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Task Force Kosovo: Adapting Operations to a Changing Security Environment

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by Colonel Michael Ward with Lieutenant-Colonel Ed Gallagher, Major Doug Delaney, and Major Hugh Ferguson Canadian Forces Photo by: Cpl Ken Allan TASK FORCE KOSOVO: ADAPTING OPERATIONS TO A CHANGING SECURITY ENVIRONMENT ithin days of arrival at the air and sea From deployment into Kosovo in June 1999 until the ports of Thessalonika, Greece, on 9 June recent first rotation of Canadian troops, Operation 1999, the units of Task Force Kosovo were “Kinetic” posed a variety of unique challenges. Under engaged in a race against time to link up the auspices of the NATO-led Kosovo Force (KFOR) with 4th (UK) Armoured Brigade to partici- and its partner, the United Nations Mission in Kosovo Wpate in the entry into Kosovo. NATO’s Operation “Joint (UNMIK), the Canadian contingent deployed in both Guardian” had begun. With no notice, on 5 June Yugoslav traditional and non-traditional roles — to provide security president Slobodan Milosevic bowed to demands from the against Yugoslav (Serb) conventional forces, establish international community for a cease-fire and withdrawal of law and order and assist in the delivery of humanitarian Serb troops from this ravaged province. A scant week later, aid. This article will explore important impressions, les- 25,000 troops of General Sir Michael Jackson’s Kosovo sons learned about our participation in this operation, Force (KFOR) were advancing northward to end the brutal and future challenges facing KFOR and UNMIK. oppression of Kosovar Albanians which for months had riveted people around the globe. Supported by National FORCE PREPARATIONS Command and Support elements based in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FRYOM), the Lord Command and Control Strathcona’s Horse Reconnaissance Squadron, the Kosovo Rotary Wing Aviation Unit (KRWAU) and 15 Composite ll Task Force Kosovo units remained under Engineer Squadron played major roles in the entry opera- A Canadian ‘command’ throughout the deployment. tion. By late summer, the 1st Battalion, Princess Patricia’s The reconnaissance, helicopters and infantry were, how- Canadian Light Infantry (PPCLI) Battle Group joined Task ever, detached under ‘operational control’ of HQ Multi- Force Kosovo to round out the Canadian commitment to peace and stability operations in this region of the Balkans. Colonel Michael Ward commanded Task Force Kosovo from March to December 1999. He is Director of Land Strategic Concepts, Canada’s contribution to peace and stability opera- focused on future Army development, at Fort Frontenac, Kingston. Lieutenant-Colonel Gallagher was the Legal Advisor to the tions in Kosovo has been a measure both of a tradition- Commander of Task Force Kosovo. Major Delaney was Battle Group al approach to peace support and of adaption to new and CIMIC Officer in Kosovo. Major Ferguson was the Task Force G2 changing factors in the global security environment. and commanded the National Intelligence Cell in Kosovo. Spring 2000 G Canadian Military Journal 67 National Brigade (Centre), the largest of KFOR’s five Training brigades in Kosovo. This Brigade was led by the UK’s 4th Armoured Brigade until August 1999, when it was ithout doubt, 1 Canadian Mechanized Brigade replaced by the 19th Mechanized Brigade. The engi- WGroup (1 CMBG) was well prepared to generate neers, National Support Element (NSE) and National the majority of the troops for the mission as a result of Command Element (NCE) were kept under national their comprehensive collective training plan. This per- command to provide distinctive Canadian sustainment mitted freedom to deploy units with only minimal mis- support along with command and intelligence links. sion-specific training. The retention of this level of oper- ational capability is expensive, but it is essential to Organization ensure readiness for short or no-notice deployments. This is our core capability, and funding must be dedicat- peration “Kinetic” was designed to provide an ed to ensure that our troops and units maintain this edge. Oinformation operations capability to a coalition formation. The inclusion of Coyotes and Griffon heli- Regular-Reserve Mix copters equipped with a Forward-Looking Infra Red (FLIR) camera offered a capability not typically found eserve augmentation was not planned for the initial at brigade level, and therefore an opportunity to test R deployment. This was an on-call contingency mis- new concepts. The organization to support this capabil- sion without predictable deployment timelines, so only a ity was sufficiently robust and flexible to support rein- few Reservists already on Class B service were included. forcements in the event of changes to the mission. These individuals were well trained and experienced in However, some capabilities were missing. Intelligence the jobs they held within the Contingent. The future direction of the Total Army is clear, and Regulars and Reserves will be integrated, but Reserve employment on missions such as this must be carefully thought-out and managed. A balance of general train- ing and individual capability is required, especially in high-profile or special assignments, and rank equivalency cannot be automatic. For example, on one occa- sion a Reserve officer was deployed to an intelligence operations position in the headquarters of Multinational Brigade (Centre). The job required specialized knowledge and experience of intelligence processes, and allowed rare autonomy to conduct real-world operations — a golden opportunity. Unfortunately, the individual nominated was relatively inexperienced and did not meet the requirements. This resulted in losing a highly advantageous job, losing influence in the planning and execution of operations, reducing our access to information within the HQ, and Canadian Forces Photo by: Sgt David Snashall almost wasted a callout for a willing, support was minimal, consisting initially of only one albeit unqualified individual. On reassignment, the offi- warrant officer. This was a critical shortcoming during cer was placed in a position in a Canadian unit where his the entry into Kosovo, and we were largely ‘in the dark’ employment was more in keeping with his training, until a fully equipped national intelligence cell was where procedures were more familiar, and where his pro- deployed in mid-July. No contingent deployed on oper- fessional development could be managed. ations should be without this capability. As well, we would have benefitted by deploying an electronic war- Preparation of Stores and Equipment fare capability. The attachment of a TRILS/AERIES detachment would have rounded out our information ecause of the contingent nature of the mission, no gathering capability, and would have provided very use- B funds were released to support pre-positioning or ful support to our units and to the Allied headquarters. packing of mission stores until late April 1999. 68 Canadian Military Journal G Spring 2000 Although this was a prudent fiscal precaution, it did not sis had been done, opportunities exploited and risk taken take account of how time consuming a process this is. to ensure that we were ready to link-up and join the When the order to deploy was given, there was a mad advance into Kosovo with 4th Brigade. The later deploy- rush to deliver supplies and pack sea containers in time ment of the 1 PPCLI Battle Group went relatively better for the ship loading in Montreal. Consequently we lost because of our experience the first time around. control of critical stores and equipment, which in turn degraded early operational capability. This is wrong. We OPERATIONS need to devote sufficient funds up front and accept the risk that not all contingency operations will actually be n general, Canadian troops performed admirably, and ordered. This will reduce the potential for failure when I were highly sought after. They were inherently objec- troops must be deployed on short notice. tive and impartial, completely reliable, innovative, flex- ible and adaptable, and thus were able to work with any Deployment nation. Our investment in the development of doctrine over the past five years paid off handsomely. Our infor- nderstandably, strategic deployment posed the mation operations doctrine, operations planning proce- U greatest challenge to mission success. The advance dures and intelligence preparation of the battlefield party’s deployment was disrupted from the beginning, and enabled the execution of operations with better- remained so until after the accelerated arrival of the main equipped Allies, and in fact we were ahead of many of body. Delivery of advance party equipment by AN 124 them in terms of emerging intelligence, surveillance, Antonov and C 130 target acquisition and transport aircraft was a reconnaissance con- near catastrophe. From cepts. Being a junior the first chaulk, break- coalition partner, how- downs interrupted the ever, our detached units flow, and equipment were limited in their was delivered out-of- ability to apply and val- sequence or not at all. In idate some recently- retrospect, this was the fielded doctrinal con- least professional aspect cepts and procedures — of the operation and a missed opportunity. threatened failure at a Although Canadians are very early stage. Given frequently modest and Canada’s remoteness critical of our own from possible opera- capabilities, I came tional theatres, the away from Kosovo con- Canadian Forces must vinced that we have the have better and more- ability, training and reliable strategic doctrine to take a lead- deployment capability. ing role in coalition The accelerated initia- operations, and should tive to procure strategic do so when we can. The air and sea-lift recog- plan to assume com- nize that this is an mand of SFOR’s Multi- essential joint opera- National Division tions capability. The air- (South West) in Bosnia lift of the main body in October 2000 is an went more smoothly. overdue initiative which Aircraft brought in personnel to conduct hasty reception, will affirm our ability to prosecute operations and permit staging, onward movement and integration, and units were us to maintain essential formation-command skills.
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