosovo officials claim that they have presented the EU mediators for the Brussels The CP units in the four North Kosovo mu- dialogue with sufficient evidence to prove the nicipalities are currently funded by the Ser- paramilitary character of the CP units (Ibid.). bian government from municipal budgets However, Serbs from North Kosovo deny that (Janković, 4 March 2015; Hodžić, 4 March the CP units are armed or that they have a 2015; Vulović, 12 March 2015). They are there- military organisational structure. According fore controlled by and subordinated to mu- to the Agreement on CP Integration signed nicipal authorities, and thus indirectly to the on 26 March 2015, the Serbian government Serbian government, although the Serbian has provided written confirmation that the MoI as well as the Office for Kosovo officially CP and its personnel are not in possession of deny that they control the CP units in North any weapons (Art. 18). Previous research on Kosovo.4 CP units are equipped with rescue small arms and light weapons in Kosovo has shown that a large number of Kosovo’s citizens are in possession of illegal arms (Kha- kee and Florquin, 2003: 11; UNDP Kosovo, 4 Official response from the Serbian Government’s Office for Kosovo to BCSP questionnaire, 23 February 2011: 1) and it is not surprising if some CP per- 2015, and official response from the Serbian MoI to BCSP sonnel are in possession of such weapons. questionnaire, 27 February 2015. 13

According to the Kosovo media, Serbian of- between Belgrade and Prishtinë/Prishtina ficial Krstimir Pantić has stated that CP units was signed on 26 March 2015. The agreement should be armed and prepared to protect was published on the website of the Office of the Serbian population of North Kosovo (Tel- the Prime Minister of Kosovo, but at the time egrafi, 14 February 2013). Nonetheless, there of going to press its content is still unknown is no proof that CP units as such have been to the wider public. trained or equipped as a military formation. According to a Kosovo government official, For the time being, in line with the divergent the most important and urgent issue is the interpretations of and political discourse on dissolution of the CP units and their integra- the mandate and purpose of CP in Prishtinë/ tion into Kosovo’s structures (Rexhepi, 10 Prishtina, North Mitrovica/Mitrovicë and Bel- March 2015). The problem of illegal arms is grade, there are different visions of whether broader than the issue of CP, and will be dealt and how CP units should be integrated into with in the next few years.5 Thus, part of the Kosovo’s institutions. Agreement on CP Integration stipulates that if the Kosovo government is able to provide CP is perceived by Kosovo’s government to be credible evidence that CP units are in posses- an illegal parallel security structure, the ‘ex- sion of official weapons, they will inform the tended arm of Belgrade in Kosovo’, a paramil- EU facilitator, and EULEX and the Kosovo Po- itary formation, an NGO, the successor to the lice will conduct joint search operations with- so-called ‘Bridgewatchers’ etc. Following the out prior notification (Art. 18). example of the integration of the police, the majority of interviewees agree that it is only a matter of time before CP units are disbanded CONFLICTING PERCEPTIONS OF and their personnel integrated into Kosovo’s CIVIL PROTECTION institutions. However, it is not possible to talk about disbanding CP and its personnel, but Civil protection has been a political issue be- rather about transforming the organisation tween Belgrade and Prishtinë/Prishtina for and its mandate (Nikola, 26 February 2015). years, but since the First Agreement of Prin- In this regard, a parallel has been drawn with ciples Governing the Normalization of Rela- the transformation of the Kosovo Protection tions (hereinafter: the Brussels Agreement) Corps (KPC) into the KSF, due to the fact that was reached between the prime ministers of a large number of KPC personnel were inte- Serbia and Kosovo on 19 April 2013, it became grated into the KSF, which continued to per- a legal obligation, because both sides are form civil protection tasks. Kosovo applied now committed to implementing in practice pressure for implementation of the agree- what they agreed. Due to the vagueness of ment to be speeded up and for CP premises the text of the Brussels Agreement, Article 8 to be closed, insisting that the Serbian gov- of which envisages dissolution of all parallel ernment undertake legal adjustments to dis- security structures in North Kosovo without mantle CP structures in Kosovo and present specifying CP units, the authorities in Bel- the EU with official proof that salaries had grade and Prishtinë/Prishtina are trying to fill been stopped and all financial support to CP in the blanks in the agreement and facilitate ended and the regulations necessary to im- its implementation. Vagueness leaves room plement this adopted (Kosovo Government for creativity and consensus, but often leads Report, 2015: 12). to differing interpretations, misunderstand- ings and difficulties in agreeing on specific For some representatives of international in- matters. Nevertheless, the agreement on CP stitutions it is not civil protection itself, but rather its current mandate and organisation that presents a problem. CP, therefore, must

5 According to Kosovo Government officials, the Law be dismantled, redefined, reorganised and on Voluntary Surrender of Illegal Arms is currently being reoriented towards exclusively civilian tasks. drafted. 14

The EU supports the dismantling of CP, but sent the interests of Serbian community and the impression is that it often holds the role to make decisions about their future. Deci- of facilitator and avoids responsibility for im- sion-making about the future of CP is left to plementing agreements. It is also perceived Belgrade’ (Nikola, 26 February 2015). Restor- that the EU is not very interested in solving ing stable relations between Kosovo and Ser- the challenges of implementation in the field, bia has been made more difficult by the fail- as long as everything is agreed ‘on paper’. ure of high-level dialogue between the coun- Furthermore, KFOR has all the necessary in- tries to provide opportunities for civil soci- formation about the situation on the ground, ety and communities to voice their concerns but does not consider CP to be a threat to the (Saferworld, 2015). Poor communication and security environment.6 a lack of transparency by the negotiating parties have led to differing interpretations Some of the Serbian interviewees from North and expectations of the impact the Brussels Mitrovica/Mitrovicë emphasised that the es- Agreement will have, as well as heightened tablishment of the Association of Serbian mistrust and tension between people (ibid). Municipalities (ASM) is a higher priority than According to a North Mitrovica/Mitrovicë CP, and that this issue is to be resolved first journalist interviewed for this research, ‘poli- at the political level. Serbian interviewees ticians in Belgrade have given up on the Ser- subsequently pointed out that the ASM can bian community in Kosovo but do not have serve as the institutional framework for in- the courage to say so, and information is tegrating CP units. However, representatives given to citizens in North Kosovo in a piece- of the Albanian community and some of the meal manner. Police integration is proof that Serbian representatives from North Kosovo everything can be done, even though police do not share the opinion that the ASM should officers were initially opposed to integration. represent the institutional framework for in- People change their minds, especially when tegrating CP units. This is not possible in par- they are under pressure, blackmailed or if you ticular as the agreement on CP integration give them money.’ Bearing this in mind, there has been reached prior to the establishment is a strong impression that all resistance to of the ASM. The bottom line is that Prishtinë/ integration will be crushed. Moreover, during Prishtina is demanding that CP be resolved their research in North Kosovo the authors of first and the ASM established only once this this report noticed that people were reluctant has been done, because the ASM apparently to talk about this and other related topics, as may require constitutional amendments and they were afraid. thus is legally and politically more compli- cated than CP, while Belgrade insisted on the Political leaders in North Kosovo state that reverse order. Civil Protection has a negative image, which it acquired when it was first formed, but that Civil society representatives in Kosovo, espe- it is an exaggeration to claim that it is a par- cially in the North, have the strong impres- amilitary organisation. CP has a poor repu- sion that all the agreements resulting from tation due to various past abuses, both by the Brussels dialogue represent only the vi- politicians and criminal structures. While the sion of the elites, i.e. the two prime ministers original purpose of CP was to protect the citi- and the EU mediator, while civil society from zens of North Kosovo from potential violence both communities has been left out. ‘Every- by Albanian extremists, the primary function thing that is happening or should happen in of CP is now the protection of people and the North will happen first in Brussels or Bel- assets. The opinion of local Serbian political grade and Prishtinë/Prishtina. Civil society, leaders is that while any CP personnel who unfortunately, lost the legitimacy to repre- are criminals should be prosecuted, neither all CP personnel nor the entire population of North Kosovo should suffer the negative con- 6 Official response from KFOR to the BCSP questionnaire, 18 March 2015 15

sequences of the abolition of CP (Hodžić, 4 March 2015).

According to politicians from North Kosovo, this issue, like many others, represents the domain of high politics and their opinion is mostly not taken into consideration by the governments of Serbia and Kosovo. It is important, therefore, to amplify their voices and concerns. Representatives of the Serbian municipalities want CP to remain under their jurisdiction, with its current mandate – to serve as a protection and rescue organisation during natural disasters and other civil emergencies. According to them, CP units are not oversized considering the volume of work that falls under their mandate in the four North Kosovo municipalities. Representatives of the Serbian municipalities claim that the firefighting and rescue unit which operates in North Mitrovica/Mitrovicë and is subordinated to EMA is not sufficient to provide civil protection, which at the moment appears to be an accurate assessment considering the current size of the unit. Furthermore, municipal officials insist that specialisation among CP personnel is necessary, as is the conse- quent additional training for various profiles such as divers, mountain rescuers, etc. This vision of CP units under municipal jurisdiction remains problematic, as according to the laws of both Serbia and Kosovo, permanent (specialised) emergency response units are subordinated to central institutions, more specifically the Serbian MoI’s Sector for Emergency Situations and the Kosovo MoI’s Emergency Management Agency. Although, according to the Kosovo Law on Local Self Government, Kosovo municipalities are responsible for local emergency response, the law does not explicitly envisage that they are permitted to form permanent CP units. More- over, the Law on Firefighting and Rescue (Art. 4) stipulates that municipalities are responsible only for establishing and managing voluntary rescue units. Therefore, the personnel of CP units – with their current mandate and responsibilities – will not be able to remain under municipal competence. 16

Chart 1

EMA 80 Kosovo correctional services 25 Religious and Cultural Heritage Unknown future 20 218 Unknown institution 358

Contingency Fund 50 Total 483

THE AGREEMENT ON ted a list of 751 CP personnel to be integrat- INTEGRATION OF CP INTO ed into Kosovo’s institutions (Art. 1). A four- KOSOVO’S INSTITUTIONS member panel (with two representatives of Kosovo’s institutions, one representative of the former Civil Protection and one EU rep- The agreement on the integration of CP units resentative) will be established on 27 April into Kosovo’s institutions was adopted on 26 2015 and will select individual candidates for March 2015, within the framework of Brussels specific positions in accordance with their dialogue. The agreement is publicly available education and professional experience (Art. on the website of the Office of the Prime Min- 5). Only those CP personnel who are in pos- ister of Kosovo, but at the time of writing it is session of a valid Kosovo ID will be eligible still unknown to the wider public. The agree- for integration (Art. 3), while a security check ment is based on the Kosovo government’s of CP personnel will be performed by the Ko- plan and lists specific obligations for both sovo Police and EULEX (Art. 13). The agree- Prishtinë/Prishtina and Belgrade. Prishtinë/ ment states that the panel will conclude its Prishtina promised to find 483 jobs within work by 14 August 2015, and all employment Kosovo’s institutions for CP personnel, and contracts will be signed by 1 September 2015 50 positions on contingency funds, while Bel- (Art. 7). The agreement also stipulates the grade will be obliged to cease financing CP removal of CP observation points and the units in North Kosovo. The integration proce- handing over of all CP premises and equip- dure will be based on the same principles as ment, which will continue to be used by Kos- the integration of former Serbian police offic- ovo’s institutions (Art. 12–18). ers into the Kosovo Police. Belgrade submit- The number of jobs provided by the Kosovo government for former CP personnel according to the CP Agreement reached in March 2015 is smaller than was promised in the Ko- sovo government’s report to the EU on the progress of implementation of the Brussels agreements (2015: 13). The plan promised 17

550 positions in total, of whom 400 persons community into Kosovo’s society – by having were to be integrated into various Kosovo representatives at the central level, Kosovo civil institutions, while 50 were to be put on a Serbs will more easily accept Kosovo’s gov- waiting list to be gradually integrated within ernment institutions as their own. According three years while being paid from the Con- to Kosovo officials, if CP units remain under tingency Fund.7 Up to 100 people were to be the exclusive jurisdiction of municipalities, employed through projects funded by the segregation would be deepened and the po- Development Fund8 (ibid). The procedures tential for future conflicts would increase. The for integration were to be in accordance with integration of CP personnel into the KSF was Kosovo’s Law on Civil Servants. On the other another option for the Kosovo government, hand, the CP Agreement states that the Ko- but the Serbian government and local lead- sovo government is offering 483 positions ers were reluctant to accept this idea. How- in North Kosovo, while there will be 50 posi- ever, there are indications that an agreement tions paid for from contingency funds, mean- on CP integration into the KSF has also been ing that these individuals will receive salaries reached (Sadiku, 27 March 2015). It is impor- but their final workplaces in the public sector tant to note that the Kosovo government’s will be determined within three years (Art. 1). plan stipulates that the personnel of CP units Of the 483 positions in North Kosovo, only will remain physically in their municipalities 125 are specified in the agreement – 80 in but will become administratively tied to cen- the EMA, 25 in the Kosovo Correctional Serv- tral institutions. As CP units in North Kosovo ices and 20 positions related to religious and are seen by Prishtinë/Prishtina as paramili- cultural heritage. This formulation leaves the tary organisations and as a security threat, question of which Kosovo institution will ac- it is crucial for the Kosovo government that commodate the remaining 358 CP personnel they are not integrated as a unit, but are de- unanswered. Bearing in mind the procedure ployed across various institutions (Ibid.). This agreed for the selection of potential employ- would primarily eliminate the symbolic power ees among current CP staff (Art. 2–10), this that CP represents – the presence of Serbian number might increase as some CP person- security structures on the territory of Kosovo. nel may fail to satisfy the agreed conditions. However, the Kosovo government’s plan may If the CP Agreement is fully implemented, 218 face some challenges. current CP personnel will remain without employment and income. Retirement and/or re-employment Two essential elements of the Kosovo government’s plan were reflected in the CP Since the governments of neither Serbia Agreement. The first is that CP units will be nor Kosovo shared their vision and plans for integrated into Kosovo’s central level institu- the future integration of CP with those who tions, while the second is that their person- would be directly affected, CP employees nel will be dispersed across a number of gov- have developed their own interpretations ernmental bodies and agencies. According and rumours based on fear and lack of infor- to Kosovo government representatives, in- mation. It is perceived by CP personnel that tegration of the personnel of Serbia’s paral- the Kosovo government’s plan, as reported in lel structures into central institutions is cru- the media, does not provide permanent and cial for the integration of the whole Serbian sustainable employment for CP personnel, but only temporary transitional solutions. This is contrary to Edita Tahiri’s statement to 7 A Contingency Fund will be created for the purpose of the media that everyone will have a job and integrating CP units into Kosovo’s institutions. The plan is to raise 10 million euros over a period of three years. that all personnel of the parallel structures in 8 The Development Fund was created on 17 January North Kosovo will be integrated into Kosovo’s 2013 according to the agreement on customs collection. It is funded from taxes collected at the Jarinje and Brnjak institutions. CP personnel are concerned that border crossings. The resources available to the fund cur- the integration of CP into Kosovo’s legal and rently amount to 5 million euros. 18

institutional system is only temporary, and they are not given real jobs they will still be that they will be flushed out of the system able to act as a parallel security structure. sooner or later. For example, it is possible that some CP personnel who join the Kosovo Therefore, the process of dissolving CP units Security Forces (KSF) will later be found to and integrating them into Kosovo’s institu- have failed to meet certain criteria (such as tions should be followed by an additional age) and professional standards, once physi- retirement plan and/or re-employment pro- cal and psychological checks are carried out. gramme. So far, there are no indications that This would lead to their retirement, leaving the governments of Kosovo or Serbia have them once again outside the institutions and developed any such programmes. As the CP with only a minimum pension. In this manner, Agreement does not provide for the employ- both governments will ‘wash their hands’ of ment of all 751 personnel of CP units in North them. This concern partly stems from the ex- Kosovo, a programme must be implemented perience of the integration of Serbian police by the four municipalities or the Kosovo au- officers on the payroll of the Serbian Minis- thorities with support from the international try of Interior into the Kosovo Police, in which community that will provide for the future some Serbian MoI employees who had ap- re-employment of those CP personnel who plied did not meet all the requirements, and remain outside Kosovo’s central institutions. some of those who did not receive security clearance were left out of the system (Bjeloš The current estimation is that there are 88 and Elek, 2014: 5). Because of this, guarantees CP personnel in North Kosovo who should are needed that part of CP will be integrated be retired, as well as around 115 who do not into KSF, while a demobilisation programme fulfil the legal criteria for integration due to that offers dignified and credible job alterna- the fact that they do not hold Kosovo citizen- tives for those who do not satisfy the criteria ship (Kosovo Government Report, 2015: 13). for recruitment should be established. It should be borne in mind that CP also operates south of the Ibar, and that more than If some CP personnel are left out of the sys- 200 CP personnel are currently receiving sal- tem, new problems may arise, such as in- aries for performing CP tasks. It is most likely creased potential for social and political un- that these individuals will share the fate of rest in North Kosovo. Second, the integration former MoI employees, since the Brussels of CP into Kosovo’s structures will require the Agreement is exclusively related to North Ko- revision of Kosovo’s budget, as the current sovo, thus omitting everyone else from the budget does not envisage the cost of this integration process. It is important to ensure transformation. Another problem that is likely that these CP personnel are offered support to arise is the refusal of CP personnel to inte- to obtain meaningful employment with a reg- grate into central level institutions, due to the ular income which will enable them to pro- official position of the Serbian side regard- vide for themselves and their families. ing Kosovo’s statehood. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, it is crucial that employ- According to the Kosovo government’s report ment is found for CP personnel that will en- (2015: 12–13), the Serbian government has able them to be actively involved in Kosovo’s promised to undertake legal adjustments for institutions. If they are merely paid salaries, the dismantlement of CP structures in Kos- it will solve the socio-economic dimension ovo similar to those made in the case of po- of the problem, but the political dimension lice integration. If the Serbian government will remain. Since CP employees will remain proposes a lex specialis or adopts a special physically in the northern municipalities, if government regulation for the retirement of CP personnel, it should not be discriminatory in terms of limiting freedom of movement, pension inheritance or other criteria for retirement (such as age, years of service etc.). 19

A re-employment programme for those CP well as supporting them in seeking alterna- personnel who will not benefit from employ- tive livelihoods. In this context, training and ment in public institutions should provide loans for developing small business start- other alternatives in the private sector, simi- ups would be highly relevant. CP personnel larly to the programme developed for demo- should be supported in conducting market bilisation of former employees of the Kosovo research in order to validate, assess and de- Protection Corps (KPC)9 or the Serbian Armed velop their ideas or business plans, as well Forces.10 This could also be beneficial for en- as their commercial potential. Unfortunately, suring the success of the implementation of such a re-employment programme has still the Prishtina-Belgrade Agreement regarding not been developed for police officers south CP. However, the Kosovo government does of the Ibar, who were forcefully retired in 2013 not currently have a budget for integration and left without any prospects for employ- of CP, and therefore a re-employment pro- ment in the police systems of either Serbia or gramme is not foreseen for 2015. This kind of Kosovo (Bjeloš and Elek, 2014: 12). Moreover, programme should therefore be supported they have been left without a plan that could by donations from the international com- facilitate their transition to civilian life. munity, and designed in partnership with the four North Kosovo municipalities and the There is also an option for some CP person- Prishtinë/Prishtina authorities. An agree- nel to be integrated into municipal structures ment between the relevant parties could en- that do not deal with CP. According to Kos- courage donors to cooperate with the Kos- ovo’s Law on Local Self Government, munici- ovo government and also with CP personnel palities are responsible for a wide range of in North Kosovo in developing and running a services including: urban and rural planning; project aimed at reintegrating CP personnel land use and development; implementation who will not be integrated into Kosovo gov- of building regulations and building control ernment institutions. standards; local environmental protection; provision and maintenance of public parks Prior to the implementation of such a project, and spaces; tourism; cultural and leisure ac- an assessment should be carried out of the tivities etc. (Art.17). If CP personnel are inte- current composition of CP, in terms of both grated into municipal structures, the function numbers and skill sets. This would serve of response and rescue in emergency situa- as the basis for developing the programme tions would be entirely transferred to the and for budget projection. Using the best EMA firefighting and rescue units. As there practices from the KPC reintegration pro- is currently only one such unit manned with gramme, two things could be also applied 30 staff covering the four northern munici- in this case. First, a severance payment dis- palities, citizens of North Kosovo would not bursed monthly would act to provide an eco- have enough support in emergency situa- nomic safety net and facilitate the transition tions. Another problem with this solution is to civilian life. Second, a set of customised that, according to representatives of Serbian services could be delivered by the Employ- municipalities, CP personnel are not qualified ment Promotion Agency of Kosovo (APPK), for administrative positions. However, there whose staff’s expertise in the employment are positions under municipal jurisdiction and vocational training sectors could help CP that are not administrative and which could personnel to enhance their employability as provide employment for some CP personnel.

The dissolution of CP will be a complex task 9 This project was implemented by UNDP Kosovo be- but, for the prospects of the long-term sta- tween 2009 and 2011. Around 1300 former KPC employees were included in this re-employment programme. bility of Kosovo, an extremely important 10 PRISMA programme, available at: https://www.bicc. one. For this reason, facilitating the release de/uploads/tx_bicctools/brief31_serbian.pdf http://www.mod.gov.rs/sadrzaj.php?id_ of former CP personnel into their communi- sadrzaja=6291http://www.kombeg.org.rs/aktivnosti/ko- ties is of the greatest importance. Moreover, mora/Komora.aspx?veza=1324 20

the re-employment programme can contrib- CONCLUSION ute to reducing the inherent risks, including those of a security, social, economic, political Civil Protection in North Kosovo has been and practical nature. the subject of political negotiations between Belgrade and Prishtinë/Prishtina since 2013, but agreement has recently been reached on the integration of these units into Kosovo’s legal and institutional system. In spite of this, the future of CP units in Kosovo’s northern municipalities is still uncertain, as there are divergent interpretations of the modalities of implementation. Bearing in mind that this, like many other processes, is an elite driven process, the pace of implementation and its outcome will largely depend on the political will of the governments of both Serbia and Kosovo. One thing is certain – both sides will have to make compromises and accept that the optimal solution for the CP issue will most probably not be the ideal one for any of the stakeholders involved. However, the fact that Serbian police officers have been integrated into the KP gives some hope that the CP issue will be dealt with in the same manner. Nevertheless, the following differences between police and CP integration have to be taken into consideration at this early stage of implementation of the agreement. While Ser- bian police officers remained in the same job, the majority of CP personnel will be transferred to positions that are not related to CP, which will require that they undergo additional training. In the process of dissolving CP units from North Kosovo and reintegrating their personnel, it is crucial to take into account human security concerns in the four northern Kosovo municipalities and ensure that enough resources – human, financial and material – are allocated to the function of protection and rescue in emergency situations. Last but not least, a re-employment programme should be agreed and supported as matter of priority for all police officers and CP personnel from both south and north of the Ibar who were left jobless after the dissolution of their previous institutions. 21

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• Branislav Krstić, Independent Journalist in Mitrovica/Mitrovicë, March 5 2015 • Veroljub Matić, MA in Security, in Mitro- vica, March 5 2015 • Shpresa Mulliqi, OSCE Mission in Kosovo, in Prishtinë/Prishtina, February 27, 2015 • Branislav Nešović, NGO Aktiv, in Mitrovi- ca/Mitrovicë, March 4 2015 • Ferdinand Nikola, Saferworld, in Prish- tinë/Prishtina, February 26 2015 • Anton Quni, Member of Kosovo Assem- bly, Committee on Internal Affairs, Secu- rity and Supervision of KSF, in Prishtinë/ Prishtina, February 24 2015 • Fisnik Rexhepi, Senior Political Advi- sor, Ministry of European Integration, in Prishtinë/Prishtina, March 10 2015 • Valdet Sadiku, Liaison Officer in Belgrade, in Belgrade, March 27 2015 • Damian Sedar, Political Advisor on Dia- logue Implementation, EU Office in Kos- ovo/EU Special Representative, in Prish- tinë/Prishtina, March 2 2015 • Nexhmedin Spahiu, Director of Radio Mitrovica, in Mitrovica/Mitrovicë, March 4 2015 • Afërdita Syla, Executive Director, Com- munity Building Mitrovica, in Mitrovica/ Mitrovicë, March 4 2015 • Stefan Vulović, Mayor of Zubin Potok/ Zubin Potoku, in Zvečan/Zveçan, March 12 2015 • Interview with senior CP officer, in Mitro- vica/Mitrovicë, March 5 2015 • Interviews with representatives of KFOR, in Prishtinë/Prishtina, March 11 2015 • Interviews with journalists from Kosovo Sever Portal (KoSSev.info), in Mitrovica/ Mitrovicë, March 5 201 25

ABOUT AUTHORS ABOUT ORGANISATIONS

Maja BJELOŠ graduated in International Studies KOSOVO CENTRE FOR SECURITY STUDIES from the Faculty of Political Sciences, University (KCSS) in Belgrade, where she also completed a Master’s Kosovo programme in International Security. Since 2009 she has worked as a researcher at the BCSP. She The Kosovar Center for Security Studies (KCSS) specialises in gender and security sector reform in is a non-governmental and non-profit think tank Serbia, but she has also researched and published established in 2008 with the main aim of devel- largely on security issues, such as Republic of Ser- oping research studies in the security sector. bia security policy, European security and security KCSS conducts research and organizes confer- sector reform in Serbia. She co-edits the Gender ences and seminars in the related fields of se- and Security Newsletter. curity policy, rule of law, justice, and monitoring of the security sector. KCSS activities contribute Isidora STAKIĆ acquired Bachelor’s degree in in- to strengthening the principles of democratic ternational relations at the Faculty of Political oversight of security institutions in the Republic Sciences, University of Belgrade, and Master’s of Kosovo. degree in human rights at an Erasmus Mundus programme in collaboration of three universities BELGRADE CENTRE FOR SECURITY POLICY from the UK, Sweden and Norway. Isidora joined (BCSP) the BCSP in 2012, and she currently works there Serbia as a researcher associate. Her research interests include: regional security and interethnic relations in the Western Balkans region, right-wing extrem- The Belgrade Centre for Security Policy (BCSP) is ism, minority rights, as well as gender perspective an independent think tank founded in 1997 to pub- on security. licly advocate national and human security based on democracy and respect for human rights. The BCSP works towards consolidation of security sector reform (SSR) and security integration of West- ern Balkan states into the Euro-Atlantic community by creating an inclusive and knowledge-based security policy environment. It achieves these goals through research, public advocacy, education, bringing together relevant stakeholders and creation of networking opportunities.

ABOUT PROJECT

The Security Research Forum is a joint project of three independent think tanks from Belgrade (BCSP), Prishtina (KCSS) and Tirana (IDM) specialized in research of security issues. The Security Research Forum is meant to foster balanced debate among think-tank community, academia, public policy and media in order to provide research-based alternative solutions to ongoing challenges of cooperation among Serbia, Kos- ovo and Albania. POLICE INTEGRATION IN NORTH KOSOVO: PROGRESS AND REMAINING CHALLENGES IN IMPLEMENTATION OF THE BRUSSELS AGREEMENT

Belgrade Centre for Security Policy