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Kosovo, Nato, and Strategic Bombing

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Kosovo, Nato, and Strategic Bombing The Lessons and Non-Lessons of the Air and Missile Campaign in Kosovo Anthony H. Cordesman Arleigh A. Burke Chair in Strategy Revised August, 2000 Copyright Anthony H. Cordesman, all rights reserved. The Air and Missile Campaign in Kosovo 9/17/03 Page ii Table of Contents I. THE LESSONS AND NON-LESSONS OF THE NATO AIR AND MISSILE CAMPAIGN IN KOSOVO .1 II. THE HISTORICAL BACKGROUND: THE COURSE AND CHARACTER OF THE NATO CAMPAIGN .....................................................................................................................................................................................3 BOSNIA AND THE DAYTON ACCORDS BECOME THE PRELUDE TO WAR IN KOSOVO................................................. 4 THE DIPLOMATIC PRELUDE ..................................................................................................................................... 6 PEACE TALKS END IN WAR ................................................................................................................................... 13 Serbia’s Grand Strategic and Tactical Mistakes .............................................................................................13 NATO’s Blundering into Large-Scale War ......................................................................................................14 OPERATION ALLIED FORCE: THE AIR AND MISSILE CAMPAIGN ............................................................................. 16 The Phases and Non-Phases of the Air and Missile Campaign .......................................................................17 The Road to Escalation....................................................................................................................................19 Expanding the Target Base and Scale of Military Action................................................................................20 NATO’s Changing Objectives..........................................................................................................................23 NATO Moves Towards Decisive Force ............................................................................................................24 Ending the Air and Missile Campaign .............................................................................................................25 Why Serbia Conceded ......................................................................................................................................26 Estimates of the Overall Impact of the Air and Missile Campaign..................................................................27 INCREASES IN NATO FORCES AND LEVELS OF EFFORT......................................................................................... 30 NATO Naval Forces.........................................................................................................................................30 NATO Aircraft Numbers...................................................................................................................................31 Sortie Rates and Intensity ................................................................................................................................36 RELIANCE AND NON-RELIANCE ON PRECISION GUIDED WEAPONS........................................................................ 41 Analysis by Farce: The Imprecise Nature of Precision Engagement..............................................................................41 British and French Use of Precision and Non-Precision Weapons ................................................................................43 The Limits of Precision Weapons and Precision Engagement.......................................................................................43 WEATHER .............................................................................................................................................................. 43 NATO’S LIMITED LOSSES ..................................................................................................................................... 48 CONFLICT TERMINATION ....................................................................................................................................... 48 III. THE GRAND STRATEGIC ASPECTS OF KOSOVO: THE “WHYS” AND “HOWS” OF THE WAR AND THE IMPLICATIONS FOR STRATEGY AND FORCE PLANNING....................................................54 THE “WHYS” OF GOING TO WAR........................................................................................................................... 54 A Lack of Criteria for Deciding on Military Action.........................................................................................54 The Dilemmas in Deciding on Peacemaking ...................................................................................................57 THE “HOWS” OF GOING TO WAR ........................................................................................................................... 59 COALITION WARFARE AND LEVELS OF COMMITMENT ........................................................................................... 60 The Contributions of the US and Europe.........................................................................................................60 Problems in Coalition Warfare: National Decision Making and the Air War.................................................63 Problems in Coalition Warfare: National Decision Making and the Incident at Pristina...............................66 Unity of Command versus Unity of Coalition ..................................................................................................66 Lessons for the NATO Alliance ........................................................................................................................68 US STRATEGY, FORCE PLANNING, AND DEFENSE SPENDING................................................................................. 69 Major Theater War (MTW) Operation Plans...................................................................................................69 Problems in US Defense Spending and Readiness...........................................................................................71 Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Jay L. Johnson .....................................................................................................73 Commandant of the Marine Corps, Charles C. Krulak .................................................................................................73 Chief of Staff of the Air Force, General Michael E. Ryan .............................................................................................74 The Force Drawdown Imposed By Kosovo......................................................................................................75 Copyright Anthony H. Cordesman, all rights reserved. The Air and Missile Campaign in Kosovo 9/17/03 Page iii Being the World’s Only Superpower Without Paying for the Power...............................................................75 IV. THE STRATEGIC IMPACT AND MILITARY EFFECTIVENESS OF THE AIR AND MISSILE CAMPAIGN.............................................................................................................................................................78 THE SPECIAL CONDITIONS OF THE WAR IN KOSOVO.............................................................................................. 78 MORE THAN AIR POWER LED TO NATO’S VICTORY ............................................................................................. 78 THE RELEVANCE OF KOSOVO TO OTHER WARS .................................................................................................... 81 ROB PETER TO PRAISE PAUL?................................................................................................................................ 82 STRATEGIC LIMITS ON IMPACT OF AIR POWER IN KOSOVO: LESSONS FOR THE FUTURE? ...................................... 83 “SHOCK AND AWE” OR “LIMITS AND RESTRAINT”................................................................................................. 85 V. THE PROBLEM OF “PERFECT” AND “BLOODLESS” WAR..................................................................89 THE ABSURDITY OF PERFECTION........................................................................................................................... 89 “BLOODLESS WAR”: THE PROBLEM OF SUFFERING NO OR MINIMAL CASUALTIES................................................ 91 Casualties and Staying at Medium to High Altitudes.......................................................................................92 Overall Sensitivity to Casualties ......................................................................................................................93 THE PROBLEM OF COLLATERAL DAMAGE ............................................................................................................. 94 The Chinese Embassy Bombing .......................................................................................................................96 The Real World Problems in Targeting in Wartime.......................................................................................................96 The Results of the US Investigation into the Bombing................................................................................................100 The CIA Accepts the Blame.........................................................................................................................................105
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