198J. M. Thornton Phd.Pdf

Kent Academic Repository Full text document (pdf) Citation for published version Thornton, Joanna Margaret (2015) Government Media Policy during the Falklands War. Doctor of Philosophy (PhD) thesis, University of Kent. DOI Link to record in KAR https://kar.kent.ac.uk/50411/ Document Version UNSPECIFIED Copyright & reuse Content in the Kent Academic Repository is made available for research purposes. Unless otherwise stated all content is protected by copyright and in the absence of an open licence (eg Creative Commons), permissions for further reuse of content should be sought from the publisher, author or other copyright holder. Versions of research The version in the Kent Academic Repository may differ from the final published version. Users are advised to check http://kar.kent.ac.uk for the status of the paper. Users should always cite the published version of record. Enquiries For any further enquiries regarding the licence status of this document, please contact: [email protected] If you believe this document infringes copyright then please contact the KAR admin team with the take-down information provided at http://kar.kent.ac.uk/contact.html Government Media Policy during the Falklands War A thesis presented by Joanna Margaret Thornton to the School of History, University of Kent In partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in the subject of History University of Kent Canterbury, Kent January 2015 ©Joanna Thornton All rights reserved 2015 Abstract This study addresses Government media policy throughout the Falklands War of 1982. It considers the effectiveness, and charts the development of, Falklands-related public relations’ policy by departments including, but not limited to, the Ministry of Defence (MoD). The literature of the 1980s concerning the media during the conflict still dominates the historiography of the subject. This thesis is the first significant reappraisal of the work offered during the decade in which the war occurred. It is informed by recently released archive material and newly conducted interviews, and boasts an extensive analysis of the content of the printed press during the conflict. There are a number of central hypotheses contained in this research (as well as many lesser theories). This thesis argues that media policy observed by the MoD in relation to the Task Force journalists was ill-prepared, reactionary, driven by internal MoD motivation and that ultimately, control of policy was devolved to the men on the ground. This thesis advances that MoD media policy in Britain, while as reactive as that rolled out to the Task Force, became more effective as the war progressed. The MoD failed to adequately cater for the British media until the middle of May 1982, at which time a number of sensible and potentially successful initiatives were introduced – specifically the News Release Group and the Military Briefing Group. It is also the contention of this work that the machinery developed centrally, by the Cabinet Office and No.10 Press Office in the form of the South Atlantic Presentation Unit and Information Group, had the potential to be successful additions to the regular organisation of Government. However, neither had enough authority and were plagued by departmental rivalries. While the media-related initiatives of the MoD ultimately became more successful, those of wider Government became less effective. Finally, this thesis provides a serious analysis of the printed press in order to substantiate the hypothesis that much of what had been argued about the printed press was generalised and oversimplified – its reliance on Argentine source material, its jingoistic nature, the dominance of reports on armed conflict and its aversion to a diplomatic settlement. Dedicated to my parents i Acknowledgements My gratitude is owed to countless people who have made my research possible. First, I would like to recognise that this research was facilitated by a School of History scholarship from the University of Kent. I would like to extend my appreciation to the staff of Collindale Newspaper Library (as was), who were patient, helpful and a great source of support over the days – and weeks – I spent there. The staff of the National Archives at Kew, and William Spencer in particular, were accommodating and informative – as ever. The support of Simon Marsh, Chief Information Officer at the MoD, and John Reynolds, of DBS Records, in accessing documents not yet available to the National Archives was greatly valued. I would also like to acknowledge the assistance of: the Hermes Association, what feels like the entire membership of the South Atlantic Medal Association, the National Union of Journalists, Kent’s own library staff, Paul Riley of Hermes and all the veterans who contacted me on social media to give me their thoughts on my research – positive and negative (the majority of which were too rude to commit to print). I would like to thank those people - veterans, journalists, politicians, civil servants, PR gurus and members of the armed forces - who spent their valuable time speaking with me (whether they have been attributed or not). I am privileged to have met so many interesting, honourable and inspiring people, and to have been permitted an insight into their personal memories. My special thanks to those who not only allowed me to quiz them personally, but who made such an effort to put me in touch with others they thought might aid my research: Admiral Sir Jonathon Band, Rear Admiral Jeremy Sanders, Lieutenant- Commander Lawrie Phillips and Captain Michael Clapp. Without the assistance of two particularly wonderful gentlemen, much of the interview material used in this thesis would not have been available. Uncle Nick Butler and Barry Bryant were tenacious in their pursuit of prominent Falklands’ vets and their efforts are very much appreciated. ii My primary supervisor, Professor Mark Connelly, has been a constant source of encouragement. His unshakable faith in my abilities has, from first we met, driven me to work harder and to a higher standard. My thanks also to Professor David Welch, my secondary supervisor, who has, along with Mark, endured my flowery language and tendency to over-write with patience. My father-(not)-in-law, Peter Smith, contributed his time to transcribing a proportion of the interviews I performed - for which I am indebted. A continuous support was my partner, Greg Smith MSc, BEng, AMInstP (theoretical physicist extraordinaire and the future genius behind the solution to the Riemann hypothesis). He has kept me sane, read my work, listened to papers and presentations and watched countless Prezis. He has wiped my tears when I felt near to failure, reassured me when I doubted myself and celebrated with me when I experienced the excitement of discovery. He is my sunshine. This PhD is dedicated to my parents. They have taught me the value of hard work and dedication. My mother has suffered my whinging, whining and screaming – and not just over the past three years. She is the most caring, loving and dedicated cheerleader. Without her enduring strength to draw from and her ceaseless love to take comfort in, I may have surrendered to this thesis. My father has spent more hours than either of us would care to note reading my work, highlighting grammatical mistakes (very few), evaluating the structure and amending details. As a former journalist, this is an emotive subject for him, yet he has disregarded his own feelings and discussed with me the positives of my work and the drawbacks of some of my opinions. Without my father, his love and his efforts, I would be not only a poorer person, but my thesis would be a poorer thing. iii Contents Acknowledgements ii Contents iv List of Tables ix List of Figures x Abbreviations xii Note on Citations xiv Chapter One 1 Introduction 1. Literature Review 2 1a. General Texts 3 1b. The Literature of the Media and the Falklands War 4 1b (i). Media-Focused Texts of the 1980s 4 1b (ii). Media-Focused Texts since the 1980s 8 1b (iii). First-Hand Accounts 10 1c. The Wider Academia of the Media 11 2. Project Outline 14 2a. Rationale for Study 16 2b. Research Questions 17 2c. Main Research Focus and Hypotheses 17 3. Sources and Methodologies 18 3a. Archival Research 18 3b. Government Reports 21 3c. Interviews 21 3d. Falklands’ ‘Footage’ 24 3d (i). Falklands’ ‘Footage’: Content Analysis 25 4. Conclusion 26 iv Chapter Two 28 Initial Policy 1. The Machinery of MoDPR 29 1a. The 1977 Plan 29 1b. Ian McDonald 31 1c. Control of MoDPR 32 1d. Understanding the Media 35 2. Initial Policy 38 2a. Communication 39 2b. Censorship 41 2c. The Ascension Option 46 3. Conclusion 48 Chapter Three 51 The MoD and PR Policy in the South Atlantic 1. Control of Policy 52 2. PR Policy and the Task Force: Incident Reporting 53 2a. MoD Credibility 54 2b. Incident Reporting from the Falklands 56 2b (i). Incident Reporting: The ‘Sheffield’ and the ‘Belgrano’ 59 2b (ii). Incident Reporting: the Effect of the ‘Sheffield’ and the 61 ‘Belgrano’ 2b (iii). Incident Reporting: the ‘Narwhal’ 63 2b (iv). Incident Reporting: Reviewing Policy 65 3. Censorship Policy and the Task Force 70 3a. Censorship: Guidelines 71 3a (i). Censorship: the ‘Sheffield’ 74 3a (ii). Censorship: the ‘Minders’ 76 3a (iii). Censorship: ‘London’ Policy 78 3a (iv). Censorship: the Military ‘Minders’ 80 3b. Policy and the Landings 89 3c. Censorship Twice Over 91 4. Conclusion 98 Chapter Four 100 MoD Public Relations Policy in Britain 1. The Foreign and Commonwealth Office and Public Relations 102 1a. Co-ordination between the FCO and MoD 108 2. MoD Facilities: Briefings 110 2a. MoD Briefings 111 v 2a (i). MoD Briefings: Media Speculation 114 2a (ii).

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